TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
2022-01
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Certification Report
Huawei Server intelligent Baseboard Management Controller
iBMC version 3.03.00.21
Sponsor and developer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Huawei Industrial Base Bantian,
Longgang, Shenzhen 518129,
People’s Republic of China
Evaluation facility: UL
De Heyderweg, 2
Leiden, 2314XZ
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0461863-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 0461863
Author(s): Denise Cater
Date: 09 November 2022
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 6
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Evaluation Results 9
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Huawei
Server intelligent Baseboard Management Controller iBMC version 3.03.00.21. The developer of the
Huawei Server intelligent Baseboard Management Controller iBMC version 3.03.00.21 is Huawei
Technologies Co., Ltd. located in Dongguan City, P.R.C. and they also act as the sponsor of the
evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when
judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
Huawei Server intelligent Baseboard Management Controller (iBMC) is an out of band management
system optimized for server remote management. The TOE consists of firmware embedded on the
motherboard of Huawei server. iBMC provides hardware monitoring, fault diagnostics and
management, energy management, domain management and directory service, firmware
management, storage management, server remote control and firmware (e.g. BIOS) updating.
The TOE is the firmware executed on the Management Plane of the Huawei server, providing server
management functionalities.
The TOE has been evaluated by UL located in Leiden, The Netherlands. The evaluation was
completed on 09 November 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of
IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Huawei Server intelligent Baseboard
Management Controller iBMC version 3.03.00.21, the security requirements, and the level of
confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security
requirements. Consumers of the Huawei Server intelligent Baseboard Management Controller iBMC
version 3.03.00.21 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security
target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this
certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Huawei Server intelligent Baseboard
Management Controller iBMC version 3.03.00.21 from Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. located in
Dongguan City, P.R.C..
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Firmware iBMC 3.03.00.21 v3.03.00.21
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Huawei Server
intelligent Baseboard Management Controller iBMC version 3.03.00.21. For details, see section 2.5
“Documentation” of this report.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security functionality:
 Identification and Authentication
 Authorization
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 Security Management
 TOE access
 Trusted communication
 Secure updating based on RoT
 Secure booting based on RoT
It should be noted that the Root of Trust (RoT) on which the secure updating and secure booting
depend are provided by the underlying Huawei server platform.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is the iBMC firmware executing in the Management Plan of the Huawei Server, as depicted
below:
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The TOE is comprised of the following four subsystems:
 IM Subsystem: This subsystem implements user interfaces management, it interacts with SM
subsystem to perform all security functionalities.
 SM Subsystem: This subsystem implements most of BMC security functionalities, which may rely
on platform functions provided by the OS subsystem, and may be called by IM to perform or
manage security functions.
 OS Subsystem: This subsystem including underlying OS and other platform modules which
provide fundamental functionalities to support BMC running.
 Secure Booting and Secure Updating Subsystem: Initial booting program part of the root of
trust, verification of L1FW, load and verify other firmware’s which will be executed later (uboot,
rootfs and the host server BIOS) and check if there’s firmware update or not.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer.
As detailed in [ST] section 1.4.1, the items detailed in the table below are provided in the “Huawei
iBMC (3.03.00.21) User Guide (Common Criteria Certification)” encrypted zip file.
Identifier Version
Operational User Guidance of Huawei iBMC 1.10, 29 July 2022
Preparative Procedures for Production of Huawei iBMC 1.7, 29 July 2022
Preparative Procedures for User of Huawei iBMC 1.8, 29 July 2022
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
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2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed comprehensive testing on functional specification and subsystem level.
These tests are grouped by the security functions: Identification and Authentication, Authorization,
Security Audit, Cryptographic Support, Security Management, TOE access security, Trusted
Communications, Secure Booting and Secure Updating.
The evaluator selected a sample of the developer test cases to repeat. The selected sample exercised
all TSFIs and subsystems of the TOE.
The evaluator created additional test cases test to supplement coverage of SFRs, TSFI and
subsystem interactions. These test cases were also developed to further exercise the behaviour of
critical functionality.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The independent vulnerability analysis consisted of two main components:
 Analysis of the implementation of the security architecture, including:
o Secure initialization of the TOE
o Tamper resistance of the TOE
o Non-bypassability of the TSF
o Exception handling by the TOE
 Analysis of the implementation of each of the SFRs claimed in [ST].
From the analysis, a number of areas of concern were identified, which were further investigated
through penetration testing. The penetration testing demonstrated that the TOE was resistant to
attacks from an attacker with enhanced-basic attack potential.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 40 days. During that test campaign, 100% of the
total time was spent on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST]. The testing of the TOE firmware was performed using the TOE
installed on a TaiShan 200 Pro Model 2480 Huawei Server, running RTOS 207.8.9.
Testing was performed on an earlier revision of the TOE. The assurance gained from testing on an
earlier revision has been assessed to be valid for the final TOE version. The specific changes were
themselves tested and the evaluators analysed the changes and concluded they did not impact other
aspects of the TSF.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There is no reuse of evaluation results in this certification.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Huawei Server intelligent Baseboard
Management Controller iBMC version 3.03.00.21.
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2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and six (6) Site Technical Audit Reports for the
sites, namely [STAR_DC1], [STAR_DC2], [STAR_DC3], [STAR_Hi1711], [STAR_iBMC] and
[STAR_KMC]
2
.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Huawei Server intelligent
Baseboard Management Controller iBMC version 3.03.00.21, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3
conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.1. This implies that
the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance. There are
no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance.
Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain
attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
2
The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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3 Security Target
The Security Target of Huawei iBMC, Version 2.0, 29 October 2022 [ST] is included here by
reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
iBMC intelligent Baseboard Management Controller
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
RoT Root of Trust
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Huawei Server intelligent Baseboard Management Controller Evaluation
Technical Report, UL13972966/ETR, v2.0, 09 November 2022
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[ST] Security Target of Huawei iBMC, Version 2.0, 29 October 2022
[STAR_DC1] Site Technical Audit Report iBMC Software Site – SITE.DC1,
UL13972966/STAR_DC1v2.0, 09 November 2022
[STAR_DC2] Site Technical Audit Report iBMC Software Site – SITE.DC2,
UL13972966/STAR_DC2v2.0, 09 November 2022
[STAR_DC3] Site Technical Audit Report iBMC Software Site– SITE.DC3,
UL13972966/STAR_DC3v2.0, 09 November 2022
[STAR_Hi1711] Site Technical Audit Report iBMC Software Site – SITE.Hi1711,
UL13972966/STAR_ Hi1711v2.0, 09 November 2022
[STAR_iBMC] Site Technical Audit Report iBMC Software Site,
UL13972966/STAR_iBMCv2.0, 09 November 2022
[STAR_KMC] Site Technical Audit Report iBMC Software Site – SITE.KMC,
UL13972966/STAR_KMCv2.0, 09 November 2022
(This is the end of this report.)