1
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Black Box Secure KVM Switch/Isolator (CAC Models)
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11240-2021
Dated: December 10, 2021
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE: 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Daniel Faigin
Alex Korobchuk
Seada Mohammed
The Aerospace Corporation
Matt Downey
National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
John Butterworth
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Leidos
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary...................................................................................................................1
2 Identification..............................................................................................................................5
2.1 Threats...............................................................................................................................5
2.2 Organizational Security Policies.......................................................................................6
3 Architectural Information ..........................................................................................................7
4 Assumptions...............................................................................................................................8
4.1 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................8
5 Security Policy.........................................................................................................................10
5.1 Keyboard and Mouse Subsystem....................................................................................10
5.2 TOE External Interfaces .................................................................................................10
5.3 Audio Subsystem ............................................................................................................11
5.4 Video Subsystem ............................................................................................................11
5.5 TOE Administration and Security Management.............................................................11
5.6 User Authentication Device Subsystem..........................................................................12
5.7 User Control and Monitoring Security ...........................................................................12
5.8 Tampering Protection......................................................................................................12
5.9 Self-Testing and Security Audit......................................................................................13
6 Documentation.........................................................................................................................14
7 Independent Testing.................................................................................................................15
7.1 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ...........................................................................15
7.2 Vulnerability Analysis ....................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration ..........................................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation .........................................................................................................18
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................................19
11 Annexes....................................................................................................................................21
12 Security Target.........................................................................................................................22
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................................23
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................24
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1 Executive Summary
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent
for that end-user to determine the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in their
environment. End-users should review the Security Target (ST), (which is where specific
security claims are made) as well as this Validation Report (VR) (which describes how those
security claims were evaluated, tested, and any restrictions that may be imposed upon the
evaluated configuration) to help in that determination. Prospective users should carefully read
the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 4 and the Validator Comments in Section
10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Black Box Secure KVM Switch/Isolator (CAC Models). It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. Government and no
warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version
and configuration of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST.
The evaluation of the Black Box Secure KVM Switch/Isolator (CAC Models) was performed by
Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, in the United
States and was completed in December 2021. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with
the requirements of the Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), version 3.1, revision 5 and the evaluation activities specified in the following materials:
• Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0, 19 July 2019 [PSD PP]
• PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 [AO Module]
• PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 [KM Module]
• PP-Module for User Authentication Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 [UA Module]
• PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 [VI Module]
Leidos performed an analysis of the NIAP Technical Decisions (https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_tds.cfm). Leidos determined that the following NIAP
Technical Decisions applied to this evaluation:
• TD0506
• TD0507
• TD0514
• TD0518
• TD0539 – note this TD applies to switch models only; it does not apply to isolators
because it references a selection in FDP_CDS_EXT.1.1 that the isolator models do not
claim
• TD0557
• TD0583
• TD0584
• TD0585
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• TD0586
• TD0593
The evaluation was consistent with NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
(CCEVS) policies and practices as described on their web site (www.niap-ccevs.org).
The Leidos evaluation team determined that the Black Box Secure KVM Switch/Isolator (CAC
Models) is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile (PP) and PP-Modules and, when
installed, configured and operated as specified in the evaluated guidance documentation,
satisfied all of the security functional requirements stated in the STs. The information in this VR
is largely derived from the publicly available Assurance Activities Report (AAR) and the
associated proprietary test report produced by the Leidos evaluation team.
The Black Box Secure KVM Switch/Isolator (CAC Models) provide a secure medium to share
peripheral components such as keyboard, video display and mouse/pointing devices among one
or more computers over USB, 3.5mm analog audio, and various video protocols. The TOE also
includes isolator models, which are functionally identical to their switch counterparts except that
only a single computer is supported. In this case the TOE acts as a secure medium between the
connected computer and its end user peripherals. Different TOE models support one or more of
DisplayPort 1.2, HDMI 1.4, or DVI-I video. The TOE is a family of hardware appliances that
consists of the following models:
Model Name Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
KVS4-8001DX 1-Port SH Secure DVI-I KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.010
KVS4-8001VX 1-Port SH Secure DP KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.001
KVS4-8001HX 1-Port SH Secure HDMI KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.100
Table 1: Black Box 1-Port TOE Models Identification
Model Name Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
KVS4-2002VX 2-Port DH Secure Pro DP KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.001
KVS4-1002HVX 2-Port SH Secure DP/HDMI KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.202
KVS4-2002HVX 2-Port DH Secure DP/HDMI KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.202
KVS4-1002VMX 2-Port SH DP to 2xHDMI Secure KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.003
Table 2: Black Box 2-Port TOE Models Identification
Model Name Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
KVS4-2004VX 4-Port DH Secure Pro DP KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.001
KVS4-4004VX 4-Port QH Secure Pro DP KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.001
KVS4-2004DX 4-Port DH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.010
KVS4-1004HVX 4-Port SH Secure DP/HDMI KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.202
KVS4-2004HVX 4-Port DH Secure DP/HDMI KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.202
KVS4-4004DHVX 4-Port QH Secure SH DVI, SH HDMI, and DH DP KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.111
KVS4-1004VMX 4-Port SH DP to 2xHDMI Secure KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.003
KVS4-2004VMX 4-Port DH DP to 2xHDMI Secure KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.003
KVS4-8004VPX 4-Port SH Secure DP KVM w/audio, CAC and preview screen 4.11.004
Table 3: Black Box 4-Port TOE Models Identification
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Model Name Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
KVS4-1008VX 8-Port SH Secure Pro DP KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.001
KVS4-2008VX 8-Port DH Secure Pro DP KVM w/audio and CAC 4.11.001
KVS4-1008DX 8-Port SH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/ audio and CAC 4.11.010
KVS4-2008DX 8-Port DH Secure Pro DVI-I KVM w/ audio and CAC 4.11.010
Table 4: Black Box 8-Port and 16-Port TOE Models Identification
Because of the fact that isolators and switches have different SFR claims, the TOE was separated
into two STs. Within each ST, different video-related SFR claims are made since different TOE
models support different protocols. For example, the selection-based SFR
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI in [VI Module] is applicable to the TOE but only for TOE models that
support at least one HDMI source video feed.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation
evidence, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the
evaluation results produced by the evaluation team. The validation team found that the
evaluation results showed that all evaluation activities specified in the claimed PP and PP-
Modules had been completed successfully and that the product satisfied all of the security
functional and assurance requirements as stated in the STs.
From this, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the
conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The products, when configured as specified in the guidance documentation, satisfy all of the
security functional requirements stated in the Black Box Secure KVM Switch Security Target
(CAC Models) and Black Box Secure KVM Isolator Security Target (CAC Models), depending
on the specific TOE model.
Item Identifier
Evaluated Product Black Box Secure KVM Switch/Isolator (CAC Models) consisting of various
models within the KVS4 model family. In particular all TOE models are those
with X at the end of the model name, which designates Black Box devices with
support for USB authentication (CAC) peripherals.
Sponsor & Developer David Isola
Black Box, Inc.
George’s Quay
Limerick, V94 CK06
Republic of Ireland
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Completion Date December 10, 2021
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1, Revision 5, April 2015
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Item Identifier
Interpretations There were no applicable interpretations used for this evaluation.
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2015
PP PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio Output
Devices, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, User Authentication Devices, and
Video/Display Devices, version 1.0, which includes the following PP and PP-
Modules:
• Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0, 19 July
2019
• PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July
2019
• PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019
• PP-Module for User Authentication Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019
• PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019
Disclaimer The information contained in this Validation Report is not an endorsement of
Black Box Secure KVM Switch/Isolator (CAC Models) by any agency of the
U.S. Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or
implied.
Evaluation Personnel Justin Fisher
Shreyansh Kansara
Madhav Nakar
Pascal Patin
Allen Sant
Furukh Siddique
Sindhu Veerabhadru
Validation Personnel Daniel Faigin, Matt Downey, John Butterworth, Alex Korobchuk, Seada
Mohammed
Table 5: Evaluation Details
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) in accordance with National
Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Product Compliant List
(PCL).
The following table identifies the evaluated Security Target and TOE.
Name Description
ST Title Black Box Secure KVM Switch Security Target (CAC Models) [Switch ST]
Black Box Secure KVM Isolator Security Target (CAC Models) [Isolator ST]
ST Version 1.08 [Switch ST]
1.04 [Isolator ST]
Publication Date November 3, 2021
Vendor and ST Author Black Box, Inc.
TOE Reference Devices identified in Table 1 through Table 4 [of this VR]
TOE Software Version Firmware versions of devices identified in Table 1 through Table 4 [of this VR]
Keywords KVM Switch, KVM Isolator, Peripheral Sharing
Table 6: ST and TOE Details
2.1 Threats
Each ST identifies the following threats that the TOE and its operational environment are
intended to counter:
• A connection via the PSD between one or more computers may allow unauthorized data
flow through the PSD or its connected peripherals.
• A connection via the PSD between one or more computers may allow unauthorized data
flow through bit‐by‐bit signaling.
• A PSD may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data between the intended connected
computer and another unintended connected computer.
• A PSD may connect the user to a computer other than the one to which the user intended
to connect.
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• The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a specific PSD peripheral port may
allow unauthorized data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on the PSD
or its connected computers.
• An attached device (computer or peripheral) with malware, or otherwise under the
control of a malicious user, could modify or overwrite code or data stored in the PSD’s
volatile or non‐volatile memory to allow unauthorized information flows.
• A malicious user or human agent could physically modify the PSD to allow unauthorized
information flows.
• A malicious human agent could replace the PSD during shipping, storage, or use with an
alternate device that does not enforce the PSD security policies.
• Detectable failure of a PSD may cause an unauthorized information flow or weakening of
PSD security functions.
2.2 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies for the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Device or the claimed PP-Modules.
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3 Architectural Information
The Black Box Secure KVM Switch (CAC Models) and Black Box Secure KVM Isolator (CAC
Models), collectively referred to as the TOE, provide secure medium to share a single set or
more of peripheral components such as keyboard, video display and mouse/pointing devices
among multiple computers over USB, analog audio, and, depending on TOE model, one or more
of DisplayPort, HDMI, and DVI-I.
The TOE utilizes multiple isolated microcontrollers to emulate the connected peripherals in order
to prevent a multitude of threats. The TOE is also equipped with numerous unidirectional data
flow forcing devices to guarantee isolation of connected computer data channels.
Black Box Secure KVM port models:
• 1-Port
• 2-Port
• 4-Port
• 8-Port
Black Box Secure KVM video outputs (displays):
• Single head
• Dual head
• Quad head
The TOE is compatible with standard personal/portable computers, servers or thin clients.
Connected computers are assumed to run off-the-shelf general-purpose operating systems such
as Windows or Linux. All TOE models include ports for the following interfaces:
• USB keyboard
• USB mouse
• 3.5mm Audio Input (computer ports)
• 3.5mm Audio Output (peripheral port)
• USB Smart-card reader, PIV/CAC reader, Token or Biometric reader
All TOE models support video as well. Depending on the specific TOE model, different numbers
and types of video inputs are supported. The permutations of this are listed in section 5.4 below.
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4 Assumptions
The ST identifies the following assumptions about the use of the product:
• Computers and peripheral devices connected to the PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
(Added from [KM Module]) The TSF may or may not isolate the ground of the keyboard
and mouse computer interfaces (the USB ground). The Operational Environment is
assumed not to support TEMPEST red‐black ground isolation.
• The environment provides physical security commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it processes and contains.
• The environment includes no wireless peripheral devices.
• PSD Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance in a trusted
manner.
• Personnel configuring the PSD and its operational environment will follow the applicable
security configuration guidance.
• All PSD users are allowed to interact with all connected computers. It is not the role of
the PSD to prevent or otherwise control user access to connected computers. Computers
or their connected network shall have the required means to authenticate the user and to
control access to their various resources.
• Users are trained not to connect a microphone to the TOE audio output interface.
• The computers connected to the TOE are not equipped with special analog data collection
cards or peripherals such as analog to digital interface, high performance audio interface,
digital signal processing function, or analog video capture function.
4.1 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the evaluation activities
specified in the claimed PP and PP-Modules and performed by the evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific hardware products, and firmware versions
identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PP and PP-Modules. Any additional security related functional
capabilities of the product were not covered by this evaluation. Any additional non-
security related functional capabilities of the product, even those described in the STs,
were not covered by this evaluation.
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4. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
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5 Security Policy
The TOE implements the User Data Protection and Data Isolation security function policies of
the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device. This PP defines a peripheral sharing device
as “a PSD is an IT product for connecting one or more peripheral devices to one or more
computers such that data cannot flow between computers by way of the peripherals or the PSD.
Examples of PSDs that can claim compliance to this PP include Keyboard, Video, Mouse
(KVM) switches; Keyboard, Mouse (KM) switches; and Isolators.” The TOE includes both
KVM switches and isolators in its evaluation boundary.
Aside from behavior specifically relating to port switching, both switches and isolators function
in the manner described below.
5.1 Keyboard and Mouse Subsystem
The keyboard and mouse processor is programmed in firmware only to accept 108-key keyboard
and 3-button mouse USB devices. Unauthorized peripheral devices will be rejected by the TOE’s
keyboard and mouse ports. Wireless keyboard and mouse are special USB composite devices;
when this type of device is recognized by the TOE, all front LED’s of the TOE will blink and the
user will need to disconnect and reboot the TOE. The only USB host peripheral devices that are
allowed by the TOE are keyboard and mouse host emulators. Basic USB 1.1/2.0 HID-class
devices are authorized as valid endpoints by the TOE. Note that devices having integrated USB
hub and composite devices will only be supported if the connected device has at least one
endpoint which is a keyboard or mouse HID class. All other non-keyboard/mouse HID class
endpoints will be disabled in this scenario. Both keyboard and mouse TOE ports are
interchangeable. It is assumed based on the claimed PP that all standard peripheral devices are
untrusted; therefore, the TOE protects the system from attacks that may be executed to exploit
such devices and enable unauthorized data flows. By creating uni-directional isolated keyboard
and mouse TOE channels that are tied to the two USB 1.1/2.0 ports on the TOE, unauthorized
data flows are eliminated.
5.2 TOE External Interfaces
The TOE only supports AC/DC power, USB keyboard and mouse, KVM Video (at least one of
DVI-I in/DVI-I out, DP 1.2 in/DP 1.2 out, HDMI 1.4 in/HDMI 1.4 out, DP 1.2 in/HDMI 1.4 out,
depending on model), analog audio output, and user authentication devices. The filter is set at
default to allow only standard smart-card reader USB 1.1/2.0 token or biometric reader but when
user or administrator registers new CAC devices, the TOE will start to support these registered
devices. All other peripheral types are rejected, either physically (because the TOE does not
support the required physical interface) or logically (because the TOE does not recognize the
connected peripheral as authorized).
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5.3 Audio Subsystem
The use of microphones as input devices is prohibited. All TOE devices support analog audio out
switching and all TOE devices will prevent microphone devices. These microphones are stopped
through the use of uni-directional audio diodes on both left and right stereo channels (forces data
flow from only the computer to the connected audio device) and the LM4880 Boomer analog
output amplifier which enforces uni-directional audio data flow. All audio signals are filtered in
accordance with the Audio Filtration Specifications table defined in the PP-Module for Analog
Audio Output.
5.4 Video Subsystem
Each connected computer has its own TOE isolated channel with its own Extended Display
Identification Data (EDID) emulator and video input port. Data flows from the input video
source through its respective EDID emulator and out of the monitor display port. Each video
input interface is isolated from one another using different EDID ICs, power planes, ground
planes, and electronic components in each independent channel. Depending on the specific TOE
model, the following numbers and types of video inputs are supported:
• 1x DVI-I in to DVI-I out
• 2x DVI-I in to DVI-I out
• 4x DVI-I in to DVI-I out
• 1x DisplayPort in to DisplayPort out
• 2x DisplayPort in to DisplayPort out
• 4x DisplayPort in to DisplayPort out
• 1x HDMI in to HDMI out
• 2x HDMI in to HDMI out
• 1x DisplayPort in to 2x HDMI out (DisplayPort Multi-Stream Transport)
• 2x DisplayPort in to 4x HDMI out (DisplayPort Multi-Stream Transport)
• 1x DisplayPort in to 2x DisplayPort out (one normal peripheral monitor and one ‘preview
screen’ multi-viewer monitor)
• “Combo” (4x total supported displays with 2x DisplayPort in to 2x DisplayPort out, 1x
DVI-I in to 1x DVI-I out, and 1x HDMI in to 1x HDMI out)
5.5 TOE Administration and Security Management
Each TOE is equipped with an Administration and Security Management Tool that can be
initiated by running an executable file on a computer with keyboard connected to the same
computer via the TOE. The tool requires administrator or a user to be successfully identified and
authenticated by the TOE in order to gain access to any supported feature. Some features are
restricted to the Administrator role only, while other features can be performed by either the
Administrator or User role.
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5.6 User Authentication Device Subsystem
The TOE is shipped with default device filtration for the CAC port. The filter is set at default to
allow only standard smart-card reader, PIV/CAC USB 1.1/2.0 token, or biometric reader. All
devices must be bus powered only (no external power source allowed). The TOE default settings
accept standard smart-card reader, PIV/CAC USB 1.1/2.0 token or biometric reader.
Authenticated users and administrator can register (allowlist) individual USB devices. All other
USB devices are prohibited (denylisted).
5.7 User Control and Monitoring Security
User monitoring and control of the TOE is performed through the TOE front panel push buttons.
These buttons are tied to the TOE system controller functionality. The TOE chassis has port
selection LEDs that correspond to the push buttons. When a given computer is selected, its
corresponding port selection LED is illuminated (the other channel LEDs remain off). During
operation, all front panel LED indications cannot be turned off or dimmed by the user in any
way, including after Restore Factory Default (reset). There are two exceptions to this:
• Isolator models do not have a switching capability because they only support a single
connected computer, and there is therefore no mechanism to switch computers or indicate
which computer is selected
• The TOE ‘preview screen’ model includes a secondary set of push-button controls for
controlling the display layout and active computers on the secondary multi-viewer
display window. This window uses on-screen display to indicate the active video feed for
each region of the display (e.g. if this monitor is configured for picture-in-picture
viewing, both the inner and outer picture are labeled with the video feed they each
represent)
The USB authentication device interface may be independently enabled or disabled using push-
button controls. Whether or not the port selection button is illuminated indicates the status of this
interface.
All features of the TOE front panel are tested during power up self-testing. From power up until
the termination of the TOE self-test, no channel is selected.
5.8 Tampering Protection
In order to mitigate potential tampering and replacement, the TOE is devised to ensure that any
replacement may be detected, any physical modification is evident, and any logical modification
may be prevented. The TOE is designed so that access to the TOE firmware, software, or its
memory via its accessible ports is prevented. The TOE is designed to prevent any physical or
logical access its internal memory. There is a mechanical switch on the inside of the TOE that
triggers the anti-tampering state when the enclosure is manually opened. Once the anti-tampering
state is triggered, the TOE is permanently disabled.
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5.9 Self-Testing and Security Audit
The TOE has a self-testing function that executes immediately after power is supplied including
Restore Factory Default (reset) and power reset. Self-testing must complete successfully before
normal operational access is granted to the TSF. The self-test function includes the following
activities:
• Basic integrity test of the TOE hardware (no front panel push buttons are jammed).
• Basic integrity test of the TOE firmware.
• Integrity test of the anti-tampering system and control function.
• Test the data traffic isolation between ports (non-isolator devices only).
The TOE has a non-volatile memory event log which records all abnormal security events that
occur within TOE operation. This log can be accessed by the identified and authorized
administrator and dumped into a .txt file using a connected computer and the Administration and
Security Management tool that is provided by the TOE vendor.
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6 Documentation
The guidance documentation examined during the course of the evaluation and delivered with the
TOE is as follows:
• Black Box Secure KVM Administration and Security Management Tool Guide (CAC),
Version 1.2, November 1, 2021
• Black Box Advanced 1-Port Secure KVM Isolator User Guide, Revision 2.0B, October
25, 2021
• Black Box Advanced 2/4/8-Port DVI-I Secure KVM Switch User Guide, Revision 2.0B,
October 25, 2021
• Black Box Advanced 2/4-Port DP/HDMI Secure KVM Switch User Guide, Revision
2.0B, October 25, 2021
• Black Box Advanced 2/4/8-Port DisplayPort Secure KVM Switch User Guide, Revision
2.0B, October 25, 2021
• Black Box Advanced 2/4-Port DP MST Secure KVM Switch User Guide, Revision 2.0B,
October 25, 2021
• Black Box Advanced 4-Port DP, HDMI & DVI-I Secure KVM Switch User Guide,
Revision 2.0B, October 25, 2021
• Black Box Advanced 4-Port DP Secure KVM Switch w/ Preview User Guide, Revision
2.0B, October 25, 2021
The above documents are considered to be part of the evaluated TOE. The documentation is
delivered with the product and is also available by download from:
https://www.blackbox.com/NIAP4/documentation.
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the TOE or made available through
electronic downloads should not be relied upon for using the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
The Security Targets used are:
• Black Box Secure KVM Switch Security Target (CAC Models), Version 1.08, November
3, 2021
• Black Box Secure KVM Isolator Security Target (CAC Models), Version 1.04,
November 3, 2021
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7 Independent Testing
7.1 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information
contained in the following proprietary documents:
• Black Box PSD PP 4.0 Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.4,
November 30, 2021
A non-proprietary summary of the test configuration, test tools, and tests performed may be
found in:
• Assurance Activities Report for Black Box KVM Switch/Isolator (CAC Models),
Version 1.3, November 5, 2021
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE
security functional requirements as specified in the STs for a product claiming conformance to
[PSD PP], [AO Module], [KM Module], [UA Module], and [VI Module].
The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Evaluation Activities specified in
the materials referenced above. The Test Plan described how each test activity was to be
instantiated within the TOE test environment. The evaluation team executed the tests specified in
the Test Plan and documented the results in the team test report listed above.
Independent testing took place at the Leidos facility in Columbia, Maryland from July 19, 2021
to July 26, 2021, at the vendor facility in North Las Vegas, Nevada from July 26, 2021 to August
3, 2021, with additional supplemental evidence conducted as needed at the Leidos facility
through November 30, 2021. For collection of supplemental evidence, devices used for testing at
the vendor site were shipped to the Leidos facility.
Testing performed at the vendor site was performed in accordance with NIAP Labgram
#078/Valgram #098. The Leidos CCTL Quality System specifies an on-site checklist that
identify the evaluator(s) sent to the vendor site and the following elements:
• Personnel access control to vendor facility (receptionist, visitor sign-in, escort)
• Physical access control to test environment within vendor facility (mechanism of
isolation from general facility, personnel present in test environment)
• Logical isolation of devices under test (non-networked devices or devices deployed in
isolated network)
• Verification of test equipment (serial number match, preservation of tamper-evident
labels, baseline oscilloscope readings)
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed
and configured the TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test
Plan on equipment configured in the testing laboratory.
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Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the
testing requirements for the claimed security functionality were fulfilled.
7.2 Vulnerability Analysis
A search of public domain sources for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE conducted in May
2021 and repeated several times, most recently in November 30, 2021, did not reveal any known
vulnerabilities.
The evaluator conducted penetration testing based on the threat model defined in the claimed PP.
The testing did not exploit any vulnerability.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version of the TOE consists of the Black Box Secure KVM Peripheral Sharing
Devices identified in Tables 1 through 4.
The TOE must be deployed as described in section 4 Assumptions of this document and be
configured in accordance with the documentation identified in Section 6. The figure below
identifies a sample evaluated configuration for a 4-port model. The only differences between the
TOE models are:
• The maximum number of computers that can be connected to the TOE (1, 2, 4, 8)
• The number and type of input video ports (1, 2, 4; DVI-I, DisplayPort, HDMI)
• The number and type of output video ports (1, 2, 4; DVI-I, DisplayPort, HDMI)
• Whether or not the TOE has a secondary peripheral monitor that has “preview screen”
(also known as multi-viewer) functionality
Figure 1: Setup of 4-Port TOE Installation
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation was conducted based upon the evaluation activities specified in the following
materials:
• Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0, July 19, 2019
• PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
• PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
• PP-Module for User Authentication Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
• PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
These evaluation activities were performed in conjunction with version 3.1, revision 5 of the CC
and the CEM, and all applicable NIAP Technical Decisions, scheme policies, scheme
publications, and official responses to Technical Queries. A verdict for an assurance component
is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the evaluation activities in the claimed PPs, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
The details of the evaluation are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), which is
controlled by the Leidos CCTL. The security assurance requirements are listed in the following
table.
Assurance Component ID Assurance Component Name
ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage
ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing – Sample
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey
Table 7: TOE Security Assurance Requirements
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team’s observations support the evaluation team’s conclusion that the Black Box Secure
KVM Switch/Isolator (CAC Models) meet the claims stated in the Security Target.
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration of the
device(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the SFR’s within the Security
Target was evaluated.
Consumers employing the devices must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated configuration is
established and maintained.
The validators point out that this product does not use encryption. Therefore, certificate review and
entropy analysis was not required for this evaluation.
NIAP established a Peripheral Sharing Switch Technical Rapid Response Team (PSS-TRRT) to
address questions and concerns related to evaluations claiming conformance to Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch. A Technical Decision is an issue resolution statement that
clarifies or interprets protection profile requirements and evaluation activities. PSS-TRRT has
formally posted ten Technical Decisions related to the claimed PP and PP-Modules: TD0506,
TD0507, TD0514, TD0518, TD0539, TD0557, TD0583, TD0584, TD0585, TD0586, and
TD0593 (see https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_tds.cfm). All
Technical Decisions applied to this evaluation. Note however that the purpose of TD0583 was to
address FPT_PHP.3 with respect to TOE models that have a wired remote control. The TOE
does not have a wired remote control, but the TD was still applied as it modifies SFR and test
activity wording regardless of whether or not the TOE has a wired remote control.
In addition to the items mentioned above some additional product administration and usability
features are worth considering:
• The vendor provides an administrative tool to configure the product. This tool is a
software application that runs on a general-purpose Windows computer. The security of
the application was not separately assessed as part of the evaluation of the product.
Distribution of this tool should only be to systems that are required to perform
administrative functions.
• The product provides administrative functionality but this is limited to role-based
administration with administrative accounts defined on the product itself. The
administrator must take care to ensure that the account credentials are provided to the
necessary individuals over secure channels.
• The product provides default passwords for its management accounts. The administrator
should ensure that these passwords are changed to secure values.
• An administrator mode is supported in the product, but its usability and features are
limited. The administrator should make sure they enable multiple users and change
default passwords.
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• An audit feature is supported, but is of a limited nature given the product.
• Different TOE models provide support for different peripheral interfaces. Vendor
guidance must be consulted to determine the interfaces that are supported for a given
TOE model. There is no difference in the underlying security architecture for each TOE
model so for those interfaces that are shared across multiple models, the required security
functionality is implemented in the same manner.
• Different TOE models have different firmware versions. These versions are used to
indicate the specific physical interfaces that are supported (e.g. the versioning for a TOE
model with DVI-I support differs from one with DisplayPort support). They do not refer
to a sequential versioning system such that a higher number indicates a newer release.
The first digit of 4 is common to all firmware versions and is used to indicate that the
firmware for that device meets the requirements of PSD PP 4.0 and the associated PP-
Modules.
10.1 Validation Approach
These evaluations were split up into separate VIDs (11240, 11241, and 11242) to comply with the PP-
Configurations introduced in PP PSD v4.0 to ensure each model was evaluated against the specific PP-
Configuration to which it applies.
To minimize documentation and test, the CCTL and the validation team agreed that a single test
plan could be shared across all three VIDs 11240, 11241, and 11242, as long as it was made
clear which tests apply to which VID.
21
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Name Description
ST Title Black Box Secure KVM Switch Security Target (CAC Models) [Switch ST]
Black Box Secure KVM Isolator Security Target (CAC Models) [Isolator ST]
ST Version 1.08 [Switch ST]
1.04 [Isolator ST]
Publication Date November 3, 2021
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13 Abbreviations and Acronyms
Acronym Full Definition
CAC Common Access Card
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
DP DisplayPort
DPMST DisplayPort Multi-Stream Transport
EDID Extended Display Identification Data
HDMI High Definition Multimedia Interface
IC Integrated Circuit
KVM Keyboard, Video and Mouse
LED Light-Emitting Diode
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation
Program
PCL Product Compliant List
PSD Peripheral Sharing Device
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
USB Universal Serial Bus
VR Validation Report
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2015.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2015.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2015.
4. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2015.
5. Black Box Secure KVM Switch Security Target (CAC Models), Version 1.08,
November 3, 2021
6. Black Box Secure KVM Isolator Security Target (CAC Models), Version 1.04,
November 3, 2021
7. Black Box Secure KVM Administration and Security Management Tool Guide (CAC),
Version 1.2, November 1, 2021
8. Black Box Advanced 1-Port Secure KVM Isolator User Guide, Revision 2.0B, October
25, 2021
9. Black Box Advanced 2/4/8-Port DVI-I Secure KVM Switch User Guide, Revision
2.0B, October 25, 2021
10. Black Box Advanced 2/4-Port DP/HDMI Secure KVM Switch User Guide, Revision
2.0B, October 25, 2021
11. Black Box Advanced 2/4/8-Port DisplayPort Secure KVM Switch User Guide,
Revision 2.0B, October 25, 2021
12. Black Box Advanced 2/4-Port DP MST Secure KVM Switch User Guide, Revision
2.0B, October 25, 2021
13. Black Box Advanced 4-Port DP, HDMI & DVI-I Secure KVM Switch User Guide,
Revision 2.0B, October 25, 2021
14. Black Box Advanced 4-Port DP Secure KVM Switch w/ Preview User Guide, Revision
2.0B, October 25, 2021
15. Black Box PSD PP 4.0 Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.4,
November 30, 2021
16. SmartAVI Vulnerability Survey, Version 1.7, November 30, 2021
17. Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0, July 19, 2019
18. PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
25
19. PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
20. PP-Module for User Authentication Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
21. PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019