Palo Alto Networks
WF-500 and WF-500-B
WildFire 10.2
Security Target
Version: 1.0
Date: February 6, 2023
Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
www.paloaltonetworks.com
© 2023 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks. A list of our trademarks
can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be
trademarks of their respective companies.
WF-500 and WF-500-B WildFire 10.2 Security Target Palo Alto Networks
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Table of Contents
1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
1.1 SECURITY TARGET, TOE AND CC IDENTIFICATION .........................................................................................2
1.2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS.................................................................................................................................2
1.3 CONVENTIONS................................................................................................................................................4
1.3.1 Terminology .........................................................................................................................................4
1.3.2 Acronyms..............................................................................................................................................5
2. PRODUCT DESCRIPTION.................................................................................................................................6
2.1 TOE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................................6
2.2 TOE ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................................7
2.2.1 Physical Boundaries ............................................................................................................................8
2.2.2 Logical Boundaries ..............................................................................................................................9
2.3 TOE DOCUMENTATION ...............................................................................................................................10
2.4 EXCLUDED FUNCTIONALITY..........................................................................................................................10
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION...............................................................................................................12
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..................................................................................................................................13
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................13
5. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................................14
5.1 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ..........................................................................................................................14
5.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ..............................................................................................14
5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU) .........................................................................................................................15
5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS) ...........................................................................................................18
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)...........................................................................................23
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)............................................................................................................25
5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)..............................................................................................................26
5.2.6 TOE Access (FTA)..............................................................................................................................27
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)...........................................................................................................28
5.3 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................................29
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .................................................................................................................30
6.1 SECURITY AUDIT...........................................................................................................................................30
6.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT...........................................................................................................................31
6.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION.......................................................................................................38
6.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................................40
6.5 PROTECTION OF THE TSF.............................................................................................................................41
6.6 TOE ACCESS ................................................................................................................................................43
6.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS..........................................................................................................................44
7. PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS ...................................................................................................................45
8. RATIONALE.......................................................................................................................................................46
WF-500 and WF-500-B WildFire 10.2 Security Target Palo Alto Networks
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 - WildFire File Analysis................................................................................................................................1
Figure 2 - WildFire Interaction with Systems..........................................................................................................7
Figure 3 - TOE Architecture.......................................................................................................................................7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Platforms ...............................................................................................................................................8
Table 2 Excluded Features.......................................................................................................................................10
Table 3 TOE Security Functional Components .....................................................................................................14
Table 4 Auditable Events..........................................................................................................................................16
Table 5 Assurance Components..............................................................................................................................29
Table 6 Cryptographic Functions ............................................................................................................................31
Table 7 FIPS 186-4 Conformance...........................................................................................................................33
Table 8 Private Keys and CSPs................................................................................................................................34
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST
conventions, ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is a physical appliance running
WildFire software version 10.2.3-h2, provided by Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
The physical appliances are the WF-500 and WF-500-B, which are on-premise network devices that
identify unknown malware, zero-day exploits, and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) through dynamic
analysis, and automatically disseminates protection in near real-time to help security teams meet the
challenge of advanced cyber-attacks. Unknown files are analyzed by WildFire in a scalable sandbox
environment where new threats are identified, and protections are automatically developed and delivered
in the form of an update. The result is a unique, closed loop approach to controlling cyber threats that
begins with positive security controls to reduce the attack surface, inspection of all traffic, ports, and
protocols to block all known threats, and rapid detection of unknown threats by observing their actual
behavior. The appliance’s architecture allows organizations to meet privacy and regulatory requirements
for local analysis while still benefiting from shared threat intelligence and protections from other WildFire
subscribers.
Figure 1 - WildFire File Analysis
The focus of this evaluation is on the TOE functionality supporting the claims in the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices. (See Section 1.2 for specific version information).
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The only capabilities covered by the evaluation are those specified in the aforementioned Protection
Profile, all other capabilities are not covered in the evaluation. The security functionality specified in
[NDcPP] includes protection of communications between the TOE and trusted external IT entities (trusted
channel), protection of communications between the TOE and remote administrators (trusted path),
identification and authentication of administrators, auditing of security-relevant events, ability to verify
the source and integrity of updates to the TOE, implementation of session idle timeout, and the restricted
use of FIPS Approved algorithms and protocols.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
• Product Description
• Security Problem Definition
• Security Objectives
• IT Security Requirements
• TOE Summary Specification
• Protection Profile Claims
• Rationale
1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification
ST Title – Palo Alto Networks WF-500 and WF-500-B WildFire 10.2 Security Target
ST Version – Version 1.0
ST Date – February 6, 2023
TOE Identification – Palo Alto Networks WildFire WF-500 and WF-500-B running version 10.2.3-h2.
TOE Developer – Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
Evaluation Sponsor – Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
CC Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Release 5,
April 2017
1.2 Conformance Claims
PP Reference: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23-March-2020
The following NIAP Technical Decisions apply to this PP, and have been accounted for in the ST
development:
• TD0527 – Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing (FIA_X509_EXT.1)
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates solely to evaluation activities so it does not affect
the ST.
• TD0528 – NIT Technical Decision for Missing EAs for FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE because FCS_NTP_EXT.1 is not claimed.
• TD0536 – NIT Technical Decision for Update Verification Inconsistency
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates solely to evaluation activities so it does not affect
the ST.
• TD0537 – NIT Technical Decision for Incorrect reference to FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates solely to evaluation activities so it does not affect
the ST.
• TD0538 – NIT Technical Decision for Outdated link to allowed-with list
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o This TD is a semantic issue with the claimed PP that was corrected. It does not affect the ST or
the evaluation of the TOE.
• TD0546 – NIT Technical Decision for DTLS - clarification of Application Note 63
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE; it relates to FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1, which is not claimed by
the ST.
• TD0547 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification on developer disclosure of AVA_VAN
o This TD is applicable to the TOE.
• TD0555 – NIT Technical Decision for RFC Reference incorrect in TLSS Test
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to test evaluation activities so it does not
affect the ST.
• TD0556 – NIT Technical Decision for RFC 5077 question
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to test evaluation activities so it does not
affect the ST.
• TD0563 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of audit date information
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to an application note that clarifies the
intent of FAU_GEN.1.2. It does not affect the ST.
• TD0564 – NIT Technical Decision for Vulnerability Analysis Search Criteria
o This requirement is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to the evaluation of AVA_VAN.1. It
does not affect the ST because the additional ST evidence required to address this TD is already
addressed by TD0547.
• TD0569 – NIT Technical Decision for Session ID Usage Conflict in FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to test evaluation activities so it does not
affect the ST. Note specifically that while the title of the TD references FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1,
which the ST does not claim, the TD also affects FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, which is within the TOE’s
logical boundary.
• TD0570 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification about FIA_AFL.1
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to clarifying how the PP reader should
interpret FIA_AFL.1. It does not affect the ST.
• TD0571 – NIT Technical Decision for Guidance on how to handle FIA_AFL.1
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to clarifying how the PP reader should
interpret the requirements that relate to FIA_AFL.1. It does not affect the ST.
• TD0572 – NIT Technical Decision for Restricting FTP_ITC.1 to only IP address identifiers
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to guidance on the interpretation of
mandatory and allowable reference identifiers for cases where the TSF must validate the
identifier of a presented X.509 certificate. It does not affect the ST.
• TD0580 – NIT Technical Decision for clarification about use of DH14 in NDcPPv2.2e
o The TD affects a selection in FCS_CKM.2.
• TD0581 – NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic curve-based key establishment and NIST SP 800-
56Arev3
o The TD adds a selection to FCS_CKM.2 that the ST has applied.
• TD0591 – NIT Technical Decision for Virtual TOEs and hypervisors
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE. The TD applies only to virtual network devices and there is
no virtualized instance of the TOE.
• TD0592 – NIT Technical Decision for Local Storage of Audit Records
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE. The TD modifies introductory text to remove a
contradictory statement about local audit storage. It does not affect any SFR claims.
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• TD0631 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of Public Key Authentication for SSH Server
o This TD is applicable to the TOE; the wording of FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 is updated and the required
selection is added to FMT_SMF.1.1,
• TD0632 – NIT Technical Decision for Consistency with Time Data for vNDs
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE. It adds a selection to FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 but the TSF does
not claim the added behavior.
• TD0633 – NIT Technical Decision for IPsec IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE because the TOE does not claim IPsec functionality.
• TD0634 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification Required for Testing IPv6
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but affects test evaluation activities only; it does not affect the
ST.
• TD0635 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server and Key Agreement Parameters
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but affects test evaluation activities only; it does not affect the
ST.
• TD0636 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of Public Key User Authentication for SSH
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE because the TOE does not claim SSH client functionality.
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 3 Conformant.
1.3 Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
• Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that
may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
• All operations performed in this ST are identified according to conventions described in [NDcPP].
• The ST author does not change operations that have been completed by the PP authors nor undo
the formatting. For example, if the text is italicized, bolded, or underlined by the PP author, the ST
author will not undo it. In this way operations have been identified.
• Selection/Assignment operations completed by the PP author remain as described in the [NDcPP].
• Selection/Assignment operations completed by the ST author was bolded to show that it was
completed by the ST author and not taken as-is from the PP.
• Iteration operations completed by the ST author are identified with (1), (2), and (next number) with
descriptive text following the name (e.g. FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1(1) HTTPS Protocol (TLS Server)).
1.3.1 Terminology
The following terms and abbreviations are used in this ST:
• WF – WildFire appliance
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• UID – Unique Identification feature is a combination LED/button that is used to assist a technician
in locating a device
• CO – Cryptographic Officer (Administrator or superuser)
• CCECG – Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide used to assist an administrator with
steps for configuring the TOE properly
1.3.2 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology
Security
CM Configuration Management
CLI Command Line Interface
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FSP Functional Specification
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IP Internet Protocol
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PP Protection Profile
REST Representational State Transfer
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)
SA Security Association
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
URL Uniform Resource Locator
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2. Product Description
The TOE is the Palo Alto Networks WF-500 or WF-500-B appliance, which utilizes the WildFire 10.2
software. It receives network traffic samples from individual Palo Alto Networks Firewalls in its
Operational Environment over a secure channel.
The evaluation only includes the WF-500 or WF-500-B physical device as identified in sections above.
Other deployments of WildFire are cloud-based and are not within scope of this evaluation. Palo Alto
Networks Next-Generation Firewalls are components of the TOE’s Operational Environment and were
evaluated previously, and information about them are provided for completeness only.
2.1 TOE Overview
It is required that the TOE be placed in FIPS-CC mode, which ensures that only FIPS/CC
approved/allowed algorithms are utilized when interacting with other devices in the operational network.
For communications with Palo Alto Networks Firewalls appliances, only the secure communication
channels are claimed.
The TOE utilizes various protocols in its communication with other devices. TLS is used to secure
connections between the TOE and other devices on the network such as the Firewall and syslog server.
For any updates that are required on the TOE such as configuration changes that are processed via CLI,
SSHv2 is used to secure these connections.
The various protocols implemented by the module include TLS and SSH. The TOE has the ability to handle
certificates for their desired purpose as well as being able to generate certificates that can be used for
these functions. Administrators are able to setup the TOE to support mutual authentication to improve the
security of their appliance as it communicates with other devices.
As a network device, the TOE is required to generate logging events, which can be used by administrators
to audit functions of the TOE as well as its interactions with other components. The TOE provides the
ability to store logs locally, and also has the ability to send these logs to an external syslog server via a TLS
connection.
To protect the TOE from unauthorized access and disruption, the TOE has security features in place that
will log out idle administrators, lock the device in the event of too many failed authentication attempts,
and has the ability to increase the password length to harden the credentials of administrators.
Operators that provide the correct credentials to the TOE are able to perform all management functions
via the CLI, which is protected using SSHv2. Configurations can be updated for the ability of the appliance
to communicate with other devices on the network, generate certificates, and perform security actions
such as zeroization.
Figure 2 provides an overview of the communication protocols used between the TOE and other devices
on the network. The PAN-OS Firewall devices are in the operational environment, and only the secure
communication channels from the WildFire to those devices are claimed.
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Figure 2 - WildFire Interaction with Systems
2.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that is comprised of items listed in Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
The software comes pre-installed on the device and can be updated by downloading a new version from the
Palo Alto Networks support site. The system consists of the following items: system software, database,
linux-derived operating system, and the hardware. The database is a repository for audit logs, user logs, and
system/configuration data. The system software contains necessary items to support the functionality of
the device such as using OpenSSL/OpenSSH, and items necessary for management interfaces (CLI). The
WildFire 10.2 software runs on top of the PAN-OS 10.2 operating system. PAN-OS 10.2 is an operating
system derived from Linux kernel version 4.18.0 to enforce domain separation, memory management, disk
access, file I/O, and communications with the underlying hardware components including memory, network
I/O, CPUs, and hard disks. Only services and libraries required by the system software and DB are enabled
in the OS.
The following diagram demonstrates the software and hardware architecture of the TOE.
Figure 3 - TOE Architecture
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2.2.1 Physical Boundaries
The TOE consists of the following components:
• Palo Alto Networks WF-500 or WF-500-B hardware appliance
• WildFire 10.2 (running on top of PAN-OS 10.2): The software component that runs on the
appliance
The WF-500 appliance includes the following ports:
• (Qty. 1) RJ-45 10/100/1000 management port used for managing the device and for data traffic
• (Qty. 3) RJ-45 10/100/1000 ports used for data traffic
• (Qty. 1) Graphics Port (reserved for future use)
• (Qty. 1) UID
• (Qty. 1) DB-9 serial port for console access (disabled in FIPS-CC mode)
• (Qty. 2) Power supplies
• (Qty. 4) USB ports (reserved for future use; disabled in FIPS-CC mode)
The WF-500-B appliance includes the following ports:
• (Qty. 1) RJ-45 10/100/1000 management port used for managing the device and for data traffic
• (Qty. 3) RJ-45 10/100/1000 ports used for data traffic
• (Qty. 1) Graphics Port (reserved for future use)
• (Qty. 1) UID
• (Qty. 1) DB-9 serial port for console access (disabled in FIPS-CC mode)
• (Qty. 2) Power supplies
• (Qty. 4) USB ports (reserved for future use; disabled in FIPS-CC mode)
Table 1 TOE Platforms
Product
Identification
Illustration Description
WF-500
The appliance detects
unknown threats through
a combination of multiple
complementary analysis
techniques.
Processor: Intel Xeon E5-
2620 (Sandy Bridge)
WF-500-B
The appliance detects
unknown threats through
a combination of multiple
complementary analysis
techniques.
Processor: Intel Xeon
Silver 4316 (Ice Lake)
The operational environment includes the following:
• Syslog server
• Palo Alto Networks Firewall appliances
• Workstation
o SSHv2 client
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2.2.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
2.2.2.1 Security Audit
The TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for a variety of security relevant events including the
events specified in NDcPP. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally or can be configured to
send the logs to a designated external log server.
2.2.2.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements NIST validated cryptographic algorithms that provide key management, random bit
generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message
authentication features in support of cryptographic protocols such as TLS and SSH. In order to utilize
these features, the TOE must be configured in FIPS-CC mode.
The TOE’s (Palo Alto Networks Crypto Module) cryptographic functionality is validated by the following
CAVP certificate: #A2906.
2.2.2.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE requires that all users that access the TOE be successfully identified and authenticated before
they can have access to any security functions that are available in the TOE. The TOE offers functions
through connections using SSH for administrators.
The TOE supports the local definition and authentication of administrators with username, password, SSH
keys, and role that it uses to authenticate the operator. These items are associated with an operator and
an authorized role for access to the TOE. The TOE uses X.509 certificates to support TLS authentication.
2.2.2.4 Security Management
The TOE provides access to the security management features using the CLI. CLI commands are
transmitted over SSH for both local and remote connections. Security management commands are limited
to administrators and only available after the operator has successfully authenticated themselves to the
TOE. The TOE provides access to these services via direct RJ-45 Ethernet connection and remotely using
an SSHv2 client. The product also includes a console port, but once FIPS-CC mode is enabled, the console
port is disabled.
2.2.2.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements features designed to protect itself, and to ensure the reliability and integrity of its
security functions.
Stored passwords and cryptographic keys are protected so that unauthorized access does not result in
sensitive data being lost, and the TOE also contains various self-tests so that it can detect if there are any
errors with the system or if malicious activity has occurred. The TOE provides its own timing mechanism
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to ensure that reliable time information is present. The TOE uses digital signature mechanisms when
performing trusted updates to ensure installation of software is valid and authenticated properly.
2.2.2.6 TOE Access
The TOE provides the ability for both TOE and user-initiated locking of the interactive sessions for the
TOE termination of an interactive session after a period of inactivity is observed. Additionally, the TOE is
able to display an advisory message regarding unauthorized use of the TOE before establishing a user
session.
2.2.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with remote administrators using SSH. Communication with
other devices and services (such as a Syslog server) are protected using TLS and X.509 certificates to
support TLS authentication.
2.3 TOE Documentation
Palo Alto Networks, Inc. has several documents that provide operators with information regarding the
installation, and the included security features.
For WildFire 10.2 these documents include the following:
• Palo Alto Networks Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide (CCECG) for WildFire 10.2
• Palo Alto Networks WildFire Administrator Guide Version 10.2, Last Revised: June 7, 2022
• WF-500 WildFire Appliance Hardware Reference Guide, February 29, 2016
• WF-500-B WildFire Appliance Hardware Reference Guide, June 6, 2022
2.4 Excluded Functionality
The list below identifies features or protocols that are not evaluated or must be disabled, and the rationale
why. Note that this does not mean the features cannot be used in the evaluated configuration (unless
explicitly stated so). It means that the features were not evaluated and/or validated by an independent third
party and the functional correctness of the implementation is vendor assertion. Evaluated functionality is
scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in Security Target. In particular, only
the following protocols implemented by the TOE have been tested, and only to the extent specified by the
security functional requirements: TLS and SSH. The features below are out of scope.
Table 2 Excluded Features
Feature Description
Telnet and HTTP Management
Protocols
Telnet and HTTP are disabled by default and cannot be enabled
in the evaluated configuration. Telnet and HTTP are insecure
protocols which allow for plaintext passwords to be
transmitted. Use SSH and HTTPS only as the management
protocols to manage the TOE.
Online Certificate Status
Protocol
CRL (not OCSP) is to be used in the evaluated configuration.
External Authentication Servers The WildFire appliance supports the optional use of RADIUS as
an authentication server, but this is not claimed in the TOE’s
evaluated configuration.
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Feature Description
Shell and Console Access The shell and console access is only allowed for pre-operational
installation, configuration, and post-operational maintenance
and trouble shooting.
Any features not associated with
SFRs in claimed NDcPP
NDcPP forbids adding additional requirements to the Security
Target (ST). If additional functionalities are mentioned in the ST,
it is for completeness only.
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3. Security Problem Definition
This security target includes by reference the Security Problem Definition (composed of organizational
policies, threat statements, and assumption) from [NDcPP].
In general, the [NDcPP] has presented a Security Problem Definition appropriate for network
infrastructure devices, such as firewalls, and as such is applicable to the Palo Alto TOE. NOTE:
A.COMPONENTS_RUNNING is not applicable because this is not a distributed TOE. [NDcPP] also has
virtualization assumptions that are not applicable here.
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4. Security Objectives
Like the Security Problem Definition, this security target includes by reference the Security Objectives
from the [NDcPP]. The security objectives for the operational environment are reproduced below, since
these objectives characterize technical and procedural measures each consumer must implement in their
operational environment. NOTE: OE.COMPONENTS_RUNNING is not applicable because this is not a
distributed TOE. [NDcPP] also has a virtualization related objective (OE.VM_CONFIGURATION) that is not
applicable here.
4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the
TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the
environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other
than those services necessary for the operation,
administration and support of the TOE.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that
traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will
be covered by other security and assurance measures in
the operational environment.
OE.UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an
administrator on a regular basis in response to the release
of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to
access the TOE must be protected on any other platform
on which they reside.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
guidance documentation in a trusted manner.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based
authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed
to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the
TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the
TOE’s trust store in case such certificate can no longer be
trusted.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Security Administrator ensures that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material,
PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the
equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
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5. IT Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements
(SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to
scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the following Protection Profiles (PP):
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 [NDcPP],
As a result, refinements and operations already performed in that PP are not identified (e.g., highlighted)
here, rather the requirements have been copied from that PP and any residual operations have been
completed herein. Of particular note, the [NDcPP] made a number of refinements and completed some of
the SFR operations defined in the CC and that PP should be consulted to identify those changes if
necessary.
The SARs are the set of SARs specified in [NDcPP].
5.1 Extended Requirements
All the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the [NDcPP]. The [NDcPP] defines all the
extended SFRs (*_EXT) and since they are not redefined in this ST, the [NDcPP] should be consulted for
more information regarding those CC extensions.
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the Palo Alto TOE.
Table 3 TOE Security Functional Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2: User Identity Association
FAU_STG_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption: Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1/SigGen: Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and
Verification)
FCS_COP.1/Hash: Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash
Algorithm)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2: TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
Page 15 of 46
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1: TLS Server Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2: TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_AFL.1: Authentication Failure Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev: X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2(1): X.509 Certificate Authentication (Syslog
Connections)
FIA_X509_EXT.2(2): X.509 Certificate Authentication (Firewall
Connections)
FIA_X509_EXT.3: X.509 Certificate Requests
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate: Management of Security Functions
Behaviour
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData: Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared,
symmetric and private keys)
FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
FTA: TOE Access FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination
FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
FTP: Trusted
Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1: Inter-TSF Trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1/Admin: Trusted Path
5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)
FAU_GEN.1 – Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
Page 16 of 46
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All administrative actions comprising:
• Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual
user accounts are required for administrators).
• Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the
information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
• Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the
action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
• Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
• [no other actions];
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 4
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the cPP/ST, information specified in column three
of Table 4.
Table 4 Auditable Events
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record
Contents
FAU_GEN.1 None. None.
FAU_GEN.2 None. None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.2 None. None.
FCS_CKM.4 None. None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption None. None.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen None. None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash None. None.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash None. None.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. None
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Failure to establish a SSH session. Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 Failure to establish a TLS session. Reason for failure
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 Failure to establish a TLS session. Reason for failure
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 Failure to establish a TLS session. Reason for failure
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 Failure to establish a TLS session. Reason for failure
FIA_AFL.1 Unsuccessful login attempts limit is
met or exceeded.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address)
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None. None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
Page 17 of 46
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record
Contents
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_UAU.7 None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev Unsuccessful attempt to validate a
certificate
Any addition, replacement or
removal of trust anchors1
in the
TOE's trust store
Reason for failure of certificate
validation
Identification of certificates
added, replaced or removed as
trust anchor in the TOE's trust
store
FIA_X509_EXT.2(1)
FIA_X509_EXT.2(2)
None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 None. None.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Any attempt to initiate a manual
update
None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData None. None.
FMT_SMF.1 All management activities of TSF
data.
None.
FMT_SMR.2 None. None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update; result of the
update attempt (success or failure)
None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Discontinuous changes to time -
either Administrator actuated or
changed via an automated process.
(Note that no continuous changes to
time need to be logged. See also
application note on
FPT_STM_EXT.1)
For discontinuous changes to
time: The old and new values for
the time.
Origin of the attempt to change
time for success and failure (e.g.,
IP address).
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (if
“terminate the session” is
selected)
The termination of a local session by
the session locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote session
by the session locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive
session.
None.
FTA_TAB.1 None. None.
1
Importing CA certificate(s) or generating CA certificate(s) internally will implicitly set them as trust anchor.
Page 18 of 46
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record
Contents
FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted channel.
Termination of the trusted channel.
Failure of the trusted channel
functions.
Identification of the initiator and
target of failed trusted channels
establishment attempt.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Initiation of the trusted path.
Termination of the trusted path.
Failures of the trusted path
functions.
None.
FAU_GEN.2 – User Identity Association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate
each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 – Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity
using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself [
• TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data
locally].
FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following
rule: [overwrite the oldest audit record with the newly generated audit
record] ] when the local storage space for audit data is full.
5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1 – Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet
the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix
B.3;
• ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the
following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4;
• FFC schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet
the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix
B.1
• FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: “NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [RFC
3526].
Page 19 of 46
] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].112 bits.
FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key establishment method: [
• RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-
PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, “Public-Key
Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version
2.1;
• Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST
Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;
• Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST
Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”
• FFC Schemes using “safe-prime” groups that meet the following: ‘NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [groups
listed in RFC 3526].
] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
Application Note: This SFR was modified by TD0580 and TD 0581.
FCS_CKM.4 – Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method
• For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a
[single overwrite consisting of [a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF’s
RBG]];
• For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by
the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [logically
addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [ [three or more]-
pass] overwrite consisting of [[alternating ones and zeroes]]]
that meets the following: No Standard.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption – Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES used in [CBC, CTR, GCM] mode and cryptographic key
sizes [128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3,
[CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in
ISO 19772].
FCS_COP.1/SigGen – Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
Page 20 of 46
• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048
bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits],
• Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes [256
bits, 384 bits, 521 bits]
]
that meet the following: [
• For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or
RSASSAPKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital
Signature scheme 3,
• For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-
521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4
].
FCS_COP.1/Hash – Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and cryptographic
key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes [160, 256,
384, 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash – Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, implicit] and cryptographic key sizes [160, 256, 384,
512] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following:
ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that
accumulates entropy from [[one] platform-based noise source] with minimum of [256
bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to
ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of
the keys and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 – SSH Server Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol in accordance with: RFCs 4251, 4252,
4253, 4254, [4344, 5656, 6668].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following
user authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based,
[password-based].
Application Note: This SFR was modified by TD0631.
Page 21 of 46
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [256k]
bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following
encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-cbc,
aes256-cbc, aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-
gcm@openssh.com].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation
uses [ssh-rsa] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key
algorithms.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1,
hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, implicit] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all
other MAC algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and
[ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521] are the only allowed key exchange
methods used for the SSH protocol.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used
for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to
protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached,
rekey needs to be performed.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 - TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] and reject all other TLS and SSL
versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:
[
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches [the reference identifier
per RFC 6125 section 6, IPv4 address in CN or SAN].
Page 22 of 46
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a
trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [
• Not implement any administrator override mechanism
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall [present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension
with the following curves/groups [secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1] and no other
curves/groups] in the Client Hello.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 - TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall support TLS communication with mutual authentication using
X.509v3 certificates.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 - TLS Server Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] and reject all
other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following
ciphersuites:
[
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0,
and [none].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using [Diffie-Hellman parameters
with size [2048 bits], ECDHE curves [secp256r1] and no other curves]].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall support [session resumption based on session IDs according to
RFC4346 (TLS1.1) or RFC5246 (TLS1.2), session resumption based on session tickets
according to RFC 5077].
Page 23 of 46
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 - TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall support TLS communication with mutual authentication of TLS
clients using X.509v3 certificates.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.2 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted
channel if the client certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [
• Not implement any administrator override mechanism
].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.3 The TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the identifier contained in a
certificate does not match an expected identifier for the client. If the identifier is a
Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), then the TSF shall match the identifiers
according to RFC 6125, otherwise the TSF shall parse the identifier from the
certificate and match the identifier against the expected identifier of the client as
described in the TSS.
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_AFL.1 – Authentication Failure Management
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [1 – 10]
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to
authenticate remotely using a password.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF
shall [prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing remote session using
any authentication method that involves a password until [unlock] is taken by an
Administrator; prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing remote
session using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator
defined time period has elapsed].
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 – Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
administrative passwords:
1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and
lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [“!”, “@”,
“#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(”, “)”, [“'”, “+”, “,”, “-”, “.”, “/”, “:”, “;”, “<”, “=”, “>”, “[”,
“\”, “]”, “_”, “`”, “{”, “}”, and “~”]];
2. Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [8] and [15]
characters.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 – User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to
initiate the identification and authentication process:
• Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
• [[ICMP]].
Page 24 of 46
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
administrative user.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 – Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local [password-based, SSH public key-based]
authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.
FIA_UAU.7 – Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the
authentication is in progress at the local console.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev – X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation supporting a
minimum path length of three certificates.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate as a trust
anchor.
• The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in
the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag
set to TRUE.
• The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [a
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3,
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5].
• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following
rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity
verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication
purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP
Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints
extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
FIA_X509_EXT.2(1) – X.509 Certificate Authentication (Syslog Connection)
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1(1) The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for [TLS], and [no additional uses].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2(1) When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a
certificate, the TSF shall [not accept the certificate].
Page 25 of 46
FIA_X509_EXT.2(2) – X.509 Certificate Authentication (Firewall Connections)
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1(2) The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for [TLS], and [no additional uses].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2(2) When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a
certificate, the TSF shall [allow the Administrator to choose whether to accept the
certificate in these cases, not accept the certificate].
FIA_X509_EXT.3 – X.509 Certificate Requests
FIA_X509_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request as specified by RFC 2986 and be able
to provide the following information in the request: public key and [Common Name,
Organization, Country].
FIA_X509_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the
CA Certificate Response.
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate - Management of Security Functions Behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual
update to Security Administrators.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData – Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security
Administrators.
FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or
locking;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital signature]
capability prior to installing those updates;
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
[
o Ability to configure the list of TOE-provided services available before an
entity is identified and authenticated, as specified in FIA_UIA_EXT.1;
o Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
o Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
o Ability to re-enable an Administrator account;
o Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
o Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X.509v3 certificates
as trust anchors;
o Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;
o Ability to manage the trusted public keys database
].
Page 26 of 46
Application Note: This SFR was modified by TD0631.
FMT_SMR.2 – Restrictions on Security Roles
FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
• Security Administrator.
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely
are satisfied.
5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 – Protection of TSF data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric key, and private
keys.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 – Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 – Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time].
FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on
power on), at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [RSA/ECDSA key
generation, loading firmware, use of DRBG or NDRNG]] to demonstrate the correct
operation of the TSF: [
• AES Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES Decrypt Known Answer Test
• AES GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• AES CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• RSA Sign Known Answer Test
• RSA Verify Known Answer Test
• RSA Encrypt Known Answer Test
• RSA Decrypt Known Answer Test
• ECDSA Sign Known Answer Test
• ECDSA Verify Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
Page 27 of 46
• HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• DRBG SP800-90A Known Answer Tests
• SP 800-90A Section 11.3 Health Tests
• DH Known Answer Test
• ECDH Known Answer Test
• SP 800-135 KDF Known Answer Tests
• Software Integrity Test
• Conditional Self-Tests
o Continuous Random Number Generator (RNG) test – Performed on
NDRNG and DRBG
o RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
o ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
o Firmware Load Test – Verify firmware signatures using RSA 2048 with
SHA-256 at time of load
].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 – Trusted Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently
executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [no other TOE
firmware/software version].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates
to TOE firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the
TOE using a [digital signature] prior to installing those updates.
5.2.6 TOE Access (FTA)
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 – TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [terminate the session] after a Security
Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
FTA_SSL.3 – TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-
configurable time interval of session inactivity.
FTA_SSL.4 – User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s own
interactive session.
Page 28 of 46
FTA_TAB.1 – Default TOE Access Banners
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security
Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the
TOE.
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
FTP_ITC.1 – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of using [TLS] to provide a trusted communication channel
between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit
server, [Firewall] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure
and detection of modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via
the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [
• transmitting audit records to an audit server using TLS ].
FTP_TRP.1/Admin – Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH] to provide a communication path
between itself and authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from
other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points
and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and provides detection
of modification of the channel data.
FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the
trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator
authentication and all remote administrative actions.
Page 29 of 46
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are included by reference to [NDcPP].
Table 5 Assurance Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-Cycle Support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ASE: Security Target Evaluation ASE_INT.1: ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1: Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1: Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1: Security objectives for the operational
environment
ASE_ECD.1: Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1: Stated security requirements
ASE_TSS.1: TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Consequently, the evaluation activities specified in the following Supporting Documents apply to the TOE
evaluation:
• Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document: Evaluation Activities for Network Device
cPP, December-2020, Version 2.2
Page 30 of 46
6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
6.1 Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 The TOE is designed to be able to generate log records for security-relevant events as
they occur. The events that can cause an audit record to be logged include starting and
stopping the audit function (also startup and shutdown of system), any use of an
administrator command via the CLI, as well as all of the events identified in Table 4 (which
corresponds to the audit events specified in the NDcPP.
All log records include the following contents: date/time, event type, user ID (i.e.,
username, IP address) or component (i.e., ssh, syslog), and description of the event
including success or failure. For user-initiated actions, the User ID is included in the log
records. For cryptographic key operations, the key name—or certificate name if the key
is embedded in certificate or certificate request—is also logged. Furthermore, based on
the event, the description of the event will include additional information as required in
Table 4. Please refer to the CC AGD [CCECG] for the complete list of mandated audit
logs and contents.
FAU_GEN.2 The TOE identifies the responsible user for each event based on the specific username
and/or network entity (identified by source IP address) that caused the event.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 The audit trail generated by the TOE comprises several logs, which are locally stored in
the TOE file system on the hard disk:
• Configuration logs—include events such as when an administrator configures the
device, user management, cryptographic functions, audit functions (e.g., enable
syslog over TLS connection), and when an administrator configures which events
gets audited.
• System logs—include events such as user login and logout, session
establishment, termination, and failures.
The TOE stores the audit records locally and protects them from unauthorized deletion
by allowing only users in the pre-defined Audit Administrator role to access the audit
trail with delete privileges. The pre-defined Audit Administrator role is part of the
Security Administrator role as defined by the NDcPP. The TOE is a single standalone
component that stores audit data locally. The TOE does not provide an interface where
a user can modify the audit records, thus it prevents modification to the audit records.
When a log reaches the maximum size, new audit data overwrites the oldest audit data.
Maximum disk space is dependent on the customer’s installation as it depends on the
number of hard drives installed on the system.
The TOE can be configured to send generated audit records to an external Syslog server
in real-time using TLSv1.2. When configured to send audit records to a syslog server,
Page 31 of 46
audit records are also written to the external syslog as they are written locally to the
internal logs.
6.2 Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_COP.1/*
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
The TOE includes NIST-validated cryptographic algorithms provided by Palo Alto
Networks Crypto Module supporting the cryptographic functions below. The following
functions have been certified in accordance with the identified standards.
Table 6 Cryptographic Functions
Functions Standards Certificates
Asymmetric Key Generation
FFC key pair generation (key
size 2048 bits)
FIPS PUB 186-4 DSA #A2906
ECDSA #A2906
RSA #A2906
ECC key pair generation (NIST
curves P-256, P-384, P-521)
Note that TLS and SSH each use
any of P-256, P-384, or P-521,
and certificate generation uses
only P-256 or P-384.
FIPS PUB 186-4
RSA key generation (key sizes
2048, 3072, 4096 bits)
Note that TLS uses 2048-bit
RSA keys while certificate and
SSH RSA key pair generation
use 2048, 3072, or 4096-bit
keys.
FIPS PUB 186-4
FFC Schemes using Diffie-
Hellman group 14 that meet
the following: RFC 3526 and
SP 800-56Ar3
RFC 3526
NIST SP 800-56Ar3
Cryptographic Key Establishment
RSA based key establishment RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 RSA = N/A
KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-FFC-SSC
#A2906
ECDSA based key
establishment
NIST SP 800-56Ar3
FFC based key establishment NIST SP 800-56Ar3
Key establishment scheme
using Diffie-Hellman group 14
that meets the following: RFC
3526 and SP 800-56Ar3
RFC 3526
NIST SP 800-56Ar3
Page 32 of 46
AES Data Encryption/Decryption
AES CBC, CTR, GCM (128,
256 bits)
AES as specified in ISO
18033-3
CBC as specified in ISO
10116
CTR as specified in ISO
10116
GCM as specified in ISO
19772
AES #A2906
Signature Generation and Verification
RSA Digital Signature
Algorithm (rDSA) (modulus
2048, 3072, 4096)
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 5.5, using PKCS #1
v2.1 Signature Schemes
RSASSA-PSS
and/or
RSASSAPKCS1v1_5;
ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital
signature scheme 2
or
Digital Signature scheme 3
RSA #A2906
ECDSA (NIST curves P-256,
P-384, and P-521)
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 6 and Appendix D,
Implementing “NIST curves”
P-256, P-384, ISO/IEC
14888-3, Section 6.4
ECDSA #A2906
Cryptographic Hashing
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384
and SHA-512 (digest sizes
160, 256, 384 and 512 bits)
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 SHS #A2906
Keyed-hash Message Authentication
• HMAC-SHA-1 (block size
512 bits, key size 160 bits and
digest size 160 bits)
• HMAC-SHA-256 (block size
512 bits, key size 256 bits and
digest size 256 bits)
• HMAC-SHA-384 (block size
1024 bits, key size 384 bits
and digest size 384 bits)
• HMAC-SHA-512 (block size
1024 bits, key size 512 bits
and digest size 512 bits)
ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 HMAC #A2906
Page 33 of 46
Random Bit Generation
CTR_DRBG (AES) from a
hardware-based noise source
with one independent
software-based noise source
of 256 bits of non-
determinism
ISO/IEC 18031:2011 DRBG #A2906
The TOE implements the ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Deterministic Random Bit Generator
(DRBG) based on the AES 256 block cipher in counter mode (CTR_DRBG(AES)). The
TOE instantiates the DRBG with maximum security strength, obtaining the 256 bits of
entropy from a proprietary hardware entropy source to seed the DRBG. The entropy
source is described in the proprietary Entropy Design document.
The TOE generates asymmetric cryptographic keys used for key establishment in
accordance with FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for
RSA schemes, FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4 for
ECC schemes, FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.1 for
FFC schemes, and Diffie-Hellman Group 14 according to RFC 3526, section 3.
While the TOE generally fulfills all of the FIPS PUB 186-4 requirements without
extensions, the following table specifically identifies the “should”, “should not”, and
“shall not” conditions from the publication along with an indication of whether the TOE
conforms to those conditions with deviations rationalized. Key generation is among the
identified sections.
Table 7 FIPS 186-4 Conformance
FIPS PUB 186-4
“should”, “should not”, or
“shall not”
Implemented
accordingly?
Rationale for
deviation
FIPS PUB 186-4
Appendix B.1
B.1.1 Should Yes N/A
B.1.2 Should Yes N/A
FIPS PUB 186-4
Appendix B.3
B.3.1 shall not Yes N/A
FIPS PUB 186-4
Appendix B.4
B.4.1 Should Yes N/A
B.4.2 Should Yes N/A
The TOE performs cryptographic RSA-based key establishment in accordance with
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, NIST Special Publication
800-56A for elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes, and NIST Special
Publication 800-56A for finite field-based key establishment schemes. The TOE acts as
both a sender and as a recipient for RSA-based, elliptic curve-based, and finite field-
based key establishment schemes. The TOE does not reveal specific details about an
Page 34 of 46
error (e.g., decryption error) for RSA-based key establishment schemes. For TLS, the
domain parameters used for the finite field-based key establishment scheme are
compliance with FIPS 186-4. For SSH, the TOE uses Diffie-Hellman Group 14 that
meets RFC 3526 section 3 key establishment scheme and ECC key establishment. Per
SP 800-56Ar3, only the safe primes (e.g., MODP-2048) defined in Sections 3 of RFC
3526 can be used. NOTE: RFC 7919 (FFDHE) is not supported.
The claimed key generation and key establishment algorithms used for each function is
summarized below.
FCS_CKM.1:
- X.509 key pair generation: ECDSA (256, 384), RSA (2048, 3072, 4096)
- SSH RSA key pair generation: RSA (2048, 3072, 4096)
- SSH: FFC DH Group 14
FCS_CKM.2:
- SSH: FFC DH Group 14, ECC (256, 384)
- TLS: ECC (256, 384, 521), FFC (2048), RSA (2048)
The SHA-1/SHA-2 hash function is associated with the digital signature
generation/verification and corresponding HMAC functions.
FCS_CKM.4
Table 8 Private Keys and CSPs
CSP
#
CSP/Key Name Type Description
1
RSA Private
Keys
RSA RSA Private keys for verification of
signatures, authentication or key
establishment.
(RSA 2048, 3072, or 4096-bit)
2
ECDSA Private
Keys
ECDSA ECDSA Private key for verification of
signatures and authentication
(P-256, P-384, P-521)
3
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
TLS
Secret
Secret value used to derive the TLS
session keys
4
TLS
DHE/ECDHE
Private
Components
DH Diffie-Hellman private FFC or EC
component used in TLS
(DHE 2048, ECDHE P-256, P-384, P-521)
5
TLS HMAC
Keys
HMAC TLS integrity and authentication session
keys (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256,
HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512)
6
TLS Encryption
Keys
AES TLS encryption session keys
(128 and 256 CBC or GCM)
7
SSH Session
Integrity Keys
HMAC Used in all SSH connections to the
security module’s command line interface.
Page 35 of 46
(HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256,
HMAC-SHA2-512)
8
SSH Session
Encryption
Keys
AES Used in all SSH connections to the
security module’s command line interface.
(128 and 256 bits in CBC and CTR, or 128
and 256 bits in GCM)
9
SSH ECDH/DH
Private
Components
ECDH ECDH and Diffie-Hellman private
component
(DH 2048 bits, ECDH P-256, P-384, P-
521)
16
Firmware code
integrity check
HMAC
ECDSA
Used to check the integrity of crypto-
related code. (HMAC-SHA-256 and
ECDSA P-256)
*Keys used to perform power-up self-
tests are not CSPs and do not need to be
zeroized
17
Firmware
Content
Encryption Key
AES-256 Used to encrypt/decrypt firmware,
software, and sensitive content.
18
Password Password Authentication string with a minimum
length of 6 characters. Stored hashed
with SHA-256 and nonce.
19
DRBG Seed
/State
DRBG AES 256 CTR DRBG used in the
generation of a random values.
The TOE performs a key error detection check on each internal, intermediate transfer
of a key. The TOE stores persistent secret and private keys in encrypted form (AES-
CBC encrypted) when not in use. The KEK (256-bit AES key) is the Firmware Content
Encryption Key (also known as the Master Key). The KEK is not stored encrypted but is
protected by Cryptod. The KEK is destroyed by the TOE’s overwriting method. The
TOE also zeroizes non-persistent cryptographic keys as soon as their associated session
has terminated. In addition, the TOE recognizes when a private key expires and
promptly zeroizes the key on expiration. The TOE does not permit expired private
signature keys to be archived.
Private cryptographic keys, plaintext cryptographic keys, and all other critical security
parameters stored in intermediate locations in volatile memory for the purposes of
transferring the key/critical security parameters (CSPs) to another location are zeroized
immediately following the transfer. Zeroization is done by overwriting the storage
location with a random pattern, followed by a read-verify. Note that plaintext
cryptographic session keys (e.g., TLS encryption keys, SSH session keys) and CSPs (e.g.,
TLS Pre-Master secret, ECDHE/DHE private components) are only ever stored in volatile
memory. For non-volatile memories other than EEPROM and Flash, the zeroization is
executed by overwriting three times using a different alternating data pattern each time.
This includes the SSD storage. This includes all CSPs that are not stored in volatile
memory such as private keys, KEK, hashed passwords, and entropy seeds. Note: Only the
Page 36 of 46
KEK is stored in plaintext and is zeroized as noted below. It is used to encrypt all the
private keys and other sensitive data.
For volatile memory and non-volatile EEPROM and Flash memories, the zeroization is
executed by a single direct overwrite consisting of a pseudo random pattern, followed
by a read-verify. Sensitive data in volatile memory includes session keys such as
encryption keys, integrity keys, pre-Master secret, etc. For non-volatile memory, the
only plaintext key that is stored is the KEK. When a new KEK is generated, the old KEK
is destroyed via key store APIs that overwrites the old KEK. The KEK is erased when
the administrator initiates the zeroization function, which overwrites the KEK three or
more times using an alternating pattern of ones and zeroes. Destruction of all
encrypted stored keys is accomplished indirectly through destruction of the KEK that
encrypted them.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.
1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.
2
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
The TOE can be configured as a TLS server for mutual certificate-based authentication
for secure connections. The key agreement parameters of the server key exchange
message consist of the key establishment parameters generated by the TOE: Diffie-
Hellman parameters with a key size 2048 bits (group 14), ECDSA implementing NIST
curves secp256r1. The TOE supports session resumption using session ID or tickets for
a single context (no configuration needed). The TOE checks if session tickets expire
which would trigger a full handshake. The session tickets are encrypted with AES
encryption and 128-bits encryption key plus 256-bits HMAC-SHA-256 key; and
adhered to the structural format provided in section 4 of RFC 5077. TOE does not
support fallback authentication for TLS. The TOE denies connections from clients
requesting connections using SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, or TLS 1.0 by default and shall not
establish a trusted channel if the fully qualified distinguished name (FQDN) in the
subject or Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field contained in a certificate does not
match the expected identifier for the peer. The TOE will match the FQDN identifier
according to RFC 6125. In addition, the TOE supports IP addresses (v4 and v6) in
addition to FQDN. The IP address is extracted from the subject or SAN field in the
certificate and is matched exactly to the referenced identifier.
The TOE can be configured as a TLS client for secure communication to an external
audit server. The TOE verifies that the presented identifier matches the reference
identifier (identifiers in RFC 6125 and IPv4 addresses) and only establishes a trusted
channel if the peer certificate is valid. The TOE compares the external server’s
presented identifier to the reference identifier by matching the certificate Common
Name (Subject), FQDN (hostname), IPv4 addresses. The CN field is composed of IPv4
addresses that follow the rules described in RFC 3986. All networking addresses are in
big-endian order, when converting between types, all strings will convert to the
machine byte order (little endian or big-endian) and in the case of little endian, it is
flipped to big-endian and then compared. The TOE supports IP address reference
identifiers and wildcards for peer authentication. Certificate pinning is not supported.
The TOE presents the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello with the
secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1 NIST curves and is enabled by default.
The TOE implements TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346).
TOE (as TLS client) to syslog server (same for mutual authentication) supports the
following cipher suites (TLSv1.2):
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
Page 37 of 46
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
TOE (as TLS server) connection to firewall (same for mutual authentication) supports
TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.2:
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
FCS_SSHS_EXT.
1
The TOE supports SSHv2 (compliant to RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4344, 5656,
6668) with AES encryption/decryption algorithm (in CBC, CTR, or GCM mode) with key
sizes of 128 or 256 bits. The TOE does not support any other optional characteristics
for encryption or public key algorithms. The TOE also supports HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-
SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512, implicit MAC (aes128-gcm@openssh.com and aes256-
gcm@openssh.com) for integrity. Both encryption and integrity algorithms are
administrator-configurable and while 3DES, HMAC-MD5, diffie-hellman-group-1 are
also supported, they are all disabled when FIPS-CC mode is enabled. Only the
Approved encryption and integrity algorithms along with key exchange algorithms
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, and ecdh-sha2-
nistp521 and authentication public-key algorithm ssh-rsa are permitted in the evaluated
configuration. If the SSH client (in the operational environment) only supports non-
Approved algorithms, the SSH connection will be rejected by the TOE.
The TOE uses OpenSSH implementation to support the SSHv2 connections. The
password authentication timeout period is 60 seconds allowing clients to retry only 4
times. In addition, both public-key (RSA) and password-based authentication can be
configured with password-based being the default method. For password, the TOE
verifies the user identity when the username is entered. For public-key, the
administrator must associate the public key to the user. SSH packets are limited to 256
Kbytes and any packet over that size will be dropped (i.e., not processed farther and
buffer containing the packet will be freed). The TOE manages a tracking mechanism for
each SSH session so that it can initiate a new key exchange (rekey) when either a
configurable amount of data (10 – 4000 MBs) or time (10 – 3600 seconds) has passed,
Page 38 of 46
whichever threshold occurs first. In the evaluated configuration, the administrator
should not configure the SSH data rekey threshold to be more than 1024 MBs.
6.3 Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
FIA_UAU.7
The TOE is designed to require users to be identified and authenticated before they
can access any of the TOE functions. The only capabilities allowed prior to users
authenticating are the display of an informative (login) banner and responding to
ICMP request (e.g., ping or ICMP echo reply).
The TOE maintains user accounts which it uses to control access to the TOE. When
creating a new user account, the administrator specifies a username, password, and
a role. Only one role is specified in the user account per user. The administrator can
also specify an SSH key to be used instead of a password.
The TOE uses the username and password or an SSH key to identify and
authenticate the user when the user logs in via the CLI. The TOE does not echo
passwords as they are entered, and the private keys are never transmitted. When
accessing the CLI, the default authentication method is password. The
administrators must configure public-key authentication which is supported for SSH
sessions. It uses the role attribute to specify user permissions and control what the
user can do with the CLI.
The administrator can logon to CLI by using a secure connection (SSHv2) from an
SSH client. The TOE provides access to the CLI locally via direct RJ-45 Ethernet
cable connection and remotely using an SSHv2 client. The administrator enters the
IP address of the TOE and their username and password or their corresponding SSH
key.
A logon successful note is provided when the correct credentials are used
(username and password or SSH key) that matches a defined account on the TOE.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Passwords can be composed of upper and lower case letters, numbers and special
characters (“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(”, “)”, “'”, “+”, “,”, “-”, “.”, “/”, “:”, “;”, “<”,
“=”, “>”, “[”, “\”, “]”, “_”, “`”, “{”, “}”, and “~”). The minimum password length is
configurable by the administrator from 8 up to 15 characters. Note in FIPS-CC mode,
the minimum password length cannot be configured below 8. The maximum
password length is 31 characters. For example, if the administrator configures the
minimum password length as 15, you can only create passwords from length of 15 to
31.
FIA_AFL.1 The TOE logs all unsuccessful authentication attempts in the system log, and tracks
the number of failed attempts via internal counters. The TOE can be configured to
lock a user or authorized IT entity out after a configurable number (1 – 10) of
unsuccessful authentication attempts. The lock can be configured to last a specified
amount of time (0 – 60 minutes) during which providing the correct credentials will
still not allow access (i.e. locked out). A setting of “0” will lock out the user
indefinitely. In this case, the Administrator must unlock the locked user.
These settings can be configured for SSH remote administration connections but
applies to password authentication only. Public-key authentication is not vulnerable
to weak passwords that can be brute-forced. In the evaluated configuration, it is
required that at least one administrator, preferably the Superuser role (predefined
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‘admin’ account), is configured with public-key authentication for SSH to prevent a
denial of service due to locked accounts. This account can then be used to unlock
administrator accounts if all other accounts have been locked. The administrator can
also wait until the lockout time has expired.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for TLS connections (client and server authentication). Public key
infrastructure (PKI) credentials, such as RSA keys and certificates are stored in the
TOE’s underlying file system on the appliance. Certificates and their associated
private key are stored in a single container: the Certificate File. The PKCS#12 file
consists of an Encrypted Private Key and X.509 Certificate. By default, all the
private keys are protected since they are always stored in encrypted format using
AES-256. The physical security of the appliance (A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION)
protects the appliance and the certificates from being tampered with or deleted. In
addition, the TOE identification and authentication security functions protect an
unauthorized user from gaining access to the TOE.
The TOE supports Certificate Revocation List (CRL) status verification for certificate
profiles.
The TOE uses the following rules for validating the extendedKeyUsage field:
• Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
• Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication
purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
The TOE validates a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints
extension is present and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates. The
TOE forms a Certificate trust path by ensuring that the basic constraints are met,
proper key usage parameters exist, the CA flag exists, performing a revocation check
of each certificate in the path and performing the validity of the CA certificate. The
TOE will not treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is
not present or the CA flag is not set to TRUE.
A certificate is checked for revocation status the first time it is used, and once
validated, the status is cached for one hour. The TOE downloads and caches the last-
issued CRL for every CA listed in the trusted CA list of the TOE. Caching only applies
to validated certificates; if a TOE never validated a certificate, the TOE cache does
not store the CRL for the issuing CA. Also, the cache only stores a CRL until it expires
(one hour period). The TOE supports CRLs only in Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
or PEM format.
The TLS session for Syslog is blocked when the certificate status is unknown or
cannot be determined. This is the default behavior for syslog connections and
cannot be changed. When configuring the TLS sessions for Firewalls, the
administrator may configure the profile whether or not to block connections when
certificate status is unknown or cannot be determined.
FIA_X509_EXT.2(1)
FIA_X509_EXT.2(2)
FIA_X509_EXT.3 The authorized administrator may generate a certificate request as specified in RFC
2986 and provide the following information in the request: Common Name,
Organization, and Country. The administrator may also import a certificate and
private key into the TOE from an enterprise certificate authority or obtain a
certificate from an external CA. When the administrators import a certificate based
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on the CSR, the TOE will check to make sure the certificate chain are present in the
TOE. Otherwise, the TOE will reject the certificate and will not associate it with the
CSR.
6.4 Security Management
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData
The TOE provides a CLI to support security management of the TOE. The CLI
is accessible via direct connection to the management port on the device (local
access), or remotely over SSHv2. The restricted role-based privileges enable
only authorized administrators to configure the TOE functions such as
updating the TOE, managing X.509v3 certificates in the trust store, and
manipulating TSF data.
FMT_SMF.1 The security management functions provided by the TOE include:
• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session
termination or locking;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital
signature capability prior to installing those updates;
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for
FIA_AFL.1;
• Ability to configure the list of TOE-provided services available before
an entity is identified and authenticated;
• Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
• Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
• Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
• Ability to re-enable an Administrator account;
• Ability to manage the TOE’s trust store and designate X.509v3
certificates as trust anchors;
• Ability to generate, import, or delete X.509v3 certificates along with
embedded key pairs
• Ability to manage the trusted public keys database
The CLI provides the administrator the ability to administer the TOE locally
and remotely with all management functions. The management functions
above can be configured when the administrator successfully authenticates
into the TOE via the CLI. The local interface supports the use of a dedicated
Ethernet port that only supports communication with a whitelisted local IP
address. Regardless of whether the physical interface is local or remote, the
logical interface used to manage the TOE is through SSH CLI.
FMT_SMR.2 The TOE controls user access to commands and resources based on user role.
Users are given permission to access a set of commands and resources based
on their user role. By default, the TOE has the following pre-defined
administrator roles: Superuser and Superuser (Read-Only). The administrator
role (Superuser) is considered the Security Administrator as defined in the
NDcPP for the purposes of this ST. For example, a user with Superuser role
can create, modify, or delete user accounts but users with Read-Only role
cannot. All roles can administer the TOE both locally and remotely, and a user
account can only be assigned one role at a time.
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• Superuser—Full read-write access to WildFire services
• Superuser (Read-Only)—Read-only access to WildFire services
6.5 Protection of the TSF
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Certificates and their associated private key are stored in a single container: the
Certificate File. The PKCS#12 file consists of an Encrypted Private Key and X.509
Certificate. By default, all the private keys (including SSH private keys) are
protected since they are always stored in encrypted format using AES-256. The
TOE prevents the reading of all keys by encrypting them with a Master Key using
AES-256. The TOE does not provide an interface to read the Master Key. The TOE
is designed specifically to prevent access to locally-stored cryptographically
protected passwords and does not disclose any keys stored in the TOE. The TOE
protects the confidentiality of user passwords by hashing the passwords using
SHA-256. The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any users a
stored cryptographic key or password.
FPT_APW_EXT.1
FPT_TST_EXT.1 The TOE runs self-tests to ensure that the cryptographic capabilities of the TOE are
intact, which include the list below. These tests are performed each time the
module is powered on or when the administrator initiates it via CLI.
• AES Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES Decrypt Known Answer Test
• AES GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• AES CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• RSA Sign Known Answer Test
• RSA Verify Known Answer Test
• RSA Encrypt Known Answer Test
• RSA Decrypt Known Answer Test
• ECDSA Sign Known Answer Test
• ECDSA Verify Known Answer Test
• DH Known Answer Test
• HMAC (HMAC-SHA-1/256/384/512) Known Answer Test
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• DRBG Known Answer Test
• ECDH Known Answer Test
• SP 800-90A Section 11.3 Health Tests
• SP 800-135 KDF Known Answer Tests
Page 42 of 46
• Software Integrity Test
The software integrity is verified with HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256. If the
calculated result does not equal the previously generated result, the integrity test
shall fail.
A known-answer test involves operating the cryptographic algorithm on data for
which the correct output is already known and comparing the calculated output
with the previously generated output (the known answer). If the calculated output
does not equal the known answer, the known-answer test shall fail. The TOE
performs the following Conditional Self-Tests within the cryptographic module
when the conditions specified for the tests occur:
Conditional Self-Tests
• Continuous Random Number Generator (RNG) test – Performed on
NDRNG and DRBG
• RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
• ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
• Firmware Load Test – Verify firmware signatures using RSA 2048 with
SHA-256 at time of load
The RNG continuous random number generator test is performed on each RNG
and tests for failure to a constant value as follows:
1. If each call to a RNG produces blocks of n bits (where n > 15), the first
n-bit block generated after power-up, initialization, or reset shall not be
used, but shall be saved for comparison with the next n-bit block to be
generated. Each subsequent generation of an n-bit block shall be
compared with the previously generated block. The test shall fail if any
two compared n-bit blocks are equal.
2. If each call to a RNG produces fewer than 16 bits, the first n bits
generated after power-up, initialization, or reset (for some n > 15) shall
not be used, but shall be saved for comparison with the next n
generated bits. Each subsequent generation of n bits shall be compared
with the previously generated n bits. The test fails if any two compared
n-bit sequences are equal.
The TOE performs the following pair-wise consistency tests for public and private
keys:
1. If the keys are used to perform an approved key transport method or
encryption, then the public key shall encrypt a plaintext value. The
resulting ciphertext value shall be compared to the original plaintext
value. If the two values are equal, then the test shall fail. If the two
values differ, then the private key shall be used to decrypt the
ciphertext and the resulting value shall be compared to the original
plaintext value. If the two values are not equal, the test shall fail.
2. If the keys are used to perform the calculation and verification of
digital signatures, then the consistency of the keys shall be tested by
Page 43 of 46
the calculation and verification of a digital signature. If the digital
signature cannot be verified, the test shall fail.
If a self-test fails, the TOE enters an error state and outputs an error indicator. The
TOE does not perform any cryptographic operations while in the error state. All
data output from the TOE is inhibited when an error state exists. Should one or
more power-up self-tests fail, the module will reboot and enter a maintenance state
in which the reason for the reboot can be determined.
The methods above are sufficient to ensure the correct functionality of the TSF as
the self-tests encompass the cryptographic functionality and the integrity of the
entire TOE software/firmware executable code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Authorized administrators can query the current version of the TOE’s software
using the CLI with the command “show system info”, and are able to receive
updates from https://updates.paloaltonetworks.com using the command “request
system software check” followed by “request system software download
<version>”. There is no automatic installation of new software; an administrator
must manually perform this update. The Palo Alto Networks Update Server
supports TLS 1.2 and uses approved cipher suites to ensure that downloads from
the server are protected, and are not tampered with in transit.
As an additional precaution, Palo Alto Networks has chosen to sign (using RSA-2048)
all content that is downloaded to the TOE. If the TOE is not connected to the
internet, the administrators can download the updates and upload it to the TOE
(manual update).
When the TOE update package and its corresponding digital signature is
downloaded or uploaded; the digital signature is checked automatically by the TOE
by verifying the signature using the public key (corresponding to the RSA key used
to create the signature). Palo Alto Networks manages the update server and
guarantees that images are digitally signed. Public keys are stored and protected in
the TOE’s file system. If the signature is verified, the update is performed;
otherwise the update is not performed.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 The TOE is a hardware appliance that includes a hardware-based real-time clock. The
TOE’s embedded OS manages the clock and exposes administrator clock-related
functions such as set time. The clock is used for audit record time stamps, measuring
session activity for termination, certificate validity checking, timing administrator
lockout due to excessive failed authentication attempts, and for cryptographic
operations based on time/date.
6.6 TOE Access
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 The TOE will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the
inactive, local or remote, session will be terminated regardless of authentication
methods (e.g. password, public-key). The TOE can be configured by an administrator
to set an interactive session timeout value (any integer value from 1 to 1,440 minutes)
with default set to 60 minutes. The function is disabled by default and the
administrator must follow the CC AGD to configure the session idle timeout value.
FTA_SSL.3
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A remote session that is inactive (i.e. no commands issued from the remote client) for
the defined timeout value will be terminated. A local session that is similarly inactive
for the defined timeout period will be terminated. The users will be required to re-
enter their user ID and their password or perform public-key authentication (i.e.
restart an SSH connection) in order to establish a new session once the session is
terminated. The users can also enter the ‘exit’ command to terminate local and remote
user sessions.
FTA_SSL.4 The TOE provides the function to logout (or terminate) both local and remote user
sessions as directed by the user.
FTA_TAB.1 The TOE can be configured to display an administrator-defined advisory banner prior
to authentication when accessing the TOE via a direct or remote connection to the
management port in order to access the CLI (SSH).
6.7 Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 The TOE can be configured to send audit records to an external syslog server using
TLS in real-time. The TOE permits the TSF to initiate communication with the syslog
server using the TLS trusted channel. The TOE (TLS server) can also communicate with
the Palo Alto Networks firewalls via TLS. Mutual authentication is supported but must
be configured for all TLS channels.
The TOE communicates with its authorized entities over TLS only and all
communication are sent over the trusted channel, including the TOE initial
communication. The underlying TLS algorithms are supported by CAVP-validated
cryptographic mechanisms included in the TOE implementation.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin The TOE provides SSH to provide a communication path between itself and
authorized remote administrators. Administrators can initiate a remote session that is
secure using CAVP validated cryptographic operations, and all remote security
management functions require the use of this security channel. In FIPS-CC mode,
Telnet and HTTP are disabled permanently.
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7. Protection Profile Claims
This ST is exact conformant to the [NDcPP].
Page 46 of 46
8. Rationale
This Security Target includes by reference the NDcPP applicable Security Problem Definition, Security
Objectives, and Security Assurance Requirements. The Security Target makes no additions to the NDcPP
assumptions. Security Functional Requirements have been reproduced verbatim with the Protection Profile
operations completed except where refinements were made by the ST author and formatted per the defined
convention. Operations on the security requirements follow NDcPP application notes and evaluation
activities. The Security Target did not add or remove any security requirements. Consequently, NDcPP
rationale applies and is complete.