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Certification Dossier Code: 2020-5
Certification Report Creation Date: 20th June 2023
Certification Report Code:
2020-5-REP-60 (internal)
2020-5-REP-86 (public)
NASK RWA code: OSiC.8711.5.2021
Certification Report
[2020-5] Certification Report on A.R.I.C. NDS Optical
Industry Data Diode EAL3
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Table of content
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 3
2. Certification overview ................................................................................................................... 3
Recognition of the certificate....................................................................................................... 4
Executive Summary....................................................................................................................... 4
Documentation available for users ............................................................................................. 5
Security Target................................................................................................................................ 5
3. TOE Summary.................................................................................................................................. 6
TOE Overview ................................................................................................................................. 6
TOE security features ..................................................................................................................... 7
Security Assurance Requirements ............................................................................................... 7
Security Policy ................................................................................................................................ 8
User Data Protection ...................................................................................................................... 8
Security Functional Requirements................................................................................................ 8
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..................................................................................... 8
Usage Assumptions........................................................................................................................ 8
Environmental Assumptions.......................................................................................................... 9
Clarification of Scope.................................................................................................................... 9
Threats ............................................................................................................................................. 9
OSPs............................................................................................................................................... 10
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................................ 10
Physical scope ............................................................................................................................. 10
Logical scope............................................................................................................................... 10
6. IT security evaluation................................................................................................................... 11
Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................................. 11
Functional testing......................................................................................................................... 12
Developer testing......................................................................................................................... 12
Evaluator testing........................................................................................................................... 12
Penetration testing ....................................................................................................................... 13
Evaluation verdicts....................................................................................................................... 13
Certifier’s Comments ................................................................................................................... 14
7. Certifier’s Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 15
8. Acronyms...................................................................................................................................... 15
9. Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 16
References.................................................................................................................................... 16
List of related documents:........................................................................................................... 17
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1. Introduction
The Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) product identified in this
certification report and its associated certificate, has been tested at an approved Laboratory
(IT Security Evaluation Facility) – on the basis of the IT Security Evaluation and Certification
Scheme – using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5. This certification report and its associated certificate
applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its tested and evaluated
configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
PC1 Scheme and the conclusions of the Laboratory in the technical evaluation report are
consistent with the evidence. This report and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement
of the IT product by the NASK National Research Institute, or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this report and its associated certificate and no warranty for the IT
product by the NASK National Research Institute, or any other organization that recognizes or
gives effect to this report and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied. This
certification report and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and
release of the product in its evaluated configuration.
2. Certification overview
The NASK’s “IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme” (Accreditation AC-223 by Polish
Centre of Accreditation) provides a third-party evaluation and certification service for
determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations
are performed by an approved Laboratory under the oversight of the Certification Body, which
is managed by the NASK National Research Institute. Laboratory is a commercial facility that
has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC
17025:2018- The General Requirements for the Competence of Testing and Calibration
Laboratories. By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that
the product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated Security Target.
A security target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the
evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the Security Target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made
during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, the evaluated security
functionality and the testing and analysis conducted by the Laboratory. The Certification
Report, Product Certificate and Security Target are posted to the Certified Products List for the
IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme published by NASK National Research Institute.
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Recognition of the certificate
European Recognition of CC Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA, version 3) became effective in April
2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products up to EAL4. A higher recognition
levels are provided for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be found on
https://www.sogis.eu/.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognized under the terms
of this agreement by signatory nations. This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all
assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the
Common Criteria (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA) became effective in
September 2014. It covers Common Criteria certificates based on: collaborative Protection
Profiles, assurance components up to EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR and certificates for PP and
cPP.
The current list of signatory nations and of collaborative Protection Profiles can be found on
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The CCRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognized under the terms of this
agreement by signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope
of recognition. This certificate is recognized under CCRA up to EAL2.
Executive Summary
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product:
A.R.I.C. NDS Optical Industry Data Diode
TOE Version: 2.0.0
Developer: Dynacon Sp. z o.o.
Sponsor: Project co-financed from the NCBiR national programme
„Cybersecurity and e-Identity” as part of the KSO3C project
Security Target: Security Target LITE A.R.I.C. NDS Optical Industry Data Diode,
Version1.0, issue date 29.09.2024
Protection Profile: None
Laboratory/ITSEF: Instytut Łączności Państwowy Instytut Badawczy (AB 1787)
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria version 3.1 Revision 5, Evaluation Assurance
Level EAL3
Evaluation end date: 16/05/2023 (Final ETR ver.2.0.0, issue date 16.05.2023)
Expiration Date: 24.10.2028
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Documentation available for users
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version:
[EXT-975] [EVD-ST-V1.6] Security Target v. 1.6, Issue date 21.04.2023
(confidential document – LITE version available)
[EXT-984] [EVD-AGD_PRE-V1.4] Preparative guidance, v. 1.4, issue date
21.04.2023 (confidential document)
[EXT-985] [EVD-AGD_OPE-V1.4] Operational user guidance, v. 1.4, issue date
21.04.2023 (confidential document)
Security Target
Along with this certification report, the complete Security Target of the evaluation is stored and
protected in the Certification Body premises. This document is identified as:
Security Target A.R.I.C. NDS Optical Industry Data Diode, Version1.6, issue date 21.04.2023
The public version of this document is published along with this Certification Report on the
Certification Body website.
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3. TOE Summary
TOE Overview
The data diode A.R.I.C. NDS DD provides security features for OT communication – it enables
one-way communication for data flow over Ethernet protocol and it ensures that the flow
initialized in opposite direction is completely blocked. The diode main aim is to secure OT
system against injection of malicious data from another autonomous system. The diode is
targeted for OT communication allowing secure data flow between defined objects in OT
network. The secure data flow is defined as one-way communication, which allows sending
data from critical infrastructure/critical technology process components to another
autonomous system, while assuring no data to be sent backwards.
Schema 1: The A.R.I.C. NDS DD general overview
The A.R.I.C. NDS DD architecture is based on two hardware units:
• A.R.I.C NDS DD INPUT,
• A.R.I.C NDS DD OUTPUT.
The TOE provides one-way communication replicating data from the inside trusted (LOW
NETWORK in Schema 1) system to the outside system (HIGH NETWORK in Schema 1) which is
located in a separate security zone. The data received on A.R.I.C. NDS DD INPUT on the HI-SEC
interface is pushed through a single fiber-optic cable to the A.R.I.C. NDS DD OUTPUT. Blocking
of the flow in opposite direction is ensured by using only single fiber-optic cable in the direction
indicated earlier. The fiber-optic cable is not connected in the direction from A.R.I.C. NDS DD
OUTPUT to the A.R.I.C. NDS DD INPUT, which ensures that the data is not sent back or data
generated on A.R.I.C. NDS DD OUTPUT site would not be sent to A.R.I.C. NDS DD INPUT. The
A.R.I.C. NDS DD OUTPUT receives data on the HIGH NETWORK side. The only data flow allowed
is from A.R.I.C. NDS DD INPUT to A.R.I.C. NDS DD OUTPUT, which is controlled on physical layer.
Physical connectivity is based on standard duplex SFP modules and duplex fiber-optic patch
cord, of which only single fiber is used for transferring the data.
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TOE security features
The major security feature of the A.R.I.C. NDS DD is to ensure one-way communication from
trusted OT system (LOW NETWORK) through the data diode towards the system located in the
different security zone (HIGH NETWORK) while blocking the communication in the opposite
direction.
Security Assurance Requirements
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL3,
according to Common Criteria v3.1 Revision 5.
Assurance Class Assurance Component
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete
summary
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural Design
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
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Security Policy
TOE provides following security policies:
• User Data Protection
User Data Protection
The TOE provides information protection by implementation of the One-Way information flow
control policy which ensures data flow in on one direction:
• Information originating from the LOW NETWORK and received on the A.R.I.C. NDS DD
INPUT HI-SEC port shall exit through the A.R.I.C NDS DD OUTPUT HI-SEC port into the HIGH
NETWORK.
• Information received on A.R.I.C NDS DD OUTPUT HI-SEC port and attempting to leave
through the A.R.I.C NDS DD INPUT HI-SEC port is not allowed to do so.
Security Functional Requirements
Functional requirement Description
FDP: User Data Protection FDP_IFC.2 Complete information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties and
functionalities introduced by the Security Target. All assumptions are to be taken into
consideration, when the attack potential is calculated and the impact of the vulnerability on
the product is presented (mostly in terms of reduction). In order to assure the secure use of the
TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its usage and operational environment.
If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure
the secure operation of the TOE. These assumptions have been applied during the evaluation
in order to determine, if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
Usage Assumptions
The Security Target [EVD-ST-V1.6] contains two assumptions related to the usage of the TOE.
A.INTEGRATOR
It is assumed that the integrator who is performing the installation and maintenance of
the TOE is well-trained and competent in the prevention of data injection and the
integrator competence is confirmed by the TOE manufacturer’s certificate.
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A.TRUSTED_OPERATOR
It is assumed that the operator who is authorized to access any information process in
LOW NETWORK and HIGH NETWORK, is always trusted and will never inject information
from HIGH NETWORK to LOW NETWORK by any mean.
Environmental Assumptions
The Security Target [EVD-ST-V1.6] makes three assumption on the operational environment of
the TOE:
A.PHYSICAL
It is assumed that all TOE and non-TOE hardware will be physically protected from
unauthorized access and mechanical, electrical, optical, radiation or any other form
of physical influence. The A.R.I.C NDS DD INPUT, the A.R.I.C NDS DD OUTPUT, the fiber-
optic cable and the media converter are located in controlled secure facility with
access control.
A.NETWORK
Apart from network path through the TOE, it is assumed that there are no other channels
for the information to flow between HIGH NETWORK and LOW NETWORK.
A.MEDIACONVERTER
The media converter is only connected to A.R.I.C. NDS DD INPUT HI-SEC RX interface as
the light (signal) source and it is not connected to any other devices.
Clarification of Scope
Threats
The Security Target [EVD-ST-V1.6] defines two threats which have been taken into consideration
during the evaluation process.
T.DATA_INJECTION
TA-HIGH threat agent is able to inject data to TOE causing any of the following:
• data to flow from HIGH NETWORK to LOW NETWORK (OT system) through TOE (what may
compromise integrity, reliability or correctness of operation of the OT system),
• interruption or distortion of communication forwarded by TOE from LOW NETWORK
towards HIGH NETWORK (what may compromise integrity, reliability or correctness of
communication of the OT system).
T.GET_DATA_FROM_HIGH
TA-LOW threat agent authorised to access the OT system from the LOW NETWORK trying to
inject data from HIGH NETWORK to LOW NETWORK by any mean.
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OSPs
There are no Organizational Security Policies that the TOE must comply to.
5. Architectural Information
Physical scope
The A.R.I.C NDS DD product, delivered to the Customer, consists of:
• 2 pcs of A.R.I.C hardware appliance
o A.R.I.C NDS DD INPUT
o A.R.I.C NDS DD OUTPUT
• 2 pcs of Gigabit SFP modules (for HI-SEC port of each appliance)
o 2 pcs of DSFP-DX-SM-1G, or
o 2 pcs of DSFP-DX-MM-1G
• 1 pcs of fiber-optic cable
• 2 pcs of user guidance: preparative guidance and operational user guidance.
Logical scope
TOE ensures that the data is always allowed to flow only from trusted area (LOW NETWORK) to
untrusted area (HIGH NETWORK) and the data flow in the opposite direction is denied at all
times. The data transfer bases on Ethernet protocol (IEEE.802.3) implemented on the single fiber-
optic cable to guarantee unidirectionality.
The LOW NETWORK data received by A.R.I.C. NDS DD INPUT is sent to A.R.I.C. NDS DD OUTPUT.
The TOE has two internal interfaces, one on each A.R.I.C NDS DD hardware appliances – HI-
SEC ports. The A.R.I.C NDS DD INPUT HI-SEC TX interface is connected by single fiber-optic cable
with A.R.I.C NDS DD OUTPUT HI-SEC RX interface, what ensures that communication originating
at LOW NETWORK is transferred through the TOE. Since the connection is ensured only by the
fiber-optic cable attached to the TX and RX interfaces of the INPUT and OUTPUT devices
respectively, there is no back channel which can be used to send data or provide
communication from HIGH NETWORK to LOW NETWORK (i.e. from OUTPUT to INPUT device).
Any network protocol, after adjustment performed by the Sender Software and Receiver
Software, could be used to implement the communication, if it is compatible with IEEE 802.3
standard (Ethernet) used by TOE at the link layer. The TOE itself is independent from the higher
layer protocols carried in the IEEE 802.3 frames. The TOE scope constitutes only a part of A.R.I.C
NDS DD solution. All the necessary adjustments of the bidirectional TCP protocol in order to be
transferred over the one-way connection provided by TOE are performed by the Sender
Software and Receiver Software. The TOE itself does not modify the data by any means.
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6. IT security evaluation
Evaluated Configuration
Physical network topology required to perform tests is shown below on Figure 1. Physical testing
environment. Additionally, the following console connections are available to enable access
to A.R.I.C. NDS DD INPUT and A.R.I.C. NDS DD OUTPUT devices (from the DIODE-PC1 and DIODE-
PC2 accordingly).
• The USB port of DIODE-PC1 is connected to the serial port of A.R.I.C. NDS DD INPUT devi
(with USB to serial console cable),
• The USB port of DIODE-PC2 is connected to the serial port of A.R.I.C. NDS DD OUTPUT
device (with USB to serial console cable).
The PCs (PC1 and PC2) shall satisfy the minimum requirements for the Debian 10 OS (minimum
RAM: 512MB, minimum Hard Drive Space: 10 GB, minimum 1GHz Pentium processor) and shall
be equipped with minimum one ethernet port (1 Gbps) and one USB port.
The detailed configuration of A.R.I.C. NDS Optical Industry Data Diode could be found in the
paragraph 1.4 of the Security Target v. 1.6.
Figure 1. Physical testing environment
The configuration items of the test bed for A.R.I.C. NDS DD consist of the following elements
shown in Table 1.
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Element description ID Type Network
Operator PC Linux OS with
monitor, keyboard.
PC-1 Host LOW
Intermediate device Router A (Cisco 2921) Router LOW
A.R.I.C. NDS DD INPUT device A.R.I.C. NDS DD INPUT Data Diode LOW
Mediaconverter Light Source NONE
A.R.I.C. NDS DD OUTPUT device A.R.I.C. NDS DD OUTPUT Data Diode LOW
Intermediate device Router B (Cisco 2921) Router HIGH
Server PC Linux OS with monitor,
keyboard.
PC-2 Host HIGH
Table 1. Test bed elements description
Functional testing
The Evaluation Assurance Level EAL3 requires the Developer to devise and conduct the
complete set of tests covering all TSFIs and interactions between subsystems of the TOE. The
Evaluator’s task is divided into two activities. The Evaluators shall confirm the Developer’s tests
results using the sampling strategy described in details by the Common Criteria methodology.
Additionally, the Evaluators are expected to devise and perform their own subset of tests which
are intended to be the supplementary for the tests prepared by the Developer.
Developer testing
The Developer has tested covers all TSFIs and their security functional behaviour. As the TOE
consists of two subsystems, the tests covered both the behaviour of the TOE subsystems and
the interaction between them.
The Developer prepared and performed 10 tests.
All the test cases have obtained a PASS verdict.
Evaluator testing
The Evaluator decided to repeat all functional tests delivered by the Developer. The positive
results of the Developer’s tests were confirmed.
Additionally the Evaluator devised a test subset supplementing the Developer’s test approach
by usage of different tools, using other types of protocols and simultaneously tracing on all
available TSFIs.
The independent tests plan covered the whole TOE functionality: all the SFRs have been tested
through their TSFIs as well as the interactions between the subsystems.
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The total number 23 cases were performed and obtained a PASS verdict.
Penetration testing
The attack potential used for this evaluation is consistent with AVA_VAN.2: Basic attack
potential. The Evaluators analysis is based on vulnerability survey of the evaluation evidence as
well as the information available in the public to ascertain potential vulnerabilities that may be
easily found by an attacker.
The intention of the vulnerability analysis is to determinate if there are faults or weaknesses of
the TOE that can be exploited in the operational environment.
The evaluation of documentation analysis and tests resulted in the 10 vulnerability notes, which
represented a potential vulnerability. Additionally 13 publicly available vulnerabilities (acquired
from databases and scientific publications) have been taken into consideration during the
analysis.
Analysis of the assumptions for the operational environment presented in the final Security
Target version 1.6 showed that NONE of the potential vulnerabilities could be exploited due to
the strong restrictions regarding the TOE accessibility.
As the result NO vulnerability testing was performed by the Evaluators.
Evaluation verdicts
The Evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within the scope
of the evaluation and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives stated in the
Security Target for an attack potential Enhanced-Basic.
The Certifier reviewed the work of the Evaluator and determined that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the following table:
Assurance Class Assurance Component
Laboratory
Verdict
Certification
Body
Validation
ADV:
Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture
description
PASS CONFORMANT
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with
complete summary
PASS CONFORMANT
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural Design PASS CONFORMANT
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance PASS CONFORMANT
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures PASS CONFORMANT
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Assurance Class Assurance Component
Laboratory
Verdict
Certification
Body
Validation
ALC: Life-cycle
support
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls PASS CONFORMANT
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation
representation CM coverage
PASS CONFORMANT
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures PASS CONFORMANT
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security
measures
PASS CONFORMANT
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle
model
PASS CONFORMANT
ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims PASS CONFORMANT
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components
definition
PASS CONFORMANT
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction PASS CONFORMANT
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives PASS CONFORMANT
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements PASS CONFORMANT
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition PASS CONFORMANT
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification PASS CONFORMANT
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage PASS CONFORMANT
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design PASS CONFORMANT
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing PASS CONFORMANT
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample PASS CONFORMANT
AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis PASS CONFORMANT
Certifier’s Comments
Recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided in the documentation.
These have been collected along the evaluation process and shall to be considered when
using the product.
The use of the TOE is recommended due to the lack of vulnerabilities that could be exploited
in the operational environment which is achieved due to the fact that the attack potential is
reduced to zero by restrictive objectives for the operational environment. The potential for
attack is radically limited because the TOE is physically protected from any access in a way
that can be considered the most significant factor in protecting the TOE and its security
functionality.
Nonetheless, the following usage recommendations are given:
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• It is mandatory to strictly follow the steps indicated in the installation documentation in
order to install the correct version of the TOE in a proper manner.
• The user guidance must be read and understood in order to operate the TOE in an
adequate manner according to the Security Target.
7. Certifier’s Recommendations
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL3 of Common Criteria
standard have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory assigned the
“PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluation requirements are satisfied for
the EAL3, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 Revision 5 and the CEM v3.1 Revision 5.
Considering the obtained and validated evidence and gained the Certification Team
experience of the Certification Team during the certification process of the product A.R.I.C.
NDS Optical Industry Data Diode v. 2.0.0 evaluation, a positive resolution is proposed.
8. Acronyms
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
CB Certification Body
TOE Target Of Evaluation
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9. Bibliography
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
1. [CC31p1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5
2. [CC31p2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Part 2: Security Functional Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5
3. [CC31p3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Part 3: Security Assurance Components, Version 3.1, Revision 5
4. [CEM31] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5
References
List of normative documents
SOG-IS MRA Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security Evaluation
Certificates
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of
Information Technology Security
ISO/IEC 15408 Information technology - Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT security
ISO/IEC 17025 General requirements for competence of calibration and testing laboratories
ISO/IEC 17065 Conformity assessment - Requirements for bodies certifying products, processes
and services
ISO/IEC 18045 Information technology — Security techniques — Methodology for IT security
evaluation
PC1 IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme
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List of related documents:
[EXT-999] [FIN-ETR-V2.0.0] Final Evaluation Technical Report, v. 2.0.0, issue date
16.05.2023 (ITSEF confidential document)
[EXT-975] [EVD-ST-V1.6] Security Target v. 1.6, issue date 21.04.2023 (confidential
document)
[EXT-1260] [EVD-ST-V1.0 LITE] Security Target LITE A.R.I.C. NDS Optical Industry Data Diode,
v. 1.0, issue date 29.09.2024
[EXT-984] [EVD-AGD_PRE-V1.4] Preparative guidance, v. 1.4, issue date 21.04.2023
(confidential document)
[EXT-985] [EVD-AGD_OPE-V1.4] Operational user guidance, v. 1.4, issue date 21.04.2023
(confidential document)
[EXT-986] [EVD-ADV-ARC-V1.4] Security Architecture, v. 1.4, issue date 21.04.2023
(confidential document)
[EXT-987] [EVD-ADV-FSP-V1.4] Functional Specification, v. 1.4, issue date 21.04.2023
(confidential document)
[EXT-988] [EVD-ADV-TDS-V1.4] TOE Design, v. 1.4, issue date 21.04.2023 (confidential
document)
[EXT-785] [EVD-ALC_CMC-V1.5] Configuration Management Plan, v. 1.5, issue date
12.07.2022 (confidential document)
[EXT-786] [EVD-ALC_CMS-V1.1] Configuration Items List, v. 1.1, issue date 12.07.2022
(confidential document)
[EXT-787] [EVD-ALC_DEL-V1.3] TOE Delivery Procedure, v. 1.3, issue date 12.07.2022
(confidential document)
[EXT-788] [EVD-ALC_DVS-V1.3] Development security measures description, v. 1.3, issue
date 12.07.2022 (confidential document)
[EXT-789] [EVD-ALC_LCD-V1.1] Development life cycle model definition, v. 1.1, issue date
12.07.2022 (confidential document)
[EXT-784] [EVD-SVCL-EAL3] Site visit checklist EAL3, v. 1.4, issue date 18.06.2022
(confidential document)
[EXT-983] [EVD-ATE-ALL-V1.3] ATE Vendor test plan supporting document, v. 1.3, issue date
21.04.2023 (confidential document)
[EXT-780] [EVD-ATE-DTR-V1.2] ATE Vendor test plan, v. 1.2, issue date 18.08.2022
(confidential document)
[EXT-808] [EVD-ATE-DTS-V1.2] ATE Test Scripts, v. 1.2, no issue date (confidential document)