National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-
Slot Hardware Encryption Layer
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10861-2018
Dated: October 19, 2018
Version: 0.3
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
John Butterworth
Joanne Fitzpatrick
Stelios Melachrinoudis
The MITRE Corporation
Bedford, MA
Kenneth Stutterheim
The Aerospace Corporation
Columbia, MD
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary................................................................................................................ 1
2 Identification........................................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ....................................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................ 3
3.2 TOE Architecture............................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries........................................................................................................ 3
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 3
4.1 Cryptographic support .................................................................................................... 4
4.2 User data protection ........................................................................................................ 4
4.3 Security management...................................................................................................... 4
4.4 Protection of the TSF...................................................................................................... 4
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ................................................................................... 4
6 Documentation........................................................................................................................ 5
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................................. 5
7.1 Developer Testing........................................................................................................... 6
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ........................................................................... 6
7.3 Test Environment............................................................................................................ 6
7.4 Testing Software............................................................................................................. 6
8 Results of the Evaluation ........................................................................................................ 7
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)........................................................................ 7
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).......................................................................... 7
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................................. 7
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................................. 8
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............................. 8
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)..................................................................... 8
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results...................................................................................... 9
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations ................................................................................ 9
10 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 10
11 Security Target...................................................................................................................... 10
12 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 10
13 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 11
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
validation team of the evaluation of Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer solution provided by Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions. It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not
an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
October 2018. The information in this report is largely derived from the proprietary Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions,
and summarized in the publically available Assurance Activity Report associated with this
evaluation. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative Protection
Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0, 09 September 2016 and
collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0,
09 September 2016.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP
approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the
TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive
versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product
satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target
(ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Curtiss-Wright Defense
Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer
(FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20) Security Target, Version 0.6, October 18, 2018 and analysis
performed by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology
(CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful
completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer
Protection Profile (Specific models identified in Section 8)
collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0, 09 September 2016 and collaborative Protection Profile for Full
Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0, 09 September 2016
ST Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer
Security Target, Version 0.6, October 18, 2018
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot
Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.3, October 18, 2018
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
Developer Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Item Identifier
CCEVS Validators John Butterworth, The MITRE Corporation
Joanne Fitzpatrick, The MITRE Corporation
Stelios Melachrinoudis, The MITRE Corporation
Kenneth Stutterheim, The Aerospace Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security
Target.
The Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Layer (hereafter
referred to as the TOE) is a hardware encryption layer that is used for Data-At-Rest (DAR)
encryption as part of the underlying rugged Network Attached Storage (NAS) file server, denoted
as the Curtiss-Wright DTS1 CSFC/ECC Cryptographic Data Transport System (DTS) (hereafter
referred to as the DTS1). The underlying DTS1 is intended for use in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAV), Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), and Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance
(ISR) aircraft. Easily integrated into network centric systems, the DTS1 is an easy to use, turnkey,
rugged network File Server that houses one Removable Memory Cartridge (RMC) that provides
quick off load of data. The RMC can be easily removed from one DTS1 and installed into any
other DTS1 providing full, seamless data transfer between one or more networks in separate
locations (e.g. ground => vehicle => ground).
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a hardware Full Drive Encryption solution that can accept a Removable
Memory Cartridge (RMC) which contains a data drive.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE provides a
ruggedized solution to secure Data at Rest (DAR).
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Security management
4. Protection of the TSF
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4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and
block-based encryption including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption,
cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key derivation.
These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation,
initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These primitive
cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection
of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on the entire drive (so that no plaintext exists) and does
so without user intervention.
4.3 Security management
The TOE provides each of the required management services to manage the full drive encryption
using a command line interface.
4.4 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of
its security features. It protects key and key material, and includes functions to perform self-tests
and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be
corrupt. If any of the self-tests fails, the TOE will not go into an operational mode.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version
2.0, 09 September 2016
 collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0, 09 September 2016
That information has not been reproduced here and the FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20 should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality
included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided
by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
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Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified
in the Full Drive Encryption Protection Profiles and performed by the evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device model and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. More specifically,
this evaluation only covers the hardware encryption layer of the Curtiss-Wright Data
Transport Solution, not the software encryption layer, which is covered in a separate
evaluation.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines
an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Curtiss-Wright DTS1 Data Transport System (Network File System) User Guide,
DDOC0099-000-A2
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the software must be configured as specified in
that guide. Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon
when configuring or operating the software as evaluated. Consumers are encouraged to download
the CC configuration guides directly from the NIAP site to ensure the software is configured as
evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in the following proprietary document:
 Evaluation Technical Report for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer, Version 0.3, October 18, 2018
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A non-proprietary summary of the test configuration, test tools, and tests performed may be found
in:
 Assurance Activity Report (FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20) for Curtiss-Wright Data
Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.3, October 18, 2018
(AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification document
and ran the tests specified in the FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20 including the tests associated with
optional requirements.
7.3 Test Environment
TOE Platform: Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot (build 373)
7.4 Testing Software
 Windows 10, 64-bit edition
 Standard Windows utilities (e.g., notepad, snip tool)
 Putty version 0.67 (used to connect to the device)
 HxD (Hexeditor) version 1.7.7.0 (used to examine dumped memory files)
 Gossamer developed test tools for binary searches
 Curtiss Wright tool for performing cryptographic operation to setup TOE – cm_crypto
 Debugger (used to dump memory) - Keil uVision Version 4
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8 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented
in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all assurance
activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Data Transport System 1-
Slot Hardware Encryption Layer TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in
the FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20.
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot
Hardware Encryption Layer product that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product
security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the
Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator performed the assurance
activities specified in the FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20 related to the examination of the
information contained in the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely
administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the
evaluation to ensure they were complete.
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The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20 and recorded the results
in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. A public search for vulnerabilities was conducted September
28, 2018 and did not uncover any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and the Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: disk encryption", "drive
encryption", "key destruction", "key sanitization", "Opal management software", "SED
management software", "Password caching", "Key caching", "Curtiss Wright", "DTS1",
"Defense Solutions Data Transport System", "Curtiss Wright Crypto Firmware", "NXP (Phillips)
ARM7 Processor P/N LPC2368FBD100", "Maxim Integrated DS3645, Rev A4", "Microchip
ATECC508A", "Enova X-Wall MX-256C ".
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
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8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the
claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration
of the hardware encryption layer. The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the
security functional requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality
implemented by the SFR’s within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality
provided, to include software, firmware, or hardware that was not part of the evaluated
configuration, needs to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
In addition to the hardware-based FDE layer provided by the DTS1, the DTS1 provides a
software/firmware-based Full Drive Encryption (FDE) layer to encrypt the drive within the RMC.
The software/firmware-based FDE layer is addressed in a separate evaluation.
Administrators should pay particular attention to the encryptor’s ability to setup Automatic Login
covered in section 6.3.6 of the Administrative Guide. It is possible to set a command that will
allow for saving login credentials, which when saved, allows for login to occur automatically
during power up. If default passwords are used, they must be changed.
NIAP established the Full Drive Encryption Technical Rapid Response Team (FDE-TRRT)
which, along with the Full Drive Encryption International Technical Community (FDE iTC),
addressed questions and concerns related to evaluations claiming conformance to the Protection
Profile for Full Drive Encryption. A Technical Decision is an issue resolution statement that
clarifies or interprets protection profile requirements and assurance activities. The FDE-TRRT,
in conjunction with the Full Drive Encryption (FDE) Interpretations Team (FIT), has formally
posted eight Technical Decisions related to collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive
Encryption Encryption Engine and collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption
Authorization Acquisition: TD0229, TD0233, TD0308, TD0309, TD0310, TD0312, TD0344,
TD0345 (see https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_tds.cfm). Of these,
the following eight FDE-TRRT Technical Decisions applied to this evaluation: TD0229,
TD0233, TD0308, TD0309, TD0310, TD0312, TD0344, TD0345.
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9.1 TRRT Decisions
There was one TRRT decision made throughout the course of this evaluation, which has not led
to a TD as of this writing but is upcoming:
9.1.1 Hardware FDE Key Dumping
A TRRT request was made to address an issue in the FCS_CKM.4(b) SFR from the Full Drive
Encryption: Encryption EE PP:
1. FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1 has FCS_CKM.4(b) only from the EE PP.
2. The SD for the FDEEE PP is confusing with this SFR as it says it has no test and then lists
a test for FCS_CKM.4(b). I checked the recently completed NIAP Seagate evaluation (10857) for
guidance and they did no tests for the FCS_CKM.4(b) requirement
Question: Does this mean this evaluation does not have to do any key dumping tests?
Upon review, the FDE-TRRT stated that the Test Assurance Activity statement in
FCS_CKM.4(b) of the FDE EE PP, “There is no test evaluation activity for this SFR”, was made
in error and tests do have to be performed for FCS_CKM.4(b). Because of this TRRT decision,
the lab performed tests consistent with the Evaluation Activities for this SFR. As of this writing,
the TRRT decision has not led to a TD, but is upcoming.
10 Annexes
Not applicable
11 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer (FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20) Security Target, Version 0.6, October 18, 2018.
12 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
13 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version
2.0, 09 September 2016
[5] collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0, 09 September 2016.
[6] Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer
(FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20) Security Target, Version 0.6, October 18, 2018 (ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report (FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20) for Curtiss-Wright Data
Transport System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.3, October 18, 2018
(AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report (FDEEEcPP20/FDEAAcPP20) for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport
System 1-Slot Hardware Encryption Layer, Version 0.2, October 17, 2018 (DTR).
<Evaluation Sensitive>
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Hardware
Encryption Layer, Version 0.3, October 18, 2018 (ETR) <Evaluation Sensitive>
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[10] Curtiss-Wright DTS1 CSfc / ECC Cryptographic Data Transport System (Network File
System) User Guide, DDOC0099-000-A2, March 23, 2018