

PREMIER MINISTRE

Secretariat General for National Defence Central Directorate for Information Systems Security

Certification Report 2006/27 ST19NR66B secure microcontroller

Paris, 8 December 2006

Courtesy Translation



Warning

This report is designed to provide sponsors with a document enabling them to assess the security level of a product under the conditions of use and operation defined in this report for the evaluated version. It is also designed to provide the potential purchaser of the product with the conditions under which he may operate or use the product so as to meet the conditions of use for which the product has been evaluated and certified; that is why this certification report must be read alongside the evaluated user and administration guidance, as well as with the product security target, which presents threats, environmental assumptions and the supposed conditions of use so that the user can judge for himself whether the product meets his needs in terms of security objectives.

Certification does not, however, constitute a recommendation product from DCSSI (Central Directorate for Information Systems Security), and does not guarantee that the certified product is totally free of all exploitable vulnerabilities.

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Page 2 out 17 CER/F/07.5

Certification report reference

2006/27

Product name

ST19NR66B secure microcontroller

Product reference

ST19NR66 revision B microcontroller (dedicated software ZXB, maskset K7H0A)

Protection profile conformity

PP/9806 - PP BSI-PP-002-2001

Evaluation criteria and version

Common Criteria version 2.3

compliant with ISO 15408:2005

Evaluation level

EAL 5 augmented

ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4

Developer(s)

STMicroelectronics

Smartcard IC division, ZI de Rousset, BP2, 13106 Rousset Cedex, France

Sponsor

STMicroelectronics

Smartcard IC division, ZI de Rousset, BP2, 13106 Rousset Cedex, France

Evaluation facility

Serma Technologies

30 avenue Gustave Eiffel, 33608 Pessac, France Phone: +33 (0)5 57 26 08 64, email : m.dus@serma.com

Recognition arrangements

CCRA

SOG-IS





The product is recognised at EAL4 level.

Introduction

The Certification

Security certification for information technology products and systems is governed by decree number 2002-535 dated April, 18th 2002, and published in the "Journal Officiel de la République Française". This decree stipulates that:

- The central information system security department draws up **certification reports**. These reports indicate the features of the proposed security targets. They may include any warnings that the authors feel the need to mention for security reasons. They may or may not be transmitted to third parties or made public, as the principals desire (article 7).
- The **certificates** issued by the Prime Minister certify that the copies of the products or systems submitted for evaluation fulfil the specified security features. They also certify that the evaluations have been carried out in compliance with applicable rules and standards, with the required degrees of skill and impartiality (article 8).

The procedures are available on the Internet site <u>www.ssi.gouv.fr</u>.

Page 4 out 17 CER/F/07.5



Content

1. T	HE PRODUIT	6
1.1.	PRESENTATION OF THE PRODUCT	6
1.2.	EVALUATED PRODUCT DESCRIPTION	6
1	2.1. Product identification	6
1	2.2. Security services	
1	2.3. Architecture	
1	2.4. Life cycle	8
1	2.5. Evaluated configuration	
2. T	HE EVALUATION	10
2.1.	EVALUATION REFERENTIAL	10
2.2.	EVALUATION WORK	
2.3.	CRYPTOGRAPHIC MECHANISMS ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS	
2.4.	RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR ANALYSIS	10
3. C	ERTIFICATION	11
3.1.	Conclusion	11
3.2.	RESTRICTIONS	11
3.3.	RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE	11
3	3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS)	
3	3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)	
ANNE	X 1. EVALUATION LEVEL OF THE PRODUCT	13
ANNE	X 2. EVALUATED PRODUCT REFERENCES	14
ANNE	X 3. REFERENCE RELATED TO THE CERTIFICATION	16

1. The produit

1.1. Presentation of the product

The evaluated product is the ST19NR66 (revision B) microcontroller (dedicated software ZXB, maskset K7H0A) developed by STMicroelectronics. This product includes a software test ("Autotest") and a software library (system management, crypto library), stored in ROM memory.

The microcontroller aims to host one or several software applications and to be embedded in a plastic support to create a Smartcard with multiple possible usages (identity documents, banking, health card, pay-TV or transport applications ...) depending on the Embedded Software applications. However, only the microcontroller is evaluated. The software applications are not in the scope of this evaluation.

1.2. Evaluated product description

The security target [ST] defines the evaluated product, its evaluated security functionalities and its operation environment.

This security target is compliant to both [PP9806] and [PP BSI] protection profiles.

1.2.1. Product identification

The configuration list [CONF] identifies the product's constituent elements.

The certified version of the product can be identified by the following elements that can be checked with a microscope:

- Die identification (maskset): K7H0A;
- Dedicated software identification: XXB:
- Embedded software identification: this reference depends on the application embedded in ROM memory;
- Manufacturing site identification: STMicroelectronics 4 (Rousset).

1.2.2. Security services

The product provides mainly the following security services:

- Hardware initialisation & TOE attribute initialisation;
- TOE configuration switching and control;
- TOE logical integrity;
- Test of the TOE:
- Administrators authentication;
- Storage and Function Access Firewall;
- Physical tampering security function;
- Security violation administrator;
- Unobservability;
- Symmetric Key Cryptography Support;
- Asymmetric Key Cryptography Support;

Page 6 out 17 CER/F/07.5



- Unpredictable Number Generation Support.

1.2.3. Architecture

The ST19NR66B microcontroller is made up of:

- A Hardware part:
 - o An 8-bit processing unit;
 - Memories: EEPROM (high density 66KB with integrity control, for program and data storage), ROM (224KB for user, 32KB for dedicated software: autotest and cryptographic libraries) and SRAM (6KB);
 - Security Modules: Memory Access Control Logic (MACL), clock generator, security administrator, power management, memories integrity control;
 - Functional Modules: 8-bits timers, I/O management in contact mode (IART ISO 7816-3) and contactless mode (RFUART ISO 14443-B), True Random Number Generators, DES and RSA co-processing units.
- A dedicated software is embedded in ROM which comprises:
 - Microcontroller test capabilities («Autotest »);
 - o System and Hardware/Software interface management capabilities
 - o ISO 14443-B interface management capabilities;
 - o Cryptographic libraries: DES (E-DES implementation), AES and RSA which are included in the product security target.

1.2.4. Life cycle

The product's life cycle is organised as follow:




Figure 1 – Life cycle

The product is designed, prepared and tested by:

STMicroelectronics

Smartcard IC division ZI de Rousset, BP2 13106 Rousset Cedex France

A part of the design is realised by:

STMicroelectronics

28 Ang Mo Kio - Industrial park 2 Singapore 569508 Singapore.

Page 8 out 17 CER/F/07.5



The photo masks of the product are manufactured by:

DAI NIPPON PRINTING CO., LTD

2-2-1, Fukuoka, kamifukuoka-shi, Saitama-Ken, 356-8507 Japan

The product can be in one of its three possible configurations:

- «Test» configuration: product configuration at the end of developer IC manufacturing. The product is tested with a part of the Dedicated Software (called "Autotest") within the secure developer premises. Pre-personalization data can be loaded in the EEPROM. The product configuration is changed to "Issuer" before delivery to the next user, and the part cannot be reversed to the «test» configuration.
- «Issuer» configuration: product configuration when delivered to users involved in IC packaging and personalization. Limited tests are still possible with the Dedicated Software (System Rom operating system). Personalization data can be loaded in the EEPROM.
 - The product configuration is changed to its final "User" configuration when delivered to the end user (the part cannot be reversed to the «Issuer» configuration).
- «User» configuration: Final product configuration. The developer test functionalities are unavailable. The Dedicated Software only provides the power-on reset sequence and routine libraries (mainly cryptographic services). After the power-on reset sequence, the product functionalities are driven exclusively by the Embedded Software.

1.2.5. Evaluated configuration

This certification report presents the evaluation work related to the product and the dedicated software library identified in §1.1. Any other embedded application, such as embedded applications intended specifically for the sake of the evaluation is not part of the evaluation perimeter.

Referring to the life-cycle, the evaluated product is the product that comes out the manufacturing, test and pre-personalization phase (phase 3).

For the evaluation needs, the product ST19NR66B was provided to the ITSEF with a dedicated test software (Card Manager reference: TZV) in a mode known as « open¹ ».

2. The evaluation

2.1. Evaluation referential

The evaluation has been performed in compliance with **Common Criteria version 2.3** [CC], and with the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM].

For assurance components above EAL4 level, the evaluation facility own evaluation methods consistent with [AIS34], validated by DCSSI have been used.

In order to meet the specificities of smart cards, the [CCIC] and [CCAP] guides have been applied.

The ST19NR66B product has already been certified in 2006 with [2006/22] reference. Some complementary works have been performed on the Random Number Generator in order to assess the conformance to the AIS31 method criteria (see [AIS31]). Thus, the verdicts related to all the other evaluation works are re-used.

2.2. Evaluation work

The evaluation technical report [RTE], delivered to DCSSI the 1st December of 2006, provides details on the work performed by the evaluation facility and assesses that all evaluation tasks are "**pass**".

2.3. Cryptographic mechanisms robustness analysis

The robustness of cryptographic mechanisms has not been analysed by DCSSI.

2.4. Random number generator analysis

The evaluated product provides a random number generator that can be used by the embedded software.

The evaluation facility has evaluated the random number generator with the [AIS31] and [FIPS 140] methodology.

The generator reaches the class "P2 - SOF-high" according to [AIS31] and Level 3^1 according to [FIPS 140].

Page 10 out 17 CER/F/07.5

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¹ Only the [FIPS 140-2] subset related to random number generators has been evaluated and only regarding the statistical tests specified in the standard.



3. Certification

3.1. Conclusion

The evaluation identified in chapter 2 and described in the evaluation technical report [ETR], was carried out according to the current rules and standards, with the required competency and impartiality by a licensed evaluation facility. All the work performed permits the release of a certificate in conformance with the decree 2002-535.

This certificate testifies that the product "ST19NR66B secure microcontroller" submitted for evaluation fulfils the security features specified in its security target [ST] for the evaluation level EAL5 augmented.

3.2. Restrictions

This certificate only applies on the product specified in chapter 1.2 of this certification report.

This certificate provides a resistance assessment of the ST19NR66B product to a set of attacks, which remains generic due to the missing of any specific embedded application. Therefore, the security of a final product based on the evaluated microcontroller would only be assessed through the final product evaluation, which could be performed on the basis of the current evaluation results.

The user of the certified product shall respect the operational environmental security objectives summarized specified in the security target [ST] and shall respect the recommendations in the guidance [GUIDES], in particular:

- Security procedures must be applied during the product delivery to the users in order to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the product and the related manufacturing and test data (prevent any copy, modification, theft, unauthorized manipulation or usage);
- The communication between a product developed based on the secured microcontroller and other products must be secured (in terms of protocols and procedures);
- The system (work station, terminal, communication...) must guaranty the confidentiality and the integrity of the sensitive data, which are stored or processed.

3.3. Recognition of the certificate

3.3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS)

This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the SOG-IS agreement [SOG-IS].

The European Recognition Agreement made by SOG-IS in 1999 allows recognition from Signatory States of the agreement¹, of ITSEC and Common Criteria certificates. The European recognition is applicable up to ITSEC E6 and CC EAL7 levels. The certificates that are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:



3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)

This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA [CC RA]. However, it is only recognised for EAL4 level.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement allows the recognition, by signatory countries², of the Common Criteria certificates. The mutual recognition is applicable up to the assurance components of CC EAL4 level and also to ALC_FLR family. The certificates that are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:



Page 12 out 17 CER/F/07.5

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¹ The signatory countries of the SOG-IS agreement are: Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

² The signatory countries of the CCRA arrangement are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.




Annex 1. Evaluation level of the product

Class	Family	Components by assurance level			Assurance level of the product					
		EAL 1	EAL 2	EAL 3	EAL 4	EAL 5	EAL 6	EAL 7	EAL 5+	Name of the component
A CD I	ACM_AUT				1	1	2	2	1	Partial CM automation
ACM Configuration	ACM_CAP	1	2	3	4	4	5	5	4	Configuration support and acceptance procedures
management	ACM_SCP			1	2	3	3	3	3	Development tools CM coverage
ADO	ADO_DEL		1	1	2	2	2	3	2	Detection of modification
Delivery and operation	ADO_IGS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Installation, generation and start-up procedures
_	ADV_FSP	1	1	1	2	3	3	4	3	Semiformal functional specification
	ADV_HLD		1	2	2	3	4	5	3	Semiformal high-level design
	ADV_IMP				1	2	3	3	2	Implementation of the TSF
ADV Development	ADV_INT					1	2	3	1	Modularity
Development	ADV_LLD				1	1	2	2	1	Descriptive low-level design
	ADV_RCR	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	Semiformal correspondence demonstration
	ADV_SPM				1	3	3	3	3	Formal TOE security policy model
AGD	AGD_ADM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Administrator guidance
Guidance	AGD_USR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	User guidance
	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2	2	Sufficiency of security measures
ALC	ALC_FLR									
Life-cycle support	ALC_LCD				1	2	2	3	2	Standardised life-cycle model
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3	2	Compliance with implementation standards
	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3	2	Analysis of coverage
ATE	ATE_DPT			1	1	2	2	3	2	Testing: low-level design
Tests	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2	1	Functional testing
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	Independent testing – sample
	AVA_CCA					1	2	2	1	Covert channel analysis
AVA Vulnavahilitu	AVA_MSU			1	2	2	3	3	3	Analysis and testing of insecure states
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_SOF		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Strength of TOE security function evaluation
	AVA_VLA		1	1	2	3	4	4	4	Highly resistant

Annex 2. Evaluated product references

[2006/22]	Certification report 2006/22 - Microcontrôleur sécurisé ST19NR66B, 21 november 2006, SGDN/DCSSI
[ST]	Reference security target for the evaluation: - ST19N Generic Security Target, Reference: SMD_ST19N_ST_06_001_V01.01, STMicroelectronics For the needs of publication, the following security target has been provided and validated in the evaluation: - ST19NR66 Security Target, Reference: SMD_ST19NR66_ST_06_001_V01.00 STMicroelectronics
[RTE]	Evaluation technical report : - Evaluation Technical Report - ST19NR66B (EAL5+ evaluation), Reference: YQM_ETR_NR66B_v1.1 Serma Technologies For the needs of composite evaluation with this microcontroller a technical report for composition has been validated: - Evaluation Technical Report Lite - ST19NR66B, Reference: YQUEM_ETR Lite ST19NR66B_v1.0 Serma Technologies
[CONF]	Product configuration list: - Configuration List ST19NR66B - PRODUCT - K7H0A MASK SET, Reference: MKT_K7H0_CFGL_06_003_V1.1 STMicroelectronics List of the delivered materials by STMicroelectronics: - Yquem Evaluation – documentation report (ST19NR66B), Reference: SMD_YQUEM_DR_06_001_V1.2 STMicroelectronics
[GUIDES]	The product user guidance documentation is the following: - ST19NR66 Dual Contactless Smartcard MCU with 66 KBytes High Density EEPROM, Enhanced RF Performances, Reference: DS_19NR66/0609 Rev 2, STMicroelectronics - Application Note: Migrating from STWR66 to ST19NR66, Reference: AN19WR66_NR66/0605 Rev 1, STMicroelectronics - Manuals of security recommendations v2.0, Reference: APM_19W-19N_SECU/0612V2.0 STMicroelectronics

Page 14 out 17 CER/F/07.5



	 ST19NR66 - System ROM - Issuer Configuration – User Manual, Reference: UM_19NR66_SR_I/0611 Rev 3, STMicroelectronics ST19W - System ROM –Issuer configuration - user manual addendum, Reference: AD_UM_19W_SR_I/0308V1.1 STMicroelectronics ST19N System Library V2 User Manual, Reference: Um_19N_SysLibV2/0610 Rev 3, STMicroelectronics ST19X, ST19W and 19N EDES Library User Manual, Reference: UM_19X_EDESLIB/0605 Rev 2, STMicroelectronics ST19N - Fast Cryptographic Library FastLIB4 – User Manual, Reference: UM_19N_FASTLIB4/0605 Rev 3, STMicroelectronics ST19W and ST19N AES Library - User Manual, Reference: UM_19W_19N_AES/0610 Rev 2, STMicroelectronics ST19N RF UART Communication Library User Manual, Reference: Um19N_RFUART_CommLib/0610 Rev 2, STMicroelectronics ST19W AIS31 compliant random numbers, User Manual, Reference: UM_19W_AIS31_CRN/0503, V3 STMicroelectronics 	
[PP/9806]	Protection Profile Smart Card Integrated Circuit Version 2.0, September 1998. <i>Certified under the reference PP/9806</i> .	
[PP0002]	Protection Profile, Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1.0 July 2001. <i>Certified under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001</i> .	



Annex 3. Reference related to the certification

	er 2002-535 dated 18 th April 2002 related to the security evaluations and for information technology products and systems.
[CER/P/01]	Procedure CER/P/01 - Certification of the security provided by IT products and systems, DCSSI.
[CC]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction and general model,
ICEMI	
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology, August 2005, version 2.3, ref CCMB-2005-08-004. The content of CEM version 2.3 is identical to the international ISO/IEC 18045:2005.
[CC IC]	Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical Document - The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, version 2.0, April 2006.
[CC AP]	Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical Document - Application of attack potential to smart-cards, version 2.1, April 2006.
[COMP]	Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical Document - ETR-lite for composition, Version 1.3, April 2006.
[CC RA]	Arrangement on the Recognition of Common criteria certificates in the field of information Technology Security, May 2000.
[SOG-IS]	«Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security Evaluation Certificates», version 2.0, April 1999, Management Committee of Agreement Group.
[AIS 34]	Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme - Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+, AIS34, Version 1.00, 01 June 2004 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

Page 16 out 17 CER/F/07.5



[AIS31]	Functionnality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number generator, AIS31 version 1, 25/09/2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[FIPS 140]	Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules Reference: FIPS PUB-140-2:1999 NIST