BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020
for
Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform Flex3
WaveLogic 3e OCLD Encryption Module, KM
Firmware Version 2.01, ASIC Firmware Version
1.00
from
Ciena Corporation
sponsored by
Ciena Limited Germany
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.3
BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020 (*)
Network and Network related Devices and Systems
Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform Flex3 WaveLogic 3e OCLD
Encryption Module
KM Firmware Version 2.01, ASIC Firmware Version 1.00
from Ciena Corporation
sponsored by Ciena Limited Germany
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 27 October 2020
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
L.S.
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................16
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................16
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................20
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................20
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................22
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................23
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................23
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................23
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................25
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................26
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................27
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
6 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components. This certificate is recognized under CCRA-2014
for all assurance components selected.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform Flex3 WaveLogic 3e OCLD Encryption
Module, KM Firmware Version 2.01, ASIC Firmware Version 1.00 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform Flex3 WaveLogic 3e
OCLD Encryption Module, KM Firmware Version 2.01, ASIC Firmware Version 1.00 was
conducted by MTG AG. The evaluation was completed on 22 October 2020. MTG AG is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Ciena Limited Germany.
The product was developed by: Ciena Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 27 October
2020 is valid until 26 October 2025. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020 Certification Report
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform Flex3 WaveLogic 3e OCLD Encryption
Module, KM Firmware Version 2.01, ASIC Firmware Version 1.00 has been included in the
BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Ciena Corporation
7035 Ridge Road
Hannover, Maryland 21078
United States of America
9 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Ciena 6500 Flex3 WaveLogic 3e OCLD Encryption
Module. The TOE is a cryptographic subsystem comprising firmware and hardware
implemented as components on a line card or circuit pack (the Ciena 6500 Flex3
WaveLogic 3e OCLD Circuit Pack), which can be installed into the Ciena 6500 series
Packet-Optical Platform. The TOE offers an integrated transport encryption solution
providing protocol-agnostic 100 Gb/s or 200 Gb/s wire-speed encryption service.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.2. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security
Functionality
Addressed issue
Encryption Plaintext user data is encrypted when entering the TOE and leaving the TOE as
ciphertext data to ensure confidentiality during transfer to a peer device. The
encryption key for this operation is kept confidential by the TOE.
Decryption Ciphertext data sent from a peer device is decrypted when entering the TOE
and leaving the TOE as plaintext data for the user. The decryption key for this
operation is kept confidential by the TOE.
Digital signature creation Digital signature creation supports authentication against the peer device. The
signature-creation key is kept private by the TOE.
Digital signature
verification
Digital signature verification allows authentication of the peer device. The
signature verification key is authentically assigned to the holder of the
signature-creation key and is public available to the verifier.
Cryptographic key
management
The TOE manages the cryptographic keys necessary for its implemented
cryptographic algorithms and protocols. The cryptographic key management
controls the generation, storage, access and use of the cryptographic keys by
the cryptographic functions. The cryptographic key management includes:
● Generation of random numbers using a deterministic random number
generator seeded by a physical RNG
● Implementation of key generation algorithms depending on the intended use
of the keys
● Secure storage of private keys protecting their confidentiality
● Key agreement protocols establishing ephemeral common secrets with
external peer entities
Mutual authentication The mutual authentication of communicating entities and the key agreement are
combined to initiate and keep secure communication between trusted peer
devices protecting the confidentiality of the transmitted user data.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapters 1.3.3 and 1.4.2.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform Flex3 WaveLogic 3e OCLD Encryption Module,
KM Firmware Version 2.01, ASIC Firmware Version 1.00
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Article Number /
Version
Form of Delivery
1 HW ● Krypto Module
● ASIC part number
● NTK53926-501,
NTK53926-502
● 077-0084-017,
077-0084-028
The TOE hardware parts are
firm components on the Ciena
6500 Flex3 WaveLogic 3e OCLD
(NTK539QS/NTK539QV
variants) circuit packs.
Shipment of the circuit pack to
the customer is done with
Ciena’s standard carriers (e.g.
FedEx).
2 FW ● KM Firmware
● ASIC Firmware
● 2.01
● 1.00
TOE SW is readily installed on
the TOE hardware, see #1
3 DOC Security Target for the Ciena
6500 Flex3 WaveLogic 3e OCLD
Encryption Module, 323-1851-
CC-ST-NTK539QS-NTK539QV,
Ciena Corporation [6]
SHA2-256 Hash:
48eb44bb591e14c4cd5729fe6cd
ad7c0bce81f0ab153af4546dfb0d
294609c94
Version 1.6 Download as PDF from portal
my.ciena.com
12 / 27
BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Article Number /
Version
Form of Delivery
4 DOC Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical
Platform, Release 12.3:
WaveLogic Ai, Flex, 100G+, 40G,
OSIC ISS, and SLIC10 Circuit
Packs, Release 12.3, 323-1851-
102.4 [8]
SHA2-256 Hash:
fb0c04be9b899cdf2f8817357faeb
3e5c9cae04863e36859cb6ae8f5
8e2b41a5
Standard Issue 1,
July 2018
Download as PDF from portal
my.ciena.com
5 DOC Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical
Platform: “Installation - General
Information”, Release 12.3, 323-
1851-201.0 [9]
SHA2-256 Hash:
8b46077a7384d5a01205b4e380
32d2076e94051755ecc25449703
e5569ac7a2d
Standard Issue 1,
July 2018
Download as PDF from portal
my.ciena.com
6 DOC Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical
Platform: “Administration and
Security”, Release 12.3, 323-
1851-301 [10]
SHA2-256:
6e06e63de19335778f057a8ac8e
c50c527c6a6d5e875463d2ca3b0
37ef1d1163
Standard Issue 2,
September 2018
Download as PDF from portal
my.ciena.com
7 DOC Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical
Platform: “TL-1 Command
Definition”, Release 12.3, 323-
1851-190 [11]
SHA2-256:
c98f421e8a24797e0ea69eab1db
d65ef885d5b540c2ab29aca7ca8
56ac8f297f
Standard Issue 1,
July 2018
Download as PDF from portal
my.ciena.com
8 DOC Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical
Platform: “MyCryptoTool
Certificate Management and
Quick Start”, Release 12.3, 323-
1851-341 [12]
SHA2-256:
00e27fb327d05d7ffcf05f3b378a5
7fb2aff61a456b485dad2aba5fab
3423111
Standard Issue 1,
July 2018
Download as PDF from portal
my.ciena.com
9 DOC Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical
Platform: “Encryption and FIPS
Security Policy Overview and
Procedures”, Release 12.3, 323-
1851-340 [13]
SHA2-256:
b88494f13b13ae9dccaeff12ac13
bc66417b66f550b813e1ec1fd500
14038fb0
Standard Issue 1,
July 2018
Download as PDF from portal
my.ciena.com
13 / 27
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020
No Type Identifier Article Number /
Version
Form of Delivery
10 DOC Ciena 6500 Flex3 WaveLogic 3e
OCLD Encryption Module: FIPS
140-2 Non-Proprietary Security
Policy [14]
SHA2-256 Hash:
b4ecfebc6017f1e1e3d391f3b898
ce5dc03995828dd39ac818a8fe2
b437aefc4
Version 1.1 Download as PDF from portal
my.ciena.com
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
2.1. Overview of the delivery procedure
TOE Distribution and Shipment
The TOE hardware and firmware parts of the Ciena security product do not require any
assembly or installation activities as they are delivered to the customer pre-installed on the
(NTK539QS/NTK539QV variants, see #1 in table 2) circuit pack from the factory.
Shipment to the customer is done with Ciena’s standard carriers (e.g. FedEx), i.e.:
● Ciena notifies the customer via email that the shipment will be sent by the carrier
(FedEx, for example) with a dedicated shipment tracking number and an attached
shipping document.
● The carrier notifies the customer via email of the expected delivery date and time
containing the shipment tracking number.
Delivery of the TOE documentation is done through the customer downloading the TOE
guidance documents from the my.ciena.com portal accessible for registered Ciena
customers.
Acceptance of TOE by customer:
On receipt of the circuit pack containing the TOE, the customer’s Crypto Officer /
Administrator should:
● physically inspect the shipping for signs of damage
● check the package for any irregular tears or opening
● remove the shipping package
● compare the serial number of the circuit pack with the serial number on the separately
mailed shipping document
If damage is found, the Crypto Officer / Administrator shall immediately contact Ciena
using one of the following Ciena contact channels:
● support website
● support phone numbers
● support email address
● support specified in the customers sales contract
● sales account team assigned to the customer
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020 Certification Report
The SHA2-256 hashes as listed in table 2 must be used to ensure data integrity during
data transmission of the TOE documents downloaded.
If the hash values of the documents downloaded match the vales given in table 2 the
documents are the correct ones. Otherwise the customer shall contact Ciena to get the
authentic documents.
2.2. Identification of TOE by the customer
The TOE consists of hardware, firmware and documentation as listed in table 2.
The TOE hardware can be identified by checking the faceplate of the circuit pack that must
be labelled with the text “NTK539QS” or “NTK539QV”.
The TOE’s firmware version can be retrieved by the administrator from the MyCryptoTool
administration firmware. Each MyCryptoTool page shows in the bottom left corner the TOE
version, i.e. “Version 2.01”. By default, the TOE version number is identical to the Krypto
Module (KM) Firmware version.
The ASIC Firmware version (i.e. version 1.00) that is built into the Ciena OCLD Encryption
Module TOE can be identified from the TOE version (i.e. 2.01) only by the developer, but
not by the customer.
The TOE’s documentation files can be uniquely identified in the download area of the
my.ciena.com portal using the name and references of the documents as listed in section
1.4.3.3 of the Security Target [6] or table 2 above.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Encryption of plaintext user data entering the TOE and leaving the TOE as ciphertext
data to ensure confidentiality during transfer to a peer device. The encryption key for this
operation is kept confidential by the TOE and is agreed with the peer device on a
regular, manageable time interval.
● Decryption of ciphertext data sent from a peer device entering the TOE and leaving the
TOE as plaintext data for the user. The decryption key for this operation is kept
confidential by the TOE and is agreed with the peer device on a regular, manageable
time interval.
● Digital signature creation to support authentication against the peer device. The
signature creation key is kept private by the TOE.
● Digital signature verification, which allows authentication of the peer device. The sig-
nature verification key is authentically assigned to the holder of the signature-creation
key and is available to the TOE as a trustworthy certificate. Digital signature verification
of the TOE’s firmware assures the integrity and authenticity of the firmware during start-
up.
● The TOE manages the cryptographic keys necessary for its implemented cryptographic
algorithms and protocols. The cryptographic key management controls the generation,
storage, access and use of the cryptographic keys by the cryptographic functions.
● The TOE provides mutual peer authentication between the TOE and the peer device
connected via Optical Transport Network (OTN).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● Those responsible for the operation of the TOE must ensure that management and
configuration of the security functions of the TOE is undertaken by non-evil, trusted
administrators trained in the secure operation of the TOE.
● Management tools used by the administrator (e.g. Web Browser) must be non-evil and
trustworthy.
● The ECC device certificate necessary for identifying the TOE during IKEv2 message
exchange must be signed by a trustworthy CA with a strong ECC key pair from the NIST
P-384 (secp384r1) elliptic curve.
● The developer key pair used for signing the TOE firmware must be a cryptographically
strong ECC key pair from the NIST P-384 (secp384r1) elliptic curve signed by a
trustworthy CA.
● All non-TOE parts of the Flex3 WL3e OCLD circuit pack are trustworthy and do not
compromise the security functionality of the TOE.
● Keys generated at the factory must be strong random numbers and are brought into the
TOE in a secure production environment by the manufacturer.
● The real time clock in the TOE environment provides reliable time services for the TOE.
This shall be achieved by regular time synchronization with NTP time server(s).
● The TOE must be installed in a non-public environment which is physically secure. Only
authorized individuals may physically access the TOE.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The following 1 shows the architectural decomposition of the TOE in terms of subsystems.
16 / 27
Figure 1: TOE subsystems
Physically the WL3E OCLD TOE consists of the Krypto Module (KM) and an ASIC. Both
hardware components are connected on the circuit pack with an embedded wire
connection.
BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020 Certification Report
Logically the TOE consists of several subsystems. The SFR-enforcing subsystems are the:
Cryptographic Service Subsystem
This subsystem implements cryptographic functions (RNG, ECC key agreement, ECC key
generation, ECDSA signature generation and verification) used by other subsystems.
IKEv2 Crypto Channel Subsystem
Here the IKE (Internet Key Exchange) v2 protocol is implemented to provide peer-to-peer
authentication with X.509 certificates and to calculate periodically common shared secrets
to derive the symmetric encryption/decryption keys for the user data.
Secure Storage Subsystem
The Secure Storage Subsystem provides certificates storage and provisioning data
storage in non-volatile memory. It protects the confidentiality of security parameters (e.g.
the private key of the authentication certificate).
Encrypt/Decrypt Subsystem
The “Encrypt/Decrypt Subsystem” provides user data encryption/decryption with the keys
set by the “IKEv2 Crypto Channel Subsystem”.
Management Subsystem
The “Management Subsystem” provides a library of APIs that allow the “MyCryptoTool I/F”
and the “TCS I/F” to interact with the rest of KM software components through messaging
for handling administrator’s requests. Management of X.500 certificates, IKEv2-
parameters setting and firmware loading is implemented in this subsystem.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Test Configuration
The ”Flex3 WL3e OCLD” circuit pack TOE consists of the following components:
TOE Hardware ● Krypto Module (part number NTK53926-501, NTK53926-502)
and
● ASIC (part number 077-0084-017, 077-0084-028) on the Ciena
6500 Flex3 WaveLogic 3e OCLD (NTK539QS/NTK539QV
variants) circuit packs
TOE Firmware ● KM Firmware Version 2.01
Table 3: TOE components
The tested TOE is part of the “Flex3 WL3e OCLD” circuit pack which are plugged into and
operated in a shelf of the Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform at the Ciena test lab in
Ottawa. A second shelf was configured to operate as a peer to the shelf containing the
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TOE, creating a loopback for data received from the TOE and provide the possibility to test
parameters related to the TOE’s communication channel setup.
Only the NTK539QS circuit pack variant has been used in the test configuration.
The following figure shows how the TOE provided by the developer has been embedded
into the overall testing environment:
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Figure 2: TOE test setup
The test setup consists of two 6500 Packet-Optical Platform shelves. Each shelf is
equipped with a 100G OCI card for client access and a Flex3 WL3e OCLD circuit pack
BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020 Certification Report
containing the TOE. The encrypted line ports of both encryption cards are connected via
an optical fibre link.
The TOE (i.e. the circuit pack with the TOE) is connected via the shelf-backplane and the
OCI card to a test client sending and receiving sample user data. The plaintext user data is
encrypted by the TOE and sent to the peer. The peer decrypts the data, sends it via the
shelf-backplane to the OCI client interface where the received data is echoed back
(plaintext loop). On the way back to the test client the echoed data is encrypted again by
the peer device and decrypted within the TOE.
Connection monitoring, certificate management and crypto parameter configuration on the
TOE has been done with the MyCryptoTool as shown in the figure above.
The TOE was installed and configured according to the guidance and configuration as de-
scribed in the ST [6] when the testing was performed.
7.2. Developer tests according to ATE_FUN
The developer performed cryptographic tests to verify the claimed security functionality
from the Security Target [6].
The developer provided test documentation consists of the test vectors and their result
files for all cryptographic algorithms implemented by the TOE. The developer tests have
also been used for the TOE’s FIPS 140-2 certification, i.e. test sessions for AES,
AES_GCM, SHA, ECDSA2, CTR_DRBG, HMAC, KDF have been conducted by the
developer.
The evaluator checked and verified on site at Ciena that the TOE as specified in the ST [6]
has really been installed and has been used within the Ciena test environment for their
tests.
7.3. Independent testing according to ATE_IND
For independent testing the evaluator specified test cases with the intention to cover all
SFRs from the ST. For that purpose, all of the developer’s KAT tests (Known Answer Test)
on cryptographic algorithms have been repeated with unknown cryptographic test vectors
and comprehensive own test cases have been specified, especially covering the
management and administration functions of the TOE.
For test case specification and test case execution documentation the evaluator used the
Open Source based test management tool “TestLink”.
The independent testing was performed in the test environment that has been installed
and configured at the developer’s test lab in Ottawa. Some developer provided tests were
carried out by Ciena personnel in the Ciena test laboratory in Ottawa under the
supervision of the evaluators.
During independent testing the evaluators specified, run and evaluated test cases covering
all SFRs from the ST. The results of those tests showed that all claimed SFRs are
achieved by the TOE.
Using this test environment when executing the evaluator’s tests, the overall test result
was that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results.
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7.4. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
The approach chosen by the evaluators is appropriate for the assurance component
AVA_VAN.2, requiring the resistance of the TOE to an attack with the Basic attack
potential. First the evaluators used publicly available sources to identify potential
vulnerabilities in the TOE.
In addition, the evaluators applied an “unstructured analysis” while evaluating the
developer provided Common Criteria evidence documentation to identify potential
vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE.
The evaluators analysed which of the potential vulnerabilities identified in the steps above
are not applicable to the TOE in its operational environment. For the potential
vulnerabilities being applicable to the TOE in its operational environment and, hence,
which were candidates for testing applicable to the TOE in its operational environment, the
evaluators devised the attack scenarios where these potential vulnerabilities could be
exploited.
For each such attack scenario they first performed a theoretical analysis on the related
attack potential, concluding that there are no attack scenarios where the required attack
potential is Basic.
None of the attack scenarios developed and analysed has been considered for further
testing, as the assumed attack potential for each scenario is beyond a Basic attacker.
Thus, no penetration testing was actually performed.
For penetration testing the evaluators therefore put emphasis on attack scenarios that
would allow an attacker to bypass the overall security functionality of the TOE.
Being resistant against attack vectors with Basic attack potential shows that the TOE,
when installed and configured as described in the operational guidance documentation,
can be operated in a secure and trustworthy manner.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual penetration test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was
found to be successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the ST [6]
provided that all configurations and measures as required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The TOE is part of the
“Flex3 WL3e OCLD” circuit pack. The difference between the QS and QV circuit pack
variants is essentially the optical performance on the DWDM line side - the QS is rated for
long haul reach (1000s of km) vs. metro reach (~300 km) for the QV variant. There is no
difference in the TOE’s firmware between both circuit pack variants. For more information,
see the test configuration in chapter 7.1.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
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For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general context)
only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
1 Key Derivation
(IKEv2)
PRF-HMAC-
SHA-384
FIPS 180-4, Secure
Hash Standard (SHS),
2015 (SHA), RFC 2104
(HMAC), RFC-4868,
RFC-7296, Sec. 2.13,
2.14, 2.17
|k| = 384 yes
2 Key Agreement
(IKEv2)
Elliptic Curve
Key Agreement
- Diffie Hellman
ANSI X9.63 (Key
Agreement and Key
Transport Using Elliptic
Curve Cryptography)
RFC-5903, Sec. 3.2
Key size for elliptic
curve - secp384r1,
i.e. |k| = 384
yes
3 Authentication
(IKEv2)
ECDSA-
signature
generation and
verification
FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital
Signature Stand-ard
(DSS), Section 6 and
Appendix D,
Key size for elliptic
curve - secp384r1,
i.e. |k| = 384
yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
using SHA-384 Implementing “NIST
curves” P-384;
ISO/IEC 14888-3,
Section 6.4, for ECDSA
schemes
RFC-4754
RFC-7296, Sec. 2.15
4 Confidentiality/
Integrity (IKEv2)
AES in GCM
mode
FIPS 197 (AES)
NIST-SP800-38D (GCM)
RFC-5282
|k| = 256 yes
5 Confidentiality
(data path)
AES in CTR
mode
FIPS 197 (AES)
NIST-SP800-38A (CTR)
|k| = 256 yes
6 Confidentiality
(key)
AES in CBC
mode
FIPS 197 (AES)
NIST-SP800-38A (CBC)
|k| = 256 yes
7 Authenticity
(Firmware)
ECDSA-
signature
verification
using SHA-384
FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital
Signature Standard
(DSS), Section 6 and
Appendix D,
Implementing “NIST
curves” P-384;
ISO/IEC 14888-3,
Section 6.4, for ECDSA
schemes
Key size for elliptic
curve - secp384r1,
i.e. |k| = 384
yes
8 Authenticity
(Certificates)
ECDSA-
signature
verification
using SHA-384
FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital
Signature Stand-ard
(DSS), Section 6 and
Appendix D,
Implementing “NIST
curves” P-384;
ISO/IEC 14888-3,
Section 6.4, for ECDSA
schemes
Key size for elliptic
curve - secp384r1,
i.e. |k| = 384
yes
9 Random
Number
Generation
(DRG.2)
CTR_DRBG
(AES)
NIST SP 800-90A using
CTR_DRBG (AES)
seeded by an entropy
source that accumulates
entropy from one
independent TSF-
hardware-based noise
source
None n.a.
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
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The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ASIC Application-Specific Integrated Circuit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CTR Counter
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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KAT Known Anser Test
KEK Key Encrypting Key
KM Krypto Module
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCLD Optical Channel Laser and Detector
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TCS Transport Control Subsystem
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
WL3e WaveLogic 3 Extreme
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1082-2020, Security Target for the Ciena 6500 Packet-
Optical Platform Flex3 WaveLogic 3e OCLD Encryption Module, Doc-ID: 323-1851-
CC-ST-NTK539QS-NTK539QV, Version 1.6, Ciena Corporation, April 28, 2020
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, ETR Part Summary, Ciena OCLD Encryption Module,
Version 1.1, October 10, 2020, MTG (confidential document)
[8] Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform, Release 12.3: WaveLogic Ai, Flex, 100G+,
40G, OSIC ISS, and SLIC10 Circuit Packs, Release 12.3, 323-1851-102.4,
Standard Issue 1, July 2018
[9] Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform: “Installation - General Information”, Release
12.3, 323-1851-201.0, Standard Issue 1, July 2018
[10] Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform: “Administration and Security”, Release 12.3,
323-1851-301, Standard Issue 2, September 2018
[11] Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform: “TL-1 Command Definition”, Release 12.3,
323-1851-190, Standard Issue 1, July 2018
[12] Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform: “MyCryptoTool Certificate Management and
Quick Start”, Release 12.3, 323-1851-341, Standard Issue 1, July 2018
[13] Ciena 6500 Packet-Optical Platform: “Encryption and FIPS Security Policy Overview
and Procedures”, Release 12.3, 323-1851-340, Standard Issue 1, July 2018
[14] Ciena 6500 Flex3 WaveLogic 3e OCLD Encryption Module: FIPS 140-2 Non-
Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.1
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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