BSI-DSZ-CC-0517-2009
for
Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC) R10.1.5
for use in the Océ VarioPrint 1055, 1055 BC,
1055 DP, 1065, 1075, 2062, 2075, 2075 DP
printer/copier/scanner products
from
Océ Technologies B.V.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0517-2009
Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC) R10.1.5
for use in the Océ VarioPrint 1055, 1055 BC, 1055 DP, 1065, 1075, 2062,
2075, 2075 DP printer/copier/scanner products
from Océ Technologies B.V.
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: product specific Security Target Common Criteria
Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 20 February 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0517-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0517-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0517-2009
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
7.1 Test configuration..................................................................................................16
7.2 Developer Testing..................................................................................................16
7.3 Evaluator Testing...................................................................................................16
7.4 Penetration Testing................................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................18
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................19
11 Security Target...........................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................19
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................19
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................21
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0517-2009 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT
security certificates was extended in April 1999 to include certificates based on the
Common Criteria for all Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises
certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France, the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0517-2009
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of
America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC) R10.1.5 for use in the Océ VarioPrint
1055, 1055 BC, 1055 DP, 1065, 1075, 2062, 2075, 2075 DP printer/copier/scanner
products has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based
on BSI-DSZ-CC-0370-2006.
The evaluation of the product Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC) R10.1.5 for use in the
Océ VarioPrint 1055, 1055 BC, 1055 DP, 1065, 1075, 2062, 2075, 2075 DP printer/copier/
scanner products was conducted by Brightsight. The evaluation was completed on 03
February 2009. The Brightsight is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Océ Technologies B.V.
The product was developed by: Océ Technologies B.V.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0517-2009 Certification Report
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance
of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if
required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to
perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC) R10.1.5 has been included in the BSI list
of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Océ Technologies B.V.
St. Urbanusweg 43
PO. Box 101
5900 MA Venlo
The Netherlands
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0517-2009 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0517-2009
1 Executive Summary
Océ Technologies B.V. produces a wide range of Multifunctional Devices (MFDs) for
copying, printing and scanning. MFDs consist of two main parts: a Digital Access
Controller (DAC) and a Digital Copier (DC). The DAC consists of two parts, the underlying
hardware platform which is not part of the TOE and the software which forms the TOE.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the software running on the hardware platform.
The TOE is the Digital Access Controller (DAC) R10.1.5 for use in the Océ VarioPrint
1055, 1055 BC, 1055 DP, 1065, 1075, 2062, 2075, 2075 DP printer/scanner/copier
products (see table 2 for detailed information).
The DAC is a PC-based MFD-controller that provides a wide range of printing and
scanning functionality to the DC of the MFD to which the DAC is connected. The DAC
provides security functionality to the DC. It does not provide copy functionality.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF.FILTERING Built-in firewall
SF.JOB_RELEASE Secure printing
SF.SHREDDING Overwriting of deleted print job data
SF.MANAGEMENT Management of TOE Security Functionality
SF.SELFTEST Checks for failures and integrity during start-up
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'basic' (SOF-basic) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.2 is confirmed.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.2 – 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● The TOE covers the DAC operating in the security mode ‘high (factory default)’ as
delivered by Océ to the customer.
● The overwrite mechanism has to be enabled for all scan and print jobs.
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The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC) R10.1.5 for use in the Océ VarioPrint 1055,
1055 BC, 1055 DP, 1065, 1075, 2062, 2075, 2075 DP
printer/copier/scanner products
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Océ DAC-specific software R10.1.5 Installed on HW-platform
2 SW Montvista Linux operating
system
Version 4.0.1
(with updates until August 9,
2007 and New-Zealand time-
zone fix. These updates are
specified in appendix F of the
ST [6])
Installed on HW-platform
3 SW Adobe PS3-PDF Interpreter Version 3016.103 v.3.1
build #03
Installed on HW-platform
4 SW Apache HTTP server with
SSL support
Apache 2.0.59 Installed on HW-platform
5 SW OpenSSL Version 0.9.7l Installed on HW-platform
6 SW SAMBA Version 3.0.25b Installed on HW-platform
7 SW PHP Version 4.4.7 Installed on HW-platform
8 DOC User Guidance:
Océ VarioPrint 1055-75
Job manual [9]
Océ VarioPrint 2062 Job
manual [10]
Océ VarioPrint 2075 Job
manual [11]
Océ VarioPrint 1055-75
Configuration manual [12]
Océ VarioPrint 2062
Configuration manual [13]
Océ VarioPrint 2075
Configuration manual [14]
All
Code Number 1060061982,
Edition 2007, 2.1,
On CD (Code Number
1060061982, Edition
2007, 2.1) together with
the MFD or download
from the support section
from the Océ corporate
website (www.oce.com)
9 DOC Administrator Guidance:
Océ System
Configuration, On-line help
R10.1.5 HTML pages that are part
of the Océ DAC-specific
software
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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The hardware platform for the TOE consists of:
● An embedded uATX motherboard based PC comprising at a minimum a Via Eden
C3 800 MHz processor, 256MB internal RAM, 20GB hard drive
● Generic graphics card and network card supporting 10/100/1000Mbs Ethernet UTP
● Drivers for the PC, graphics card and network card
● USB hardware support
The DAC is customized and installed according to the customer order form and packaged
with the MFD into one package. The package is labelled and transported to the customer.
The MFD together with the DAC is installed and configured according to the evaluated
configuration at the customer site by Océ Service Technicians.
The customer operator can instruct the TOE to print out a configuration report. This
configuration report clearly lists the separate software components and their versions. The
customer can compare the configuration report to the Security Target or this Certification
Report in order to determine that he received the TOE.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE protects two assets: itself and the print jobs it receives.
The TOE protects it’s own integrity against threats from the LAN, service engineer laptop,
USB memory sticks and the Digital Copier to which it is attached through use of a firewall
and integrity checks on system files upon system reboot.
The TOE protects the confidentiality of secure print jobs once they have been received by
the DAC by storing them until the user authenticates himself to the DAC via a user
interface on the DC. The DAC shreds the data after printing is completed.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance: Physical protection of the TOE by the environment, secure management
of the network to which the TOE is attached and the local physical interfaces of the TOE
as well as the allowed MFDs to which the DAC is connected. Details can be found in the
Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
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5 Architectural Information
The following diagram indicates the subsystems of the TOE (blue boxes) that implement
the security functionality and the external interfaces (black boxes).
Figure 1: Overview of the TOE subsystems and external interfaces
The subsystems are as follows:
Communication Layer: This subsystem provides the communication functionality between
the TOE subsystems and the internal interfaces between the subsystems. In addition, this
subsystem provides the communication functionality to the Digital Copier interface.
Firewall: This subsystem provides stateful inspection of the network packets that pass
through the network card (both inbound and outbound). It ensures that there is no direct
path between the Digital Copier and the network to which the DAC is attached.
Job Manager: This subsystem manages the print and scan jobs that are handled by the
DAC. There are four types of job:
● Standard Print Job (D.PRINT_JOB in ST)
● User associated Print Job (D.PRINT_JOB in ST)
● User associated print job with unique PIN(D.SECURE_PRINT_JOB in ST)
● Scan job (D.SCAN_JOB in ST)
DAC Settings manager: This subsystem manages security related settings of the DAC.
Start-up control/Integrity checker: This subsystem performs an integrity check as part of
the start-up process when power is applied to the DAC. The DAC file system is checked
for inconstancies.
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E-shred service: This subsystem provides the shredding of the job data objects that are
handled by the Job Manager subsystem (Standard Print Job, User associated Print Job,
User associated print job with unique PIN and Scan job).
The external interfaces are the network interface, the USB-interface and the interface to
the Digital Copier.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is provided with the product to the
customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the
TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Test configuration
Tests were performed with the DAC connected to the Océ VarioPrint 1055 and 2075.
The security mode was ‘High’ (factory default) with E-shredding switched on.
The following software components are used:
● MontaVista Linux Version 4.0.1, with updates until August 9, 2007 and New-Zealand
time-zone fix. These updates are specified in appendix F of the ST [6]
● Océ Digital Access Controller -specific software release 10.1.5
● Adobe 3016.103, v3.1 build #3
● Apache: 2.0.59 with OpenSSL 0.9.7l
● Samba 3.0.25b
● PHP 4.4.7
7.2 Developer Testing
The developer has performed all necessary functional tests for the Security Functions. The
depth of testing corresponded with the depth of the level of the Functional Specification.
All Security Functions have been tested at least once.
In addition, the developer has performed extensive vulnerability tests that exceeds the
attack potential required by EAL2.
7.3 Evaluator Testing
The evaluators repeated all of the developer tests and additionally performed independent
evaluator tests. All Security Functions have been tested at least once.
The depth of testing corresponded with the depth of the level of the Functional
Specification.
The objectives for the tests are derived from the security functions and are:
● Check that filtering performs conform to the Functional Specification. With all
network functionality enabled in security level ‘high (factory default)’, the firewall
should be properly configured. Check that on the external Ethernet connector the
firewall only allows certain defined ports.
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● Check that the job release function performs conform to the Functional Specification.
● Check that the self-test mechanism performs conform to the Functional
Specification.
● Check that the shredding mechanism performs conform to the Functional
Specification.
● Check that authentication mechanisms perform conform to the Functional
Specification.
All test results were as expected.
7.4 Penetration Testing
Following the developer and evaluator independent vulnerability analysis, the evaluators
identified the necessary penetration tests. The evaluators took the functional specification
as starting point for the identification of which interfaces and which functions need to be
penetration tested. Based on the more detailed knowledge of the high-level design some
tests are included additionally.
The evaluators applied a number of publicly available network and vulnerability scanners
for the search for obvious vulnerabilities.
All test results were as expected. The security functionality works as expected. The
vulnerability tests showed that the TOE is resistant against all tested public known
vulnerabilities that were identified on recent internet searching. The network and
vulnerability scanners did not revealed vulnerabilities that could be exploited on the level of
EAL2.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The DAC can operate in three different security modes: ‘high’, ‘normal’ and ‘low’. The TOE
covers the DAC operating in the security mode ‘high (factory default)’ as delivered by Océ
to the customer. This mode is the initial version of the security mode ‘high‘ and provides a
restricted set of functionality that is configured to meet the Security Target claim. Once
changed, it is not possible to get the DAC back into the certified configuration (‘high
(factory default)’) by changing the security mode back to 'high'. Changing the operational
mode invalidates the claim made in the Security Target.
The remote system administrator must not change the 'Jobs to overwrite' settings. If E-
shredding is disabled for 'scan jobs' or 'print jobs without security code', the DAC is no
longer in the certified configuration and is no longer able to assure the security of 'scan
jobs' and 'print jobs without security code'.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL 2 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0370-2006, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the following aspects:
● Evaluate that the claimed security functionality is still correctly present in the updated
versions of the software parts.
● Evaluate that the firewall settings comply to the new set of allowed protocols and that
the built in firewall still protects the TOE as expected.
● Evaluate that the added possibility to hash the PINs for the protected print jobs does
not weaken the Security Function for the secure release of print jobs. The hashing of
the PINs is not a Security Function for the TOE.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by
ALC_FLR.1
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : basic
SF.JOB_RELEASE and SF.MANAGEMENT
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptoalgorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the
assessment.
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10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DAC Digital Access Controller
DC Digital Copier
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MFD Multifunctional Device
PC Personal Computer
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random-Access Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirements
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirements
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
USB Universal Serial Bus
UTP Unshielded Twisted Pair
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12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected
and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0517-2009, Version 3.3, “Security Target The Océ Digital
Access Controller (DAC) R10.1.5, as used in the Océ VarioPrint 1055, 1055 BC,
1055 DP, 1065, 1075, 2062, 2075, 2075 DP printer/copier/scanner products“, Océ
Technologies B.V.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 7.0, 19th
January 2009, “Evaluation Technical
Report Digital Access Controller (DAC) R10.1.5“, Brightsight (confidential
document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 3.3, 19th
January 2009, “Configuration
Management List for the Océ Digital Access Controller (DAC) R10.1.5, as used in
the as used in the Océ VarioPrint 1055, 1055 BC, 1055 DP, 1065, 1075, 2062,
2075, 2075 DP printer/copier/scanner products“, Océ Technologies B.V.
(confidential document)
[9] Océ VarioPrint 1055-75 Job manual, Code Number 1060061982, Edition 2007, 2.1,
Océ Technologies B.V.
[10] Océ VarioPrint 2062 Job manual, Code Number 1060061982, Edition 2007, 2.1,
Océ Technologies B.V.
[11] Océ VarioPrint 2075 Job manual, Code Number 1060061982, Edition 2007, 2.1,
Océ Technologies B.V.
[12] Océ VarioPrint 1055-75 Configuration manual, Code Number 1060061982, Edition
2007, 2.1, Océ Technologies B.V.
[13] Océ VarioPrint 2062 Configuration manual, Code Number 1060061982, Edition
2007, 2.1, Océ Technologies B.V.
[14] Océ VarioPrint 2075 Configuration manual, Code Number 1060061982, Edition
2007, 2.1, Océ Technologies B.V.
[15] Océ System Configuration, On-line help for Océ DAC R10.1.5, version 4.3, Océ
Technologies B.V.
[16] DAC administration guidance for Océ service engineer “Administrating R10.1.5 of
the Océ DAC” (Lotus Notes Application), Océ Technologies B.V.
8
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0517-2009 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/
or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately
resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0517-2009 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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