National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11323-2023
Dated: April 20, 2023
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Daniel Faigin
Fernando Guzman
Meredith Martinez
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Leidos
Columbia, MD
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary...................................................................................................................1
2 Identification..............................................................................................................................6
2.1 Threats...............................................................................................................................6
2.2 Organizational Security Policies.......................................................................................7
3 Architectural Information ..........................................................................................................8
4 Assumptions.............................................................................................................................12
4.1 Clarification of Scope .....................................................................................................12
5 Security Policy.........................................................................................................................13
5.1 Security Audit.................................................................................................................13
5.2 User Data Protection.......................................................................................................13
5.3 Identification and Authentication ...................................................................................13
5.4 Security Management .....................................................................................................13
5.5 Protection of the TSF......................................................................................................14
5.6 TOE Access ....................................................................................................................14
6 Documentation.........................................................................................................................15
7 Independent Testing.................................................................................................................16
7.1 Evaluation team independent testing ..............................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration ..........................................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation .........................................................................................................18
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)........................................................................18
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)..........................................................................19
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) .............................................................19
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC).................................................19
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) .............................20
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN).....................................................................20
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................................22
11 Annexes....................................................................................................................................23
12 Security Target.........................................................................................................................24
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................................25
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................27
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
iv
List of Figures
Figure 1: Simplified block diagram of a 2-Port KVM TOE......................................................... 10
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
v
List of Tables
Table 1: Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC TOE Models .......................................... 3
Table 2: Evaluation Details............................................................................................................. 4
Table 3: Raritan Secure KVM Switch Console Interfaces and TOE Models................................. 8
Table 4: Raritan Secure KVM Switch Computer Interfaces and TOE Models.............................. 9
Table 5: TOE Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................... 18
Table 6: Security Target Identification......................................................................................... 24
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
1
1 Executive Summary
This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification agent
for that end-user to determine the suitability of this Information Technology (IT) product in
their environment. End-users should review the Security Target (ST) [5]1, (which is where
specific security claims are made) as well as this Validation Report (VR) (which describes how
those security claims were evaluated, tested, and any restrictions that may be imposed upon
the evaluated configuration) to help in that determination. Prospective users should carefully
read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in section 4 and the Validator Comments in
section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of
the evaluation of the Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC of peripheral sharing switches.
It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is
not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the U.S. Government
and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific
version and configuration of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST.
The evaluation of the Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC peripheral sharing switches
was performed by Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, in
the United States and was completed in April 2023. The evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), version 3.1, revision 5 [4] and the assurance activities specified in the
PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio Output Devices,
Keyboard/MouseDevices, User Authentication Devices, and Video/Display Devices, 19 July 2019
including the following components:
• Base-PP: Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0
o including the following optional and selection-based SFRs: FAU_GEN.1,
FDP_RIP_EXT.2, FDP_SWI_EXT.2, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FMT_MOF.1,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_STM.1, and FTA_CIN_EXT.1.
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019
o including the following optional and selection-based SFRs: FDP_FIL_EXT.1/KM,
FDP_RIP.1/KM, and FDP_SWI_EXT.3.
• PP-Module: PP-Module for User Authentication Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019
1
See section 14 Bibliography.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
2
o including the following selection-based SFRs: FDP_TER_EXT.2 and
FDP_TER_EXT.3.
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019
o including the following selection-based SFRs: FDP_CDS_EXT.1, FDP_IPC_EXT.1,
FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DP(DP), FDP_SPR_EXT.1/DVI-I(D), and FDP_SPR_EXT.1/HDMI(H).
The following NIAP Technical Decisions are applicable to the claimed Protection Profile and
Modules:
• TD0686 – DisplayPort CEC Testing
• TD0681 – PSD purging of EDID data upon disconnect
• TD0620 – EDID Read Requirements
• TD0619 – Test EAs internal UA devices
• TD0593 – Equivalency Arguments for PSD
• TD0586 – DisplayPort and HDMI Interfaces in FDP_IPC_EXT.1
• TD0585 – Update to FDP_APC_EXT.1 Audio Output Tests
• TD0584 – Update to FDP APC_EXT.1 Video Tests
• TD0583 – FPT_PHP.3 modified for PSD remote controllers
• TD0557 – Correction to Audio Filtration Specification Table in FDP_AFL_EXT.1
• TD0539 – Incorrect Selection Trigger in FTA_CIN_EXT.1 in MOD_VI_V1.0
o The TOE does not fit the Combiner Use Case and so the specific assignment
required by the VI Module does not apply.
• TD0518 – Typographical Error in Dependency Table
• TD0514 – Correction to MOD_VI FDP_APC_EXT.1 Test 3 Step 6
• TD0507 – Clarification on USB Plug Type
• TD0506 – Missing Steps to Disconnect and Reconnect Display
The Leidos evaluation team determined that the Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC of
peripheral sharing switches is conformant to the claimed Protection Profile (PP) and, when
installed, configured, and operated as specified in the evaluated guidance documentation,
satisfied all the security functional requirements stated in the ST. The information in this VR is
largely derived from the publicly available Assurance Activities Report (AAR) Error! Reference
source not found. and the associated proprietary test report Error! Reference source not
found. produced by the Leidos evaluation team.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
3
The Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC products allow for the connection of a mouse,
keyboard, user authentication device (such as smart card or CAC reader), speaker, and one or
two video displays (depending on specific device type) to the Secure KVM Switch, which is then
connected to 2, up to 4, or up to 8 separate computers (again depending on specific device
type). The user can then switch the connected peripherals between any of the connected
computers using a push button on the front of the device or on the RPS. The selected device is
always identifiable by a bright orange LED associated with the applicable selection button. The
user can switch the peripherals between any of the connected computers while preventing
unauthorized data flows or leakage between computers.
The TOE is the following models of the Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC. The
firmware version for all models is v1.1.101.
Table 1: Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC TOE Models
Configuration (with CAC function) 2-Port 4-Port 8-Port
DisplayPort
Single Head RSS4-102-DP RSS4-104-DP RSS4-108-DP
Dual Head RSS4-102-DUAL-DP RSS4-104-DUAL-DP RSS4-108-DUAL-DP
HDMI
Single Head RSS4-102 RSS4-104 N/A
Dual Head RSS4-102-DUAL RSS4-104-DUAL N/A
The Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC implement a secure isolation design for all
models to share a single set of peripheral components. Each peripheral has its own dedicated
data path. USB keyboard and mouse peripherals are filtered and emulated. The USB
authentication device connection is on a separate circuit from the keyboard and mouse and,
after filtering for qualification, has a direct connection path to the selected computer. The TOE
does not emulate the user authentication device function. DisplayPort video from the selected
computer is converted internally to HDMI, then back to DisplayPort for communication with the
connected video display and the AUX channel is monitored and converted to EDID.
The Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC are designed to enforce the allowed and
disallowed data flows between user peripheral devices and connected computers as specified
in [PSD]. Data leakage is prevented across the TOE to avoid compromise of the user's
information. The Secure KVM Switch products automatically clear the internal TOE keyboard
and mouse buffers.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation
evidence, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the
evaluation results produced by the evaluation team. The validation team found that the
evaluation results showed that all assurance activities specified in the claimed PP had been
completed successfully and that the product satisfied all the security functional and assurance
requirements as stated in the ST.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
4
Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the
conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The products, when configured as specified in the guidance documentation, satisfy all the
security functional requirements stated in the Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
Security Target.
Table 2: Evaluation Details
Item Identifier
Evaluated Product Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC devices identified in Table 1
Sponsor & Developer Legrand DPC LLC d.b.a Raritan
400 Cottontail Lane, Somerset, NJ 08873, U.S.A
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Completion Date April 2023
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017
Interpretations There were no applicable interpretations used for this evaluation.
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
PP PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio Output Devices,
Keyboard/MouseDevices, User Authentication Devices, and Video/Display
Devices, 19 July 2019 including the following components:
Base-PP: Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version
1.0, 19 July 2019
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, 19
July 2019
• PP-Module: PP-Module for User Authentication Devices, Version 1.0,
19 July 2019
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, 19
July 2019
Disclaimer The information contained in this Validation Report is not an endorsement of
the Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC by any agency of the U.S.
Government and no warranty of Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
is either expressed or implied.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
5
Item Identifier
Evaluation Personnel Justin Fisher
Greg Beaver
Allen Sant
Josh Marciante
Armin Najafabadi
Validation Personnel Daniel Faigin
Fernando Guzman
Meredith Martinez
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
6
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) in accordance with National
Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Product Compliant List
(PCL) (https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Product/).
The following table identifies the evaluated Security Target and TOE.
Name Description
ST Title Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC Security Target
ST Version V1.1
Publication Date April 10, 2023
Vendor and ST Author Raritan
TOE Reference Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC identified in Table 1
TOE Software Version Firmware version v1.1.101
Keywords KVM Switch, Peripheral Sharing Switch
2.1 Threats
The ST identifies the following threats that the TOE and its operational environment are
intended to counter the following threats.
• A connection via the PSD between one or more computers may allow
unauthorized data flow through the PSD or its connected peripherals.
• A connection via the PSD between one or more computers may allow
unauthorized data flow through bit‐by‐bit signaling.
• A PSD may leak (partial, residual, or echo) user data between the intended connected
computer and another unintended connected computer.
• A PSD may connect the user to a computer other than the one to which the user
intended to connect.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
7
• The use of an unauthorized peripheral device with a specific PSD peripheral port
may allow unauthorized data flows between connected devices or enable an attack on
the PSD or its connected computers.
• An attached device (computer or peripheral) with malware, or otherwise under
the control of a malicious user, could modify or overwrite code or data stored in the
PSD’s volatile or non‐volatile memory to allow unauthorized information flows.
• A malicious user or human agent could physically modify the PSD to allow unauthorized
information flows.
• A malicious human agent could replace the PSD during shipping, storage, or use with
an alternate device that does not enforce the PSD security policies.
• Detectable failure of a PSD may cause an unauthorized information flow or weakening
of PSD security functions.
• A malicious agent could use an unauthorized peripheral device such as a microphone,
connected to the TOE audio out peripheral device interface to eavesdrop or transfer
data across an air‐gap through audio signaling.
• A malicious agent could repurpose an authorized audio output peripheral device by
converting it to a low‐gain microphone to eavesdrop on the surrounding audio or
transfer data across an air‐gap through audio signaling.
2.2 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies for the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing
Device [5].
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
8
3 Architectural Information
The Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC series are KVM switches with the following
characteristics:
• 2/4/8 port USB DisplayPort single and dual display for DisplayPort (6 devices)
• 2/4 port USB HDMI single and dual display for HDMI (4 devices)
The Secure KVM Switch products allow for the connection of a mouse, keyboard, user
authentication device (such as smart card or CAC reader), speaker, and one or two video
displays (depending on specific device type) to the Secure KVM Switch, which is then connected
to 2, up to 4, or up to 8 separate computers (again depending on specific device type). The user
can then switch the connected peripherals between any of the connected computers using a
push button on the front of the device or on the RPS. The selected device is always identifiable
by a bright orange LED associated with the applicable selection button.
To interface with connected computers, the Secure KVM Switch products support analog audio
output and USB connections for the keyboard, mouse, and user authentication device.
Depending on model, they support DisplayPort or HDMI for the computer video display
interface. The switched peripherals on the console side are analog audio output, USB keyboard
and mouse, USB user authentication device, and DisplayPort or HDMI video output (depending
on model).
Separate USB cables are used to connect the keyboard/mouse combination and the user
authentication device to the connected computers. The Secure KVM Switch products
supporting DisplayPort convert the DisplayPort video signal to HDMI. The HDMI signal inside
the KVM will be converted again to DisplayPort signal for output to the connected video
display(s) and the AUX channel is monitored and converted to EDID. The Secure KVM Switch
products also support audio output connections from the computers to a connected audio
output device. Only speaker connections are supported, and the use of an analog microphone
or line-in audio device is prohibited. The tables below identify the interfaces of the Secure KVM
console and computer ports according to model number.
Table 3: Raritan Secure KVM Switch Console Interfaces and TOE Models
Console Video Output Console
Keyboard
Console
Mouse
Console Audio
output
Console CAC
Reader
DisplayPort HDMI USB 1.1/2.0 USB 1.1/2.0
Analog Audio
output
(Speaker)
USB
1.1/2.0
RSS4-102-DP • • • • •
RSS4-102-DUAL-DP • • • • •
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
9
Console Video Output Console
Keyboard
Console
Mouse
Console Audio
output
Console CAC
Reader
DisplayPort HDMI USB 1.1/2.0 USB 1.1/2.0
Analog Audio
output
(Speaker)
USB
1.1/2.0
RSS4-102 • • • • •
RSS4-102-DUAL • • • • •
RSS4-104-DP • • • • •
RSS4-104-DUAL-DP • • • • •
RSS4-104 • • • • •
RSS4-104-DUAL • • • • •
RSS4-108-DP • • • • •
RSS4-108-DUAL-DP • • • • •
Table 4: Raritan Secure KVM Switch Computer Interfaces and TOE Models
Computer Video Input
Interface
Console
Keyboard
Console
Mouse
Console Audio
output
Console CAC
Reader
DisplayPort HDMI USB 1.1/2.0 USB 1.1/2.0
Analog Audio
output
(Speaker)
USB
1.1/2.0
RSS4-102-DP • • • • •
RSS4-102-DUAL-DP • • • • •
RSS4-102 • • • • •
RSS4-102-DUAL • • • • •
RSS4-104-DP • • • • •
RSS4-104-DUAL-DP • • • • •
RSS4-104 • • • • •
RSS4-104-DUAL • • • • •
RSS4-108-DP • • • • •
RSS4-108-DUAL-DP • • • • •
The following figure shows the data path design using a 2-Port KVM as an example.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
10
Figure 1: Simplified block diagram of a 2-Port KVM TOE
As shown in Figure 1 above, the internal components of the KVM consist of switches,
emulators, USB host controllers, processors, and embedded with non-updateable firmware
v1.1.101. The internal hardware components are identified in Appendix A and include the
manufacturer and the part number. The data flow of USB keyboard/mouse is controlled by the
host controller for console HID keyboard and pointing devices. Details of the data flow
architecture are provided in the proprietary Secure KVM Isolation Document. All keyboard and
mouse connections are filtered first, and only authorized devices will be allowed. The TOE
emulates data from authorized USB keyboard and mouse to USB data for computer sources.
The TOEs proprietary design ensures there is no possibility of data leakage from a user’s
peripheral output device to the input device; ensures that no unauthorized data flows from the
monitor to a connected computer; and unidirectional buffers ensure that the audio data can
travel only from the selected computer to the audio device. There is no possibility of data
leakage between computers or from a peripheral device connected to a console port to a non-
selected computer. Each connected computer has its own independent Device Controller,
power circuit, and EEPROM. Additionally, keyboard and mouse are always switched together.
All Secure KVM Switch components, including the RPS, feature hardware security mechanisms
including tamper-evident labels, always active chassis-intrusion detection, and tamper-proof
hardware construction, while software security includes restricted USB connectivity (non-
Human Interface Devices (HIDs) are ignored when switching), an isolated channel per port that
makes it impossible for data to be communicated between computers, and automatic clearing
of the keyboard and mouse buffer.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
11
The Raritan Port Authentication Utility must be installed on a separate secure source computer
using an installation wizard. The utility supports Microsoft Windows 8 and higher. The Port
Authentication Utility computer connects to the TOE via USB connection to Computer Port 1.
The dedicated secure source computer must have its own monitor, keyboard, and mouse
connected for installation and operation.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
12
4 Assumptions
The ST identifies the following assumptions about the use of the product:
• Computers and peripheral devices connected to the PSD are not TEMPEST approved.
• The environment provides physical security commensurate with the value of the TOE
and the data it processes and contains.
• The environment includes no wireless peripheral devices.
• PSD Administrators and users are trusted to follow and apply all guidance in a trusted
manner.
• Personnel configuring the PSD and its operational environment follow the
applicable security configuration guidance.
• All PSD users are allowed to interact with all connected computers. It is not the role of
the PSD to prevent or otherwise control user access to connected computers.
Computers or their connected network shall have the required means to authenticate
the user and to control access to their various resources.
4.1 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the claimed PPs and performed by the evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific hardware products, and firmware versions
identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
product were not covered by this evaluation. Any additional non-security related
functional capabilities of the product, even those described in the ST, were not covered
by this evaluation.
4. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM [4]
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication, and resources.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
13
5 Security Policy
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC series devices enforce the following TOE security
functional policies as specified in the ST.
5.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records for the authorized administrator actions. Each audit record
records a standard set of information such as date and time of the event, type of event, and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event.
5.2 User Data Protection
The TOE controls and isolates information flowing between the peripheral device interfaces and
a computer interface. The peripheral devices supported include USB keyboard; USB mouse; USB
authentication device (CAC reader and smart card); audio output; and (depending on device
type) DisplayPort or HDMI video. Some TOE models accept DisplayPort signals at the computer
interface and internally convert the signals to HDMI signals and then convert back to
DisplayPort for output to the console interface.
The TOE authorizes peripheral device connections with the TOE console ports based on the
peripheral device type.
The TOE ensures that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon
the deallocation of the resource from a TOE computer interface immediately after the TOE
switches to another selected computer and on start-up of the TOE.
The TOE provides a Reset to Factory Default function allowing authenticated authorized
Administrators to remove all settings previously configured by the Administrator (such as USB
device Allowlist/Blocklist). Once the Reset to Factory Default function has been completed, the
Secure KVM will terminate the Administrator Logon mode, purge keyboard/mouse buffer, and
power cycle the Secure KVM automatically.
5.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE provides an identification and authentication function for the administrative user to
perform administrative functions such as configuring the user authentication device filtering
Allowlist and Blocklist. The authorized administrator must logon by providing a valid password.
5.4 Security Management
The TOE supports configurable device filtration (CDF). This function is restricted to the
authorized administrator and allows the TOE to be configured to accept or reject specific USB
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
14
devices using CDF Allowlist and Blocklist parameters. Additionally, the TOE provides security
management functions to configure the keyboard/mouse device filtration, Reset to Factory
Default and to change the administrator password.
5.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE runs a suite of self-tests during initial startup and after activating the reset button that
includes a test of the basic TOE hardware and firmware integrity; a test of the basic computer-
to-computer isolation; and a test of critical security functions (i.e., user control and anti-
tampering). The TOE provides users with the capability to verify the integrity of the TSF and the
TSF functionality.
The TOE resists physical attacks on the main TOE enclosure as well as the RPS enclosure for the
purpose of gaining access to the internal components or to damage the anti-tampering battery
by becoming permanently disabled. The TOE preserves a secure state by disabling the TOE
when there is a failure of the power on self-test, or a failure of the anti-tampering function.
The TOE provides unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the
TSF. The TSF provides the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF's
devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
5.6 TOE Access
The TOE displays a continuous visual indication of the computer to which the user is currently
connected, including on power up, and on reset.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
15
6 Documentation
The guidance documentation examined during the evaluation and delivered with the TOE is as
follows:
• Raritan Secure Switch Administrator Guide, Release 1.0, August 2022
• Raritan Secure Switch User Guide, Release 1.1, August 2022
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that which may be
available online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be
relied upon to configure or operate the device as evaluated. Consumers are encouraged to
download these listed guidance documents from the NIAP website.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
16
7 Independent Testing
7.1 Evaluation team independent testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information
contained in the following proprietary document:
• Raritan Secure KVM PSD PP 4.0 Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures, Version
1.2, April 18, 2023, Error! Reference source not found.
A non-proprietary summary of the test configuration, test tools, and tests performed may be
found in:
• Assurance Activities Report For Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC Version 1.2,
2023-04-18, Error! Reference source not found.
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE
security functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product claiming conformance to
Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device [5].
The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Assurance Activities specified in
Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, [5]. The Test Plan described how each test
activity was to be instantiated within the TOE test environment. The evaluation team executed
the tests specified in the Test Plan and documented the results in the team test report listed
above.
Independent testing took place at the Leidos facility in Columbia, Maryland from August 18,
2022, to April 14, 2023.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed,
and configured the TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test
Plan on equipment configured in the testing laboratory.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the
testing requirements for Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device [5] were fulfilled.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
17
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version of the TOE consists of the Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
devices identified in Table 1.
The TOE must be deployed as described in Section 4 Assumptions of this document and must
be configured in accordance with the documentation identified in Section 6.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
18
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation was conducted based upon the assurance activities specified in Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device [5] in conjunction with version 3.1 revision 5 of the CC and
the CEM ([1], [2], [3], and [4]). A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the
resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that the
evidence demonstrates the evaluation team performed the assurance activities in the claimed
PPs, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
The details of the evaluation are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) Error!
Reference source not found., which is controlled by the Leidos CCTL. The security assurance
requirements are listed in the following table.
Table 5: TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Requirement Class Requirement Component
Security Target (ASE) Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST Introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
Derived Security Requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV) Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance Documents (AGD) Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life Cycle Support (ALC) Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent Testing – Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the TOE that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
19
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
assurance activities specified in the claimed PP and PP-Modules related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
20
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the claimed PP and PP-Modules and recorded the results
in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
Searches of public domain sources for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE were conducted
periodically throughout the evaluation, most recently on April 11, 2023. During each search, no
known vulnerabilities were revealed.
Vulnerability searches were performed using the terms listed below for the rationale listed
below:
Search Term Search Type Rationale
aten Advanced: Vendor TOE vendor
belkin Advanced: Vendor Comparable vendor
black box Advanced: Vendor Comparable vendor
blackbox Advanced: Vendor Comparable vendor
iogear Advanced: Vendor Comparable vendor
ipgard Advanced: Vendor Comparable vendor
kvm Basic: Keyword General type
kvm switch Basic: Keyword TOE type
peripheral switch Basic: Keyword TOE type
raritan Advanced: Vendor Comparable vendor
smartavi Advanced: Vendor Comparable vendor (OEM)
tripplite Advanced: Vendor Comparable vendor
sekuryx Advanced: Vendor Comparable vendor
SICG8021A Basic: Keyword Raritan: System Controller Host Controller
SICG8022A Basic: Keyword Raritan: Host Controller Device Emulators
AT24C512 Basic: Keyword Raritan: System EEPROM ATMEL
EN29LV040A Basic: Keyword Raritan: System Flash EON
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
21
Search Term Search Type Rationale
BR24G02-3 Basic: Keyword Raritan: EDID Emulator ROHM
MX25L4006E Basic: Keyword Raritan: DP Video Controller Flash MXIC
ITE IT66354 Basic: Keyword Raritan: HDMI2.0 Switch
The search of public domain sources for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE did not reveal
any known vulnerabilities. More detail on the vulnerability assessment can be found in the
Assurance Activities Report For Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC Version 1.2,
2023-04-18, Error! Reference source not found., Section 7.8.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
22
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
All validator comments have been addressed in section 4 of this document.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
23
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
24
12 Security Target
Table 6: Security Target Identification
Name Description
ST Title Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC Security Target
ST Version v1.1
Publication Date April 10, 2023
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
25
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms
AAR Assurance Activity Report
CAC Common Access Card
CC Common Criteria
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCTL Common Criteria Test Lab
CDF Configurable Device Filtration
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
DP DisplayPort
DVI Digital Visual Interface
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HDMI High Definition Multimedia Interface
HID Human Interface Device
IT Information Technology
KVM Keyboard, Video and Mouse
LED Light-Emitting Diode
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program
PC Personal Computer
PCL Product Compliant List
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
USB Universal Serial Bus
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
26
VR Validation Report
VALIDATION REPORT
Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC
27
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[5] Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0, 19 July 2019
[6] Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC Security Target, Version 1.1, April 10,
2023
[7] Assurance Activities Report For Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC, Version
1.2, April 18, 2023
[8] Raritan Secure KVM PSD PP 4.0 Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures,
Version 1.2, April 18, 2023
[9] Evaluation Technical Report For Raritan Secure KVM Switch Series with CAC (Leidos
Proprietary) ETR, Version 1.2, April 18, 2023