KECS-CR-20-68
CubeOne V2.5 SP1
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1054-2020
2020. 11. 26.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2020.11.26. -
Certification report for CubeOne V2.5 SP1
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for CubeOne V2.5 SP1 of
eGlobal Systems Co., ltd
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
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Table of Contents
Certification Report ......................................................................................................1
1. Executive Summary...............................................................................................5
2. Identification ........................................................................................................10
3. Security Policy..................................................................................................... 11
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope...........................................................12
5. Architectural Information....................................................................................13
6. Documentation.....................................................................................................13
7. TOE Testing..........................................................................................................13
8. Evaluated Configuration .....................................................................................14
9. Results of the Evaluation....................................................................................15
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE).............................................................15
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) .......................................................15
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD) .................................................16
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ...............................................................16
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE) ..............................................................................16
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)...............................................................17
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary.....................................................................17
10. Recommendations...............................................................................................18
11. Security Target.....................................................................................................19
12. Acronyms and Glossary .....................................................................................19
13. Bibliography.........................................................................................................19
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the evaluation result drawn by the evaluation facility on the
results of the EAL1+ evaluation of CubeOne V2.5 SP1(“TOE” hereinafter) with
reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(“CC” hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and
conformity.The TOE is provided as software and provides the encryption/decryption
function for the user data by each column of Database. The TOE consists of
CubeOne Security Server that save cryptographic policy and security audit log of
TOE, CubeOne Manager that configure and control cryptographic policy like role
definition of TOE, CubeOne Server that perform cryptographic operation of user data
for TOE, and CubeOne Beacon that perform latent violation analysis and security
alert of TOE. The plug-in type shown in [Figure 1], which is installed in the protected
DB server, performs encryption/decryption of the user data. And API type shown in
[Figure 2] which is installed in Application server developed to provide a certain
application service, encrypts/decrypts user data on it. CubeOne Beacon and
CubeOne Security Server are installed in the same server. The authorized
administrator can connect to CubeOne Manager for security control. The authorized
user can connect CubeOne Beacon to check security alert and audit log. The TOE is
required to use the cryptographic algorithm validated in the Korea Cryptographic
Module Validation Program (KCMVP). The TOE is used to encrypt the user data
according to the policy set by the authorized administrator to prevent the
unauthorized disclosure of the confidential information. In order that the authorized
administrator can operate the TOE securely in the operational environment of the
organization, the TOE provides various security features such as the security audit
function that records and manages major auditable events; cryptographic support
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function such as cryptographic key management to encrypt the user and the TSF
data, and cryptographic operation; user data protection function that encrypts the
user data and protects the residual information; identification and authentication
function such as verifying the identity of the authorized administrator, authentication
failure handling, and mutual authentication among the TOE components; security
management function for security functions, role definition, and configuration; TSF
protection functions including protecting the TSF data transmitted among the TOE
components, protecting the TSF data stored in the storage that is controlled by the
TSF, and TSF self-test; and TOE access function to manage the access session of
the authorized administrator. The DEK (Data Encryption Key) used to
encrypt/decrypt the user data is protected by encryption with the KEK (Key
Encryption Key). The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA) and completed on November 10,
2020. This report grounds on the evaluation technical report (ETR) TTA had
submitted [5] and the Security Target (ST) [6]. The ST claims strict conformance to
the Korean National Protection Profile for Data Encryption V1.1 [3]. All Security
Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance
component in CC Part 3. The ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional
components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE satisfies the
SFRs in the ST. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended. The
operational environment of the TOE is shown in [Figure 1, 2] TOE Operational
Environment. The operational environment of the TOE includes all the two types(API
type, plug-in type) defined in the PP [3].
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Application service user
Application Server
CubeOne
Security Server / Beacon
TSF data transmission
Database Server
CubeOne Server
TSF data transmission
User data
123456 - 1234567
User data
ABCVDASFD12345AS
D1234ASDF1234ASD
User data
encryption/decryption
TSF data transmission
123456 - 1234567
Authorized log administrator
Authorized policy
administrator
CubeOne Manager
TOE
Secure Communication
(Using Validated Cryptographic Module)
Secure Communication
[Figure 1] Plug-in Operational environment of the TOE
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Application service user
TSF data transmission
TSF data transmission
Database Server
TSF data transmission
Application Server
CubeOne Server
Authorized log administrator
CubeOne
Security Server / Beacon
ABCVDASFD12345AS
D1234ASDF1234ASD
User data
encryption/decryption
User data 123456 - 1234567
User data
ABCVDASFD12345AS
D1234ASDF1234ASD
Authorized policy
administrator
CubeOne Manager
TOE
Secure Communication
(Using Validated Cryptographic Module)
Secure Communication
[Figure 2] API Operational environment of the TOE
Item Minimum operation specification
CubeOne Server
(Plug-In)
CPU
POWER5
2.0Ghz
above
sparcv9
2848 MHz
above
Intel(R)
Itanium 2
1.6 GHz
above
Intel Dual
Core 1.8GHz
above
Memory 4GB above
HDD At least 200MB of space required to install TOE
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port above
OS
AIX 7.1
64bit
SunOS
5.11 64bit
HP-UX
11.31 64bit
CentOS
7.8.2003 64bit
(kernel 3.10.0-
1127.el7.x86_64)
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Item Minimum operation specification
DBMS
Tibero 6
DB2 10.5
Tibero 6
CubeOne Server
(API)
CPU
POWER5
2.0Ghz above
sparcv9 2848
MHz above
Intel(R) Itanium 2
1.6 GHz above
Memory 4GB above
HDD At least 200MB of space required to install TOE
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port above
OS AIX 7.1 64bit
SunOS 5.11
64bit
HP-UX 11.31 64bit
CubeOne Manager
CPU Intel Core 2 Duo 2.40GHz above
Memory 4GB above
HDD At least 200MB of space required to install TOE
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port above
OS Windows 2012 R2 Standard 64bit
essential
S/W
- IBM Data Server Client Packages Version 10.5
- Tibero6 ODBC client
- MS Visual C++ 2010 Redistributable Package (x86)
CubeOne
Security Server /
Beacon
CPU Intel Core 2 Duo 2.26 GHz above
Memory 4GB above
HDD At least 200MB of space required to install TOE
NIC 10/100/1000 X 1Port above
OS CentOS 7.8.2003 64bit (kernel 3.10.0-1127.el7.x86_64)
essential
S/W
- MariaDB 10.5.5
- Apache tomcat 8.5.57
Authorized log
administrator
Web
browser
Chrome V 70
[Table 1] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE
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Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE reference is identified as follows.
TOE CubeOne V2.5 SP1
Version V2.5 SP1
Detail version rev.0002
TOE
Components
- CubeOne_Manager_V2.5.00.01_SP1
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_A64_7.1_TI6
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_A64_7.1_DB10.5
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_S64_5.11_TI6
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_H64_B.11.31_TI6
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_L64_3.10_TI6
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_A64_7.1_API
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_S64_5.11_API
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_H64_B.11.31_API
- CubeOne_SServer_V2.5.00.01_SP1_L64_3.10_MA
- CubeOne_Beacon_V2.5.00.01_SP1
Guidance
Documents
CubeOne_OPE_V2.5.1.1_SP1.pdf
CubeOne_PRE_V2.5.1.2_SP1.pdf
[Table 2] TOE identification
[Table 3] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 24, 2017)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
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(September 12, 2017)[4]
TOE CubeOne V2.5 SP1
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~
CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
EAL EAL1+
(augmented by ATE_FUN.1)
Developer eGlobal Systems Co., ltd
Sponsor eGlobal Systems Co., ltd
Evaluation Facility Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
November 10, 2020
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 3] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The TOE provides following security features. For more details refer to the ST [6].
TSF Explanation
Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events such
as the start-up/shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation,
self-test failures, and stores them in the DBMS.
Cryptographic
Support
The TOE performs cryptographic operation such as
encryption/decryption, and cryptographic key management such as
key generation/distribution/destruction using COLib V1.1.0
User data
protection
The TOE provides encryption / decryption function for each column
of Database to protect user data.
Identification
and
Authentication
The TOE identifies and authenticates the administrators(Policy
administrator, General administrator) based on ID/PW.
Mutual authentication between TOE components.
Security Only the authorized administrator who can access the management
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TSF Explanation
Management interface provided by TOE can performs security management of the
TOE.
Protection of
the TSF
The TOE provides secure communications amongst TOE
components to protect confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted
data between them. The TOE also protects TSF data against
unauthorized exposure and modification through encryption.
TOE Access
The TOE manages the authorized administrator’s or end user’s
access to itself by terminating interactive sessions after defined time
interval of their inactivity. The TSF restrict the maximum number of
concurrent session, and management access session of the
administrator based on Access IP, and same administrator right.
[Table 4] Security features
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no explicit Assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the Low
Assurance ST. The followings are procedural method supported from operational
environment in order to provide the TOE security functionality accurately.
- The place where the TOE components are installed and operated shall be
equipped with access control and protection facilities so that only authorized
administrator can access
- The authorized administrator of the TOE shall be non-malicious users, have
appropriately trained for the TOE management functions and accurately fulfill
the duties in accordance with administrator guidance.
- The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification
and authentication function in the operational environment of the business
system shall ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely applied
in accordance with the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
- The authorized administrator of the TOE shall periodically checks a spare
space of audit data storage in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the
audit data backup (external log server or separate storage device, etc.) to
prevent audit data loss.
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- The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability and security
of the operating system by performing the reinforcement on the latest
vulnerabilities of the operating system in which the TOE is installed and
operated.
- The TOE accurately records incidents related to security by receiving reliable
time stamps provided by the TOE operating environment.
- DBMS that saves the TSF data and audit data is operated in a physically safe
environment.
- All information that is sent when an authorized log administrator connect to the
Web server through the Web browser shall be protected through a secure
channel.
5. Architectural Information
The physical scope of TOE is CubeOne Manager, CubeOne Server, CubeOne Security
Server, CubeOne Beacon and those are inside CD. The major security functions of the
TOE and logical scope of the TOE are shown in [Figure 1, 2] and chapter 3, [Table
3].For the detailed description, refer to the ST [6, 7].
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
CubeOne_PRE_V2.5.1.2_SP1.pdf V1.2 Sep. 11, 2020
CubeOne_OPE_V2.5.1.1_SP1.pdf V1.1 Sep. 10, 2020
[Table 5] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE component based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test
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case includes the following information:
 Test no. and conductor: Identifier of each test case and its conductor
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions and modules to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
 Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the
expected and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator has installed the product using the same evaluation configuration and
tools as the developer’s test and performed all tests provided by the developer. The
evaluator has confirmed that, for all tests, the expected results had been consistent
with the actual results. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based
upon test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for
potential vulnerabilities. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration,
depth, and results are summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: CubeOne V2.5 SP1(rev.0002)
- CubeOne_Manager_V2.5.00.01_SP1
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_A64_7.1_TI6
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_A64_7.1_DB10.5
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_S64_5.11_TI6
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_H64_B.11.31_TI6
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_L64_3.10_TI6
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_A64_7.1_API
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_S64_5.11_API
- CubeOne_Server_V2.5.00.01_SP1_H64_B.11.31_API
- CubeOne_SServer_V2.5.00.01_SP1_L64_3.10_MA
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- CubeOne_Beacon_V2.5.00.01_SP1
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6,
[Table 4] were evaluated with the TOE
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are
internally consistent. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has clearly identified the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned
to ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes
the TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
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ALC_CMS.1.
Also the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in
device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specifies a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing
and SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
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Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The administrator should install and operate the TOE and DBMS in a
physically secure environment accessible only by the authorized administrator,
and should not allow remote management from the outside.
 Developers who link the encryption function to the application or DBMS should
ensure that the security functions of the TOE are applied safely in accordance
with the requirements of the manual.
 When operating the product, the administrator's password should be changed
periodically.
 It is necessary to maintain the reliability and safety of the operating system by
performing reinforcement work on the latest vulnerabilities of the operating
system installed and operated by the TOE.
 The authorized administrator should maintain the secure state, such as
applying the latest security patches to the operating system and DBMS, and
removing unnecessary services, when operating the product.
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 The authorized administrator shall periodically check the free space of the
audit data storage in preparation for the loss of the audit records and perform
the backup of the audit records so that the audit records are not deleted.
 The administrator should perform periodic monitoring through Beacon when a
potential security violation event occurs after installing the product.
 The policy manager should manage the PC so that only the authorized policy
manager can access the system to prevent modification and deletion of the
audit log from unauthorized users.
11. Security Target
The CubeOne V2.5 SP1 Security Target V1.3, November 5, 2020 [6] is included in this
report by reference.
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
13. Bibliography
The evaluation facility has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April, 2017
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[3] Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1, KECS-PP-
0820a-2017, December 11, 2019
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security(September 12, 2017)
[5] TTA-CCE-19-008 CubeOne V2.5 SP1 Evaluation Technical Report V1.3,
November 10, 2020
[6] CubeOne V2.5 SP1 Security Target V1.3, November 05, 2020