Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 22FMV4134-24 Dokument ID CSEC2022003 Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585) SEKRETESS Enligt offentlighets- och Sekretesslagen (2009:400) 2023-03-16 Försvarets materielverk Swedish Defence Material Administration Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 Issue: 1.0, 2023-mar-16 Authorisation: Jerry Johansson, Lead Certifier , CSEC Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 22FMV4134-24 Dokument ID CSEC2022003 Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 2 (18) Table of Contents 1 Executive Summary 3 2 Identification 4 3 Security Policy 5 3.1 User Management 5 3.2 Data Access Control 5 3.3 FAX Data Flow Control 5 3.4 SSD Encryption 5 3.5 Audit Log 5 3.6 Security Management 5 3.7 Self-Test 6 3.8 Network Protection 6 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7 4.1 Assumptions 7 4.2 Clarification of Scope 7 5 Architectural Information 8 6 Documentation 9 7 IT Product Testing 10 7.1 Developer Testing 10 7.2 Evaluator Testing 10 7.3 Penetration Testing 10 8 Evaluated Configuration 11 9 Results of the Evaluation 12 10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 13 11 Glossary 14 12 Bibliography 15 Appendix A Scheme Versions 17 A.1 Quality Management System 17 A.2 Applicable Scheme Notes 17 Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 3 (18) 1 Executive Summary The TOE is the hardware and the firmware of the following multifunction printer (MFP) models with FAX: KYOCERA TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i, M30040i and M30032i TA Triumph-Adler 4063i and 3263i UTAX 4063i and 3263i with the following firmware: System firmware 2ZS_S0IS.C02.504 FAX firmware 3R2_5100.003.012 In the evaluated configuration, FAX System 12 is installed and included in the scope of the TOE. The TOE provides copying, scanning, printing, faxing and boxing (storage). Delivery is done by means of a courier trusted by KYOCERA Document Solutions Inc. Installation and initial setup is done by a representative of KYOCERA or the ap- proved reseller. The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB, in their premises in Växjö and Bromma, Sweden, and was completed on the 4th of March 2023. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Crite- ria (CC), version 3.1 revision 5, and Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM), ver- sion 3.1 revision 5. Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe- dish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Com- mon Criteria. The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver- sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security Target (ST) and the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2. The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target (ST) and the Final Evaluation Report (FER) produced by Combitech AB. The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer- tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ- isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate is either expressed or implied. Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 4 (18) 2 Identification Certification Identification Certification ID CSEC2022003 Name and version of the certified IT product KYOCERA TASKalfa MZ4000i, TASKalfa MZ3200i, TASKalfa M30040i, TASKalfa M30032i, TA Triumph-Adler 4063i, 3263i UTAX 4063i, 3263i with FAX System, all with system firmware: 2ZS_S0IS.C02.504 and fax firmware: 3R2_5100.003.012 Security Target Identification TASKalfa MZ4000i, TASKalfa MZ3200i Series with FAX System Security Target EAL EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2 Sponsor Kyocera Document Solutions Inc. Developer Kyocera Document Solutions Inc. ITSEF Combitech AB Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5 CEM version 3.1 release 5 QMS version 2.3 Scheme Notes Release 20.0 Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS and, EA/MLA Certification date 2023-03-16 Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 5 (18) 3 Security Policy TOE provides the following security services: - User Management - Data Access Control - FAX Data Flow Control - SSD Encryption - Audit Log - Security Management - Self-Test - Network Protection 3.1 User Management A function that identifies and authenticates users so that only authorized users can use the TOE. When using the TOE from the Operation Panel and Client PCs, a user will be required to enter his/her login user name and login user password for identification and authentication. The User Management Function includes a User Account Lockout Function, which prohibits the users access for a certain period of time if the number of identification and authentication attempts consecutively result in failure, a function, which protects feedback on input of login user password when performing identifica- tion and authentication and a function, which automatically logouts in case no opera- tion has been done for a certain period of time. 3.2 Data Access Control A function that restricts access so that only authorized users can access to image data stored in the TOE. 3.3 FAX Data Flow Control A function that controls forwarding the data received from public line to the TOE’s external interface, following to the FAX forward setting. 3.4 SSD Encryption A function that encrypts information assets stored in the SSD in order to prevent leak- age of data stored in the SSD inside the TOE. 3.5 Audit Log A function that records and stores the audit logs of user operations and security- relevant events on the SSD. This function provides the audit trails of TOE use and se- curity-relevant events. Stored audit logs can be accessed only by a device administra- tor. The stored audit logs will be sent by email to the destination set by the device administrator. 3.6 Security Management A function that sets security functions of the TOE. This function can be used only by authorized users. This function can be utilized from an Operation Panel and a Client PC. Operations from a Client PC use a web browser. Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 6 (18) 3.7 Self-Test A function that verifies the integrity of TSF executable code and TSF data to detect unauthorized alteration of the executable code of the TOE security functions. 3.8 Network Protection A function that protects communication paths to prevent leaking and altering of data by eavesdropping of data in transition over the internal network connected to TOE. This function verifies the propriety of the destination to connect to and protects target- ed information assets by encryption, when using a Scan to Send Function, a Print Function, a Box Function and a BOX Function from a Client PC (web browser), or a Security Management Function from a Client PC (web browser). However, usage of a Print Function directly connected to a MFP is exception. Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 7 (18) 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 4.1 Assumptions The Security Target [ST] makes four assumptions on the usage and the operational environment of the TOE. A.ACCESS The hardware and software that are composed of TOE are located in a protected envi- ronment from security invasion such as illegal analysis and alteration. A.NETWORK The TOE is connected to the internal network that is protected from illegal access from the external network. A.USER_EDUCATION The TOE users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and are educated to follow those policies and procedures. A.DADMIN.TRUST The TOE's administrators are competent to manage devices properly as a device ad- ministrator and have a reliability not to use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes. 4.2 Clarification of Scope The Security Target contains three threats, which have been considered during the evaluation. T.SETTING_DATA Malicious person may have unauthorized access to, to change, or to leak TOE setting data via the operation panel or client PCs. T.IMAGE_DATA Malicious person may illegally access not authorized image data via the operation panel or Client PC and leak or alter them. T.NETWORK Malicious person may illegally eavesdrop or alter image data or TOE setting data on the internal network. The Security Target contains three Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have been considered during the evaluation. P.SSD_ENCRYPTION TOE must encrypt image data and TOE setting data stored on SSD. P.FAX_CONTROL TOE must control forwarding data received from public line and send it to external in- terface according with rules set by authorized roles. P.SOFTWARE_VERIFICATION TOE must execute Self Test that verify execution code of TSF to detect corruption of executable code. Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 8 (18) 5 Architectural Information Figure 1, Physical configuration of the TOE The TOE consists of an Operation Panel, a Scanner Unit, a Printer Unit, a Main Board, a FAX Board, SSD hardware, and firmware. The Operation Panel is the hardware that displays status and results upon receipt of input by the TOE user. The Scanner Unit and the Printer Unit are the hardware that input document into MFP and output as printed material. A Main Board is the circuit board to control entire TOE. A system firmware is in- stalled on a SSD, which is positioned on the Main Board. The Main Board has a Net- work Interface (NIC) and a Local Interface (USB Port). The ASIC that is also on the Main Board includes a Security Chip, which shares installation of some of the security functions. The Security Chip realizes security arithmetic processing for SSD encryption function. A FAX control firmware that controls FAX communication is installed on the PROM, which is positioned on the FAX Board. Additionally, a FAX Board has a NCU as an interface. Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 9 (18) 6 Documentation For proper configuration into the evaluated configuration, the following guidance documents are available: Notice1 (KYOCERA) Notice2 (KYOCERA) Notice4 (TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX) FAX System 12 Installation Guide TASKalfa MZ4000i / TASKalfa MZ3200i First Steps Quick Guide TASKalfa MZ4000i / TASKalfa MZ3200i Operation Guide TASKalfa MZ4000i / TASKalfa MZ3200i Safety Guide FAX System 12 Operation Guide Data Encryption/Overwrite Operation Guide Command Center RX User Guide TASKalfa MZ4000i / TASKalfa MZ3200i Printer Driver User Guide KYOCERA Net Direct Print User Guide Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 10 (18) 7 IT Product Testing 7.1 Developer Testing The developer performed extensive testing with good coverage of the TSFI on the TASKalfa MZ4000i and the TASKalfa MZ3200i models, with System Firmware 2ZS_S0IS.C02.504 FAX Firmware 3R2_5100.003.012 Each of the other models are functionally identical to one of the tested models. The developer testing was performed in the developer's premises in Osaka, Japan. All test results were as expected. 7.2 Evaluator Testing The evaluators' testing was performed in the evaluator's premises in Växjö, Sweden, between 2022-11-08 and 2022-11-13. The MX3200i model was used. More than 50% of the developer tests were repeated. Some complementary tests were run as well. All test results were as expected. 7.3 Penetration Testing The evaluator penetration testing was performed in the evaluator's premises in Växjö, Sweden, between 2022-11-08 and 2022-11-13. The MX3200i model was used. NMAP was used to perform a series of port scans, NESSUS was used for a vulnerabil- ity scan, and Peach fuzzer was used for jpeg fuzzing. Also, some negative tests were performed as part of the independent testing. No anomalies were encountered and all results were as expected. Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 11 (18) 8 Evaluated Configuration In the TOE operational environment, the following non-TOE hardware, and software is expected: Client PC with KX printer driver, Kyocera TWAIN driver, and web browser Mail server connected via IPSec (IKE 1) FTP server connected via IPSec (IKE 1) Mandatory in the evaluated configuration: - a FAX System 12 faxboard shall be installed and is included in the scope of the TOE. - maintenance interfaces shall not be accessible Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 12 (18) 9 Results of the Evaluation The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic. The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC]. The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS. The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow- ing table: Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family Name Short name (includ- ing component iden- tifier for assurance families) Verdict Security Target Evaluation ST Introduction Conformance claims Security Problem Definition Security objectives Extended components definition Derived security requirements TOE summary specification ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_CCL.1 ASE_SPD.1 ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_ECD.1 ASE_REQ.2 ASE_TSS.1 PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS Life-cycle support Use of a CM system Parts of the TOE CM Coverage Delivery procedures Flaw reporting procedures ALC ALC_CMC.2 ALC_CMS.2 ALC_DEL.1 ALC_FLR.2 PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS Development Security architecture description Security-enforcing functional specification Basic design ADV ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.2 ADV_TDS.1 PASS PASS PASS PASS Guidance documents Operational user guidance Preparative procedures AGD AGD_OPE.1 AGD_PRE.1 PASS PASS PASS Tests Evidence of coverage Functional testing Independent testing - sample ATE ATE_COV.1 ATE_FUN.1 ATE_IND.2 PASS PASS PASS PASS Vulnerability Assessment Vulnerability analysis AVA AVA_VAN.2 PASS PASS Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 13 (18) 10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations None. Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 14 (18) 11 Glossary CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, document describing the methodology used in Common Cri-teria evaluations CM Configuration Management EAL Evaluation Assurance Level HDD Hard Disk Drive IPSec Internet Protocol Security ISO International Organization for Standardization IT Information Technology ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory li- censed to operate within an evaluation and certifica- tion scheme LAN Local Area Network MFP Multi-Function Printer NCU Network Control Unit OSP Organizational Security Policy PP Protection Profile SMTP Simple Mail Transport Protocol SSD Solid State Disk ST Security Target, document containing security re- quirements and specifications , used as the basis of a TOE evaluation TLS Transport Layer Security TOE Target of Evaluation TSF TOE Security Functionality TSFI TSF Interface Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 15 (18) 12 Bibliography ST TASKalfa MZ4000i, TASKalfa MZ3200i Series with FAX System Security Target, KYOCERA document solutions Inc., 2022-12-06, document version 1.00, FMV ID 22FMV4134-27 Notice2 NoticeMZ (KYOCERA), Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., December 2022, document version 302ZS5641001, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 Notice1 NoticeM (KYOCERA), Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., December 2022, document version 302ZS5644001, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 Notice3 Notice3 (Copystar), Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., December 2022, document version 302ZS5642002, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 Notice4 Notice4 (TA Triumph-Adler/UTAX), Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., December 2022, document version 302ZS5643001, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 IG-FAX FAX System 12 Installation Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., September 2020, document version 303RK5671202, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 QG TASKalfa MZ4000i / TASKalfa MZ3200i First Steps Quick Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., November 2021, document version 302ZS5602001, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 OG TASKalfa MZ4000i / TASKalfa MZ3200i Operation Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., May 2022, document version 2ZSKDEN002, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 SG TASKalfa MZ4000i / TASKalfa MZ3200i Safety Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., November 2021, document version 302ZS5622001, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 OG-FAX FAX System 12 Operation Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., January 2022, document version 2ZSKDENCS500, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 16 (18) DE Data Encryption/Overwrite Operation Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., September 2022, document version 3MS2ZSKDEN0, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 CCRX Command Center RX User Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., May 2022, document version CCRXKDEN28, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 PD TASKalfa MZ4000i / TASKalfa MZ3200i Printer Driver User Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc.,May 2022, document version 02ZSBWKTEN821.2022.5, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 NDP KYOCERA Net Direct Print User Guide, Kyocera Document Solutions Inc., May 2022, document version DirectPrintKDEN3.2022.5, FMV ID 22FMV4134-9 PP2600B 2600.2-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment B, IEEE, with NIAP CCEVS Policy Letter #20, June 2009, document version 1.0 CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001 CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002 CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003 CC CCpart1 + CCPart2 + CCPart3 CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004 EP-002 EP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2021-10-26, document version 34.0 Swedish Certification Body for IT Security Certification Report - Kyocera TASKalfa MZ4000i, MZ3200i EAL2 22FMV4134-24 1.0 2023-03-16 CSEC2022003 17 (18) Appendix A Scheme Versions During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval- uation and Certification scheme have been used. A.1 Quality Management System During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management system (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was registered 2022-05-19: QMS 2.1.1 valid from 2022-03-09 QMS 2.2 valid from 2022-06-27 QMS 2.3 valid from 2023-01-26 In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has examined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system. The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista CSEC QMS 2.3”. The certifier concluded that, from QMS 2.1.1 to the current QMS 2.3, there are no changes with impact on the result of the certification. A.2 Applicable Scheme Notes SN-15 Testing SN-18 Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target SN-22 Vulnerability assessment SN-27 ST requirements at the time of application for certification SN-28 Updated procedures for application, evaluation and certification