Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003
for
IBM Directory Server 5.1
FixPak510-01
from
IBM Corporation
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
SOGIS-MRA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003
IBM Directory Server 5.1
FixPak510-01
from
IBM Corporation Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and
approved/licensed evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation,
Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL2
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 19. August 2003
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the Certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
· BSIG2
· BSI Certification Ordinance3
· BSI Schedule of Costs4
· Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
· DIN EN 45011 standard
· BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
· Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
· Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
· BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-
Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003
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2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates based on the CC
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003 Certification Report
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3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 was
conducted by atsec information security GmbH which is an evaluation facility
recognised by BSI (ITSEF)6
.
The sponsor and developer is:
IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758
USA.
The certification is concluded with
· the comparability check and
· the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 19th
August 2003.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
· all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
· the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-30.
The product IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 has been included in the
BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the sponsor of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
· the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
· the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
· complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003
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Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 9
3 Security Policy 10
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 11
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 16
7 IT Product Testing 17
8 Evaluated Configuration 19
9 Results of the Evaluation 21
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations 23
11 Annexes 24
12 Security Target 25
13 Definitions 26
14 Bibliography 28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003 Certification Report
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 (also
named IDS in short). IDS is an implementation of the Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP) and meets the requirements of LDAP Version 3 as
defined in RFC 2251–2256 and LDAP Version 2 as defined in RFC 1777.
LDAP is essentially a specialised database where the update operation is less
frequent and dedicated to the common goal within the enterprise on
consolidating and unifying the management of identity. IBM Directory Server is
built for identity management with role supports, fine-grained access control and
entry ownership.
The IBM Directory Server is a software product only, delivered over the Internet
as a package including
- the TOE (the LDAP server and the administration daemon executables),
- user and administrative tools (like IBM Directory Server Client SDK 5.1 or
the Web Administration Tool),
- a WebSphere HTTP server,
- and an IBM DB2 database.
Note: Although delivered together with the TOE, the user and administrator
tools, the HTTP server and the DB2 database are all excluded from the TOE
and are considered part of the environment. The TOE are the LDAP server
and the administration daemon executables only.
The TOE environment can also include applications that are not delivered with
the IBM Directory Server, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the
Netscape browser needed to administrate the TOE or the Adobe Acrobat
Reader to access the supplied online documentation.
The TOE provides the following evaluated security functionality:
- Identification and authentication
- Access control
- Auditing
- Management
- Reference mediation
To ensure a secure usage, a set of guidance documents is provided together
with the IDS. Details can be found in chapter 6 of this report.
The TOE can use a variety of different hardware and operating system
platforms to operate on. For the hardware/OS combinations used during the
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003
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evaluation of the TOE please refer to chapter 7. Please note that no hardware is
provided with the TOE.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) used in the Security Target
are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following table:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Functionality
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_MOF.1a7
Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
The TOE IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 was evaluated by:
atsec information security GmbH
Steinstraße 70
81667 München
Germany.
7
Notation of SFR component iteration: FXX_XXX.ya means iteration “a” of the SFR
FXX_XXX.y
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003 Certification Report
B-5
The evaluation was completed on 18th
July 2003. The atsec information security
GmbH is an evaluation facility recognised by BSI (ITSEF)8
.
The sponsor and developer is:
IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758
USA
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C of this report,
or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL2
(Evaluation Assurance Level 2).
1.2 Functionality
The TOE IDS provides the following Security Functions:
Name Function
Audit
F.AUDIT.1 Generation of audit and error log information
Access Control
F.ACCESS_CONTROL Access control to particular LDAP operations
Identification & Authentication
F.I&A.1 Identification & authentication of TOE user
Management
F.MANAGEMENT.1 Management of the roles Directory Administrator and
End User
F.MANAGEMENT.2 Management of the authentication functionality
F.MANAGEMENT.3 Management of authorisation on directory entries
F.MANAGEMENT.4 Management of audit functionality
Reference Mediation
F.REF_MEDIATION Non-bypassability of the TSF
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003
B-6
Note: Only the titles of the SF and a short summary are provided here because
they are very granular and almost self-explanatory. Please refer for a precise
definition of the SF to the Security Target of the TOE ([5], chapter 6.1)
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of function is claimed SOF-basic for the password based
authentication function F.I&A.1 only.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
A summary of the threats defined in [5], chapter 3.2.1 is provided here. For the
precise description of the threats please refer to [5]:
T.ENTRY:
Unauthorised, malicious access to a resource/information protected by the
TOE.
T.ACCESS:
Unauthorised execution of operations.
T.ACCOUNT:
Security relevant actions occur without awareness by Directory
Administrators.
T.BYPASS:
Bypass of the TOE security functions.
Please note that T.ACCESS is not entirely averted by the TOE. Instead,
additional support from the TOE’s environment is needed. For information which
parts are averted by the TOE and which by the environment of the TOE, please
refer to [5], chapter 8.1 (Security Objective Rationale) and to chapter 4.3 of this
report.
The TOE has to comply to the following Organisational Security Policy (OSP).
P.PUBLIC:
Of the information under the control of the TOE, only information classified
as public information should be made available to unauthenticated or
anonymous users.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
According to the Security Target Directory Server can be run on
- Microsoft Windows 2000,
- IBM AIX 5.2,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003 Certification Report
B-7
- Sun Solaris 8,
- Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1, and
- SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8.
Please note that
- the underlying hardware and the operating system used by the Directory
Server,
- the Database used as back-end data store,
- the LDAP clients,
- the SSL module used for the protection of the path between the LDAP
clients and the server and between LDAP servers and
- the replication service between LDAP servers
are not part of the TOE. They are hence out of evaluation scope. Please refer
to [5], chapter 2.3 for more information.
No explicit restrictions on the usable hardware were made in the Security
Target [5]. For information on the hardware / OS platform used during
evaluation, please refer to chapter 7 of this report.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the
Security Target.
The following constraints are based on the assumptions defined in [5], chapter
3.1. The are reproduced here:
A.PHYSICAL
The TOE is operated in a physically secure environment.
A.NOEVIL
The TOE and TOE Environment Administrators are trustworthy to perform
discretionary actions in accordance with security policies and not to
interfere with the abstract machine.
A.ADMIN
The TOE and TOE environment are competently installed and
administered.
A.COMM
It is assumed that a communication link exists from the TOE to LDAP
clients on external systems, and that any communication links between
the TOE and external systems are protected against unauthorised
modification and disclosure of communication data.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003
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A.COOP
Authorised end users are trusted and expected to act in a co-operating
manner in a benign environment.
A.TIME
It is assumed that a reliable time is provided by the TOE environment.
1.7 Disclaimers
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. The rating of the strength of functions does not include
cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4,
Para. 3, Clause 2). This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by
the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product
by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003 Certification Report
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation is called:
IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01
The IBM Directory Server is a software product only, delivered over the Internet
as a package including
Component TOE / Not TOE
The LDAP server daemon executable and
Administration daemon executable.
TOE
User and administrative tools (like the IBM Directory
Server Client SDK 5.1 or the Web Administration
Tool).
Not TOE.
A WebSphere HTTP server. Not TOE
A IBM DB2 database. Not TOE
Note: Although delivered together with the TOE, the user and administrator
tools, the HTTP server and the DB2 database are all excluded from the TOE
and are considered part of the environment. The TOE are the the LDAP server
and the administration daemon executables only.
The TOE environment can also include applications that are not delivered with
the IBM Directory Server, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the
Netscape browser needed to administrate the TOE or the Adobe Acrobat
Reader to access the supplied online documentation.
The TOE can be subdivided into two major components:
- The LDAP Server executable
- and the LDAP Server Administration Daemon executable.
The LDAP server may be partitioned again into two parts: the Front -end and
the Back-end. The Front-end is the network interface to LDAP clients and the
Back-end is the interface to a DB2 database. The Administration Daemon
provides an LDAP interface to clients, used for the administration of the LDAP
server. For more details refer to chapter 5.
A set of Guidance documents is provided with the TOE (for a list please refer to
chapter 6). To install and configure the TOE in an evaluation conformant way
the user has to follow the guidance documentation provided in [14], [10], [11],
[12], [13] and [9]. The Security Guide [9] provides guidance on how to configure
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. For the secure operation of the
TOE [8] is required.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003
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3 Security Policy
The TOE is an implementation of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP). Its main purpose is to provide identification and authentication, access
control and audit functionality. This is supplemented by management and non-
bypassability.
Therefore the Security Policy of the TOE is defined by the following TOE
security functional requirements:
- All SFR components being part of the CC class FIA (like FIA_SOS.1
defining the password policy constraints).
- FDP_ACC.2 and FDP_ACF.1 defining the Directory Access Control
SFP, a Security Policy that controls access to directory entries
protected by the TOE.
A detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the TOE is
given in the Security Target [5], chapter 5.1.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003 Certification Report
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the Organisational Security Policy to which the TOE complies the
following usage assumption arise (for the detailed and precise definition refer to
[5], chapter 3.3):
- Of the information under the control of the TOE, only information
classified as public information should be made available to
unauthenticated or anonymous users (P.PUBLIC).
Based on personnel assumptions defined in [5] the following usage conditions
exist:
- The Administrators of the TOE and its environment are trustworthy to
perform discretionary actions in accordance with security policies and
not to interfere with the abstract machine (A.NOEVIL).
- The TOE and its environment are competently installed and
administered (A.ADMIN).
- Authorised users are expected to act in a co-operating manner in a
benign environment (A.COOP).
For a detailed description of the usage assumptions refer to the Security Target
[5], especially chapter 3.2.1 and 4.2.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [5], chapter 3.2.1
and 4.2):
- The TOE is operated in a physically secure environment
(A.PHYSICAL).
- Communication links (between TOE and LDAP clients on external
systems, and between the TOE and external systems) are protected
against modification and disclosure of transmitted data (A.COM).
- A reliable time is provided by the environment (A.TIME).
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 8 of this report.
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4.3 Clarification of scope
The threats listed below are not averted by the TOE. Additional support from the
operating environment of the TOE is necessary (for detailed information about
the threats and how the environment cover them refer to the Security Target [5],
especially chapter 3.2.2 and chapter 8.1).
TE.USAGE:
The TOE may be configured, used and administered in an insecure
manner, allowing an illegitimate user gaining access to resources or
information protected by the TOE.
TE.CRASH:
Human error or a failure of software, hardware, power supply, or an
accidental event may cause an abrupt interruption to the TOE operation,
resulting in loss or corruption of data.
TE.SOPHISTICATED:
An unauthorised individual may gain access to TOE resources or
information by using sophisticated technical attack, using IT security-
defeating tools applied to the TOE or the underlying system components.
TE.PASS:
An attacker may bypass the TOE to access resources or resources
protected by the TOE by attacking the underlying operating system or
database, in order to gain access to TOE resources and information.
Please note that T.ACCESS is directed to the TOE but partially has to be
addressed by the TOE environment as well (refer to chapter 1.4 for details on
T.ACCESS).
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003 Certification Report
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5 Architectural Information
General overview
The target of evaluation is the IBM Directory Server Version 5.1 FixPak510-01.
IBM Directory Server version 5.1 is an implementation of the Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), which is compliant with the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) LDAP Version 2 specifications, i.e. RFC 1777
and Version 3 specifications, i.e. RFC 2251 - 2256.
The server is a software only product and can be installed and operated on
variety of hardware/software platforms (refer to chapter 1.5).
LDAP essentially provides access to and management of a specialised
database where the update operation is less frequent and dedicated to the
common goal within the enterprise on consolidating and unifying the
management of identity.
IBM Directory Server is built for identity management with role support, fine-
grained access control and entry ownership. It provides the foundation for
improved security, rapid development and deployment of Web applications.
The IBM DB2 Universal Database is used as back end data store to provide
high performance, reliability and stability in an enterprise or e-business.
The IBM Directory Server (IDS) Version 5.1 is a software product only,
delivered over the Internet as a package including the TOE, user and
administrative tools, a WebSphere HTTP server, and a DB2 database. The user
and administrator tools, the HTTP server and the DB2 database are all
excluded from the TOE and are considered part of the environment.
The TOE environment can also include applications that are not delivered with
the IDS product, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the Netscape
browser needed to administrate the TOE or the Adobe Acrobat Reader to
access the supplied online documentation.
Major structural units of the TOE
The TOE is the LDAP Server and the Administration Daemon as part of the
product IBM Directory Server.
User clients are connecting both to the LDAP server and to the administration
daemon, using the LDAP protocol, but using different port numbers. The LDAP
server component is providing the LDAP functionality to users and
administrators, while the administration daemon is only used by the
administrator for starting, stopping and querying the status of the TOE.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003
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The following figure provides a more detailed overview of the TOE:
TOE functionality
Identification and authentication
Identification and authentication are used to determine the identity of the
LDAP clients; that is, verifying that users are who they say they are. A user
name and password is a basic authentication scheme. This user identity is
used for determining access rights and for user accountability. The
administrator can manage users, set passwords for users, and place
restrictions on user-selected passwords by specifying rules in the
password policy managed by the administrator.
Access control
After users are authenticated, it must be determined whether they have
authorisation or permission to perform the requested operation on the
specific object. Authorisation is often based on access control lists (ACLs).
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003 Certification Report
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An ACL is a list of authorisations that can be attached to objects and
attributes in the directory. An ACL lists what type of access each user or a
group of users is allowed or denied. To make ACLs shorter and more
manageable, users with the same access rights are often put into groups.
The directory administrator can manage access control by specifying the
access rights to objects for individual users or groups.
Auditing
The IBM Directory Server can perform auditing of security-relevant events,
such as user authentication and modification to the directory tree. The
audit function provides a means for accountability by generating audit
records containing the time, user identity, and additional information about
the operation. The behaviour of the audit function, such as selection of
auditable events, as well as audit review and clearing of audit files, is
managed by the directory administrator.
Management
The IBM Directory Server is supporting the roles of Directory Administrator
and End User, allowing the Directory Administrator to manage the
functions for identification and authentication, authorisation and audit. The
Directory Administrator can also manage the users and user attributes.
Reference mediation
The IBM Directory Server is designed that all security policy enforcement
functions are invoked and must succeed before any function is allowed to
proceed. This means that any request for access to a directory entry is
checked for access according to the rules defined before access is
granted.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer:
[7] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1 README Addendum, Second Edition
(December 2002).
[8] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Administration Guide, First Edition
(November 2002).
[9] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Common Criteria Compliant
Configuration Security Guide, Version 0.9
[10] FixPak FP510A-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 AIX (April
2003).
[11] FixPak FP510L-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 Linux i386
(April 2003).
[12] FixPak FP510S-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 Solaris OS
(April 2003).
[13] FixPak FP510W-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 Windows®
OS (April 2003).
[14] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Installation Guide and Configuration,
First Edition (November 2002).
[15] IBM Directory Server 5.1, Server Plug-ins Reference, First Edition
(November 2002).
[16] C-Client SDK Programming Reference, First Edition (November 2002).
[17] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, QuickStart, First Edition (November
2002).
[18] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Performance Tuning Guide, Second
Edition (December, 2002)
BSI-DSZ-CC-0207-2003 Certification Report
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7 IT Product Testing
Test Schedule
Developer testing was performed from March 3 to March 14, 2003 at IBM in
Austin, Texas. Evaluator testing was performed in May 2003 at IBM in Munich,
on an AIX 5.2 system, and at the evaluation facility site in Munich, on Microsoft
Windows 2000, SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8, Red Hat Advanced Server and
Solaris 8.
Test configuration
The test have been performed on the following platforms:
- Operating System: Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows 2000 Fix pack 3
Hardware: IBM Thinkpad 600 E
- Operating System: SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8
Hardware: IBM Thinkpad 600 E
- Operating System: Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1
Hardware: IBM Thinkpad 600 E
- Operating System: IBM AIX 5.2.0.0
Hardware: RS 6000 Model 7044-270 (p-Series)
- Operating System: SUN Solaris Version 8.0
Hardware: SUN Sparc Ultra 5
Depth/Coverage of Testing
Although not required by the chosen evaluation assurance level 2 the developer
did already testing on the level of the high-level design. According to the
evaluation findings complete testing coverage was achieved for all the TOE
security functions, with the developer tests and the additional tests performed
by the independent evaluator testing.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
Test configuration:
All the tests have been performed on the configuration defined above.
Testing approach:
The developer provided evidence that the functionality of the TOE was tested
exhaustively. The developer divided the testing effort needed for the TOE into
several test areas representing groups of similar functionality. Each test area
comprised several function tests that probe for the behaviour of the functions to
be tested. For each single test case, the developer provided sufficient
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information on the setup of the test environment and on the instructions needed
to actually run the test.
Testing results:
The developer testing was performed successfully by the developer on all
tested platforms comprising the evaluated configuration of the TOE. The actual
test results were made available to the evaluator for inspection during an on-site
introduction to the developer’s development and testing facility.
Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration
The evaluator performed his tests mainly at the atsec evaluation facility in
Munich. All the evaluator tests on AIX 5.2 were performed by the evaluator on a
p610 system located at the developer’s site in Munich, where the developer
provided a machine for testing purposes.
The rerun of developer tests, with respect to the AIX5.2 platform were carried
out at the IBM facility in Munich. All other tests regarding the remaining
platforms of the evaluated configuration were performed at the atsec evaluation
facility using the configurations listed above.
Testing approach:
The evaluator testing effort consists of two parts: The first one is the rerun of
developer test cases and the second is the execution of the tests created by the
evaluator.
- Sample of developer tests:
The evaluator successfully performed all sampled developer tests on all
platforms that are part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE. The actual
test results achieved by the evaluator matched the expected results.
- Evaluator tests:
Although complete coverage on all platforms was not intended, the evaluator
performed almost all of the evaluator tests on all platforms. The security
functionality of the TOE behaved as expected.
Evaluator penetration testing:
Penetration tests have been performed by the evaluation lab to assess possible
vulnerabilities found during the evaluation of the different CC assurance
classes.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 (also
named IDS in short).
The IBM Directory Server is a software product only, delivered over the Internet
as a package including
- the TOE (the LDAP server and the administration daemon executables),
- user and administrative tools (like IBM Directory Server Client SDK 5.1 or
the Web Administration Tool),
- a WebSphere HTTP server,
- and an IBM DB2 database.
Note: Although delivered together with the TOE, the user and administrator
tools, the HTTP server and the DB2 database are all excluded from the TOE
and are considered part of the environment. The TOE are the LDAP server
and the administration daemon executables only.
The TOE environment can also include applications that are not delivered with
the IBM Directory Server, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the
Netscape browser needed to administrate the TOE or the Adobe Acrobat
Reader to access the supplied online documentation.
The TOE can be run on the following Operating Systems:
- Microsoft Windows 2000,
- IBM AIX 5.2,
- Sun Solaris 8,
- Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1, and
- SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 8.
Please note that
- the underlying hardware and the operating system used by the Directory
Server,
- the Database used as back-end data store,
- the LDAP clients,
- the SSL module used for the protection of the path between the LDAP
clients and the server and between LDAP servers and
- the replication service between LDAP servers
are not part of the TOE. They are hence out of evaluation scope. Please refer
to [5], chapter 2.3 for more information.
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No restriction on the usable hardware was made in the Security Target [5]. For
information on the hardware / OS platform used during evaluation, please refer
to chapter 7 of this report.
The Administrators of the TOE and its environment are seen as trustworthy to
perform discretionary actions in accordance with security policies. The TOE and
its environment is competently installed and administered. Authorised users are
expected to act in a co-operating manner in a benign environment.
The TOE is operated in a physically secure environment. Communication links
(between TOE and LDAP clients on external systems, and between the TOE
and external systems) are protected against modification and disclosure of
transmitted data. A reliable time is provided by the TOE environment.
For setting up / configuring the TOE all guidance documents have to be
followed (refer to chapter 6 of this report).
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Common Evaluation Methodology [2],
the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the
Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL2 and
the Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table:
Assurance Classes and Components Verdict
Security Target CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Configuration items ACM_CAP.2 PASS
Delivery and Operation CC Class ADO PASS
Delivery Procedures ADO_DEL.1 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC class ADV PASS
Informal functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Descriptive high-level design ADV_HLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Developer vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.1 PASS
The evaluation has shown that the TOE fulfils the claimed strength of function
(SOF-basic) for the authentication function using passwords.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the product IBM Directory
Server 5.1 FixPak510-01 in the configuration as defined in the Security Target
and summarised in this report (refer to the Security Target [5] and the chapters
2, 4 and 8 of this report). The validity can be extended to new versions and
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releases of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the
modified product, and if the evaluation of the modified product does not reveal
any security deficiencies.
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10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation (refer to chapter 6) contains necessary
information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage
of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the
Security Target [5] and the Security Target as a whole has to be taken into
account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance in these
documents.
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11 Annexes
None.
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [5] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TP TSF Protection
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
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Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE
[5] IBM Directory Server 5.1 FixPak 510-01 Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-
0207, Version 1.2, IBM Corporation, 2003-05-07
[6] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0207, Version 1.5, atsec
information security GmbH, 2003-07-18 (confidential document)
User Guidance Documentation:
[7] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1 README Addendum, Second Edition
(December 2002).
[8] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Administration Guide, First Edition
(November 2002).
[9] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Common Criteria Compliant
Configuration Security Guide, Version 0.9
[10] FixPak FP510A-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 AIX (April
2003).
[11] FixPak FP510L-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 Linux i386
(April 2003).
[12] FixPak FP510S-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 Solaris OS
(April 2003).
[13] FixPak FP510W-01 README for IBM Directory Server 5.1 Windows®
OS (April 2003).
[14] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Installation Guide and Configuration,
First Edition (November 2002).
[15] IBM Directory Server 5.1, Server Plug-ins Reference, First Edition
(November 2002).
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[16] C-Client SDK Programming Reference, First Edition (November 2002).
[17] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, QuickStart, First Edition (November
2002).
[18] IBM Directory Server Version 5.1, Performance Tuning Guide, Second
Edition (December, 2002)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“