Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 20FMV2139-34:1
HEMLIG/
enligt Offentlighets- och sekretesslagen
(2009:400)
2021-07-09
Country of origin: Sweden
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Dencrypt Connex 6.0
Issue: 1.0, 2021-Jul-09
Authorisation: Ulf Noring, Lead Certifier , CSEC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 Secure initialisation 6
3.2 Update of TOE settings, phonebook and certificate 6
3.3 Secure voice and video 7
3.4 Secure messaging 7
3.5 Data-at-rest protection 7
3.6 Secure communication channel (TLS) 8
3.7 Encrypted push notifications 8
3.8 TCP tunnelling of secure calls 8
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
4.1 Usage Assumptions 9
4.2 Environmental Assumptions 9
4.3 Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 11
6 Documentation 12
7 IT Product Testing 13
7.1 Developer Testing 13
7.2 Evaluator Testing 13
7.3 Penetration Testing 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 15
9 Results of the Evaluation 16
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 17
10.1 Certifier Comments 17
11 Glossary 18
12 Bibliography 19
12.1 General 19
12.2 Documentation 19
Appendix A Scheme Versions 20
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 20
A.2 Scheme Notes 20
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Dencrypt Connex, version 6.0 for Apple iOS, build
6.0.0.4.
The TOE is an application for iPhone that offers encrypted mobile voice, video and
message communication within well-defined user groups. Although the application is
available for both iPhone and Android, only the iPhone version is evaluated.
The main security features of the TOE and its operational environment are:
• Encrypted end-to-end voice and video communication (Secure Call)
• Encrypted messages (Secure Messaging)
• Encrypted group calls
• Secure Individual phone book
◦ Centrally managed (TOE environment)
◦ Distributed seamlessly to user devices
◦ Supports individual groups settings
◦ Supports individual emergency contacts
• Encrypted communication is restricted to administrator defined groups
• Supports secure provisioning to set up a new DCA installation
• Supports its own key-pair generation
• Secure data-at-rest storage of credentials and data
• Encrypted push notifications
• TCP tunnelling for voice or video communication
The TOE is provided and installed using Apple’s App Store. The App Store delivery
mechanism operated by Apple is assumed to be trusted and secure. The TOE can also
be provided using Apple’s Volume Purchase Program (VPP), where the app is in-
stalled via an MDM. Note that the TOE is delivered in an unprovisioned state. Provi-
sioning is started by the Dencrypt administrator by adding the user to the Dencrypt
Communication Solution and directory (part of the TOE environment). After that the
administrator will send an invitation message e.g. by email to the user's handset. The
invitation message has a link to the web server. The user shall tap the link which starts
the TOE. The link can also be encoded in a QR code which the phone can scan to load
the link into the TOE. The TOE parses the link, fetches the provisioning data from the
Dencrypt Provisioning Server (part of the TOE environment) and installs the data.
Guidance is provided in two manuals:
● Operational user guide Dencrypt Connex v. 6.0.0.4
● Dencrypt Connex v. 6.0.0.4 Preparative guide
The TOE claims conformance to the EAL4 package of security assurance require-
ments, augmented with ALC_FLR.2. It does not claim conformance to any Protection
Profile (PP).
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Three threats, eight OSPs and nine assumptions are specified in chapter three in the
security target [ST].
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB in their premises
in Danderyd, Sweden. The evaluation was completed on 2021-06-24. The evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria (CC), ver-
sion. 3.1 release 5.
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec in-
formation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body according
to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports and by observing a site visit and performing testing
oversight. The certifier determined that the evaluation results confirm the security
claims in the Security Target (ST) and the Common Methodology
for evaluation assurance level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.2. The technical in-
formation in this report is based on the Security Target [ST] and the
Final Evaluation Report (FER) produced by atsec information security AB.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
As specified in the Security Target of this evaluation, the invocation of the random
number generator (RNG) has been included in the TOE, while the implementation of
the RNG has been located in TOE environment (Apple iOS). Therefore the invoca-
tion of cryptographic primitives has been in the scope of this evaluation, while cor-
rectness of implementation of cryptographic primitives been excluded from the TOE.
Correctness of implementation is assumed by the Security Target as stated in
A.KEYS: "It is assumed that random bits provided by the underlying platform are of
good quality and have sufficient entropy."
Users of this product are advised to consider their acceptance of this assumption
regarding the correctness of implementation of the RNG.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2020005
Name and version of the
certified IT product
Dencrypt Connex 6.0.0.4
Security Target Identification Security Target for Dencrypt Connex version 6.0,
2021-03-31, version 0.14
EAL EAL 4 + ALC_FLR.2
Sponsor Dencrypt A/S
Developer Dencrypt A/S
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5
CEM version 3.1 revision 5
QMS version 1.25
Scheme Notes Release 18.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS, EA/MLA
Certification date 2021-07-09
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3 Security Policy
The TOE has the following security functionality:
 Secure initialisation
 Update of TOE settings, phonebook and certificate
 Secure voice and video
 Secure messaging
 Data-at-rest protection
 Secure communication channel (TLS)
 Encrypted push notifications
 TCP tunnelling of secure calls
For detailed information on the security functionality, see chapter 7 of the [ST].
3.1 Secure initialisation
This security function provisions a Dencrypt Connex client with user credential, Den-
crypt Server System (DSS) domain and signed certificate. The provisioning starts by
the administrator adding the user to the DSS. Afterwards, the administrator provides
an invitation link (which can also be encoded as a QR-code) to the user in a secure
way. This link points to the web server of the Dencrypt Provisioning Server (DPS).
The user shall tap the invitation link or scan the QR code which starts the TOE. The
TOE parses the link, fetches the provisioning data from the DPS and installs the provi-
sioning data. The provisioning data is then deleted from the DPS, i.e. the link can be
used only once. Additionally, the link is only valid for a limited time after the link has
been provided.
3.2 Update of TOE settings, phonebook and certificate
This security function keeps the TOE's local settings in sync with the server system's
settings. Whenever the TOE is running and registered on the Dencrypt Communica-
tion Server (DCS), the TOE downloads network settings as soon as the checksum of
its local settings differs from the settings checksum advertised by the DCS. The same
mechanism applies to keep the phone book up-to-date.
Although the TOE user is the single individual that is authorized to use the TOE, the
user cannot change any phone book entries or make calls from a dial-pad. Besides, the
mobile's built-in phone book is kept completely separate from the Dencrypt Connex
application (DCA)'s phone book.
During provisioning, the TOE generates by itself an RSA 3072-bit private-public key
pair and sends, via the DPS, its public key with a certificate signing request (CSR) to
the Dencrypt Certificate Manager (DCM) which signs it and delivers the client certifi-
cate. This is to ensure that the private key never must leave the TOE. The client cre-
ates a new private key and CSR if the client certificate expires soon (e.g. within the
next 12 months). This CSR is submitted to the DCM via the DCS, since the DPS is
only used during provisioning.
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3.3 Secure voice and video
The secure communication channel between two handsets, the TOE and the other in-
stance of the TOE goes as followed: Dencrypt's secure call extends a Voice/Video
over IP (VoIP) system by a patented Dynamic Encryption for voice and video data.
Dencrypt's VoIP system employs the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), Secure Real-
time Transmission Protocol (SRTP) and DTLS-SRTP standard components that are
partly modified to integrate dynamic encryption.
For secure calls, DTLS-SRTP uses Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange to es-
tablish a common secret and authenticate the call. Additionally, both DCAs exchange
their client certificates over the peer-to-peer connection. The fingerprints of the certif-
icates are sent over the call setup channel through the DSS. To mitigate a Man-in-the-
middle (MitM) attack, the fingerprint calculated from the exchanged certificate has to
match with the fingerprint signalled through the DSS. The common secret is then used
to derive a 256-bit key and 128-bit salt which are fed into SRTP's key derivation func-
tion (KDF). Besides, Key Boosting is used to create a common Dynamic Encryption
key which is used for both AES and the S-box seed. Once the SRTP session ends all
the keys are destroyed (overwritten with zeros)
Secure calls and messages can only be initiated to users within the caller’s phone
book. All the content, i.e. SRTP stream for audio/video and text data for messaging,
are dynamically encrypted.
3.4 Secure messaging
The Secure Messaging is provided by the LIMEv2 protocol, which in turn is based on
the Signal Protocol. Additionally the message encryption has been modified via Den-
crypt’s Dynamic Encryption and Key Boosting, which are the same implementation as
for Secure Calls. The DCA primarily generates Diffie-Hellman keypairs and uploads
its public keys to the DSS. Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman (X3DH) is used to estab-
lish the initial shared secret. After that, Double Ratchet computes the symmetric key
for the Dynamic Encryption of the messages. The algorithm ratchets the symmetric
key for each message to ensure Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). After a message is re-
ceived and decrypted, the related keys are erased.
3.5 Data-at-rest protection
The TOE dynamically encrypts the databases that store the chat history and the LI-
MEv2 keys. The same Dynamic Encryption key decrypts both databases and the key is
constant but unique for each TOE.
At the end of provisioning the TOE generates two 640-bit keys. One (Storage Key)
will be used for Dynamic Encryption of the storage, while the other (Device Key) will
be used as a Key Encryption Key using XOR. The encrypted Storage Key is submitted
to the DSS and will not be stored by the TOE, it is downloaded and only kept in RAM.
After a message is received and decrypted using the LIMEv2 protocol it is encrypted
via storage encryption before being stored on the device. The cleartext data (messages
and attachments) will only be stored in RAM. This approach ensures that neither the
device nor the server system becomes a point-of-alack. In case of a lost or stolen de-
vice, the TLS certificate is revoked and the device cannot connect to the server system
to fetch the encrypted Storage Key
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3.6 Secure communication channel (TLS)
The TOE can establish a secure channel between the TOE and DSS components. All
TLS connections are initiated by the TOE. The secure SIP connection between the
TOE and the SIP server on the DCS uses mutually authenticated TLS 1.2, with RSA
signature, AES 256-bit encryption and SHA-384 hashing. The HTTPS connection to
the web server on the DPS also uses TLS 1.2, with RSA signature, AES 256-bit en-
cryption and SHA-384 hashing. However, in this case the TOE is not authenticated to
the DPS. This is only performed once during the provisioning and the link is only val-
id for a limited time after it has been provided.
3.7 Encrypted push notifications
Apple requires the TOE to indicate to the user immediate feedback for incoming mo-
bile push. This leaves TOE no time to connect to DSS to get hold of the incoming
caller ID. The SIP caller ID is placed encrypted in the mobile push. This ensures that
only the intended DCA recipient can read the caller ID, even though the push message
is sent via the system of a different vendor. The TOE generates and submits an AES
push encryption key at the end of provisioning. The key is also stored by the TOE and
used to decrypt incoming push notifications. AES CFB is used instead of Dynamic
Encryption since DSS has no Dynamic Encryption capabilities. There is no integrity
protection since the push notification is sent through Apple via TLS.
3.8 TCP tunnelling of secure calls
The TOE also supports tunnelling of voice and video traffic over TCP and TLS 1.2.
Voice and video are normally sent over UDP via SRTP, however, this tunnelling ser-
vice will allow the TOE to instead use TCP and TLS 1.2 to tunnel the call traffic. The
DSS provides a tunnel server to which the TOE can connect to enable this. Whether
the tunnel is enabled or not by default depends on the settings as specified on the serv-
er, but this setting can be changed on the TOE. While the tunnel provides the TLS en-
cryption, this is not security relevant since the tunnelled traffic is still protected by
SRTP.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes two assumptions on the usage of the TOE:
A.SINGLEUSER
It is assumed that the TOE is under the physical control of a single authorized user.
A.USER
It is assumed that the users are trustworthy and trained to perform their actions in ac-
cordance with their instructions and security policies.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes seven assumptions on the operational environment of
the TOE:
A.ADMIN
It is assumed that the TOE administrators (i.e. the administrators using the DSS) are
trustworthy and trained to perform the actions required by them for the management
and maintenance of the DSS.
A.APPS
It is assumed that only approved, benign applications are running on the handset
where the TOE is running.
A.BACKEND
It is assumed that the underlying hardware, firmware (BIOS and device drivers) and
software of the server system used by the TOE are working correctly and have no un-
documented security critical side effect on the TOE. Furthermore, the server system is
operated in a physically secure and well managed environment.
A.HANDSET
It is assumed that the functions in the TOE environment related to memory manage-
ment, program execution, access control and privilege management provided by the
underlying iOS of the handset and the SIM card, work correctly and have no undocu-
mented security critical side effects on the security functions of the TOE.
A.KEYS
It is assumed that random bits provided by the underlying platform are of good quality
and have sufficient entropy.
A.PROVISIONING
It is assumed that the operational environment ensures that the web link is not predict-
able, only active for a limited time and that access to the link is limited to one attempt
only. It is also assumed that the operational environment provides the link to clients in
a secure way so that the link is not disclosed to any potential attacker. Note: The link
might be disclosed for the user's organisation, e.g. the link might be in cleartext on the
organisation's local mail server.
A.APPSTORE
It is assumed that the operational environment provides a secure delivery mechanism
for the TOE operated by a trusted third party. For the TOE which runs on the iPhone
iOS operating system, this is the built in App Store operated by Apple.
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4.3 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains three threats which have been considered during the
evaluation:
T.DATA
An unauthorized user or attacker will gain access to user credentials, TOE settings or
phone book entries to which they are not authorized. This involves data sent between
the TOE and the DSS, including push notifications.
T.MASQUERADE
A user within a closed user group is masquerading, pretending to be another user to
mislead the receiver that a secure voice or video call, or a secure message is originat-
ing from another user belonging to the phone book of that user group.
T.TRAFFIC
An attacker (including network operators) may gain access (disclosure or modifica-
tion) to secure voice, video or messaging conversations between users within a closed
user group.
The Security Target contains eight Organisational Security Policies (OSPs) which
have been considered during the evaluation:
OSP.CLOSED
The TOE shall ensure that secure calls and secure messages are restricted to parties
defined by the phone book on the TOE of the calling party.
OSP.FORWARD
The TOE must be able to prevent an unauthorized user that obtains a handset to de-
crypt previously transmitted traffic (voice, video or message) that has been encrypted
using the obtained handset. Any encryption keys used for the transmitted traffic must
be erased.
OSP.PRIVATEKEY
The TOE must be able to generate its own private-public key pairs.
OSP.MANAGE
The TOE shall allow secure provisioning and remote update of certificates and phone
book.
OSP.PHONEBOOK
The TOE must ensure that the phone book cannot be changed locally.
OSP.UPTODATE
The TOE must ensure that the phone book held by the TOE is up-to-date.
OSP.STORAGE
The TOE must use cryptography to protect the confidentiality of data stored on the
device. The data involves both DCA data, messages and message attachments. The da-
ta must only be accessible if the user can authenticate to the DSS.
OSP.TUNNEL
The TOE must support tunnelling of voice or video communication over TCP by tun-
nelling the connection over TLS 1.2.
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE, i.e. Dencrypt Connex, is an app running on iPhone. It is part of the Den-
crypt Communication Solution that provides mobile devices with secure end-to-end
voice, video and message communication within closed user groups that are centrally
managed. The Dencrypt Communication Solution also contains the server side system
- Dencrypt Server System (DSS). The TOE relies on the DSS for provisioning, call
signaling, messaging, and management of phone book, but only the Dencrypt Connex
application is in the scope of this evaluation. The figure below shows the TOE and its
interactions with the server side within the Dencrypt Communication Solution.
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6 Documentation
The following documentation comprise the TOE guidance:
PREGUIDE Dencrypt Connex v. 6.0.0.4 Preparative guide
OPGUIDE Operational user guide Dencrypt Connex v. 6.0.0.4
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer uses both automated and manual tests. In total 130 tests were executed
to test the TOE. Among them, there are 5 manual tests, 10 design checks (only code
review is performed) and the rest are automated. Each test, both automated and manu-
al test, contains a description. For manual tests the test steps are described which con-
tain the expected outcome of the test, e.g. "Accept call and check that transmission,
e.g. audio works". For automated tests, the steps are described in the code which the
evaluator has examined.
The testing approach of the developer was to demonstrate that all test cases ran suc-
cessfully and that all ST claims, interfaces, and subsystems are verified by the tests.
Doctest C++ testing framework, Python, GnuTLS server and TCL/TK are used for
testing. For automated tests, some are limited to a specific functionality that does not
require any interaction with DSS. For tests that require DSS, both mocked VoIP/Chat
transmission engine and fully functional DSS are used, and the tests with mocked en-
gine are more extensive.
The tests include both positive and negative tests, e.g. test case "DC-TLS-
WrongCipher: Negative TLS test: Wrong ciphersuite" has the following description:
"Testing that connection fails when server insists on wrong algorithm".
The developer performed the tests on the actual TOE installed on the iPhone and on
the TOE running in a simulated environment.
The tests were either executed on TOE installed on iPhone or in a simulated environ-
ment on Mac. The TOE was configured (provisioned) to use the servers in the test en-
vironment. The developer also performed manual/semi-automatic test of dynamic en-
cryption by making a separate build to test against reference implementation.
The developer has provided the results of all test cases that were performed and the
source code of the automated tests. All tests were successful.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluators observed when the developer re-ran all developer tests (130 tests), both
automated and manual tests. The evaluators also observed when the developer ran an
extra test to verify the inner and outer AES operations within Dynamic Encryption.
The evaluator also examined the source code of a sample of automated developer test
to verify that they test what they claim. The evaluator further performed two Evaluator
Tests: one negative test where she tested if the provisioning link was usable after the
valid time window had expired; and the other where she intercepted a chat message to
verify it is end-to-end encrypted.
The developer's testing environment was used, which consisted of iPhones running
Dencrypt Connex (TOE), Dencrypt Server System, and a Mac computer running au-
tomated tests. All security functionality defined in the ST has been tested.
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The evaluators tested all security functions for appropriate coverage and depth; since
the evaluators already determined that the developer testing sufficiently exercised all
interfaces and TSF subsystems, the evaluators did not need to exhaustively test all in-
terfaces and subsystems.
The tests re-ran by the developer and the extra Dynamic Encryption test ran by the de-
veloper, both under the evaluators' observation, went successfully. All evaluator tests
were also performed successfully.
7.3 Penetration Testing
Vulnerability testing was performed against the TOE interfaces that are accessible to a
potential attacker. I.e., the communication during provisioning. The evaluator also
performed traffic analysis during voice call between TOEs. Several tests using modi-
fied provisioning links were also executed.
The evaluator analyzed the developer design, the implementation representation and
guidance documentation in order to identify the attack surface of the TOE. The eval-
uator came to the conclusion that the attack surface consists of the external network
interfaces, i.e., data that are sent or received on these interfaces. The evaluator also
used publicly documented vulnerabilities in CVE database and used general search
engines. The analysis of potential attack surfaces was performed according to the
ISO/OSI layer model, i.e., for TLSv1.2, SRTP, DTLS etc. connections.
The evaluator performed four penetration tests. None of the performed penetration
tests revealed any exploitable vulnerability in the TOE.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is an iPhone application and thus requires an iPhone to run.
The IT environment must provide the following:
 The mobile device hardware (iPhone) and iOS software on which the TOE is in-
stalled. This includes the App Store application included in iOS, which is used for
the delivery mechanism.
 The DSS with DPS, DCC, DCM, DDB, DSB and DCS, as well as any standard
MDM system in the case that the DCA is distributed using Apple’s VPP.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Enhanced Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluator and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family Name Short name (includ-
ing component iden-
tifier for assurance
families)
Verdict
Security Target Evaluation
ST Introduction
Conformance claims
Security Problem Definition
Security objectives
Extended components definition
Derived security requirements
TOE summary specification
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Life-cycle support
Use of a CM system
Parts of the TOE CM Coverage
Delivery procedures
Developer Security
Flaw reporting procedures
Life-cycle definition
Tools and Techniques
ALC
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMS.4
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_FLR.2
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Development
Security architecture description
Security-enforcing functional specification
Implementation representation
Basic design
ADV
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.3
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Guidance documents
Operational user guidance
Preparative procedures
AGD
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
PASS
PASS
PASS
Tests
Evidence of coverage
Depth
Functional testing
Independent testing - sample
ATE
ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability analysis
AVA
AVA_VAN.3
PASS
PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
10.1 Certifier Comments
Dencrypt's Dynamic Encryption, used to protect voice and video calls, messaging and
local storage in the TOE, is based on 256-bit AES in GCM mode with several steps
added as described in chapter 7.3.1 in the [ST]. For the purposes of this certification,
the security provided by Dynamic Encryption is considered to be at least that of 256-
bit AES in GCM mode.
As the mobile device industry pushes new hardware, OS versions and updates at a
high pace, any application dependent on the OS and hardware needs to be updated
regularly. As the threat landscape is shifting at a high pace, the current security level
of mobile devices can swiftly change, since new potential vulnerabilities that could af-
fect the TOE or its underlying platform are regularly discovered. While the Common
Criteria certificate is only valid for version 6.0.0.4 of the Toe, and though the evalua-
tor has not found any vulnerabilities in the TOE, it is possible that the developer will
release security updates at a later date. The certifier notes that while updating the ap-
plication or its environment will put it outside of the evaluated configuration, for many
scenarios a reasonable policy would be to keep products up to date with the latest ver-
sion of the firmware/software. However, the benefit of installing firmware/software
updates must be balanced with the potential risks that such changes might have unex-
pected effects on the behaviour of the evaluated security functionality.
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11 Glossary
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security,
document describing the methodology used in Common Cri-
teria evaluations
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to
operate within a evaluation and certification scheme
ST Security Target, document containing security requirements
and specifications , used as the basis of a TOE evaluation
TOE Target of Evaluation
DSS Dencrypt Server System
DCM Dencrypt Certificate Manager
DPS Dencrypt Provisioning Server
DCA Dencrypt Connex Application
DCC Dencrypt Control Center
DDB Dencrypt Database
DCS Dencrypt Communications Server
DSB Dencrypt Server Bridge
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Dencrypt Connex 6.0
20FMV2139-34:1 1.0 2021-07-09
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12 Bibliography
12.1 General
CC Combination of CCp1, CCp2, CCp3, and CEM (see below)
CCp1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCp2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCp3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
3:, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004
ST Security Target for Dencrypt Connex version 6.0, Dencrypt A/S, 2021-03-
31, document version 0.14
SP-002 SP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2020-11-30, document ver-
sion 32.0
SP-188 SP-188 Scheme Crypto Policy, CSEC, 2020-11-03, document version
10.0
12.2 Documentation
PREGUIDE Dencrypt Connex v. 6.0.0.4 Preparative guide, Dencrypt A/S, 2020-12-
15, document version 2.13
OPGUIDE Operational user guide Dencrypt Connex v. 6.0.0.4, Dencrypt A/S,
2020-12-15, document version 1.2
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Dencrypt Connex 6.0
20FMV2139-34:1 1.0 2021-07-09
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Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme has been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
1.25 2021-06-17 None
1.24 2020-11-19 None
1.23.2 2020-05-11 None
1.23.1 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
Scheme
Note
Version Title Applicability
SN-15 3.0 Demonstration of
test coverage
Clarify demonstration of test cover-
age at EAL4.
SN-18 3.0 Highlighted Re-
quirements on
the Security Tar-
get
Clarifications on the content of the
ST.
SN-22 3.0 Vulnerability
Assessment
Vulnerability assessment needs to be
redone if 30 days or more has passed
between AVA and the final version
of the final evaluation report.
SN-28 1.0 Updated proce-
dures application,
evaluation and
certification
Evaluator reports should be received
in two batches.