National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Axway, Inc. Axway Validation Authority Server, version
5.2
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11452-2024
Dated: July 15, 2024
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Lori Sarem
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Julia Miller
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................1
2 Identification ...........................................................................................................2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................3
3.1 TOE Description..............................................................................................3
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms.................................................................................4
3.3 TOE Architecture.............................................................................................4
3.4 Physical Boundaries.........................................................................................5
4 Security Policy ........................................................................................................5
4.1 Cryptographic support......................................................................................5
4.2 User data protection.........................................................................................5
4.3 Identification and authentication ......................................................................5
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................6
4.5 Privacy.............................................................................................................6
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................6
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................6
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope.....................................................................6
6 Documentation ........................................................................................................7
7 IT Product Testing...................................................................................................8
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................8
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing .............................................................8
8 Evaluated Configuration..........................................................................................8
9 Results of the Evaluation .........................................................................................9
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE) ..........................................................9
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ............................................................9
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)................................................9
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ..................................10
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ...............10
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN) .....................................................10
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results .....................................................................10
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations ................................................................11
11 Annexes.................................................................................................................11
12 Security Target ......................................................................................................11
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................11
14 Bibliography..........................................................................................................12
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
1
1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information
Technology (IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target
(ST), which is where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which
describes how those security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the
evaluated configuration. Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and
Clarification of Scope in Section 5 and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any
restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Axway Validation Authority Server solution
provided by Axway, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the
conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or
implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in July 2024. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Extended, and meets the assurance requirements of the Protection
Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 07 October 2021 (ASPP14) with the
Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019
(PKGTLS11).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Axway Validation Authority Server, version 5.2.
The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only to the specific version of the TOE as
evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
2
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Axway Validation
Authority Server, version 5.2 Security Target, version 0.4, July 2, 2024 and analysis
performed by the validation team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Axway Validation Authority Server, version 5.2
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 07 October 2021
(ASPP14) with the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS),
Version 1.1, 01 March 2019 (PKGTLS11)
ST Axway Validation Authority Server, version 5.2 Security Target, version 0.4, July
2, 2024
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor & Developer Axway, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
3
Item Identifier
CCEVS Validators Lisa Mitchell, Linda Morrison, Lori Sarem
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Axway Validation Authority Server, version 5.2.
3.1 TOE Description
The Axway Validation Authority Server (Server) is part of Axway’s Validation Authority
Suite, which provides a comprehensive, scalable, and reliable framework for real-time
validation of digital certifications for the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The Axway VA
Suite provides a variety of PKI and certificate management functionality to prevent revoked
credentials from being used for secure email, smart card login, network access (including
wireless), or other sensitive electronic transactions. The administrator can configure the
Axway VA Server to act in one of two manners: Repeater or Responder. One can think of
the Repeater, conceptually the simpler configuration, as a revocation caching proxy (locally
caching CRLs and OCSP responses). While the Responder can locally cache CRLs and
generate new OCSP responses (using the certificate statuses within the CRLs) for clients.
The TOE provides the following functionality:
• Maintains and processes a store of digital certificate revocation data by obtaining the
digital Certificate Revocation List (CRL) from multiple CA or VA sources and
performing end-to-end certificate validation if one or more intermediate CAs are used
and the validation policy requires a complete certificate chain validation.
• Generates and signs OCSP/SCVP responses. Maintains a cache loaded with OCSP
responses that are pre-computed or dynamically built up by proxy client requests to
a responder.
• Allows caching of CRLs and delta CRLs to support non-OCSP clients or clients that
want to maintain their own revocation data caches for backup and in low-bandwidth
and non real-time environments.
• Supports SSL-based communications with clients, digitally signed client
requests/responses, and digitally signed XML logs and CRL archives, as well as SSL-
based server administration.
• Supports software PKCS #11 or CAPI token based hardware signing and encryption
products, including hardware security modules from leading vendors that comply
with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or above.1
1
The use of a Hardware Security Module (HSM) is not included in the evaluated configuration.
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
4
For purposes of this evaluation, the Axway Server is a software application that offers
cryptographic functions (key generation, hashing, signing, random bit generation), secure
remote administration, secure storage of credentials, X.509 certificate validation and
authentication, trusted update, anti-exploitation capabilities and restricted network
communications. This evaluation is limited to the security functions claimed in Section 5
and further described in Section 6 of this Security Target (ST).
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The Axway Validation Authority Server runs on the following platforms:
• Microsoft Windows Server 2019 (64 bit) on VMWare ESXi 7.0 running on Intel
Xeon E5-2670
• Microsoft Windows Server 2022 (64 bit) on VMWare ESXi 7.0 running on Intel
Xeon E5-2670
• RHEL 7 (64 bit) on VMWare ESXi 7.0 running on Intel Xeon E5-2670
• RHEL 8 (64 bit) on VMWare ESXi 7.0 running on Intel Xeon E5-2670
• RHEL 9 (64 bit) on VMWare ESXi 7.0 running on Intel Xeon E5-2670
The Windows and RHEL platforms are part of the operating environment of the TOE. The
TOE can execute on any Intel Xeon processor, however the lab tested the TOE on an Intel
Xeon E5-2670. The lab also tested the TOE on Windows Server 2022 (64 bit) on ESXi 7.0
and RHEL 8 (64 bit) on ESXi 7.0 in the evaluated configuration. The TOE binaries remain
unchanged for each flavor of operating systems. Thus, the same TOE binaries compiled as
Windows executables are used for all claimed Windows operating systems, and the same
TOE binaries compiled as 64-bit ELF executables are used for all claimed Red Hat Linux
distributions.
3.3 TOE Architecture
The Axway VA Suite is composed of the following applications:
1. Validation Authority Server (VA Server) – the VA Server is comprised of the VA
validation server acting as either a Repeater or Responder operating on a Windows or
Linux platform, and the Web based administration (Admin UI). The VA Server
maintains a store of digital certificate revocation data and ensures the integrity and
validity of online transactions by delivering real-time validation of digital certificates.
2. Desktop Validator (DV) - (Standard and Enterprise Editions) - the Desktop Validator is
a Microsoft CAPI compliant revocation trust provider that communicates with the
Validation Authority Server (VA server) in responder mode to check status of digital
certs in real time. DV runs as a service on a 64bit Microsoft Windows platforms and
can be invoked to validate standard X.509v3 digital certificates issued by any
Certificate Authority (CA). The DV Standard edition provides certificate validation
support for client applications, while the DV Enterprise edition provides certificate
validation support for both client and server applications.
The focus of the evaluation is the Validation Authority Server (VA Server).
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
5
3.4 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a software-only application which executes on a Microsoft Windows or RHEL
operating system platform. The underlying platform is considered part of the operating
environment but provides some of the security functionality required by the ASPP14. The
evaluated configuration includes the Axway Validation Authority Server v5.2 - a software
server application running on the platforms listed above in the TOE Architecture section.
The TOE also requires a Certificate Authority (CA) server in the operational environment to
provide valid digital certificates.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Privacy
6. Protection of the TSF
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE uses CAVP-validated cryptographic algorithm implementations, provided by the
Axway Security Kernel, a cryptographic module built from OpenSSL 3.0.0, to support
asymmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, signature generation and verification and
establishment of trusted channels to protect data in transit. The TOE provides a web server
for TLS/HTTPS to facilitate trusted remote communications and implements functionality
to securely store key data related to secure communications. The TOE also relies on the
underlying platform to generate entropy that is used as input data for the TOE’s deterministic
random bit generator (DRBG).
4.2 User data protection
The TOE does not access any hardware resources (other than network connectivity) or
sensitive information repositories. The TOE does not store any sensitive data in non-volatile
memory. Inbound and outbound network communications are restricted to those that are
application initiated.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE implements X509 certificate validation to validate the revocation status of
certificates using CRL. The TOE uses X509 certificates to support HTTPS/TLS
authentication of administrators.
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
6
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides a Web-based Graphical User Interface (Web GUI) to access and manage
the TOE security functions. When configured with default credentials or no credentials, the
TOE restricts its functionality and only allows the ability to set new credentials. By default,
the TOE is configured with file permissions to protect itself and its data from unauthorized
access.
4.5 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit personally identifiable information (PII) over any network
interfaces.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects itself against exploitation by implementing address space layout
randomization (ASLR) and by not allocating any memory region for both write and execute
permission. The TOE is compiled for both Windows and Linux with stack-based buffer
overflow protection and does not allow user-modifiable files to be written to directories that
contain executable files. The TOE uses standard platform APIs and includes a number of
third party libraries used to perform its functions.
The TOE includes mechanisms to check for updates and to query the current version of the
application software. TOE software is digitally signed and distributed using the platform-
supported package manager (Windows or Linux). The TOE does not update its own binary
code in any way and when removed, all traces of the TOE application software are deleted.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects communications between itself and remote administrators using
HTTPS/TLS.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The ST references the PP/FP to which it claims conformance for assumptions about the use
of the TOE. Those assumptions, drawn from the claimed PP/FP, are as follows:
• The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for
its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime
environment it provides to the TOE.
• The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the
software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
• The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software in compliance with the applied enterprise
security policy.
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
7
Clarification of scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
ASPP14/PKGTLS11 as described for this TOE in the ST. Other functionality included in the
product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the
devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Application Software Protection Profile with the TLS
Package and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Software Application models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as
evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the ASPP14/PKGTLS11 and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were
not covered by this evaluation.
6 Documentation
The vendor offers guidance documents describing the installation process for the TOE as
well as guidance for subsequent administration and use of the applicable security features.
The guidance documentation examined during the evaluation and delivered with the TOE
is as follows:
• Validation Authority Common Criteria Guide, Version 5.2, July 1, 2024
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
8
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Axway
Validation Authority Server, version 5.2, Version 0.3, July 11, 2024 (DTR), as summarized
in the Assurance Activity Report for Axway Validation Authority Server, version 5.2, Version
0.3, July 11, 2024 (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the ASPP14/PKGTLS11 including the tests
associated with optional and selection-based requirements. The evaluation team executed the
tests specified in the test plan and documented the results in the test report listed above.
Testing took place from August 2023 through July 2024 within the Gossamer Security
Solutions laboratory in Columbia, MD following the procedures identified in the Gossamer
Quality Manual with no deviations. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the
AAR, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE runs on the evaluated platforms identified in Section 3.2.
The environmental components described in the following table are required to operate the
TOE in the evaluated configuration.
Component Description
Axway Desktop
Validator (DV) Client
(Mandatory)
The Axway Desktop Validator Client is another application in
the Axway Validation Authority Suite. The DV interfaces with
the TOE to use the VA server’s certificates for outgoing
revocation queries.
Revocation Server
(Mandatory)
Validity of the certificates the TOE uses for asserting the
authenticity of the TLS peers is verified using CRLs.
Management
Workstation
(Mandatory)
A workstation used by an administrator to locally or remotely
manage the TOE. The workstation must have a compatible web
browser to connect to the TOE’s web UI for management.
IT Environment Components
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
9
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Axway
Validation Authority Server TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in
the ASPP14/PKGTLS11.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Axway Validation Authority Server,
version 5.2 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the ASPP14/PKGTLS11 related to the
examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
10
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the ASPP14/PKGTLS11 and recorded the results
in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: Axway, Axway VA Suite,
Axway VA Server, Axway Validation Authority Suite, Axway Validation Authority
Server, Axway Security Kernel, curl, openldap, apache, zlib, xerces, sqlite3, and openssl.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
11
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team suggests that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the TOE. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated functionality
is scoped exclusively to the SFRs specified in the ST, and the only evaluated functionality
was that which was described by the SFRs claimed in the ST. All other functionality provided
by the TOE needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about
its effectiveness.
Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated
configuration is established and maintained.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Axway Validation Authority Server, version 5.2 Security
Target, Version 0.4, July 2, 2024.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
Axway Validation Authority Server 5.2 Validation Report Version 1.0, July 15, 2024
12
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 07 October 2021 (ASPP14).
[5] Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 01 March 2019
(PKGTLS11).
[6] Axway Validation Authority Server, version 5.2 Security Target, Version 0.4, July 2,
2024 (ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Axway Validation Authority Server, version 5.2,
Version 0.3, July 11, 2024 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for Axway Validation Authority Server, version 5.2, Version
0.3, July 11, 2024 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Axway Validation Authority Server, version 5.2,
Version 0.3, July 11, 2024 (ETR).
[10] Validation Authority Common Criteria Guide, Version 5.2, July 1, 2024 (AGD).