BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017
for
IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h,
IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh,
IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h,
IFX_CCI_000018h, design step G13 including
optional software libraries and dedicated firmware
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.15
BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017 (*)
IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah,
IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h,
IFX_CCI_000018h, design step G13 including optional software
libraries and dedicated firmware
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 10 July 2017
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
5. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6. Documentation............................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................19
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up
to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components
ADV_FSP.5, ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.3, ADV_SPM.1, ADV_TDS.5, ALC_CMC.5,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_COV.3, ATE_DPT.3, ATE_FUN.2 and
AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are
relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah,
IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h, design
step G13 including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-2015.
Specific results, mainly regarding ALC aspects of the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-
0891-2015 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah,
IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h, design
step G13 including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware was conducted by T-
Systems International GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 03.07.2017. T-Systems
International GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of
BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 10 July 2017
is valid until 9 July 2022. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah,
IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h, design
step G13 including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware has been included in
the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017
1. Executive Summary
The TOE is named IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah,
IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h, design
step G13 including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware and is an integrated
circuit (IC) in 65nm technology, providing a platform for an operating system and
application software used in smartcards but also in any other device or form factor
requiring a high level of resistance against attackers.
The Security Target [6] and [9] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.4 (Security
Requirements Rationale).
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.2 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapters 4.3, 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
Within the Security Target [6] and [9], references to, and aspects of, GBIC (German
Banking Industry Committee) are given. Unless Common Criteria relevant refinements are
made to CC contents, these GBIC topics are to be regarded as parallel and independent
of the CC certification.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017 Certification Report
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh,
IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h, design step G13 including
optional software libraries and dedicated firmware.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW IFX_CCI_000007h,
IFX_CCI_000009h,
IFX_CCI_00000Ah,
IFX_CCI_00000Bh,
IFX_CCI_000016h,
IFX_CCI_000017h and
IFX_CCI_000018h
design step G13.
Firmware includes BOS,
Flash Loader (with SCL),
and RMS.
HW-Version:
G13
FW-Version
80.101.07.0
Complete modules, with or
without inlay mounting, with or
without inlay antenna mounting,
plain wafers, in any IC case (e.g.
TSSOP28, VQFN32, VQFN40,
CCS-modules, etc.), in no IC
case or package, simply as bare
dies or arbitrary type of package.
The firmware is stored in
reserved areas of ROM and
NVM memories.
2 SW Libraries (to be chosen
optionally and individually):
RSA2048,
RSA4096,
EC,
Toolbox,
HSL.
V2.06.003,
V2.06.003,
V2.06.003,
V2.06.003,
V01.22.4346.
Object code (electronic data in
lib format)
3 Doc 16-bit Security Controller –
V02 Errata sheet
[13]
Rev. 2.2,
Infineon, 14th
March 2016
Document in electronic form
4 Doc 16-bit Security Controller –
V02 Hardware Reference
Manual
[12]
Rev. 4.2,
Infineon, 15th
November 2016
Document in electronic form
5 Doc 16-Bit Security Controller -
V02, Security Guidelines
[11]
Rev. 1.00-1545,
Infineon, 01st
December 2016
Document in electronic form
6 Doc CL52 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T
RSA/ECC/Toolbox with
included Errata Sheet of 10th
May 2017
[14]
Rev. 2.06.003,
Infineon, 12th
December 2016
Document in electronic form
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
7 Doc Crypto@2304TV3 User
manual
[15]
Rev. 1.4.1,
Infineon, 10th
November 14
Document in electronic form
8 Doc Hardware Support Library
(HSL)
[18]
Rev. 01.22.4346,
2016, Infineon
Document in electronic form
9 Doc Production and
Personalization, 16-bit
Security Controller in 65 nm
[17]
Rev. 3.2,
Infineon, 05th
August 2016
Document in electronic form
10 Doc 16-bit Security Controller 65-
nm Technology,
Programmer's Reference
Manual
[16]
Rev. 9.1,
Infineon, 11th
February 2016
Document in electronic form
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery procedures follow the user demands, meaning that the user defines the
procedures applied for delivery. These procedures include, but are not limited to, selection
of the carrier, packing requirements, labelling, delivery documentation and information.
The delivery to the user is always via the regional distribution centres, which are also
audited.
Regarding identification of the TOE, at TOE start-up a special mode can be chosen by
applying special signalling in contact based communication and the TOE subsequently
outputs the generic chip identification data. A user can identify these data, interpret it and
retrieve the respective TOE versioning information.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE.
It provides basic security functionalities to be used by a smart card operating system and a
smart card application, thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the
TOE implements a symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES)
to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support
implementations of secure authentication protocols.
It furthermore provides a True Random Number Generator (TRNG), Hybrid Random
Generator (HRNG), and Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG).
The RSA Library is used to provide a high level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the core and on the hardware asymmetric coprocessor and
includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The EC Library is used to
provide a high level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the core and
on hardware asymmetric coprocessor and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA
and DFA attacks.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017 Certification Report
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA and EC cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
The TOE as well implements user manageable memory access control policy. The security
policy of memory access control policy has been formally modelled. The formal model
covers further security policies.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment.
Regarding the operational environment of the TOE the security objectives OE.Resp-Appl
(Treatment of User Data of the Composite TOE), and OE.Process-Sec-IC (Protection
during composite product manufacturing), OE.Lim_Block_Loader (Limitation of capability
and blocking the Loader), OE.TOE_Auth (External entities authenticating of the TOE) and
OE.Loader_Usage (Secure communication and usage of the Loader) are relevant for the
user in context of secure installation of the TOE and the secure preparation of the
operational environment. All objectives are properly covered by user guidance.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is an integrated circuit (IC) providing a platform for an operating system and
application software used in smartcards but also in any other device or form factor
requiring a high level of resistance against attackers. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 2.1.
The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251
architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central
Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit) and MED (Memory
Encryption/Decryption Unit). The two CPUs control each other in order to detect faults and
serve by this for data integrity.
The TOE implements a linear addressable memory space for each privilege level and a
simple scalable Memory Management concept. The flexible memory concept consists of
ROM- and Flash-memory as part of the non volatile memory (NVM). There is no user
available on-chip ROM module. The user software and data are now located in a
dedicated and protected part of the NVM.
Two cryptographic co-processors are available: The symmetric co-processor (SCP)
combines both AES and Triple-DES with dual-key or triple-key hardware acceleration. And
the Asymmetric Crypto Co-processor is used for RSA and Elliptic Curve (EC)
cryptography.
The software part of the TOE consists of the cryptographic RSA- and EC- libraries and the
supporting Toolbox libraries.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017
The Flash Loader is a firmware located in the ROM and enables the download of the user
software or parts of it to the NVM. After completion of the download and before delivery to
the final user the Flash Loader shall be locked by the by the user.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapters 1.2 and 2.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into following categories:
● technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against the
specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the circuitry
(this testing is not strictly related to Security Functions),
● tests which are performed in a simulation environment for analogue and for digital
simulations,
● regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software (optional
software libraries) and for the IC Dedicated Support Software (BOS) on emulator
versions of the TOE or within the simulation of chip in special hardware, or on final
hardware and firmware,
● qualification tests to release the TOE to production:
• used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation
tests)
• special verification tests for Security Functions which were done with samples of the
TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which include also layout
tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify statements concerning
the layout;
● functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3 or phase 4 depending on
the TOE delivery form).
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms as identified
in the functional specification, and in the high and low level designs.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
sites. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer by sampling or by complete repetition of regression tests
especially for the software. Besides repeating exactly the developer’s tests, test
parameters and test equipment are varied and additional analysis was done. Security
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features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the
evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The developer has tested the TOE. In cases that different configurations were tested, the
evaluators assessed the validity of test results for the TOE.
The evaluators supplied evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides the Security
Functions as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE Security Functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functions into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planed based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of Security Functions using bespoke equipment and expert
know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically (i.e. DPA/SPA testing).
The evaluators have tested the TOE. In cases that different configurations were tested, the
evaluators assessed the validity of test results for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated derivate of the TOE is IFX_CCI_000007h, G13 with firmware and optional
software libraries (RSA2048 2k and 4k, EC, Toolbox, HSL) with revisions as stated in table
2 above. The flash loader (part of FW) was enabled on evaluated derivative. All hardware
modules and all interfaces including options were activated and the ranges of available
memories was not limited (i.e. maximum size was available). The BPU feature was not
used.
An extensive overview over all possible configuration options is given in the Security
Target [6] and [9] in table 4.
The evaluation results, also including results of tests performed by the developer, are valid
for all hardware derivates of IFX_CCI_000007h, G13 (with all further identifiers, all
identifiers represent the equal hardware platform and the differences are achieved by
configuration and blocking options) of the TOE. The firmware and optional software
libraries (RSA2048 2k and 4k, EC, Toolbox, HSL libraries) were examined in those
revisions, which are stated in table 2 (above).
The evaluation results are valid for all configurations and blocking options of the hardware
stated in table 4 of the Security Target [6] and [9]. Depending on configuration, blocking
option and on selection of optional software libraries, some of the services might be
unavailable to the user. The unavailable services have no security impact on the TOE. The
user must ensure a working configuration, e.g. the RAM size shall be selected to fulfill the
minimum requirement of RSA library, if it was also selected as an option. The evaluation
results apply to all configurations of Flash Loader, BPU and PIN-Letter as stated in table 3
of the Security Target [6] and [9].
The evaluation results cannot be extended to further versions/derivates of the TOE and/or
another production sites without any extra investigations.
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9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Functionality Classes and Evaluation Methodology for Deterministic Random Number
Generators, Part of AIS20, Version 2.0, 02.12.1999
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Part of AIS25, JIL, version 3.0, February
2009
● JIL-HW-ADV_ARC Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and
similar devices, Version 2.0, JIL, January 2012,
● Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.9, JIL, January 2013,
● Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.2, JIL, January 2013,
● A proposal for: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for true (physical)
random number generators, Part of AIS31, Version 3.1, BSI, 25.09.2001,
● A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Part of AIS31,
Version 2.00, BSI, 18.09.2011,
● Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Part of AIS36,
Version 1.2, JIL, January 2012,
● Guideline for the Development and Evaluation of formal security policy models in the
scope of ITSEC and Common Criteria, Part of AIS39, Version 2.0, BSI, 04.12.2007,
● Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of Elliptic Curve
Implementations, Part of AIS46, Version 1.0.4, BSI, 01.07.2011,
● Methodology for cryptographic rating of memory encryption schemes used in smartcards
and similar devices, Part of AIS46, Version 1.0, BSI, 31.10.2013,
● Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA, DSA
and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations, Part of AIS46, Version 1.0, BSI,
14.01.2013.
(see [4] for respective AIS references).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE, where it has to be noticed that these are only relevant in the
GBIC context and not in the CC context.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
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● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report),
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-2015 in the sense that specific
results, mainly regarding ALC aspects of the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-2015
were re-used.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
A table of cryptographic functionalities of the TOE can be found in table 19 of the Security
Target [6] and [9], where all Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security
Level above 100 Bits' of table 19 with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits
(in general context).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software and/or Embedded Software using the TOE.
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For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely
use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of
the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been
correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the
evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as
outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
In addition, all the instructions in the following user guidance documents shall be
considered when using the TOE (see also section 13 below, bibliography):
● see documents [11] – [18].
The fulfilment of security objectives for the environment from the Security Target, [6] and
[9] shall be ensured as well.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BOS Boot Operating System
BPU Bill per use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DRNG Deterministic random number generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FW Firmware
GBIC German Banking Industry Committee
HRNG Hybrid random number generator
HSL Hardware Support Library
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HW Hardware
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NVM Non volatile memory
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
SCL Symmetric cryptographic library
SCP Symmetric cryptographic processor
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True random number generator
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Confidential Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017, Version 0.9, 22.05.2017,
“Confidential Security Target IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h,
IFX_CCI_00000Ah, IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h,
IFX_CCI_000018h, design step G13”, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential
document)
8
specifically
• AIS1, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, Version 13,
14.08.2008,
• AIS14, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 03.08.2010,
• AIS19, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical
Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC, Version 9, 03.11.2014,
• AIS20, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3.0, 15.05.2013,
• AIS25, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen, Version 8, 12.02.2013,
• AIS26, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9, 21.03.2013,
• AIS31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3.0, 15.05.2013,
• AIS32, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 6, 08.07.2011,
• AIS34, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+, Version 3, 03.09.2009,
• AIS35, Öffentliche Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 12.11.2007,
• AIS36, Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 4, 15.05.2013,
• AIS38, Wiederverwendung von Evaluationsergebnissen, Version 2, 28.09.2007,
• AIS39, Formal Method, Version 3.0, 24.10.2008,
• AIS46, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise
für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 04.12.2013.
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[7] Evaluation Technical Report for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017, 1.01,
03.07.2017, “Evaluation Technical Report - Summary”, T-Systems International
GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Public Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017, Version 0.3, 22.05.2017, “Public
Security Target IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah,
IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h,
design step G13”, Infineon Technologies AG (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-
0961-2017, Version 1.13, 27.06.2017, ETR for composite evaluation (EFC), T-
Systems International GmbH (confidential document)
[11] 16-Bit Security Controller - V02, Security Guidelines, Rev. 1.00-1545, Infineon,
01.12.2016
[12] 16-bit Security Controller – V02 Hardware Reference Manual, Rev. 4.2, Infineon,
15.11.2016
[13] 16-bit Security Controller – V02 Errata sheet, Rev. 2.2, Infineon, 14.03.2016
[14] CL52 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox with
included Errata Sheet of 10th
May 2017, Rev. 2.06.003, Infineon, 12.12.2016
[15] Crypto@2304TV3 User manual, Rev. 1.4.1, Infineon, 10.11.2014
[16] 16-bit Security Controller 65-nm Technology, Programmer's Reference Manual, Rev.
9.1, Infineon, 11.02.2016
[17] Production and Personalization, 16-bit Security Controller in 65 nm, Rev. 3.2,
Infineon, 05.08.2016
[18] Hardware Support Library (HSL), chm-file, Rev. 01.22.4346, 2016, Infineon
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
Table 3: APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
Table 4: ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Table 5: Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0961-2017
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product IFX_CCI_000007h, IFX_CCI_000009h, IFX_CCI_00000Ah,
IFX_CCI_00000Bh, IFX_CCI_000016h, IFX_CCI_000017h, IFX_CCI_000018h, design
step G13 including optional software libraries and dedicated firmware (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme
Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 10 July 2017, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3) are fulfilled for the development and production
sites of the TOE listed below:
Type of site Site
Development Infineon Technologies AG, Am Campeon 1-12, 85579 Neubiberg,
Germany
Infineon Technologies Austria AG, Development Center Graz,
Babenbergerstr. 10, 8020 Graz Austria
Infineon Technologies AG, Alter Postweg 101, 86159 Augsburg,
Germany
Infineon Technologies AG DC Bucharest, Novopark Blvd., Dimitrie
Pompei Nr. 6, Section 2, 020335 Bucharest, Romania
Production / Testing /
Packaging / Delivery
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd., 1, Nan-Ke
North Rd., Tainan Science Park, Tainan 741-44, Taiwan
Ardentec Corporation, No. 3, Gungye 3rd Rd., Hsin-Chu Industrial
Park, Hu-Kou, Hsin-Chu Hsien, Taiwan 30351, R.O.C., Taiwan
Amkor Technology Philippines, Km. 22 East Service Rd., South
Superhighway, Muntinlupa City 1702, Philippines
Amkor Technology Philippines, 119 North Science Avenue,
Laguna Technopark, Binan, Laguna 4024, Philippines
Infineon Technologies AG, Wernerwerkstraße 2, 93049
Regensburg, Germany
Infineon Technology AG, DCE, Kühne & Nagel, Stockstädter
Strasse 10 – Building 8A, 63762 Großostheim, Germany
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Type of site Site
Infineon Technologies AG, Wernerwerkstraße 2, 93049
Regensburg, Germany
Kuehne & Nagel, 30805 Santana Street, Hayward, CA 94544,
USA
Excel Singapure PTE Ltd., DHL Exel Supply Chain, Greenwich
Drive 1, Singapore 489949, Singapore
Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd., No. 118, Xing Chuang San
Lu, Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu, P.R. China
Table 7: List of relevant sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6] and [9]. Within the baseline certification and re-considered via
re-use in the AIS38-sense in this certification, the evaluators verified, that the threats,
security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated
in the Security Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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