



**TPG0028A**

**General Business Use**

**Security Target-Lite**

**AT90SO128 (Spyder)**

**inside**  
**SECURE**

**General Business Use**



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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Security target reference

Title: Spyder Security Target  
Version number: A  
Sponsor: [INSIDE SECURE](#)  
Evaluation Scheme: [France \(ANSSI\)](#)  
Evaluator: [SERMA Technologies France](#)

Version	Date	Changes	Author
A	19 Nov 13	First release	Graeme Calder

## 1.2 Purpose

1 This document defines the Security Target of the Spyder project, and is provided to satisfy the Assurance Class ASE Security Target Evaluation as defined in Part 3 [CC\_PART3] of the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4.

## 1.3 References

2 The table below lists only the documents that are referenced in this Security Target to give the user further information. Section 1.4 the TOE overview lists the User Guidance documents applicable to the Security IC Embedded Software Developer. Section 8.2 lists the Standards used to perform the certification of the TOE.

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[TDS]	Spyder Semi-Formal TOE Design
[FSP]	Spyder Semi-Formal Functional Specification
[ARC]	Spyder Security Architecture Description
[COF]	Customer Option Form

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Note: For the correct version of the above documents the user of this document should refer to the TOE Deliverables list (EDL).

## 1.4 TOE Overview

### 1.4.1 TOE Identification

- 3 The Target of Evaluation is a Secure Microcontroller with Cryptographic Software library. The TOE is identified as shown below:


		Identifier (FAU_SAS.1 where applicable)
Part Number	AT90SO128	SN_0 = 0x3D [TD]
Product Identification Number	58U58	
Hardware Revision	F (Lfoundry)	SN_1 = 0x05 [GEN_TD]
	F (UMC)	SN_1 = 0x85 [Gen_TD]
Applicable Inside Toolbox(s)	<b>00.03.1x.xx Family</b> <sup>a</sup>	
	00.03.12.01	0x00031201 <sup>b</sup>
	00.03.11.08	0x00031108
	00.03.10.02	0x00031002
	00.03.14.03	0x00031403

- 4 The TOE is a Secure Microcontroller (Security IC) that may be used in a variety of security applications, including, Banking, Identification, PayTV and embedded systems.
- 5 The increase in the number and complexity of applications in the market of a Secure Microcontroller is reflected in the increase of the level of data security required. The security needs for the TOE can be summarised as being able to counter those who want to defraud, gain unauthorised access to data and control a system utilising the TOE. Therefore it is mandatory to:
- maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of the content of the TOE memories as required by the end application(s)
  - maintain the correct execution of the software residing on the TOE
- 6 This requires that the TOE especially maintains the integrity and the confidentiality of its security functionality.

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<sup>a</sup> The Customer has the option to choose any member of the 00.03.1x.xx family of toolboxes, each toolbox is a subset of the 00.03.12.xx toolbox. This ST clearly states the functions applicable to each toolbox. Further information is given in section 1.4.2.2

<sup>b</sup> The toolbox identification is output by the TOE when the self test function of the toolbox is called

- 
- 7 Protected information is in general secret or integrity sensitive data such as Personal Identification Numbers, Balance Value (Stored Value Cards), and Personal Data Files. Other protected information data representing the access rights; these include any cryptographic algorithms and keys needed for accessing and using the services provided by the system through use of the Security IC.
  - 8 The TOE can be used in smartcard application, a USB token or other devices. The intended environment is very large; and generally once issued the TOE may be stored and used anywhere, generally there is no control applied to the TOE and its operational environment.

## 1.4.2 TOE Definition

### 1.4.2.1 TOE Definition Summary

#### General Features


- High-performance, Low-power 8/16-Bit RISC CPU Core Enhanced RISC Architecture
  - 137 Powerful Instructions (Most Executed in a Single Clock Cycle)
- Low-power IDLE and Power-Down Modes
- Bond pad locations Conforming to ISO 7816-2
- Operating Ranges: from 2.70v to 5.50v
- Compliant with EMV 2000 Specifications; PC Industry Compatible

#### Memory

- 288K Bytes of ROM Program Memory
- 128K Bytes of EEPROM, including 128 OTP Bytes and 384 Bit-addressable Bytes
  - 1 to 128-byte Program/Erase
  - 2.00ms Program, 2.00ms Erase
- 12K Bytes of RAM Memory (10K bytes of CPU RAM, 2K bytes of Ad-X™ RAM, shared with the CPU core)

#### Peripherals

- Ten I/O ports (can be configured to support ISO7816-3, I2C, SPI etc.)
- One ISO 7816 Controller
  - Up to 625 kbps at 5MHz
  - Compliant with T=0 and T=1 Protocols
- One High Speed SPI Controller (master and slave modes)

- 
- One I2C Controller
  - One USB 2.0 Full Speed Interface
  - One Interface detector
  - Programmable Internal Oscillator (Up to 36 MHz for Ad-X and internal CPU clocks)
  - Two 16-bit Timers
  - True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
  - 2-level Interrupt Controller
  - Hardware DES and Triple DES with DPA/DEMA Resistance
  - Hardware AES 128/192/256 Engine DPA/DEMA Resistance
  - Checksum Accelerator
  - Code Signature Module
  - CRC16 and 32 Engine (compliant with ISO/IEC 3309)
  - 32-bit Cryptographic Accelerator (Ad-X for public key Operations): RSA, DSA, ECC, etc.

## Security

- Dedicated Hardware Protection Against SPA/DPA/DEMA/SEMA attacks
- Advanced Protection Against Physical Attack
- Environmental Protection Systems
- Voltage Monitor
- Frequency Monitor
- Temperature Monitor
- Glitch protection
- Light Protection
- Secure Memory Management / Access Protection

## Security IC Embedded Software Developer Guidance Documents

REF	Title	Inside Identifier	Version	Note
[TD]	AT90SO128 Technical Datasheet	TPR0402	C	Hardware Datasheet details the FSP
[GEN_TD]	AT90SC Enhanced Security Technical Datasheet	TPR0255	E	AT90SC Hardware Datasheet
[APP_AD-X]	Ad-X for AT90SC Family	TPR0116	F	Ad-X Hardware Datasheet
[APP_SEC]	Security Recommendations for 0.13 $\mu$ m products - 2	TPR0456	E	General Security recommendations for the TOE
[APP_DES]	Secure Hardware DES/TDES on AT90SC 0.13 $\mu$ m products <sup>a</sup>	TPR0400	J	Hardware TDES recommendations
[APP_AES]	Secure Hardware AES on AT90S)128	TPR0573	B	Hardware AES recommendations
[APP_CSM]	The Code Signature Module for 0.13 $\mu$ m products	TPR0409	C	Datasheet for the Code Signature Module
[APP_RNG]	Generating Random numbers to known standards for 0.13 $\mu$ m products	TPR0468	E	Details how to write an AIS31 driver using the hardware and the AIS31 test routines from the Inside toolbox
[TBX_TD]	Toolbox 00.03.1x.xx on AT90SCxxxxC	TPR0454	D	Toolbox 00.03.1x.xx Datasheet details the FSP for the Toolbox functions
[APP_TBX_SE C]	Secure use of Tbx 00.03.1x.xx on AT90SC	TPR0455	G	Toolbox 00.03.1x.xx family Security recommendations
[WSR]	Wafer saw Recommendations	TPG0079	B	Wafer saw Guidelines
[APP_CUST_T BX]	Efficient use of Ad-X™ for Implementing Cryptographic Operations	TPR0142	E	Guidance for customers who wish to use their own Cryptographic Toolbox

<sup>a</sup> The guidance documents listed as .13 $\mu$ m are also applicable to the .15 $\mu$ m AT90SO128 TOE





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[ACT]

SmartACT User's Manual

TPR0134


D

Security IC developer  
Code entry user  
manual

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## TOE Life Cycle Addresses

Function	Company	Location
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IC Design</li> <li>Dataprep</li> <li>Cryptographic Support Software Development</li> </ul>	Inside Secure (RFO)	Inside Secure Vault-IC Division Zone Industrielle Peynier Rousset 13106 Rousset - FRANCE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IC Design</li> </ul>	Inside Secure (AIX)	Inside Secure Parc du Golf, 350 rue Guilibert Gauthier de la Lauzière, ZI Les Milles, 13856 Aix en Provence
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IC Design</li> </ul>	Inside Secure (EKB)	Inside Secure Vault-IC Division Scottish Enterprise Technology Park East Kilbride - SCOTLAND
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IC Design</li> </ul>	Inside Secure (Nice)	Inside Secure Space Antipolis 9 2323 chemin St-Bernard 06225 Vallauris Cedex
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wafer Fab</li> </ul>	Lfoundry	Lfoundry Rousset Zone Industrielle 13106 Rousset Cedex France
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wafer Fab</li> </ul>	UMC	Fab 8C, 8D No. 3, Li-Hsin 2nd Road, Hsinchu Science Park, Hsin-Chu Taiwan
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wafer Fab</li> </ul>	TSMC	No. 8, Li-Hsin Rd. VI, Hsinchu Science Park, Hsinchu, Taiwan 300-78, R. O. C.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mask Shop</li> </ul>	Toppan Dresden	Toppan Photomasks Europe Rahnitzer Allee 9 01109 DRESDEN - GERMANY
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mask Shop</li> </ul>	TCE	1127-3 Hopin Road Padeh City Taoyuan Taiwan 30080
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mask Shop</li> </ul>	Toppan Corbeil	Toppan Photomasks Europe 224, boulevard John Kennedy 91105 CORBEIL-ESSONNES



		FRANCE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mask Shop</li> </ul>	Compugraphics	Compugraphics International Limited Newark Road North Eastfield Industrial Estate KY7 4NT Scotland
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Test Centre</li> </ul>	ASE	Advanced Semiconductor Engineering 26 Chin 3 <sup>rd</sup> Rd Nantze Export Processing Zone Kaohsiung Taiwan
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Test Centre</li> </ul>	UTAC	Address: 73 Moo 5, Bangsamak, Bangpakong Chachoengsao 24180, THAILAND
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Test Centre</li> </ul>	Chipbond	CHIPBOND TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION KAOHSIUNG BRANCH NO.5, SOUTH 6TH ROAD, K.E.P.Z. KAOHSIUNG, TAIWAN, R.O.C
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Wafer Saw</li> </ul>	DISCO	Kirchheim bei Munich - GERMANY

### 1.4.2.2 TOE Detailed Description

9 Figure 1 gives an overview of the AT90SO128 device (Spyder)





Figure 1: Block Diagram of the AT90SO128 TOE

10 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Secure Microcontroller (Security IC) it is composed of a processing unit, security components, I/O port, ROM, EEPROM, and RAM memories.



11 The TOE will contain software elements during its life cycle. This software falls into 3 distinct categories:

- Test Software
- Cryptographic Support Software
- Security IC Embedded Software

12 **Test Software:** Test software includes the test programs that are produced as evidence to support the ATE class for the evaluation of the TOE. INSIDE Engineering ROM is provided to facilitate testing of the device, this Engineering ROM is applicable to Phases 2 and 3 of the TOE life Cycle. To further aid testing of the TOE, additional test programs may be loaded into the EEPROM. In addition to the Test software the TOE also includes dedicated hardware to perform testing. To allow the ITSEF to perform testing of the TOE a version of the TOE is delivered with an INSIDE Engineering ROM (it should be noted this also includes the **Cryptographic Support Software** detailed below), and some simple test routines stored in the EEPROM. It must be noted that this **Engineering ROM and associated test software is not part of the TOE (apart from the Cryptographic Support Software which is part of the TOE)**. The entry and abuse of test modes (hardware) must be verified after TOE Delivery: this is evaluated according to the Common Criteria assurance family AVA\_VAN. Refer to TOE Summary Specification for further information.

13 **Cryptographic Support Software (Toolbox):** The TOE where applicable also consists of a Cryptographic Toolbox provided by INSIDE. This Toolbox is part of the ROM embedded on the TOE within the Secure Core. The user of this document should refer to the TOE Summary specification of this document for the full details. **The INSIDE Toolbox is considered part of the TOE.**

14 **Security IC Embedded Software:** The final version of the AT90SO128 device also includes embedded software, this final version of the product is referred to as a Composite Product. The Security IC Embedded Software can be stored in non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). But some parts of it (called supplements for the Security IC Embedded Software, refer to [PP]) may also be stored in non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). All data managed by the Security IC Embedded Software is called User Data. In addition, Pre-personalisation Data [PP] belongs to the User Data.

15 The Composite Product comprises


- the TOE
- the Security IC Embedded Software comprising
  - Hard-coded Security IC Embedded Software (normally stored in ROM)
  - Soft-coded Security IC Embedded Software (normally stored in EEPROM)
- User Data (especially personalisation data and other data generated and used by the Security IC Embedded Software)

- 16 The **Security IC Embedded Software** and the User Data are developed separately to the hardware TOE by the Inside Customers. Therefore **the Security IC Embedded Software is not part of the TOE.**

**Note:** even though the Security IC Embedded Software is not part of the TOE, the documentations delivered as evidence for the AGD Class (**Guidance Documentation**) aid the developer to ensure the correct operation of the device and more importantly the security functionality of the device and **is therefore part of the TOE.**

### 1.4.2.3 Cryptographic Toolbox Software

- 17 The TOE contains a member of the 00.03.1x.xx Inside Toolbox family. The 00.03.1x.xx family consists of 4 variants. The 4 variants are related to each other as shown.



- 18 Toolbox 00.03.12.xx contains the full set of cryptographic functions, 00.03.11.xx is a subset of 00.03.12.xx. 00.03.10.xx is a subset 00.03.11.xx. 00.03.14.xx is a subset of 00.03.10.xx. Therefore all the functions available in the 00.03.14.xx are available in 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx and 00.03.12.xx and so on.

- 19 Therefore, the TOE comprises

- the circuitry of the IC (hardware including the physical memories)

- configuration data, initialisation data related to the IC Dedicated Software and the behaviour of the security functionality <sup>a</sup>
- the associated guidance documentation
- Cryptographic Support Software

The TOE is designed, and generated by the TOE Manufacturer

- 20 The TOE is intended to be used for a Secure Microcontroller product (Security IC), independent of the physical interface and the way it is packaged. Generally, a Security IC product may include other optional elements (such as specific hardware components, batteries, capacitors, antennae) but these are not in the scope of this Security Target.
- 21 Note that the Security IC is usually packaged. However the way it is packaged is not specified here.

### 1.4.3 TOE life cycle

- 22 This security Target is fully conformant to the claimed PP, the full details of the Security IC life cycle is shown in the PP. This Security Target gives a short summary of the information given in the PP. Information is also given within this Security Target to expand on the applicable phases of the life cycle of the TOE.

#### 1.4.3.1 Overview of the Composite Product Life Cycle

- 23 The complex development and manufacturing processes of a Composite Product can be separated into seven distinct phases. The phases 2 and 3 of the Composite Product life cycle cover the TOE (IC) development and production:
- The IC Development (Phase 2):
    - IC design
    - IC Dedicated Software development (Security IC Embedded Software **not part of the TOE**, Cryptographic Toolbox Software **part of the TOE**.)
  - The IC Manufacturing (Phase 3):
    - integration and photomask fabrication
    - IC production
    - IC testing
    - preparation
    - Pre-personalisation if necessary
- 24 In addition, five important stages have to be considered in the Composite Product life cycle:

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<sup>a</sup> which may also be coded in specific circuitry of the IC; for a definition refer to ([PP] glossary 7.4)



- Security IC Embedded Software Development (Phase 1) **(not part of the TOE)**
- the IC Packaging (Phase 4)
- the Composite Product finishing process, preparation and shipping to the personalisation line for the Composite Product (Composite Product Integration Phase 5)
- the Composite Product personalisation and testing stage where the User Data is loaded into the Security IC's memory (Personalisation Phase 6)
- the Composite Product usage by its issuers and consumers (Operational Usage Phase 7) which may include loading and other management of applications in the field





Figure 2: Definition of “TOE Delivery” and responsible Parties

- 25 The Security IC Embedded Software is developed outside the TOE development in Phase 1. The TOE is developed in Phase 2 and produced in Phase 3. Then the TOE can be delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice).
- 26 In the following the term “TOE Delivery” (refer to Figure 2) is uniquely used to indicate
- after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice).





-The Protection Profile uniquely uses the term “TOE Manufacturer” (refer to Figure 2) which includes the following roles:

- the IC Developer (Phase 2) and the IC Manufacturer (Phase 3)

The TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice).

27 Hence the “TOE Manufacturer” comprises all roles beginning with Phase 2 and before “TOE Delivery”. Starting with “TOE Delivery” another party takes over the control of the TOE.

28 The Protection Profile uniquely uses the term “Composite Product Manufacturer” which includes all roles (outside TOE development and manufacturing) except the End-consumer as user of the Composite Product (refer to Figure 2) which are the following:

- Security IC Embedded Software development (Phase 1)
- the IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice)
- the Composite Product Manufacturer (Phase 5) and the Personaliser (Phase 6).

#### 1.4.3.2 Phases 2 and 3 of the TOE Life Cycle

##### 1.4.3.3 Phase 2 IC Development


29 The development of the TOE is applicable to phase 2 of the life cycle and can be split into two sections:

- IC design
- Cryptographic Support Software Development

30 **IC design:** IC design takes place across the Inside Design locations. The main project design team is located in RFO but some modules or libraries may originate in any of the Inside Design centres. Any sharing of information (data transfer) is achieved through a secure FTP link.

31 **Cryptographic Support Software Development:** The Toolbox development takes place within the Inside Design Centre in France (RFO).

32 To ensure security of the TOE development, IC design takes place within a secure environment, access is controlled with full traceability. A dedicated security person is on site at all times. The IC and Toolbox development is achieved using appropriate development tools running on a secure network, all access to tools and data are controlled using appropriate restrictions and passwords, the full details are shown within the evidence provided for the ALC class. On completion of the design database, the data is transferred from the Design centre to RFO Dataprep to allow for generation of the Photomasks used to manufacture the TOE. Delivery once again is through a secure FTP link.



#### 1.4.3.4 Phase 3 IC Manufacturing

33 The IC manufacturing falls into three sections

- Dataprep and Mask Shop
- Wafer Fab
- Testing

34 **Dataprep and Mask Shop:** The design database is delivered from the design centre to the Dataprep team within Inside Rousset France (RFO). This delivery and acceptance process and associated outputs are delivered as part of the evidence provided for the ALC class. The Photomasks used to manufacture the TOE are created by the Mask Shop. Data is transferred from RFO to the Mask Shop by secure FTP. Once created the Photomasks are transferred to the Wafer Fab by a secure approved carrier. This transfer includes tamper evidence and full traceability.

35 **Wafer Fab:** The TOE is manufactured within a Wafer Fabrication facility. The fabrication process occurs within the secure facility, as with the protection mechanisms in place in Phase 2 access to the fabrication facility is restricted. The batches are controlled using a tracking database to ensure that there is traceability of wafers at all times (including rejected wafers/dies). On completion of the fabrication process the wafers are transferred to the test facility for test and pre-personalisation. Transfer is by a secure carrier, includes tamper evidence, and has full traceability.

36 **Testing:** This stage of the process includes production testing (refer to ATE evidence), pre-personalisation, configuration of the security functionality. The test facility has a controlled environment, access is restricted with full traceability, and dedicated security personnel are on site at all times. The wafers are then shipped to a Wafer sawing facility for thinning and saw.

### 1.4.3.5 Modes of Operation and life Cycle Phases

37 The TOE has three distinct modes of operation

<b>Test Mode</b>	This mode is designed to allow <b>authenticated test engineers</b> access to Test features of the TOE. This mode of operation is applicable up to the end of Phase 1, 2 and 3 of the life cycle. This mode of operation is disabled by wafer saw.
<b>Secure Test Return</b>	This mode is designed to allow <b>authenticated test engineers</b> access to a <b>subset</b> of the Test features of the TOE. This mode of operation is applicable to the full life cycle of the TOE.
<b>User Mode</b>	This is the Mode of operation that the end Security IC (composite product) is intended to be used in. This mode of operation is dependent on the ROM and NVM code loaded. This mode of operation is available throughout the life cycle of the TOE.

### 1.4.3.6 Composite Product Manufacturer Phases of the Life Cycle


38 Although the pertinent phases of the Life cycle associated with the TOE and this Security Target are Phases 2 and 3; It should be noted that parts of the TOE and this Security Target relate to Phase 1 of the TOE life Cycle. The user of this document should note the following:

- Tools and Emulator
- Guidance Documents
- Code Entry (Security IC Embedded Software Delivery)

39 **Tools and Emulator:** To aid with the development of the Security IC Embedded Software, specific tools and an emulator configured to simulate the AT90SO128 and Toolbox can be delivered by Inside. The emulator and tools are treated with the same level of protection by Inside as the final IC.

40 **Guidance Documents:** To ensure that the end Composite Product is fully protected and that the SFR enforcing mechanisms cannot be tampered with or bypassed, user guidance is delivered in Phase 1 to the Security IC Embedded Software Developer. Delivery procedures are in place to ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive information contained in this documentation set, including secure courier delivery with traceability is followed. Also all parties are covered with NDA before any information is delivered (this also is applicable to Tools and Emulator).

41 **Code Entry:** Guidance documents and a delivery tool (smartACT) are delivered to the Security IC Embedded Software Developer. The guidance document [ACT] describes how to use the smartACT tool and also how to securely transmit the final code to Inside for embedding on the final device. As part of the code delivery a



Customer Option Form [COF] is also delivered to the Code entry team in EKB, this gives details of the options that the customer may choose for the AT90SO128 device.

- 42 Guidance Documents and Code Entry documents are also delivered as evidence for the AGD class, to allow the ITSEF to use these as part of the search for vulnerabilities during the Vulnerability Assessment part of the evaluation.



## 2 Conformance Claims

43 This chapter contains details the conformance claims for the TOE.

### 2.1 CC Conformance Claim

44 This Security Target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.

45 Furthermore it claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The extended Security Functional Requirements are defined in the Protection Profile.

### 2.2 Package Claim

46 The TOE is evaluated to EAL5 level augmented with AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2.

### 2.3 PP Claim

47 This Security Target is strictly conformant to the Protection Profile BSI-PP-0035 “Security IC Platform Protection Profile”

### 2.4 PP Refinements

48 The refinements to the PP within this security target relate to the Cryptographic Operations. The refinements and additions are taken from “Smartcard Integrated Circuit Augmentations” Version 1.0, March 2002, registered under the German Certification Scheme BSI-AUG-2002 [AUG].

49 Refinements are made to the following Security objectives for the environment:

- OE.Plat-Appl
- OE.Resp-Appl

### 2.5 PP Additions


50 The following organisational security policies, security objectives, and security functional requirements have been added.

- P.Add-Functions
- A.Key-Function
- O.Add-Functions
- FCS\_COP.1

### 2.6 PP Claims Rationale

51 The differences between this Security Target and the BSI-PP-0035, that is the addition of:

- Organisational Security Policy

- 
- Assumptions
  - Security Objectives for the TOE
  - Security Functional Requirements for the TOE

52 Do not affect the conformance claim of this Security Target. The Rationale for the additions is given in section 6 and section 7 of this ST.

53 For each addition the appropriate section clearly shows the addition, that is, section 3, Section 4 and section 6.

54 Although the PP recommends a EAL4 certification level with augmentations, the TOE claims an EAL5 plus certification level. This ST maintains the conformance to BSI-PP-0035, the rationale for this is given in section 5.

55 All the Protection Profile requirements have been shown to be satisfied within this Security Target.

### 3 Security Problem Definition

56 This chapter describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended to be used. As this security target is conformant to BSI-PP-0035, this section contains only the relevant details and a summary where applicable. For complete details refer to the Protection Profile.

#### 3.1 Description of Assets

##### Assets regarding the Threats

57 The assets (related to standard functionality) to be protected are

- the User Data
- the Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation
- the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software

58 The user (consumer) of the TOE places value upon the assets related to high-level security concerns:

SC1 integrity of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories)

SC2 confidentiality of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories)

SC3 correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software

59 According to this Protection Profile there is the following high-level security concern related to security service:

SC4 deficiency of random numbers.

60 To be able to protect these assets the TOE shall protect its security functionality. Therefore critical information about the TOE shall be protected. Critical information includes:

- logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, and configuration data
- Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data, specific development aids, test and characterisation related data, material for software development support, and photomasks

Such information and the ability to perform manipulations assist in threatening the above assets.

### 3.2 Threats

- 61 The threats are listed in PP-BSI-0035, only a summary is provided in this Security target.
- 62 The standard threats to the TOE are shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Standard Threats

- 63 The threats relating to specific security services are shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Threats related to security service

- 64 The Security IC Embedded Software may be required to contribute to preventing the threats. At least it must not undermine the security provided by the TOE. For detail refer to the assumptions regarding the Security IC Embedded Software specified in Section 3.4
- 65 The above security concerns are derived from considering the operational usage by the end-consumer (Phase 7) since
- Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are covered by assumptions and



- the development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy.

### 3.3 Organisational Security Policies

66 The following Figure 5 shows the policies applied in this Security Target.




Figure 5: Policies

67 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” as specified below.

**P.Process-TOE**      Protection during TOE Development and Production

An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification.

68 The accurate identification is introduced at the end of the production test in phase 3. Therefore the production environment must support this unique identification.

69 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Additional Specific Security Functionality (P.Add-Functions)” as specified below.

**P.Add-Functions**      Additional Specific Security Functionality

The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the Security IC Embedded Software:

- TDES <sup>a</sup>
- AES

<sup>a</sup> The functions TDES and AES are based on a hardware dedicated part of the TOE and is applicable to all versions of the TOE

- RSA without CRT <sup>a \*</sup>
- RSA with CRT \*
- Miller Rabin algorithm \*
- Secure Hash (SHA) <sup>+b</sup>
- ECDSA over  $Z_p$  <sup>‡ c</sup>
- EC-DH over  $Z_p$  <sup>‡</sup>
- ECDSA over  $GF(2n)$  <sup>^ d</sup>
- EC-DH over  $GF(2n)$  <sup>^</sup>

### 3.4 Assumptions

70 Full details of the assumptions are listed in PP-BSI-0035, only a summary is provided in this Security Target. Full details are given for the additional assumption taken from [AUG].

71 The following Figure 6 shows the assumptions applied in this Security Target.





Figure 6: Assumptions

<sup>a</sup> The functions marked \* are applicable to toolbox versions 00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

<sup>b</sup> The functions marked + are applicable to toolbox versions 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

<sup>c</sup> The functions marked ‡ are applicable to toolbox versions 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

<sup>d</sup> The functions marked ^ are applicable to toolbox version 00.03.12.xx



72 Appropriate “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Sec-IC)” must be ensured after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the delivery to Phase 7 as specified below.

A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation

It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).

This means that the Phases after TOE Delivery (refer to Section 1.4.3) are assumed to be protected appropriately. For a list of assets to be protected see below.


73 The information and material produced and/or processed by the Security IC Embedded Software Developer in Phase 1 and by the Composite Product Manufacturer can be grouped as follows:

- the Security IC Embedded Software including specifications, implementation and related documentation
- pre-personalisation and personalisation data including specifications of formats and memory areas, test related data
- the User Data and related documentation
- material for software development support

74 The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while developing this software in Phase 1 as specified below.

A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform

The Security IC Embedded Software is designed so that the requirements from the following documents are met: (i) TOE guidance documents (refer to the Common Criteria assurance class AGD) such as the hardware data sheet, and the hardware application notes, and (ii) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security IC Embedded Software as documented in the certification report.



75 The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing this software in Phase 1 as specified below.

A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data

All User Data is owned by the Security IC Embedded Software. Therefore, it must be assumed that security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as defined for its specific application context.

76 The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Usage of key-dependent Functions (A.Key-Function)” while developing this software in Phase 1 as specified below.

A.Key-Function Usage of Key-dependent Functions

Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Security IC Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage attacks (as described under T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced).

Note that here the routines which may compromise keys when being executed are part of the Security IC Embedded Software. In contrast to this the threats T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced address (i) the cryptographic routines which are part of the TOE and (ii) the processing of User Data including cryptographic keys.



## 4 Security Objectives

77 The full details of the Security Objectives are listed in PP-BSI-0035, only a summary is provided in this Security target.

### 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

78 The user has the following standard high-level security goals related to the assets:

SG1 maintain the integrity of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (when being executed/processed and when being stored in the TOE's memories) as well as

SG2 maintain the confidentiality of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (when being processed and when being stored in the TOE's memories).

The Security IC may not distinguish between User Data which are public known or kept confidential. Therefore the security IC shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, unless the Security IC Embedded Software chooses to disclose or modify it.

In particular, integrity of the Security IC Embedded Software means that it is correctly being executed which includes the correct operation of the TOE's functionality. Though the Security IC Embedded Software (normally stored in the ROM) will in many cases not contain secret data or algorithms, it must be protected from being disclosed, since for instance knowledge of specific implementation details may assist an attacker.

SG3 maintain the correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.

79 These standard high-level security goals in the context of the security problem definition build the starting point for the definition of security objectives as required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 7). Note that the integrity of the TOE is a means to reach these objectives.




Figure 7: Standard Security Objectives

80 According to this Security Target there is the following high-level security goal related to specific functionality:

SG4 provide true random numbers.

81 The additional high-level security considerations are refined below by defining security objectives as required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 8).




Figure 8: Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality



## Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality (referring to SG4)

82 The TOE shall provide “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” [AUG] as specified below.

O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality

The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the Security IC Embedded Software:

- TDES <sup>a</sup>
- AES
- RSA without CRT <sup>b \*</sup>
- RSA with CRT <sup>\*</sup>
- Miller Rabin algorithm <sup>\*</sup>
- Secure Hash (SHA) <sup>+c</sup>
- ECDSA over  $Z_p$  <sup>‡ d</sup>
- EC-DH over  $Z_p$  <sup>‡</sup>
- ECDSA over  $GF(2n)$  <sup>^ e</sup>
- EC-DH over  $GF(2n)$  <sup>^</sup>

### 4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development Environment (not part of TOE)

83 The development of the Security IC Embedded Software is outside the development and manufacturing of the TOE (cf. section 1.4.3). The Security IC Embedded Software defines the operational use of the TOE. This section describes the security objectives for the operational environment enforced by the Security IC Embedded Software.

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<sup>a</sup> The functions TDES and AES are based on a hardware dedicated part of the TOE and is applicable to all versions of the TOE

<sup>b</sup> The functions marked \* are applicable to toolbox versions 00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

<sup>c</sup> The functions marked + are applicable to toolbox versions 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

<sup>d</sup> The functions marked ‡ are applicable to toolbox versions 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

<sup>e</sup> The functions marked ^ are applicable to toolbox version 00.03.12.xx



## Phase 1

- 84 The Security IC Embedded Software shall provide “Usage of Hardware Platform (OE.Plat-Appl)” as specified below.

OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform

To ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the Security IC Embedded Software shall be designed so that the requirements from the following documents are met: (i) hardware data sheet for the TOE, (ii) data sheet of the IC Dedicated Software of the TOE, (iii) TOE application notes, other guidance documents, and (iv) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security IC Embedded Software as referenced in the certification report.

The TOE supports cipher schemes as additional specific security functionality. If required the Security IC Embedded Software shall use the cryptographic services of the TOE and their interface as specified. When key-dependent functions implemented in the Security IC Embedded Software are just being executed, the Security IC Embedded Software must provide protection against disclosure of confidential data (User Data) stored and/or processed in the TOE by using the methods described under “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” and “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)” [AUG].

- 85 The Security IC Embedded Software shall provide “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)” as specified below.

OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data

Security relevant User Data (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as required by the security needs of the specific application context.

For example the Security IC Embedded Software will not disclose security relevant User Data to unauthorised users or processes when communicating with a terminal.

By definition, cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are User Data. The Security IC Embedded Software shall treat this data appropriately, use only proper secret keys (chosen from a large key space) as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of the cryptographic operation.

This means that keys are treated as confidential as soon as they are generated. The keys must be unique with a very high probability, as well as cryptographically strong. For example, it must be ensured that it is not practical to derive the private key from a public key if asymmetric algorithms are used. If keys are imported into the TOE and/or derived from other keys, quality and confidentiality must be maintained. This implies that appropriate key management has to be realised in the environment [AUG].





### 4.3 Security Objectives for the operational Environment

#### TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6

- 86 Appropriate “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (OE.Process-Sec-IC)” must be ensured after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phases 6, as well as during the delivery to Phase 7 as specified below.

OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing

Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).

This means that Phases after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 (refer to Section 1.4.3) must be protected appropriately. For a preliminary list of assets to be protected refer to (Section 3.4, A.Process-Sec-IC).

## 4.4 Security Objectives Rationale

87 Table 1 below shows how the assumptions, threats, and organisational security policies are addressed by the objectives. The text following after the table justifies this in detail.

Assumption, Threat or Organisational Security Policy	Security Objective	Notes
A.Plat-Appl	OE.Plat-Appl	Phase 1
A.Resp-Appl	OE.Resp-Appl	Phase 1
A.Key-Function	OE.Resp-Appl OE.Plat-Appl	Phase 1
P.Process-TOE	O.Identification	Phase 2 – 3 optional Phase 4
A.Process-Sec-IC	OE.Process-Sec-IC	Phase 5 – 6 optional Phase 4
T.Leak-Inherent	O.Leak-Inherent	
T.Phys-Probing	O.Phys-Probing	
T.Malfunction	O.Malfunction	
T.Phys-Manipulation	O.Phys-Manipulation	
T.Leak-Forced	O.Leak-Forced	
T.Abuse-Func	O.Abuse-Func	
T.RND	O.RND	
P.Add-Functions	O.Add-Functions	

Table 1: Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies


88 The justification related to the assumption “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” is as follows:


89 Since OE.Plat-Appl requires the Security IC Embedded Software developer to implement those measures assumed in A.Plat-Appl, the assumption is covered by the objective.

90 The justification related to the assumption “Usage of Key-dependent Functions (A.Key-Function)” is as follows:

91 Since OE.Plat-Appl and OE.Resp-Appl requires the Security IC Embedded Software developer to implement those measures assumed in A.Key-Function, the assumption is covered by the objective.

92 The justification related to the assumption “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” is as follows:

- 
- 93 Since OE.Resp-Appl requires the developer of the Security IC Embedded Software to implement measures as assumed in A.Resp-Appl, the assumption is covered by the objective.
- 94 The justification related to the organisational security policy “Protection during TOE Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” is as follows:
- 95 O.Identification requires that the TOE has to support the possibility of a unique identification. The unique identification can be stored on the TOE. Since the unique identification is generated by the production environment, it must support the integrity of the generated unique identification. The technical and organisational security measures that ensure the security of the development environment and production environment are evaluated based on the assurance measures that are part of the evaluation. For a list of material produced and processed by the TOE Manufacturer refer to paragraph 60. All listed items and the associated development and production environments are subject of the evaluation. Therefore, the organisational security policy P.Process-TOE is covered by this objective, as far as organisational measures are concerned.
- 96 The justification related to the assumption “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Sec-IC)” is as follows:
- 97 Since OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the Composite Product Manufacturer to implement those measures assumed in A.Process-Sec-IC, the assumption is covered by this objective.
- 98 The justification related to the threats “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)”, “Physical Probing (T.Phys-Probing)”, “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress (T.Malfunction)”, “Physical Manipulation (T.Phys-Manipulation)”, “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)”, “Abuse of Functionality (T.Abuse-Func)” and “Deficiency of Random Numbers (T.RND)” is as follows:
- 99 For all threats the corresponding objectives (refer to Table 1) are stated in a way that directly corresponds to the description of the threat (refer to Section 3.2). It is clear from the description of each objective (refer to Section 4.1), that the corresponding threat is removed if the objective is valid. More specifically, in every case the ability to use the attack method successfully is countered, if the objective holds.
- 100 The justification related to the security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” is as follows:
- 101 Since O.Add-Functions requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by P.Add-Functions, the organizational security policy is covered by the objective.
- 102 Nevertheless the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced define how to implement the specific security functionality required by P.Add-Functions (Note that these objectives support that the specific security functionality is provided in a secure way as expected from P.Add-Functions). Especially O.Leak-Inherent and O.Leak-Forced refer to the protection of confidential data (User Data or TSF Data (section 7.1) in general. User Data are also processed by the specific security functionality required by P.Add-Functions.

- 
- 103 The following text gives details of the clarification added to OE.Plat-Appl. If required the Security IC Embedded Software shall use these cryptographic services of the TOE and their interface as specified. In addition, the Security IC Embedded Software must implement functions which perform operations on keys (if any) in such a manner that they do not disclose information about confidential data. This addition ensures that the assumption A.Plat-Appl is still covered by the objective OE-Plat-Appl although additional functions are being supported according to O.Add-Functions.
  - 104 The following text gives details of the clarification added to OE.Resp-Appl. By definition cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys, are defined as User Data. So, the Security IC Embedded Software will protect such data if required and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation. Strength and confidentiality must be maintained for keys that are imported and/or derived from other keys. This implies that appropriate key management has to be realised in the environment. These measures make sure that the assumption A.Resp-Appl is still covered by the security objective OE.Resp-Appl although additional functions are being supported according to P.Add-Functions.
  - 105 The justification of the additional policy (P.Add-Functions) and assumption (A.Add-Functions) do not contradict the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for assumptions, policy and threats defined in the PP and within this Security Target.



## 5 Extended Components Definition

106 The extended components:

- FCS\_RNG.1
- FMT\_LIM.1
- FMT\_LIM.2
- FAU\_SAS.1

107 Are defined within the Protection Profile [PP] that this Security Target is strictly conformant to.

## 6 IT Security Requirements

108 The standard Security Requirements are shown in Figure 9. These security components are listed and explained below.




Figure 9: Standard Security Requirements

109 The Security Functional Requirements related to Specific Functionality are shown in Figure 10. These security functional components are listed and explained below.




Figure 10: Security Functional Requirements related to Specific Functionality

## 6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE

110 In order to define the Security Functional Requirements Part 2 of the Common Criteria was used. However, some Security Functional Requirements have been refined (please refer to the Protection Profile [PP]).

### Malfunctions

111 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2)” as specified below.

**FRU\_FLT.2** Limited fault tolerance

Hierarchical to: FRU\_FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerance

FRU\_FLT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE’s capabilities when the following failures occur: ***exposure to operating conditions which are not detected according to the requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1)<sup>a</sup>***.

Dependencies: FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state.

**Refinement:** The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures for the “circumstances” defined above.

112 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1)” as specified below.

**FPT\_FLS.1** Failure with preservation of secure state

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FPT\_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: ***exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur<sup>b</sup>***.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**Refinement:** The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures for the “circumstances” defined above.

---

<sup>a</sup> The TOE operates in a stable way within this operating window, this is verified during the development and manufacturing phase of the life cycle. This is verified by the ITSEF during the ATE Assurance Class analysis.

<sup>b</sup> TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT details the operating conditions that are not tolerated by the TOE (namely Voltage and temperature out of bounds, and internal frequency following below a defined level). The TOE takes action through TSF\_AUDIT\_ACTION to ensure the TOE fails in a secure state.

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**Refinement Note**

Environmental conditions include but are not limited to power supply, clock, and other external signals (e.g. reset signal) necessary for the TOE operation.

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**Abuse of Functionality**

113 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FMT\_LIM.1** Limited capabilities

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FMT\_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: ***Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks<sup>a</sup>.***

Dependencies: FMT\_LIM.2 Limited availability.

114 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FMT\_LIM.2** Limited availability

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FMT\_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced: ***Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks<sup>b</sup>.***

Dependencies: FMT\_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.

---

<sup>a</sup> TSF\_TEST details the Limited capability and availability policy.

<sup>b</sup> TSF\_TEST details the Limited capability and availability policy.



115 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU\_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FAU\_SAS.1** Audit storage

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FAU\_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide ***the test process before TOE Delivery<sup>a</sup>*** with the capability to store ***the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data and/or supplements of the Security IC Embedded Software<sup>b</sup>*** in the ***Non-Volatile Memory***.

### Physical Manipulation and Probing

116 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT\_PHP.3)” as specified below.

**FPT\_PHP.3** Resistance to physical attack

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FPT\_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist ***physical manipulation and physical probing<sup>c</sup>*** to the ***TSF<sup>d</sup>*** by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

**Refinement:** **The TSF will implement appropriate mechanisms to continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TSF can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that security functional requirements are enforced. Hence, “automatic response” means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.**

Note: The TOE provides the ability to perform an automatic response when a violation is detected. To allow the Security IC Embedded Software developer to choose an appropriate response the TOE allows some configuration of this response mechanism (refer to TSF\_AUDIT\_ACTION). Further details of the automatic response mechanisms can be found in [GEN\_TD] (section 8.1 Violation reactions).

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<sup>a</sup> The code entry process allows the Security IC Embedded Software developer to deliver pre-personalisation data, details are given in the smartACT manual [ACT]. Some configuration of the TOE is allowed using the [COF].

<sup>b</sup> The Security IC Embedded Software Developer may deliver data during the code entry process [ACT].

<sup>c</sup> Direct Probing, manipulation by operating the TOE, out with the specified operating conditions [TD].

<sup>d</sup> The TSF are detailed in TOE Summary Specification Section.



## Leakage

117 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic internal transfer protection (FDP\_ITT.1)” as specified below.

**FDP\_ITT.1** Basic internal transfer protection

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FDP\_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **Data Processing Policy**<sup>a</sup> to prevent the **disclosure or modification** of user data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

**Refinement:** **The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as physically-separated parts of the TOE.**

118 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT\_ITT.1)” as specified below.

**FPT\_ITT.1** Basic internal TSF data transfer protection

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FPT\_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from **disclosure or modification** when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**Refinement:** **The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as separated parts of the TOE.**

This requirement is equivalent to FDP\_ITT.1 above but refers to TSF data instead of User Data. Therefore, it should be understood as to refer to the same **Data Processing Policy** defined under FDP\_IFC.1 below.

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<sup>a</sup> The user of this document should refer to TSF\_LEAK\_PROTECT for the SFP: Data Processing Policy

119 The TOE shall meet the requirement “ Subset information flow control (FDP\_IFC.1)” as specified below:

**FDP\_IFC.1** Subset information flow control

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FDP\_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **Data Processing Policy<sup>a</sup>** on **all confidential data when they are processed or transferred by the TOE or by the Security IC Embedded Software<sup>b</sup>**.

Dependencies: FDP\_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

120 The following Security Function Policy (SFP) **Data Processing Policy** is defined for the requirement “ Subset information flow control (FDP\_IFC.1)”:

User Data and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except when the Security IC Embedded Software decides to communicate the User Data via an external interface. The protection shall be applied to confidential data only but without the distinction of attributes controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software.

## Random Numbers

121 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS\_RNG.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FCS\_RNG.1** Random number generation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a **physical** random number generator that implements **total failure test of the random source, and online test capability**.

FCS\_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet **AIS31 Class P2 quality metric**.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

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<sup>a</sup> The user of this document should refer to TSF\_LEAK\_PROTECT for the SFP: Data Processing Policy

<sup>b</sup> The sensitive information that must be protected includes information when transferred from one memory location to another by the user or Security IC Embedded Software or being operated on by the hardware processors. This information must be protected as it would allow an attacker to gain knowledge of the functions of the TOE TSF, or gain access to cryptographic key information.



## Cryptography

122 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic Operation (FCS\_COP.1)” as specified below.

**FCS\_COP.1/TDES** Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **hardware TDES encryption and decryption** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES)** and cryptographic key sizes: **112-bit cryptographic key sizes** that meet the following: **E-D-E two-key triple-encryption implementation of the Data Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 46-3, 25<sup>th</sup> October 1999<sup>a</sup>**.

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

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### Note on TDES

TDES Cryptographic operation based on a hardware dedicated part of the TOE and is applicable to all versions of the TOE

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<sup>a</sup> E-D-E =The simplest variant of TDES operates as follows:  $DES(k_3;DES(k_2;DES(k_1;M)))$ , where M is the message block to be encrypted and k1, k2, and k3 are DES keys. This variant is commonly known as EEE because all three DES operations are encryptions. In order to simplify interoperability between DES and TDES the middle step is usually replaced with decryption (EDE mode):  $DES(k_3;DES^{-1}(k_2;DES(k_1;M)))$  and so a single DES encryption with key k can be represented as TDES-EDE with  $k_1 = k_2 = k_3 = k$ . The choice of decryption for the middle step does not affect the security of the algorithm.

**FCS\_COP.1/AES** Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **hardware AES encryption and decryption** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)** and cryptographic key sizes: **128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit cryptographic key sizes** that meet the following **FIPS 197 November 26, 2001**.

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

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**Note on AES** AES Cryptographic operation based on a hardware dedicated part of the TOE and is applicable to all versions of the TOE

---

**FCS\_COP.1/SHA-1** Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **data signing** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **SHA-1** and cryptographic key sizes: **no cryptographic key size** that meet the following: **Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-2, 2002 August 1**.

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

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**Note on SHA-1** SHA-1 Cryptographic operation is only applicable to versions of the TOE including the following Inside Toolboxes: 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

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**FCS\_COP.1/SHA-224** Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **data signing** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **SHA-224** and cryptographic key sizes: **no cryptographic key size** that meet the following: **Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-2, 2002 August 1.**

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

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**Note on SHA-224**

SHA-224 Cryptographic operation is only applicable to versions of the TOE including the following Inside Toolboxes: 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

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**FCS\_COP.1/SHA-256** Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **data signing** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **SHA-256** and cryptographic key sizes: **no cryptographic key size** that meet the following: **Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-2, 2002 August 1.**

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

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**Note on SHA-256**

SHA-256 Cryptographic operation is only applicable to versions of the TOE including the following Inside Toolboxes: 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

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**FCS\_COP.1/SHA-384** Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **data signing** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **SHA-384** and cryptographic key sizes: **no cryptographic key size** that meet the following: **Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-2, 2002 August 1.**

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

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**Note on SHA-384**

SHA-384 Cryptographic operation is only applicable to versions of the TOE including the following Inside Toolbox: 00.03.12.xx

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**FCS\_COP.1/SHA-512** Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **data signing** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **SHA-512** and cryptographic key sizes: **no cryptographic key size** that meet the following: **Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-2, 2002 August 1.**

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

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**Note on SHA-512**

SHA-512 Cryptographic operation is only applicable to versions of the TOE including the following Inside Toolbox: 00.03.12.xx

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**FCS\_COP.1/RSA without CRT** Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **data encryption and decryption** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **RSA without CRT** and cryptographic key sizes: **between 96 bits and 2624 bits** that meet the following: **PKCS#1 V2.0, 1<sup>st</sup> October, 1998**.

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

---

**Note on RSA without CRT** RSA without CRT Cryptographic operation is only applicable to versions of the TOE including the following Inside Toolboxes: 00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

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**FCS\_COP.1/RSA with CRT** Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **data encryption and decryption** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **RSA with CRT data** and cryptographic key sizes: **between 192 bits and 3520 bits** that meet the following: **PKCS#1 V2.0, 1<sup>st</sup> October, 1998**.

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

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**Note on RSA with CRT** RSA with CRT Cryptographic operation is only applicable to versions of the TOE including the following Inside Toolboxes: 00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

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**FCS\_COP.1/ECDSA over Zp** Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **signature generation and verification** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **ECDSA over Zp** and cryptographic key sizes: **between 192 bits and 521 bits** that meet the following: **FIPS 186-3**

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

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**Note on ECDSA over Zp** ECDSA over Zp Cryptographic operation is only applicable to versions of the TOE including the following Inside Toolboxes: 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

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**FCS\_COP.1/EC-DH over Zp** Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **signature generation and verification** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **EC-DH over Zp** and cryptographic key sizes: **between 192 bits and 521 bits** that meet the following: **ISO 15946-3:2002 for ECDH standard.**

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

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**Note on EC-DH over Zp** EC-DH over Zp Cryptographic operation is only applicable to versions of the TOE including the following Inside Toolboxes: 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

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### FCS\_COP.1/ECDSA over GF(2n) Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **signature generation and verification** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **ECDSA over GF(2n)** and cryptographic key sizes: **between 192 bits and 521 bits** that meet the following: **FIPS 186-3**

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

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**Note on ECDSA over GF(2n)** ECDSA over GF(2n) Cryptographic operation is only applicable to versions of the TOE including the following Inside Toolbox: 00.03.12.xx

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### FCS\_COP.1/EC-DH over GF(2n) Cryptographic operation

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform **signature generation and verification** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **EC-DH over GF(2n)** and cryptographic key sizes: **between 192 bits and 521 bits** that meet the following: **ISO 15946-3:2002 for ECDH standard.**

Dependencies: (FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation)  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

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**Note on EC-DH over GF(2n)** EC-DH over GF(2n) Cryptographic operation is only applicable to versions of the TOE including the following Inside Toolbox: 00.03.12.xx

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## 6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE

123 This Security Target is evaluated according to

124 Security Target evaluation (Class ASE)

125 The “Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE”, for the evaluation of the Spyder TOE are those taken from the

Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5)

and augmented by taking the following components:

ALC\_DVS.2, and AVA\_VAN.5.

126 The assurance requirements are (augmentation from EAL5+ highlighted)

### Class ADV: Development

Architectural design	(ADV_ARC.1)
Functional specification	(ADV_FSP.5)
Implementation representation	(ADV_IMP.1)
Well-structured internals	(ADV_INT.2)
TOE design	(ADV_TDS.4)

### Class AGD: Guidance documents

Operational user guidance	(AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative user guidance	(AGD_PRE.1)

### Class ALC: Life-cycle support

CM capabilities	(ALC_CMC.4)
CM scope	(ALC_CMS.5)
Delivery	(ALC_DEL.1)
Development security	(ALC_DVS.2)
Life-cycle definition	(ALC_LCD.1)
Tools and techniques	(ALC_TAT.2)

### Class ASE: Security Target evaluation

Conformance claims	(ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition	(ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction	(ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives	(ASE_OBJ.2)
Derived security requirements	(ASE_REQ.2)
Security problem definition	(ASE_SPD.1)
TOE summary specification	(ASE_TSS.1)

### Class ATE: Tests

Coverage	(ATE_COV.2)
Depth	(ATE_DPT.3)
Functional tests	(ATE_FUN.1)

Independent testing (ATE\_IND.2)

**Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment**

Vulnerability analysis (AVA\_VAN.5)

**6.2.1 Refinements of the TOE Assurance Requirements**

- 127 The Protection Profile BSI-PP-0035 defines refinements to the Security Assurance requirements defined in CC V3.1 Part 3. The TOE is assessed to EAL5 Level with additional augmentations which are taken into account in this analysis.
- 128 The [PP] allows the TOE to be evaluated above the EAL4+ requirements given in the [PP], therefore the fact that this Security Target is assessed to EAL5 level, it still maintains the conformance claim to [PP]. The refinements stated in [PP] remain consistent with the EAL5 package claims of this Security Target.

**6.3 Security Requirements Rationale**

**6.3.1 Rationale for the security functional requirements**

129 Table 2 below gives an overview of how the security functional requirements are combined to meet the security objectives. The detailed justification follows after the table.

Objective	TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements
O.Leak-Inherent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection”</li><li>- FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”</li><li>- FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control”</li></ul>
O.Phys-Probing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”</li></ul>
O.Malfunction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance</li><li>- FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”</li></ul>
O.Phys-Manipulation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”</li></ul>
O.Leak-Forced	All requirements listed for O.Leak-Inherent <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1</li></ul> plus those listed for O.Malfunction and O.Phys-Manipulation <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3</li></ul>
O.Abuse-Func	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”</li><li>- FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”</li></ul> plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1</li></ul>

Objective	TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements
O.Identification	- FAU_SAS.1 "Audit storage"
O.RND	- FCS_RNG.1 "Quality metric for random numbers" plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced - FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1
O.Add-Functions	- FCS_COP.1 "Cryptographic Operation"
OE.Plat-Appl	not applicable
OE.Resp-Appl	not applicable
OE.Process-Sec-IC	not applicable

Table 2: Security Requirements versus Security Objectives

130 It should be noted by the user of this Security Target that the justification related to the security objective "Random Numbers (O.RND)" contains the following note:

131 Depending on the functionality of the TOE the Security IC Embedded Software will have to support the objective by providing runtime-tests of the random number generator (for instance by implementing FPT\_AMT.1 as defined in [PP]). Together, these requirements allow the TOE to provide cryptographically good random numbers and to ensure that no information about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker.

132 It should be noted by the user of this Security Target that the justification related to the security objective "Additional Specific Security Functionality" (O.Add-Functions)" contains the following note:

Depending on the functionality of the end composite device the Security IC Embedded Software will have to support the objective by using the additional functions as specified by the [CC]. The user data processed by the functions relating to FCS\_COP.1 is protected as defined for the end application. The Embedded Software will have to support the objective O.Add-Functions by implementing the security functional requirements below:

- [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of User data without security attributes or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
- FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

### 6.3.2 Dependencies of security functional requirements

133 Table 3 below lists the security functional requirements defined in this Security Target, their dependencies and whether they are satisfied by other security requirements defined in this Security Target. The text following the table discusses the remaining cases.

Security Functional Requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled by security requirements in this PP
FRU_FLT.2	FPT_FLS.1	Yes
FPT_FLS.1	None	No dependency
FMT_LIM.1	FMT_LIM.2	Yes
FMT_LIM.2	FMT_LIM.1	Yes
FAU_SAS.1	None	No dependency
FPT_PHP.3	None	No dependency
FDP_ITT.1	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	Yes
FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFF.1	See discussion below
FPT_ITT.1	None	No dependency
FCS_RNG.1	None	No dependency
FCS_COP.1	(FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1) FCS_CKM.4	See discussion below


Table 3: Dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements

- 134 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of FDP\_IFC.1 (information flow control policy statement) on FDP\_IFF.1 (Simple security attributes). The specification of FDP\_IFF.1 would not capture the nature of the security functional requirement nor add any detail. As stated in the *Data Processing Policy* referred to in FDP\_IFC.1 there are no attributes necessary. The security functional requirement for the TOE is sufficiently described using FDP\_ITT.1 and its *Data Processing Policy* (FDP\_IFC.1).
- 135 The dependencies for FCS\_COP.1 can not be satisfied by the TOE the dependencies for key management must be met by the Security IC Embedded Software, they are dependent on the end usage of the Security IC.
- 136 As Table 3 shows, all other dependencies of functional requirements are fulfilled by security requirements defined in this Protection Profile.
- 137 The discussion in Section 6.3.1 has shown, how the security functional requirements support each other in meeting the security objectives of this Protection Profile. In particular the security functional requirements providing resistance of the hardware against manipulations (e. g. FPT\_PHP.3) support all other more specific security functional requirements (e. g. FCS\_RNG.1) because they prevent an attacker from disabling or circumventing the latter.

### 6.3.3 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements

- 138 Although [PP] requires EAL4 the TOE is assessed against the EAL5 requirements, this gives the additional assurance that the TOE is developed and tested in a structured and methodical way, part of the TOE development is described in semi-






formal terms to allow the ITSEF and Certification Body to understand the TOE to a detailed level.

- 139 The assurance level EAL5 and the augmentation with the requirements ALC\_DVS.2, and AVA\_VAN.5 were chosen in order to meet assurance expectations explained in the following paragraphs.
- 140 An assurance level of EAL5 with the augmentations AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2 are required for this type of TOE since it is intended to defend against sophisticated attacks. This evaluation assurance package was selected to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial practices. In order to provide a meaningful level of assurance that the TOE provides an adequate level of defence against such attacks, the evaluators should have access to the low level design and source code. The user of this document should refer to [PP] for further understanding on the requirement for the augmentations.

#### **6.3.4 Security Requirements are Internally Consistent**


- 141 The discussion of security functional requirements and assurance components in the preceding sections has shown that consistency are given for both groups of requirements. The arguments given for the fact that the assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE also shows that the security functional requirements and assurance requirements support each other and that there are no inconsistencies between these groups.
- 142 The security functional requirement FPT\_PHP.3 makes it harder to manipulate data. This protects the primary assets identified in Section 3.1 and other security features or functionality which use these data.
- 143 Though a manipulation of the TOE (refer to FPT\_PHP.3) is not of great value for an attacker in itself, it can be an important step in order to threaten the primary assets identified in Section 3.1. Therefore, the security functional requirement FPT\_PHP.3 is not only required to meet the security objective O.Phys-Manipulation. In addition it protects other security features or functions of both the TOE and the Security IC Embedded Software from being bypassed, deactivated or changed. In particular this may pertain to the security features or functions being specified using FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1, FPT\_FLS.1, FMT\_LIM.2, FCS\_RNG.1, and those implemented in the Security IC Embedded Software.
- 144 A malfunction of TSF (refer to FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1) can be an important step in order to threaten the primary assets identified in Section 3.1. Therefore, the security functional requirements FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1 are not only required to meet the security objective O.Malfunction. In addition they protect other security features or functions of both the TOE and the Security IC Embedded Software from being bypassed, deactivated or changed. In particular this pertains to the security features or functions being specified using FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1, FMT\_LIM.1, FMT\_LIM.2, FCS\_RNG.1, and those implemented in the Security IC Embedded Software.
- 145 In a forced leakage attack the methods described in “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” (refer to T.Malfunction) and/or “Physical Manipulation” (refer to T.Phys-Manipulation) are used to cause leakage from signals which normally do not



contain significant information about secrets. Therefore, in order to prevent the disclosure of primary assets identified in Section 3.1 it is important that the security functional requirements preventing leakage (FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1) and those against malfunction (FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1) and physical manipulation (FPT\_PHP.3) are effective and bind well. The security features and functions against malfunction ensure correct operation of other security functions (refer to above) and help to prevent forced leakage in other attack scenarios. The security features and functions against physical manipulation make it harder to manipulate the other security functions (refer to above).

- 146 Physical probing (refer to FPT\_PHP.3) shall directly prevent the disclosure of primary assets identified in Section 3.1. In addition, physical probing can be an important step in other attack scenarios if the corresponding security features or functions use secret data. For instance the security functional requirement FMT\_LIM.2 may use passwords. Therefore, the security functional requirement FPT\_PHP.3 (against probing) help to protect other security features or functions including those being implemented in the Security IC Embedded Software. Details depend on the implementation.
- 147 Leakage (refer to FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1) shall directly prevent the disclosure of primary assets identified in Section 3.1. In addition, inherent leakage and forced leakage (refer to above) can be an important step in other attack scenarios if the corresponding security features or functions use secret data. For instance the security functional requirement FMT\_LIM.2 may use passwords. Therefore, the security functional requirements FDP\_ITT.1 and FPT\_ITT.1 help to protect other security features or functions implemented in the Security IC Embedded Software (FDP\_ITT.1) or provided by the TOE (FPT\_ITT.1). Details depend on the implementation.
- 148 According to the assumption Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Platt-App) the Security IC Embedded Software will correctly use the functions provided by the TOE. Thus the User Data is treated as required to meet the requirements defined for the specific application context (refer to Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-App)). However, the TOE may implement additional functions not controllable by the Security IC Embedded Software (e.g. test features). This can be a risk if their interface can not completely be controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software. Therefore, the security functional requirements FMT\_LIM.1 and FMT\_LIM.2 are very important. They ensure that appropriate control is applied to the interface of these functions (limited availability) and that these functions, if being usable, provide limited capabilities only.
- 149 The combination of the security functional requirements FMT\_LIM.1 and FMT\_LIM.2 ensures that (especially after TOE Delivery) these additional functions can not be abused by an attacker to (i) disclose or manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or services of the TOE or of the Security IC Embedded Software or (iii) to enable other attacks on the assets. Therefore the binding between the two security functional requirements is very important.
- 150 The security functional requirement Limited Capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1) must close gaps which could be left by the control being applied to the function's interface (Limited Availability (FMT\_LIM.2)). Note that the security feature or services which limits the availability could be bypassed, deactivated or changed by physical





manipulation or a malfunction caused by an attacker. Therefore, if Limited Availability (FMT\_LIM.2) is vulnerable<sup>a</sup>, it is important to limit the capabilities of the functions in order to limit the possible benefit for an attacker.

- 151 The security functional requirement Limited Availability (FMT\_LIM.2) must close gaps which could result from the fact that the function's kernel (test software<sup>b</sup>) in principle would allow to perform attacks. The TOE must limit the availability of functions which potentially provide the capability to disclose or manipulate User Data, to manipulate security features or services of the TOE or of the Security IC Embedded Software or to enable other attacks on the assets. Therefore, if an attacker could benefit from using such functions<sup>c</sup>, it is important to limit their availability so that an attacker is not able to use them.
- 152 No perfect solution to limit the capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1) is required if the limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2) alone can prevent the abuse of functions. No perfect solution to limit the availability (FMT\_LIM.2) is required if the limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1) alone can prevent the abuse of functions. Therefore, it is correct that both requirements are defined in a way that they together provide sufficient security.
- 153 It is important to prevent malfunctions of TSF and of security functions implemented in the Security IC Embedded Software (refer to above). There are two security functional requirements which ensure that malfunctions cannot be caused by exposing the TOE to environmental stress. First it must be ensured that the TOE operates correctly within some limits (Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2)). Second the TOE must prevent its operation outside these limits (Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1)). Both security functional requirements together prevent malfunctions. The two functional requirements must define the "limits". Otherwise there could be some range of operating conditions which is not covered so that malfunctions may occur. Consequently, the security functional requirements Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2) and Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1) are defined in a way that they together provide sufficient security.
- 154 The addition of the security functional requirement FCS\_COP.1 and how it relates to the security objective O.Add-Functions is detailed in 6.3.1. It should be noted that any assets related to the cryptographic operations (e.g. cryptographic keys) are protected by the objectives relating to "Leakage", "Physical Manipulation and Probing" and "Malfunction".

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<sup>a</sup> or, in the extreme case, not being provided

<sup>b</sup> Test Software is not included in the TOE refer to section 1.4.2.2

<sup>c</sup> the capabilities are not limited in a perfect way (FMT\_LIM.1)

## 7 TOE Summary Specification

155 This section demonstrates how the TOE matches the Security Functional requirements as detailed in section 6.1 (Security functional Requirements).

156 It gives a description of the TSF elements of the TOE to allow an understanding of how the security of the TOE matches the SFR of section 6.1, and also how they TOE protects itself against tampering, interfering and bypass of the TSF Features of the TOE.

### 7.1 Description of TSF Features of the TOE

#### 7.1.1 TSF\_TEST Test Interface

- Test Mode (TME)
- Serial Number Registers Write
- Test Mode Disable (User Mode)
- Secure Return Test (SRT)

157 The TOE has two engineering test modes Test Mode (TME) and Secure Return Test (SRT).

158 **Test Mode Entry:** TME is protected by a Test mode entry condition and is only accessible to authenticated test engineers.

159 **Serial Number Register Write:** In test mode it is possible to store pre-personalisation data etc., also the serial number information is written at this time.


160 **Test Mode Disable:** TME is permanently disabled by wafer saw.

161 **Secure Return Test:** The TOE also offers another test mode called Secure Return Test (SRT), this is considered as a subset of TME, it does not offer the full access as is allowed in TME. On entry into Secure Return Test a full NVM erase is performed, to further protect any sensitive data stored in the TOE. SRT is protected by entry conditions.

#### **SFP: Limited capability and availability Policy**

The TOE Test features are only available to authenticated Inside engineers with the knowledge of the Test Mode Entry and Secure Return Test sequence. Once the wafer is sawn Test Mode is not available. A subset of the Test Mode features is available after TEST Mode Disable, but only to authenticated users with the knowledge of the Secure Return Test Entry Sequence.

### 7.1.1.1 SFR to TSF Test Interface



### 7.1.2 TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT Environmental Protection

- Hardware Protection (Active Shield)
- Voltage Monitor
- Frequency Monitor
- Temperature Monitor
- Light Scan Detector
- Memory Encryption (Scramblers)
- Bus Encryption (Protection)<sup>a</sup>
- Structure and Layout<sup>b</sup>

**162 Hardware Protection:** The TOE has an active shield that covers the top of the chip, this provides tamper evidence protection, if violated a flag is raised.


**163 Voltage Monitor:** The power supply lines to the TOE are monitored to protect the TOE from the supply going out of bounds.

<sup>a</sup> The security mechanism **Bus Encryption** utilises the layout process of the design, this mechanism is not included in the TOE testing, FSP, and TDS description, if the evaluator requires further information or confirmation of this mechanism, they can be shown the methods used during the project site visit. This mechanism has no TSFI.

<sup>b</sup> The security mechanism **Structure and Layout** utilises the TOE design technology, and the layout process of the design, this mechanism is not included in the TOE testing, FSP, and TDS description, if the evaluator requires further information or confirmation of this mechanism, they can be shown the methods used during the project site visit. This mechanism has no TSFI.

- 164 **Frequency Monitor:** The internal frequency is monitored to protect the internal clock falling below a defined level.
- 165 **Temperature Monitor:** The operating temperature of the TOE is monitored to prevent the TOE from being operated out-with the correct operating conditions.
- 166 **Light Scan Detector:** The TOE provides a Light scan Detector (LSD) to protect against laser (or focused light) scanning of the TOE.
- 167 **Memory encryption:** The ROM, EEPROM, RAM memories are encrypted also the 8/16-Bit RISC CPU register file is encrypted.
- 168 **Bus Encryption:** Layout structures are implemented to make internal bus probing difficult. The TOE contains no visible bus structures.
- 169 **Structure and Layout:** The process technology used to design the TOE is 0.13µm, the TOE is compact especially in the main logic region (adding complexity). The structures are routed across several layers. This provides complexity to any attack that involves identifying specific areas of the TOE.

#### 7.1.2.1 SFR to TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT



#### 7.1.3 TSF\_LEAK\_PROTECT Leakage Protection


- Internal Clock (VFO)
- VFO Jitter
- Dummy Interrupt
- Dummy Instruction Generator
- Frequency Divider
- Power Scrambling

- 170 **Internal Clock:** The TOE provides an internal Variable Frequency Oscillator (VFO).

- 171 **VFO Jitter:** The VFO frequency offers variances of the frequency through time (Jitter), to help against side channel leakage analysis.
- 172 **Dummy Interrupt:** The TOE can trigger Dummy Interrupts on average every 1024 clock cycles.
- 173 **Dummy Instruction Generator:** The TOE can send Dummy instructions to the AVR system.
- 174 **Frequency Divider:** The VFO clock can be varied by dividing the clock, this can also be set up by the IC embedded software to perform this subdivision on the fly.
- 175 **Power Scrambling:** Power scrambling introduces a random component into the power signature of the chip.

**SFP: Data Processing Policy** When processing or moving information within the TOE, the TOE should not leak any specific information that would allow an attacker to gain sufficient knowledge to gain access to secret information stored within the TOE memories.

### 7.1.3.1 SFR to TSF\_LEAK\_PROTECT





#### 7.1.4 TSF\_DATA\_PROTECT Data Protection

- Secure Memory Management
- CRC
- Code Signature Module
- Parity Checker ROM/Registers
- Register Mirroring
- Enhanced Protection Object (EPO) NVM
- CStack Checker
- Glitch Detectors

176 **Secure Memory Management:** The TOE features a memory access protection feature.

177 **CRC:** The TOE provides a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC32 or CRC16).

178 **Code Signature Module:** The TOE provides a Code Signature Module, this is a dedicated 16-bit CRC engine that computes a signature for instructions being executed by the AVR processor and an instruction counter.

179 **Parity Checker ROM/Registers:** The TOE features parity checking on the ROM, and AVR Registers. If a fault is injected by modifying a data bit the parity check will be able to detect it and generate a violation.


180 **Register Mirroring:** Some of the internal security registers have been duplicated/mirrored. A violation is triggered if the register and its mirror differ.

181 **Enhanced Protection Object:** The NVM read is protected against attempted perturbations.

182 **Cstack Checker:** The TOE allows the IC Embedded Software to define a RAM window and verify the stack using a RAMP-Y pointer.

183 **Glitch Detectors:** The Glitch Detectors can detect a glitch on the Vcc signal. This protects against attempted perturbations.

### 7.1.4.1 SFR to TSF\_DATA\_PROTECT




### 7.1.5 TSF\_AUDIT\_ACTION Event Audit and Action

- Reset System
- Security Registers

**184 Reset System:** The TOE allows the security IC Embedded Software to select the response the TOE makes to a security violation. The TOE has several modes when reacting to a security issue to ensure that the device fails in a safe mode.

**185 Security registers:** The TOE includes several registers to report failures (violations) detected by the security mechanisms of the TOE.

#### 7.1.5.1 SFR to TSF\_AUDIT\_ACTION



## 7.1.6 TSF\_RNG Random Number Generator


- True RNG
- RNGDAS
- RDWDR

186 **True RNG:** The TOE has an analogue noise source that can be used to provide random numbers when required by the Security IC Embedded Software.

187 **RNGDAS:** The Analogue Noise Source is sampled to create a digitized analogue source that is accessible to the Security IC Embedded Software through the RNGDAS register.

188 **RDWDR:** The digital analogue source from RNGDAS can be post processed using a seeded LFSR. The result of the post processed data is accessible to the Security IC Embedded Software through the RDWDR register.

### 7.1.6.1 SFR to TSF\_RNG



## 7.1.7 TSF\_CRYPT0\_HW Hardware Cryptography


- Hardware Triple DES
- Hardware AES



189 **Hardware Triple DES:** The TOE provides a hardware DES / TDES engine which enables fast cryptographic computations.

190 **Hardware AES:** The TOE provides a hardware AES engine which enables fast cryptographic computations.

#### 7.1.7.1 SFR to TSF\_CRYPT0\_HW



#### 7.1.8 TSF\_CRYPT0\_SW Toolbox Cryptography

- AIS31 Online Test (00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
- Secure Hash (SHA) (00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
- RSA (00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
- RSA with CRT (00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
- PrimeGen (Miller Rabin) (00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
- ECDSA over  $Z_p$  (00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
- EC-DH over  $Z_p$  (00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)
- ECDSA over  $GF(2^n)$  (00.03.12.xx)
- EC-DH over  $GF(2^n)$  (00.03.12.xx)
- Self-Test (00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.03.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx)

191 **Self-Test:** The TOE can perform a test of the crypto toolbox at the request of the Security IC Embedded Software

192 **AIS31 Online Test:** The TOE provides the ability to run online tests of the random numbers provided to the RNGDAS register. The test performed is a  $\chi^2$  (chi squared) test to check the randomness of the data.

193 **Secure Hash:** The TOE provides Secure Hash (SHA) data signing capability


194 **RSA without CRT:** The TOE provides RSA without CRT (Modular Exponentiation) data encryption decryption functions.

195 **RSA with CRT:** The TOE provides RSA with CRT data encryption decryption functions.

- 196 **PrimeGen:** The TOE provides RSA cryptographic key generation capability using Miller Rabin algorithm with confidence criteria (t parameter) between 0 and 255.
- 197 **ECDSA over Zp:** The TOE provides ECDSA over Zp cryptographic signature capability
- 198 **EC-DH over Zp:** The TOE provides EC-DH over Zp cryptographic signature capability
- 199 **ECDSA over GF(2n):** The TOE provides ECDSA over GF(2n) cryptographic signature capability
- 200 **EC-DH over GF(2n):** The TOE provides EC-DH over GF(2n) cryptographic signature capability
- 201 A summary of which functions are available to which member of the 00.03.1x.xx family is given below.

00.03.14.xx	00.03.10.xx	00.03.11.xx	00.03.12.xx
Self-Test	Self-Test	Self-Test	Self-Test
AIS31 Online Test	AIS31 Online Test	AIS31 Online Test	AIS31 Online Test
RSA Without CRT	RSA Without CRT	RSA Without CRT	RSA Without CRT
RSA With CRT	RSA With CRT	RSA With CRT	RSA With CRT
PrimeGen	PrimeGen	PrimeGen	PrimeGen
	SHA-1	SHA-1	SHA-1
	SHA-224	SHA-224	SHA-224
	SHA-256	SHA-256	SHA-256
		ECDSA over Zp	ECDSA over Zp
		EC-DH over Zp	EC-DH over Zp
			ECDSA over GF(2n)
			EC-DH over GF(2n)
			SHA-384
			SHA-512

### 7.1.8.1 SFR to TSF\_CRYPT0\_SW



## 7.2 Rationale for TSF

202 This section demonstrates how the TSF contribute and work together to fulfil the SFR defined in section 6.

### 7.2.1 Summary of TSF to SFR

203 Table 4 gives an overview of the TSF that contribute to the SFRs.


Security Functional Requirements												
		Malfunctions		Leakage			Physical Manipulation and Probing	Abuse of Functionality		Identification	Random Number Generation	Cryptography
		FRU_FLT.2	FPT_FLS.1	FDP_ITT.1	FPT_ITT.1	FDP_IFC.1		FPT_PHP.3	FMT_LIM.1			
TSF Features	TSF_TEST							X	X	X		
	TSF_ENV_PROTECT	X					X					
	TSF_LEAK_PROTECT			X	X	X						
	TSF_DATA_PROTECT						X					
	TSF_AUDIT_ACTION	X	X									
	TSF_RNG			X	X	X					X	
	TSF_CRYPT_HW											X
	TSF_CRYPT_SW										X	X

Table 4 Dependencies of the TOE Security Features

### 7.2.2 Rationale for the TSF Features of the TOE

204 The justification for the SFRs relating to Malfunctions that is FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1 is as follows:

205 The SFR “FRU\_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance” and “FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state” relate to the TSF Features “TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT



Environmental Protection” and “TSF\_AUDIT\_ACTION Event Audit and Action”. TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT defines an operating window that the TOE safely works within, if the TOE is subjected to operating conditions out-with this operating range the TSF mechanisms of TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT, Voltage Monitor, Frequency Monitor, Temperature Monitor, set a violation through TSF\_AUDIT\_ACTION mechanism Security Registers, and the mechanism Reset System can take appropriate action to ensure the TOE fails in a secure state (FPT\_FLS.1).

206 The justification for the SFRs relating to Abuse of Functionality that is FMT\_LIM.1 and FMT\_LIM.2 is as follows:

207 The SFR “FMT\_LIM.1 Limited capabilities” and “FMT\_LIM.2 Limited availability” relates to the TSF Feature TSF\_TEST. The security mechanism Test Mode Entry protects the test features during Phases 2-3 of the life cycle, this means that only authenticated Inside test engineers have access to this mode. After wafer saw Test Mode Entry is permanently disabled by the mechanism Test Mode Disable. In phase 2-7 of the life cycle a further test mode is available this is called Secure Return Test and is protected by the mechanism SRT entry conditions once again only authenticated test engineers with the correct knowledge can enter this test mode, SRT does not give full access to the chip and therefore is limited in its capabilities. SRT is not disabled by the Test Mode Disable mechanism.

208 The justification for the SFRs relating to Identification that is FAU\_SAS.1 is as follows:

209 The SFR “FAU\_SAS.1 Audit Storage” relates to the TSF Feature TSF\_TEST. The mechanism Serial Number Register Write allows the storage of Initialisation data, Pre-personalisation data, supplements of the Security IC Embedded Software and unique identification information for the TOE when in Test Mode.

210 The justification for the SFRs relating to Physical Manipulation and Probing that is FPT\_PHP.3 is as follows:

211 The SFR “FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack” relates to the TSF Features TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT and TSF\_DATA\_PROTECT. The mechanisms of TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT, Voltage Monitor, Frequency Monitor, Temperature Monitor detect when the TOE has been manipulated to try to operate it out-with its operating conditions. To protect against direct probing using galvanic contacts the mechanisms of TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT prevent this attack, Hardware Protection has an active shield that is monitored to detect any violation or removal, the Structure and Layout and also Bus Encryption make any attempt to identify important structures difficult for an attacker, any attempt to directly identify or probe memory contents is also made difficult through the mechanism Memory Encryption of TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT. Attempts to probe the TOE in an indirect way (with-out galvanic contacts) for example using a laser to identify registers is countered by the TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT mechanism Light Scan Detector and the TSF\_DATA\_PROTECT mechanism Register Mirroring. Attempts to use Fault Injection to indirectly probe or gather information from the memory contents is countered by the mechanism Memory Encryption of TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT and the mechanisms Secure Memory Management, CRC, Code Signature Module, Parity Checker ROM/Registers, Register Mirroring, Enhanced Protection Object, Cstack Checker, Glitch Detectors of TSF\_DATA\_PROTECT.

212 The justification for the SFRs relating to Leakage that is FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1 and FDP\_IFC.1 is as follows:

213 The SFR “FDP\_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection”, “FPT\_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data protection” and “Subset information flow control” relates to TSF\_LEAK\_PROTECT and TSF\_RNG. The TSF feature TSF\_LEAK\_PROTECT provides mechanisms to help prevent side channel analysis both through power or electro-magnetic emissions. The mechanisms Dummy Interrupt, Dummy Instruction Generator, VFO Jitter, Frequency Divider, Power Scrambling help spread the information content of any power signature emanating from the TOE. The Internal Clock (VFO) mechanism helps prevent any clock pulse synchronisation to aid the attacker when setting up or timing the study of the emanations. The mechanism True RNG of TSF\_RNG can also be used to add noise to the leakage from the TOE and also contributes to the mechanism Power Scrambling of TSF\_LEAK\_PROTECT. The TSF Features TSF\_LEAK\_PROTECT and TSF\_RNG combine to comply with the Data Processing Policy defined by FDP\_IFC.1.

214 The justification for the SFR relating to Random Number Generation FCS\_RNG.1 for is as follows:

215 The SFR “FCS\_RNG.1 Random number generation” relates to TSF\_RNG and TSF\_CRYPTOP\_SW. The SFR requires a physical random number generator this is provided by the mechanism True RNG of TSF\_RNG. The total failure test of the noise source is provided by the AIS31 cryptographic toolbox functions, if the Security IC Embedded Software requires to perform an online test of the random data FCS\_COP.1 provides the mechanism AIS31 Online Test (see Table 5). FCS\_RNG.1 also requires the random data to be compliant to a quality metric, de TSF\_RNG allows data to be gathered using the mechanism RNGDAS for AIS31 compliant data. It is also possible for the end user of the TOE to apply post processing to the random data and gather the resulting data through mechanism RDWDR.

216 The justification for the SFR relating to Cryptography FCS\_COP.1 is as follows:

217 The SFR “FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation” relates to TSF\_CRYPTOP\_HW and TSF\_CRYPTOP\_SW. The SFR requires cryptographic operations to be performed with certain key lengths and to a specific standard to understand how the mechanisms of the TSF features contribute to this a map is shown in Table 5.

FCS_COP.1 requirement	TSF Feature	Mechanism	This function is only available on the TOE with this toolbox version
/TDES	TSF_CRYPTOP_HW	Triple DES	The TOE has a TDES hardware engine and therefore is present independent of Toolbox
/AES	TSF_CRYPTOP_HW	AES	The TOE has a AES hardware engine and therefore is present independent of Toolbox

/SHA-1	TSF_CRYPT0_SW	Secure Hash (SHA-1)	00.03.10.xx, 00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
/SHA-224	TSF_CRYPT0_SW	Secure Hash (SHA-224)	00.03.10.xx, 00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
/SHA-256	TSF_CRYPT0_SW	Secure Hash (SHA-256)	00.03.10.xx, 00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
/SHA-384	TSF_CRYPT0_SW	Secure Hash (SHA-384)	00.03.12.xx
/SHA-512	TSF_CRYPT0_SW	Secure Hash (SHA-512)	00.03.12.xx
/RSA without CRT	TSF_CRYPT0_SW	RSA Without CRT  PrimeGen	00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
/RSA with CRT	TSF_CRYPT0_SW	RSA with CRT  PrimeGen	00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
/ECDSA over $Z_p$	TSF_CRYPT0_SW	ECDSA over $Z_p$	00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
/EC-DH over $Z_p$	TSF_CRYPT0_SW	EC-DH over $Z_p$	00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx
/ECDSA over GF(2n)	TSF_CRYPT0_SW	ECDSA over GF(2n)	00.03.12.xx
/EC-DH over GF(2n)	TSF_CRYPT0_SW	EC-DH over GF(2n)	00.03.12.xx
N/A  (support for FCS_RNG.1)	TSF_CRYPT0_SW	AIS31 Online test	00.03.14.xx, 00.03.10.xx, 00.3.11.xx, 00.03.12.xx

Table 5 Cryptographic Functions Overview

- 218 The TOE is a generic hardware IC with cryptographic support software, this allows the Security IC Embedded Software to use the cryptographic functions detailed in FCS\_COP.1. It should be noted as detailed in the rationale for the dependencies of FCS\_COP.1 that key management including key generation that is the SFR FCS\_CKM.1 are satisfied by the Security IC Embedded Software and not the TOE, this is especially important for the security mechanism PrimeGen and also ECDSA/ECDH.



### 7.2.3 Note on ADV\_ARC.1

219 The Assurance component ADV\_ARC.1 states that the TOE should be self-protected against any tampering or bypassing of the TSF of the TOE.

220 The TSF Features TSF\_ENV\_PROTECT, TSF\_AUDIT\_ACTION and TSF\_DATA\_PROTECT contain mechanisms that fully protected the TOE against any external tamper or bypass.

221 The Security Mechanisms applicable to this protection are:

- Hardware Protection (Active Shield)
- Voltage Monitor
- Temperature Monitor
- Glitch Detectors
- Memory Encryption
- Reset System



## 8 Annex

### 8.1 Glossary of Vocabulary

Application Data	All data managed by the Security IC Embedded Software in the application context. Application data comprise all data in the final Security IC.
Composite Product Integrator	<p>Role installing or finalising the IC Embedded Software and the applications on platform transforming the TOE into the un-personalised Composite Product after TOE delivery.</p> <p>The TOE Manufacturer may implement IC Embedded Software delivered by the Security IC Embedded Software Developer before TOE delivery (e.g. if the IC Embedded Software is implemented in ROM or is stored in the non-volatile memory as service provided by the IC Manufacturer or IC Packaging Manufacturer).</p>
Composite Product Manufacturer	<p>The Composite Product Manufacturer has the following roles (i) the Security IC Embedded Software Developer (Phase 1), (ii) the Composite Product Integrator (Phase 5) and (iii) the Personaliser (Phase 6). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) he has the role of the IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.</p> <p>The customer of the TOE Manufacturer who receives the TOE during TOE Delivery. The Composite Product Manufacturer includes the Security IC Embedded Software developer and all roles after TOE Delivery up to Phase 6.</p>
End-consumer	User of the Composite Product in Phase 7.
IC Dedicated Software	IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC (also known as IC firmware) and developed by the IC Developer. Such software is required for testing purpose (IC Dedicated Test Software) but may provide additional services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support Software).
IC Dedicated Test Software	That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
IC Dedicated Support Software	That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.



Initialisation Data

Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to identify the TOE and to keep track of the Security IC's production and further life-cycle phases are considered as belonging to the TSF data. These data are for instance used for traceability and for TOE identification (identification data).

Integrated Circuit (IC)

Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.

Pre-personalisation Data

Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is programmed into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). This data is for example used for traceability and/or to secure shipment between phases.

Security IC

(as used in this Protection Profile) Composition of the TOE, the Security IC Embedded Software, User Data and the package (the Security IC carrier).

Security IC Embedded Software

Software embedded in a Security IC and normally not being developed by the IC Designer. The Security IC Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the Security IC in Phase 3 or in later phases of the Security IC product life-cycle.

Some part of that software may actually implement a Security IC application others may provide standard services. Nevertheless, this distinction doesn't matter here so that the Security IC Embedded Software can be considered as being application dependent whereas the IC Dedicated Software is definitely not.

Security IC Product

Composite product which includes the Security Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and the Embedded Software and is evaluated as composite target of evaluation in the sense of the Supporting Document

Test Features


All features and functions (implemented by the IC Dedicated Test Software and/or hardware) which are designed to be used before TOE Delivery only and delivered as part of the TOE.

TOE Delivery

The period when the TOE is delivered which is either (i) after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or (ii) after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products.

TOE Manufacturer

The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that all requirements for the TOE and its development and production environment are fulfilled.



The TOE Manufacturer has the following roles: (i) IC Developer (Phase 2) and (ii) IC Manufacturer (Phase 3). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 4 in form of packaged products, he has the role of the (iii) IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.

**TSF data** Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE. This includes information about the TOE's configuration, if any is coded in non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM), in specific circuitry, in non-volatile programmable memories (for instance E<sup>2</sup>PROM) or a combination thereof.

**User Data** All data managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software in the application context. User data comprise all data in the final Smartcard IC except the TSF data.

## 8.2 Literature

[CC\_PART1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012

[CC\_PART2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012

[CC\_PART3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012

[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Part 2: Evaluation Methodology; Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012

[JHAS] Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document: Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, March 2009, Version 2.7

[COMP] Supporting Document: Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, CCDB-2007-09-001, Sept. 2007

[PP] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI- PP-0035-2007, V1.0

[AIS31] AIS31: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for true (physical) random number generators, Version 3.1, 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

[AUG] Smartcard Integrated Circuit Augmentations Version 1.0, March 2002, registered under the German Certification Scheme BSI-AUG-2002



### 8.3 List of Abbreviations

CC	Common Criteria.
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level.
IC	Integrated circuit.
IT	Information Technology.
PP	Protection Profile.
ST	Security Target.
TOE	Target of Evaluation.
TSC	TSF Scope of Control.
TSF	TOE Security Functionality.



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