STMicroelectronics
SA/SB23YT66/34A
Security Target -
Public Version
Common Criteria for IT security
evaluation
SMD_Sx23YTxx_ST_09_002 Rev 01.00
January 2010
BLANK
January 2010 SMD_Sx23YTxx_ST_09_002 Rev 01.00 3/51
SA/SB23YT66/34A
Security Target - Public Version
Common Criteria for IT security evaluation
1 Introduction
1.1 Security Target reference
1 Document identification: SA/SB23YT66/34A SECURITY TARGET - PUBLIC VERSION.
2 Version number: Rev 01.00, issued December 2009.
3 Registration: registered at ST Microelectronics under number
SMD_Sx23YTxx_ST_09_002_V01.00.
1.2 Purpose
4 This document presents the Security Target - Public version (ST) of the SA23YT66A,
SB23YT66A, SA23YT34A, and SB23YT34A, Security Integrated Circuits (IC), with
Dedicated Software (DSW) and an embedded cryptographic library, designed on the ST23
platform of STMicroelectronics.
5 This document is a sanitized version of the Security Target used for the evaluation. It is
classified as public information.
6 The precise reference of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and the security IC features are
given in Section 3: TOE description.
7 A glossary of terms and abbreviations used in this document is given in Appendix A:
Glossary
www.st.com
Contents SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version
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Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Security Target reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 TOE description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 TOE overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 TOE life cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3 TOE environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3.1 TOE Development Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3.2 TOE production environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3.3 TOE operational environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 Conformance claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1 Common Criteria conformance claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2 PP Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.1 PP Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.2 PP Refinements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.3 PP Additions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.4 PP Claims rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5 Security problem definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1 Description of assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2 Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3 Organisational security policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.4 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6 Security objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.1 Security objectives for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.2 Security objectives for the environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.3 Security objectives rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.3.1 TOE threat "Memory Access Violation" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
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6.3.2 Organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security Functionality"
25
7 Security requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.1.1 Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.1.2 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.1.3 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.1.4 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.1.5 Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.1.6 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.1.7 Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.1.8 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.1.9 Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.1.10 Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.1.11 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.1.12 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.1.13 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.1.14 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.15 Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1.16 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.2 TOE security assurance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.3 Refinement of the security assurance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.3.1 Refinement regarding functional specification (ADV_FSP) . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.3.2 Refinement regarding test coverage (ATE_COV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.4 Security Requirements rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.4.2 Additional security objectives are suitably addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.4.3 Additional security requirements are consistent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.4.4 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.4.5 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8 TOE summary specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.1 Statement of TOE security functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.1.1 TSF_INIT_A: Hardware initialisation & TOE attribute initialisation . . . . 39
8.1.2 TSF_CONFIG_A: TOE configuration switching and control . . . . . . . . . 39
8.1.3 TSF_INT_A: TOE logical integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
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8.1.4 TSF_TEST_A: Test of the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.1.5 TSF_FWL_A: Memory Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.1.6 TSF_PHT_A: Physical tampering protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.1.7 TSF_ADMINIS_A: Security violation administrator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.1.8 TSF_OBS_A: Unobservability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.1.9 TSF_SKCS_A: Symmetric Key Cryptography Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.1.10 TSF_AKCS_A: Asymmetric Key Cryptography Support . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.1.11 TSF_ALEAS_A: Unpredictable Number Generation Support . . . . . . . . 42
8.2 TOE summary specification rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.2.1 TSF rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Appendix A Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.1 Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.2 Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10 Revision history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version List of tables
SMD_Sx23YTxx_ST_09_002 7/51
List of tables
Table 1. Products of the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table 2. Composite product life cycle phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Table 3. Summary of security environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Table 4. Summary of security objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 5. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Table 7. FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Table 8. FCS_CKM.1 iterations (cryptographic key generation). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Table 9. TOE security assurance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Table 10. Impact of EAL5 selection on BSI-PP-0035 refinements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Table 11. Dependencies of security functional requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Table 12. Mapping of TSF services and SFRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Table 13. List of abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Table 14. Document revision history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
List of figures SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version
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List of figures
Figure 1. Sx23YT66A block diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Figure 2. Sx23YT34A block diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version Context
SMD_Sx23YTxx_ST_09_002 9/51
2 Context
8 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) referred to in Section 3: TOE description, is evaluated under
the French IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme and is developed by the
Smartcard Division of STMicroelectronics (ST).
9 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) comprises the SA23YT66A, SB23YT66A, SA23YT34A, and
SB23YT34A.
10 The assurance level of the performed Common Criteria (CC) IT Security Evaluation is EAL 5
augmented.
11 The intent of this Security Target is to specify the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs)
and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) applicable to the SA23YT66A, SB23YT66A,
SA23YT34A, and SB23YT34A security ICs, and to summarise their chosen TSF services
and assurance measures.
12 This ST claims to be an instantiation of the "Security IC Platform Protection Profile" (PP)
registered and certified under the reference BSI-PP-0035 in the German IT Security
Evaluation and Certification Scheme, with the following augmentations:
● Addition #1: “Support of Cipher Schemes” from AUG
● Addition #4: “Area based Memory Access Control” from AUG
The original text of this PP is typeset as indicated here, its augmentations from AUG as
indicated here, when they are reproduced in this document.
13 Extensions introduced in this ST to the SFRs of the Protection Profile (PP) are exclusively
drawn from the Common Criteria part 2 standard SFRs.
14 This ST makes various refinements to the above mentioned PP and AUG. They are all
properly identified in the text typeset as indicated here. The original text of the PP is
repeated as scarcely as possible in this document for reading convenience. All PP identifiers
have been however prefixed by their respective origin label: BSI for BSI-PP-0035, AUG1 for
Addition #1 of AUG and AUG4 for Addition #4 of AUG.
TOE description SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version
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3 TOE description
3.1 TOE overview
15 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) comprises four products: the SA23YT66A, SB23YT66A,
SA23YT34A, and SB23YT34A.
All those products share the same hardware design, and the same maskset. The different
derivates differ only on the available memories size, on the available I/Os, and on the
associated cryptographic library, as detailed here below:
16 The different products can be distinguished by their product identification number, included
in the traceability number, as detailed in their Data Sheets.
17 In this Security Target, the terms:
● "TOE" or "Sx23YTxx" or "SA/SB23YT66/34A" mean all 4 products,
● "Sx23YT66" means the subset of products SA23YT66A / SB23YT66A,
● "Sx23YT34" means the subset of products SA23YT34A / SB23YT34A,
● "SA23YTxx" means the subset of products SA23YT66A / SA23YT34A.
● "SB23YTxx" means the subset of products SB23YT66A / SB23YT34A.
18 The TOE comprises two possible versions of Neslib, a SA and a SB version.
19 The rest of this document applies to all products, except when a particular mention to one of
the products or one of the subsets is added. For easier reading, the restrictions
corresponding to a particular product or subset are typeset as indicated here.
20 The SA23YT66A and SB23YT66A are directly derived from the ST23YT66A by the addition
of a public key cryptographic library named Neslib SA for the SA23YT66A, Neslib SB for the
SB23YT66A.
21 The SA23YT34A and SB23YT34A are directly derived from the ST23YT34A by the addition
of a public key cryptographic library named Neslib SA for the SA23YT34A, Neslib SB for the
SB23YT34A.
22 The TOE is a serial access Smartcard IC based on the enhanced 8/16-bit ST23 CPU core,
with 66 Kbytes EEPROM for the Sx23YT66 / 34 Kbytes EEPROM for the Sx23YT34, an
internally generated clock, an MPU, an internal True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
and accelerators dedicated to cryptographic algorithms.
23 Operations are synchronized with an internally generated clock issued by the Clock
Generator module. The internal speed of the device is fully software programmable. High
performance can be reached by using high speed internal clock frequency (up to 29 MHz).
The CPU interfaces with the on-chip RAM, ROM and EEPROM memories via an internal
Table 1. Products of the TOE
Product name EEPROM size
User RAM
size
User ROM
size
Number of
pins
Crypto library
Identification
number
SA23YT66A 66 KBytes 6.2 KBytes 210 KBytes 20 Neslib SA 2.0 B410h
SB23YT66A 66 KBytes 6.2 KBytes 210 KBytes 20 Neslib SB 2.0 B410h
SA23YT34A 34 KBytes 5 KBytes 110 KBytes 8 Neslib SA 2.0 B408h
SB23YT34A 34 KBytes 5 KBytes 110 KBytes 8 Neslib SB 2.0 B408h
SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version TOE description
SMD_Sx23YTxx_ST_09_002 11/51
bus offering 16 MBytes of linear addressing space, protected by the memory protection unit
(MPU) without performance loss.
24 The CPU includes the Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) and the control logic.
This device includes a flexible memory protection unit (MPU), which enables a fully dynamic
memory segmentation and protection without downgrading the CPU performance. The MPU
enables the software to control the addressable space and registers available to any given
program, thanks to a flexible and software-friendly interface. As a result, the MPU allows the
software developers to enforce a wide range of memory protection policies.
The E-DES (Enhanced DES) module supports efficiently the Data Encryption Standard
(DES [2]) with built-in coutermeasures against side channel attacks. Additionally, an extra
feature allows fast implementation of CBC and CBC-MAC modes [10] [9].
The NESCRYPT (NExt Step CRYPTo-processor) is the latest generation of ST
cryptographic accelerator providing native modular arithmetic for both GF(p) and GF(2n
)
with a very high level of performance. NESCRYPT also includes dedicated instructions to
accelerate SHA-1 and SHA-2 family hash functions. NESCRYPT allows efficient and secure
implementation of almost all known public key cryptosystems with a high level of
performance ([4], [8], [12], [18],[19], [20], [21]).
As randomness is a key stone in many applications, the SA/SB23YT66/34A features a
highly reliable True Random Number Generator (TRNG), compliant with P2 Class of AIS-31
[1] and directly accessible through dedicated registers.
25 In a few words, the SA/SB23YT66/34A offer a unique combination of high performances and
very powerful features for high level security:
● Die integrity,
● Monitoring of environmental parameters,
● Protection mechanisms against faults,
● Hardware Security Enhanced DES accelerator,
● AIS-31 class P2 compliant True Random Number Generator,
● ISO 3309 CRC calculation block,
● Memory Protection Unit,
● NExt Step CRYPTography accelerator (NESCRYPT).
26 The TOE includes in the ST protected ROM a Dedicated Software which provides full test
capabilities (operating system for test, called “OST”), not accessible by the Security IC
Embedded SoftWare (SICESW), after delivery.
27 The SA23YTxx comprises a specific application in User ROM: this applicative Embedded
Software is a cryptographic library called Neslib SA. Neslib SA is a cutting edge
cryptographic library in terms of security and performance.
Neslib SA provides the most commonly used operations in public key algorithms and
protocols:
● an asymmetric key cryptographic support module, supporting secure modular
arithmetic with large integers, with specialized functions for Rivest, Shamir & Adleman
Standard cryptographic algorithm (RSA [20]),
● an asymmetric key cryptographic support module that provides secure hash functions
(SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 [4]).
28 The SB23YTxx comprises a specific application in User ROM: this applicative Embedded
Software is a cryptographic library called Neslib SB. Neslib SB is a cutting edge
TOE description SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version
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cryptographic library in terms of security and performance.
Neslib SB provides the most useful operations in public key algorithms and protocols:
● an asymmetric key cryptographic support module, supporting secure modular
arithmetic with large integers, with specialized functions for Rivest, Shamir & Adleman
Standard cryptographic algorithm (RSA [20]),
● a symmetric key cryptographic support module whose base algorithm is the Advanced
Encryption Standard cryptographic algorithm (AES [7]),
● an asymmetric key cryptographic support module that provides very efficient basic
functions to build up protocols using Elliptic Curves Cryptography on prime fields GF(p)
[18],
● an asymmetric key cryptographic support module that provides secure hash functions
(SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 [4]).
29 In addition, the ROM of the tested samples contains an operating system called “Card
Manager” that allows the evaluators to use a set of commands with the I/O, and to load in
EEPROM (or in RAM) test softwares.
30 Figure 1 provides an overview of the Sx23YT66A.
Figure 1. Sx23YT66A block diagram
31 Figure 2 provides an overview of the Sx23YT34A.
SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version TOE description
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Figure 2. Sx23YT34A block diagram
3.2 TOE life cycle
32 This Security Target is fully conform to the claimed PP. In the following, just a summary and
some useful explanations are given. For complete details on the TOE life cycle, please refer
to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0035), section 1.2.3.
33 The composite product life cycle is decomposed into 7 phases. Each of these phases has
the very same boundaries as those defined in the claimed protection profile.
34 The life cycle phases are summarized in Table 2.
35 The limit of the evaluation corresponds to phases 2 and 3, including the delivery and
verification procedures of phase 1, and the TOE delivery to the IC packaging manufacturer ;
procedures corresponding to phases 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are outside the scope of this
evaluation.
36 The TOE Manufacturer, as defined in [BSI-PP-0035], is STMicroelectronics.
37 In the following, the term "TOE delivery" is uniquely used to indicate after phase 3 (or before
phase 4). The TOE is delivered after phase 3, in USER configuration.
Table 2. Composite product life cycle phases
Phase Name Description Responsible party
1
IC embedded software
development
Security IC embedded software
development
IC embedded software
developer
2 IC development
IC design
IC dedicated software development
IC developer: ST
TOE description SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version
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3.3 TOE environment
38 Considering the TOE, three types of environments are defined:
● Development environment corresponding to phase 2,
● Production environment corresponding to phase 3,
● Operational environment, including phase 1 and from phase 4 to phase 7.
3.3.1 TOE Development Environment
39 To ensure security, the environment in which the development takes place is secured with
controllable accesses having traceability. Furthermore, all authorised personnel involved
fully understand the importance and the strict implementation of defined security
procedures.
40 The development begins with the TOE's specification. All parties in contact with sensitive
information are required to abide by Non-Disclosure Agreements.
41 Design and development of the IC then follows, together with the dedicated and engineering
software and tools development. The engineers use secure computer systems (preventing
unauthorised access) to make their developments, simulations, verifications and generation
of the TOE's databases. Sensitive documents, files and tools, databases on tapes, and
printed circuit layout information are stored in appropriate locked cupboards/safe. Of
paramount importance also is the disposal of unwanted data (complete electronic erasures)
and documents (e.g. shredding).
42 The development centres involved in the development of the TOE are the following: ST
ROUSSET and ST ANG MO KIO, for the design activities, ST ROUSSET, for the engineering
activities, ST ROUSSET and ST ZAVENTEM for the software development activities.
43 Reticules and photomasks are generated from the verified IC databases; the former are
used in the silicon Wafer-fab processing. As reticules and photomasks are generated off-
site, they are transported and worked on in a secure environment with accountability and
3 IC manufacturing
integration and photomask fabrication
IC production
IC testing
preparation
pre-personalisation
IC manufacturer: ST
4 IC packaging
security IC packaging (and testing)
pre-personalisation if necessary
IC packaging
manufacturer
5
Composite product
integration
composite product finishing process
composite product preparation
composite product shipping
Composite product
integrator
6 Personalisation
composite product personalisation
composite product testing
Personaliser
7 Operational usage
composite product usage by its issuers
and consumers
End-consumer
Table 2. Composite product life cycle phases (continued)
Phase Name Description Responsible party
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traceability of all (good and bad) products. During the transfer of sensitive data
electronically, procedures are established to ensure that the data arrive only at the
destination and are not accessible at intermediate stages (e.g. stored on a buffer server
where system administrators make backup copies).
44 The authorized sub-contractors involved in the TOE mask manufacturing can be DNP JAPAN
and DPE ITALY.
3.3.2 TOE production environment
45 As high volumes of product commonly go through such environments, adequate control
procedures are necessary to account for all product at all stages of production.
46 Production starts within the Wafer-fab; here the silicon wafers undergo the diffusion
processing. Computer tracking at wafer level throughout the process is commonplace. The
wafers are then taken into the test area. Testing of each TOE occurs to assure conformance
with the device specification. The wafers are then delivered for assembly onto the composite
products.
47 The authorized front-end plant involved in the manufacturing of the TOE is ST ROUSSET.
48 The authorized EWS plant involved in the testing of the TOE is ST ROUSSET.
3.3.3 TOE operational environment
49 A TOE operational environment is the environment of phases 1, then 4 to 7.
50 At phases 1, 4, 5 and 6, the TOE operational environment is a controlled environment.
51 End-user environments (phase 7): composite products are used in a wide range of
applications to assure authorised conditional access. Examples of such are pay-TV, banking
cards, portable communication SIM cards, health cards, transportation cards, identity and
passport cards. The end-user environment therefore covers a wide range of very different
functions, thus making it difficult to avoid and monitor any abuse of the TOE.
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4 Conformance claims
4.1 Common Criteria conformance claims
52 The SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria
version 3.1.
53 Furthermore it claims to be CC Part 2 (CCMB-2007-09-002) extended and CC Part 3
(CCMB-2007-09-003) conformant. The extended Security Functional Requirements are
those defined in the Security IC Platform Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0035).
54 The assurance level for the SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target is EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
4.2 PP Claims
4.2.1 PP Reference
55 The SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target claims strict conformance to the Security IC
Platform Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0035), as required by this Protection Profile.
4.2.2 PP Refinements
56 The main refinements operated on the BSI-PP-0035 are:
● Addition #1: “Support of Cipher Schemes” from AUG,
● Addition #4: “Area based Memory Access Control” from AUG,
● Refinement of assurance requirements.
57 All refinements are indicated with type setting text as indicated here, original text from the
BSI-PP-0035 being typeset as indicated here. Text originating in AUG is typeset as indicated
here.
4.2.3 PP Additions
58 The security environment additions relative to the PP are summarized in Table 3.
59 The additional security objectives relative to the PP are summarized in Table 4.
60 A simplified presentation of the TOE Security Policy (TSP) is added.
61 The additional SFRs for the TOE relative to the PP are summarized in Table 6.
62 The additional SARs relative to the PP are summarized in Table 9.
4.2.4 PP Claims rationale
63 The differences between this Security Target security objectives and requirements and
those of BSI-PP-0035, to which conformance is claimed, have been identified and justified
in Section 6 and in Section 7. They have been recalled in the previous section.
64 In the following, the statements of the security problem definition, the security objectives,
and the security requirements are consistent with those of the BSI-PP-0035.
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65 The security problem definition presented in Section 5, clearly shows the additions to the
security problem statement of the PP.
66 The security objectives rationale presented in Section 6.3 clearly identifies modifications
and additions made to the rationale presented in the BSI-PP-0035.
67 Similarly, the security requirements rationale presented in Section 7.4 has been updated
with respect to the protection profile.
68 All PP requirements have been shown to be satisfied in the extended set of requirements
whose completeness, consistency and soundness has been argued in the rationale sections
of the present document.
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5 Security problem definition
69 This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended
to be used and addresses the description of the assets to be protected, the threats, the
organisational security policies and the assumptions.
70 This Security Target being fully conform to the claimed PP, in the following, just a summary
and some useful explanations are given. For complete details on the security problem
definition please refer to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile (BSI-PP-0035), section
3.
71 A summary of all these security aspects and their respective conditions is provided in
Table 3.
5.1 Description of assets
72 The assets (related to standard functionality) to be protected are:
● the User Data,
● the Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation,
● the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.
73 The user (consumer) of the TOE places value upon the assets related to high-level security
concerns:
SC1 integrity of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being
executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories),
SC2 confidentiality of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being
processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories)
SC3 correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC
Embedded Software.
74 According to the Protection Profile there is the following high-level security concern related to
security service:
SC4 deficiency of random numbers.
75 To be able to protect these assets the TOE shall protect its security functionality. Therefore
critical information about the TOE shall be protected. Critical information includes:
● logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, and configuration
data,
● Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data, specific development aids, test and
characterisation related data, material for software development support, and
photomasks.
Such information and the ability to perform manipulations assist in threatening the above
assets.
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76 The information and material produced and/or processed by ST in the TOE development
and production environment (Phases 2 to 3) can be grouped as follows:
● logical design data,
● physical design data,
● IC Dedicated Software, Security IC Embedded Software, Initialisation Data and pre-
personalisation Data,
● specific development aids,
● test and characterisation related data,
● material for software development support, and
● photomasks and products in any form
as long as they are generated, stored, or processed by ST.
5.2 Threats
77 The threats are described in the BSI-PP-0035, section 3.2. Only those originating in AUG
are detailed in the following section.
Table 3. Summary of security environment
Label Title
TOE
threats
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
BSI.T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
BSI.T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
BSI.T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
BSI.T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
AUG4.T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation
OSPs
BSI.P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production
AUG1.P.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality (Cipher Scheme
Support)
Assumptions
BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
BSI.A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
BSI.T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
BSI.T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
BSI.T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
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5.3 Organisational security policies
78 The TOE provides specific security functionality that can be used by the Security IC
Embedded Software. In the following specific security functionality is listed which is not
derived from threats identified for the TOE’s environment because it can only be decided in
the context of the Security IC application, against which threats the Security IC Embedded
Software will use the specific security functionality.
79 ST applies the Protection policy during TOE Development and Production (BSI.P.Process-
TOE) as specified below.
80 ST applies the Additional Specific Security Functionality policy (AUG1.P.Add-Functions) as
specified below.
81 No other Organisational Security Policy (OSP) has been defined in this ST since their
specifications depend heavily on the applications in which the TOE will be integrated. The
Security Targets for the applications embedded in this TOE should further define them.
BSI.T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
AUG4.T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation:
Parts of the Security IC Embedded Software may cause security violations
by accidentally or deliberately accessing restricted data (which may include
code). Any restrictions are defined by the security policy of the specific
application context and must be implemented by the Security IC
Embedded Software.
Clarification: This threat does not address the proper definition and
management of the security rules implemented by the Security IC
Embedded Software, this being a software design and correctness issue.
This threat addresses the reliability of the abstract machine targeted by the
software implementation. To avert the threat, the set of access rules
provided by this TOE should be undefeated if operated according to the
provided guidance. The threat is not realized if the Security IC Embedded
Software is designed or implemented to grant access to restricted
information. It is realized if an implemented access denial is granted under
unexpected conditions or if the execution machinery does not effectively
control a controlled access.
Here the attacker is expected to (i) take advantage of flaws in the design
and/or the implementation of the TOE memory access rules (refer to
BSI.T.Abuse-Func but for functions available after TOE delivery), (ii)
introduce flaws by forcing operational conditions (refer to
BSI.T.Malfunction) and/or by physical manipulation (refer to BSI.T.Phys-
Manipulation). This attacker is expected to have a high level potential of
attack.
BSI.P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production:
An accurate identification is established for the TOE. This requires that
each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification.
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5.4 Assumptions
82 The assumptions are described in the BSI-PP-0035, section 3.4.
AUG1.P.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality:
The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the
Security IC Embedded Software:
– Data Encryption Standard (DES),
– Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES),
– Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), for SB23YTxx only,
– Elliptic Curves Cryptography on GF(p), for SB23YTxx only,
– Secure Hashing (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256),
– Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA),
– Prime Number Generation.
Note that DES is no longer recommended as an encryption function in the
context of smart card applications. Hence, Security IC Embedded Software
may need to use triple DES to achieve a suitable strength.
BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
BSI.A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
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6 Security objectives
83 The security objectives of the TOE cover principally the following aspects:
● integrity and confidentiality of assets,
● protection of the TOE and associated documentation during development and
production phases,
● provide random numbers,
● provide cryptographic support and access control functionality.
84 A summary of all security objectives is provided in Table 4. Note that the origin of each
objective is clearly identified in the prefix of its label.
85 Most of these security aspects can therefore be easily found in the protection profile. Only
those originating in AUG are detailed in the following sections.
6.1 Security objectives for the TOE
Table 4. Summary of security objectives
Label Title
TOE
BSI.O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
BSI.O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
BSI.O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
BSI.O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
BSI.O.Identification TOE Identification
BSI.O.RND Random Numbers
AUG1.O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality
AUG4.O.Mem Access Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control
Environments
BSI.OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
BSI.O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
BSI.O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
BSI.O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
BSI.O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
BSI.O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
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6.2 Security objectives for the environment
86 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development environment
(phase 1):
87 Security Objectives for the operational Environment (phase 4 up to 6):
6.3 Security objectives rationale
88 The main line of this rationale is that the inclusion of all the security objectives of the BSI-
PP-0035 protection profile, together with those in AUG, guarantees that all the security
environment aspects identified in Section 5 are addressed by the security objectives stated
in this chapter.
89 Thus, it is necessary to show that:
● security environment aspects from AUG are addressed by security objectives stated in
this chapter,
● security objectives from AUG are suitable (i.e. they address security environment
aspects),
● security objectives from AUG are consistent with the other security objectives stated in
this chapter (i.e. no contradictions).
BSI.O.Identification TOE Identification
BSI.O.RND Random Numbers
AUG1.O.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality:
The TOE must provide the following specific security functionality to
the Security IC Embedded Software:
– Data Encryption Standard (DES),
– Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES),
– Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), for SB23YTxx only,
– Elliptic Curves Cryptography on GF(p), for SB23YTxx only,
– Secure Hashing (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256),
– Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA),
– Prime Number Generation.
AUG4.O.Mem Access Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control:
The TOE must provide the Security IC Embedded Software with the
capability to define dynamic memory segmentation and
protection. The TOE must then enforce the defined access rules
so that access of software to memory areas is controlled as required,
for example, in a multi-application environment.
BSI.OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
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90 The selected augmentations from AUG introduce the following security environment
aspects:
● TOE threat "Memory Access Violation, (AUG4.T.Mem-Access)",
● organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security Functionality, (AUG1.P.Add-
Functions)".
91 As required by CC Part 1 (CCMB-2006-09-001), no assumption nor objective for the
environment has been added to those of the BSI-PP-0035 Protection Profile to which strict
conformance is claimed.
92 The justification of the additional policy and the additional threat provided in the next
subsections shows that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the protection
profile BSI-PP-0035 for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.
6.3.1 TOE threat "Memory Access Violation"
93 The justification related to the threat “Memory Access Violation, (AUG4.T.Mem-Access)” is
as follows:
94 According to AUG4.O.Mem Access the TOE must enforce the dynamic memory
segmentation and protection so that access of software to memory areas is controlled.
Any restrictions are to be defined by the Security IC Embedded Software. Thereby security
violations caused by accidental or deliberate access to restricted data (which may include
code) can be prevented (refer to AUG4.T.Mem-Access). The threat AUG4.T.Mem-Access is
therefore removed if the objective is met.
95 The added objective for the TOE AUG4.O.Mem Access does not introduce any contradiction
in the security objectives for the TOE.
Table 5. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies
Assumption, Threat or Organisational
Security Policy
Security Objective Notes
BSI.A.Plat-Appl BSI.OE.Plat-Appl Phase 1
BSI.A.Resp-Appl BSI.OE.Resp-Appl Phase 1
BSI.P.Process-TOE BSI.O.Identification Phase 2-3
BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC Phase 4-6
BSI.T.Leak-Inherent BSI.O.Leak-Inherent
BSI.T.Phys-Probing BSI.O.Phys-Probing
BSI.T.Malfunction BSI.O.Malfunction
BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation
BSI.T.Leak-Forced BSI.O.Leak-Forced
BSI.T.Abuse-Func BSI.O.Abuse-Func
BSI.T.RND BSI.O.RND
AUG1.P.Add-Functions AUG1.O.Add-Functions
AUG4.T.Mem-Access AUG4.O.Mem Access
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6.3.2 Organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security
Functionality"
96 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security
Functionality, (AUG1.P.Add-Functions)” is as follows:
97 Since AUG1.O.Add-Functions requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific
security functionality as required by AUG1.P.Add-Functions, and in the very same
conditions, the organisational security policy is covered by the objective.
98 Nevertheless the security objectives BSI.O.Leak-Inherent, BSI.O.Phys-Probing, ,
BSI.O.Malfunction, BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation and BSI.O.Leak-Forced define how to
implement the specific security functionality required by AUG1.P.Add-Functions. (Note that
these objectives support that the specific security functionality is provided in a secure way
as expected from AUG1.P.Add-Functions.) Especially BSI.O.Leak-Inherent and BSI.O.Leak-
Forced refer to the protection of confidential data (User Data or TSF data) in general. User
Data are also processed by the specific security functionality required by AUG1.P.Add-
Functions.
99 The added objective for the TOE AUG1.O.Add-Functions does not introduce any
contradiction in the security objectives for the TOE.
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7 Security requirements
100 This chapter on security requirements contains a section on security functional
requirements (SFRs) for the TOE (Section 7.1), a section on security assurance
requirements (SARs) for the TOE (Section 7.2), a section on the refinements of these SARs
(Section 7.3) as required by the "BSI-PP-0035" Protection Profile. This chapter includes a
section with the security requirements rationale (Section 7.4).
7.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE
101 Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) from the "BSI-PP-0035" Protection Profile (PP)
are drawn from CCMB-2007-09-002, except the following SFRs, that are extensions to
CCMB-2007-09-002:
● FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers,
● FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability,
● FAU_SAS Audit data storage.
The reader can find their certified definitions in the text of the "BSI-PP-0035" Protection
Profile.
102 All extensions to the SFRs of the "BSI-PP-0035" Protection Profiles (PPs) are exclusively
drawn from CCMB-2007-09-002.
103 All iterations, assignments, selections, or refinements on SFRs have been performed
according to section C.4 of CCMB-2006-09-001. They are easily identified in the following
text as they appear as indicated here. Note that in order to improve readability, iterations
are sometimes expressed within tables.
104 In order to ease the definition and the understanding of these security functional
requirements, a simplified presentation of the TOE Security Policy (TSP) is given in the
following section.
105 The selected security functional requirements for the TOE, their respective origin and type
are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE
Label Title Addressing Origin Type
FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance
Malfunction BSI-PP-0035
CCMB-2007-09-002
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation
of secure state
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Abuse of functionality BSI-PP-0035
Extended
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage Lack of TOE identification
BSI-PP-0035
Operated
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7.1.1 Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)
106 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE’s capabilities when the following failures
occur: exposure to operating conditions which are not detected according to the
requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1).
7.1.2 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)
107 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: exposure
to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement
Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur.
108 Refinement:
The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures for the
“circumstances” defined above.
Regarding application note 15 of BSI-PP-0035, the TOE provides information on the
operating conditions monitored during Security IC Embedded Software execution and after
a warm reset. No audit requirement is however selected in this Security Target.
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical
attack
Physical manipulation &
probing
BSI-PP-0035
CCMB-2007-09-002
FDP_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer
protection
Leakage
FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data
transfer protection
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow
control
FCS_RNG.1
Random number
generation
Weak cryptographic
quality of random
numbers
BSI-PP-0035
Operated
Extended
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Cipher scheme support
AUG #1
Operated
CCMB-2007-09-002
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key
generation
Security Target
Operated
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
Memory access violation
Security Target
Operated
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based
access control
AUG #4
Operated
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute
initialisation
Correct operation
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security
attribute
Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE (continued)
Label Title Addressing Origin Type
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7.1.3 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)
109 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their capabilities so that
in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Limited capability and availability Policy.
7.1.4 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)
110 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their availability so that
in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Limited capability and availability Policy.
111 SFP_1: Limited capability and availability Policy
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or
manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no
substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other
attacks.
7.1.5 Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)
112 The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery with the capability to store
the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data and/or supplements of the
Security IC Embedded Software in the NVM.
7.1.6 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)
113 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing, to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
114 Refinement:
The TSF will implement appropriate mechanisms to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially
manipulation) the TSF can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore,
permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that security functional
requirements are enforced. Hence, “automatic response” means here (i)assuming that there
might be an attack at any time and (ii)countermeasures are provided at any time.
7.1.7 Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1)
115 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy to prevent the disclosure of user data
when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.
7.1.8 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1)
116 The TSF shall protect TSF data from disclosure when it is transmitted between separate
parts of the TOE.
117 Refinement:
The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic
co-processor) are seen as separated parts of the TOE.
This requirement is equivalent to FDP_ITT.1 above but refers to TSF data instead of User
Data. Therefore, it should be understood as to refer to the same Data Processing Policy
defined under FDP_IFC.1 below.
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7.1.9 Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)
118 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy on all confidential data when they are
processed or transferred by the TSF or by the Security IC Embedded Software.
119 SFP_2: Data Processing Policy
User Data and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except when the Security IC
Embedded Software decides to communicate the User Data via an external interface. The
protection shall be applied to confidential data only but without the distinction of attributes
controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software.
7.1.10 Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1)
120 The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that implements a total failure
test of the random source.
121 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet P2 class of BSI-AIS31.
7.1.11 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
122 Depending on the product in Table 7, the TSF shall perform the operations in Table 7 in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm in Table 7 and cryptographic key sizes
of Table 7 that meet the standards in Table 7.
Table 7. FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations)
Product Iteration label
[assignment: list of
cryptographic
operations]
[assignment:
cryptographic
algorithm]
[assignment:
cryptographic
key sizes]
[assignment: list of
standards]
Sx23YTxx
(TOE)
DES / 3DES
operation
encryption
decryption
- in Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC) mode
- in Electronic Code Book
(ECB) mode
- in CBC-MAC operating
modes
Data Encryption
Standard (DES)
56 effective bits
FIPS PUB 46-3
ISO/IEC 9797-1
ISO/IEC 10116
Triple Data
Encryption
Standard (3DES)
112 effective
bits
Sx23YTxx
(TOE)
RSA operation
RSA recovery (encryption)
RSA signature (decryption)
without the Chinese
Remainder Theorem
RSA signature (decryption)
with the Chinese
Remainder Theorem
Rivest, Shamir &
Adleman’s
up to 4096 bits PKCS #1 V2.1
SB23YTxx
AES operation
cipher operation
inverse cipher operation
Advanced
Encryption
Standard
128, 192 and
256 bits
FIPS PUB 197
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7.1.12 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
123 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm, in Table 8, and specified cryptographic key sizes of Table 8 that meet
the following standards in Table 8.
7.1.13 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)
124 The TSF shall enforce the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy to provide minimally
protective(a)
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
SB23YTxx
Elliptic Curves
Cryptography
operation
general point addition,
point expansion
point compression,
public scalar multiplication
private scalar multiplication
Elliptic Curves
Cryptography on
GF(p)
up to 640 bits
IEEE 1363-2000,
chapter 7
IEEE 1363a-2004
Sx23YTxx
(TOE)
SHA-1
operation
SHA-1 (secure hash
function)
revised Secure
Hash Algorithm
(SHA-1)
assignment
pointless
because
algorithm has
no key
FIPS PUB 180-1
FIPS PUB 180-2
ISO/IEC 10118-
3:1998
Sx23YTxx
(TOE)
SHA-224
operation
SHA-224 (secure hash
function)
revised Secure
Hash Algorithm
(SHA-224)
assignment
pointless
because
algorithm has
no key
FIPS PUB 180-1
FIPS PUB 180-2
ISO/IEC 10118-
3:1998
Sx23YTxx
(TOE)
SHA-256
operation
SHA-256 (secure hash
function)
revised Secure
Hash Algorithm
(SHA-256)
assignment
pointless
because
algorithm has
no key
FIPS PUB 180-1
FIPS PUB 180-2
ISO/IEC 10118-
3:1998
Table 7. FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations) (continued)
Product Iteration label
[assignment: list of
cryptographic
operations]
[assignment:
cryptographic
algorithm]
[assignment:
cryptographic
key sizes]
[assignment: list of
standards]
Table 8. FCS_CKM.1 iterations (cryptographic key generation)
Iteration label
[assignment: cryptographic
key generation algorithm]
[assignment:
cryptographic key
sizes]
[assignment: list of
standards]
Prime generation primes generation algorithm up to 2048 bits
FIPS PUB 140-2
FIPS PUB 186
RSA key generation
RSA public and private keys
computation algorithm
up to 4096 bits
FIPS PUB 140-2
ISO/IEC 9796-2
PKCS #1 V2.1
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125 The TSF shall allow none to specify alternative initial values to override the default values
when an object or information is created.
Application note:
The security attributes are the set of access rights currently defined. They are dynamically
attached to the subjects and objects locations, i.e. each logical address.
7.1.14 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
126 The TSF shall enforce the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy to restrict the ability
to modify the current set of access rights security attributes to software running in
supervisor level.
7.1.15 Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2)
127 The TSF shall enforce the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy on all subjects
(software), all objects (data including code stored in memories) and all operations
among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
128 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any
object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
7.1.16 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
129 The TSF shall enforce the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy to objects based on
the software clearance level, the object location, the operation to be performed, and
the current set of access rights.
130 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: the operation is allowed if and only if the
software clearance level, the object location and the operation matches an entry in
the current set of access rights.
131 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
132 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: none.
Note: It should be noted that this level of policy detail is not needed at the application level. The
composite Security Target writer should describe the SICESW access control and
information flow control policies instead. Within the SICESW High Level Design description,
the chosen setting of IC security attributes would be shown to implement the described
policies relying on the IC SFP presented here.
133 The following SFP Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy is defined for the requirement
"Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)":
134 SFP_3: Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy
135 The TSF must control read, write, execute accesses of software to data (including code
stored in memory areas), based on their respective clearance levels and on the current set
of access rights.
a. See the Datasheet referenced in Section 9 for actual values.
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7.2 TOE security assurance requirements
136 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE for the evaluation of the TOE are those taken
from the Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) and augmented by taking the following
components:
● ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
137 Regarding application note 21 of BSI-PP-0035, the continuously increasing maturity level of
evaluations of Security ICs justifies the selection of a higher-level assurance package.
138 The set of security assurance requirements (SARs) is presented in Table 9, indicating the
origin of the requirement.
7.3 Refinement of the security assurance requirements
139 As BSI-PP-0035 defines refinements for selected SARs, these refinements are also claimed
in this Security Target.
140 The main customizing is that the IC Dedicated Software is an operational part of the TOE
after delivery, although it is not available to the user.
Table 9. TOE security assurance requirements
Label Title Origin
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ADV_FSP.5
Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
EAL5
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ADV_INT.2 Well-stuctured internals EAL5
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design EAL5
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ALC_CMC.4
Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage EAL5
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures BSI-PP-0035
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards EAL5
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design EAL5
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample EAL5/BSI-PP-0035
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis BSI-PP-0035
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141 Regarding application note 22 of BSI-PP-0035, the refinements for all the assurance
families have been reviewed for the hierarchically higher-level assurance components
selected in this Security Target.
142 The text of the impacted refinements of BSI-PP-0035 is reproduced in the next sections.
143 For reader’s ease, an impact summary is provided in Table 10.
7.3.1 Refinement regarding functional specification (ADV_FSP)
144 Although the IC Dedicated Test Software is a part of the TOE, the test functions of the IC
Dedicated Test Software are not described in the Functional Specification because the IC
Dedicated Test Software is considered as a test tool delivered with the TOE but not
providing security functions for the operational phase of the TOE. The IC Dedicated
Software provides security functionalities as soon as the TOE becomes operational
(boot software). These are properly identified in the delivered documentation.
145 The Functional Specification refers to datasheet to trace security features that do not
provide any external interface but that contribute to fulfil the SFRs e.g. like physical
protection. Thereby they are part of the complete instantiation of the SFRs.
146 The Functional Specification refers to design specifications to detail the mechanisms
against physical attacks described in a more general way only, but detailed enough to be
able to support Test Coverage Analysis also for those mechanisms where inspection of the
layout is of relevance or tests beside the TSFI may be needed.
147 The Functional Specification refers to data sheet to specify operating conditions of the
TOE. These conditions include but are not limited to the frequency of the clock, the power
supply, and the temperature.
148 All functions and mechanisms which control access to the functions provided by the IC
Dedicated Test Software (refer to the security functional requirement (FMT_LIM.2)) are part
of the Functional Specification. Details will be given in the document for ADV_ARC, refer to
Section 6.2.1.5. In addition, all these functions and mechanisms are subsequently be
Table 10. Impact of EAL5 selection on BSI-PP-0035 refinements
Assurance
Family
BSI-PP-0035
Level
ST
Level
Impact on refinement
ADO_DEL 1 1 None
ALC_DVS 2 2 None
ALC_CMS 4 5 None, refinement is still valid
ALC_CMC 4 4 None
ADV_ARC 1 1 None
ADV_FSP 4 5
Presentation style changes, IC Dedicated Software is
included
ADV_IMP 1 1 None
ATE_COV 2 2 IC Dedicated Software is included
AGD_OPE 1 1 None
AGD_PRE 1 1 None
AVA_VAN 5 5 None
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refined according to all relevant requirements of the Common Criteria assurance class ADV
because these functions and mechanisms are active after TOE Delivery and need to be part
of the assurance aspects Tests (class ATE) and Vulnerability Assessment (class AVA).
Therefore, all necessary information is provided to allow tests and vulnerability assessment.
149 Since the selected higher-level assurance component requires a security functional
specification presented in a “semi-formal style" (ADV_FSP.5.2C) the changes affect the style
of description, the BSI-PP-0035 refinements can be applied with changes covering the IC
Dedicated Test Software and are valid for ADV_FSP.5.
7.3.2 Refinement regarding test coverage (ATE_COV)
150 The TOE is tested under different operating conditions within the specified ranges. These
conditions include but are not limited to the frequency of the clock, the power supply, and the
temperature. This means that “Fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)” is proven for the complete TSF.
The tests must also cover functions which may be affected by “ageing” (such as EEPROM
writing).
151 The existence and effectiveness of measures against physical attacks (as specified by the
functional requirement FPT_PHP.3) cannot be tested in a straightforward way. Instead
STMicroelectronics provides evidence that the TOE actually has the particular physical
characteristics (especially layout design principles). This is done by checking the layout
(implementation or actual) in an appropriate way. The required evidence pertains to the
existence of mechanisms against physical attacks (unless being obvious).
152 The IC Dedicated Test Software is seen as a “test tool” being delivered as part of the TOE.
However, the Test Features do not provide security functionality. Therefore, Test Features
need not to be covered by the Test Coverage Analysis but all functions and mechanisms
which limit the capability of the functions (cf. FMT_LIM.1) and control access to the
functions (cf. FMT_LIM.2) provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software must be part of the
Test Coverage Analysis. The IC Dedicated Software provides security functionalities as
soon as the TOE becomes operational (boot software). These are part of the Test
Coverage Analysis.
7.4 Security Requirements rationale
7.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements
153 Just as for the security objectives rationale of Section 6.3, the main line of this rationale is
that the inclusion of all the security requirements of the BSI-PP-0035 protection profile,
together with those in AUG, guarantees that all the security objectives identified in Section 6
are suitably addressed by the security requirements stated in this chapter, and that the latter
together form an internally consistent whole.
154 As origins of security objectives have been carefully kept in their labelling, and origins of
security requirements have been carefully identified in Table 6 and Table 9, it can be verified
that the justifications provided by the BSI-PP-0035 protection profile and AUG can just be
carried forward to their union.
155 From Table 4, it is straightforward to identify two additional security objectives for the TOE
(AUG1.O.Add-Functions and AUG4.O.Mem Access), all tracing back to AUG. This rationale
must show that security requirements suitably address these too.
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156 Furthermore, a more careful observation of the requirements listed in Table 6 and Table 9
shows that:
● there are additional security requirements introduced by this Security Target
(FCS_CKM.1 and various assurance requirements of EAL5),
● there are security requirements introduced from AUG (FCS_COP.1, FDP_ACC.2,
FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.3 and FMT_MSA.1).
157 Though it remains to show that:
● security objectives from AUG are addressed by security requirements stated in this
chapter,
● additional security requirements from this Security Target and from AUG are mutually
supportive to the security requirements from the BSI-PP-0035 protection profile, and
they do not introduce internal contradictions,
● all dependencies are still satisfied.
158 The justification that the additional security objectives are suitably addressed, that the
additional security requirements are mutually supportive and that, together with those
already in BSI-PP-0035, they form an internally consistent whole, is provided in the next
subsections.
7.4.2 Additional security objectives are suitably addressed
Security objective “Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control
(AUG4.O.Mem Access)”
159 The justification related to the security objective “Dynamic Area based Memory Access
Control (AUG4.O.Mem Access)” is as follows:
160 The security functional requirements "Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2)" and
"Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)", with the related Security Function
Policy (SFP) “Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy” exactly require to implement a
Dynamic area based memory access control as demanded by AUG4.O.Mem Access.
Therefore, FDP_ACC.2 and FDP_ACF.1 with their SFP are suitable to meet the security
objective.
161 The security functional requirement "Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)" requires
that the TOE provides default values for security attributes. The ability to update the security
attributes is restricted to privileged subject(s) as further detailed in the security
functional requirement "Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)". These
management functions ensure that the required access control can be realised using the
functions provided by the TOE.
Security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality (AUG1.O.Add-
Functions)”
162 The justification related to the security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality
(AUG1.O.Add-Functions)” is as follows:
163 The security functional requirements “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” and
"Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)" exactly require those functions to be
implemented that are demanded by AUG1.O.Add-Functions. Therefore, FCS_COP.1 is
suitable to meet the security objective, together with FCS_CKM.1.
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7.4.3 Additional security requirements are consistent
"Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) & key generation (FCS_CKM.1)"
164 These security requirements have already been argued in Section : Security objective
“Additional Specific Security Functionality (AUG1.O.Add-Functions)” above.
"Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3),
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1),
Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2),
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)"
165 These security requirements have already been argued in Section : Security objective
“Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control (AUG4.O.Mem Access)” above.
7.4.4 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements
166 All dependencies of Security Functional Requirements have been fulfilled in this Security
Target except :
● those justified in the BSI-PP-0035 protection profile security requirements rationale,
● those justifed in AUG security requirements rationale (except on FMT_MSA.2, see
discussion below),
● the dependency of FMT_MSA.1 on FMT_SMF.1 (see discussion below).
167 Details are provided in Table 11 below.
Table 11. Dependencies of security functional requirements
Label Dependencies
Fulfilled by security
requirements in this
Security Target
Dependency already
in BSI-PP-0035 or
in AUG
FRU_FLT.2 FPT_FLS.1 Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FPT_FLS.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.1 FMT_LIM.2 Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.2 FMT_LIM.1 Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FAU_SAS.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FPT_PHP.3 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FDP_ITT.1
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
Yes Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FPT_ITT.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FDP_IFC.1 FDP_IFF.1 No, see BSI-PP-0035 Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FCS_RNG.1 None No dependency Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FCS_COP.1
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
Yes Yes, AUG #1 (adapted to
CC V3.1 R2, see
discussion below)
FCS_CKM.4 Yes (by the environment)
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168 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of "Management of security
attributes (FMT_MSA.1)" on "Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)". In this
particular ST, the specification of FMT_SMF.1 is useless. As stated in the Dynamic
Memory Access Control Policy and in FMT_MSA.1, there is no specific function for the
management of the memory access rights, it is just part of the Management of the security
attributes.
169 AUG #1 defines the dependency of “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)" on "Secure
security attributes (FMT_MSA.2)". This dependency is not anymore defined in the Part 2 of
the Common Criteria V3.1 Revision 2. Thus, it has not been retained in this Security Target.
7.4.5 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements
Security assurance requirements added to reach EAL5 (Table 9)
170 Regarding application note 21 of BSI-PP-0035, this Security Target chooses EAL5 because
developers and users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned
development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.
171 EAL5 represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL4 by requiring semiformal
design descriptions, a more structured (and hence analyzable) architecture, and improved
mechanisms and/or procedures that provide confidence that the TOE will not be tampered
during development.
172 The assurance components in an evaluation assurance level (EAL) are chosen in a way that
they build a mutually supportive and complete set of components. The requirements chosen
for augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the
corresponding requirements contained in EAL5. Therefore, these components add
additional assurance to EAL5, but the mutual support of the requirements and the internal
consistency is still guaranteed.
FCS_CKM.1
[FDP_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
Yes
No, CCMB-2007-09-002
FCS_CKM.4 Yes (by the environment)
FDP_ACC.2 FDP_ACF.1 Yes No, CCMB-2007-09-002
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 Yes
Yes, AUG #4
FMT_MSA.3 Yes
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1 Yes
Yes, AUG #4
FMT_SMR.1 No, see AUG #4
FMT_MSA.1
[FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
Yes Yes, AUG #4
FMT_SMF.1 No, see discussion below No, CCMB-2007-09-002
FMT_SMR.1 No, see AUG #4 Yes, AUG #4
Table 11. Dependencies of security functional requirements (continued)
Label Dependencies
Fulfilled by security
requirements in this
Security Target
Dependency already
in BSI-PP-0035 or
in AUG
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173 Note that detailed and updated refinements for assurance requirements are given in
Section 7.3.
Dependencies of assurance requirements
174 Dependencies of security assurance requirements are fulfilled by the EAL5 package
selection.
175 Augmentation to this package are identified in paragraph 136 and do not introduce
dependencies not already satisfied by the EAL5 package.
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8 TOE summary specification
176 This section demonstrates how the TOE meets each Security Functional Requirement.
177 The following TSS relies on the refinement of the TSF security elements, as detailed in the
TOE Functional Specification referenced in the ST/SB23YT66/34 Documentation Report
(see Section 9, paragraph 218).
8.1 Statement of TOE security functionality
178 The following TSF services are an abstraction of the TOE Functional Specification.
8.1.1 TSF_INIT_A: Hardware initialisation & TOE attribute initialisation
179 In TEST and USER configurations, this functionality ensures the following:
● the TOE starts running in a secure state,
● the TOE is securely initialised,
● the reset operation is correctly managed.
8.1.2 TSF_CONFIG_A: TOE configuration switching and control
180 In TEST and USER configurations, this functionality ensures the switching and the control of
TOE configuration.
181 This functionality ensures that the TOE is either in TEST or USER configuration.
182 The only authorised TOE configuration modification is TEST to USER configuration, by the
TEST administrator.
183 This functionality is responsible for the TOE configuration detection and notification to the
other resources of the TOE.
8.1.3 TSF_INT_A: TOE logical integrity
184 In TEST and USER configurations, this functionality is responsible for:
● correcting single bit fails upon a read operation on each NVM byte,
● verifying valid CPU usage,
● checking integrity loss when accessing NVM, ROM or RAM,
● providing a sign engine to check code and/or data integrity loss,
● monitoring various manifestations of fault injection attempts,
● providing a security timeout feature (watchdog timer),
● providing the SICESW with the traceability information of the TOE.
185 This functionality is responsible for reporting to TSF_ADMINIS_A all detected errors
resulting from the above operations.
8.1.4 TSF_TEST_A: Test of the TOE
186 This functionality is responsible for restricting access of the TOE TEST functionality to the
TEST process in TEST configuration.
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187 In TEST configuration, this functionality ensures that the only allowed TOE user is an
authorized TEST process.
188 In TEST configuration, this functionality ensures the test of TOE functionality with respect to
the IC specification, including the TSF. This functionality is therefore responsible of the
hardware functional integrity (CPU, RAM, ROM, NVM, Bus...).
189 In TEST configuration, this functionality provides commands to store data and/or pre-
personalisation data and/or supplements of the Security IC Embedded Software
(personalisation).
190 In USER configuration, this functionality ensures that the critical TOE TEST functionality is
disabled.
8.1.5 TSF_FWL_A: Memory Firewall
191 In TEST and USER configurations, this security functionality monitors:
● access from memory locations to other locations for ROM, RAM and NVM,
● register access.
192 The TOE memories segmentation and protection can be dynamically defined, by the TOE
user, thanks to the Memory Protection Unit (MPU), in order to implement various access
control policies.
193 A default-TOE memories segmentation and protection is initially defined by ST.
194 In TEST and USER configurations, this security functionality relies on the MPU to ensure
that only the Supervisor programs can change the TOE memories segmentation and
protection in ROM, RAM and NVM.
195 This security functionality is responsible for the notification of violation attempts to
TSF_ADMINIS_A.
8.1.6 TSF_PHT_A: Physical tampering protection
196 In TEST and USER configurations, this functionality ensures the following:
● the TOE detects clock and voltage supply operating changes by the environment,
● the TOE detects attempts to violate its physical integrity, and glitch attacks,
● the TOE is always clocked with shape and timing within specified operating conditions.
197 This functionality is responsible for the notification of physical tampering attempts and clock
and voltage supply operating changes by the environment to TSF_ADMINIS_A.
8.1.7 TSF_ADMINIS_A: Security violation administrator
198 In TEST and USER configurations, this functionality ensures the management of security
violations attempts.
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199 The main security violations attempts which are managed are:
● incorrect CPU usage,
● integrity loss in NVM, ROM or RAM,
● code signature alarm,
● fault injection attempt,
● watchdog timeout.
● access attempt to unavailable or reserved memory areas,
● MPU errors,
● clock and voltage supply operating changes by the environment,
● TOE physical integrity abuse.
8.1.8 TSF_OBS_A: Unobservability
200 In USER configuration, this functionality addresses the Basic internal transfer protection
(FDP_ITT.1), the Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1) and the Subset
information flow control (FDP_IFC.1) security functional requirements expressed in this
document.
201 This functionality provides additional support mechanisms to the SICESW developer
contributing to avoid information leakage.
8.1.9 TSF_SKCS_A: Symmetric Key Cryptography Support
202 In USER configuration, this functionality implements the following standard symmetric key
cryptography algorithms:
● Data Encryption Standard (DES) with 64 bits long keys (56 effective bits).
This functionality supports the following standard modes of operation, both for encryption
and for decryption:
● DES by itself (fast DES),
● Triple DES.
Each of these modes of operation can be chained in the standard Cipher Block Chaining
mode (CBC).
203 For the SB23YTxx only, in User configuration, this security functionality implements the
following standard symmetric key cryptography algorithms:
● Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 128, 192 and 256 bits long keys, 128 bits
long blocks, providing cipher, inverse cipher and key expansion operations.
8.1.10 TSF_AKCS_A: Asymmetric Key Cryptography Support
204 In USER configuration, this functionality implements the following standard asymmetric key
cryptography algorithms:
● RSA verification (encryption) with an RSA modulo up to 4096 bits,
● RSA signature (decryption) using or not using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT),
with an RSA modulo up to 4096 bits,
● RSA private and public keys computation with an RSA modulo up to 4096 bits,
● Prime number generation up to 3200 bits, with Rabin-Miller primality tests.
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205 In USER configuration, this functionality implements the following standard hash function:
● SHA-1 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 160-bit result,
● SHA-224 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 224-bit result,
● SHA-256 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 256-bit result.
206 For the SB23YTxx only, in USER configuration, this security function provides to the
SICESW developer the following very efficient basic functions for Elliptic Curves
Cryptography over prime fields:
● general point addition,
● point expansion and compression,
● public scalar multiplication,
● private scalar multiplication.
8.1.11 TSF_ALEAS_A: Unpredictable Number Generation Support
207 In all configurations, this functionality provides 8-bit true random numbers.
208 In USER configuration, this functionality supports the mitigation of information leakage.
209 This functionality can be qualified with the test metrics required by the BSI-AIS31 standard
for a P2 class device.
8.2 TOE summary specification rationale
210 This section shows that the TSF and assurance measures are suitable to meet the TOE
security requirements.
8.2.1 TSF rationale
211 This section demonstrates that the combination of the specified TSF work together so as to
satisfy the TOE security functional requirements.
212 Each of the security functional requirements is addressed by at least one or a combination
of TSF services.
213 The complete rationale has been presented and evaluated in the SB23YT66, SA23YT66,
ST23YT66, SB23YT34, SA23YT34, ST23YT34 Security Target.
214 For confidentiality reasons, this rationale is not fully reproduced here.
215 Table 12 below summarises which TOE security functional requirements (SFRs) are
addressed by each TSF service (TSFs).
SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version TOE summary specification
SMD_Sx23YTxx_ST_09_002 43/51
Table 12. Mapping of TSF services and SFRs
TSFs
SFRs
TSF_INIT_A
(8.1.1)
TSF_CONFIG_A
(8.1.2)
TSF_INT_A
(8.1.3)
TSF_TEST_A
(8.1.4)
TSF_FWL_A
(8.1.5)
TSF_PHT_A
(8.1.6)
TSF_ADMINIS_A
(8.1.7)
TSF_OBS_A
(8.1.8)
TSF_ALEAS_A
(8.1.11)
TSF_SKCS_A
(8.1.9)
TSF_AKCS_A
(8.1.10)
FAU_SAS.1 (7.1.5) X X
FRU_FLT.2 (7.1.1) X X
FPT_FLS.1 (7.1.2) X X X X X
FMT_LIM.1 (7.1.3) X X
FMT_LIM.2 (7.1.4) X X
FPT_PHP.3 (7.1.6) X X X
FDP_ITT.1 (7.1.7) X X X X X
FPT_ITT.1 (7.1.8) X X X X X
FDP_IFC.1 (7.1.9) X X X X X
FCS_RNG.1 (7.1.10) X
FDP_ACC.2 (7.1.15) X
FDP_ACF.1 (7.1.16) X
FMT_MSA.3 (7.1.13) X
FMT_MSA.1 (7.1.14) X
FCS_COP.1 (7.1.11) X X
FCS_CKM.1 (7.1.12) X
References SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version
44/51 SMD_Sx23YTxx_ST_09_002
9 References
216 Protection Profile references
217 Sx23Zxx Security Target reference
218 Target of Evaluation referenced documents
219 For security reasons, all these documents are classified and their applicable revisions are
referenced in the ST/SB23YT66/34 Documentation Report.
220 Standards references
Component description Reference Revision
Security IC Platform Protection Profile BSI-PP-0035 1.0
Component description Reference
SB23YT66, SA23YT66, ST23YT66, SB23YT34,
SA23YT34, ST23YT34 Security Target
SMD_Sx23YTxx_ST_09_001
Component description Reference
ST/SB23YT66/34 Documentation Report SMD_STSB23YT66_DR_09_001
Ref Identifier Description
[1] BSI-AIS31
A proposal for Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for
true (physical) random number generators,
W. Killmann & W. Schindler
BSI, Version 3.1, 25-09-2001
[2] FIPS PUB 46-3
FIPS PUB 46-3, Data encryption standard (DES), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999
[3] FIPS PUB 140-2
FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1999
[4] FIPS PUB 180-1
FIPS PUB 180-1 Secure Hash Standard, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce,1995
[5] FIPS PUB 180-2
FIPS PUB 180-2 Secure Hash Standard with Change Notice 1 dated
February 25,2004, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
U.S.A., 2004
[6] FIPS PUB 186
FIPS PUB 186 Digital Signature Standard (DSS), National Institute of
Standards and Technology, U.S.A., 1994
[7] FIPS PUB 197
FIPS PUB 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), National
Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce,
November 2001
SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version References
SMD_Sx23YTxx_ST_09_002 45/51
[8] ISO/IEC 9796-2
ISO/IEC 9796, Information technology - Security techniques - Digital
signature scheme giving message recovery - Part 2: Integer
factorization based mechanisms, ISO, 2002
[9] ISO/IEC 9797-1
ISO/IEC 9797, Information technology - Security techniques -
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a
block cipher, ISO, 1999
[10] ISO/IEC 10116
ISO/IEC 10116, Information technology - Security techniques - Modes
of operation of an n-bit block cipher algorithm, ISO, 1997
[11]
ISO/IEC 10118-
3:1998
ISO/IEC 10118-3:1998, Information technology - Security techniques -
Hash functions - Part 3: Dedicated hash functions
[12] ISO/IEC 14888
ISO/IEC 14888, Information technology - Security techniques - Digital
signatures with appendix - Part 1: General (1998), Part 2: Identity-
based mechanisms (1999), Part 3: Certificate based mechanisms
(2006), ISO
[13] CCMB-2006-09-001
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part
1: Introduction and general model, September 2006, version 3.1
[14] CCMB-2007-09-002
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part
2: Security functional components, September 2007, version 3.1
Revision 2
[15] CCMB-2007-09-003
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part
3: Security assurance components, September 2007, version 3.1
Revision 2
[16] AUG
Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations,
Atmel, Hitachi Europe, Infineon Technologies, Philips Semiconductors,
Version 1.0, March 2002.
[17] MIT/LCS/TR-212
On digital signatures and public key cryptosystems,
Rivest, Shamir & Adleman
Technical report MIT/LCS/TR-212, MIT Laboratory for computer
sciences, January 1979
[18] IEEE 1363-2000
IEEE 1363-2000, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography,
IEEE, 2000
[19] IEEE 1363a-2004
IEEE 1363a-2004, Standard Specifications for Public Key
Cryptography - Amendment 1:Additional techniques, IEEE, 2004
[20] PKCS #1 V2.1
PKCS #1 V2.1 RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June
2002
[21] MOV 97
Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone,
Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997
Ref Identifier Description
Glossary SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version
46/51 SMD_Sx23YTxx_ST_09_002
Appendix A Glossary
A.1 Terms
Authorised user
A user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.
Composite product
Security IC product which includes the Security Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and the
Embedded Software and is evaluated as composite target of evaluation.
End-consumer
User of the Composite Product in Phase 7.
Integrated Circuit (IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.
IC Dedicated Software
IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC (also known as IC firmware) and
developed by ST. Such software is required for testing purpose (IC Dedicated Test
Software) but may provide additional services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or
to provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support Software).
IC Dedicated Test Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software which is used to test the TOE before TOE
Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
IC developer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC development.
IC manufacturer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC manufacturing, testing, and pre-
personalization.
IC packaging manufacturer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC packaging and testing.
Initialisation data
Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to identify the TOE and to keep
track of the Security IC’s production and further life-cycle phases are considered as
belonging to the TSF data. These data are for instance used for traceability and for
TOE identification (identification data)
Object
An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects
perform operations.
Packaged IC
Security IC embedded in a physical package such as micromodules, DIPs, SOICs or
TQFPs.
Pre-personalization data
Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is injected into the non-volatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). These data are for instance
used for traceability and/or to secure shipment between phases.
Secret
SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version Glossary
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Information that must be known only to authorised users and/or the TSF in order to
enforce a specific SFP.
Security IC
Composition of the TOE, the Security IC Embedded Software, User Data, and the
package.
Security IC Embedded SoftWare (SICESW)
Software embedded in the Security IC and not developed by the IC designer. The
Security IC Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the
Security IC in Phase 3.
Security IC embedded software (SICESW) developer
Institution (or its agent) responsible for the security IC embedded software
development and the specification of IC pre-personalization requirements, if any.
Security attribute
Information associated with subjects, users and/or objects that is used for the
enforcement of the TSP.
Sensitive information
Any information identified as a security relevant element of the TOE such as:
– the application data of the TOE (such as IC pre-personalization requirements, IC
and system specific data),
– the security IC embedded software,
– the IC dedicated software,
– the IC specification, design, development tools and technology.
Smartcard
A card according to ISO 7816 requirements which has a non volatile memory and a
processing unit embedded within it.
Subject
An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Test features
All features and functions (implemented by the IC Dedicated Software and/or
hardware) which are designed to be used before TOE Delivery only and delivered as
part of the TOE.
TOE Delivery
The period when the TOE is delivered which is after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) in
this Security target.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE.
User
Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the
TOE.
User data
All data managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software in the application context.
User data comprise all data in the final Smartcard IC except the TSF data.
Glossary SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version
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A.2 Abbreviations
Table 13. List of abbreviations
Term Meaning
AIS Application notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (BSI)
ALU Arithmetical and Logical Unit.
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
CBC Cipher Block Chaining.
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code.
CC Common Criteria Version 3.1.
CPU Central Processing Unit.
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check.
DCSSI Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information
DES Data Encryption Standard.
DIP Dual-In-Line Package.
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level.
ECB Electronic Code Book.
EDES Enhanced DES.
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory.
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard.
I/O Input / Output.
IC Integrated Circuit.
ISO International Standards Organisation.
IT Information Technology.
MPU Memory Protection Unit.
NESCRYPT Next Step Cryptography Accelerator.
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NVM Non Volatile Memory.
OSP Organisational Security Policy.
OST Operating System for Test.
PP Protection Profile.
PUB Publication Series.
RAM Random Access Memory.
RF Radio Frequency.
RF UART Radio Frequency Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter.
ROM Read Only Memory.
RSA Rivest, Shamir & Adleman.
SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version Glossary
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SAR Security Assurance Requirement.
SFP Security Function Policy.
SFR Security Functional Requirement.
SICESW Security IC Embedded SoftWare.
SOIC Small Outline IC.
ST Context dependent : STMicroelectronics or Security Target.
TOE Target of Evaluation.
TQFP Thin Quad Flat Package.
TRNG True Random Number Generator.
TSC TSF Scope of Control.
TSF TOE Security Functionality.
TSFI TSF Interface.
TSP TOE Security Policy.
TSS TOE Summary Specification.
Table 13. List of abbreviations (continued)
Term Meaning
Revision history SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version
50/51 SMD_Sx23YTxx_ST_09_002
10 Revision history
Table 14. Document revision history
Date Revision Changes
15-Dec-2009 01.00 Initial release.
SA/SB23YT66/34A Security Target - Public Version
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