Palo Alto Networks
GlobalProtect App 6
Security Target
Version: 1.0
Date: July 26, 2023
Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
www.paloaltonetworks.com
© 2023 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks. A list of our trademarks
can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be
trademarks of their respective companies.
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Table of Contents
1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................3
1.1 SECURITY TARGET, TOE AND CC IDENTIFICATION .........................................................................................3
1.2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS.................................................................................................................................4
1.3 CONVENTIONS................................................................................................................................................5
1.3.1 Terminology 5
1.3.2 Acronyms 5
2. PRODUCT DESCRIPTION.................................................................................................................................7
2.1 TOE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................................7
2.2 TOE ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................................8
2.2.1 Physical Boundaries 9
2.2.2 Logical Boundaries 9
2.3 TOE DOCUMENTATION ...............................................................................................................................11
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION...............................................................................................................12
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..................................................................................................................................13
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ...........................................................................................................13
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................14
5. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................................15
5.1 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ..........................................................................................................................15
5.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ..............................................................................................15
5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS) 17
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP) 20
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA) 21
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT) 22
5.2.5 Privacy (FPR) 22
5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) 22
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channel (FTP) 24
5.3 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................................25
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .................................................................................................................26
6.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT...........................................................................................................................26
6.2 USER DATA PROTECTION .............................................................................................................................29
6.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION.......................................................................................................29
6.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................................31
6.5 PRIVACY .......................................................................................................................................................32
6.6 PROTECTION OF THE TSF.............................................................................................................................32
6.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNEL............................................................................................................................34
7. PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS ...................................................................................................................35
8. RATIONALE.......................................................................................................................................................36
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: TOE Deployment 6
Figure 2: TOE Architecture 7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components 13
Table 2 Assurance Components 23
Table 3 - Keys and Credentials 25
Table 4 Cryptographic Functions and CAVP Certificates 26
1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions,
ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is the GlobalProtect client (GlobalProtect App 6).
The Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect App provides users with the ability to securely communicate with
their internal networks.
The focus on this evaluation is on the TOE functionality supporting the claims in the Protection Profile for
Application Software.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
● Product Description (Section 2)
● Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
● Security Objectives (Section 4)
● IT Security Requirements (Section 5)
● TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
● Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)
● Rationale (Section 8).
1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification
ST Title – Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect App 6 Security Target
ST Version – Version 1.0
ST Date – July 26, 2023
TOE Identification – GlobalProtect App 6, which is available in five images (four downloadable from the
Palo Alto Networks Support site), include the following:
● Windows 11
● GlobalProtect64-6.0.7.msi
● macOS 12
● GlobalProtect-6.0.7.pkg
● Android 12
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● global-protect-6.0.7-signed.apk
● iOS 16
● GlobalProtect App downloaded from iTunes Store
● Linux Ubuntu 20.04
● PanGPLinux-6.0.7.tgz
TOE Developer – Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
Evaluation Sponsor – Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
CC Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017
1.2 Conformance Claims
This ST and the TOE it describes are conformant to the following CC specifications: This ST is conformant
to:
● Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, October 7, 2021 [APPSW].
● Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, March 1, 2019 [PKGTLS]
This TOE and ST are conformant to Parts 2 (extended) and 3 (extended) of Common Criteria Version 3.1,
Revision 5.
The following NIAP Technical Decisions1
apply to this APPSW, and have been accounted for in the ST
development:
● TD0624 – Addition of DataStore for Storing and Setting Configuration Options
● TD0628 – Addition of Container Image to Package Format
● TD0664 – Testing activity for FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
● TD0669 – FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4 Interpretation
● TD0717 – Format Changes for PP_APP_V1.4
● TD0719 – ECD for PP APP V1.3 and 1.4
● TD0743 – FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 Selection Exclusivity
● TD0756 – Update for Platform-provided Full Disk Encryption
The TOE and ST is package-name conformant to [PKGTLS].
The following NIAP Technical Decisions apply to this PKGTLS, and have been accounted for in the ST
development:
● 0442 – Updated TLS Ciphersuites for TLS package
● 0469 – Modification of test activity for FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 test 4.1
o Not Applicable: TLS server is not supported by the TOE.
● 0499 – Testing with pinned certificates
● 0513 – CA Certificate loading
● 0588 – Session Resumption Support in TLS Package
o Not Applicable: SFRs for this are not supported by the TOE.
1
TD0736 (HTTPS server is not supported by the TOE), TD0650 (VPN Client PP-Module is not claimed), TD0726
and TD0770 (TLS server is not supported by the TOE) are not applicable for the reasons stated.
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● 0739 – PKG_TLS_V1.1 has 2 different publication dates
1.3 Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
● Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that
may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the
ST, iteration is indicated by a number in parentheses placed at the end of the component.
For example, FDP_ACC.1 (1) and FDP_ACC.1 (2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations
of the FDP_ACC.1 requirement, (1) and (2).
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated
using italicized and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an assignment
within a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g.,
[[selected-assignment]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are
indicated using bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
o Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for
additions, and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”).
Note that ‘cases’ that are not applicable in a given SFR have simply been removed without
any explicit identification.
● Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest,
such as captions.
● The ST does not highlight operations that have been completed by the PP and EP authors.
1.3.1 Terminology
The following terms and abbreviations are used in this ST:
Remote
Access VPN
Provides secure access to internal and cloud-based business applications
1.3.2 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CM Configuration Management
FIA Identification and Authentication CC Class
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
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FMT Security Management CC Class
FSP Functional Specification
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol (Secure)
MDM Mobile Device Management
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SM Security Management
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
VPN Virtual Private Network
VPNGW VPN Gateway
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2. Product Description
The TOE is the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect App that provides users with the ability to access their
company network resources via the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect Portals and Gateways that have
been deployed. The TOE also provides several management functions that include, for example, allowing
the endpoint user to select their desired gateway, and to collect troubleshooting logs from the TOE.
Additional components that interact with the TOE are noted in the TOE Overview.
2.1 TOE Overview
The GlobalProtect App is a software program that runs on the endpoint (desktop/laptop computer) to
protect users by using the same security policies that protect the sensitive resources in corporate networks.
The GlobalProtect App secures the traffic using TLS and allows users to connect to corporate networks to
access company’s resources from anywhere in the world (e.g., when users are remote). The TOE runs on
platforms identified in section 1.1.
The TOE is a software program as specified in the APPSW, which uses TLS to protect communication as
defined in PKGTLS. The TOE interacts with other GlobalProtect components, which include the Palo Alto
Networks GlobalProtect Portal and Gateway.
The Palo Alto Next Generation Firewall provides the GlobalProtect Portal, which provides details for the
GlobalProtect infrastructure. Every client system that participates in the GlobalProtect network receives
configuration information from the portal, including information about available gateways as well as any
client certificates that may be required to connect to the Palo Alto Next Generation Firewall GlobalProtect
Gateways. The GlobalProtect gateways provide security enforcement for traffic from GlobalProtect apps.
Once connected, user and host information are sent to the GlobalProtect gateway, which identifies the
identity of the operator that is connecting along with details of the host via the host profile (e.g., antivirus
definitions installed, security patches, etc.).
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Figure 1: TOE Deployment
.
2.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE is a software solution that is composed of items listed in Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. The software is
available for download from the Palo Alto Networks support site.
The following diagram depicts the software architecture of the TOE.
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Figure 2: TOE Architecture
2.2.1 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundary of the TOE is the GlobalProtect App installed and running on a supported platform
(see below).
2.2.1.1 Software Requirements
The TOE runs on desktop or mobile operating system that includes macOS 12 or later, Android 12 or later,
iOS 16 or later, Linux Ubuntu 20.04 or later, or Windows 11 that communicates with a Palo Alto Networks
Next Generation Firewall that utilizes PAN-OS 10.1 or later.
2.2.1.2 Hardware Requirements
The TOE must be installed on desktop/laptop/phone with operating systems identified above. The
GlobalProtect Portal and Gateway reside on a Palo Alto Networks Next Generation Firewall. The Palo
Alto Networks Next Generation Firewall is covered in a separate evaluation and is in the operational
environment.
The TOE was installed and tested on the following platforms2
.
● HP Envy running Windows 11 – Processor: Intel Core i7-1250U (Alder Lake microarchitecture)
● MacBook Air running macOS 12 - Processor: Apple M-Series M1
● Samsung S21 Ultra running Android 12 - Processor: Qualcomm Snapdragon 888
● iPhone 12 Mini running iOS 16 – Processor: Apple A-Series A14 (Bionic)
● HP Envy running Ubuntu 20.04 – Processor: Intel Core i7-1250U (Alder Lake microarchitecture)
2.2.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:
● Cryptographic Support
● User Data Protection
● Identification and Authentication
● Security Management
● Privacy
● Protection of the TSF
● Trusted Path/Channels
2
While the TOE was tested on these operating systems, the TOE will function and behave the same on later versions
of the operating systems identified here. This is vendor affirmed.
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2.2.2.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements NIST validated cryptographic algorithms that provide key management, random bit
generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message
authentication features in support of cryptographic protocols such as TLS. In order to utilize these features,
the TOE must be configured in FIPS-CC mode.
GlobalProtect App includes algorithms that are covered by CAVP certificates that are noted in this
document. In addition, the TOE also relies on the underlying platforms. Table 3 contains information
regarding all the keys included and utilized by the TOE.
2.2.2.2 User Data Protection
The TOE restricts its access to only using network connectivity when it is needed to communicate to the
Palo Alto Networks Gateway or Portal. Other functionality on the host platform such as its camera,
Bluetooth, USB, or microphone are not needed. The TOE does not store any sensitive data in non-volatile
memory.
2.2.2.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE authenticates the X.509 certificate of the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect Gateway/Portal as
part of establishing a TLS connection.
2.2.2.4 Security Management
The TOE provides access to the security management features using an interface on a general-purpose
computer. Security management operations are provided to the user of the TOE. A user is able to perform
security management by configuring necessary items such as assigning the Palo Alto Networks
GlobalProtect Portal and Gateway that the TOE will use for its connections. It also provides the user with
the ability to collect troubleshooting logs, configure gateway and portal, check the current version, check
for updates, and to enable/disable the transmission of information regarding the system’s
hardware/software or configuration. The TOE relies on the OS’ network ports (i.e. ethernet ports) for
communication and management capabilities.
In order to install or uninstall the TOE, the user is required to have platform administrator privileges.
2.2.2.5 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit PII over the network.
2.2.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a variety of functions to ensure that it is protected against corruption. These include
utilizing platform APIs, memory mapping, and stack-based buffer overflow protection. Palo Alto Networks
provides customers with a means of updating their TOE using trusted updates. These trusted updates are
securely delivered and installed using protection mechanisms such as TLS, and by using approved digital
signature methods. All these updates are properly signed using RSA 2048 with SHA-256. The trusted
update site also provides a checksum of the updates that can be used for additional verification before it is
utilized.
2.2.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE protects communication between itself as the endpoint and other networks using TLS. TLS 1.2 is
utilized to encrypt all data that is passed from the TOE to other components (i.e., Palo Alto Networks
GlobalProtect Portals and Gateways).
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2.3 TOE Documentation
Palo Alto Networks Inc. offers a series of documents that describe the installation of Palo Alto Networks
GlobalProtect App as well as guidance for subsequent use and administration of the applicable security
features.
For GlobalProtect App 6, these documents include the following:
● Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect App 6 Security Target, [This document]
● Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect App User Guide Version 6, January 24, 2023 (Last Updated)
● Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect Administrator's Guide Version 10.1 or Later, February 22, 2023
(Last Updated)
● Palo Alto Networks Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide (CCECG) GlobalProtect App
6, June 28, 2023
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3. Security Problem Definition
This security target includes by reference the Security Problem Definition (composed of organizational
policies, threat statements, and assumption) from [APPSW].
In general, the [APPSW] has presented a Security Problem Definition appropriate for software
applications, and as such, is applicable to the TOE.
The following threats are directly from the [APPSW]:
T. NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere
on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in
communications with the application software or alter
communications between the application software and other
endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere
on the network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain
access to data exchanged between the application and other
endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same
computing platform on which the application executes. Attackers
may provide maliciously formatted input to the application in the
form of files or other local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
The following assumptions are made as drawn directly from the [APPSW]:
A. PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a
reliable time clock for its execution. This includes the underlying
platform and whatever runtime environment it provides to the TOE.
A. PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or
hostile, and uses the software in compliance with the applied
enterprise security policy.
A. PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully
negligent or hostile, and administers the software in compliance with
the applied enterprise security policy.
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4. Security Objectives
The sections below identify the security objectives for the TOE and for the operational environment. These
security objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and the operational environment in meeting
security needs.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
O.INTEGRITY Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their installation and
update packages, and also leverage execution environment-based
mitigations. Software is seldom, if ever, shipped without errors. The
ability to deploy patches and updates to fielded software with
integrity is critical to enterprise network security. Processor
manufacturers, compiler developers, execution environment
vendors, and operating system vendors have developed execution
environment-based mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by
adding complexity to the task of compromising systems. Application
software can often take advantage of these mechanisms by
using APIs provided by the runtime environment or by enabling the
mechanism through compiler or linker options.
O.QUALITY To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs leverage
services and APIs provided by the runtime environment rather than
implementing their own versions of these services and APIs. This is
especially important for cryptographic services and other complex
operations such as file and media parsing. Leveraging this platform
behavior relies upon using only documented and supported APIs.
O.MANAGEMENT To facilitate management by users and the enterprise,
conformant TOEs provide consistent and supported interfaces for
their security-relevant configuration and maintenance. This includes
the deployment of applications and application updates through the
use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and formats, as
well as providing mechanisms for configuration. This also includes
providing control to the user regarding disclosure of any PII.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in the
event of loss of physical control of the storage medium,
conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest protection. This involves
encrypting data and keys stored by the TOE in order to prevent
unauthorized access to this data. This also includes unnecessary
network communications whose consequence may be the loss of
data.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet
modification) network attack threats, conformant TOEs will use a
trusted channel for sensitive data. Sensitive data includes
cryptographic keys, passwords, and any other data specific to the
application that should not be exposed outside of the application.
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.PLATFORM Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the
data it contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or
hostile, and uses the software within compliance of the applied
enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully
negligent or hostile, and administers the software within compliance
of the applied enterprise security policy.
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5. IT Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements
(SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to
scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the following Protection Profiles (PP):
● Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021 [APPSW],
● Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1 [PKGTLS]
The SARs are the set of SARs specified in [APPSW].
5.1 Extended Requirements
All extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the [APPSW] and [PKGTLS]. The [APPSW] and
[PKGTLS] define all the extended SFRs (*_EXT.1) and since they are not redefined in this ST, the [APPSW]
and [PKGSTLS] should be consulted for more information in regard to those CC extensions.
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the Palo Alto TOE.
Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash
Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation -- Signing
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
FDP: User Data
Protection
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
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Requirement Class Requirement Component
FIA: Identification
and Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FPR: Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally
Identifiable Information
FPT: Protection of
the TSF
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FTP: Trusted
Path/Channel
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
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5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 – Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
● implement asymmetric key generation
].
FCS_CKM.1/AK – Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/AK The application shall [
● implement functionality
] to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [
● [ECC schemes] using [“NIST curves” P-384 and [P-256, P-521]] that meet the
following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4]
].
FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1 The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key
establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment
method:
[
● [Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meets the following:
[NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”]
].
FCS_COP.1/SKC – Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1/SKC The application shall perform [encryption/decryption] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [
● AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode,
● AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D) mode
] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit].
FCS_COP.1/Hash – Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The application shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [
● SHA-1,
● SHA-256,
● SHA-384
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] and message digest sizes [
● 160
● 256,
● 384
] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 180-4].
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash – Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The application shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
● HMAC-SHA-256,
● HMAC-SHA-384]
and [
● HMAC-SHA-1
] with key sizes [160, 256, 384] and message digest sizes [256, 384] and [160] bits
that meet the following [FIPS Pub 198-1, ‘The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code’ and FIPS Pub 180-4 ‘Secure Hash Standard’].
FCS_COP.1/Sig – Cryptographic Operation – Signing
FCS_COP.1.1/Sig The application shall perform [cryptographic signature services (generation and
verification)] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
● RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [2048-bit or greater] that meet
the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5],
● ECDSA schemes using [“NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [P-521]] that meet the
following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6
].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
● implement DRBG functionality
] for its cryptographic operations.
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 – Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.1 The application shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG)
services in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using
[CTR_DRBG(AES)]
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FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates
entropy from a platform-based DRBG and [
● no other noise source
] with a minimum of [
● 256 bits
] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP
800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 – Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
● not store any credentials
] to non-volatile memory.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 – TLS Protocol
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 The product shall implement [
● TLS as a client
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 - TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a
client that supports the cipher suites [
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
] and also supports functionality for [
● mutual authentication
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 The product shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference
identifier according to RFC 6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid [
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● with no exceptions
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 - TLS Client Protocol with Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 The product shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 - TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5.1 The product shall present the Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello with
the supported groups [
● secp256r1,
● secp384r1,
].
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 – Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict its access to [
● network connectivity
].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2 The application shall restrict its access to [
● no sensitive information repositories
].
FDP_NET_EXT.1 – Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict network communication to [
● user-initiated communication for [connections to Palo Alto Networks Next
Generation Firewall Gateways and Portals].
].
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 – Encryption of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
● not store any sensitive data
] in non-volatile memory.
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5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_X509_EXT.1– X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The application shall [implement functionality] to validate certificates in accordance
with the following rules:
● RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
● The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
● The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of
the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all
CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met.
● The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning
purpose in the key usage field
● The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using
[OCSP as specified in RFC 6960, CRL as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3].
● The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according
to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code
integrity verification shall have the Code Signing Purpose (id-kp 3
with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server
Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the
EKU field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client
Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the
EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature
shall have the Email Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the
OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the
EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC
Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the
basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 – X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for [TLS].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a
certificate, the application shall [allow the administrator to choose whether to accept
the certificate in these cases].
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5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 – Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
● invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and
setting configuration options.
].
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 – Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1 The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when
configured with default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2 The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect
the application binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged
users.
FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [
● enable/disable the transmission of any information describing the system’s
hardware, software, or configuration
● [ setting gateway and portal addresses
● collecting troubleshooting logs
● check for updates
● querying the current version of the TOE]
]
5.2.5 Privacy (FPR)
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 – User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
● not transmit PII over a network
].
5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_API_EXT.1 – Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1 The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 – Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1 The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address expect for
[no exceptions].
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FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2 The application shall [
● not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions
].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform
vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4 The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain
executable files unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5 The application shall be compiled with stack-based buffer overflow protection
enabled.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 – Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The application shall [provide the ability] to check for updates and patches to the
application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The application shall [provide the ability] to query the current version of the
application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4 Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5 The application is distributed [with the platform OS, as an additional software
package to the platform OS].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 – Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 The application shall be distributed using the [format of the platform-supported
package manager].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all
traces of the application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files,
and audit/log events.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3 The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform
can cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 – Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1 The application shall be versioned with [[GlobalProtect software version]].
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FPT_LIB_EXT.1 – Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1 The application shall be packaged with only [OpenSSL, OESIS]
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channel (FTP)
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 – Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
● encrypt all transmitted [data] with [TLS as a client as defined in the Functional
Package for TLS for [traffic to VPN gateway]]
] between itself and another trusted IT product.
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5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are included by reference to [APPSW].
Table 2 Assurance Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ASE: Security Target ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.1 Security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-Cycle Support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
● Cryptographic Support
● User Data Protection
● Identification and Authentication
● Security Management
● Privacy
● Protection of the TSF
● Trusted Path/Channel
6.1 Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1/AK
The GlobalProtect App itself does not generate certificates or keypairs3
.
Platform Administrators are able to set/load client or server certificates into
the certificate store of the platform (i.e., keypair generated by the platform) it is
running on. During a TLS handshake, the TOE utilizes ECDHE for the key
establishment with NIST curves that include P-256, P-384, and P-521 that
adhere to the NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3.
The TOE uses the functionality provided by the platform in order to securely
store X.509 certificates that are used for connections to the Palo Alto
Networks GlobalProtect Gateway/Portal. The platform provides the necessary
security to protect these items.
For Windows, certificates are stored within the Windows Certificate Store.
For macOS, certificates are stored within the Keychain.
For Android, certificates are stored on Keystore
For iOS, certificates are stored within the Keychain.
For Linux, certificates are stored in Linux keyrings.
The TOE’s keys/credentials are noted in Table 3.
Table 3 - Keys and Credentials
Key Description/Usage Storage
CA Certificates
Used to extend trust for certificates
(ECDSA – P-256/384/521)
(RSA – 2048/3072/4096 bits)
OS’ key
store
RSA Public Keys
RSA public keys managed as
certificates for the verification of
signatures, establishment of TLS, and
peer authentication.
(RSA 2048/3072/4096 bits)
OS’ key
store
3
NOTE: EC key pairs are generated by the TOE as part of the ECDHE key establishment scheme, but these
ephemeral keys are not stored.
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RSA Private Keys
RSA Private key used for
authentication, and signature
generation
(RSA 2048, 3072, or 4096 bits)
OS’ key
store
ECDSA Public Keys
ECDSA public keys managed as
certificates for the verification of
signatures, establishment of TLS, and
peer authentication.
(P-256/384/521)
OS’ key
store
ECDSA Private Keys
ECDSA Private key used for
authentication, and signature
generation
(P-256, P-384 or P-521)
OS’ key
store
FCS_CKM.2 The TOE implements key establishment methods using elliptical curve key
establishment scheme (ECDHE). The curves utilized by the TOE include P-256,
P-384, and P-521 as defined in NIST SP 800-56A Revision 3. For details
regarding the algorithms supported and their CAVP certificates, see Table 4.
FCS_COP.1/SKC The TOE is able to encrypt/decrypt using AES-CBC mode (as defined in NIST
SP 800-38A) and AES-GCM mode (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D) with key
sizes 128-bits and 256-bits. Corresponding CAVP certificates for these
algorithms are present in Table 4.
FCS_COP.1/Hash The TOE uses hash functions that include SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384 as
defined in FIPS 180-4. The digest sizes include 160-bits, 256-bits, and 384-bits
that are compliant with FIPS 180-4. The hashing capabilities are utilized for
digital signature verification and generation and data integrity checks. SHA-1 is
not used for generating digital signatures as noted in SP 800-131A but is only
used for verification for legacy purposes. The TOE uses SHA-256 and SHA-384
hashing as part of generating digital signatures. SHA-1 is used as part of the
software integrity power-up test. Corresponding CAVP certificates for these
algorithms are present in Table 4.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash The TOE supports the use of Keyed-Hash Message Authentication algorithms
that include HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, and HMAC-SHA-384. They
include key sizes of 160 bits, 256-bits, and 384-bits respectively. The HMAC-
SHA functions are used as part of the TOE’s integrity check (HMAC-SHA-1) to
ensure that it has not been tampered and is additionally used as part of the TLS
handshake (HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-384). Corresponding CAVP
certificates for these algorithms are present in Table 4.
FCS_COP.1/Sig Both RSA and ECDSA schemes are used for TLS functions with approved key
sizes. These include RSA 2048-bits, 3072-bits, and 4096-bits. For ECDSA, they
include the curves P-256, P-384, and P-521. During TLS handshakes, these
certificates are used for peer authentication to verify the server’s identity. These
certificates are also used by the TOE to present its identity as a client when
connecting to a Palo Alto Networks Gateway. Corresponding CAVP certificates
and the relevant schemes for these algorithms are present in Table 4.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_RBG_EXT.2
The TOE implements DRBG functionality using the CTR_DRBG in AES mode by
default. The DRBG is seeded using the Intel RDSEED or source identified below,
which provides a minimum of 256 bits of entropy. A description of the noise
sources for the operating systems are noted below.
Windows – Intel RDSEED
macOS – Secure Enclave (TRNG)
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Android – /dev/random
iOS – Secure Enclave (TRNG)
Linux – Intel RDSEED
FCS_STO_EXT.1 The TOE does not generate or store any credentials. All certificates and private
keys are generated externally and are stored externally on the platforms.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5
FTP_DIT_EXT.1
All data that is transmitted between the GlobalProtect App and the Palo Alto
Networks VPN Gateway and Portal are encrypted using TLS. When the TOE is
establishing a TLS session, it checks the reference identifier that has been
specified by the user via the GlobalProtect App. These reference identifiers
include IP addresses and are checked when looking at the Common Name or in
the Subject Alternative Name. The TOE supports the handling of wildcards if a
certificate is presented with one in it. Certificate pinning is not supported.
The TOE shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid –
no exceptions.
During the TLS handshake with connections to the Palo Alto Networks VPN
Gateway and Portal (both acting as the server), the TOE presents the following
cipher suites in its Client Hello. The TOE is only a client and does not act as a
server in any connection. TLS 1.2 is the only version of TLS supported by the
TOE.
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
During the negotiation of the TLS handshake, X.509v3 certificates are used to
verify the server’s identity. Additionally, client certificates can be set on the
GlobalProtect App to support mutual authentication. For the cipher suites noted
above, the client hello extension supports secp256r1 and secp384r1 curves.
Table 4 Cryptographic Functions and CAVP Certificates
Function(s) Standards Certificates
Asymmetric key generation (FCS_CKM_EXT.1 and FCS_CKM.1/AK)
ECDSA (P-256, P-384, P-521 curves) FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Appendix B.4
A2999
Cryptographic key establishment (FCS_CKM.2)
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Elliptic curve-based scheme NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”
A2999
Symmetric encryption/decryption (FCS_COP.1/SKC)
AES CBC, GCM (128, 256 bits) FIPS PUB 197
CBC as defined in NIST SP 800-38A
GCM as defined in NIST SP 800-38D
A2999
Cryptographic hashing (FCS_COP.1/Hash)
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 FIPS PUB 180-4 A2999
Cryptographic signature services (FCS_COP.1/Sig)
RSA with 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-
bit
FIPS PUB 186-4 A2999
ECDSA with NIST Curves P-256, P-
384, P-521
FIPS PUB 186-4 A2999
Keyed-hash message authentication (FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash)
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
FIPS Pub 198-1
FIPS Pub 180-4
A2999
Deterministic random bit generation (FCS_RBG_EXT.2)
CTR_DRBG (AES) NIST SP 800-90A A2999
6.2 User Data Protection
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 The GlobalProtect App does not store any sensitive data in non-volatile memory.
During the configuration of the TOE, the user is not able to enter any sensitive data.
When a user is initiating connections to the Palo Alto Networks Gateway or Portal,
they are required to enter their authentication data for each new session that includes
the username and password that is defined from the Palo Alto Networks Next
Generation Firewall Gateway/Portal for the connection to succeed. These credentials
are not stored or managed by GP.
The application restricts its access to only using network connectivity when it is
needed to communicate to the Palo Alto Networks Gateway or Portal. Other
functionality on the host platform such as its camera, Bluetooth, USB, or microphone
are not needed. The TOE does not require access to sensitive information
repositories.
FDP_NET_EXT.1
FDP_DAR_EXT.1
6.3 Identification and Authentication
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FIA_X509_EXT.1 The GlobalProtect App implements the ability to perform certificate path validation
on the certificate chain that is presented to it by the Palo Alto Networks
GlobalProtect Gateway or Portal. The certificate path validation begins with the
identity certificate presented by the Gateway or Portal, and then proceeds in
checking the intermediate CA certificate(s) until it reaches the trusted root certificate
issued in the platform OS trust store. Only root certificates stored here are used and
trusted by the TOE. On Windows platform, use the Certificates Snap-In (from the
MMC). On Android/Linux platforms, use the keyring or Keystore to store the
certificate. On MacOS/iOS platforms, use the Keychain to install the certificate. The
following steps are performed for each certificate in the path:
● The public key algorithm/parameters are checked (i.e., RSA/ECDSA key
sizes meet FIPS-CC requirements)
● The certificate is checked to make sure it is not expired (i.e. validity
period of the certificate must be proper)
● The CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field
● The certificate is checked to make sure it is not revoked using either
CRL/OCSP
● The issuer name is checked to ensure that it matches the subject name
of the previous certificate in the chain
● The certificate is checked that it terminates with a trusted CA
certificate and that all CA certificates have the basicConstraints
extension present (and set to TRUE)
● The extendedKeyUsage field is checked such that OCSP certificates
and server certificates contain the correct OID (e.g., OCSP Signing
purpose and Server Authentication purpose)
● The key usage extension of the certificate is checked to make sure that
it is allowed to sign certificates
● Path lengths are checked to ensure it does not exceed any maximum
path length inserted
Certificates that are presented to the TOE must meet the x509v3 requirements as
defined in RFC 5280 for TLS. If there are any issues with the certificate presented
(as noted above), the application will not accept the certificate and reject the
connection. A log message will be generated, and an administrator will be required
to address the problem noted in order for the connection to succeed. The TOE will
also display an error window with the failure reason and the option to continue is
greyed out (i.e. unable to be selected). In FIPS-CC mode, the option to continue or
override based on the administrator discretion is disabled.
The TOE also supports the revocation checking of the certificate presented using
either OCSP or CRL (as specified in RFC 6960 and RFC 5280 Section 6.3). In the
event that the certificate is revoked following a check of its status, the TOE will reject
the connection, and not allow the connection to continue. In the event that
OCSP/CRL can’t be reached, the administrator is provided with a warning message
that the revocation status cannot be checked or determined along with the option to
proceed with the connection as permitted by FIA_X509_EXT.2.2.
Certificates are not used for email encryption, or server certificates presented for
EST.
FIA_X509_EXT.2
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6.4 Security Management
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 When the TOE is configured, it is required that the platform administrator follow
the rules defined in the administrator guide to properly set the correct
configuration. If they are not followed, the GlobalProtect App will be active in
non-FIPS-CC mode. The installation of the TOE must be completed by a platform
administrator that is present at the endpoint/device on which the TOE resides as
it will need administrator privileges to perform the installation of the software.
There are no default credentials that are used or included with the TOE during its
configuration. The TOE stores configuration data using mechanisms
recommended by the OS.
If the TOE is installed on a Windows 11 or Ubuntu 20.04 environment, it is
required that the platform OS’ FIPS mode be enabled. FIPS mode is also required
for the macOS and iOS platform, but this is enabled by default.
As noted in the Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide, a platform
administrator setting the TOE on a Windows 11 environment is required to launch
the Windows Registry and make the proper edits there to set FIPS-CC mode.
For the macOS configuration, a platform administrator is required to edit the
relevant plist file to set the FIPS-CC mode of the TOE. This file is located in the
platform’s Library folder. Detailed instructions on how to set the required settings
for enabling FIPS-CC mode for the GlobalProtect App on macOS is included in
the CCECG.
If the TOE is installed on Android or iOS mobile managed device, please use the
MDM to enable FIPS-CC mode. Detailed instructions on how to set the required
settings for enabling FIPS-CC mode for the GlobalProtect App on mobile platform
is included in the CCECG.
For the Linux configuration, a platform administrator is required to edit the
relevant pangps.xml file to set the FIPS-CC mode of the TOE. Detailed
instructions on how to set the required settings for enabling FIPS-CC mode for
the GlobalProtect App on Linux is included in the CCECG.
Once the TOE has been properly initialized into FIPS-CC mode, the TOE will have
the ability to connect to the Palo Alto Networks Gateways provided by the Palo
Alto Networks Next Generation Firewalls. The TOE provides several
management functions that include the following that can be performed by the
user:
▪ Enable/disable the transmission of any information describing the
system’s hardware, software, or configuration
▪ Setting gateway and portal addresses
▪ Check for updates
▪ Collecting troubleshooting logs (i.e. GlobalProtect App system logs for
the application, self-test results, connection details)
▪ Querying the current version of the TOE
FMT_CFG_EXT.1
FMT_SMF.1
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By default, the TOE includes file permissions that protect the TOE’s binary and
data files from modification from normal unprivileged users. The TOE also
includes an integrity check for itself to ensure that no malicious activity occurs.
6.5 Privacy
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 The GlobalProtect App does not transmit personally identifiable information
about an individual. While the TOE may use client certificates to identify itself to
the Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect Gateway, it does not include sensitive
information such as financial records, medical history, or social security numbers
that could be used to identify an individual.
6.6 Protection of the TSF
FPT_API_EXT.1 The TOE includes the use of documented, platform APIs for underlying platforms.
The TOE automatically enables ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) when
the application is compiled on Windows 11 (/DYNAMICBASE link flag) or
macOS/Android/iOS/Linux (-pie link flag), and stack-based buffer overflow
protection is enabled by default (compiled with /GS flag). There is no administrator
intervention required to set this item. The GlobalProtect App does not request any
memory mapping at an explicit address. The TOE does not allocate any memory
region with both write and execute permissions; users shall also not write user-
modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless they are explicitly
told to do so.
The GlobalProtect App is designed to be compatible with the security features that
are provided by the platform vendors that it is installed on.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.2
The TOE has specific versions, which can be queried by the user via the TOE’s
interface. New versions of the TOE are created by Palo Alto Networks, which an
administrator can retrieve to update the current version of the TOE. During the
installation process, a digital signature verification check is automatically performed
to verify that the update has not been modified. All new versions of the
GlobalProtect App are digitally signed by Palo Alto Networks using RSA 2048 with
SHA-256.
The following package formats are used for the GlobalProtect installation file:
● Windows: GlobalProtect64-6.0.7.msi
● macOS: GlobalProtect-6.0.7.pkg
● Android: global-protect-6.0.7-signed.apk
● iOS: Download from iTunes Store
● Linux: PanGPLinux-6.0.7.tgz
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The TOE is packaged such that the uninstall of the software results in complete
zeroization of the TOE automatically. All files are removed from the platform when
this uninstall process is initiated. Before files are uninstalled, they are overwritten
with a random pattern, and then zeroized.
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Palo Alto Networks provides a version control system for its software components.
The TOE has a unique software versioning that identifies major versions and their
subsequent maintenance releases in the following form:
<major>.<minor>.<maintenance release>. Major and minor releases introduce new
major and minor features for the product, and additional maintenance releases (e.g.
6.0.1, 6.0.24
) are released on a regular cadence to fix issues identified with the
major release.
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 The TOE utilizes OpenSSL for its crypto functions and OESIS to provide endpoint
security detection service in the underlying platforms. This library is checked for its
integrity during the installation/initialization period to ensure that it has not been
tampered with, and that the necessary procedures are followed to place this library
in its required FIPS-CC mode.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 The TOE is regularly updated with maintenance releases once a major release is
made available to the public. These maintenance releases include various bug fixes
to improve product features and to address any security vulnerabilities that may
have come up in previous versions. When a new version is available, users are
notified via an email from Palo Alto Networks with the specific version published.
These versions are also displayed on Palo Alto Networks’ Customer Support page
(https://support.paloaltonetworks.com). Palo Alto Networks provides an updated
version of the product on a regular basis to customers.
The support portal provides users the ability to download new versions of the
software. This portal also includes links to the Palo Alto Networks Release Notes
that highlight all the changes included in the published release. These release notes
detail all the bug fixes and security advisories/vulnerabilities that have been
addressed. When a user downloads the new version from the support portal there
is an option to display the SHA-256 checksum of the file that can be verified again
once the file is downloaded.
Palo Alto Networks provides customers with a Security Advisory page for any
security vulnerabilities that have been identified in Palo Alto Networks products
(https://securityadvisories.paloaltonetworks.com/).
Each vulnerability is given a criticality rating and an updated status on any updates
or mitigations regarding each discovered vulnerability. Each vulnerability listing
also provides a list of the versions of the product that the vulnerability is known to
affect. In the event that a vulnerability has been discovered, Palo Alto Networks
provides users with the ability to report them via the Product Security Incident
Response Team (PSIRT) via a trusted channel for a website:
(https://securityadvisories.paloaltonetworks.com/Report)
Palo Alto Networks provides timely security updates to our customers. Depending
on the CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System), the security updates can be
provided as quickly as 2 weeks via a security hotfix release.
4
There is also an internal build number which may be displayed. This is used by the vendor for internal tracking
only.
GlobalProtect 6 Security Target Palo Alto Networks
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6.7 Trusted Path/Channel
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 All data that is transmitted between the GlobalProtect App and the Palo Alto Networks
Gateway and Portal are encrypted using TLS.
GlobalProtect 6 Security Target Palo Alto Networks
Page 35 of iii
7. Protection Profile Claims
This ST is conformant to the [APPSW] and TLS Functional Package.
GlobalProtect 6 Security Target Palo Alto Networks
Page 36 of iii
8. Rationale
This Security Target includes by reference the [APPSW] Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives,
and Security Assurance Requirements. The security target makes no additions to the [APPSW]
assumptions. Security functional requirements have been reproduced verbatim with the protection profile
operations completed. Operations on the security requirements follow [APPSW] application notes and
assurance activities. The security target did not add or remove any security requirements. Consequently,
[APPSW] rationale applies and is complete.