1
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for
Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch (Non-CAC Models)
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11169-2021
Dated: September 3, 2021
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
John Butterworth
Jenn Dotson
Ted Farnsworth
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Chris Thorpe
MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Leidos
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary...................................................................................................................1
2 Identification..............................................................................................................................2
3 Architectural Information ..........................................................................................................4
4 Assumptions...............................................................................................................................5
4.1 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................................5
5 Security Policy...........................................................................................................................6
5.1 Keyboard and Mouse Subsystem......................................................................................6
5.2 TOE External Interfaces ...................................................................................................6
5.3 Audio Subsystem ..............................................................................................................6
5.4 Video Subsystem ..............................................................................................................6
5.5 TOE Administration and Security Management...............................................................7
5.6 User Control and Monitoring Security .............................................................................7
5.7 Tampering Protection........................................................................................................7
5.8 Self-Testing and Security Audit........................................................................................7
6 Documentation...........................................................................................................................9
7 Independent Testing.................................................................................................................10
7.1 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ...........................................................................10
7.2 Vulnerability Analysis ....................................................................................................10
8 Evaluated Configuration ..........................................................................................................12
9 Results of the Evaluation .........................................................................................................13
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................................14
11 Annexes....................................................................................................................................16
12 Security Target.........................................................................................................................17
13 Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................................18
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................19
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch (Non-CAC Models) Target of Evaluation (TOE).
It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This
Validation Report (VR) is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S.
Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to
the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and as documented in the ST.
The evaluation of the Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch (Non-CAC Models) was performed by
Leidos Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland and was completed
in September 2021. The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the
Common Criteria and Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 3.1,
revision 5, and the evaluation activities specified in the following materials:
• Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0, 19 July 2019 [PSD PP]
• PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 [AO Module]
• PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 [KM Module]
• PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019 [VI Module]
The evaluation was consistent with NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
(CCEVS) policies and practices as described on their web site (www.niap-ccevs.org).
The Leidos evaluation team determined that the Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch (Non-CAC
Models) is conformant to the PP-Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio
Output Devices, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices (CFG_PSD-AO-KM-
VI_V1.0), Version: 1.0, July 19, 2019 and, when installed, configured and operated as specified
in the evaluated guidance documentation, satisfied all of the security functional requirements
stated in the Security Target (ST). The information in this VR is largely derived from the
publicly available Assurance Activities Report (AAR) and the associated proprietary test report
produced by the Leidos evaluation team.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation
evidence, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the
evaluation results produced by the evaluation team. The validation team found that the
evaluation results showed that the product satisfies all the functional requirements and assurance
requirements stated in the ST. Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct.
The products, when configured as specified in the guidance documentation, satisfy all of the
security functional requirements stated in the Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch Security Target (Non-
CAC Models), Revision 1.06, August 20, 2021. The technical information included in this report
was obtained from the ST and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment
Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile (PP) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch (non-CAC Models) as defined in Section 3
ST Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch Security Target (non-CAC Models), Revision,
1.06, August 20, 2021
Sponsor & Developer Steven Barash
Sekuryx, Inc.
12437 Huston St
Valley Village, CA 91607
CCTL Leidos
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Completion Date September 3, 2021
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1, Revision 5, April 2015
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant
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Item Identifier
Protection Profile PP‐Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio Output
Devices, Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices, version 1.0, 19
July 2019, which includes the following PP and PP-Modules:
• Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0, 19 July
2019
• PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July
2019
• PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019
• PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, 19 July 2019
Evaluation Personnel Justin Fisher
Shreyansh Kansara
Madhav Nakar
Pascal Patin
Allen Sant
Furukh Siddique
Sindhu Veerabhadru
Validation Personnel John Butterworth
Jenn Dotson
Ted Farnsworth
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Chris Thorpe
Table 1: ST and TOE Details
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3 Architectural Information
The Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch (Non-CAC Models), collectively referred to as the TOE,
provide secure medium to share a single set or more of peripheral components such as keyboard,
video display and mouse/pointing devices among multiple computers over USB, analog audio,
and DisplayPort video.
The TOE utilizes multiple isolated microcontrollers to emulate the connected peripherals in order
to prevent a multitude of threats. The TOE is also equipped with numerous unidirectional data
flow forcing devices to guarantee isolation of connected computer data channels.
Sekuryx Secure KVM port models:
• 2-Port
• 4-Port
• 8-Port
Sekuryx Secure KVM video outputs (displays):
• Single head
• Dual head
The TOE is compatible with standard personal/portable computers, servers or thin clients.
Connected computers are assumed to run off-the-shelf general-purpose operating systems such
as Windows or Linux. All TOE models include ports for the following interfaces:
• USB keyboard
• USB mouse
• 3.5mm Audio Input (computer ports)
• 3.5mm Audio Output (peripheral port)
• DisplayPort 1.2 input
• DisplayPort 1.2 output
The TOE is a family of hardware appliances that consists of the following models:
Model Name Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
CK4-P102 2-Port SH Secure DP KVM w/audio 4.30.001
CK4-P202 2-Port DH Secure DP KVM w/audio 4.30.001
Table 2: Sekuryx 2-Port TOE Models Identification
Model Name Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
CK4-P104 4-Port SH Secure DP KVM w/audio 4.30.001
CK4-P204 4-Port DH Secure DP KVM w/audio 4.30.001
Table 3: Sekuryx 4-Port TOE Models Identification
Model Name Description and NIAP Certification Version Version
CK4-P108 8-Port SH Secure DP KVM w/ audio 4.30.001
CK4-P208 8-Port DH Secure DP KVM w/ audio 4.30.001
Table 4: Sekuryx 8-Port TOE Models Identification
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4 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found the Sekuryx Secure
KVM Switch Security Target (Non-CAC Models), Revision, 1.06, August 20, 2021. That
information has not been reproduced here and the ST should be consulted if there is interest in that
material.
4.1 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
1. As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance (in accordance with the
evaluation activities specified in the PP and PP-Modules associated with the claimed PP-
Configuration and performed by the evaluation team).
2. This evaluation covers only the specific hardware products, and firmware versions
identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
3. The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the in the PP and PP-Modules associated with the claimed PP-Configuration
and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional
capabilities of the product were not covered by this evaluation. Any additional non-
security related functional capabilities of the product, even those described in the ST,
were not covered by this evaluation.
4. This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
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5 Security Policy
The TOE implements the User Data Protection and Data Isolation security function policies of
the Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device. This PP defines a peripheral sharing device
as “a PSD is an IT product for connecting one or more peripheral devices to one or more
computers such that data cannot flow between computers by way of the peripherals or the PSD.
Examples of PSDs that can claim compliance to this PP include Keyboard, Video, Mouse
(KVM) switches; Keyboard, Mouse (KM) switches; and Isolators.” The TOE includes KVM
switches in its evaluation boundary.
5.1 Keyboard and Mouse Subsystem
The keyboard and mouse processor is programmed in firmware only to accept 108-key keyboard
and 3-button mouse USB devices. Unauthorized peripheral devices will be rejected by the TOE’s
keyboard and mouse ports. Wireless keyboard and mouse are special USB composite devices.
The only USB host peripheral devices that are allowed by the TOE are keyboard and mouse host
emulators. Basic USB 1.1/2.0 HID-class devices are authorized as valid endpoints by the TOE.
Both keyboard and mouse TOE ports are interchangeable. It is assumed based on the claimed PP
that all standard peripheral devices are untrusted; therefore, the TOE protects the system from
attacks that may be executed to exploit such devices and enable unauthorized data flows. By
creating uni-directional isolated keyboard and mouse TOE channels that are tied to the two USB
1.1/2.0 ports on the TOE, unauthorized data flows are eliminated.
5.2 TOE External Interfaces
The TOE only supports AC/DC power, USB keyboard and mouse, and DP 1.2 in/DP 1.2 out video.
5.3 Audio Subsystem
The use of microphones as input devices is prohibited. All TOE devices support analog audio out
switching and all TOE devices will prevent microphone devices. These microphones are stopped
through the use of uni-directional audio diodes on both left and right stereo channels (forces data
flow from only the computer to the connected audio device) and the LM4880 Boomer analog
output amplifier which enforces uni-directional audio data flow. All audio signals are filtered in
accordance with the Audio Filtration Specifications table defined in the PP-Module for Analog
Audio Output.
5.4 Video Subsystem
Each connected computer has its own TOE isolated channel with its own Extended Display
Identification Data (EDID) emulator and video input port. Data flows from the input video
source through its respective EDID emulator and out of the monitor display port. Each video
input interface is isolated from one another using different EDID ICs, power planes, ground
planes, and electronic components in each independent channel. Depending on the specific TOE
model, the following numbers and types of video inputs are supported:
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• 1x DVI-I in to DVI-I out
• 2x DVI-I in to DVI-I out
5.5 TOE Administration and Security Management
Each TOE is equipped with an Administration and Security Management Tool that can be
initiated by running an executable file on a computer with keyboard connected to the same
computer via the TOE. The tool requires the administrator or a user to be successfully identified
and authenticated by the TOE in order to gain access to any supported feature. Some features are
restricted to the Administrator role only, while other features can be performed by either the
Administrator or User role.
5.6 User Control and Monitoring Security
User monitoring and control of the TOE is performed through the TOE front panel push buttons.
These buttons are tied to the TOE system controller functionality. The TOE chassis has port
selection LEDs that correspond to the push buttons. When a given computer is selected, its
corresponding port selection LED is illuminated (the other channel LEDs remain off). During
operation, all front panel LED indications cannot be turned off or dimmed by the user in any
way, including after Restore Factory Default (reset).
All features of the TOE front panel are tested during power up self-testing. From power up until
the termination of the TOE self-test, no channel is selected.
5.7 Tampering Protection
In order to mitigate potential tampering and replacement, the TOE is devised to ensure that any
replacement may be detected, any physical modification is evident, and any logical modification
may be prevented. The TOE is designed so that access to the TOE firmware, software, or its
memory via its accessible ports is prevented. The TOE is designed to prevent any physical or
logical access its internal memory. There is a mechanical switch on the inside of the TOE that
triggers the anti-tampering state when the enclosure is manually opened. Once the anti-tampering
state is triggered, the TOE is permanently disabled.
5.8 Self-Testing and Security Audit
The TOE has a self-testing function that executes immediately after power is supplied including
Restore Factory Default (reset) and power reset. Self-testing must complete successfully before
normal operational access is granted to the TSF. The self-test function includes the following
activities:
• Basic integrity test of the TOE hardware (no front panel push buttons are jammed).
• Basic integrity test of the TOE firmware.
• Integrity test of the anti-tampering system and control function.
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• Test the data traffic isolation between ports.
The TOE has a non-volatile memory event log which records all abnormal security events that
occur within TOE operation. This log can be accessed by the identified and authorized
administrator and dumped into a .txt file using a connected computer and the Administration and
Security Management tool that is provided by the TOE vendor.
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6 Documentation
The guidance documentation examined during the course of the evaluation and delivered with the
TOE is as follows:
• User Manual Sekuryx Secure DP KVM Switch with CAC Port and 4K Ultra-HD Support,
Revision 1.0, July 21, 2021
Note that the manual includes information on both CAC and non-CAC models; the TOE only
includes the non-CAC models (the CAC models were evaluated separately).
• Sekuryx Secure KVM Administration and Security Management Tool Guide (Non-CAC),
Version 1.0, April 6, 2021
The above documents are considered to be part of the evaluated TOE. The documentation is
delivered with the product and is also available by download from:
https://sekuryx.com/documentation/NIAP4.
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the TOE or made available through
electronic downloads should not be relied upon for using the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
The Security Target used is:
• Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch Security Target (Non-CAC Models), Version 1.06, August
20, 2021
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7 Independent Testing
7.1 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the evaluation team. It is derived from information
contained in the following proprietary documents:
• Sekuryx PSD PP 4.0 Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.2,
September 1, 2021
A non-proprietary summary of the test configuration, test tools, and tests performed may be
found in:
o Assurance Activities Report for Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch (Non-CAC Models),
Version 1.1, September 1, 2021
The purpose of the testing activity was to confirm the TOE behaves in accordance with the TOE
security functional requirements as specified in the ST for a product claiming conformance to the
PP-Configuration for Peripheral Sharing Device, Analog Audio Output Devices,
Keyboard/Mouse Devices, and Video/Display Devices, version 1.0, July 19, 2019, which consists
of [PSD PP], [AO Module], [KM Module], and [VI Module].
The evaluation team devised a Test Plan based on the Testing Evaluation Activities specified in
the materials referenced above. The Test Plan described how each test activity was to be
instantiated within the TOE test environment. The evaluation team executed the tests specified in
the Test Plan and documented the results in the team test report listed above.
Independent testing took place at the Leidos facility in Columbia, Maryland from January 11,
2021 to August 6, 2021. Additional supplemental evidence was collected between August 18 and
September 1, 2021.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed
and configured the TOE in accordance with the provided guidance, and exercised the Team Test
Plan on equipment configured in the testing laboratory.
Given the complete set of test results from the test procedures exercised by the evaluators, the
testing requirements for the claimed security functionality were fulfilled.
7.2 Vulnerability Analysis
A search of public domain sources for potential vulnerabilities in the TOE was conducted in May
2021, repeated in June, and a final search was performed on 20 August 2021 which did not
reveal any known vulnerabilities. The vulnerability analysis is documented in the Vulnerability
Survey documented by the evaluation team. The evaluation team searched the National
Vulnerability Database (https://nvd.nist.gov/) for vulnerabilities related to the TOE series and
used NVD’s Basic and Advanced search features (https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search). The terms
used for the search were as follows:
• Aten
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• Belkin
• black box, blackbox
• logear
• Ipgard
• Kvm, kvm switch, peripheral switch
• Raritan
• smartavi
• tripplite
• Sekuryx
The evaluator conducted penetration testing based on the threat model defined in the claimed PP-
Configuration which consists of [PSD PP], [AO Module], [KM Module], [UA Module], and [VI
Module]. The testing did not exploit any vulnerability.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version of the TOE consists of the Sekuryx Secure KVM Peripheral Sharing
Devices identified in Tables 2 through 4.
The TOE must be deployed as described in section 4 Assumptions of this document and be
configured in accordance with the documentation identified in Section 6. The figure below
identifies a sample evaluated configuration for a 4-port model. The only differences between the
TOE models are:
• The maximum number of computers that can be connected to the TOE (2, 4, 8)
• The number of input video ports (1, 2)
• The number of output video ports (1, 2)
Figure 1: Setup of 4-Port TOE Installation
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation was conducted based upon the evaluation activities specified in the following
materials:
• Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0, July 19, 2019
• PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
• PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
• PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
These evaluation activities were performed in conjunction with version 3.1, revision 5 of the CC
and the CEM, and all applicable NIAP Technical Decisions, scheme policies, scheme
publications, and official responses to Technical Queries. A verdict for an assurance component
is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the evaluation activities in the claimed PPs, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
The details of the evaluation are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), which is
controlled by the Leidos CCTL. The security assurance requirements are listed in the following
table.
Assurance Component ID Assurance Component Name
ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational User Guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative Procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM Coverage
ATE_IND.1 Independent Testing – Sample
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability Survey
Table 4: TOE Security Assurance Requirements
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators suggest that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated configuration
of the device(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality implemented by the
requirements within the Security Target was evaluated.
Consumers employing the devices must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated configuration
is established and maintained.
This product does not use encryption. Therefore, a certificate review and entropy analysis were
not required for this evaluation.
NIAP established a Peripheral Sharing Switch Technical Rapid Response Team (PSS-TRRT) to
address questions and concerns related to evaluations claiming conformance to Protection
Profile for Peripheral Sharing Switch. A Technical Decision is an issue resolution statement that
clarifies or interprets protection profile requirements and evaluation activities. PSS-TRRT has
formally posted ten Technical Decisions related to the claimed PP and PP-Modules: TD0506,
TD0507, TD0514, TD0518, TD0539, TD0557, TD0583, TD0584, TD0585, TD0586, and
TD0593 (see https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_tds.cfm). All
Technical Decisions applied to this evaluation. Note however that the purpose of TD0583 was to
address FPT_PHP.3 with respect to TOE models that have a wired remote control. The TOE
does not have a wired remote control, but the TD was still applied as it modifies SFR and test
activity wording regardless of whether or not the TOE has a wired remote control.
In addition to the items mentioned above some additional product administration and usability
features are worth considering:
• The vendor provides an administrative tool to configure the product. This tool is a
software application that runs on a general-purpose Windows computer. The security of
the application was not separately assessed as part of the evaluation of the product.
Distribution of this tool should only be to systems that are required to perform
administrative functions.
• The product provides administrative functionality but this is limited to role-based
administration with administrative accounts defined on the product itself. The
administrator must take care to ensure that the account credentials are provided to the
necessary individuals over secure channels.
• The product provides default passwords for its management accounts. The administrator
should ensure that these passwords are changed to secure values.
• An administrator mode is supported in the product, but its usability and features are
limited. The administrator should make sure they enable multiple users and change
default passwords.
• An audit feature is supported, but is of a limited nature given the product.
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• Different TOE models provide support for different peripheral interfaces. Vendor
guidance must be consulted to determine the interfaces that are supported for a given
TOE model. There is no difference in the underlying security architecture for each TOE
model so for those interfaces that are shared across multiple models, the required security
functionality is implemented in the same manner.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable.
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12 Security Target
Name Description
ST Title Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch Security Target (Non-CAC Models)
ST Version 1.06
Publication Date August 20, 2021
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13 Abbreviations and Acronyms
Acronym Full Definition
CAC Common Access Card
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
DP DisplayPort
EDID Extended Display Identification Data
HDMI High Definition Multimedia Interface
IC Integrated Circuit
KVM Keyboard, Video and Mouse
LED Light-Emitting Diode
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation
Program
PCL Product Compliant List
PSD Peripheral Sharing Device
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
USB Universal Serial Bus
VR Validation Report
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Assurance Activities Report for Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch (Non-CAC Models),
Version 1.1, September 1, 2021
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2015.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2015.
4. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2015.
5. Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2015.
6. Evaluation Technical Report for Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch (Non-CAC Models),
Version 1.1, September 1, 2021
7. Sekuryx Secure KVM Switch Security Target (Non-CAC Models), Version 1.06, August
20, 2021
8. User Manual Sekuryx Secure DP KVM Switch with CAC Port and 4K Ultra-HD
Support, Revision 1.0, July 21, 2021
9. Sekuryx Secure KVM Administration and Security Management Tool Guide (Non-
CAC), Version 1.0, April 6, 2021
10. Sekuryx PSD PP 4.0 Common Criteria Test Report and Procedures, Version 1.2,
September 1, 2021
11. SmartAVI Vulnerability Survey, Version 1.4, August 20, 2021
12. Protection Profile for Peripheral Sharing Device, Version 4.0, July 19, 2019
13. PP-Module for Analog Audio Output Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
14. PP-Module for Keyboard/Mouse Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019
15. PP-Module for Video/Display Devices, Version 1.0, July 19, 2019