National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Infinera Corporation mTera Universal Transport Platform
version MT5.1.2
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11153-2021
Dated: August 31, 2021
Version: 0.3
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, SUITE 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant
Randy Heimann
Linda Morrison
Clare Parran
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Kevin Cummins
Khai Van
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................ 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 3
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 4
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 4
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 4
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 5
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 5
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 5
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 5
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 6
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 6
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 7
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 7
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 7
8 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................. 7
9 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................ 7
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................ 8
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV).............................................................. 8
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ................................................. 8
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)..................................... 8
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ................. 9
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)......................................................... 9
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 10
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 10
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 10
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 10
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 10
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 11
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers........................................................................................... 2
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Infinera mTera Universal Transport Platform
solution provided by Infinera Corporation. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of
the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either
expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in August 2021. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.1, 24 September 2018.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infinera mTera Universal Transport Platform
MT5.1.2.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the
Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the mTera Universal
Transport Platform version MT5.1.2 Security Target, version 0.5, August 26, 2021 and
analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Infinera mTera Universal Transport Platform MT5.1.2
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.1, 24 September 2018
ST mTera Universal Transport Platform version MT5.1.2 Security Target, version 0.5,
August 26, 2021
Evaluation
Technical Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Infinera mTera Universal Transport Platform
MT5.1.2, version 0.3, August 26, 2021
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Infinera Corporation
Developer Infinera Corporation
Common Criteria
Testing Lab
(CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Sheldon Durrant, Randy Heimann, Linda Morrison, Clare Parran (The MITRE
Corporation)
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Infinera mTera Universal Transport Platform is an extremely flexible and highly
efficient transport solution supporting up to 12Tb/s of switching and grooming for OTN,
Packet and SONET/SDH leveraging protocol agnostic fabrics and interface cards that can be
software configured for OTN, MPLS-TP or Carrier Ethernet on each interface or virtual
interface. The Infinera mTera is offered in either a 16-slot chassis or 8-slot chassis.
The mTera is an optical network appliance delivering Wavelength, High-capacity Electrical
OTN, and Packet network switching. The mTera supports electrical switching using an
agnostic switch fabric. Signals switched by the electrical switch fabric include high-capacity
ITU Optical Transport Network (OTN) ODU switching, ITU/ANSI SDH/SONET switching
and service oriented MPLS-TP/Ethernet packet switching. The security functions provided
include Identification, Authentication, Access Control, Protection of TSF, Confidentiality,
Integrity and Auditing.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The Infinera mTera is a network appliance composed of various module slots. The mTera
supports up to two STPM (shelf timing and processor module) cards for management in
addition to optical network switch blades. The mTera TOE's management capabilities rely
on TL1 commands. The mTera’s interfaces provide TLS and IPsec functionality as well as
SSHv2 for management.
The mTera STPM includes an LCI (local craft interface) port for local CLI access and DCN
(data communications network) ports for network communications. Though an administrator
uses SSH to connect to the mTera through both interfaces, the LCI port does not provide
network routing, thus requiring an administrator to connect directly to the LCI port for local
console access.
The mTera TOE contains an OpenSSL FIPS object module and a kernel crypto module for
cryptographic services. The Kernel Crypto module is used for IPSEC data path
(encrypt/decrypt, message authentication, hash) while the OpenSSL module is used for
IPSEC Key management (i.e. IKE), SSH and TLS operations. The OpenSSL module is used
for secret negotiation, authentication, encrypt/decrypt, message authentication, hashes and
DRBG.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE's physical boundary includes the entire chassis, which contains the STPM
management and optical network line cards. The TOE runs firmware version FP.5.1.2p1.
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The TOE operates with the following components in the Operating Environment:
• Audit Server – The TOE utilizes an external syslog server to store audit records.
• Authentication Server – The TOE has the ability to use RADIUS servers to
authenticate users.
• Time Server – The TOE uses a Network Time Protocol (NTP) server to synchronize
its system clock with a central time source.
• SSH Client – The remote administrator uses an SSH client to access the CLI.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events
including start-up and shutdown of the TOE, all administrator actions, and all events
identified in the Security Target, Table 2 Auditable Events. The TOE can be configured to
store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator or alternately to send the
logs to a designated syslog server in the operational environment.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic modules that provide key management, random bit
generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing
features in support of higher level cryptographic protocols including IPsec, SSH, and TLS.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires administrators to be identified and authenticated before they can access
any TOE security functions. The TOE supports role-based authentication, so user accounts
are assigned predefined roles which restrict them based on their assigned role. The TOE
maintains these administrator and user attributes which can be defined locally with user
names and passwords or can be defined in the context of local RADIUS services.
Authentication can be either locally or remotely through an external authentication server, or
internally. After an administrator-specified number of failed attempts, the user account is
locked out. The TOE’s password mechanism provides configuration for a minimum
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password length. The TOE also protects, stores and allows authorized administrators to load
X.509.v3 certificates for use to support authentication for IPsec, TLS and SSH connections.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides the administrator role the capability to configure and manage all TOE
security functions including cryptographic operations, user accounts, passwords, advisory
banner, session inactivity and TOE updates. The management functions are restricted to the
administrator role. The role must have the appropriate access privileges or access will be
denied. The TOE’s cryptographic functions ensure that only secure values are accepted for
security attributes.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE has its own internal hardware clock that provides reliable time stamps used for
auditing. The TOE stores passwords on flash and encrypts the passwords using an AES-256-
CBC key. The TOE does not provide any interfaces that allow passwords or keys to be read.
The TOE also provides integrity and security protection for all communication between its
components. This prevents unauthorized modification or disclosure of TSF data during
transmission.
The TOE runs self-tests during power up and periodically during operation to ensure the
correct operation of the cryptographic functions and TSF hardware. There is an option for
the administrator to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. The TOE executes
self-tests for both the Kernel Crypto module and OpenSSL FIPS Object module.
The TOE includes mechanisms so that the administrator can determine the TOE version and
update the TOE securely using digital signatures.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE allows administrators to configure a period of inactivity for administrator and user
sessions. Once that time period has been reached while the session has no activity, the session
is terminated. All users may also terminate their own sessions at any time. A warning banner
is displayed at the management interfaces (local CLI and SSH) to advise users on appropriate
use and penalty for misuse of system.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE uses IPsec to provide an encrypted channel between itself and third-party trusted
IT entities in the operating environment including external syslog server, external
authentication server and NTP server. The TOE also uses IPsec to encrypt communications
between the TOE and external IT entities. The TOE uses TLS to secure network
communications with an external optical network peer.
The TOE secures remote communication with administrators by implementing SSHv2 for
CLI access. Both the integrity and disclosure protection are ensured via the secure protocol.
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If the negotiation of a secure session fails or if the user cannot be authenticated for remote
administration, the attempted session will not be established.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.1, 24 September 2018
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP21 should be consulted if there
is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP21 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices and
performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP21 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• mTera Universal Transport Platform version MT5.1.2 Security Target, v0.5, August
26, 2021
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• Coriant Product Hardening Guide, Version BP11, August 23, 2021
• TL1 Specification, version CP11, August 26, 2021
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP21) for
Infinera mTera Universal Transport Platform MT5.1.2, Version 0.3, August 26, 2021 (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP21 including the tests associated with
optional requirements.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following series and models:
Product Model Part Number(s) CPU
Infinera Corporation mTera Universal
Transport Platform – 8 slot chassis
81.71S-MTERA8-R6 See the 8-slot
STPM CPU below
Infinera Corporation mTera Universal
Transport Platform – 16 slot chassis
81.71S-MTERA-R6 See the 16-slot
STPM CPU below
8-slot STPM 82.71C-M8STPM-R6 NXP QorIQ P-4080
16-slot STPM 82.71C-MSTPM-R6 NXP QorIQ P-4080
The STPM cards are management cards that run the software image for the mTera. The only
difference between the two STPMs is that they are built with different form factors.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the mTera Universal
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Transport Platform TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
NDcPP21.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Infinera mTera Universal Transport
Platform MT5.1.2 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product
security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP21 related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
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The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP21 and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover
any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the:
• National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search)
• Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities)
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories)
• Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engin (http://www.exploitsearch.net)
• SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com)
• Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search)
• Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
on 08/11/2021 with the following search terms:
"Infinera",
"Coriant mTera",
"TL1",
"radius",
"ssh",
"ike",
"ipsec",
"tls",
"tcp",
"NXP QorIQ P-4080".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.1 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the document “Coriant Product
Hardening Guide, Version BP11”, dated 23 August 2021. No versions of the TOE and
software, either earlier or later were evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product
was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the
operational environment, such as a management workstation, need to be assessed separately
and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
The evaluation and testing of security functional requirements are scoped by the guidance
included by the Assurance Activity associated with the Protection Profile claimed by the
TOE. There is an inherent risk that elements of the TOE security functionality were not fully
evaluated. It is recommended that the TOE be subject to integration testing within its
intended environment to ensure proper configuration, compliance, and operation.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: mTera Universal Transport Platform version MT5.1.2
(NDcPP21) Security Target, Version 0.5, August 26, 2021.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
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• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, September 2102.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.1, 24 September 2018.
[5] mTera Universal Transport Platform version MT5.1.2 (NDcPP21) Security Target,
Version 0.5, August 26, 2021 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report for Infinera mTera Universal Transport Platform MT5.1.2,
Version 0.3, August 26, 2021 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report for Infinera mTera Universal Transport Platform MT5.1.2,
Version 0.3, August 26, 2021 (DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Infinera mTera Universal Transport Platform,
Version 0.3, August 26, 2021 (ETR)