National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on NX-OS 9.3
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11173-2021
Dated: November 12, 2021
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort. Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches Validation Report Version 1.0, 11/12/2021
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Patrick Mallett, Ph.D.
Jerome Myers, Ph.D.
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Cody Cummins
Shahid Islam
Katie Sykes
Gossamer Security Solutions
Columbia, MD
Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches Validation Report Version 1.0, 11/12/2021
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary........................................................................................1
2 Identification...................................................................................................2
3 Architectural Information ...............................................................................3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ..................................................................3
3.2 TOE Architecture......................................................................................3
3.3 Physical Boundaries..................................................................................5
4 Security Policy..............................................................................................10
4.1 Security audit ..........................................................................................10
4.2 Cryptographic support ............................................................................10
4.3 Identification and authentication.............................................................10
4.4 Security management..............................................................................11
4.5 Protection of the TSF..............................................................................11
4.6 TOE access..............................................................................................11
4.7 Trusted path/channels .............................................................................11
5 Assumptions..................................................................................................11
5.1 Clarification of Scope .............................................................................12
6 Documentation..............................................................................................12
7 Product Testing.............................................................................................13
7.1 Developer Testing...................................................................................13
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ...................................................13
8 Evaluated Configuration ...............................................................................13
9 Results of the Evaluation ..............................................................................13
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)................................................13
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ..................................................14
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) .....................................14
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) .........................14
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) .....14
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN).............................................14
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..............................................................15
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations ......................................................16
11 Annexes.........................................................................................................16
12 Security Target..............................................................................................16
13 Glossary ........................................................................................................16
14 Bibliography .................................................................................................17
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1 Executive Summary
The evaluation of Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on NX-OS 9.3 was
performed by Gossamer Security Solutions, in the United States and was completed in November
2021. The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Cisco Nexus 3000
and 9000 Series Switches running on NX-OS 9.3 TOE was judged are described in the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The
evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation was available in the
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
Gossamer Security Solutions determined that the product satisfies evaluation assurance level “EAL
1” as defined within the Common Criteria (CC). The product, when configured as specified in the
installation guides and user guides, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the
Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on NX-OS 9.3 Security Target, Version 1.0,
October 22, 2021.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory
in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This Validation Report
is not an endorsement of Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on NX-OS 9.3 by
any agency of the US Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or implied.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation evidence,
provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work
units and versions of the ETR. Also, at some discrete points during the evaluation, validators
formed a Validation Oversight Review panel in order to review the Security Target and other
evaluation evidence materials along with the corresponding evaluation findings in detail. The
validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the security
functional and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation
team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the
conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation
technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cisco Nexus 3000 and
9000 Series Switches running on NX-OS 9.3 Security Target, Version 1.0, October 22,2021
produced by Cisco.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology
(CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful
completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on NX-OS 9.3
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March
2020
ST Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on NX-OS 9.3 Security
Target, Version 1.0, October 22, 2021
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches
running on NX-OS 9.3 version 1.1, 11/09/2021
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Patrick Mallett, Jerome Myers
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security
Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on
NX-OS 9.3. The Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches in standalone mode are purpose-built
data center-class switches for use as an aggregation switch in the data center.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE is a hardware and software solution made up of the models as follows: 3100. 3100v,
3100z, 3200, 3400, 3500, 3600, 9200, 9300 and 9500 series. The software is comprised of the
NX-OS software image Release 9.3. The TOE has two or more network interfaces and is
connected to at least one internal and one external network. The Cisco NX-OS configuration
determines how packets are handled to and from the TOE’s network interfaces. The switch
configuration will determine how traffic flows received on an interface will be handled.
Typically, packet flows are passed through the internetworking device and forwarded to their
configured destination.
If the TOE is to be remotely administered, then the management workstation must be connected
to an internal network and SSHv2 must be used to securely connect to the TOE. Audit records are
stored locally and are also remotely backed up to a remote syslog server. If these servers are used,
they must be attached to the internal (trusted) network. The internal (trusted) network is meant to
be separated effectively from unauthorized individuals and user traffic; one that is in a controlled
environment where implementation of security policies can be enforced.
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Figure 1. Cisco Nexus 3000 and Environment
The previous figure includes the following:
 The TOE models:
o Cisco Nexus 3000 Series
 The following are considered to be in the IT Environment:
o Management Workstation
o Syslog Server
For management purposes the TOE provides command line access to administer the TOE.
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Figure 2. Cisco Nexus 9000 and Environment
The previous figure includes the following:
 The TOE models:
o Cisco Nexus 9000 Series
 The following are considered to be in the IT Environment:
o Management Workstation
o Syslog Server
For management purposes the TOE provides command line access to administer the TOE.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a hardware and software solution made up of the models as follows: 3100. 3100v,
3100z, 3200, 3400, 3500, 3600, 9200, 9300 and 9500 series. The network, on which they reside,
is considered part of the IT environment. The TOE guidance documentation that is considered to
be part of the TOE can be found listed in the Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Common Criteria
Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures document and are downloadable from the
http://cisco.com web site. The TOE is comprised of the following physical specifications as
described in Table 1 below.
Table 1 Hardware Models and Specifications
Hardware Platform Model External Identification Description Interfaces
Cisco 3100 Models
Cisco Nexus 3100 Series Nexus
3172PQL
N3K-C3172PQ-10GE  Management ports: 1 RJ-
45
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Nexus
3172PQ-
XL
N3K-C3172PQ-XL 72 x 10 Gigabit
Ethernet ports (48
SFP+1 and 6 QSFP+)
 Console serial port: 1 RS-
232 connector
 USB ports (1)
Nexus
3172TQ
N3K-C3172TQ-10GT
N3K-C3172TQ-32T
72 x 10 Gigabit
Ethernet ports (48
10GBASE-T and 6
QSFP+)
Nexus
31128PQ
N3K-C31128PQ-10GE 48 x 10 Gigabit
Ethernet ports (32
10GBASE-T and 6
QSFP+)
Cisco 3100v Models
Cisco Nexus 3100V Series Nexus
31108PC-
V
N3K-C31108PC-V 48 x 10-Gbps SFP+
ports and 6 x QSFP282
ports (all QSFP ports
can operate at 40 or
100 Gbps)
 Management ports: 1 RJ-
45
 Console serial port: 1 RS-
232 connector
 USB ports (1)
Nexus
31108TC-
V
N3K-C31108TC-V 48 x 10GBASE-T ports
and 6 x QSFP28 ports
(all QSFP ports can
operate at 40 or
100 Gbps)

Nexus
3132Q-V
N3K-C3132Q-V 32 x 40-Gbps QSFP+
ports (all ports are
capable of 10 or 40
Gbps)

Cisco 3100z Models
Cisco Nexus 3100Z Series Nexus
3132C-Z
N3K-C3132C-Z 32 fixed 100-Gigabit
Ethernet QSFP28 ports
 Management ports: 1 RJ-
45
 Console serial port: 1 RS-
232 connector
 USB ports (1)
 10-Gbps SFP port (2)
Cisco 3200 Models
Cisco Nexus 3200 Series Nexus
3232C
N3K-C3232C 32 fixed 100 Gigabit
Ethernet QSFP28 ports
 Management ports: 1 RJ-
45
 Console serial port: 1 RS-
232 connector
 USB ports (2)
Nexus
3264C-E
N3K-C3264C-E 64 fixed 100-Gigabit
Ethernet QSFP28 ports
Cisco 3400 Models
Cisco Nexus 3400 Series Nexus
34180-YC
N3K-C34180YC 48 x SFP+/SFP28 and 6
x QSFP+/QSFP28 ports
 Management ports: 1
RJ-45, 1 SFP
1
SFP+ - Enhanced Small Form-Factor Pluggable
2
QSFP28 - Quad Small Form-Factor Pluggable
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Nexus
3464C
N3K-C3464C 64 x QSFP+/QSFP28
ports and 2 x SFP+
 Console serial port: 1
RS-232 connector
 USB ports (1)
Nexus
3432D-S
N3K-C3432D-S 32 fixed 400-Gigabit
Ethernet QSFP-DD3
ports
Nexus
3408-S
N3K-C3408-S 4RU, 8-slot
chassis. 128 ports of
100G or 32 ports of
400G.
Cisco 3500 Models
Cisco Nexus 3500 Series Nexus
3524-X
N3K-C3524P-10GX 48 fixed SFP+ ports (1
or 10 Gbps); the Cisco
Nexus 3524-X enables
only 24 ports
 Management ports: 2 RJ-
45
 Console serial port: 1 RS-
232 connector
 USB ports (1)
Nexus
3524-XL
N3K-C3524P-XL 48 fixed SFP+ ports (1
or 10 Gbps); the Cisco
Nexus 3524-XL enables
only 24 ports
Nexus
3548-X
N3K-C3548P-10GX 48 fixed SFP+ ports (1
or 10 Gbps); the Cisco
Nexus 3524-X enables
only 24 ports
Nexus
3548-XL
N3K-C3548P-XL 48 fixed SFP+ ports (1
or 10 Gbps); the Cisco
Nexus 3524-XL enables
only 24 ports
Cisco 3600 Models
Cisco Nexus 3600 Series Nexus
36180YC-
R
N3K-C36180YC-R 48 ports 1, 10, or 25
Gigabit Ethernet SFP. 6
ports 100 Gigabit
Ethernet QSFP28.
 Management ports: 1 RJ-
45
 Console serial port: 1 RS-
232 connector
 USB ports (1)
Nexus
3636C-R
N3K-C3636C-R 36 QSFP28 ports
operating at 40 or 100
Gigabit Ethernet.
Cisco 9200 Models
Cisco Nexus 9200 Series Nexus
92348GC-
X
N9K- C92348GC-X 48p 100M/1G Base-T
ports + 4p 1/10/25G
SPF28,+2p 40/100G
QSFP28
 Management ports: 1 RJ-
45, 1 SFP+
 Console serial port: 1 RJ-
45
 USB ports (1)
Nexus
92160YC-
X
N9K-C92160YC-X 8 x 1/10/25-Gbps SFP+
ports and 6 x QSFP28
ports (4 of the QSFP+
ports are 100 Gbps
capable ports)
Nexus
92300YC
N9K-C92300YC 48 x 1/10/25-Gbps SFP+
ports and 18 x 40/100-
Gbps QSFP28 ports
Nexus
9272Q
N9K-C9272Q 72 x 40-Gbps QSFP+
ports
3
QSFP-DD – Quad Small Form-factor pluggable Double Density
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Nexus
9272Q
N9K-C9272Q
Cisco 9300 Models
Cisco Nexus 9300 Series 93108TC-
EX
N9K-C93108TC-EX Four 48 x 10GBASE-T
ports and 6 x 40/100-
Gbps QSFP28 ports
 Management ports: 1 RJ-
45
 Console serial port: 1 RJ-
45
 USB ports (2)
Nexus
93108TC-
FX
N9K-C93108TC-FX 48 x 100M/1/10GBASE-
T ports and 6 x
x40/100-Gbps QSFP28
ports
Nexus
9348GC-
FXP
N9K-C9348GC-FXP 48 x 100M/1G BASE-T
ports, 4 x 1/10/25-Gbps
SFP28 ports and 2 x
40/100-Gbps QSFP28
ports
 Management ports: 1 RJ-
45 and 1 SFP+
 Console serial port: 1 RJ-
45
 USB ports (1)
Nexus
93216TC-
FX2
N9K-C93216TC-FX2 96 x 100M/1/10GBASE-
T ports and 12 x
40/100-Gigabit QSFP28
ports
Nexus
93180YC-
EX
N9K-C93180YC-EX Four 48 x 10/25-Gbps
fiber ports and 6 x
40/100-Gbps Quad
Small Form-Factor
Pluggable 28 (QSFP28)
ports
 Management ports: 1 RJ-
45
 Console serial port: 1 RJ-
45
 USB ports (2)
Nexus
93180YC-
FX
N9K-C93180YC-FX 48 x 1/10/25-Gbps fiber
ports and 6 x 40/100-
Gbps QSFP28 ports
Nexus
93240YC-
FX2
N9K-C93240YC-FX2 48 x 1/10/25-Gbps fiber
ports and 12 x 40/100-
Gbps QSFP28 ports
Nexus
93360YC-
FX2
N9K-C93360YC-FX2 96 x 1/10/25-Gbps fiber
ports and 12 x 40/100-
Gbps QSFP28 ports
Nexus
9364C
N9K-C9364C 64-port 40/100G
QSFP28 ports and 2-
port 1/10G SFP+ ports
 Management ports: 2 (1
x 10/100/1000BASE-T
and 1 x 1-Gbps SFP+)
 Console serial port: 1 RJ-
45
 USB ports (1)
Nexus
9332C
N9K-C9332C 32-port 40/100G
QSFP28 ports and 2-
port 1/10G SFP+ ports
Nexus
9336C-
FX2
N9K-C9336C-FX2 36 x 40/100-Gbps
QSFP28 ports
 Management ports: 2 (1
x 10/100/1000BASE-T
and 1 x 1-Gbps SFP+)
 Console serial port: 1 RJ-
45
 USB ports (1)
Nexus
9364C-GX
N9K-C9364C-GX 64 x 100/40-Gbps Quad
Small Form-Factor
Pluggable (QSFP28)
Nexus
9316D-GX
N9K-C9316D-GX 16 x 400/100-Gbps
QSFP-DD ports
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Nexus
93600CD-
GX
N9K-C93600CD-GX 28 x 100/40-Gbps Quad
Small Form-Factor
Pluggable (QSFP28) and
8 x 400/100-Gbps
QSFP-DD ports
Cisco 9500 Models
Cisco Nexus 9500 Series Nexus
9504
N9K-C9504 Chassis: up to 2
supervisor modules of
the same type, 4 I/O
modules, and up to 6
fabric modules, 2
system controllers
 Based on Supervisor and
I/O modules installed)
Nexus
9508
N9K-C9508 Chassis: up to 2
supervisor modules of
the same type, 8-I/O
modules, up to two
system controller
modules, up to six
fabric modules
Nexus
9516
N9K-C9516 Chassis: up to 2
supervisor modules and
16 I/O modules, up to
two system controller
modules, up to six
fabric modules
Supervisor
9500-Sup-
A
N9K-SUP-A Four cores, 1.8 GHz, 16
GB of memory, and 64
GB of SSD (N9K-SUP-A)
 Management ports: 1 RJ-
45
 Console serial port: 1 RJ-
45
 USB ports (2)
Supervisor
9500-Sup-
A +
N9K-SUP-A+ Four cores/8-Thread,
1.8 GHz, 16 GB of
memory, and 64 GB of
SSD (N9K-SUP-A+)
Supervisor
9500-Sup-
B
N9K-SUP-B Six cores, 2.1 GHz, 24
GB of memory, and 256
GB of SSD (N9K-SUP-B)
 Management ports: 1 RJ-
45
 Console serial port: 1 RJ-
45
 USB ports (2)
Supervisor
9500-Sup-
B +
N9K-SUP-B+ Six cores/12-Thread,
1.9 GHz, 24 GB of
memory, and 256 GB of
SSD4 (N9K-SUP-B+)
System
Controller
N9k-SC-A
N9K-SC-A A pair of redundant
system controllers
offloads chassis
management functions
from the supervisor
modules.
The controllers are
responsible for
managing power
supplies and fan trays
and are a central point
for the Gigabit Ethernet
out-of-band channel
(EOBC) between the
 Not applicable
4
SSD – Solid-state Drive
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supervisors, fabric
modules, and line
cards.
4 Security Policy
The TOE enforces the following security policies as described in the ST:
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE provides extensive capabilities to generate audit data targeted at detecting such activity.
The TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. Each security relevant audit event
has the date, timestamp, event description, and subject identity. The administrator configures
auditable events, performs back-up operations and manages audit data storage. The TOE
provides circular audit trail. Audit logs are transmitted to an external audit server over a trusted
channel protected with TLS.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. All the
algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates (Operational Environment –Intel Xeon processor).
The TOE leverages the Cisco FIPS Object Module (FOM) 6.2 certificate and has been validated
for conformance to the requirements of FIPS140-2 140-2 Level 1.
The TOE provides cryptography in support of remote administrative management via SSHv2 and
secure the session between the TOE and remote syslog server using TLS.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users wishing to connect to the
TOEs secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to
authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can
be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as mandatory
password complexity rules. After a configurable number of incorrect login attempts, the TOE will
lockout the account until a configured amount of time for lockout expires. The TOE provides
administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be
performed on the serial console or SSH interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports
authentication using SSH keys. The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to
support authentication for TLS connections.
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4.4 Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration
and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either
through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability
to securely manage all TOE administrative users; all identification and authentication; all audit
functionality of the TOE; all TOE cryptographic functionality; the timestamps maintained by the
TOE; and updates to the TOE. The TOE supports privileged administrator. Only the privileged
administrator can perform the above security relevant management functions.
Administrators can create configurable login banners to be displayed at time of login and can also
define an inactivity timeout for each admin interface to terminate sessions after a set period of
inactivity.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized
Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally,
Cisco NX-OS is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco NX-OS memory space
is restricted to only Cisco NX-OS functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the timestamp that
is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s clock
manually. Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the router itself and that
of the cryptographic module.
The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the
TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time-
period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to
establish a new session. The administrator can also terminate their own session by exiting out of
the CLI.
The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI management
interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE establishes a trusted path between the appliance and the CLI using SSHv2 and the
syslog server using TLS.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020
(NDcPP22e)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22e should be consulted if there is
interest in that material.
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The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP22e as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the
product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the
devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
5.1 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified
in Protection Profile for Network Devices and performed by the evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines
an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the NDcPP22e and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security
related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
The functionality listed below will be disabled by configuration, as described in the
Guidance documents (AGD). The excluded functionality does not affect conformance to
the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices v2.2e.
 Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of operation. This mode of operation includes non-FIPS
allowed operations.
 Telnet will be disabled in the evaluated configuration.
 SNMP will be disabled in the evaluated configuration.
 NTP will be disabled in the evaluated configuration.
 The DCNM GUI was not included in the evaluated configuration.
 Bash shell interface was not included in the evaluation.
 PTP is not included in the evaluation.
This service can be disabled by configuration settings as described in the Guidance
documents (AGD). The exclusion of this functionality does not affect the compliance to
the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e.
6 Documentation
The guidance documentation examined during the course of the evaluation and therefore delivered
with the TOE is as follows:
 Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on NX-OS 9.3 Common Criteria
Operational User Guidance and Preparative Procedures, Version 1.0, September 7, 2021
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Only the Administrator Guide listed above the specific sections of any other documents referenced
by that guide should be trusted for the installation, administration, and use of this product in its
evaluated configuration.
7 Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP22e) for Cisco Nexus 3000
and 9000 Series Switches running on NX-OS 9.3 Version 1.1, 11/09/2021 (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification document
and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP22e including the tests associated with optional
requirements. The specific test configurations and test tools utilized may be found in Section 3.4
of the AAR.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware when configured in accordance with the
documentation specified in section 6. The hardware is comprised of the following model series: 3100.
3100v, 3100z, 3200, 3400, 3500, 3600, 9200, 9300 and 9500.. The software is comprised of the NX-OS
software image Release 9.3.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented
in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all assurance activities
and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000
Series Switches running on NX-OS 9.3 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained
in the NDcPP22e.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains
a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on
NX-OS 9.3 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
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9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the Security
target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the assurance activities
specified in the NDcPP22e related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the adequacy
of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the evaluation
team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely administer
the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the evaluation to
ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a public
search for vulnerabilities and fuzz testing. Neither the public search for vulnerabilities nor the fuzz
testing uncovered any residual vulnerability.
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The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities in order to ensure there are no
publicly known and exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE from the following sources:
 National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search)
 Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
 Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities)
 Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories )
 Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engin (http://www.exploitsearch.net)
 SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com)
 Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search)
 Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
The search was performed on 10/20/2021 with the following search terms:
 "NX-OS 9.3"
 "Cisco Nexus"
 "Nexus 3000"
 "Nexus 9000"
 "3000"
 "3100"
 "3100v"
 "3100z"
 "3200"
 "3400"
 "3500"
 "3600"
 "9300"
 "9500"
 "Intel Pentium B925C"
 "Intel i3-3115C"
 "Intel Xeon D-1500"
 "Intel Xeon E5-2400"
 "Intel Xeon E3-1105C"
 "Cisco FOM "
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the
claims in the ST.
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The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series
Switches running on NX-OS 9.3 Common Criteria Operational User Guidance And Preparative
Procedures, Version 1.0, September 7, 2021 document. No versions of the TOE and software, either
earlier or later were evaluated. Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to
the security functional requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included
in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices
in the operational environment, such as the syslog server, need to be assessed separately and no
further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on NX-
OS 9.3 Security Target, Version 1.0, October 22, 2021.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more
TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under
the CC.
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 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and
for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction,
Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[5] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 27 March 2020
(NDcPP22e)
[6] Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on NX-OS 9.3 Security Target,
Version 1.0, October 22, 2021.
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on
NX-OS 9.3, Version 1.1, 11/09/2021 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running on NX-
OS 9.3, Version 1.1, 11/09/2021 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series Switches running
on NX-OS 9.3, Version 1.1, 11/09/2021 (ETR).