Public
Class: ASE
Version 0.0
28th September 2022
ST(Security Target) Lite
 2013 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. All rights reserved.
Common Criteria
Information Technology
Security Evaluation
S3SSE1A
Important Notice
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Copyright  2013 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
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Chip Handling Guide
Precaution against Electrostatic Discharge
When using semiconductor devices, ensure that the environment is protected against static electricity:
1. Wear antistatic clothes and use earth band.
2. All objects that are in direct contact with devices must be made up of materials that do not produce static
electricity.
3. Ensure that the equipment and work table are earthed.
4. Use ionizer to remove electron charge.
Contamination
Do not use semiconductor products in an environment exposed to dust or dirt adhesion.
Temperature/Humidity
Semiconductor devices are sensitive to:
 Environment
 Temperature
 Humidity
High temperature or humidity deteriorates the characteristics of semiconductor devices. Therefore, do not store or
use semiconductor devices in such conditions.
Mechanical Shock
Do not to apply excessive mechanical shock or force on semiconductor devices.
Chemical
Do not expose semiconductor devices to chemicals because exposure to chemicals leads to reactions that
deteriorate the characteristics of the devices.
Light Protection
In non- Epoxy Molding Compound (EMC) package, do not expose semiconductor IC to bright light. Exposure to
bright light causes malfunctioning of the devices. However, a few special products that utilize light or with
security functions are exempted from this guide.
Radioactive, Cosmic and X-ray
Radioactive substances, cosmic ray, or X-ray may influence semiconductor devices. These substances or rays may
cause a soft error during a device operation. Therefore, ensure to shield the semiconductor devices under
environment that may be exposed to radioactive substances, cosmic ray, or X-ray.
EMS (Electromagnetic Susceptibility)
Strong electromagnetic wave or magnetic field may affect the characteristic of semiconductor devices during the
operation under insufficient PCB circuit design for Electromagnetic Susceptibility (EMS).
Revision History
Revision No. Date Description
0.0 28th September 2022 Creation
-
-
-
Table of Contents
1 ST INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................13
1.1 Security Target and TOE Reference ...........................................................................................................14
1.2 TOE Overview and TOE Description ........................................................................................................15
1.2.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................15
1.2.2 TOE Definition....................................................................................................................................15
1.2.3 TOE Features ......................................................................................................................................21
1.2.4 TOE Life cycle.....................................................................................................................................24
1.3 Interfaces of the TOE..................................................................................................................................26
1.4 TOE Intended Usage..................................................................................................................................26
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS...........................................................................28
2.1 CC Conformance Claim .............................................................................................................................29
2.2 PP Claim ....................................................................................................................................................29
2.3 Package Claim............................................................................................................................................29
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale ...................................................................................................................30
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ...........................................................31
3.1 Description of Assets .................................................................................................................................31
3.2 Threats .......................................................................................................................................................34
3.2.1 Standard Threats ................................................................................................................................36
3.2.2 Threats related to security services.....................................................................................................38
3.2.3 Threats related to additional TOE Specific Functionality...................................................................39
3.2.4 Threats related to Authentication of the Security IC ..........................................................................39
3.2.5 Threats related to Diffusion of open samples.....................................................................................39
3.3 Organizational Security Policies ................................................................................................................40
3.4 Assumptions ..............................................................................................................................................42
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..............................................................................44
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE .................................................................................................................45
4.1.1 Standard Security Objectives..............................................................................................................46
4.1.2 Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality (referring to SG4).............................................48
4.1.3 Security Objectives for Added Function.............................................................................................49
4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software .....................................................................52
4.2.1 Clarification of “Treatment of User Data of the Composite TOE(OE.Resp-Appl)”............................52
4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ...............................................................................52
4.3.1 Clarification of “Protection during Composite Product Manufacturing (OE.Process-Sec-IC)” .........53
4.4 Security Objectives Rationale.....................................................................................................................53
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION.................................................57
5.1 Definition of the Family FCS_RNG............................................................................................................58
5.2 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM............................................................................................................58
5.3 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS ............................................................................................................61
5.4 Definition of the Family FDP_SDC ............................................................................................................62
5.5 Definition of the Family FIA_API ..............................................................................................................63
6 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................65
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE .........................................................................................66
6.1.1 Malfunctions.......................................................................................................................................66
6.1.2 Abuse of Functionality .......................................................................................................................66
6.1.3 Physical Manipulation and Probing ...................................................................................................67
6.1.4 Leakage...............................................................................................................................................69
6.1.5 Random Numbers (DTRNG FRO M) .................................................................................................70
6.1.6 Memory Access Control .....................................................................................................................71
6.1.7 Cryptographic Support.......................................................................................................................73
6.1.8 Triple-DES Operation.........................................................................................................................74
6.1.9 AES Operation....................................................................................................................................74
6.1.10 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Operation (optional).......................................................................75
6.1.11 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Key Generation (optional) ..............................................................76
6.1.12 Elliptic Curve DSA Operation (optional) .........................................................................................76
6.1.13 Elliptic Curve DSA Key Generation (optional).................................................................................77
6.1.14 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Agreement (optional)..................................................78
6.1.15 X25519(DH with curve25519) (optional) ..........................................................................................79
6.1.16 EdDSA_key_gen(Ephemeral or static key pair generation for EdDSA25519) (optional) .................80
6.1.17 EdDSA25519 (optional) ....................................................................................................................80
6.1.18 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) (optional).........................................................................................81
6.1.19 Bootloader ........................................................................................................................................81
6.1.20 Authentication Proof of Identity.......................................................................................................84
6.1.21 Summary of Security Functional Requirements...............................................................................84
6.2 TOE Assurance Requirements ...................................................................................................................87
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale...............................................................................................................89
6.3.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements ..........................................................................89
6.3.2 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements ..........................................................................95
6.3.3 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements ........................................................................................98
6.3.4 Security Requirements are Internally Consistent .............................................................................100
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ............................................................103
7.1 List of Security Functional Requirements ................................................................................................104
7.2 Architectural Design Summary ...............................................................................................................111
8 ANNEX.........................................................................................................113
8.1 Glossary ...................................................................................................................................................113
8.2 Abbreviations...........................................................................................................................................115
8.3 References ................................................................................................................................................116
List of Figures
Figure Title Page
Number Number
Figure 1 S3SSE1A Block Diagram ..........................................................................................................................16
Figure 1-2 Privilege and User Modes ..............................................................................................................21
Figure 2 Definition of “TOE Delivery” and responsible Parties ............................................................................26
Figure 3 Standard Threats......................................................................................................................................35
Figure 4 Threats related to security service ...........................................................................................................35
Figure 5 Interactions between the TOE and its outer world ..................................................................................36
Figure 6 Policies .....................................................................................................................................................40
Figure 7 Assumptions............................................................................................................................................42
Figure 8 Standard Security Objectives ...................................................................................................................45
Figure 9 Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality ...............................................................................46
List of Tables
Table Title Page
Number Number
Table 1 TOE Configuration ..................................................................................................................................21
Table 1-1 Sites of the TOE life cycle......................................................................................................................24
Table 4 Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies..................................................................54
Table 5 Security Functional Requirements defined in Smart Card IC Protection Profile ....................................85
Table 6 Augmented Security Functional Requirements.......................................................................................86
Table 8 Dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements .........................................................................97
List of Conventions
Register RW Access Type Conventions
Type Definition Description
R Read Only The application has permission to read the Register field. Writes to read-only fields
have no effect.
W Write Only The application has permission to write in the Register field.
RW Read & Write The application has permission to read and writes in the Register field. The
application sets this field by writing 1’b1 and clears it by writing 1’b0.
Register Value Conventions
Expression Description
x Undefined bit
X Undefined multiple bits
? Undefined, but depends on the device or pin status
Device dependent The value depends on the device
Pin value The value depends on the pin status
Reset Value Conventions
Expression Description
0 Clears the register field
1 Sets the register field
x Don't care condition
Warning: Some bits of control registers are driven by hardware or write operation only. As a result the
indicated reset value and the read value after reset might be different.
List of Terms
Terms Descriptions
Application Data All data managed by the Security IC Embedded Software in the application context.
Application data comprise all data in the final Security IC.
Composite Product
Integrator
Role installing or finalising the IC Embedded Software and the applications on
platform transforming the TOE into the unpersonalised Composite Product after TOE
delivery. The TOE Manufacturer may implement IC Embedded Software delivered by
the Security IC Embedded Software Developer before TOE delivery (e.g. if the IC
Embedded Software is implemented in ROM or is stored in the non-volatile memory as
service provided by the IC Manufacturer or IC Packaging Manufacturer)
Composite Product
Manufacturer
The Composite Product Manufacturer has the following roles (i) the Security IC
Embedded Software Developer (Phase 1), (ii) the Composite Product Integrator (Phase
5) and (iii) the Personaliser (Phase 6). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of
wafers or sawn wafers (dice) he has the role of the IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase
4) in addition.
End-consumer User of the Composite Product in Phase 7.
IC Dedicated
Software
IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC (also known as IC firmware) and
developed by the IC Developer. Such software is required for testing purpose (IC
Dedicated Test Software) but may provide additional services to facilitate usage of the
hardware and/or to provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support Software).
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the TOE
before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
IC Dedicated
Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after
TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to
certain phases.
Initialisation Data Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to identify the TOE and to keep
track of the Security IC’s production and further life-cycle phases are considered as
belonging to the TSF data. These data are for instance used for traceability and for TOE
identification (identification data).
Integrated Circuit
(IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.
Pre-personalisation
Data
Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is injected into the non-volatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). These data are for instance
used for traceability and/or to secure shipment between phases.
Security IC Composition of the TOE, the Security IC Embedded Software, User Data and the
package (the Security IC carrier).
Security IC
Embedded Software
Software embedded in a Security IC and normally not being developed by the IC
Designer. The Security IC Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded
into the Security IC in Phase 3 or in later phases of the Security IC product life-cycle.
Some part of that software may actually implement a Security IC application others
may provide standard services. Nevertheless, this distinction doesn’t matter here so
that the Security IC Embedded Software can be considered as being application
dependent whereas the IC Dedicated Software is definitely not.
Security IC Product Composite product which includes the Security Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and
the Embedded Software and is evaluated as composite target of evaluation in the sense
of the Supporting Document
TOE Delivery The period when the TOE is delivered which is either (i) after Phase 3 (or before Phase
4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or (ii) after Phase 4 (or
before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products.
TOE Manufacturer The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that all requirements for the TOE and its
development and production environment are fulfilled. The TOE Manufacturer has the
following roles: (i) IC Developer (Phase 2) and (ii) IC Manufacturer (Phase 3). If the
TOE is delivered after Phase 4 in form of packaged products, he has the role of the (iii)
IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.
TSF data Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE. This
includes information about the TOE’s configuration, if any is coded in non-volatile non-
programmable memories (ROM), in specific circuitry, in non-volatile programmable
memories (for instance E2PROM) or a combination thereof.
User data All data managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software in the application context.
User data comprise all data in the final Smartcard IC except the TSF data.
List of Acronyms
Acronyms Descriptions
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Feature
TSFI TSF Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
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1 ST INTRODUCTION
1 This introductory chapter contains the following sections:
1.1 Security Target and TOE Reference
1.2 TOE Overview and TOE Description
1.3 Interfaces of the TOE
1.4 TOE Intended Usage
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1.1 Security Target and TOE Reference
2 The Security Target Lite version is 0.0 and dated 28th September 2022.
The Security Target Lite is strictly compliant to
3 [5] Eurosmart Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version 1.0, BSI-CC-
PP-0084-2014.
4 The Protection Profile and the Security Target are built on Common Criteria version 3.1.
Title: Security Target Lite of S3SSE1A
 Target of Evaluation: S3SSE1A
 TOE reference: S3SSE1A_20220930
 Provided by: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
 Common Criteria version:
5 [1] Common Criteria, Part 1: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001
6 [2] Common Criteria, Part 2: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,Part2:
Security Functional Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
7 [3] Common Criteria, Part 3: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
8 [4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004
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1.2 TOE Overview and TOE Description
1.2.1 Introduction
9 The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the S3SSE1A microcontroller featuring the TORNADOTM-E cryptographic
coprocessor, is a smartcard integrated circuit which is composed of a processing unit, security components,
contact based I/O ports, hardware circuit for testing purpose during the manufacturing process and
volatile and non-volatile memories (hardware). The TOE also includes any IC Designer/Manufacturer
proprietary IC Dedicated Software as long as it physically exists in the smartcard integrated circuit after
being delivered by the IC Manufacturer. Such software (also known as IC firmware) is used for testing
purpose during the manufacturing process but also provides additional services to facilitate the usage of
the hardware and/or to provide additional services, including optional the public key cryptographic
libraries, an random number generation library and an random number generator. The public key
cryptographic libraries further include the functionality of hash computation. The use for keyed hash
operations like HMAC or similar security critical operations involving keys and other secrets, is not subject
of this TOE and requires specific security improvements and DPA analysis including the operating system,
which is not part of this TOE. However, this functionality is intended to be used for signature generation
and verification only. All other software is called Smartcard Embedded Software and is not part of the TOE.
10 Regarding the public key cryptographic libraries, the user has the possibility to tailor this IC Dedicated
Software part of the TOE during the manufacturing process by deselecting the public key cryptographic
libraries. Hence the TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of the public key cryptographic
libraries what’s resulting in two TOE configurations. This is considered in this Security Target and
corresponding notes (indicated by “optional”) are added where required. If the user decides not to use the
public key cryptographic libraries, the library is not delivered to the user and the accompanying Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (O.RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (O.ECDSA, O.ECDH, O.EdDSA, O.X25519) is
not provided by the TOE. Deselecting public key cryptographic libraries means excluding the code
implementing functionality, which the user decided not to use. Excluding the code of the deselected
functionality has no impact on any other security policy of the TOE, it is exactly equivalent to the situation
where the user decides just not to use the functionality.
1.2.2 TOE Definition
11 The S3SSE1A single-chip CMOS micro-controller is designed and packaged specifically for "Smart Card"
applications.
12 The SC300 CPU architecture of the S3SSE1A microcontroller follows the Harvard style, that is, it has
separate program memory and data memory. Both instruction and data can be fetched simultaneously
without causing a stall, using separate paths for memory access.
13 The main security features of the S3SSE1A integrated circuit are:
 Security sensors, detectors or filters.
 Shields
 Life time detector for detecting if detector signals are modified or not
 Dedicated tamper-resistant design based on synthesizable glue logic and secure topology
 Dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel attacks
 Secure DES and AES Symmetric Cryptography support
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 Secure TORNADOTM-E coprocessor for the support of RSA and ECC (with SHA) cryptographic
operations
 One Hardware Digital True Random Number Generator (DTRNG FRO M) that meet PTG.2 class of BSI
AIS31 (German scheme) and some of ANSSI RGS requirements (French Scheme).
 HASH with SHA 256/384/512 which is internally used in the SHA library of AE1 Secure
RSA/ECC/SHA Library.
 The IC Dedicated Software includes:
- An optional modular arithmetic library for the support of RSA and ECC (with SHA) cryptographic
operations
- DTRNG FRO M library built around Hardware DTRNG FRO M together with corresponding
DTRNG FRO M application notes. This library meets some of ANSSI requirements (French
scheme) as well as PTG.2 class of BSI-AIS31 (German scheme).
14 The main hardware blocks of the S3SSE1A Integrated Circuit are described in Figure 1 below:
TORNADO-E
20 Bit
Watchdog Timer
ROM
(48/8 KB)
FLASH
1024 KB
RAM - 48 KB
Crypto.RAM - 5KB
Two 16 Bit/One 32bit
Timer
Interrupt
Controller
Random Number
Generator
AES/DES
MPU
SC300
I/O
UART
SWP
Clock Control
Security
Controler
DMA
AMBA
BUS
SYSTICK
NOTE : Little-endian mode only
SPI/I2C/I3C/GPIO
Cache
2KB
HASH
Figure 1 S3SSE1A Block Diagram
NOTE:That only the Triple DES algorithm belongs to the TOE, not the Single DES.
NOTE:CACHE is controlled by hardware of Flash. There is no address and then User software can't control CACHE.
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The TOE consists of the following Hardware and Software:
TOE Hardware
 1024Kbytes FLASH/ 64K bytes RAM/ 5K bytes Crypto. RAM / 2K bytes Cache RAM / 48K bytes
ROM/ 8K bytes TestROM
 32-bit Central Processing Unit (CPU)
 Memory Protection Unit (MPU) up to 4 GB
 Internal Voltage Regulator (IVR)
 Power on Reset
 Internal Clock
 Detectors & Security Logic
 Bilateral Pseudo Random Number Generator (BPRNG)
 Digital True random number generator (DTRNG FRO M) that meets PTG.2 class of BSI-AIS31 (German
scheme) and some of ANSSI RGS requirements (French Scheme).
 Triple DES cryptographic coprocessor with 112 or 168 bits key size
 AES cryptographic coprocessor with 128 bits, 192bits and 256bits key size
 TORNADO-E coprocessor supports a Montgomery type multiplication for the operand size up to 4128-
bit and modular additions/subtractions for the operand size up to 544-bit
 PARITY/ CRC-32 calculators
 Hardware UART, SPI, I2C and I3C
 Timers
 HASH with SHA 256/384/512
 DMA controller for data transfer from UART and SPI to RAM
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TOE Software
15 The TOE software comprises the following components:
 The AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library (optional)
TORNADO-E is a hardware coprocessor for high speed modular multiplications, modular additions
and modular subtractions.
The AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library is a software library built on the TORNADO-E coprocessor
that provides high level interface for RSA and ECC cryptographic algorithms.
The RSA functions of the library included in the TOE are:
 RSA_KeyGen_Secure (RSA public/private key pair generation)
 TND_RSA_SigSTD_Secure (RSA signature generation with the standard method)
 TND_RSA_SigCRT_Secure (RSA signature generation with the CRT method)
 TND_RSA_Verify (RSA signature verification)
 RSA_R2modM_precompute_sec (R^2 value precomputation for the standard RSA)
 RSA_R2modPandQ_precompute_sec (R^2 value precomputation for the CRT RSA)
The library supports RSA operations of the key size from 32-bit to 4096-bit by step of 2-bit. However,
only the key size from 1280-bit up to 4096-bit is within the scope of this evaluation.
The functions TND_RSA_SigSTD_Secure and TND_RSA_SigCRT_Secure implement some
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The RSA_KeyGen_Secure function implements
some countermeasures against SPA and DFA attacks. . Finally, the RSA_R2modM_precompute_sec
and RSA_R2modPandQ_precompute_sec functions implement some countermeasures against the
fault attack.
The AT1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library provides a set of functions to implement ECC cryptographic
algorithms. In particular, it provides some functions to implement the ECDSA signing/verifying and
the ECDH key exchange protocol. The library implements ECC for general curves over prime fields of
size from 192-bit to 512-bit and the only certain curves are in the scope of this evaluation. The ECC
functions of the library included in the TOE are:
 ECDSA_keygen (Ephemeral or static key pair generation for ECDSA
signing/verifying)
 ECDSA_sign_digest (ECDSA signature generation for a message digest)
 ECDSA_verify_digest (ECDSA signature verification for a message digest)
 ECDH_generate (ECDH secret key derivation)
 X25519(DH with curve25519)
 X25519_keypair(private/public key generation with X25519)
 X25519_public_form_private(public key generation with X25519)
 X25519_with_decoded_number(X25519 with decoded scalar)
 EDDSA_key_gen(Ephemeral or static key pair generation for EDDSA25519)
 EDDSA_key_gen_fixed_private_key(public key generation with fixed private_key of
EDDSA25519)
 EDDSA_sign(EDDSA25519 signature generation for a message digest)
 EDDSA_verify(EDDSA signature verification for a message digest)
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The functions ECDSA_keygen, ECDSA_sign_digest and ECDH_generate implement some
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA for protecting the private key. The function
ECDSA_verify_digest implements some countermeasures against DFA. The base point is assumed to
be public.
Note1) The RSA/ECC/SHA library supports any valid elliptic curves over prime fields of size from
192-bit to 512-bit. However, the standard curves listed below whose security has been proven
are in the scope of this evaluation.
１) [NIST curves]: Curves P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384
２) [Brainpool curves]: brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP192t1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP224t1,
brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP256t1, brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP320t1, brainpoolP384r1,
brainpoolP384t1, brainpoolP512r1, brainpoolP512t1
３) [SEC-recommended curves]: secp192k1, secp192r1, secp224k1, secp224r1, secp256k1,
secp256r1, secp384r1
４) [RFC7748] Curve25519 and [RFC8032] Ed25519
The AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library provides the functions for calculating hash (digest) values
using the SHA1,SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 algorithms as specified in [FIPS PUB 180-3],
but only those related to SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 listed below are within the scope of
this evaluation:
 SHA224_init, SHA224_update, SHA224_final
 SHA256_init, SHA256_update, SHA256_final
 SHA384_init, SHA384_update, SHA384_final
 SHA512_init, SHA512_update, SHA512_final
 SHA256_init_hw, SHA384_init_hw, SHA512_init_hw, SHA_Update_hw,
SHA_Final_hw
These functions are not security relevant functions, i.e. they must not be used to hash security values
like keys etc. There are implemented no countermeasures against side channel attacks. The TOE
provides the functionality of hash computation if and only if the optional TORNADO-E AE1 Secure
RSA/ECC/SHA library is delivered.
 A Digital True Random Number Generator (DTRNG FRO M) library that fulfills the requirements of
Class PTG.2 (German Scheme) as well as meets some of ANSSI RGS requirements (French scheme)
 Secure Boot Loader is a loader for downloading in Flash and can download the encrypted user code
with AES
 System API is an Application Programming Interface which controls Non-Volatile Memory (NOR
Flash), receives and transmits data from a host and utilities supported. It is used in Bootloader and can
be also used for the Security IC Embedded Software. No security relevant policy, mechanism or
function is supported
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16 The TOE configuration is summarized in table 1 below:
Item type Item
Ver
sion
Date Form of delivery
Hardware
S3SSE1A 32-bit RISC Microcontroller for
Smart Card
0 - Wafer or Module
Software Test ROM Code 1.0 -
- Included in S3SSE1A Test
ROM
- Test ROM code is not part of
the TOE.
Software
Secure Boot loader & System API Code
(s3sse1a_bootloader_system_api_v1.2_20
211019.zip)
1.2 2021.10.19 Included in S3SSE1A in ROM
Software
DTRNG FRO M library
(S3SSE1A_DTRNG_Lib_v1.1_20220412.zi
p)
1.1 2022.04.12
Software Library. This library
is delivered as object file and is
optionally integrated into user
NVM code.
Software
(optional)
AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA Library
(20220830_PKA_lib_AE1_v4.04.zip)
4.04 2022.08.30
Software Library. This library
is delivered as object file and is
optionally integrated into user
NVM code.
Document
DTRNG FRO M Application Note
(S3SSE1A_DTRNG_FRO_M_AN_v1.0.pd
f)
1.0 2022.03.29 Softcopy
Document
AE1 RSA/ECC/RSA Library API
Manual
(AE1 RSA ECC SHA Library API Manual
v2.04.pdf)
2.04 2022.09.26 Softcopy
Document
Hardware User’s manual
(S3SSE1A_UM_v0.5.pdf)
0.5 2022.09.16 Softcopy
Document
Security Application Note
(SAN_S3SSE1A_v0.1.pdf)
0.1 2022.09.22 Softcopy
Document
Chip Delivery Specification
(DeliverySpec_S3SSE1A_Rev1.00.pdf)
1.00 2022.05 Softcopy
Document
Bootloader User's Manual
(S3SSE1A_TN01_Bootloader_Specificatio
n_v0.1.pdf)
0.1 2022.04.06 Softcopy
Document
System API Application Note
(S3SSE1A_AN01_SystemAPI_v1.pdf)
1.0 2022.04.06 Softcopy
Document
SC300 Reference Manual
(SC300_Reference_Manual v0.0.pdf)
0.0 2014.05.12 Softcopy
Document
Cryptographic Mechanisms
(Cryptographic_Mechanisms_S3SSE1A_v
0.1.pdf)
0.1 2022.09.26 Softcopy
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Address Items The value
Refer to the chapter 7 in
Delivery specification
Device type Product: S3SSE1A → 1C1C0E010A
IC Version
00
Test ROM Code Version
10
Boot loader code version
12
Crypto. Library Version
4.04
DTRNG FRO Library Version
1.1
Item Method of delivery
Hardware Secure carrier
Software Libraries are encrypted by PGP encryption and then delivered by email.
Documents Documents are encrypted by PGP encryption and then delivered by email.
Table 1 TOE Configuration
17 PRIVILEGE mode and USER mode
Figure 1-2 Privilege and User Modes
Code can execute as privileged or unprivileged.
Software in the privileged access level can switch the program into the user access level using the control
register. A user program cannot change back to the privileged state by writing to the Control register. It has
to go through an exception handler.
1.2.3 TOE Features
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18 CPU
 SC300 32-bit core (MPU extension to 4GB)
19 Memory
 48 KB MASK ROM (32 KB is only for Samsung built-in boot loader and 16 KB for system API)/ 8K
bytes TestROM
 1024 KB NOR flash memory (2 banks)
 64 KB SRAM (general purpose)
 5KB Crypto RAM (specially used for TORNADO-E operation, therefore user cannot use this area for
general purpose)
 2KB SRAM for Cache
20 FLASH Write Operations
21 Triple DES
 Built-in hardware Triple DES accelerator
 Circuit for resistance against SPA, DPA and safe error attacks
22 AES
 Built-in hardware AES accelerator
 Circuit for resistance against SPA, DPA and safe error attacks
23 TORNADO-E
 Built-in hardware accelerator for big number calculation
24 Abnormal Condition Detectors and filters
25 Interrupts
 Nested Vector Interrupt Controller: 32ea
 SYSTICK
26 SPI interface
 One hardware slave interface
 Support class B, C
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27 I2C interface
 Serial communication
28 I3C interface
 Serial communication
29 Serial I/O Interface
 T=0 and 1 (ISO 7816-3)
 Hardware UART (ISO7816) supports T=0 andT=1 protocols
 Fast switching from transmission to reception
 CRC-CCITT
30 Reset and Power Down Mode
31 Random Number Generator
 A Digital True random number generator (DTRNG FRO M): PTG.2 class compliant (German Scheme)
and meeting some of ANSSI RGS requirements (French scheme)
 A Bilateral Pseudo Random Number Generator (BPRNG): no compliance to any specific metric, but
BPRNG is used by the chip for internal use
32 Memory Protection Unit
 Memory Protection Unit(MPU) up to 4 GB
33 Memory Encryption and Bus Scrambling
34 HASH
 SHA256/384/512 based on HASH standard-NIST FIPS 180-4
35 Timers
 Two 16-Bit Timer and one idle timer with programmable interval timers
 20-bit Watchdog Timer
36 ECC
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 ECC on Flash
37 CRC
38 Clock Sources
 External clock: 1 MHz–10 MHz
 Internal clock
39 Operating Voltage Range
 1.62 V - 3.3 V
40 Operating Temperature
 - 30°C to 85°C
41 Package
 FO-WLP/Wafer
1.2.4 TOE Life cycle
42 The complex development and manufacturing processes of a Composite Product can be separated into
seven distinct phases. The phases 2 and 3 of the Composite Product life cycle cover the IC development and
production:
Site / Building Phase
Hwasung Plant Phase 2+3
Giheung Plant Phase 3
Onyang Plant Phase 3+4
Photronics Plant Phase 3
TOPPAN Plant Phase 3
HANAMICRON Plant Phase 3+4
Inesa Plant Phase 3+4
Eternal Plant Phase 3+4
TESNA Plant Phase 3
ASE Korea Phase 3+4
SFA Plant Phase 4
Table 1-1 Sites of the TOE life cycle
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 IC Development (Phase 2):
– IC design,
– IC Dedicated Software development,
 the IC Manufacturing (Phase 3):
– integration and photomask fabrication,
– IC production,
– IC testing,
– preparation and
– Pre-personalisation if necessary
43 The Composite Product life cycle phase 4 can be included in the evaluation of the IC as an option:
 the IC Packaging (Phase 4):
– Security IC packaging (and testing),
– Pre-personalization if necessary (if not done in phase 3).
44 In addition, three important stages have to be considered in the Composite Product life cycle:
 Security IC Embedded Software Development (Phase 1),
 the Composite Product finishing process, preparation and shipping to the personalisation line for the
Composite Product (Composite Product Integration Phase 5),
Package in Phase 5 Description
Package 1
(Static Mutual Authentication)
Loader dedicated for usage in Secured Environment
only
Package 2
(Dynamic Mutual Authentication)
Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only
 the Composite Product personalisation and testing stage where the User Data is loaded into the
Security IC's memory (Personalisation Phase 6),
 the Composite Product usage by its issuers and consumers (Operational Usage Phase 7) which may
include loading and other management of applications in the field.
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Device is in Test
mode
Device is in Normal
mode
Figure 2 Definition of “TOE Delivery” and responsible Parties
45 The Security IC Embedded Software is developed outside the TOE development in Phase 1. The TOE is
developed in Phase 2 and produced in Phase 3. Then the TOE is delivered in form of wafers. The TOE can
also be delivered in form of packaged products. In this case, the development and production of the TOE
not only pertain to Phase 2 and 3 but to Phase 4 in addition.
1.3 Interfaces of the TOE
 The physical interface of the TOE with the external environment is the entire surface of the IC
 The electrical interface of the TOE with the external environment is made of the chip’s pads including
the VDD5P, EXRESETB, EXCLK, GND, EXSIO, EXSPI, EXI2C as well as EXI3C interface.
 The data interface of the TOE is made of the Contact EXSIO, EXSPI, EXI2C and EXI3C interfaces.
 The software interface of the TOE with the hardware consists of Special Function Registers (SFR) and
CPU instructions.
 The TRNG interface of the TOE is defined by the DTRNG FRO M libraries interface.
 The Bootloader interface and the System API interface
 The RSA interface of the TOE is defined by the RSA/ECC/SHA library interface (optional).
 The interface to the ECC and SHA calculations is defined from the RSA/ECC/SHA library interface
(optional)
1.4 TOE Intended Usage
46 The TOE is dedicated to applications such as:
 Banking and finance applications for credit or debit cards, electronic purse (stored value cards) and
electronic commerce.
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 Network based transaction processing such a mobile phones (GSM SIM cards), pay TV (subscriber and
pay-per-view cards), communication highways (Internet access and transaction processing).
 Transport and ticketing applications (access control cards).
 Governmental cards (ID cards, health cards, driving licenses).
 Multimedia applications and Digital Right Management protection.
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2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
47 This chapter 2 contains the following sections:
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
2.2 PP Claim
2.3 Package Claim
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale
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2.1 CC Conformance Claim
48 This Security target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria version 3.1 R5.
49 Furthermore it claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The extended Security
Functional Requirements are defined in chapter 5.
50 This Security Target has been built with the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation; Version 3.1 which comprises
[1] Common Criteria, Part 1: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001
[2] Common Criteria, Part 2: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
[3] Common Criteria, Part 3: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004
has been taken into account.
2.2 PP Claim
51 This Security Target is strictly compliant to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [5]. The Security IC
Platform Protection Profile is registered and certified by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084, Version 1.0, dated 01.2014.
52 This ST does not claim conformance to any other PP.
2.3 Package Claim
53 The assurance level for this Security Target is EAL6 augmented with ASE_TSS.2.
54 This Security Target is strictly compliant to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [5] with additional
packages:
 Package “Authentication of the Security IC”, “TDES”, “AES” and “SHA”
 Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only
Bootloader
version
TOE silicon
revision
Bootloader
encryption
algorithm
Mutual
Authentication
Mechanism
Loader Package
1.2 0 AES Static Mutual
Authentication
Package 1
55 The Security IC Platform Protection Profile is registered and certified by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084, Version 1.0, dated 01.2014.
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56 This ST does not claim conformance to any other PP.
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale
57 This security target claims strict conformance only to one PP, the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [5].
58 The Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) of the PP [5] is EAL 4 augmented with the assurance components
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. The Assurance Requirements of the TOE obtain the Evaluation Assurance
Level 6 augmented with the assurance component ASE_TSS.2 for the TOE.
59 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a complete solution implementing a security integrated circuit (security
IC) as defined in the PP [5] section 1.3.1, so the TOE is consistent with the TOE type in the PP [5].
60 The security problem definition of this security target is consistent with the statement of the security
problem definition in the PP [5], as the security target claimed strict conformance to the PP [5]. Additional
threats, organizational security policies and assumptions are introduced in chapter 3 of this ST, a rationale
is given in chapter 4.4.
61 The security objectives of this security target are consistent with the statement of the security objectives in
the PP [5], as the security target claimed strict conformance to the PP [5]. Additional security objectives are
added in chapter 4.1 of this ST, a rationale is given in chapter 4.4.
62 The security requirements of this security target are consistent with the statement of the security
requirements in the PP [5], as the security target claimed strict conformance to the PP [5]. Additional
security requirements are added in chapter 6.1 of this ST, a rationale is given in chapter 6.3. All assignments
and selections of the security functional requirements are done in the PP [5] and in this security target
section 6.
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3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
63 This chapter 3 contains the following sections:
3.1 Description of Assets
3.2 Threats
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
3.4 Assumptions
3.1 Description of Assets
Assets regarding the Threats
64 The assets (related to standard functionality) to be protected are
 the User Data of the Composite TOE,
 the Security IC Embedded Software stored and in operation,
 the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.
65 The user (consumer) of the TOE places value upon the assets related to high-level security concerns:
SC1 integrity of user data of the Composite TOE,
SC2 confidentiality of user data of the Composite TOE being stored in the TOE’s protected memory
areas,
SC3 correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded
Software.
Note the Security IC Embedded Software is user data and shall be protected while being
executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s protected memories.
66 The Security IC may not distinguish between user data which is public knowledge or kept confidential.
Therefore the security IC shall protect the user data of the Composite TOE in integrity and in
confidentiality if stored in protected memory areas, unless the Security IC Embedded Software chooses to
disclose or modify it.
67 In particular integrity of the Security IC Embedded Software means that it is correctly being executed
which includes the correct operation of the TOE’s functionality. Parts of the Security IC Embedded
Software which do not contain secret data or security critical source code, may not require protection from
being disclosed. Other parts of the Security IC Embedded Software may need to be kept confidential since
specific implementation details may assist an attacker.
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68 The Protection Profile[5] requires the TOE to provide at least one security service: the generation of random
numbers by means of a physical Random Number Generator. The Security Target may require additional
security services as described in the annexe 7 of the protection profile or define TOE specific security
services. It is essential that the TOE ensures the correct operation of all security services provided by the
TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.
69 According to the Protection Profile there is the following high-level security concern related to security
service:
SC4 deficiency of random numbers.
70 To be able to protect these assets (SC1 to SC4) the TOE shall self-protect its TSF. Critical information about
the TSF shall be protected by the development environment and the operational environment. Critical
information may include:
 logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, and configuration data,
 Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data, specific development aids, test and characterisation
related data, material for software development support, and photomasks.
71 Such information and the ability to perform manipulations assist in threatening the above assets.
72 Note that there are many ways to manipulate or disclose the user data of the Composite TOE: (i) An
attacker may manipulate the Security IC Embedded Software or the TOE. (ii) An attacker may cause
malfunctions of the TOE or abuse Test Features provided by the TOE. Such attacks usually require design
information of the TOE to be obtained. They pertain to all information about (i) the circuitry of the IC
(hardware including the physical memories), (ii) the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated
Test Software (if any) and IC Dedicated Support Software (if any), and (iii) the configuration data for the
TSF. The knowledge of this information may enable or support attacks on the assets. Therefore the TOE
Manufacturer must ensure that the development and production of the TOE (refer to Section 1.2.3) is secure
so that no restricted, sensitive, critical or very critical information is unintentionally made available for
attacks in the operational phase of the TOE (cf. [8] for details on assessment of knowledge of the TOE in the
vulnerability analysis).
73 The TOE Manufacturer must apply protection to support the security of the TOE. This not only pertains to
the TOE but also to all information and material exchanged with the developer of the Security IC
Embedded Software. This covers the Security IC Embedded Software itself if provided by the developer of
the Security IC Embedded Software or any authentication data required to enable the download of
software. This includes the delivery (exchange) procedures for Phase 1 and the Phases after TOE Delivery
as far as they can be controlled by the TOE Manufacturer. These aspects enforce the usage of the supporting
documents and the refinements of SAR defined in the protection profile.
74 The information and material produced and/or processed by the TOE Manufacturer in the TOE
development and production environment (Phases 2 up to TOE Delivery) can be grouped as follows:
● logical design data,
● physical design data,
● IC Dedicated Software, Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data,
● Security IC Embedded Software, provided by the Security IC Embedded Software developer
and implemented by the IC manufacturer,
● specific development aids,
● test and characterisation related data,
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● material for software development support, and
● photomasks and products in any form
as long as they are generated, stored, or processed by the TOE Manufacturer.
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3.2 Threats
75 The following explanations help to understand the focus of the threats and objectives defined below. For
example, certain attacks are only one step towards a disclosure of assets, others may directly lead to a
compromise of the application security.
 Manipulation of user data (which includes user data and code of the Composite TOE, stored in or
processed by the Security IC) means that an attacker is able to alter a meaningful block of data. This
should be considered for the threats T.Malfunction, T.Phys-Manipulation and T.Abuse-Func
 Disclosure of user data (which may include user data and code of the Composite TOE, stored in
protected memory areas or processed by the Security IC) or TSF data means that an attacker is
realistically3F2 able to determine a meaningful block of data. This should be considered for the threats
T.Leak-Inherent, T.Phys-Probing, T.Leak-Forced and T.Abuse-Func.
 Manipulation of the TSF or TSF data means that an attacker is able to deliberately deactivate or
otherwise change the behaviour of a specific security functionality in a manner which enables
exploitation. This should be considered for the threat T.Malfunction, T.Phys-Manipulation and
T.Abuse-Func.
76 The cloning of the functional behaviour of the Security IC on its physical and command interface is the
highest level security concern in the application context. This should be considered for the threat
T.Masquerade_TOE.
77 The cloning of that functional behaviour requires to (i) develop a functional equivalent of the Security IC
Embedded Software, (ii) disclose, interpret and employ the user data of the Composite TOE stored in the
TOE, and (iii) develop and build a functional equivalent of the Security IC using the input from the
previous steps.
78 The Security IC is a platform for the Security IC Embedded Software which ensures that especially the
critical user data of the Composite TOE are stored and processed in a secure way (refer to below). The
Security IC Embedded Software must also ensure that critical user data of the Composite TOE are treated as
required in the application context. In addition, the personalisation process supported by the Security IC
Embedded Software (and perhaps by the Security IC in addition) must be secure. This last step is beyond
the scope of this security target. As a result the threat “cloning of the functional behaviour of the Security
IC on its physical and command interface” is averted by the combination of mechanisms which split into
those being evaluated according to this security target (Security IC) and those being subject to the
evaluation of the Security IC Embedded Software or Security IC and the corresponding personalisation
process. Therefore, functional cloning is indirectly covered by the security concerns and threats described
below.
79 The high-level security concerns are refined below by defining threats as required by the Common Criteria
(refer to Figure 3). Note that manipulation of the TOE is only a means to threaten user data and is not a
success for the attacker in itself.
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Figure 3 Standard Threats
80 The high-level security concern related to security service is refined below by defining threats as required
by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 4).
T.RND
T.Mem-
Access
T.Masquerade_TOE
Figure 4 Threats related to security service
81 The Security IC Embedded Software must contribute to averting the threats: At least it must not undermine
the security provided by the TOE.
82 The above security concerns are derived from considering the end-usage phase (Phase 7) since
 Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are covered by assumptions and
 the development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE Delivery are covered
by an organisational security policy.
83 The TOE’s countermeasures are designed to avert the threats described below. Nevertheless, they may be
effective in earlier phases (Phases 4 to 6).
84 The TOE is exposed to different types of influences or interactions with its outer world. Some of them may
result from using the TOE only but others may also indicate an attack. The different types of influences or
interactions are visualised in Figure 5. Due to the intended usage of the TOE all interactions are considered
as possible.
T.Malfunction
T.Phys-Probing T.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func
T.Phys-Manipulation T.Leak-Inherent
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Figure 5 Interactions between the TOE and its outer world
85 An interaction with the TOE can be done through the physical interfaces (Number 7 – 9 in Figure 5) which
are realised using contacts and/or a contactless interface. Influences or interactions with the TOE also occur
through the chip surface (Number 1 – 6 in Figure 5). In Number 1 and 6 galvanic contacts are used. In
Number 2 and 5 the influence (arrow directed to the chip) or the measurement (arrow starts from the chip)
does not require a contact. Number 3 and 4 refer to specific situations where the TOE and its functional
behaviour is not only influenced but definite changes are made by applying mechanical, chemical and other
methods (such as 1, 2). Many attacks require a prior inspection and some reverse-engineering (Number 3).
This demonstrates the basic building blocks of attacks. A practical attack will use a combination of these
elements.
3.2.1 Standard Threats
86 The TOE shall avert the threat “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” as specified below.
T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during usage
of the Security IC in order to disclose confidential user data as part of the assets.
87 No direct contact with the Security IC internals is required here. Leakage may occur through emanations,
variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time
requirements. One example is the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). This leakage may be interpreted as a
covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which
may be derived either from direct (contact) measurements (Numbers 6 and 7 in Figure 5) or measurement
of emanations (Number 5 in Figure 5) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed.
88 The TOE shall avert the threat “Physical Probing (T.Phys-Probing)” as specified below.
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T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
An attacker may perform physical probing of the TOE in order (i) to disclose user
data while stored in protected memory areas, (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the user
data while processed or (iii) to disclose other critical information about the
operation of the TOE to enable attacks disclosing or manipulating the user data
of the Composite TOE or the Security IC Embedded Software.
89 Physical probing requires direct interaction with the Security IC internals (Numbers 5 and 6 in Figure 5).
Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used.
Before that hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified (Number 3 in
Figure 5). Determination of software design including treatment of user data of the Composite TOE
may also be a pre-requisite.
90 This pertains to “measurements” using galvanic contacts or any type of charge interaction whereas
manipulations are considered under the threat “Physical Manipulation (T.Phys-Manipulation)”. The threats
“Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” and “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)“ may
use physical probing but require complex signal processing in addition.
91 The TOE shall avert the threat “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress (T.Malfunction)” as specified
below.
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the Security IC Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) modify security services
of the TOE or (ii) modify functions of the Security IC Embedded Software (iii)
deactivate or affect security mechanisms of the TOE to enable attacks disclosing
or manipulating the user data of the Composite TOE or the Security IC
Embedded Software. This may be achieved by operating the Security IC
outside the normal operating conditions (Numbers 1, 2 and 9 in Figure 5).
92 The modification of security services of the TOE may e.g. affect the quality of random numbers provided by
the random number generator up to undetected deactivation when the random number generator does not
produce random numbers and the Security IC Embedded Software gets constant values. In another case
errors are introduced in executing the Security IC Embedded Software. To exploit this an attacker needs
information about the functional operation, e.g. to introduce a temporary failure within a register used by
the Security IC Embedded Software with light or a power glitch.
93 The TOE shall avert the threat “Physical Manipulation (T.Phys-Manipulation)” as specified below.
T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
An attacker may physically modify the Security IC in order to (i) modify user
data of the Composite TOE, (ii) modify the Security IC Embedded Software, (iii)
modify or deactivate security services of the TOE, or (iv) modify security
mechanisms of the TOE to enable attacks disclosing or manipulating the user
data of the Composite TOE or the Security IC Embedded Software.
94 The modification may be achieved through techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis
(Numbers 1, 2 and 4 in Figure 5) and IC reverse engineering efforts (Number 3 in Figure 5). The
modification may result in the deactivation of a security feature. Before that hardware security mechanisms
and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of
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user data of the Composite TOE may also be a pre-requisite. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent
or temporary.
95 In contrast to malfunctions (refer to T.Malfunction) the attacker requires gathering significant knowledge
about the TOE’s internal construction here (Number 3 in Figure 5).
96 The TOE shall avert the threat “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)“ as specified below:
T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during usage
of the Security IC in order to disclose confidential user data of the Composite
TOE as part of the assets even if the information leakage is not inherent but
caused by the attacker.
97 This threat pertains to attacks where methods described in “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress”
(refer to T.Malfunction) and/or “Physical Manipulation” (refer to T.Phys-Manipulation) are used to cause
leakage from signals (Numbers 5, 6, 7 and 8 in Figure 5) which normally do not contain significant
information about secrets.
98 The TOE shall avert the threat “Abuse of Functionality (T.Abuse-Func)” as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE
Delivery in order to (i) disclose or manipulate user data of the Composite TOE, (ii)
manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security services of the TOE
or (iii) manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) functions of the
Security IC Embedded Software or (iv) enable an attack disclosing or
manipulating the the user data of the Composite TOE or the Security IC
Embedded Software.
3.2.2 Threats related to security services
99 The TOE shall avert the threat “Deficiency of Random Numbers (T.RND)” as specified below.
T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
An attacker may predict or obtain information about random numbers generated
by the TOE security service for instance because of a lack of entropy of the
random numbers provided.
An attacker may gather information about the random numbers produced by the TOE security service.
Because unpredictability is the main property of random numbers this may be a problem in case they are
used to generate cryptographic keys. The entropy provided by the random numbers must be appropriate
for the strength of the cryptographic algorithm, the key or the cryptographic variable is used for. Here the
attacker is expected to take advantage of statistical properties of the random numbers generated by the
TOE. Malfunctions or premature ageing are also considered which may assist in getting information about
random numbers.
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3.2.3 Threats related to additional TOE Specific Functionality
100 The TOE shall avert the additional threat “Memory Access Violation (T.Mem-Access)” as specified below.
T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation
Parts of the IC Smartcard Embedded Software may cause security violations by
accidentally or deliberately accessing restricted data (which may include code).
Any restrictions are defined by the security policy of the specific application
context and must be implemented by the Smartcard IC Embedded Software.
Clarification: This threat does not address the proper definition and management of the security rules
implemented by the Security IC Embedded Software, this being software design and correctness issue.This
threat addresses the reliability of the abstract machine targeted by the software implementation. To avert
the threat, the set of access rules provided by this TOE should be undefeated if operated according to the
provided guidance. The threat is not realized if the Security IC Embedded Software is designed or
implemented to grant access to restricted information. It is realized if an implemented access denial is
granted under unexpected conditions or if the execution machinery does not effectively control a controlled
access.
Here the attacker is expected to (i) take advantage of flaws in the design and/or the implementation of the
TOE memory access rules (refer to T.Abuse-Func but for functions available after TOE delivery), (ii)
introduce flaws by forcing operational conditions (refer to T.Malfunction) and/or by physical manipulation
(refer to T.Phys-Manipulation). This attacker is expected to have a high level potential of attack.
3.2.4 Threats related to Authentication of the Security IC
The TOE shall avert the threat “Masquerade the TOE (T. Masquerade_TOE)” as specified below.
T.Masquerade_TOE Masquerade the TOE
An attacker may threaten the property being a genuine TOE by producing a chip
which is not a genuine TOE but wrongly identifying itself as genuine TOE sample.
The threat T.Masquerade_TOE may threaten the unique identity of the TOE as described in the P.Process-
TOE or the property as being a genuine TOE without unique identity. Mitigation of masquerade requires
tightening up the identification by authentication.
3.2.5 Threats related to Diffusion of open samples
The TOE shall avert the threat “Diffusion of open samples(T.Open_Samples_Diffusion)” as specified below.
T.Open_Samples_Diffusion Diffusion of open samples
An attacker may get access to open samples of the TOE and use them to gain
information about the TSF (loader, memory management unit, ROM code, …). He
may also use the open samples to characterize the behavior of the IC and its
security functionalities (for example: characterization of side channel profiles,
perturbation cartography, …). The execution of a dedicated security features (for
example: execution of a DES computation without countermeasures or by de-
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activating countermeasures) through the loading of an adequate code would
allow this kind of characterization and the execution of enhanced attacks on the
IC.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
101 The following Figure 6 shows the policies applied in this Security Target.
P.Process-
TOE
P.Crypto-
Service
P.Lim_Block_Lo
ader P.Ctlr_Loader
Figure 6 Policies
102 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Identification during TOE Development and
Production (P.Process-TOE)” as specified below.
P.Process-TOE Identification during TOE Development and Production
An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that
each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification.
103 The accurate identification is introduced at the end of the production test in phase 3. Therefore the
production environment must support this unique identification.
104 The information and material produced and/or processed by the TOE Manufacturer in the TOE
development and production environment (Phases 2 up to TOE Delivery) can be grouped as follows:
 logical design data,
 physical design data,
 IC Dedicated Software, Security IC Embedded Software, Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation
Data,
 specific development aids,
 test and characterisation related data,
 material for software development support, and
 photomasks and products in any form
as long as they are generated, stored, or processed by the TOE Manufacturer.
105 The TOE provides specific cryptographic services which can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software.
In the following specific cryptographic services are listed which is not derived from threats identified for
the TOE’s environment because it can only be decided in the context of the smartcard applications, against
which threats the Smartcard Embedded Software will use the specific cryptographic service.
The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Cryptographic Service (P.Crypto-Service)” as
specified below.
P.Crypto-Service Cryptographic Services provided by the TOE
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The TOE shall provide the following cryptographic services to the IC Embedded
Software:
 Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES)
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key asymmetric cryptography
(optional)
 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) (optional)
 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) (optional)
Note: The TOE can be delivered without the RSA/ECC/SHA crypto library. In this case the TOE does not
provide the Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography and Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).
The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the organisational security policy “Limiting and Blocking
the Loader Functionality (P.Lim_Block_Loader)” applies to Loader dedicated for usage in secured
environment specified below.
P.Lim_Block_Loader Limiting and Blocking the Loader Functionality
The composite manufacturer uses the Loader for loading of Security IC
Embedded Software, user data of the Composite Product or IC Dedicated
Support Software in charge of the IC Manufacturer. He limits the capability and
blocks the availability of the Loader in order to protect stored data from
disclosure and manipulation.
The organizational security policy “Controlled usage to Loader Functionality (P.Ctlr_Loader)” applies to
Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only.
P.Ctlr_Loader Controlled usage to Loader Functionality
Authorized user controls the usage of the Loader functionality in order to protect
stored and loaded user data from disclosure and manipulation.
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3.4 Assumptions
106 The following Figure 7 shows the assumptions applied in this Security Target.
A.Process-Sec-IC A.Key-Function
A.Resp-Appl
Figure 7 Assumptions
107 The intended usage of the TOE is twofold, depending on the Life Cycle Phase: (i) The Security IC
Embedded Software developer use it as a platform for the Security IC software being developed. The
Composite Product Manufacturer (and the consumer) uses it as a part of the Security IC. The Composite
Product is used in a terminal which supplies the Security IC (with power and clock) and (at least) mediates
the communication with the Security IC Embedded Software.
108 Before being delivered to the consumer the TOE is packaged. Many attacks require the TOE to be removed
from the carrier. Though this extra step adds difficulties for the attacker no specific assumptions are made
here regarding the package.
109 Appropriate “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Sec-IC)” must be
ensured after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the delivery to Phase 7 as specified
below.
A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the
TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to
prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).
This means that the Phases after TOE Delivery are assumed to be protected
appropriately.
110 The information and material produced and/or processed by the Security IC Embedded Software
Developer in Phase 1 and by the Composite Product Manufacturer can be grouped as follows:
 the Security IC Embedded Software including specifications, implementation and related
documentation,
 Pre-personalisation Data and Personalisation Data including specifications of formats and memory
areas, test related data,
 the user data of the Composite TOE and related documentation, and
 material for software development support
111 as long as they are not under the control of the TOE Manufacturer. Details must be defined in the
Protection Profile or Security Target for the evaluation of the Security IC Embedded Software and/or
Security IC.
112 The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate usage of Security IC
while developing this software in Phase 1 as described in the (i) TOE guidance documents (refer to the
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Common Criteria assurance class AGD) such as the hardware data sheet, and the hardware application
notes, and (ii) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security IC Embedded Software as
documented in the certification report.
113 The Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Treatment of user data of the Composite
TOE (A.Resp-Appl)” as specified below.
A.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE
All user data of the Composite TOE are owned by Security IC Embedded
Software. Therefore, it must be assumed that security relevant user data of the
Composite TOE (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Security IC
Embedded Software as defined for its specific application context.
114 The application context specifies how the user data of the Composite TOE shall be handled and protected.
The evaluation of the Security IC according to this Security Target is conducted on generalized application
context. The concrete requirements for the Security IC Embedded Software shall be defined in the
Protection Profile respective Security Target for the Security IC Embedded Software. The Security IC cannot
prevent any compromise or modification of user data of the Composite TOE by malicious Security IC
Embedded Software.
115 The developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Usage of Key-
dependent Functions (A.Key-Function)” while developing this software in Phase 1 as specified below.
A.Key-Function Usage of Key-dependent Functions
Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Smartcard
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage attacks (as
described under T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced).
116 Note that here the routines which may compromise keys when being executed are part of the Smartcard
Embedded Software. In contrast to this the threats T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced address (i) the
cryptographic routines which are part of the TOE and (ii) the processing of User Data including
cryptographic keys.
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4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
117 This chapter Security Objectives contains the following sections:
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software
4.3 Security Objectives for the operational Environment
4.4 Security Objectives Rationale
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4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
118 The user have the following standard high-level security goals related to the assets:
SG1 maintain the integrity user data (when being executed/processed and when being stored
in the TOE’s memories) as well as
SG2 maintain the confidentiality of user data (when being processed and when being stored in
the TOE’s protected memories).
SG3 maintain the correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the
Security IC Embedded Software.
119 Note, the Security IC may not distinguish between user data which are public known or kept confidential.
Therefore the security IC shall protect the user data in integrity and in confidentiality if stored in protected
memory areas, unless the Security IC Embedded Software chooses to disclose or modify it. Parts of the
Security IC Embedded Software which do not contain secret data or security critical source code, may not
require protection from being disclosed. Other parts of the Security IC Embedded Software may need kept
confidential since specific implementation details may assist an attacker.
120 These standard high-level security goals in the context of the security problem definition build the starting
point for the definition of security objectives as required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 8). Note
that the integrity of the TOE is a means to reach these objectives.
O.Abuse_Func
O.Leak-Forced
O.Identification
O.Leak-Inherent
O.Malfunction
O.Phys-Probing
O.Phys-Manipulation
Figure 8 Standard Security Objectives
121 According to the Protection Profile there is the following high-level security goal related to specific
functionality:
122 SG4 provide random numbers.
123 The additional high-level security considerations are refined below by defining security objectives as
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required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 9).
Figure 9 Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality
4.1.1 Standard Security Objectives
124 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Inherent Information Leakage (O.Leak-Inherent)” as specified
below.
O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential data (User
Data or TSF data) stored and/or processed in the Smartcard IC
● by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals (for
example on the power, clock, or I/O lines) and
● by measurement and analysis of the time between events found by
measuring signals (for instance on the power, clock, or I/O lines).
This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal
processing whereas O.Phys-Probing is about direct measurements on elements
on the chip surface. Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is
not given here.
125 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Physical Probing (O.Phys-Probing)” as specified below.
O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
O.Cap_Avail_Loader O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader
O.RND
O.AES
O.Mem-Access O.Authentication
O.TDES
O.Prot_TSF_Confidenti
ality
O.SHA
O.RSA O.ECDSA O.ECDH
O.EdDSA O.X25519
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The TOE must provide protection against disclosure/reconstruction of user data
while stored in protected memory areas and processed or against the disclosure
of other critical information about the operation of the TOE.
This includes protection against
● measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the
chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for
measuring voltage and current) or
● measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC
failure analysis)
with a prior reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and
functions.
The TOE must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high combination
of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed
design information or other information which could be used to compromise
security through such a physical attack.
126 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Malfunctions (O.Malfunction)” as specified below.
O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation.
The TOE must indicate or prevent its operation outside the normal operating
conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested.
This is to prevent malfunctions. Examples of environmental conditions are
voltage, clock frequency, temperature, or external energy fields.
Remark: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on the chip
surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective O.Phys-Manipulation) provided
that detailed knowledge about the TOE´s internal construction is required and the attack is performed in a
controlled manner.
127 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Physical Manipulation (O.Phys-Manipulation)” as specified
below.
O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
The TOE must provide protection against manipulation of the TOE (including its
software and TSF data), the Smartcard Embedded Software and the user data of
the Composite TOE. This includes protection against
● reverse-engineering (understanding the design and its properties and
functions),
● manipulation of the hardware and any data, as well as
● undetected manipulation of memory contents.
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The TOE must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high combination
of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed
design information or other information which could be used to compromise
security through such a physical attack.
128 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Forced Information Leakage (O.Leak-Forced)“ as specified
below:
O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
The Security IC must be protected against disclosure of confidential data
processed in the Security IC (using methods as described under O.Leak-Inherent)
even if the information leakage is not inherent but caused by the attacker
● by forcing a malfunction (refer to “Protection against Malfunction due to
Environmental Stress (O.Malfunction)” and/or
● by a physical manipulation (refer to “Protection against Physical
Manipulation (O.Phys-Manipulation)”.
If this is not the case, signals which normally do not contain significant
information about secrets could become an information channel for a leakage
attack.
129 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Abuse of Functionality (O.Abuse-Func)” as specified below.
O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after
TOE Delivery can be abused in order to (i) disclose critical user data of the
Composite TOE, (ii) manipulate critical user data of the Composite TOE, (iii)
manipulate Security IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or
explore security features or security services of the TOE. Details depend, for
instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated
Test Software which are not specified here.
130 The TOE shall provide “TOE Identification (O.Identification)“ as specified below:
O.Identification TOE Identification
The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation
Data in its non-volatile memory. The Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are
used for TOE identification.
4.1.2 Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality (referring to SG4)
131 The TOE shall provide “Random Numbers (O.RND)” as specified below.
O.RND Random Numbers
The TOE will ensure the cryptographic quality of random number generation.
For instance random numbers shall not be predictable and shall have sufficient
entropy.
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The TOE will ensure that no information about the produced random numbers is
available to an attacker since they might be used for instance to generate
cryptographic keys.
4.1.3 Security Objectives for Added Function
132 The TOE shall provide “Area based Memory Access Control (O.Mem-Access)” as specified below.
O.Mem-Access Area based Memory Access Control
The TOE must provide the Smartcard Embedded Software with the capability to
define restricted access memory areas. The TOE must then enforce the
partitioning of such memory areas so that access of software to memory areas is
controlled as required, for example, in a multi-application environment.
133 The TOE shall provide “Capability and availability of the Loader (O.Cap_Avail_Loader)” as specified
below.
O.Cap_Avail_Loader Capability and availability of the Loader
The TSF provides limited capability of the Loader functionality and
irreversible termination of the Loader in order to protect stored user
data from disclosure and manipulation.
134 The TOE shall provide “Access control and authenticity for the Loader (O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader)” as specified
below.
O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader Access control and authenticity for the Loader
The TSF provides trusted communication channel with authorized user,
supports confidentiality protection and authentication of the user data
to be loaded and access control for usage of the Loader functionality.
135 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service Triple-DES (O.TDES)” as specified below.
O.TDES Cryptographic service Triple-DES
The TOE provides secure hardware based cryptographic services implementing
the Triple-DES for encryption and decryption.
136 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service AES (O.AES)” as specified below.
O.AES Cryptographic service AES
The TOE provides secure hardware based cryptographic services for the AES
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for encryption and decryption.
137 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service Hash function (O.SHA)” as specified below.
O.SHA Cryptographic service Hash function
The TOE provides secure software based cryptographic services for secure
hash calculation.
138 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (O.RSA)” as specified below.
O.RSA Cryptographic service Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
The TOE provides secure software based cryptographic services for
Cryptographic operation and Cryptographic key generation.
139 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service Elliptic Curve DSA (O.ECDSA)” as specified below.
O.ECDSA Cryptographic service Elliptic Curve DSA
The TOE provides secure software based cryptographic services for
Cryptographic operation and Cryptographic key generation.
140 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (O.ECDH)” as specified
below.
O.ECDH Cryptographic service Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
The TOE provides secure software based cryptographic services for
Cryptographic operation.
141 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service Edwards-curve DSA (O.EdDSA)” as specified below.
O.EdDSA Cryptographic service Edwards-curve DSA
The TOE provides secure software based cryptographic services for
Cryptographic operation and Cryptographic key generation.
142 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with curve25519 (O.X25519)”
as specified below.
O.X25519 Cryptographic service Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with curve25519
The TOE provides secure software based cryptographic services for
Cryptographic operation.
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143 The Security IC Embedded Software shall provide “Authentication to external entities (O.Authentication)”
as specified below.
O. Authentication Authentication to external entities
The TOE shall be able to authenticate itself to external entities. The Initialisation
Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE authentication verification data.
144 The TOE shall provide “Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF (O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality)” as
specified below.
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential operations of
the Security IC (loader, memory management unit, …) through the use of a
dedicated code loaded on open samples.
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software
145 The development of the Security IC Embedded Software is outside the development and manufacturing of
the TOE. The Security IC Embedded Software defines the operational use of the TOE. This section describes
the security objective for the Security IC Embedded Software.
Note, in order to ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the Security IC Embedded Software shall
be designed so that the requirements from the following documents are met: (i) hardware data sheet for the
TOE, (ii) data sheet of the IC Dedicated Software of the TOE, (iii) TOE application notes, other guidance
documents, and (iv) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security IC Embedded Software
as referenced in the certification report.
146 The Security IC Embedded Software shall provide “Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE
(OE.Resp-Appl)” as specified below.
OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE
Security relevant user data of the Composite TOE (especially cryptographic keys)
are treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as required by the security
needs of the specific application context.
For example the Security IC Embedded Software will not disclose security relevant user data of the
Composite TOE to unauthorised users or processes when communicating with a terminal.
4.2.1 Clarification of “Treatment of User Data of the Composite TOE(OE.Resp-Appl)”
147 Regarding the cryptographic services this objective of the environment has to be clarified. By definition
cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys are User Data. The Smartcard Embedded Software shall
treat these data appropriately, use only proper secret keys (chosen from a large key space) as input for the
cryptographic function of the TOE and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength
of cryptographic operation.
148 This means that keys are treated as confidential as soon as they are generated. The keys must be unique
with a very high probability, as well as cryptographically strong. If keys are imported into the TOE and/or
derived from other keys, quality and confidentiality must be maintained. This implies that appropriate key
management has to be realised in the environment.
149 Regarding the area based access control this objective of the environment has to be clarified. The treatment
of User Data of the Composite TOE is also required when a multi-application operating system is
implemented as part of the Smartcard Embedded Software on the TOE. In this case the multi-application
operating system should not disclose security relevant user data of one application to another application
when it is processed or stored on the TOE.
4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
TOE Delivery up to the End of Phase 6
150 Appropriate “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (OE.Process-Sec-IC)” must be
ensured after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phases 6, as well as during the delivery to Phase 7 as specified
below.
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
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Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to delivery to the "end-
consumer" to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its
manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification,
retention, theft or unauthorised use).
This means that Phases after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 must be
protected appropriately.
The operational environment of the TOE shall provide “Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader
(OE.Lim_Block_Loader)” as specified below.
OE.Lim_Block_Loader Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader
The Composite Product Manufacturer will protect the Loader functionality
against misuse, limit the capability of the Loader and terminate irreversibly the
Loader after intended usage of the Loader and before the end of phase 5.
Note: To maintain the confidentiality of the data of the composite TOE, the
intended usage of the Loader is limited to the phase 5 of the life cycle.
The operational environment of the TOE shall provide “Secure communication and usage of the Loader
(OE.Loader_Usage)” as specified below.
OE.Loader_Usage Secure communication and usage of the Loader
The authorized user must support the trusted communication channel with the
TOE by confidentiality protection and authenticity proof of the data to be loaded
and fulfilling the access conditions required by the Loader
The operational environment shall provide “External entities authenticating of the TOE (OE.TOE_Auth)”.
OE.TOE_Auth External entities authenticating of the TOE
The operational environment shall support the authentication verification
mechanism and know authentication reference data of the TOE.
4.3.1 Clarification of “Protection during Composite Product Manufacturing (OE.Process-Sec-IC)”
151 The protection during packaging, finishing and personalization includes also the personalization process
and the personalization data during Phase 4, Phase 5 and Phase 6.
152 Since OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the Composite Product Manufacturer to implement those measures
assumed in A.Process-Sec-IC, the assumption is covered by this objective.
4.4 Security Objectives Rationale
153 Table 4 below gives an overview, how the assumptions, threats, and organisational security policies are
addressed by the objectives. The text following after the table justifies this in detail.
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Assumption, Threat or
Organisational Security
Policy
Security Objective Notes
A.Resp-Appl OE.Resp-Appl Phase 1
P.Process-TOE O.Identification Phase 2 – 3
optional
Phase 4
A.Process-Sec-IC OE.Process-Sec-IC Phase 5 – 6
optional
Phase 4
T.Leak-Inherent O.Leak-Inherent
T.Phys-Probing O.Phys-Probing
T.Malfunction O.Malfunction
T.Phys-Manipulation O.Phys-Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced O.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func O.Abuse-Func
T.RND O.RND
T.Mem-Access O.Mem-Access
P.Crypto-Service O.TDES
O.AES
O.RSA
O.ECDSA
O.ECDH
O.EdDSA,
O.X25519,
O.SHA
A.Key-Function OE.Resp-Appl
P.Lim_Block_Loader O.Cap_Avail_Loader
OE.Lim_Block_Loader
Phase 5
P.Ctlr_Loader O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader
OE.Loader_Usage
Phase 5
T.Masquerade_TOE O.Authentication
OE.TOE_Auth
T.Open_Samples_Diffusion O.Prot_TSF_Confidentia
lity
O.Leak-Inherent
O.Leak-Forced
Phase 4, 5
Table 4 Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies
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154 The justification related to the assumption “Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE (A.Resp-Appl)” is
as follows:
155 Since OE.Resp-Appl requires the Security IC Embedded Software to implement measures as assumed in
A.Resp-Appl, the assumption is covered by the objective.
156 The justification related to the organisational security policy “Protection during TOE Development and
Production (P.Process-TOE)” is as follows:
157 O.Identification requires that the TOE has to support the possibility of a unique identification. The unique
identification can be stored on the TOE. Since the unique identification is generated by the production
environment the production environment must support the integrity of the generated unique identification.
The technical and organisational security measures that ensure the security of the development
environment and production environment are evaluated based on the assurance measures that are part of
the evaluation. For a list of material produced and processed by the TOE Manufacturer refer to paragraph
44. All listed items and the associated development and production environments are subject of the
evaluation. Therefore, the organisational security policy P.Process-TOE is covered by this objective, as far as
organisational measures are concerned.
158 The justification related to the assumption “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
(A.Process-Sec-IC)” is as follows:
159 Since OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the Composite Product Manufacturer to implement those measures
assumed in A.Process-Sec-IC, the assumption is covered by this objective.
160 The justification related to the threats “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)”, “Physical Probing
(T.Phys-Probing)”, “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress (T.Malfunction)”, “Physical Manipulation
(T.Phys-Manipulation)”, “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)“, “Abuse of Functionality (T.Abuse-
Func)” and “Deficiency of Random Numbers (T.RND)” is as follows:
161 For all threats the corresponding objectives are stated in a way, which directly corresponds to the
description of the threat. It is clear from the description of each objective, that the corresponding threat is
removed if the objective is valid. More specifically, in every case the ability to use the attack method
successfully is countered, if the objective holds.
162 The justification related to the threat “Memory Access Violation (T.Mem-Access)” is as follows:
163 According to O.Mem-Access the TOE must enforce the partitioning of memory areas so that access of
software to memory areas is controlled. Any restrictions are to be defined by the Smartcard Embedded
Software. Thereby security violations caused by accidental or deliberate access to restricted data (which
may include code) can be prevented (refer to T.Mem-Access). The threat T.Mem-Access is therefore
removed if the objective is met.
164 The clarification of O.Mem-Access makes clear that it is up to the Smartcard Embedded Software to
implement the memory management scheme by appropriately administrating the TSF. The TOE shall
provide access control functions as a means to be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. This is
further emphasised by the clarification of Treatment of User Data of the Composite TOE(OE.Resp-Appl)
which reminds that the Smartcard Embedded Software must not undermine the restrictions it defines.
Therefore, the clarifications contribute to the coverage of the threat T.Mem-Access. .
165 Compared to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile a clarification has been made for the security
objective “Treatment of User Data of the Composite TOE(OE.Resp-Appl)”: By definition cipher or plain text
data and cryptographic keys are User Data. So, the Smartcard Embedded Software will protect such data if
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required and use keys and functions appropriately in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic
operation. Quality and confidentiality must be maintained for keys that are imported and/or derived from
other keys. This implies that appropriate key management has to be realised in the environment. That is
expressed by the assumption A.Key—Function which is covered from OE.Resp–Appl. These measures
make sure that the assumption A.Resp-Appl is still covered by the security objective OE.Resp-Appl.
166 The organisational security policy Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader (P.Lim_Block_Loader)
is directly implemented by the security objective for the TOE “Capability and availability of the Loader
(O.Cap_Avail_Loader)” and the security objective for the TOE environment “Limitation of capability and
blocking the Loader (OE.Lim_Block_Loader)”. The TOE security objective “Capability and availability of
the Loader” (O.Cap_Avail_Loader)” mitigates also the threat “Abuse of Functionality “ (T.Abuse-Func) if
attacker tries to misuse the Loader functionality in order to manipulate security services of the TOE
provided or depending on IC Dedicated Support Software or user data of the TOE as IC Embedded
Software, TSF data or user data of the smartcard product.
167 The organisational security policy “Controlled usage to Loader Functionality (P.Ctlr_Loader) is directly
implemented by the security objective for the TOE “Access control and authenticity for the Loader
(O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader)” and the security objective for the TOE environment “Secure communication and
usage of the Loader (OE.Loader_Usage)”.
168 The threat “Masquerade the TOE (T.Masquerade_TOE)” is directly covered by the TOE security objective
“Authentication to external entities (O.Authentication)” describing the proving part of the authentication
and the security objective for the operational environment of the TOE “External entities authenticating of
the TOE (OE.TOE_Auth)” the verifying part of the authentication.
169 The justification related to the security objectives O.TDES, O.AES, O.RSA, O.ECDSA, O.ECDH, O.EdDSA,
O.X25519 and O.SHA are followings: Since these objectives require the TOE to implement the same specific
security functionality as required by P.Crypto-Service, the organization security policy is covered by the
objective.
170 The threat “Diffusion of open samples” (T.Open_Samples_Diffusion) is directly covered by the TOE
security objective “Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF” (O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality) based on the
self-protection of the TOE and the authentication mechanism of the Loader. Additionally to
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality (Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF), T.Open_Samples_Diffusion threat
is countered by O.Leak-Inherent (Protection against Inherent Information Leakage) and O.Leak-Forced
(Protection against Forced Information Leakage) from the PP.
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5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
171 This chapter 5 Extended Components Definition contains the following sections:
5.1 Definition of the family FCS_RNG
5.2 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
5.3 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
5.4 Definition of the Family FDP_SDC
5.5 Definition of the Family FIA_API
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5.1 Definition of the Family FCS_RNG
172 To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FCS_RNG) of the Class
FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for random
number generation used for cryptographic purposes.
FCS_RNG Generation of Random Numbers
173 Family behaviour
174 This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be
used for cryptographic purposes.
175 Component levelling:
FCS_RNG.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined
quality metric.
Management: FCS_RNG.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RNG.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid
physical, hybrid deterministic] random number generator that implements:
[assignment: list of security capabilities].
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide [selection: bits, octets of bits, numbers [assignment: format of
the numbers]] that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
5.2 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
176 To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FMT_LIM) of the Class
FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the Test
Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the
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TOE appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the
capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
177 The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined
manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the component Limited Capability
of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component levelling:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities
(perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by
removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
178 The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability policy].
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
179 The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
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FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited availability policy].
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
Application note: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are
two types of mechanisms (limitation of capabilities and limitation of availability)
which together shall provide protection in order to enforce the same policy or two
mutual supportive policies related to the same functionality. This allows e.g. that
(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user
environment but its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
(ii) the TSF is designed with high functionality but is removed or disabled in the
product in its user environment.
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5.3 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
180 To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FAU_SAS) of the Class
FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of
audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data
to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit
records.
181 The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: list of subjects] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the [assignment: type of persistent memory].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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5.4 Definition of the Family FDP_SDC
182 To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FDP_SDC.1) of the Class
FDP (User data protection) is defined here.
183 The family “Stored data confidentiality (FDP_SDC)” is specified as follows.
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
Family behavior
This family provides requirements that address protection of user data confidentiality while these data are
stored within memory areas protected by the TSF. The TSF provides access to the data in the memory
through the specified interfaces only and prevents compromise of their information bypassing these
interfaces. It complements the family “Stored data integrity (FDP_SDI)” which protects the user data from
integrity errors while being stored in the memory.
Component leveling
184 FDP_SDC.1 Requires the TOE to protect the confidentiality of information of the user data in specified
memory areas.
Management: FDP_SDC.1.
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FDP_SDC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
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FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user data while it
is stored in the [assignment: memory area]
5.5 Definition of the Family FIA_API
2 To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a functional family FIA_API
(Authentication Proof of Identity) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This
family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity by the TOE and enables
the authentication verification by an external entity. The other families of the class FIA address the
verification of the identity of an external entity by the TOE.
3 The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication verification of users’ identity
performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of the user to prove their identity. The
following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [3],
chapter “Extended components definition (APE_ECD)”) from a TOE point of view.
4 The family “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API)” is specified as follows.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
5 This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove its identity and to be verified by an external
entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity, provides proof of the identity of the TOE, an object or an authoriz
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Audit: FIA_API.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the
identity of
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the [selection: TOE, [assignment: object, authorized user or role]] to an external entity.
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6 IT security requirements
185 This chapter 6 IT Security Requirements contains the following sections:
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
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6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
186 In order to define the Security Functional Requirements the Part 2 of the Common Criteria was used.
However, some Security Functional Requirements have been refined. The refinements are described below
the associated SFR. The operations completed in the ST are marked in italic font.
6.1.1 Malfunctions
187 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)” as specified below.
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Hierarchical to: FRU_FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerance
FRU_FLT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE’s capabilities when the
following failures occur: exposure to operating conditions which are not detected
according to the requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1).
Dependencies: FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Refinement: The term “failure” above means “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures for
the “circumstances” defined above.
Application Note 13: Environmental conditions include but are not limited to power supply, clock,
and other external signals (e.g. reset signal) necessary for the TOE operation.
188 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as specified
below.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement
Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur.
Dependencies: No dependencies
Refinement: The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures
for the “circumstances” defined above.
Application note: The secure state is maintained by TOE’s detectors. The TOE’s detectors are
monitoring the failure occurs. The failures are abnormal detectors that detect out of the
specified range. If the failures are happen, the TOE goes into secure state. This satisfies
the FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state.
6.1.2 Abuse of Functionality
189 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
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FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not
allow user data of the Composite TOE to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be
disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information
about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
190 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow user data of the
Composite TOE to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to
be gathered which may enable other attacks
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
191 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery with the capability to
store the Initialisation Data and/or Prepersonalisation Data and/or supplements of the
Smartcard Embedded Software in the Test ROM area.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Application Note: The integrity and uniqueness of the unique identification of the TOE must be
supported by the development, production and test environment.
6.1.3 Physical Manipulation and Probing
192 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data confidentiality (FDP_SDC.1)” as specified below.
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP.SDC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user data while it
is stored in the FLASH, RAM or ROM.
193 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)” as specified
below.
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for
error on all objects, based on the following attributes: FLASH, RAM or ROM read
operation.
FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall enforce a device RESET or an
interrupt.
Application Note: This requirement is achieved by security features such internal encryption and
scrambling mechanisms.
194 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified below.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Refinement: The TSF will implement appropriate mechanisms to continuously counter
physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks
(especially manipulation) the TSF can by no means detect attacks on all of its
elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required
ensuring that security functional requirements are enforced. Hence, “automatic
response” means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and
(ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.
Application Note: This requirement is achieved by security feature as the shield must be removed
and bypassed in order to perform physical intrusive attacks. The TOE makes
appropriate secure reaction to stop operation if a physical manipulation or
physical probing attack is detected. And also internal scrambling & encryption
for memories and logic area make the reverse-engineering of the TOE layout
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unpractical. So these functionalities meet the security functional requirement of
FPT_PHP.3: Resistance to physical attack.
6.1.4 Leakage
195 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1)” as specified below.
FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy to prevent the disclosure of user
data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
Refinement: The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a
cryptographic co-processor) are seen as physically-separated parts of the TOE.
196 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1)” as specified
below.
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure when it is transmitted between
separate parts of the TOE.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Refinement: The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a
cryptographic co-processor) are seen as separated parts of the TOE.
This requirement is equivalent to FDP_ITT.1 above but refers to TSF data instead of user data. Therefore,
it should be understood as to refer to the same Data Processing Policy defined under FDP_IFC.1 below.
197 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)”as specified below:
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy on all confidential data when they are
processed or transferred by the TOE or by the Security IC Embedded Software.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
198 The following Security Function Policy (SFP) Data Processing Policy is defined for the requirement “ Subset
information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)”:
User data of the Composite TOE and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except when the
Security IC Embedded Software decides to communicate the user data of the Composite TOE via an
external interface. The protection shall be applied to confidential data only but without the distinction of
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attributes controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software.
6.1.5 Random Numbers (DTRNG FRO M)
199 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RNG.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2 Random number generation - PTG.2
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RNG.1.1/PTG.2 The TSF shall provide a physical true random number generator that implements:
(PTG.2.1) A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG has
started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be output.
(PTG.2.2) If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the RNG
prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random
numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source
(PTG.2.3) The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random number
sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is being
operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up online test
has finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.
(PTG.2.4) The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the random
numbers soon.
(PTG.2.5) The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number sequence. It is
triggered, externally applied upon specified internal events (i.e., crypto key generation).
The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical defects of the statistical
properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period of time
FCS_RNG.1.2/PTG.2 The TSF shall provide numbers, 16-bit per number that meet:
(PTG.2.6) Test procedure A does not distinguish the internal random numbers from
output sequences of an ideal RNG.
(PTG.2.7) The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.997.
Application Note: The DTRNG FRO library comprises some functions that perform statistical tests
on the DTRNG FRO output. If either test fails, the function returns an error value
and the DTRNG FRO is shut down. Those functions are described in DTRNG
FRO Application note in detail and are available to embedded software.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC Random number generation – RGS-IC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RNG.1.1/RGS-IC The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that implements:
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- the rules RègleArchiGVA-1 and the recommendation RecomArchiGVA-1 of [18] ;
- total failure tests and online tests.
FCS_RNG.1.2/RGS-IC The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet the rule RègleArchiGVA-2 of [18].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Warning: The TSF fulfils some but not all the necessary rules to comply with [18] regarding
random numbers generators (RNG). The composite product's RNG will comply
with [18] only when all the rules of §2.4 "Génération d'aléa cryptographique" of
[18] are addressed. In particular, a cryptographic post-processing must be
implemented by the composite developer.
6.1.6 Memory Access Control
200 Usage of multiple applications in one Smartcard often requires separating code and data in order to prevent
that one application can access code and/or data of another application. To support the TOE provides Area
based Memory Access Control.
201 The security service being provided is described in the Security Function Policy (SFP) Memory Access
Control Policy. The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” requires that this
policy is in place and defines the scope were it applies. The security functional requirement “Security
attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” defines addresses security attribute usage and characteristics
of policies. It describes the rules for the function that implements the Security Function Policy (SFP) as
identified in FDP_ACC.1. The decision whether an access is permitted or not is taken based upon attributes
allocated to the software. The user software defines the attributes and memory areas. The corresponding
permission control information is evaluated “on-the-fly” by the hardware so that access is
granted/effective or denied/inoperable.
202 The security functional requirement “Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3)” ensures that the default
values of security attributes are appropriately either permissive or restrictive in nature. Alternative values
can be specified by any subject provided that the Memory Access Control Policy allows that. This is
described by the security functional requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)”. The
attributes are determined during TOE manufacturing (FMT_MSA.3) or set at run-time (FMT_MSA.1).
203 From TOE´s point of view the different roles in the user software can be distinguished according to the
memory based access control. However the definition of the roles belongs to the user software.
204 The following Security Function Policy (SFP) Memory Access Control Policy is defined for the requirement
“Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)”:
Memory Access Control Policy
The TOE shall control read, write, delete, and execute accesses of software
running at between two different modes (privilege and user mode) on data
including code stored in memory areas.
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The TOE shall restrict the ability to define, to change or at least to finally accept
the applied rules (as mentioned in FDP_ACF.1) to software with privilege mode).
205 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy on all subjects (software
with privilege mode and user mode), all objects (data including code stored in memories)
and all the operations defined in the Memory Access Control Policy.
Subjects are software codes in Privilege and User mode.
Objects are data stored in ROM, RAM and FLASH memories.
Refinement
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as specified
below.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
The attributes are all the operations related to the data stored in memories, which
are the read, write and execute operations.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to objects based on the
following: memory area where the software is executed from and/or the memory area
where the read is performed to and/or the memory area where the write is performed to
and/or the operation to be performed.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: evaluate the corresponding
permission control information before the access so that accesses to be denied cannot be
utilised by the subject attempting to perform the operation.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)” as specified below.
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to provide well defined
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow any subject (provided that the Memory Access Control Policy is
enforced and the necessary access is therefore allowed) to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
206 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)” as specified below:
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to restrict the ability to
change default, modify or delete the security attributes permission control information
to running at privilege mode.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
207 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as specified
below:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
Hierarchical to: No other components
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management
functions: access the control registers of the MPU.
Dependencies: No dependencies
6.1.7 Cryptographic Support
208 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation requires, a cryptographic operation to be performed in accordance
with a specified algorithm and with a cryptographic key of specified sizes. The specified algorithm and
cryptographic key sizes can be based on an assigned standard.
209 The following additional specific security functionality is implemented in the TOE:
 Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) with 112bit or 168bit key size
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 128 bit, 192bit and 256bit key size
 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key asymmetric cryptography, with key size 1280-bit up to
4096-bit with a granularity of 2 bits (optional)
 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) (optional)
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 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) (optional)
6.1.8 Triple-DES Operation
210 The Triple DES (TDES) operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/TDES Cryptographic operation – TDES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) - ECB mode and
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit or 168 bit key size that meet the following: [FIPS
SP800-67], chapter 2 and 3. TOE implements TDES with key option 1 and 2 with ECB
mode.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
211 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction – TDES FCS_CKM.4/TDES)” as
specified below.
FCS_CKM.4/TDES Cryptographic Key destruction – TDES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/TDES The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting that meets the following: none.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
Application Note The cryptographic key destruction can be done by overwriting the internal
stored key when a new key value is provided through the key interface or by
TOE reset which provides randomization of the internal stored key.
6.1.9 AES Operation
212 The AES operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below.
FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation – AES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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FCS_COP.1.1/AES The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) - ECB mode and
cryptographic key sizes 128bit, 192bit or 256bit key size that meet the following:
[FIPS197], chapter 5.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
213 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.4/AES Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/AES The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting that meets the following: none.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
Application Note The cryptographic key destruction can be done by overwriting the internal
stored key when a new key value is provided through the key interface or by
TOE reset which provides randomization of the internal stored key.
6.1.10 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Operation (optional)
214 The AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA cryptographic library of the TOE shall meet the requirement
“Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/RSA Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA The TSF shall perform the modular exponentiation part of RSA signature generation
and verification in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA:standard RSA and RSA-CRT) and cryptographic key sizes
from 1280-bit up to 4096-bit with 2-bit granularity that meet the following standard:
[ISO/IEC14888-2:2008]] section 6.2 and 6.3.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
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6.1.11 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Key Generation (optional)
215 The RSA key generation for the AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library shall meet the requirement
“Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.1/RSA Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA and with the specified
cryptographic key sizes from 1280-bit up to 4096-bit with 2-bit granularity that meet
the following: [ETSI TS 102 176-1], section 6.2.2.1 Key and parameter generation
algorithm rsagen1.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
216 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.4/RSA Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/RSA The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting or zeroing that meets the
following: none.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
Application Note The key destruction FCS_CKM.4/RSA applies only for the keys stored by the
AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library in crypto. RAM and/or RAM. This internal
key storage can be cleared by hardware resetting.
Clearing of keys that are provided by the smartcard embedded software to the
AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library is under the responsibility of the smartcard
embedded software.
6.1.12 Elliptic Curve DSA Operation (optional)
217 The ECC library of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below.
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components
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FCS_COP.1.1/ECDSA The TSF shall perform the signature generation/verification in accordance with the
specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes from 192-bit
up to 512-bit that meet the following standard: [ANS X9.62] , section 7.3 Signing
Process and section 7.4 Verifying Process.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note1) The RSA/ECC/SHA library supports any valid curves over prime fields of
size from 192-bit to 512-bit. However standard curves listed below whose
security has been proven are in the scope of this evaluation. 1) [NIST
curves]: Curves P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 2) [Brainpool curves]:
brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP192t1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP224t1,
brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP256t1, brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP320t1,
brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP384t1, brainpoolP512r1, brainpoolP512t1, 3)
[SEC-recommended curves]: secp192k1, secp192r1, secp224k1, secp224r1,
secp256k1, secp256r1, secp384r1
6.1.13 Elliptic Curve DSA Key Generation (optional)
218 The key generation for the ECC library shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDSA The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with the cryptographic
key generation algorithm ECC and with the cryptographic key sizes from 192-bit
up to 512-bit that meet the following standard: [ANS X9.62], section A.4.3 Elliptic
Curve Key Generation.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note1) The RSA/ECC/SHA library supports any valid curves over prime fields of
size from 192-bit to 512-bit. However standard curves listed below whose
security has been proven are in the scope of this evaluation. 1) [NIST
curves]: Curves P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 2) [Brainpool curves]:
brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP192t1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP224t1,
brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP256t1, brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP320t1,
brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP384t1, brainpoolP512r1, brainpoolP512t1, 3)
[SEC-recommended curves]: secp192k1, secp192r1, secp224k1, secp224r1,
secp256k1, secp256r1, secp384r1
219 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below.
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FCS_CKM.4/ECDSA Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/ECDSA The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroing that meets the following: none.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
Application Note The key destruction FCS_CKM.4/ECDSA applies only for the keys stored by the
AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library in crypto. RAM and/or RAM. This internal
key storage can be cleared by hardware resetting.
Clearing of keys that are provided by the smartcard embedded software to the
AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library is under the responsibility of the smartcard
embedded software.
6.1.14 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Agreement (optional)
220 The ECC library of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below.
FCS_COP.1/ECDH Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components
FCS_COP.1.1/ECDH The TSF shall perform the key exchange in accordance with the specified
cryptographic algorithm ECDH and cryptographic key sizes from 192-bit up to 512-
bit that meet the following standard: [ANS X9.63], section 5.4.1 Standard Diffie-
Hellman primitive.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note1) The RSA/ECC/SHA library supports any valid curves over prime fields of
size from 192-bit to 512-bit. However standard curves listed below whose
security has been proven are in the scope of this evaluation. 1) [NIST
curves]: Curves P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 2) [Brainpool curves]:
brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP192t1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP224t1,
brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP256t1, brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP320t1,
brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP384t1, brainpoolP512r1, brainpoolP512t1,
3)[SEC-recommended curves]: secp192k1, secp192r1, secp224k1, secp224r1,
secp256k1, secp256r1, secp384r1
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Note2) The implemented routines can be used with ephemeral or static private keys.
The base point is assumed to be public.
Note3) For full compatibility, the user is responsible to perform step 2 of [ANS
X9.63], section 5.2.2.1, prior to using the ECDH_generate function.
221 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.4/ECDH Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/ECDH The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting or zeroing that meets the
following: none.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
Application Note The key destruction FCS_CKM.4/ECDH applies only for the keys stored by the
AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library in crypto. RAM and/or RAM. This internal
key storage can be cleared by hardware resetting.
Clearing of keys that are provided by the smartcard embedded software to the
AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library is under the responsibility of the smartcard
embedded software.
6.1.15 X25519(DH with curve25519) (optional)
222 The X25519 library of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below.
FCS_COP.1/X25519 Cryptographic key operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/ X25519 The TSF shall perform the key exchange in accordance with the specified
cryptographic algorithm X25519 and cryptographic key sizes 255bits that
meet the following standard: [RFC7748]
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note 1) The implemented routines can be used with ephemeral or static
private keys. The base point is assumed to be public.
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6.1.16 EdDSA_key_gen(Ephemeral or static key pair generation for EdDSA25519) (optional)
223 The key generation for the EdDSA25519 library shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.1/EdDSA25519 Cryptographic key operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/EdDSA25519 The TSF shall generate ECC cryptographic keys in accordance with the
cryptographic key generation algorithm specified in [RFC8032] and with
the cryptographic key size 255bits [RFC8032]
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note 1) The TOE offers the functionality of hash value computation
SHA-512.
224 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.4/EdDSA25519 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/EdDSA25519 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroing that meets the following: none.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
Application Note The key destruction FCS_CKM.4/EdDSA25519 applies only for the keys stored
by the AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library in crypto. RAM and/or RAM. This
internal key storage can be cleared by hardware resetting.
Clearing of keys that are provided by the smartcard embedded software to the
AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library is under the responsibility of the smartcard
embedded software.
6.1.17 EdDSA25519 (optional)
225 The EdDSA25519 library of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below.
FCS_COP.1/EdDSA25519 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/EdDSA25519 The TSF shall perform the signature generation/verification in accordance
with the specified cryptographic algorithm EdDSA25519 and
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cryptographic key size 255bits that meet the following standard:
[RFC8032]
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Note 1) The TOE offers the functionality of hash value computation SHA-512.
6.1.18 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) (optional)
The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform secure hash computation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 and
cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following standard: [FIPS 180-4].
Note1) The AE1 Secure libraries provides the functionalities for computation of hash
values. The use of these functionalities for keyed hash operations like
HMAC or similar, is not subject of this TOE and requires specific security
improvements and DPA analysis by the operating system which is not part
of the TOE. The SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 functionalities are
intended to be used for ECDSA signature generation and verification.
Note2) The TOE offers the functionality of hash value computation using SHA-1,
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. However, only the functions
related to SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 is in the scope of this
evaluation and is intended to be used for signature generation and
verification. Note that neither of the functions must be used to hash secret
values. In addition, the user is responsible for the truncation or padding of
the hash value as required by step e), section 7.3 and step c), section 7.4.1 of
the standard cited above.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
6.1.19 Bootloader
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities – Loader(FMT_LIM.1/Loader)” is specified as
follows.
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FMT_LIM.1/Loader Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1/Loader The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced: Deploying Loader functionality after locking the chip to
FLASH booting mode does not allow stored user data to be disclosed or manipulated by
unauthorized user.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability – Loader (FMT_LIM.2/Loader)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.2/Loader Limited availability - Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1/Loader The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced: The TSF prevents deploying the Loader functionality after locking the chip to
FLASH booting mode
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)” is specified as follows.
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and the authorized
user for using the Bootloader that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of
the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for deploying Loader
mutual Authentication and establishment of session keys.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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The TOE Functional Requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” is specified as
follows.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to receive user data in a manner protected
from unauthorised disclosure.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] [FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
The TOE Functional Requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” is specified as follows.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to receive user data in a manner protected
from modification, deletion, insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion, insertion has occurred.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] [FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
The TOE Functional Requirement “Subset access control - Loader (FDP_ACC.1/Loader)” is specified as
follows.
FDP_ACC.1/ Loader Subset access control - Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1/ Loader The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP on
(1) the subjects Loader authorized users,
(2) the objects user data in FLASH or ROM
(3) the operation deployment of Loader
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
Application Note: The TOE enforces the Loader SFP by FTP_ITC.1, FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 and
FDP_ACF.1 to describe additional access control rules.
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The TOE Functional Requirement “Security attribute based access control - Loader (FDP_ACF.1/Loader)”
is specified as follows.
FDP_ACF.1/ Loader Security attribute based access control - Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1/ The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to objects based on the following:
Loader (1) the subjects Loader authorized users with security attributes FLASH write.
(2) the objects user data in FLASH with security attributes FLASH write.
FDP_ACF.1.2/ Loader The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: Bootloader can do write
operation in FLASH after a successful Authentication.
FDP_ACF.1.3/ Loader The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: FLASH can be controlled based on security attributes,
which can be limited by Bootloader APDU command.
FDP_ACF.1.4/ Loader The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: Bootloader can’t access the FLASH without successful authentication.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation.
6.1.20 Authentication Proof of Identity
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified below.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mutual authentication of Bootloader to prove the identity of
the TOE to an external entity
6.1.21 Summary of Security Functional Requirements
Security Functional Requirements
Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)
Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)
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Stored data confidentiality (FDP_SDC.1)
Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)
Limited capabilities(FMT_LIM.1)
Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)
Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1)
Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1)
Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)
Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)
Limited capabilities(FMT_LIM.1/Loader)
Limited availability - Loader(FMT_LIM.2/Loader)
Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)
Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)
Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)
Subset access control - Loader (FDP_ACC.1/ Loader)
Security attribute based access control - Loader (FDP_ACF.1/Loader)
Random number generation – PTG.2(FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2)
Random number generation – RGS-IC(FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC)
Table 5 Security Functional Requirements defined in Smart Card IC Protection Profile
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Security Functional Requirements
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3 )
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1/TDES)
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1/AES)
Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4/TDES, FCS_CKM.4/AES,
FCS_CKM.4/RSA, FCS_CKM.4/ECDSA, FCS_CKM.4/ECDH,
FCS_CKM.4/EdDSA25519)
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1/RSA) (optional)
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1/ RSA) (optional)
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1/ECDSA) (optional)
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1/ECDH) (optional)
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA) (optional)
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_COP.1/SHA) (optional)
Cryptographic key operation (FCS_COP.1/X25519) (optional)
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1/EdDSA25519) (optional)
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1/EdDSA25519) (optional)
Table 6 Augmented Security Functional Requirements
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6.2 TOE Assurance Requirements
The Security Target will be evaluated according to
Security Target evaluation (Class ASE)
The TOE Assurance Requirements for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating
environment are those taken from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 6 (EAL6)
and augmented by the following components
ASE_TSS.2
corresponding to level “EAL6+”.
All refinements from Protection Profile BSI-PP-0084 version 1.0 for the assurance requirements (ALC_DEL,
ALC_DVS, ALC_CMS, ALC_CMC, ADV_ARC, ADV_FSP, ADV_IMP, ATE_COV, AGD_OPE,
AGD_PRE and AVA_VAN) have to be taken into consideration. In particular the document [13] is used in
the context of vulnerability analysis
Class ADV: Development
Architectural design (ADV_ARC.1)
Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.5)
Implementation Representation (ADV_IMP.2)
TSF Internals (ADV_INT.3)
TOE Design (ADV_TDS.5)
Security Policy Model (ADV_SPM.1)
Class AGD: Guidance documents activities
Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Class ALC: Life-cycle support
CM Capabilities (ALC_CMC.5)
CM Scope (ALC_CMS.5)
Delivery (ALC_DEL.1)
Development Security (AULCU_DVS.2)
Life Cycle Definition (ALC_LCD.1)
Tools and Techniques (ALC_TAT.3)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
Derived security requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
Security problem definition (ASE_SPD.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.2)
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Class ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV.3)
Depth (ATE_DPT.3)
Functional Tests (ATE_FUN.2)
Independent Testing (ATE_IND.2)
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Vulnerability Analysis (AVA_VAN.5)
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6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements
226 Table 7 below gives an overview, how the security functional requirements are combined to meet the
security objectives. The detailed justification follows after the table.
Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements
O.Leak-Inherent - FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection”
- FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”
- FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control”
- AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”
O.Phys-Probing - FDP_SDC.1 “Stored data confidentiality”
- FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Malfunction - FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance
- FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”
- ADV_ARC.1 “Architectural Design with domain separation and
non-bypassability”
O.Phys-Manipulation - FDP_SDI.2 “Stored data integrity monitoring and action”
- FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
O.Leak-Forced All requirements listed for O.Leak-Inherent
- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, AVA_VAN.5
plus those listed for O.Malfunction and
O.Phys-Manipulation
- FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3, ADV_ARC.1
O.Abuse-Func - FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
- FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction,
O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced
- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2,
FPT_FLS.1, ADV_ARC.1
O.Identification - FAU_SAS.1
“Audit storage”
O.RND - FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2 “Quality metric for random numbers” and
FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC “Quality metric for random numbers”
plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction,
O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced
- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2,
FPT_FLS.1, AVA_VAN.5, ADV_ARC.1
OE.Resp-Appl not applicable
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Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements
OE.Process-Sec-IC not applicable
O.Mem-Access - FDP_ACC.1 “Subset access control”
- FDP_ACF.1 “Security attribute based access control”
- FMT_MSA.3 “Static attribute initialisation”
- FMT_MSA.1 “Management of security attributes”
- FMT_SMF.1 “Specification of Management Functions”
O.TDES - FCS_COP.1/TDES “Cryptographic operation”
- FCS_CKM.4/TDES “Cryptographic key destruction”
O.AES - FCS_COP.1/ AES “Cryptographic operation”
- FCS_CKM.4/AES “Cryptographic key destruction”
O.RSA - FCS_COP.1/RSA “Cryptographic operation”
- FCS_CKM.1/RSA “Cryptographic key generation”
- FCS_CKM.4/RSA “Cryptographic key destruction”
O.ECDSA - FCS_COP.1/ ECDSA “Cryptographic operation”
- FCS_CKM.1/ ECDSA “Cryptographic key generation”
- FCS_CKM.4/ECDSA “Cryptographic key destruction”
O.ECDH - FCS_COP.1/ ECDH “Cryptographic operation”
- FCS_CKM.4/ECDH “Cryptographic key destruction”
O.EdDSA - FCS_COP.1/ EdDSA25519 “Cryptographic operation”
- FCS_CKM.1/ EdDSA25519 “Cryptographic key generation”
- FCS_CKM.4/EdDSA25519 “Cryptographic key destruction”
O.X25519 - FCS_COP.1/X25519 “Cryptographic key operation”
O.SHA - FCS_COP.1/SHA
O.Authentication - FIA_API.1 ” Authentication Proof of Identity”
OE.TOE_Auth not applicable
O.Cap_Avail_Loader - FMT_LIM.1/Loader “Limited capabilities”
- FMT_LIM.2/Loader “Limited availability – Loader”
OE.Lim_Block_Loader not applicable
O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader - FTP_ITC.1 "Inter-TSF trusted channel"
- FDP_UCT.1 "Basic data exchange confidentiality"
- FDP_UIT.1 "Data exchange integrity"
- FDP_ACC.1/Loader "Subset access control - Loader"
- FDP_ACF.1/Loader "Security attribute based access control -
Loader"
OE.Loader_Usage not applicable
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Objective TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality - FDP_ACC.1/Loader "Subset access control - Loader"
- FDP_ACF.1/Loader "Security attribute based access control -
Loader"
Table 7: Security Requirements versus Security Objectives
227 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
(O.Leak-Inherent)” is as follows:
228 The refinements of the security functional requirements FPT_ITT.1 and FDP_ITT.1 together with the policy
statement in FDP_IFC.1 explicitly require the prevention of disclosure of secret data (TSF data as well as
user data) when transmitted between separate parts of the TOE or while being processed. This includes that
attackers cannot reveal such data by measurements of emanations, power consumption or other behavior of
the TOE while data are transmitted between or processed by TOE parts.
229 It is possible that the TOE needs additional support by the Security IC Embedded Software (e.g. timing
attacks are possible if the processing time of algorithms implemented in the software depends on the
content of secret). This support must be addressed in the Guidance Documentation. Together with this
FPT_ITT.1, FDP_ITT.1 and FDP_IFC.1 are suitable to meet the objective.
230 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Physical Probing (O.Phys-Probing)” is
as follows:
231 The SFR FDP_SDC.1 requires the TSF to protect the confidentiality of the information of the user data
stored in specified memory areas and prevent its compromise by physical attacks bypassing the specified
interfaces for memory access. The scenario of physical probing as described for this objective is explicitly
included in the assignment chosen for the physical tampering scenarios in FPT_PHP.3. Therefore, it is clear
that this security functional requirement supports the objective.
232 It is possible that the TOE needs additional support by the Security IC Embedded Software (e. g. to send
data over certain buses only with appropriate precautions). This support must be addressed in the
Guidance Documentation. Together with this FPT_PHP.3 is suitable to meet the objective.
233 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Malfunctions (O.Malfunction)” is as
follows:
234 The definition of this objective shows that it covers a situation, where malfunction of the TOE might be
caused by the operating conditions of the TOE (while direct manipulation of the TOE is covered O.Phys-
Manipulation). There are two possibilities in this situation: Either the operating conditions are inside the
tolerated range or at least one of them is outside of this range. The second case is covered by FPT_FLS.1,
because it states that a secure state is preserved in this case. The first case is covered by FRU_FLT.2 because
it states that the TOE operates correctly under normal (tolerated) conditions. The functions implementing
FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_FLS.1 must work independently so that their operation cannot affected by the Security
IC Embedded Software (refer to the refinement). Therefore, there is no possible instance of conditions
under O.Malfunction, which is not covered.
235 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Physical Manipulation
(O.Phys-Manipulation)” is as follows:
236 The SFR FDP_SDI.2 requires the TSF to detect the integrity errors of the stored user data and react in case of
detected errors. The scenario of physical manipulation as described for this objective is explicitly included
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in the assignment chosen for the physical tampering scenarios in FPT_PHP.3. Therefore, it is clear that this
security functional requirement supports the objective.
237 It is possible that the TOE needs additional support by the Embedded Software (for instance by
implementing FDP_SDI.1 to check data integrity with the help of appropriate checksums, refer to Section
6.1). This support must be addressed in the Guidance Documentation. Together with this FPT_PHP.3 is
suitable to meet the objective.
238 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Forced Information Leakage
(O.Leak-Forced)“ is as follows:
239 This objective is directed against attacks, where an attacker wants to force an information leakage, which
would not occur under normal conditions. In order to achieve this the attacker has to combine a first attack
step, which modifies the behaviour of the TOE (either by exposing it to extreme operating conditions or by
directly manipulating it) with a second attack step measuring and analysing some output produced by the
TOE. The first step is prevented by the same measures which support O.Malfunction and
O.Phys-Manipulation, respectively. The requirements covering O.Leak-Inherent also support
O.Leak-Forced because they prevent the attacker from being successful if he tries the second step directly.
240 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Abuse of Functionality
(O.Abuse-Func)” is as follows:
241 This objective states that abuse of functions (especially provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software, for
instance in order to read secret data) must not be possible in Phase 7 of the life-cycle. There are two
possibilities to achieve this: (i) They cannot be used by an attacker (i. e. its availability is limited) or
(ii) using them would not be of relevant use for an attacker (i. e. its capabilities are limited) since the
functions are designed in a specific way. The first possibility is specified by FMT_LIM.2 and the second one
by FMT_LIM.1. Since these requirements are combined to support the policy, which is suitable to fulfil
O.Abuse-Func, both security functional requirements together are suitable to meet the objective.
242 Other security functional requirements which prevent attackers from circumventing the functions
implementing these two security functional requirements (for instance by manipulating the hardware) also
support the objective. The relevant objectives are also listed in Table 7.
243 It was chosen to define FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 explicitly (not using Part 2 of the Common Criteria) for
the following reason: Though taking components from the Common Criteria catalogue makes it easier to
recognise functions, any selection from Part 2 of the Common Criteria would have made it harder for the
reader to understand the special situation meant here. As a consequence, the statement of explicit security
functional requirements was chosen to provide more clarity.
244 The justification related to the security objective “TOE Identification (O.Identification)“ is as follows:
245 Obviously the operations for FAU_SAS.1 are chosen in a way that they require the TOE to provide the
functionality needed for O.Identification. The Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE
identification. The technical capability of the TOE to store Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation
Data is provided according to FAU_SAS.1.
246 It was chosen to define FAU_SAS.1 explicitly (not using a given security functional requirement from Part 2
of the Common Criteria) for the following reason: The security functional requirement FAU_GEN.1 in Part
2 of the CC requires the TOE to generate the audit data and gives details on the content of the audit records
(for instance data and time). The possibility to use the functions in order to store security relevant data
which are generated outside of the TOE, is not covered by the family FAU_GEN or by other families in Part
2. Moreover, the TOE cannot add time information to the records, because it has no real time clock.
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Therefore, the new family FAU_SAS was defined for this situation.
247 The objective must be supported by organisational and other measures, which the TOE Manufacturer has
to implement. These measures are a subset of those measures, which are examined during the evaluation of
the assurance requirements of the classes AGD and ALC.
248 The justification related to the security objective “Random Numbers (O.RND)” is as follows:
249 FCS_RNG.1 requires the TOE to provide random numbers of good quality. The metrics associated to the
DTRNG FRO M are given by the SFRs FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2, FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC.
250 Other security functional requirements, which prevent physical manipulation and malfunction of the TOE
(see the corresponding objectives listed in the table), support this objective because they prevent attackers
from manipulating or otherwise affecting the random number generator.
251 Random numbers are often used by the Security IC Embedded Software to generate cryptographic keys for
internal use. Therefore, the TOE must prevent the unauthorised disclosure of random numbers. Other
security functional requirements which prevent inherent leakage attacks, probing and forced leakage
attacks ensure the confidentiality of the random numbers provided by the TOE.
252 Depending on the functionality of specific TOEs the Security IC Embedded Software will have to support
the objective by providing runtime-tests of the random number generator. Together, these requirements
allow the TOE to provide cryptographically good random numbers and to ensure that no information
about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker.
253 It was chosen to define FCS_RNG.1 explicitly, because Part 2 of the Common Criteria does not contain
generic security functional requirements for Random Number generation. (Note, that there are security
functional requirements in Part 2 of the Common Criteria, which refer to random numbers. However, they
define requirements only for the authentication context, which is only one of the possible applications of
random numbers.)
254 The security objective “Capability and availability of the Loader (O.Cap_Avail_Loader) is directly covered
by the SFR FMT_LIM.1/Loader and FMT_LIM.2/Loader.
255 The security objective Access control and authenticity for the Loader (O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader) is covered by
the SFR as follows:
256 The SFR FDP_ACC.1/Loader defines the subjects, objects and operations of the Loader SFP enforced by the
SFR FTP_ITC.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1 and FDP_ACF.1/Loader.
257 The SFR FTP_ITC.1 requires the TSF to establish a trusted channel with assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
258 The SFR FDP_UCT.1 requires the TSF to receive data protected from unauthorised disclosure.
259 The SFR FDP_UIT.1 requires the TSF to verify the integrity of the received user data.
260 The SFR FDP_ACF.1/Loader requires the TSF to implement access control for the Loader functionality.
261 The FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_CKM.4/TDES meet the security objective “Cryptographic service Triple-
DES (O.TDES)”.
262 The FCS_COP.1/AES and FCS_CKM.4/AES meet the security objective “Cryptographic service AES
(O.AES)”.
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263 The security functional requirement(s) “Cryptographic operation
(FCS_COP.1/RSA,FCS_COP.1/ECDSA,ECDH, FCS_COP.1/EdDSA25519, X25519)” exactly requires those
functions to be implemented which are demanded by O.RSA, O.ECC, O.EdDSA or O.X25519. FCS_CKM.1
supports the generation of keys needed for this cryptographic operations(optional). Therefore,
FCS_COP.1/RSA, FCS_COP.1/ECDSA, FCS_COP.1/ECDH, FCS_COP.1/EdDSA25519, FCS_COP.1/X25519,
FCS_CKM.1/RSA, FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA, FCS_CKM.1/EdDSA25519, FCS_CKM.4/RSA,
FCS_CKM.4/ECDSA, FCS_CKM.4/ECDH, FCS_CKM.4/EdDSA25519 are suitable to meet the security
objective.
264 The FCS_COP.1/SHA meet the security objective “Cryptographic service SHA (O.SHA)”.
265 The security objective “Authentication to external entities (O.Authentication) is directly covered by the SFR
FIA_API.1.
266 The justification related to the security objective “Area based Memory Access Control (O.Mem-Access)” is
as follows:
267 The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” with the related Security
Function Policy (SFP) “Memory Access Control Policy” exactly require the implementation of an area based
memory access control, which is a requirement from O.Mem-Access. Therefore, FDP_ACC.1 with its SFP is
suitable to meet the security objective.
268 The security functional requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)” requires that the TOE
provides default values for the security attributes. Since the TOE is a hardware platform these default
values are generated by the reset procedure. Therefore FMT_MSA.3 is suitable to meet the security
objective O.Mem-Access.
269 The security functional requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)” requires that the
ability to change the security attributes is restricted to privileged subject(s). It ensures that the access control
required by O.Mem-Access can be realised using the functions provided by the TOE. Therefore
FMT_MSA.1 is suitable to meet the security objective O.Mem_Access.
270 Finally, the security functional requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” is used
for the specification of the management functions to be provided by the TOE as required by
O.MEM_ACCESS. Therefore, FMT_SMF.1 is suitable to meet the security objective O.Mem_Access.
271 The justification related to the security objective “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and
Personalisation (OE.Process-Sec-IC)” is as follows:
272 The Composite Product Manufacturer has to use adequate measures to fulfil OE.Process-Sec-IC. Depending
on the security needs of the application, the Security IC Embedded Software may have to support this for
instance by using appropriate authentication mechanisms for personalisation functions.
273 The security objective Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF (O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality) is covered
by the SFR as follows:
274 The SFR FDP_ACC.1/Loader defines the subjects, objects and operations of the Loader SFP enforced by the
FDP_ACF.1/Loader.
275 The SFR FDP_ACF.1/Loader requires the TSF to implement authentication mechanism for the Protection of
the confidentiality of the TSF
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6.3.2 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements
276 Table 8 below lists the security functional requirements defined in this Security Target, their dependencies
and whether they are satisfied by other security requirements defined in this Security Target. The text
following the table discusses the remaining cases.
Security Functional Requirement Dependencies Fulfilled by security requirements
FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1 Yes
FPT_FLS.1 None No dependency
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Yes
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Yes
FAU_SAS.1 None No dependency
FDP_SDC.1 None No dependency
FDP_SDI.2 None No dependency
FPT_PHP.3 None No dependency
FDP_ITT.1 FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 Yes
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 See discussion below
FPT_ITT.1 None No dependency
FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2 None No dependency
FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC None No dependency
FCS_COP.1/TDES
FCS_CKM.4
Yes (by environment, see discussion
below)
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if
not FCS_CKM.1) or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes (by environment, see discussion
below)
FCS_CKM.4/TDES
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if
not FCS_CKM.1) or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes (by environment, see discussion
below)
FCS_COP.1/AES
FCS_CKM.4
Yes (by environment, see discussion
below)
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if
not FCS_CKM.1) or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes (by environment, see discussion
below)
FCS_CKM.4/AES
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if
not FCS_CKM.1) or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes (by environment, see discussion
below)
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
(optional)
FCS_COP.1 or FCS_CKM.2 Yes
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_COP.1/RSA
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes
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Security Functional Requirement Dependencies Fulfilled by security requirements
(optional) FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_CKM.4/RSA
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if
not FCS_CKM.1) or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes
FCS_CKM.1 /ECDSA (optional) FCS_COP.1 or FCS_CKM.2 Yes
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA(optional)
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes
FCS_CKM.4 Yes (by environment, see discussion
below)
FCS_CKM.4/ECDSA (optional)
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if
not FCS_CKM.1) or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes
FCS_COP.1/ECDH(optional)
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2, or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes (by environment, see discussion
below)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_CKM.4/ECDH (optional)
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if
not FCS_CKM.1) or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes
FCS_COP.1/EdDSA25519(optional)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if
not FCS_CKM.1) or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes
FCS_COP.1/X25519(optional)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes (by environment, see discussion
below)
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if
not FCS_CKM.1) or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes (by environment, see discussion
below)
FCS_CKM.1/EdDSA25519(optional)
FCS_COP.1 or FCS_CKM.2
FCS_CKM.4
Yes
FCS_COP.1 or FCS_CKM.2
FCS_CKM.4
Yes
FCS_CKM.4/ EdDSA25519(optional)
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 (if
not FCS_CKM.1) or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes
FCS_COP.1/SHA (optional)
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 Yes
FCS_CKM.1 or FCS_CKM.4 See discussion below
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Yes
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
Yes
Yes
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1 Yes
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Security Functional Requirement Dependencies Fulfilled by security requirements
FMT_SMR.1 See discussion below
FMT_MSA.1
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
Yes
See discussion below
Yes
FMT_SMF.1 None No dependency
FMT_LIM.1/Loader FMT_LIM.2 Yes
FMT_LIM.2/Loader FMT_LIM.1 Yes
FTP_ITC.1 None No dependency
FDP_UCT.1
FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1,
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
Yes
FDP_UIT.1
FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1,
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
Yes
FDP_ACC.1/ Loader FDP_ACF.1 Yes
FDP_ACF.1/ Loader
FMT_MSA.3 See discussion below
FDP_ACC.1 Yes
FIA_API.1 None No dependency
Table 8 Dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements
277 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of FDP_IFC.1 (information flow control policy
statement) on FDP_IFF.1 (Simple security attributes). The specification of FDP_IFF.1 would not capture the
nature of the security functional requirement nor add any detail. As stated in the Data Processing Policy
referred to in FDP_IFC.1 there are no attributes necessary. The security functional requirement for the TOE
is sufficiently described using FDP_ITT.1 and its Data Processing Policy (FDP_IFC.1). Therefore the
dependency is considered satisfied.
278 In particular the security functional requirements providing resistance of the hardware against
manipulations (e. g. FPT_PHP.3) support all other more specific security functional requirements (e. g.
FCS_RNG.1) because they prevent an attacker from disabling or circumventing the latter. Together with the
discussion of the dependencies above this shows that the security functional requirements build a mutually
supportive whole.
279 The functional requirement FCS_CKM.1 which is dependent to FCS_COP.1/DES and FCS_COP.1/AES is
not included in this Security Target since the TOE only provides an engine for encryption and decryption.
But the Security IC Embedded Software may fulfill this requirement related to the needs of the
implemented application. The dependent requirements of FCS_COP.1/DES and FCS_COP.1/AES
concerning this function shall be fulfilled by the environment (Security IC Embedded Software).
280 The TOE provides the cryptographic key generation for RSA and ECDSA by the TOE (FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA), but it is up to the Smart Card Embedded Software’s security policy to adopt the
cryptographic key generation by the TOE or use the cryptographic key generation by the Smart Card
Embedded Software. The dependent requirements of FCS_COP.1/RSA and FCS_COP.1/ECDSA shall be
fulfilled by the environment (Security IC Embedded Software).
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281 The functional requirement FCS_CKM.1 which is dependent to FCS_COP.1/ECDH is not included in this
Security Target. But the Security IC Embedded Software may fulfill this requirement related to the needs of
the implemented application. The dependent requirements of FCS_COP.1/ECDH concerning this function
shall be fulfilled by the environment (Security IC Embedded Software).
282 The functional requirement FCS_CKM.1 which is dependent to FCS_COP.1/ECDH and
FCS_COP.1/X25519 are not included in this Security Target. But the Security IC Embedded Software may
fulfill this requirement related to the needs of the implemented application. The dependent requirements of
FCS_COP.1/ECDH and FCS_COP.1/X25519 concerning these functions shall be fulfilled by the
environment (Security IC Embedded Software).
283 The functional requirements FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2 and FCS_CKM.1 which are dependent to
FCS_CKM.4/TDES and FCS_ CKM.4/AES are not included in this Security Target since the TOE only
provides an engine for encryption and decryption. But the Security IC Embedded Software may fulfill these
requirements related to the needs of the implemented application. The dependent requirements of
FCS_CKM.4/TDES and FCS_ CKM.4/AES concerning these functions shall be fulfilled by the environment
(The cryptographic key destruction can be done by overwriting the key register interfaces or by TOE reset
which provides randomization of the key registers.)
284 Since SHA is a keyless algorithm, there is no need for key import as required by dependency to FDP_ITC.1,
FDP_ITC.2 or key generation as required by dependency to FCS_CKM.1 or destruction as required by
dependency to FCS_CKM.4. So the dependencies to FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1 and FMT_CKM.4
are not required.
285 The dependency FMT_SMR.1 introduced by the two components FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3 is
considered to be satisfied because the access control specified for the intended TOE is not role-based but
enforced for each subject. Therefore, there is no need to identify roles in form of a security functional
requirement FMT_SMR.1.
286 The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1/Loader is not be necessary. The security attributes of ROM
and Flash used to enforce the Loader SFP are fixed by the IC manufacturer. The access attribute of ROM
and Flash memory have DEFAULT value.
6.3.3 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements
287 The assurance level EAL6 and the augmentation with the requirement ASE_TSS.2 were chosen to
demonstrate that the TOE fulfills the high-level Common Criteria requirements. An assurance level of
EAL6 is required for this type of TOE since it is intended to defend against sophisticated attacks. This
evaluation assurance level was selected since it is designed to permit a developer to gain maximum
assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial practices. In order to provide a
meaningful level of assurance that the TOE provides an adequate level of defense against such attacks, the
evaluators should have access to the low level design and all the source code.
288 In addition, the TOE security policy is formally described and its security objective i.e. the complete
memory access control is formally proved. The ASE_TSS.2 was chosen to demonstrate further assurance
extensions provided by the TOE.
6.3.3.1 ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE Security Policy Model
289 The formally modelled security policy consists of the complete TSF access control, in particular:
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 The access control to the security registers, the Flash, ROM regions and Booting memory area are
correctly enforced.
 The access control with respect to the MPU memory areas is correctly enforced, in particular:
o A data is accessible if and only if its address is included in one of the Data Memory areas and this
area has the access right (i.e. Read-only or Writing);
o A data is writable if and only if
 its address is included in one of the Data Memory areas and this area has the Writing
right, and
 its address is not included in any Data Memory area that has the Read-only right;
o A code element is executable if and only if its address is included in one of the Program Memory
areas and this area has the Execute right;
o Any other access is a violation and is detected by the TSF;
 The consistency of the memory areas is correctly enforced i.e.
o All memory areas and access rights are correctly initialized at the IC reset
o Each fixed data area and program area is completely contained in the physical memory space of
its memory type
 The consistency of the bootloader is correctly enforced
 ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE Security Policy Model as defined in Section 13.5 of [3]
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
Developer action elements:
ADV_SPM.1.1D The developer shall provide a formal security policy model
ADV_SPM.1.2D For each policy covered by the formal security policy model, the model shall
identify the relevant portions of the statement of SFRs that make up that policy.
ADV_SPM.1.3D The developer shall provide a formal proof of correspondence between the model
and any formal specification.
ADV_SPM.1.4D The developer shall provide a demonstration of correspondence between the
model and the functional specification.
6.3.3.2 ASE_TSS.2 TOE Summary specification with architectural design summary
290 The augmentation ASE_TSS.2 is required in order to provide the potential users (e.g. the embedded
software developers) with a succinct but comprehensive explanation on the TOE security functions that
protect it against interference, logical tampering and bypass. This description is also necessary to establish
the component ASE_TSS.2 for any composed TOE.
291 This assurance component is a higher hierarchical component to EAL6. ASE_TSS.2 has two dependencies
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(ASE_INT.1 and ASE_REQ.1) that both are satisfied by this TOE.
6.3.4 Security Requirements are Internally Consistent
292 The discussion of security functional requirements and assurance components in the preceding sections has
shown that mutual support and consistency are given for both groups of requirements. The arguments
given for the fact that the assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE also shows
that the security functional requirements and assurance requirements support each other and that there are
no inconsistencies between these groups.
293 The security functional requirements FDP_SDC.1 and FDP_SDI.2 address the protection of user data in the
specified memory areas against compromise and manipulation. The security functional requirement
FPT_PHP.3 makes it harder to manipulate data. This protects the primary assets identified in Section 3.1
and other security features or functionality which use these data.
294 Though a manipulation of the TOE (refer to FPT_PHP.3) is not of great value for an attacker in itself, it can
be an important step in order to threaten the primary assets. Therefore, the security functional requirement
FPT_PHP.3 is not only required to meet the security objective O.Phys-Manipulation. Instead it protects
other security features or functions of both the TOE and the Security IC Embedded Software from being
bypassed, deactivated or changed. In particular this may pertain to the security features or functions being
specified using FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_FLS.1, FMT_LIM.2, FCS_RNG.1, and those implemented in the
Security IC Embedded Software.
295 A malfunction of TSF (refer to FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_FLS.1) can be an important step in order to threaten the
primary assets. Therefore, the security functional requirements FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_FLS.1 are not only
required to meet the security objective O.Malfunction. Instead they protect other security features or
functions of both the TOE and the Security IC Embedded Software from being bypassed, deactivated or
changed. In particular this pertains to the security features or functions being specified using FDP_ITT.1,
FPT_ITT.1, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FCS_RNG.1, and those implemented in the Security IC Embedded
Software.
296 In a forced leakage attack the methods described in “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” (refer to
T.Malfunction) and/or “Physical Manipulation” (refer to T.Phys-Manipulation) are used to cause leakage
from signals which normally do not contain significant information about secrets. Therefore, in order to
avert the disclosure of primary assets it is important that the security functional requirements averting
leakage (FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1) and those against malfunction (FRU_FLT.2 and FPT_FLS.1) and physical
manipulation (FPT_PHP.3) are effective and bind well. The security features and functions against
malfunction ensure correct operation of other security functions (refer to above) and help to avert forced
leakage themselves in other attack scenarios. The security features and functions against physical
manipulation make it harder to manipulate the other security functions (refer to above).
297 Physical probing (refer to FPT_PHP.3) shall directly avert the disclosure of primary assets. In addition,
physical probing can be an important step in other attack scenarios if the corresponding security features or
functions use secret data. For instance the security functional requirement FMT_LIM.2 may use passwords.
Therefore, the security functional requirement FPT_PHP.3 (against probing) help to protect other security
features or functions including those being implemented in the Security IC Embedded Software. Details
depend on the implementation.
298 Leakage (refer to FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1) shall directly avert the disclosure of primary assets. In addition,
inherent leakage and forced leakage (refer to above) can be an important step in other attack scenarios if the
corresponding security features or functions use secret data. For instance the security functional
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requirement FMT_LIM.2 may use passwords. Therefore, the security functional requirements FDP_ITT.1
and FPT_ITT.1 help to protect other security features or functions implemented in the Security IC
Embedded Software (FDP_ITT.1) or provided by the TOE (FPT_ITT.1). Details depend on the
implementation.
299 The user data of the Composite TOE are treated as required to meet the requirements defined for the
specific application context (refer to Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE (A.Resp-Appl)).
However, the TOE may implement additional functions. This can be a risk if their interface cannot
completely be controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software. Therefore, the security functional
requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 are very important. They ensure that appropriate control is
applied to the interface of these functions (limited availability) and that these functions, if being usable,
provide limited capabilities only.
300 The combination of the security functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 ensures that
(especially after TOE Delivery) these additional functions cannot be abused by an attacker to (i) disclose or
manipulate user data of the Composite TOE, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change)
security features or services of the TOE or of the Security IC Embedded Software or (iii) to enable other
attacks on the assets. Hereby the binding between these two security functional requirements is very
important:
301 The security functional requirement Limited Capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) must close gaps which could be left
by the control being applied to the function’s interface (Limited Availability (FMT_LIM.2)). Note that the
security feature or services which limits the availability can be bypassed, deactivated or changed by
physical manipulation or a malfunction caused by an attacker. Therefore, if Limited Availability
(FMT_LIM.2) is vulnerable, it is important to limit the capabilities of the functions in order to limit the
possible benefit for an attacker.
302 The security functional requirement Limited Availability (FMT_LIM.2) must close gaps which could result
from the fact that the function’s kernel in principle would allow to perform attacks. The TOE must limit the
availability of functions which potentially provide the capability to disclose or manipulate user data of the
Composite TOE, to manipulate security features or services of the TOE or of the Security IC Embedded
Software or to enable other attacks on the assets. Therefore, if an attacker could benefit from using such
functions, it is important to limit their availability so that an attacker is not able to use them.
303 No perfect solution to limit the capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) is required if the limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)
alone can prevent the abuse of functions. No perfect solution to limit the availability (FMT_LIM.2) is
required if the limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) alone can prevent the abuse of functions. Therefore, it is
correct that both requirements are defined in a way that they together provide sufficient security.
304 It is important to avert malfunctions of TSF and of security functions implemented in the Security IC
Embedded Software (refer to above). There are two security functional requirements which ensure that
malfunctions cannot be caused by exposing the TOE to environmental stress. First it must be ensured that
the TOE operates correctly within some limits (Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)). Second the TOE must
prevent its operation outside these limits (Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)). Both
security functional requirements together prevent malfunctions. The two functional requirements must
define the “limits”. Otherwise there could be some range of operating conditions which is not covered so
that malfunctions may occur. Consequently, the security functional requirements Limited fault tolerance
(FRU_FLT.2) and Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1) are defined in a way that they
together provide sufficient security.
305 The security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-
Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced protect the cryptographic algorithms
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(FCS_COP.1) and the cryptographic key generations (FCS_CKM.1). Therefore these security functional
requirements support the secure implementation and operation of FCS_COP.1 and FCS_CKM.1.
306 Parts of the Smartcard IC Embedded Software may cause security violations by accidentally or deliberately
accessing restricted data (which may include code). In order to avert the memory access violation it is
important to the security functional requirement defining the scope where the Memory Access Policy is
applied (FDP_ACC.1) and the security functional requirement defining the Memory Access
Policy(FDP_ACF.1), and the security functional requirement ensuring the default value of security
attribute(FMT_MSA.3) and the security functional requirement managing security attribute ( FMT_MSA.1)
and the security functional requirement performing security management function(FMT_SMF.1) are
effective and bind well.
307 Two refinements from the PP [5] have to be discussed here in the ST as the assurance level is increased. The
refinement for ALC_CMS from the PP [5] can even be applied at the assurance level EAL 6 augmented with
ALC_CMS.5. The assurance component ALC_CMS.4 is augmented to ALC_CMS.5 with aspects regarding
the configuration control system for the TOE. The refinement is not touched. The refinement for ADV_FSP
from the PP [5] can even be applied at the assurance level EAL 6 augmented with ADV_FSP.5. The
assurance component ADV_FSP.4 is extended to ADV_FSP.5 with aspects regarding the description level.
The level is increased from informal to semi-formal with informal description. The refinement is not
touched by this measure.
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7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
308 This chapter 7 TOE Summary Specification contains the following sections:
7.1 List of Security Functional Requirements
7.2 Architectural Design Summary
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7.1 List of Security Functional Requirements
SFR1: FPT_FLS.1: Failure with preservation of secure state
309 The detection thresholds of TOE’s detectors are inside the operating range of the TOE. Therefore abnormal
events/failures are detected before the secure state is compromised. This allows to take User’s defined
appropriate actions by software or to immediately RESET the TOE.
310 The secure state is maintained by TOE’s detectors. This satisfies the FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation
of secure state.”
TOE’s Detectors
311 These functions records in register the events notified by the detectors (refer to list below). The software
configures the reaction in case of detection:
● The TOE is immediately reset when an event is detected.
● Or, a special function register bit is set.
TOE’s detectors are implemented by the hardware. The detection cannot be affected or bypassed by Smartcard
Embedded Software. The reaction to the detection can be configured by the software. The influence on security
and the way how to configure it is described in details in the S3SSE1A User’s Manual. Therefore, FPT_FLS.1 is
implemented by TOE.
312 Security domains are maintained since accesses to the access-prohibited area are trapped by this access
control function.
SFR2: FRU_FLT.2: Limited fault tolerance
313 Some operating signals are filtered/regulated in order to prevent malfunction.
TOE’s Filters
314 These filters are used for preventing noise, glitches and extremely high frequency in the external reset or
clock pad from causing undefined or unpredictable behavior of the chip.
Integrity Checkers
315 These Integrity Checkers are used for preventing noise and laser from causing undefined or unpredictable
behavior of the chip.
316 TOE’s filters and integrity checkers are implemented by the hardware. The filtering cannot be affected or
bypassed by Smartcard Embedded Software. The reaction to the detection can be configured by the
software. The influence on security and the way how to configure it is described in details in the S3SSE1A
User’s Manual. Therefore, FRU_FLT.2 is implemented by TOE.
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SFR3: FPT_PHP.3: Resistance to physical attacks
317 This requirement is achieved by security feature as the shield must be removed and bypassed in order to
perform physical intrusive attacks. The TOE makes a reset or interrupt feature occurs to stops operation if a
physical manipulation or physical probing attack is detected. So these functionalities meet the security
functional requirement of FPT_PHP.3: Resistance to physical attack.
SFR4: FDP_ACC.1: Subset access control
318 This requirement is achieved by security register access control, invalid address access and access right for
the code executed in FLASH.
1) Security registers access control: This security function manages access to the security control registers
through access control security attributes.
2) Invalid address access: This function detects invalid address access occurrence.
3) Access rights for the code executed in FLASH
4) Access control for Operating state: This security function selects booting memory area (reset path).
User can select ROM-BOOT.
5) Flash protection about Write operation: This function provides protection about flash write operation.
SFR5: FDP_ACF.1: Security attributes based access control.
319 This is covered by the Privilege and User modes of the TOE.
SFR6: FMT_MSA.3: Static attribute initialization.
320 All Special Function Registers including MPU have DEFAULT values after Power on Reset.
The access attribute of ROM and Flash memory have DEFAULT values.
SFR7: FMT_MSA.1: Management of security attributes.
321 This is achieved with the control features of memory accessibility.
The Memory Protection Unit (MPU) enables user to partition memory and set individual protection
attributes for each partition. This allows the operating system to control the memory regions accessible by a
User mode application process.
The OPRSEL enables user to ROM protection attributes.
The OPRSEL enables user to FLASH and set individual protection attributes for each area.
SFR8: FMT_SMF.1: Specification of management functions.
322 This is achieved via access to Special Function Registers of Memory Protection Unit(MPU). MPU provides
Special Function Registers which defines the base address and the limit address for a partition. The
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Registers exist for Flash, and RAM. Additional Registers exist for defining the protection attribute for each
partition.
SFR9: FAU_SAS.1: Audit Storage
323 This is fulfilled by the traceability/identification data written once and for all during the TEST mode of the
manufacturing process.
1) Non-reversibility of TEST mode and NORMAL mode: This function disables the TEST mode and
enables the NORMAL mode of the TOE. This function ensures the non-reversibility of the NORMAL
mode. This function is used once during the manufacturing process.
2) TEST mode communication protocol and data commands: This function is the proprietary protocol
used to operate the chip in TEST mode. This function enforces the identification and authentication of
the TEST administrator during the test phase of the manufacturing process.
3) Functional Tests: During the manufacturing process, the operation of the TOE and the embedded
software checksum are verified. This security function ensures the correct operation of the TOE
security functions and the integrity of the embedded software.
4) Identification: During the TEST mode of manufacturing process, traceability data are written in the
non-volatile memory of the TOE. Once the TOE is switched from TEST to NORMAL mode, those
traceability data are READ ONLY and cannot be modified anymore. In particular, user can identify the
version of device Dedicated SW part. The Bootloader, DTRNG FRO M library and AE1 Secure
RSA/ECC/SHA library version are identified by the version function in the library. This enables to
identify and track the TOE during the rest of its life.
SFR10: FMT_LIM.1: Limited capabilities
324 TEST mode can be accessed only by the TEST administrator by supplying an authentication password
through a proprietary protocol. Once the TOE is changed to NORMAL mode, TEST mode functions are no
more available for NORMAL mode.
SFR11: FMT_LIM.2: Limited availabilities
325 TEST mode can be accessed only by the TEST administrator by supplying an authentication password
through a proprietary protocol. Once the TOE is changed to NORMAL mode, TEST mode commands are
no more available for NORMAL mode. Functional test during manufacturing process is only available for
TEST mode only.
SFR12: FDP_IFC.1: Subset information flow control
326 Memory Encryption: This is achieved by the function protects the memory contents of the TOE from data
analysis on the stored data as well as on internally transmitted data.
Shield: This requirement is achieved by security feature as the shield must be removed and bypassed in
order to perform physical intrusive attacks.
Life time detector: Life time detector detects if detector signals are modified or not.
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SFR13: FDP_ITT.1: Basic internal transfer protection
327 This requirement is achieved by the combination of the TOE security features TOE features 1) to 5) as it is
unpractical to get access to internal signals and interpret them.
1) Static Address/Data scrambling for bus and memory: This function protects memory and
address/data bus from probing attacks.
2) Dynamic Data encryption for bus: This function protects data bus from probing attacks.
3) Memory encryption: This security function protects the memory contents of the TOE from data
analysis on the stored data as well as on internally transmitted data.
4) Synthesizable processor core: The Central Processing Unit (CPU) of the TOE is synthesizable with glue
logic, which makes reverse engineering and signal identification more difficult.
5) De-synchronization and signal-to-noise ratio reduction mechanisms: The TOE operations can be made
asynchronous. They make a full range of intrusive (e.g. probing attacks) and non intrusive attacks (e.g.
side-channel attacks) more complex and difficult.
SFR14: FPT_ITT.1: Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
328 This requirement is achieved by the combination of the TOE security features TOE features 1) to 5) as it is
unpractical to get access to internal signals and interpret them.
1) Static Address/Data scrambling for bus and memory: This function protects memory and
address/data bus from probing attacks.
2) Dynamic Data encryption for bus: This function protects data bus from probing attacks.
3) Memory encryption: This security function protects the memory contents of the TOE from data
analysis on the stored data as well as on internally transmitted data.
4) Synthesizable processor core: The Central Processing Unit (CPU) of the TOE is synthesizable with glue
logic, which makes reverse engineering and signal identification more difficult.
5) De-synchronization and signal-to-noise ratio reduction mechanisms: The TOE operations can be made
asynchronous. They make a full range of intrusive (e.g. probing attacks) and non intrusive attacks (e.g.
side-channel attacks) more complex and difficult.
SFR15: Random number generation
FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2
329 This requirement is ensured by the design of the random number generation algorithm that makes use of
Digital True Random Number Generator (DTRNG FRO M) and the associated DTRNG FRO M library
conforming to BSI-AIS31 Class PTG.2 requirements (German scheme).
FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC
330 This requirement is ensured by the design of the random number generation algorithm that makes use of
Digital True Random Number Generator (DTRNG FRO M) and the associated DTRNG FRO M library
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conforming to some of ANSSI RGS requirements (French scheme).
SFR16: FCS_COP.1: Cryptographic operation
331 This requirement is covered by the TOE.
Triple Data Encryption Standard Engine
332 This function is used for encrypting and decrypting data using the Triple DES symmetric algorithm with
112bit or 168bit key size. (FCS_COP.1/TDES)
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
333 This function supports the AES operation with 128 bit, 192bit and 256bit key size. (FCS_COP.1/AES)
HASH(SHA256/384/512)
334 This function supports the SHA library of AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA Library with 256 bit, 384 bit and 512
bit key size. (FCS_COP.1/SHA)
TORNADO-E RSA Cryptographic Library as part of AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library (optional)
This function assists in the acceleration of modulo exponentiations required in the RSA
encryption/decryption algorithm. (FCS_COP.1/RSA)
TORNADO-E is a high speed modular multiplication coprocessor for the support of the RSA public key
cryptosystem. The TORNADO-E RSA Library is the software built on the TORNADO-E coprocessor that
provides high level interface for RSA-based algorithms.
The functions of the library included in the evaluation are:
 TND_RSA_SigSTD_Secure (RSA signature generation with the standard method)
 TND_RSA_SigCRT_Secure (RSA signature generation with CRT method)
 TND_RSA_Verify (RSA signature verification)
This function performs the RSA signature verification. Since this function uses only the public
information, it does not implement any dedicated countermeasures against the side-channel attacks.
 RSA_R2modM_precompute_sec (R^2 value precomputation for the standard RSA)
This function calculates the R^2 value for the Montgomery constant R, which will then be used for
the subsequent standard RSA operations.
 RSA_R2modPandQ_precompute_sec (R^2 value precomputation for the CRT RSA)
This function calculates the R^2 value for the Montgomery constant R, which will then be used for
the subsequent CRT RSA operations.
The TND_RSA_SigSTD_Secure and TND_RSA_SigCRT_Secure have some countermeasure against the
timing attack, SPA, DPA and the fault attack.
The RSA_R2modM_precompute_sec and RSA_R2modPandQ_precompute_sec functions implement some
countermeasures against the fault attack.
TORNADO-E ECC Cryptographic Library as part of Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library (optional)
This function assists in the acceleration of required for the ECC cryptographic operations including the
ECDSA signature generation/verification, the ECDH secret key derivation, EdDSA25519 signature
generation/verification and the X25519 secret key derivation.
(FCS_COP.1/ECDSA, FCS_COP.1/ECDH, FCS_COP.1/X25519 and FCS_COP.1/EdDSA25519)
TORNADO-E RSA/ECC/SHA library provides a set of functions to implement elliptic curve cryptographic
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algorithms. In particular, it provides some functions to implement the ECDSA signature
generation/verification, the ECDH secret key derivation, EdDSA25519 signature generation/verification
and the X25519 secret key derivation.
The functions of the library included in the evaluation are:
 ECDSA_sign_digest
 ECDSA_verify_digest
 ECDH_generate
 X25519/X25519_keypair/X25519_public_from_private
 X25519_with_decoded_number(X25519 with decoded scalar)
 EDDSA_sign
 EDDSA_verify
The functions ECDSA_sign_digest and ECDH_generate have some countermeasure against the timing
attack, SPA and the fault attack. The ECDSA_verify_digets function has some countermeasures against
the fault attack.
The TORNADO-E AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library provides the functions to calculate hash (digest)
values using the SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA 512 algorithm as specified in [FIPS 180-4],
but only the functions related to SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 listed below are in the scope of
this evaluation(FCS_COP.1/SHA):
 SHA224_init, SHA224_update, SHA224_final,
 SHA256_init, SHA256_update, SHA256_final.
 SHA384_init, SHA384_update, SHA384_final.
 SHA512_init, SHA512_update, SHA512_final.
 SHA256_init_hw, SHA384_init_hw, SHA512_init_hw, SHA_Update_hw, SHA_Final_hw
These functions are not security relevant functions, i.e. they must not be used to hash security values like
keys etc. There are implemented no countermeasures against side channel attacks. The TOE provides the
functionality of hash computation if and only if the optional TORNADO-E AE1 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA
library is delivered.
SFR17: FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic key generation
335 This requirement is covered by the TOE for the RSA/ECC key generation. (optional)
RSA_KeyGen_Secure - FCS_CKM.1/RSA.
This function generates an RSA public/private key pair.
ECDSA_keygen - FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA.
This function generates an ephemeral or static public/private key for the ECDSA signature generation
EDDSA_key_gen - FCS_CKM.1/ EdDSA25519.
This function generates an ephemeral or static public/private key for the EDDSA25519 signature
generation..
EDDSA_key_gen_fixed_private_key(public key generation with fixed private_key of EDDSA25519)
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This function generates an ephemeral or static public for the EDDSA25519 signature generation.
SFR18: Limited capabilities - Loader(FMT_LIM.1/Loader)
This requirement is achieved by changing the Operating Mode Selection from ROM Booting mode to Flash
Booting mode and then locking the Operating Mode.
SFR19: Limited availability – Loader (FMT_LIM.2/Loader)
This requirement is achieved by changing the Operating Mode Selection from ROM Booting mode to Flash
Booting mode and then locking the Operating Mode. The Bootloader is only supported in ROM Booting
mode. In Flash Booting mode, the Bootloader doesn’t operate.
SFR20: Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)
This requirement is achieved by processing the Authentication sequence. This channel is only distinct from
other communication channels and provides assured identification for its end points and protection of the
channel data from modification or disclose.
SFR21: Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)
This requirement is achieved by secure writing.
SFR22: Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)
This requirement is achieved by checking appropriate code integrity mechanism.
SFR23: Subset access control - Loader (FDP_ACC.1/ Loader)
This requirement is achieved by following functions.
ROM hiding function: The attribute of ROM is changed from Accessible ROM to Inaccessible ROM.
Flash memory attribute as Read only: The attribute of Flash memory is changed from Read/Write to Read
only.
SFR24: Security attribute based access control - Loader (FDP_ACF.1/Loader)
This is covered by the ROM Booting(ROM Reset) and Flash Booting(Flash Reset) mode of the TOE. TOE can
be set to ROM Booting(ROM Reset) and FLASH Booting(FLASH Reset) mode domains exclusively. All
Bootloader APDU commands are accessible only in Rom Booting mode. The Flash Booting mode can not
access all Bootloader APDU commands.
SFR25: Stored data confidentiality (FDP_SDC.1)
This requirement is achieved by the combination of the TOE security features TOE features 1) to 9) as it is
unpractical to get access to internal signals and interpret them.
1) Static Address/Data scrambling for bus and memory: This function protects memory and address/data
bus from probing attacks.
2) Dynamic Data encryption for bus: This function protects data bus from probing attacks.
3) Memory encryption: This security function protects the memory contents of the TOE from data analysis
on the stored data as well as on internally transmitted data.
4) Invalid address access: This function detects invalid address access occurrence.
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5) Shield: This requirement is achieved by security feature as the Active shield must be removed and
bypassed in order to perform physical intrusive attacks.
6) Life time detector: Life time detector detects if detector signals are modified or not.
7) Filters: These filters are used for preventing noise, glitches and extremely high frequency in the external
reset or clock pad from causing undefined or unpredictable behavior of the chip.
8) Non-reversibility of TEST and NORMAL modes: This function disables the TEST mode and enables the
NORMAL mode of the TOE. This function ensures the non-reversibility of the NORMAL mode. This
function is used once during the manufacturing process
9) Control of Booting mode: This requirement is achieved by changing the Operating Mode Selection.
SFR26: Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)
This requirement is achieved by functions to support the detection of error manage features (FDP_SDI.2).
SFR27: Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)
This requirement is achieved by processing the Authentication sequence(FIA_API.1).
SFR28: FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic key destruction
336 This requirement is covered by the TOE.
Cryptographic Key destruction – Triple Data Encryption Standard Engine
337 This requirement is achieved by overwriting the registers or by TOE reset(FCS_CKM.4/TDES).
Cryptographic Key destruction – AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
338 This requirement is achieved by overwriting the registers or by TOE reset(FCS_CKM.4/AES).
Cryptographic Key destruction – RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman)
339 This requirement is achieved by TOE hardware reset(FCS_CKM.4/RSA).
Cryptographic Key destruction – ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm)
340 This requirement is achieved by TOE hardware reset(FCS_CKM.4/ECDSA).
Cryptographic Key destruction – ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman)
341 This requirement is achieved by TOE hardware reset(FCS_CKM.4/ECDH).
Cryptographic Key destruction – EdDSA_key_gen(Ephemeral or static key pair generation for
EdDSA25519)
342 This requirement is achieved by TOE hardware reset (FCS_CKM.4/EdDSA25519)
7.2 Architectural Design Summary
343 The TOE claims the assurance requirement ASE_TSS.2, the security architectural information on a very high
level is included in the TSS to inform the embedded software developers on how the TOE protects itself
against interference, logical tampering and bypass.
344 Interference
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345 Interference consists in interfering in the TSF in order to get access to assets.
346 Logical tampering
347 Logical tampering consists in get access to the assets by a logical means (in contrast with physical
tampering). For this TOE, logical tampering may be used on
 the access control
 the information flow control
348 The access control is enforced by the following security functions: “Security registers access control”,
“Invalid address access”, “Access rights for the code executed in FLASH”, “Access control for Operating
state”, “Flash protection about Write operation”.
349 The information flow control is enforced by the following security function “Memory Encryption”.
350 Bypass
351 Non-bypassability is a property that the security functionality of the TSF is always invoked. For this TOE,
bypassing a security function may be caused by
352 A physical perturbation on the IC: protection against this bypass if ensured by the security functions
“Static Address/Data scrambling for bus and memory”, “Synthesizable processor core”, “Detectors”,
“Filters”
353 Switching back from Normal mode to Test mode in order to get more privilege: protection against this
bypass if ensured by the security functions “Non-reversibility of TEST mode and NORMAL mode”
354 Masking the security errors: protection against this bypass if ensured by the security function “Security
registers access control”
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8 Annex
8.1 Glossary
Application Data
All data managed by the Security IC Embedded Software in the application context. Application data comprise all
data in the final Security IC.
Composite Product Integrator
Role installing or finalising the IC Embedded Software and the applications on platform transforming the TOE
into the unpersonalised Composite Product after TOE delivery. The TOE Manufacturer may implement IC
Embedded Software delivered by the Security IC Embedded Software Developer before TOE delivery (e.g. if the
IC Embedded Software is implemented in ROM or is stored in the non-volatile memory as service provided by
the IC Manufacturer or IC Packaging Manufacturer)
Composite Product Manufacturer
The Composite Product Manufacturer has the following roles (i) the Security IC Embedded Software Developer
(Phase 1), (ii) the Composite Product Integrator (Phase 5) and (iii) the Personaliser (Phase 6). If the TOE is
delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) he has the role of the IC Packaging Manufacturer
(Phase 4) in addition.
End-consumer
User of the Composite Product in Phase 7.
IC Dedicated Software
IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC (also known as IC firmware) and developed by the IC
Developer. Such software is required for testing purpose (IC Dedicated Test Software) but may provide additional
services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support Software).
IC Dedicated Test Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but
which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
IC Dedicated Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of
parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
Initialisation Data
Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to identify the TOE and to keep track of the Security IC’s
production and further life-cycle phases are considered as belonging to the TSF data. These data are for instance
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used for traceability and for TOE identification (identification data).
Integrated Circuit (IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.
Pre-personalisation Data
Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated
Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). These data are for instance used for traceability and/or to secure shipment
between phases.
Security IC
Composition of the TOE, the Security IC Embedded Software, User Data and the package (the Security IC carrier).
Security IC Embedded Software
Software embedded in a Security IC and normally not being developed by the IC Designer. The Security IC
Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the Security IC in Phase 3 or in later phases of the
Security IC product life-cycle. Some part of that software may actually implement a Security IC application others
may provide standard services. Nevertheless, this distinction doesn’t matter here so that the Security IC
Embedded Software can be considered as being application dependent whereas the IC Dedicated Software is
definitely not.
Security IC Product
Composite product which includes the Security Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and the Embedded Software and
is evaluated as composite target of evaluation in the sense of the Supporting Document
TOE Delivery
The period when the TOE is delivered which is either (i) after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in
form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or (ii) after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of
packaged products.
TOE Manufacturer
The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that all requirements for the TOE and its development and production
environment are fulfilled. The TOE Manufacturer has the following roles: (i) IC Developer (Phase 2) and (ii) IC
Manufacturer (Phase 3). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 4 in form of packaged products, he has the role of the
(iii) IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE. This includes information about the
TOE’s configuration, if any is coded in non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM), in specific circuitry, in
non-volatile programmable memories (for instance E2PROM) or a combination thereof.
User data
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All data managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software in the application context. User data comprise all data in
the final Smartcard IC except the TSF data.
8.2 Abbreviations
CC
Common Criteria
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
IT
Information Technology
PP
Protection Profile
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functionality
TSFI
TSF Interface
TSP
TOE Security Policy
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8.3 References
[1] Common Criteria, Part 1: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001
[2] Common Criteria, Part 2: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
[3] Common Criteria, Part 3: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004
[5] Eurosmart Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version 1.0, BSI-CC-PP-0084-
2014.
[6] AIS31: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for true (physical) random number generators,
Version 1, 25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[7] A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version 2.0, 18.09.2011, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[8] ALGO: Federal Gazette No 19, Notification in accordance with the Electronic Signatures Act and the Electronic
Signatures Ordinance (overview of suitable algorithms), Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas,
Telecommunications, Post and Railway, 2008-11-17
[9] [FIPS SP800-67] Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, version 1.1
[10] [FIPS 197] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 2001-11-26
[11] [ISO/IEC 14888-2:2008] - Information technology -- Security techniques-- Digital signatures with appendix --
Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms.
[12] CC Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, "Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards":
version 3.0 (April 2019).
[13] [FIPS 180-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4 SECURE HASH STANDARD U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011 February, 11
[14] [NIST curves] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 180-3, Digital Signature
Standard; U.S. department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), June 2009
[15] [ETSI TS 102 176-1] Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Algorithms and Parameters for Secure
Electronic Signatures; Part 1: Hash functions and asymmetric algorithms, 2007-11, version 2.0.0
[16] [SCA on Prime Gen] T. Finke, M. Gebhardt and W. Schindler, A New Side-Channel Attack on RSA Prime
Generation, CHES 2009, LNCS 5747, pp. 141-155, 2009.
[17] [SCA on Prime Gen] T. Finke, M. Gebhardt and W. Schindler, A New Side-Channel Attack on RSA Prime
Generation, CHES 2009, LNCS 5747, pp. 141-155, 2009.
[18] Les règles et recommandations concernant le choix et le dimensionnement de mécanismes
cryptographiques. Annexe B1 du RGS 2.0. Version 2.03, 21/02/2014, ANSSI.
http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2015/01/RGS_v-2-0_B1.pdf
[19] PP0084 – Interpretations – v3, 01/06/2016, ANSSI