BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014
for
Bundesdruckerei Document Application, Version:
1.2.1129, Terminal Firmware Version 3.4.8
from
Bundesdruckerei GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.75
BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014
Bundesdruckerei Document Application
Version: 1.2.1129, Terminal Firmware Version 3.4.8
from Bundesdruckerei GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile for Inspection
Systems Version 1.01, 15 April 2010,
BSI-CC-PP-0064-2010
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 15 April 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Thomas Gast L.S.
Head of Division SOGIS Recognition
Agreement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................14
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................23
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................27
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................28
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Bundesdruckerei Document Application, Version: 1.2.1129, Terminal Firmware
Version 3.4.8 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification
based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0863-2013. Specific results from the evaluation process
BSI-DSZ-CC-0863-2013 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Bundesdruckerei Document Application, Version: 1.2.1129,
Terminal Firmware Version 3.4.8 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 25 March 2014. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Bundesdruckerei GmbH.
The product was developed by: Bundesdruckerei GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014 Certification Report
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Bundesdruckerei Document Application, Version: 1.2.1129, Terminal Firmware
Version 3.4.8 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Bundesdruckerei GmbH
Oranienstraße 91
10969 Berlin
Deutschland
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Bundesdruckerei Document Application 1.2.1129.
The Document Application is a library, which is used via a static link by an application
running on an Inspection System (IS). The library is used to read and update the electronic
data of the German identification card (“neuer Personalausweis (nPA)”) and electronic
resident permit (“elektronischer Aufenthaltstitel (eAT)”) as well as to verify the document’s
authenticity and the integrity of its data.
The TOE is applied in registration offices to allow card holders to verify that their nPA or
eAT is working correctly. It is further possible to update the address information of the card
holder, the card holder’s PIN for eID applications, and the community ID
(“Gemeindeschlüssel”). In addition, the eID application functionality of the nPA or eAT can
be activated or deactivated.
Necessary protocols for the communication of the TOE with the electronic Machine
Readable Travel Documents (eMRTD) like the nPA or eAT are described in [12] and [14].
The TOE has been evaluated in version 1.2.1129 and under consideration of version 3.4.8
of the rest of the firmware of the EAC-Module (including the Operating System).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Protection Profile for Inspection Systems Version 1.01,
15 April 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0064-2010 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.PROTOCOLS Ensures the necessary protocols and
cryptographic operations
SF.MANAGEMENT Enforces the management functions for
the administrator and the operator
SF.AUDIT Generates audit data which is then
stored by the environment
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2 .
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.3 to 3.5.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014 Certification Report
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG
Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Bundesdruckerei Document Application,
Version: 1.2.1129, Terminal Firmware Version 3.4.8
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Software Library called
Bundesdruckerei Document
Application
1.2.1129 Stored in the terminal or
via update
2 DOC AGD - Document Application
Guidance Document [10]
2.6.19 Download via secured web
portal
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
It should be noted that the TOE is a software library delivered as part of a terminal, which
is called Visotec Änderungsterminal containing the firmware version 3.4.8.
It should also be noted that additional smart cards are required for the administrator,
operator and revisor of the terminal. However, the delivery of those cards is out of scope
for this evaluation.
The terminal that operates the TOE is delivered to the user via standard delivery services
(e.g. DHL). The delivery however, is tracked and the terminal can only be operated using
an operator, administrator and revisor smart card, which are shipped separately. For
terminals that are already delivered to the customer, the update functionality may be used
to deliver the TOE (part of the firmware).
The guidance will inform the administrator about all important aspects that need to be
checked for a secure delivery.
The guidance documentation [10] is not delivered together with the terminal as this would
allow an attacker to steal a packet and manipulate a terminal as well as the guidance.
Instead, the guidance documentation is downloaded by the users via a secured web
portal.
The guidance documentation informs the administrator about the security characteristics of
an authentic terminal. The following aspects ensure the authenticity:
• A logo of Bundesdruckerei,
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• Two seals on the terminal,
• The type information printed on the terminal,
• The security characteristics of the box used for shipment.
The version of the software can be verified, this enables the authorized users, Operator
and Administrator to identify the TOE by its version number.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: Use of the results of an
identification and authentication mechanisms, security audit, acceptance of software
updates, deletion of ephemeral data and the implementation of communication protocols.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● Mechanisms to secure boot the Operation System and the device drivers
● Signed certificates
● Public Key Infrastructures
● Cryptographic mechanism
● Secure administration
● Trained user
● Secure operating environment including a certified Private Key Store
● Secure communication
● Shielded display
● Terminal integrity
● Correct date
● Protection of chip password
● Protection of key and certificate data
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The physical scope of the TOE can best be depicted by the following figure from the
Security Target:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014 Certification Report
The TOE is the document application that is the core of the EAC-Module, a smart card
terminal to be used with the German Identity card. The TOE is software only that is
executed within an Operating System/Firmware that belongs to the environment of the
TOE.
The platform for the TOE is the Document Application Platform 1.0, which is based on a
Linux Kernel of the 3.2 series and the GNU C library. The underlying hardware is a 32 bit
embedded controller.
The TOE relies on a security controller that performs the cryptographic operations for
Terminal Authentication and that stores the necessary private key. All other cryptographic
operations (e.g. for the other protocols) are performed in software by the TOE itself.
Private keys that are used for other authentication mechanisms are stored temporarily in
the volatile memory of the TOE.
Internally, the TOE can be structured according to the following subsystems from the TOE
Design documentation.
Subsystem Description
CRCTaskAssignment
Ensures that for each function call the correct role is active
and handles the authentication context.
After successful verification of the role the function calls
are forwarded to EAC-Lib.
CryptoLib Cryptographic service provider
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Figure 1: TOE physical scope
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014
Subsystem Description
EAC-Lib
Implements all relevant write and read permissions for the
communication with the chip of an identity document.
CRCLogger
Creates and checks audit files. Logfiles are generated
after a predefined scheme. The scheme for logging
ensures the authenticity, order and completeness of audit
data.
SCardLib
Handles the communication with the reader and the chip
of an identity document.
CRCSecurityController
Realizes certificate management and delivers certificates
for Terminal Authentication and Passive Authentication.
Realizes the signature functionality of Terminal
Authentication.
CRCValidateUpdatePackage
Verifies the integrity and authenticity of software updates
for the TOE.
Table 3: Overview of TOE structure
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Exact Description of the Test configuration
As the TOE is a software application that is executed within an operating system that runs
on a smart card terminal the developer of the TOE chooses a software based concept for
testing. They developed a dedicated test framework that integrates the TOE and that can
then be run on the same hardware on which the TOE will be operated in practice.
This test configuration provides a dedicated test interface (based on SSH) that can be
used to start test cases contained in the test framework. This is the only way to directly
address the interfaces the TOE provides during testing. The test cases of the developer
cover the complete security functionality of the TOE.
The evaluator has chosen a multi-dimensional concept for testing:
● All tests of the developer have been reviewed and executed again within the
laboratory of TUViT.
● The evaluator conducted vulnerability examinations and penetration tests on a
special development sandbox terminal.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014 Certification Report
● As some of the security properties of the final TOE can only be judged for
appropriateness using the final product, the evaluator tested the TOE using the
final terminal and checked the behavior of the terminal against the guidance
documentation.
The evaluator conducted penetration tests based on the final TOE including direct
manipulations of the environment of the TOE (even though such manipulations are not
formally necessary due to dedicated assumptions in the Security Target).
7.2 Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
TOE configuration tested:
● The tests were performed with the TOE in a special testing framework that was
used to simulate the real operational environment.
Developer’s testing approach:
● Tests to cover the TSFI and their behavioural aspects defined in functional
specification (FSP), by testing each command that can be sent to the TOE,
● Positive and negative tests are applied,
● Tests considering the different roles that can access the TOE,
● Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design.
Verdict for the activity:
● All test cases in each test scenario were run successfully on the TOE.
● The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE performs as expected.
All tests PASSED.
7.3 Evaluator Tests
7.3.1 Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
TOE configurations tested:
● C1: Standard test configuration - TOE within the test framework on the target Linux
on ARM based hardware, as delivered to the final customer.
● C2: Final configuration for delivery - TOE within the final delivered terminal with
ARM hardware and terminal software and embedded Linux OS.
● C3: Sandbox test configuration - Terminal – TOE with certificates of the test PKI
within the final delivered terminal with ARM hardware and terminal software and
embedded Linux OS.
C1 is the standard configuration for all tests of the developer and the evaluator. C2 is the
terminal in the final delivery state that is used for guidance testing and penetration testing
of the evaluator. C3 is the test configuration for forged ID document penetration testing of
the evaluator.
Subset size chosen:
● The evaluators have tested each of the twelve commands of the two TSFI
E.ADMIN and E.OPERATOR with C1. The configuration was used to cover usage
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of the TOE in the final terminal. Circumvention of both TSFI was covered by C2 and
C3.
TSFI subset selection criteria:
● The evaluator chose to repeat all developer tests and add tests for all TSFI with
valid and invalid test cases. This approach covers the TOE functionality by invoking
the complete set of interfaces and confirms that the TOE operates as specified.
TSFI tested:
● The evaluator tested the complete TSFI as documented in the functional
specification
Developer tests performed:
● The developer performed tests of all TSFI with an automated test framework
running on the final hardware.
● The evaluator selected all tests of the developer’s testing documentation for
sampling due to the fact that all developer tests are implemented in scripts that can
run without manual interactions.
Verdict for the activity:
● During the evaluator’s testing the TOE operated as specified.
● The evaluator verified the developer’s test results by executing all of the
developer’s tests in the test documentation.
7.3.2 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Overview:
● The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing
environment, partially using the test environment of TÜViT.
● There is only one configuration of the TOE under evaluation and addressed by
testing.
● No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic has actually been successful.
Penetration testing approach:
● Based on a list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment created within the work unit AVA_VAN.2-5 the evaluators devised the
attack scenarios for penetration tests when they were of the opinion, that those
potential vulnerabilities could be exploited in the TOE’s operational environment.
● While doing this, also the aspects of the security architecture (ADV_ARC) were
considered for penetration testing. All other evaluation input was used for the
creation of the tests as well. Specifically the test documentation provided by the
developer was used to find out if there are areas of concern that should be covered
by tests of the evaluation body.
● As the TOE is a static library that heavily relies on the security measures of the
environment (including the terminal in, which the TOE is integrated), the ADV_ARC
document also covers some of the security measure that are applied by the
terminal. The evaluator considered the fact that the TOE is delivered in such a way
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014 Certification Report
and widened the scope of the vulnerability analysis to cover specific security
aspects of the whole terminal.
● The evaluator also paid attention to the TSFI in the functional specification (FSP).
As the TSFI are quite simple with few options that can be varied and the TOE in
deeply integrated into a terminal when it is delivered, the vulnerability assessment
needed to focus on mechanisms that are operational inside the TOE or the terminal.
TOE test setup configurations:
● C1: Standard test configuration - TOE within the test framework on the target Linux
on x86 based hardware, that is delivered to the final customer.
● C2: Final configuration for delivery - TOE within the final delivered terminal with
x86 hardware and terminal software and embedded Linux OS.
● C3: Sandbox test configuration – Terminal – TOE with certificates of the test PKI
within the final delivered terminal with ARM hardware and terminal software and
embedded Linux OS.
Different attack scenarios having been penetration tested. Regarding the implementation
and execution of test cases in detail, the evaluator achieved the necessary test coverage
in this re-evaluation scenario by including the following types of tests:
● PREVIOUS – Test of the previous evaluation, which is still appropriately valid, this
prevents the complete removal of the potential vulnerability, attack scenario and test
from the re-evaluation..
● REPEATED – Test which is simply repeated, parameters may be modified, but the
test area is the same.
● NEW – Test which is added due to different potential reasons, e.g. new test ideas
from evaluator experience, new promising test tool, special certification body input,
new identified details in area of concern, vaguely interesting aspects, that were not
covered previously, but could be promising in the current evaluation.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
● No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was actually successful in the
TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all measures required
by the developer are applied.
Recommendation of the Evaluation Body:
The TOE is only a small part of the whole terminal and it heavily relies on the secure
functioning of the rest of the terminal. The overall security significantly depends on the
secure environment in which the terminal is operated. Therefore, the evaluation body
strongly advises that the responsible personnel is well trained to uphold security, i.e.
secure operation, detection of manipulations, checking of seals, general security
awareness.
8 Evaluated Configuration
Item Exact version
TOE software 1.2.1129
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Rest of the terminal firmware (including
the operating system)
3.4.8
Archive file (TOE) MD5 Hash Value
libDocumentApplication.a 2ab9cdb5035df01b8d36f42d4c5583a
libCRC_full.a 6d9398283bd6ba76e9d123ccd29e86e
libact.a 94f7919f4088535cb5f2a570ff3d7d
Firmware file including the TOE SHA-256 Hash Value
AeT_V3.4.8_T1.2.1129.firmware
f966d94ca6e6fd2b5fba68614d0a812871c398ed
50a9cb74568b59e98536c176
Table 4: Exact version information and hash values of the TOE
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0863-2013, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on bugfixes and
improvements mainly related to the environment of the TOE including changes in the
(CC-)documentation of the TOE.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile for Inspection Systems
Version 1.01, 15 April 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0064-2010 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The table also lists the cryptographic algorithms that are used by the TOE to enforce its
security policy:
Algorithm Bit
Length
Application Portion of the
TSF
Implementation
Standard
Application
Standard
Validity Period
Triple
DES, CBC
and CBC
MAC
112
encryption /
decryption /
key derivation
SF.Protocols [12] [12] --
AES CBC
and CMAC
128
encryption /
decryption
SF.Protocols
[16]
[17]
[12] --
RSA 2048
Signature
verification
SF.Protocols
SF.Management
[13] [13] --
ECDSA 256
Signature
verification
SF.Protocols [14] [14] --
SHA-18
160
Hash value
computation
SF.Protocols [15] [15] --
SHA-224 224
Hash value
computation
SF.Protocols [15] [15]
Recommended
until 20159
SHA-256 256
Hash value
computation
SF.Protocols [15] [15]
Recommended
after 20159
SHA-384 384
Hash value
computation
SF.Protocols [15] [15]
Recommended
after 20159
SHA-512 512
Hash value
computation
SF.Protocols [15] [15]
Recommended
after 20159
ECDH Key exchange SF.Protocols [12] [12] --
PACE
Password
authenticated
key exchange
SF.Protocols [12] [12] --
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality
Besides, the [AIS20] conformant deterministic random number generation (class K4) with
at least 64bit of entropy has been examined.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to TR-03110 [12] the algorithms are suitable for securing originality and
confidentiality of the stored data for machine readable travel documents (MRTDs). All
cryptographic algorithms listed in table 5 are implemented by the TOE because of the
standards building the TOE application (e.g. TR-03110 [12]). A validity period of each
8
The use of SHA-1 is required according to EAC2.10 [12]
9
See [18]
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algorithm is not mentioned in TR-03110 [12]. For that reason an explicit validity period is
not given.
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Beside or in order to highlight the information provided for TOE users (Administrator,
Operator, and Revisor) in the guidance documentation the following hints and
requirements have been of specific importance and are therefore mentioned here
explicitly:
● The Security Target contains assumptions about the physical environment of the
TOE. It is essential to understand that – even though the terminal that operates the
TOE implements some very basic features for physical protection – the operators,
administrators and revisors have to ensure that no unauthorized and unobserved
access to the terminal that operates the TOE is possible.
● The terminals that operates the TOE shall be powered off every evening.
● The correct operation of the software environment of the TOE (i.e. the Operating
System/Firmware) is of specific importance to the secure operation of the TOE. As
such, the certificate for the TOE shall only be valid for the operation using the exact
version of the Operating System/Firmware as it has been available during
evaluation.
There are no other requirements for the TOE usage, except those provided for TOE in the
guidance documentation [10] Obligations and recommendations regarding the developers
of the TOE are stated in the ETR [9] chapter 9.2.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BAC Basic Acesss Control
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
eMRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
ePASS Elektronischer Reisepass
eRA Elektronischer Reiseausweis
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
nPA neuer Personalausweis
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
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Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0932-2014, Version 3.12, 2014-01-31,
Bundesdruckerei Document Application, Bundesdruckerei GmbH
[7] Common Criteria Protection Profile for Inspection Systems Version 1.01, 15 April
2010, BSI-CC-PP-0064-2010
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, CI Liste Document Application, V3.14 (confidential
document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2014-03-24, Bundesdruckerei Document
Application 1.2.1129, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[10] Visotec© Änderungsterminal - Installation und Bedienung Version 2.6.19,
2014-03-17, Bundesdruckerei GmbH
[11] IAR - Impact Analysis Report, TOE Version 1.2.1129, based on
BSI-DSZ-0863-2013, V 0.0.9, Bundesdruckerei GmbH
[12] BSI - Technical Guideline TR-03110: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents - Part 1 - 3, Version 2.10, 2012-03-20, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[13] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.1, June 14, 2002, RSA
Laboratories.
[14] ICAO Doc 9303, Specifications for electronically enabled passports with biometric
identification capabilities. In Machine Readable Travel Documents - Part 1: Machine
Readable Passport, volume 2, ICAO, 6th edition, 2006
10
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 13, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 8, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria) und ITSEC
• AIS 20, Version 1, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
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[15] FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication 180-4, March 2012.
[16] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Announcing the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), November 26, 2001, National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
[17] NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, May 2005
[18] BSI - Technische Richtlinie TR-02102, Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen
und Schlüssellängen, Version 2013-01-07, 2013-01-09, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik.
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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