JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
Certification Report
Tatsuo Tomita, Chairman
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan
2-28-8 Honkomagome, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
IT Product (TOE)
Reception Date of
Application
(Reception Number)
2018-08-03 (ITC-8683)
Certification
Identification
JISEC-C0635
Product Name RICOH IM C6000/C5500/C4500
Version and Release
Numbers
J-1.01
Product Manufacturer RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
Conformance of
Functionality
PP conformant functionality, CC Part 2 Extended
Protection Profile
Conformance
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std.
2600.2TM
-2009)
Assurance Package EAL2 Augmented by ALC_FLR.2
Name of IT Security
Evaluation Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE has been certified as follows.
2019-03-27
Tatsuro Yano, Technical Manager
IT Security Technology Evaluation Department
IT Security Center
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following
standards prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme Document."
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 5
• Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 5
Evaluation Result: Pass
"RICOH IM C6000/C5500/C4500" has been evaluated based on the standards required, in
accordance with the provisions of the "Requirements for IT Security Certification" by
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance
requirements.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published by
the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.................................................................................................1
1.1 Product Overview..............................................................................................1
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package ............................................................1
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality........................................................................1
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives .....................................................................2
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions......................................................................2
1.1.3 Disclaimers .....................................................................................................2
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation .......................................................................................2
1.3 Certification......................................................................................................3
2. Identification...........................................................................................................4
3. Security Policy ........................................................................................................5
3.1 Security Function Policies..................................................................................6
3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies..............................................................6
3.1.1.1 Threats ........................................................................................................6
3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats......................................................7
3.1.2 Organisational Security Policies and Security Function Policies ..........................9
3.1.2.1 Organisational Security Policies.....................................................................9
3.1.2.2 Security Function Policies to Organisational Security Policies ..........................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ...................................................................12
4.1 Usage Assumptions .........................................................................................12
4.2 Environmental Assumptions ............................................................................12
4.3 Clarification of Scope .......................................................................................14
5. Architectural Information ......................................................................................15
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components.......................................................................15
5.2 IT Environment ..............................................................................................17
6. Documentation......................................................................................................18
7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results .........................................19
7.1 Evaluation Facility..........................................................................................19
7.2 Evaluation Approach .......................................................................................19
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity........................................................................19
7.4 IT Product Testing...........................................................................................20
7.4.1 Developer Testing ..........................................................................................20
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing.......................................................................22
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing ........................................................................24
7.5 Evaluated Configuration..................................................................................26
7.6 Evaluation Results ..........................................................................................27
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations............................................................27
8. Certification..........................................................................................................28
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
8.1 Certification Result .........................................................................................28
8.2 Recommendations ...........................................................................................28
9. Annexes................................................................................................................29
10. Security Target ..................................................................................................29
11. Glossary ............................................................................................................30
12. Bibliography ......................................................................................................33
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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1. Executive Summary
This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT
Security Evaluation of "RICOH IM C6000/C5500/C4500 J-1.01" (hereinafter referred to as
"this TOE") developed by RICOH COMPANY, LTD., and the evaluation of the TOE was
finished in 2019-03-13 by ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center (hereinafter referred to
as the "Evaluation Facility"). It is intended to report to the sponsor, RICOH COMPANY, LTD.,
and provide security information to consumers and procurement entities who are interested
in this TOE.
Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter
referred to as the "ST") described in Chapter 10. Especially, details of security functional
requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements of
this TOE are described in the ST.
This Certification Report assumes "general consumers and procurement entities who
purchase this TOE that is commercially available" to be readers. Note that the Certification
Report presents the certification result based on assurance requirements to which this TOE
conforms, and does not guarantee an individual IT product itself.
1.1 Product Overview
An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described as follows. Refer to
Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package
This TOE conforms to the following protection profile [14] [15] (hereinafter referred to as the
"conformance PP").
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for
Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2TM-2009)
Assurance Package of this TOE is EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality
This TOE is a digital Multi Function Product (hereafter "MFP") made by RICOH COMPANY,
LTD., which provides the functions of copy, scanner, printer, and fax for digitising
paper-based documents, document management, and printing.
This MFP is an IT product which incorporates each function of scanner, printer, and fax with
Copy Function, and is generally connected to an office LAN and used for inputting, storing,
and outputting documents.
This TOE provides the Security Functions required for the conformance PP, and also provides
the Security Functions to accomplish the necessary security policy for an organisation which
manages the TOE.
For these security functionalities, the evaluation for the validity of the design policy and the
correctness of the implementation is conducted in the scope of the assurance package. The
next clause describes the assumed threats and assumptions in this TOE.
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1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives
This TOE assumes the following threats and provides the Security Functions to counter
them.
For protected assets such as the documents that the TOE handles and the setting
information relevant to the Security Functions, there are threats of disclosure and tampering
caused by unauthorised access to both the TOE and the communication data on the network.
This TOE provides the Security Functions to prevent those protected assets from
unauthorised disclosure and tampering.
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions
The evaluated product is assumed to be operated under the following configuration and
assumptions.
This TOE is the MFP with the configuration satisfying follows:
• It is equipped with an Auto Document Feeder (ADF) or an exposure glass cover.
• It is equipped with Fax Controller Unit (hereafter, "FCU") that provides Fax Function.
It is assumed that this TOE is located in an environment where physical components and
interfaces of the TOE are protected from the unauthorised access. For the operation, the TOE
shall be properly configured, maintained, and managed according to the guidance documents.
1.1.3 Disclaimers
This TOE is assumed to be operated while the following functions are deactivated. The case
that the TOE is operated with these settings changed is not included in the assurance
provided by this evaluation:
• Maintenance Function
• IP-Fax and Internet Fax Function
• Authentication methods except for Basic Authentication (for Internal Authentication)
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation
Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body
operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed in 2019-03,
based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of this TOE according to the
publicised documents, "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document" [1],
"Requirements for IT Security Certification" [2], and "Requirements for Approval of IT
Security Evaluation Facility" [3] provided by the Certification Body.
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1.3 Certification
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] and the Observation
Report prepared by the Evaluation Facility, as well as evaluation documentation, and
confirmed that the TOE evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. The certification oversight review was also prepared for those concerns found in
the certification process. Those concerns pointed out by the Certification Body were fully
resolved, and the Certification Body confirmed that the TOE evaluation had been
appropriately conducted in accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or [7][8][9]) and the CEM (either
of [10][11]). The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on the
Evaluation Technical Report submitted by the Evaluation Facility and fully concluded
certification activities.
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2. Identification
This TOE is identified as follows:
TOE Name: RICOH IM C6000/C5500/C4500
TOE Version: J-1.01
Developer: RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
This TOE is the MFP with the configuration satisfying follows:
• It is equipped with any of follows. (It can be standard feature or optional product.)
- ARDF (Auto Reverse Document Feeder)
- SPDF (One-pass Duplex Scanning ADF)
- Exposure glass cover
• It is equipped with FCU. (It can be standard feature or optional product.)
This TOE has the following combinations:
• RICOH IM C6000 (equipped with ARDF or SPDF or exposure glass cover, and FCU)
• RICOH IM C5500 (equipped with ARDF or SPDF or exposure glass cover, and FCU)
• RICOH IM C4500 (equipped with ARDF or SPDF or exposure glass cover, and FCU)
• RICOH IM C5500A (equipped with ARDF or SPDF or exposure glass cover, and FCU)
• RICOH IM C4500A (equipped with ARDF or SPDF or exposure glass cover, and FCU)
• RICOH IM C6000F (equipped with ARDF or SPDF or exposure glass cover, and FCU)
• RICOH IM C5500F (equipped with ARDF or SPDF or exposure glass cover, and FCU)
• RICOH IM C4500F (equipped with ARDF or SPDF or exposure glass cover, and FCU)
Users can verify that a product is this TOE, which is evaluated and certified, by the following
means.
After confirming that the name and version of the TOE described in the guidance documents
are identical to the aforementioned name and version of the TOE, users can confirm that the
installed product is this evaluated TOE by comparing the name that is displayed on the MFP
exterior and the version of each component, which constitutes the TOE, displayed on the
Operation Panel of the TOE with the applicable descriptions in the list of the TOE
configuration items described in the guidance documents.
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3. Security Policy
This chapter describes security function policies that the TOE adopts to counter threats, and
organisational security policies.
The TOE provides the Security Functions to counter the unauthorised access to the stored
documents in the MFP, and to protect the communication data on the network.
For meeting the organisational security policies, the TOE provides the functions to overwrite
the internal stored data, to encrypt the stored data in an HDD, and to prevent the
unauthorised access through telephone lines via fax I/F.
For each setting that is relevant to the above mentioned Security Functions, only
administrators are permitted to set configurations in order to prevent the deactivation and
unauthorised use of the Security Functions.
Tables 3-1 and 3-2 show the protected assets for the Security Functions of this TOE.
Table 3-1 TOE Protected Assets (user data)
Type Asset
Document
information
Digitised documents, deleted documents, temporary
documents and their fragments under the TOE control.
Function
information
Active Job executed by users.
(Hereafter, referred to as "user job.")
Table 3-2 TOE Protected Assets (TSF data)
Type Asset
Protected data The information that shall be protected from
changes by users without edit permission; it includes
Login user name, Number of Attempts before
Lockout, year/month/day setting, time setting, and
Minimum Character No. of password, etc.
(Hereafter, referred to as "TSF protected data.")
Confidential data The information that shall be protected from
changes by users without edit permission, and also
shall be protected from reading by users without
viewing permission; it includes Login password,
audit log, and HDD cryptographic key.
(Hereafter, referred to as "TSF confidential data.")
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3.1 Security Function Policies
The TOE possesses the security functions to counter the threats shown in Section 3.1.1 and to
meet the organisational security policies shown in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.1 Threats and Security Function Policies
3.1.1.1 Threats
This TOE assumes the threats shown in Table 3-3 and provides the functions as
countermeasures against them. Although threats are expressed differently from the
conformance PP, the evaluation process confirmed the equivalence of both threats.
Table 3-3 Assumed Threats
Identifier Threat
T.DOC.DIS
(Document disclosure)
Documents under the TOE management may be
disclosed to persons without a login user name, or to
persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the document.
T.DOC.ALT
(Document alteration)
Documents under the TOE management may be altered
by persons without a login user name, or by persons
with a login user name but without an access
permission to the document.
T.FUNC.ALT
(User job alteration)
User jobs under the TOE management may be altered
by persons without a login user name, or by persons
with a login user name but without an access
permission to the user job.
T.PROT.ALT
(Alteration of TSF
protected data)
TSF Protected Data under the TOE management may
be altered by persons without a login user name, or by
persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the TSF Protected Data.
T.CONF.DIS
(Disclosure of TSF
confidential data)
TSF Confidential Data under the TOE management
may be disclosed to persons without a login user name,
or to persons with a login user name but without an
access permission to the TSF Confidential Data.
T.CONF.ALT
(Alteration of TSF
confidential data)
TSF Confidential Data under the TOE management
may be altered by persons without a login user name, or
by persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the TSF Confidential Data.
* "Persons with a login user name" mean persons who are permitted to use the TOE.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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3.1.1.2 Security Function Policies against Threats
All threats shown in Table 3-3 describe breaches (viewing or alteration) of user data and TSF
data caused by persons who are not permitted users for the TOE, or by persons who do not
have any valid authorities.
These threats are countered by the following Security Functions:
(1) User identification and authentication
The TOE requires a user to enter the login user name and login password. By confirming
that the entered data are identical to the user authentication data managed internally by
the TOE, the TOE verifies that the person who attempts to use the TOE is an authorised
TOE user. The entry means are the input from Operation Panel of the TOE itself, the
input on a Web browser of client computers, the input via drivers when using Printer
Function and LAN-Fax Transmission.
As a means to ensure the necessary functional strength, the following functions are
provided:
- If users fail to be authenticated consecutively until reaching the specified
number of times set by the MFP administrator, the user accounts are forced to
be locked out. (The user accounts cannot be used until the lockout time elapses
or the lockout is released.)
- The login passwords are required, when they are set, to be composed of more
than the level of quality that has been established in terms of the length
(number of characters) and the character types.
When the login password is validated and a user is confirmed as an authorized TOE user,
the user receives the user privilege that is set in advance in accordance with the role
assigned to the user. Accordingly, the user is allowed to use the TOE. As shown in "Table
4-2 TOE Users," the roles specified by the TOE include normal user, MFP administrator,
and supervisor.
As a means to support the Identification and Authentication Function, the following
functions are provided:
- Display dummy characters in place of the entered login password on the input
screen.
- After once logged in, if at any time the TOE is not operated by the user or
anyone in a certain period of time, the user account will be automatically logged
out.
(2) Access control (Access control against the user data)
For processing request by users, access control to the document information and the user
jobs is performed, based on the login user names and permissions of each user role of the
users. Stored documents are associated with specific information (a document user list)
that stipulates which user is allowed to perform the operation (deletion, printing, and
downloading, etc.). Access control to allow or deny the operation request by normal user is
performed, according to the login user names and the information in the document user
list. The MFP administrator is permitted to delete any stored documents, but is not
permitted to perform any other operation on stored documents.
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User jobs are associated with the login user names of the users that create the jobs, and
the normal user who is associated with the login user name is allowed to delete the
applicable job. The MFP administrator is allowed to delete all the user jobs. The
supervisor is forbidden to perform any operations on the user data.
(3) Overwrite residual data
In order to protect from unauthorised access to documents that have been deleted but
remain residually stored in the HDD, temporary documents and their fragments in the
HDD, the residual data shall be overwritten by specified data when deleting the
documents.
(4) Network protection
In order to prevent information leakage by being monitored via communication paths,
TLS encrypted communication is used for communications between the TOE and client
computers for the operations via a Web browser and communications using Printer
Function and LAN-Fax Transmission. IPsec communication and S/MIME communication
are also used for the communications between the TOE and the clients.
(5) Security management
In order to protect the TSF data from unauthorised access beyond the user permissions,
access control is performed on actions, such as viewing or altering TOE setting
information, and newly creating or altering user data in accordance with the TOE user
roles. As a permission policy of information alteration (modification), normal users are
only authorised to alter their login passwords, and supervisor is only authorised to alter
the login passwords of the supervisor and the MFP administrators. Only MFP
administrators are allowed to alter the TSF data, except for the above mentioned
permissions.
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3.1.2 Organisational Security Policies and Security Function Policies
3.1.2.1 Organisational Security Policies
Organisational security policies required in use of this TOE are shown in Table 3-4. The
evaluation process has confirmed that the security policies except for
P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION are identical to the security policies in the conformance PP.
P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION is the security policy that assumes writing data into the HDD
not in a directly readable format.
Table 3-4 Organisational Security Policies
Identifier Organisational Security Policy
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION
(User identification and
authentication)
Only users with operation permission of the TOE shall
be authorised to use the TOE.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION
(Software verification)
Procedures shall exist to self-verify executable code in
the TSF.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING
(Management of audit log
records)
The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use
and security-relevant events. The audit log shall be
protected from unauthorised disclosure or alteration,
and shall be reviewed by authorised persons.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT
(Management of external
interfaces)
To prevent unauthorised use of the external interfaces of
the TOE, operations of those interfaces shall be
controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.
P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION
(Encryption of storage devices)
The data stored on the HDD inside the TOE shall be
encrypted.
3.1.2.2 Security Function Policies to Organisational Security Policies
The TOE provides the security functions to meet the Organisational Security Policies shown
in Table 3-4.
(1) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.USER.AUTHORIZATION"
This security policy requires that only officially registered TOE users be allowed to use
the TOE.
The TOE implements this policy by the following Security Function:
(a) User identification and authentication
Based on the user identification and authentication described in Section 3.1.1.2,
whether a person who attempts to use the TOE is an authorised user will be verified
with reference to the identification and authentication information obtained from the
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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user. A person is provided with the user privileges that are set in advance in
accordance with the role assigned to the user, so that the authorised person is allowed
to use the TOE only if the person is confirmed as an authorised user.
(2) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION"
This security policy requires the validity of the TOE executable code to be self-verified.
The TOE implements this policy by the following Security Function:
(a) Self test
The TOE (configuration items except for FCU) runs a self test during the initialisation
start-up after turning on the power, and it checks the integrity and the validity of
executable codes in the MFP control software and the Operation Panel control software.
The self test verifies the hash values of firmware and confirms the integrity of the
executable code. The test verifies each application on the basis of a signature key and
confirms the validity of the executable code.
If something abnormal is recognised in the MFP control software during the self test,
an error message is displayed on the Operation Panel, and the TOE stops the
operations so that normal users cannot use the TOE. If something abnormal is
recognised in the Operation Panel control software, normal users cannot use the TOE
through the Operation Panel. If no abnormal operations are recognised during the self
test, the TOE continues the start-up processing and makes itself usable for the users.
As for the FCU, the TOE provides the verification information to perform integrity
verification in a way that the users can confirm it. The users need to confirm the FCU
based on this information, and can use the TOE when there is no problem.
(3) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.AUDIT.LOGGING"
This security policy requires audit logs for the security events of the TOE to be acquired,
and the audit logs to be appropriately managed.
The TOE implements this policy by the following Security Function:
(a) Security audit
When auditable security events occur, the TOE generates the audit logs that consist of
such items as event type, user identification, occurrence date and time, and outcome,
etc., to add and save to the audit logging file. Only successfully authenticated MFP
administrators are allowed to read and delete the generated audit logging file. Reading
the audit logging file is executed by text format through a Web browser of client
computers.
In addition, in order to record the occurrence date and time of the audit event log, the
date and time information are acquired from the system clock of the TOE.
(4) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT"
This security policy requires that external interfaces (Operation Panel, LAN interface,
USB interface, and telephone lines) of the TOE are appropriately managed without being
used by unauthorised persons.
The TOE implements this policy by the following Security Functions:
(a) User identification and authentication
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Based on the user identification and authentication described in Section 3.1.1.2,
whether a person who attempts to use the TOE is an authorised user will be verified
with reference to the identification and authentication information obtained from the
user. A person is provided with the user privileges that are set in advance in
accordance with the role assigned to the user, so that the authorised person is allowed
to use the TOE only if the person is confirmed as an authorised user.
(b) Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
This function is not an implementation for active mechanism, but is addressed as
architectural design of external interfaces. By its architecture, any information
received from an external interface is processed by the TSF, and any information sent
to an external interface is controlled by the TSF. Thus, unauthorised forwarding of
data between the different external interfaces is prevented.
As for USB interfaces, unauthorised forwarding of data by using this interface is
prevented by deactivating the use of USB interfaces.
(5) Means to support Organisational Security Policy, "P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION"
This security policy requires that the TOE encrypts the stored contents on the HDD inside
the TOE.
The TOE implements this policy by the following Security Functions:
(a) Stored data protection function
The encryption and decryption by AES are performed for all data written into or
reading out to the HDD. When encrypting and decrypting the data, the key of 256-bits
length is used. The key is created from the administrator setting an initial value and
stored in the TOE.
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate this TOE
as useful information for the assumed readers to determine the use of this TOE.
4.1 Usage Assumptions
Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate this TOE. Although the assumptions in Table 4-1 are
expressed differently from the conformance PP, the evaluation process confirmed the
equivalence of both assumptions.
The effective performances of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these
assumptions are upheld.
Table 4-1 Assumptions in Use of the TOE
Identifier Assumptions
A.ACCESS.MANAGED
(Access management)
According to the guidance document, the TOE is placed
in a restricted or monitored area that provides
protection from physical access by unauthorised
persons.
A.USER.TRAINING
(User training)
The responsible manager of MFP trains users according
to the guidance document so that users are aware of the
security policies and procedures of their organisation
and are competent to follow those policies and
procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING
(Administrator
training)
Administrators are aware of the security policies and
procedures of their organisation, and are competent to
correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance
with the guidance document following those policies and
procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST
(Trusted administrator)
The responsible manager of MFP selects administrators
who do not use their privileged access rights for
malicious purposes according to the guidance document.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
This TOE is installed in general offices and connected to the local area networks (hereafter,
"LAN"), and it is used through the Operation Panel of the TOE itself and client computers
that are also connected to the LAN. Figure 4-1 shows the general operational environment as
assumptions of this TOE.
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Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE
Figure 4-1 gives an example environment to handle office documents in general offices where
this TOE is assumed to be used. The TOE is connected to the LAN and telephone lines.
When the TOE is connected to the LAN that is connected to an external network such as the
Internet, firewalls are installed at the boundaries between the external network and the LAN
to protect the LAN and the TOE from attacks that originate from the external network. The
LAN is connected to server computers such as an FTP server, an SMB server, and an SMTP
server, and is connected to client computers. The LAN performs the communication for the
TOE to gather data such as documents and a variety of information.
The operation of the TOE includes both cases of using the Operation Panel of the TOE and
using client computers. Installing printer drivers or fax drivers in client computers enables to
process printing via the local area network from the client computers.
Although the reliability of hardware and software shown in this configuration is outside the
scope of this evaluation, it is assumed to be trustworthy.
Table 4-2 shows the associated users to use of the TOE in this environment.
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Table 4-2 TOE Users
User Definition Explanation
Normal user A user who is allowed to use the TOE. A
normal user is provided with a login user
name and can use normal functions of MFP.
Administrator Supervisor A user who is authorised to modify the login
password of the MFP administrator.
MFP
administrator
A user who is allowed to manage the TOE
and performs the management operations
such as normal user management, device
management, file management, and
network management.
As shown in Table 4-2, the TOE users are classified into normal user and administrator.
According to the roles, administrators shall be identified as supervisor and MFP
administrator. The users shown in Table 4-2 are direct users of the TOE. There is also a
responsible manager of the MFP who, as an indirect TOE user, is authorised to select the
MFP administrator and supervisor. The responsible manager of the MFP is assumed to be an
organisational manager in the operational environment.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
To protect data on communication paths between client computers/each server and the TOE,
it is necessary that communication protocols on client computers and each server are
operated securely to work properly.
To operate client computers and each server securely is the responsibility of the operator.
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5. Architectural Information
This chapter explains the scope of this TOE and the main components (subsystems).
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components
Figure 5-1 shows the composition of the TOE. The TOE is the entire MFP product.
Figure 5-1 TOE Boundary
As shown in Figure 5-1, the TOE consists of the following hardware: Operation Panel Unit,
Engine Unit, Document Feed Unit, Fax Controller Unit, Controller Board, HDD, Ic Ctlr,
Network Unit, USB Slot (Controller Board), SD Card Slot (Controller Board), SD Card Slot
(Operation Panel Unit), USB Memory Slot, USB Slot (Operation Panel Unit), miniUSB Slot,
and NFC Tag. The general description of each configuration item is described as follows:
[Operation Panel Unit (hereafter, referred to as "Operation Panel")]
The Operation Panel is attached to the TOE and is an interface device that the TOE users
use for the TOE operation. It features the following devices: key switches, LED indicators, an
LCD touch screen, and Operation Panel Control Board. The Operation Panel control software
is installed on the Operation Panel Control Board.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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[Engine Unit]
The Engine Unit contains a Scanner Engine that is an input device to read paper documents,
Printer Engine that is an output device to print and eject paper documents, and Engine
Control Board that controls each engine.
[Document Feed Unit]
As the Document Feed Unit, ARDF or SPDF or exposure glass cover is equipped.
[Fax Controller Unit (FCU)]
The Fax Controller Unit is a unit that has a modem function and sends or receives fax data to
and from other fax devices with G3 standard when connected to a telephone line.
[Controller Board]
The Controller Board is a device that contains Processors, RAM, NVRAM, Ic Key and
FlashROM. The following describes the components of the Controller Board:
• Processor
A semiconductor chip which carries out the basic arithmetic processing of MFP
operations.
• RAM
A volatile memory medium which is used as the image data.
• NVRAM
A non-volatile memory medium which stores the MFP control data to configure the
MFP operation.
• Ic Key
A security chip which has the function of a random number generation and
cryptographic key generation. It is used to detect alteration of the MFP Control
Software.
• FlashROM
A non-volatile memory medium in which the MFP Control Software is installed.
[HDD]
The HDD is a hard disk drive which image data as well as login user names and login
passwords to be used for identification and authentication are written into.
[Ic Ctlr]
The Ic Ctlr is a security chip that has the functions to encrypt the information stored into the
HDD and decrypt the information read from the HDD.
[Network Unit]
The Network Unit is an external interface to support an Ethernet LAN.
[USB Slot (Controller Board)]
The USB Slot is an external interface to connect a client computer to the TOE for printing
directly from client computers. This interface is disabled at the time of installation.
[SD Card Slot (Controller Board)]
The SD Card Slot is used for inserting an SD Card. The SD Card Slots are located inside and
on the front of the MFP. The SD Card Slot on the front of the device is disabled at the time of
operation, and the SD Card is not operated by hand in normal operation.
[SD Card Slot (Operation Panel Unit)]
The SD Card Slot is used by users to print documents in the SD Card. In this TOE, this slot is
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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disabled at the time of installation.
[USB Memory Slot]
The USB Memory Slot is an external interface used by users to print documents in the USB
Memory. In this TOE, this interface is disabled at the time of installation.
[USB Slot (Operation Panel Unit)]
The USB Slot is an external interface used by users to utilize a camera, USB keyboard, or
USB card reader. In this TOE, this interface is disabled at the time of installation.
[miniUSB Slot]
The miniUSB Slot is used by users to utilize the NFC. In this TOE, this slot is disabled at the
time of installation.
[NFC Tag]
The NFC tag is used by users to get connection information between the TOE and smart
devices and shall be set to disabled at the installation of the TOE.
5.2 IT Environment
The TOE is connected to the LAN and communicates with server computers, such as an FTP
server, an SMB server, and an SMTP server, as well as with client computers. The TOE
communicates with fax devices via telephone lines.
The client computer connected via the LAN uses the TOE through the printer driver, the fax
driver, and the Web browser. The client computer performs not only communication of
document data to the TOE, but also an operation of some management functions and status
checking of the TOE via the Web browser.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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6. Documentation
The identification of documents attached to this TOE is listed below.
TOE users are required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in
order to uphold the assumptions.
Document Name Version
かんたん操作ガイド D0BQ-7003A
本機を安全にご利用いただくために D0BQ-7028
本製品をお使いのお客様へ D0BQ-7035A
本機をお使いのお客様へ D0BQ-7037
本製品をお使いのお客様へ（正誤表） D0BQ-7091
安全上のご注意 D0BQ-7502
セキュリティーリファレンス D0BQ-7470
セットアップ D0BQ-7449
本機の紹介と基本操作 D0BQ-7452
コピー D0BQ-7453
ドキュメントボックス D0BQ-7454
ファクス D0BQ-7455
スキャナー D0BQ-7456
プリンター D0BQ-7457
メンテナンス D0BQ-7458
こまったときには D0BQ-7459
設定 D0BQ-7460
仕様 D0BQ-7461
セキュリティー D0BQ-7462
ドライバーインストールガイド D0BQ-7463
セキュリティー機能をお使いになるお客様へ D0BQ-7504
IEEE Std 2600.2TM-2009 準拠でお使いになる管理者の方へ D0BQ-7473
ヘルプ 83NHEEJAR
1.10 v242
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results
7.1 Evaluation Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center that conducted the evaluation as the Evaluation
Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE (National Institute of Technology
and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which joins Mutual Recognition Arrangement of
ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation). It is periodically confirmed that
the above Evaluation Facility meets the requirements on the appropriateness of the
management and evaluators for maintaining the quality of evaluation.
7.2 Evaluation Approach
Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in the CEM in
accordance with the assurance components in the CC Part 3. Details for evaluation activities
were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. The Evaluation Technical Report explains
the summary of this TOE as well as the content of the evaluation and the verdict of each work
unit in the CEM.
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity
The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report as
follows.
The evaluation has started in 2018-08 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation
Technical Report dated 2019-03. The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation
deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence
in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. For the development sites, site visits have
been omitted, and the Evaluation Facility determined with its responsibility that the
examination details on those of the past CC-certified products could be reused.
Furthermore, the evaluator conducted the sampling check of the developer testing and the
evaluator testing by using the developer testing environment at the developer site in 2018-12.
Concerns found in evaluation activities for each work unit were all issued as the Observation
Report, and it was reported to the developer. Those concerns were reviewed by the developer,
and all the concerns were solved eventually.
Concerns that the Certification Body found in the evaluation process were described as the
certification oversight review, and it was sent to the Evaluation Facility.
After the Evaluation Facility and the developer examined them, those concerns were
reflected in the Evaluation Technical Report.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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PSTN PSTN
Internal Network
7.4 IT Product Testing
The evaluator confirmed the validity of the testing that the developer had performed.
As a result of the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation and the verification results
of the testing performed by the developer, the evaluator performed the reproducibility testing,
additional testing, and evaluator's penetration testing based on vulnerability assessments
judged to be necessary.
7.4.1 Developer Testing
The evaluator evaluated the integrity of the developer testing that the developer performed
and the documentation of actual testing results. The content of the developer testing
evaluated by the evaluator is explained as follows.
(1) Developer Testing Environment
Figure 7-1 shows the testing configuration performed by the developer, and Table 7-1
shows the main configuration items.
Figure 7-1 Configuration of the Developer Testing
MFP Fax Machine
Client
Computer
SMB
Server
Mail
Server
FTP
Server
Telephone
Switchboard
Simulator
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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Table 7-1 Test Configurations
Configuration Item Detail
TOE RICOH IM C4500F (equipped with ARDF and FCU)
RICOH IM C5500F (equipped with ARDF and FCU)
RICOH IM C6000F (equipped with SPDF and FCU)
(Complement) Evaluator judged that the performance of the
configuration with the exposure glass cover can be confirmed
with the configuration above.
Client Computer OS: Windows 7/8.1/10
Web browser: Internet Explorer 11, Microsoft Edge 40
Printer driver: RPCS Driver 1.1.0.0
FAX driver: PCFAX Driver 8.13.0.0
SMTP Server Windows Server 2012 P-Mail Server Manager version 1.91
FTP Server Windows Server 2012 IIS8 V8.0.9200.16384
Linux (Fedora20) vsftpd 3.0.2-6
SMB Server Windows Server 2012
Telephone
Switchboard
Simulator
XF-A150 (Panasonic Corporation)
Fax Machine MP C6503
Although the TOE used in the developer testing is a part of the multiple MFPs identified
in the ST, other models are the same models as the MFPs used in the testing with
different product names.
Therefore, the evaluator judged that the developer testing was performed in the TOE
testing environment consistent with the TOE configuration identified in the ST.
(2) Summary of the Developer Testing
A summary of the developer testing is as follows.
(a) Developer Testing Outline
An outline of the developer testing is as follows.
<Developer Testing Approach>
The testing approaches consisted of:
- stimulating the assumed external interfaces (Operation Panel, Web browser, and so
on) in normal use of the TOE, and visually observing the results;
- analysing the generated audit log and the logging data for debug;
- checking the communication protocols between client computers/each server and
the TOE with packet capture; and
- executing anomaly simulation tests to generate abnormal events by altering a part
of the TSF implementation, and so on.
<Content of the Performed Developer Testing>
The expected values of testing results described in testing specifications which are
provided in advance by the developer were compared to the values of the actual
developer testing results described in the testing result reports which are also provided
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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by the developer. As a result, it was found that the values of the actual testing results
are in conformity to those of the expected testing results.
(b) Scope of the Performed Developer Testing
The developer testing was performed on about 500 items by the developer.
By the coverage analysis, it was verified that all security functions and external
interfaces described in the functional specification had been tested.
(c) Result
The evaluator confirmed an approach of the performed developer testing and the
legitimacy of tested items, and confirmed consistencies between the testing approach
described in the testing plan and the actual testing approach.
The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the testing results expected by the
developer and the actual testing results performed by the developer.
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing
The evaluator performed the sample testing to reconfirm the execution of the security
functions by the testing items extracted from the developer testing, and the evaluator
performed the evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as the "independent
testing") to gain further assurance that security functions are certainly implemented, based
on the evidence shown in the process of the evaluation.
The independent testing performed by the evaluator is explained below.
(1) Independent Testing Environment
The configuration of the independent testing performed by the evaluator was the same as
the configuration of the developer testing as shown in Figure 7-1.
(2) Summary of Independent Testing
A summary of the independent testing is as follows.
(a) Independent Testing Viewpoints
The viewpoints for the independent testing that the evaluator designed from the
developer testing and the provided evaluation documentation are shown below.
<Independent Testing Viewpoints>
1. For TSFI that has many types of input parameters and to which the developer
testing is insufficient in terms of completeness, the testing items such as parameter
scheme, boundary values, and abnormal values are added.
2. For execution timing of several TSFs and combination of execution, the testing
items to which conditions are added are performed.
3. The testing items to which the different variation from the developer testing is
added are performed in regard to procedures of exception and cancellation.
4. The testing items are selected in the sampling testing from the following
viewpoints:
- The testing items are selected to include all of TSFs and TSFIs in terms of
completeness.
- The testing items are selected to cover the different testing approaches and
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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testing environments.
- The testing items involving TSFI that meet many of the SFRs are mainly
selected in order to conduct tests efficiently.
(b) Independent Testing Outline
An outline of the independent testing that the evaluator performed is as follows.
<Independent Testing Approach>
In setting the different initialisation and the different parameters from the developer
testing, the independent testing approaches consisted of:
- stimulating the assumed external interfaces (Operation Panel, Web browser, and so
on) in normal use of the TOE, and visually observing the results;
- analysing the generated audit log; and
- checking the communication protocols between client computers/each server and
the TOE with packet capture, and so on.
<Independent Testing Tool>
The independent testing was performed adding the test tool shown in Table 7-2 to the
developer testing.
Table 7-2 Tool Used in the Independent Testing
Tool Name (Version) Outline and the Utilization Purpose
Wake On Lan for
Windows (2.09)
The tool that turns on the equipment corresponding to
the Wake On Lan feature via LAN.
<Content of the Performed Independent Testing >
Based on the viewpoints of the independent testing, 21 items for the independent
testing and 19 items for the sampling testing were performed.
The outline of the main independent testing performed and corresponding viewpoints
are shown in Table 7-3.
Table 7-3 Viewpoints for the Independent Testing
Viewpoints for the
Independent Testing
Outline of the Independent Testing
1 - By changing conditions, etc., confirmed that the
behaviours concerning the user account lock were as
specified.
- Since there are multiple methods of specifying which
user can use MFP features, confirmed there is no
inconsistency by adding the testing of combination of
the methods.
- Confirmed that the access control was performed as
specified when operating the internally stored
documents from several interfaces.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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Viewpoints for the
Independent Testing
Outline of the Independent Testing
2 - Confirmed that the auto logout process was performed
as specified while the same user simultaneously logged
on.
- Confirmed that the behaviours were as specified when
user accounts were deleted while login status was
maintained or when user privileges were changed.
3 - Confirmed that the IPsec procedure was performed as
specified when using the expired certificates.
- Regarding the operational function for the internally
stored documents, confirmed that the exception
procedures were performed as specified when
unexpected parameters were specified or when a process
was interrupted.
- Confirmed that the exception procedures were
performed as specified when entering unauthorised
inputs from the printer driver.
- Confirmed that the procedures were performed as
specified even when performing unexpected operations
or entering unexpected parameters on the Operation
Panel.
- Confirmed that the Wake on Lan feature was
deactivated.
(c) Result
All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed, and
the evaluator confirmed the behaviour of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed
consistencies between the expected behaviour and all the testing results.
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator devised and performed the necessary evaluator penetration testing
(hereinafter referred to as the "penetration testing") on the potentially exploitable
vulnerabilities of concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level from the
evidence shown in the process of the evaluation.
The penetration testing performed by the evaluator is explained below.
(1) Summary of the Penetration Testing
A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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(a) Vulnerability of Concern
The evaluator searched into the provided documentation and the publicly available
information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following
vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.
1. Unauthorised access to the TOE may be caused by unintentional network port
interfaces.
2. Security Functions may be bypassed in case of entering data, for interfaces, which
have the values and formats that are unintended by the TOE.
3. There may be some vulnerabilities when implementing secure channels, and
consequently the Security Functions of the TOE may be bypassed.
4. Security Functions may be bypassed by maintaining the TOE overloaded.
5. Security Functions may be bypassed if operation conflicts by multiple interfaces
occur.
(b) Penetration Testing Outline
The evaluator performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially
exploitable vulnerabilities.
< Penetration Testing Environment>
The penetration testing configuration is identical with those of the developer testing
shown in Figure 7-1, and evaluator independent testing.
Table 7-4 shows key tools used in the penetration testing.
Table 7-4 Penetration Testing Tools
Name(Version) Outline
ZAP (2.7.0) Inspection tool of Web vulnerabilities with Proxy traffic
nmap (7.70) Port Scanning Tool
Netcat (1.11) Packet Communication Tool
Nessus (7.1.2)
Plugin 201812112336
Vulnerability Scanning Tool
Burp Suite Professional
(1.7.35)
Inspection tool of Web vulnerabilities with Proxy traffic
Wireshark (2.2.5/2.6.5) Packet Capture Tool
OpenSSL 1.0.1j Software library that provides the SSL/TLS protocol
robot-detect (2018, April
3)
The tool that examines whether the TLS implementation
has countermeasures against the specific attack
procedures
PRET (0.40) PJL and PostScript test tools
<List of the Performed Penetration Testing>
Table 7-5 shows vulnerabilities concerned and the content of the related penetration
testing. The evaluator performed 16 test cases in the following penetration testing to
identify possibly exploitable vulnerabilities:
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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Table 7-5 Outline of the Performed Penetration Testing
Vulnerability Outline of the Penetration Testing
1 Confirmed that the unintended network ports were not
opened using the port scanning tool and the vulnerability
scanning tool. Also checked no vulnerabilities to unauthorised
inputs for available ports.
2 Checked no publicly-known vulnerabilities on Web interfaces
to access the TOE.
Confirmed that the Security Functions may not be bypassed
by the specified URL at the time of connecting to the TOE via
a Web browser.
Checked no implementation-specific vulnerabilities regarding
PJL, PostScript, and SQL.
3 Checked no implementation-specific vulnerabilities regarding
the encryption communication with TLS and IPsec.
Confirmed that parameters were not easily predicted by
verifying the randomness of numbers as parameters used in
Web interfaces.
4 Confirmed that the TOE was not unsecured due to insufficient
resources.
5 Confirmed that Security Functions were not bypassed when
user login was performed using multiple interfaces and user
privileges were changed on various occasions.
(c) Result
In the penetration testing performed by the evaluator, the evaluator did not find any
exploitable vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack potential could
exploit.
7.5 Evaluated Configuration
In this evaluation, the configurations shown in Figure 7-1 were evaluated. IPv4 was used in
the network. This TOE will not be used in the configuration which is significantly different
from the above configuration items. Therefore, the evaluator determined the configuration of
the above evaluation is appropriate.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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7.6 Evaluation Results
The evaluator had concluded that this TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM by
submitting the Evaluation Technical Report.
In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.
- PP Conformance:
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile
for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2TM-2009)
The TOE also conforms to the following SFR packages defined in the above PP.
- 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational
Environment B
- 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational
Environment B
- 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational
Environment B
- 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational
Environment B
- 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Document Storage and Retrieval
Functions, Operational Environment B
- 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface
Functions, Operational Environment B
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance
components.
- All assurance components of EAL2 package
- Additional assurance component ALC_FLR.2
The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE
corresponding to the identification described in Chapter 2.
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
There is no evaluator recommendation to be addressed to procurement entities.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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8. Certification
The Certification Body conducted the following certification based on the materials submitted
by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation process.
1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Report shall properly be solved.
3. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the related
work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
4 Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report
shall conform to the CEM.
Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight
review, and it was sent to the Evaluation Facility. The Certification Body confirmed such
concerns pointed out in the certification oversight review were solved in the ST and the
Evaluation Technical Report and issued this Certification Report.
8.1 Certification Result
As a result of verification of the submitted Evaluation Technical Report, Observation Report,
and related evaluation documentation, the Certification Body determined that this TOE
satisfies all assurance requirements for EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 in the CC Part 3.
8.2 Recommendations
Any influences on the security functions of this TOE in the operation, in the case the
Maintenance Functions are activated, are out of the scope of the assurance provided by this
evaluation. Therefore, it is advised to make a judgment at the administrator's responsibility
about the acceptance of maintenance.
It should be noted that the TOE users need to refer to the description of "4.3 Clarification of
Scope" and to see whether or not the evaluated scope of this TOE and the operational
requirement items can be handled in the actual operating environment of the TOE.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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9. Annexes
There is no annex.
10. Security Target
The Security Target [12] of this TOE is provided as a separate document along with this
Certification Report.
RICOH IM C6000/C5500/C4500 Security Target,
Version 1.00, February 5, 2019, RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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11. Glossary
The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.
ARDF An abbreviation of Automatic Reversing Document Feeder.
FCU An abbreviation of Fax Controller Unit.
HDD An abbreviation of Hard Disk Drive; in this document, it
indicates the HDD installed in the TOE if simply described as
"HDD."
IPsec Secure Architecture for Internet Protocol; a protocol that
provides the functions of data tampering prevention and data
confidentiality with IP packets traffic using cryptographic
technology.
MFP An abbreviation of a digital multifunctional product.
PSTN An abbreviation of Public Switched Telephone Networks.
S/MIME Secure / Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions; a standard
for e-mail encryption and digital signatures with a public key
system.
SPDF An abbreviation of Single Pass Document Feeder (the one-pass
duplex scanning ADF).
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
31
The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.
Administrative role Pre-defined roles that enable administrators to be given.
Although the following four types of administrative roles are
defined and can be assigned to respective administrators, this
TOE assumes the MFP administrator who is assigned to all
the roles.
(The access control for each subcategorised administrative
role is excluded from this evaluation.)
- Device administrator (executes device administration and
audit)
- User administrator (executes the management of normal
users)
- Network administrator (executes the network connection
management of the TOE)
- File administrator (executes the management of stored
documents and document user list)
Documents General term for paper documents and electronic documents
operated by the TOE.
Internet Fax A function to perform fax communications with the system of
sending or receiving e-mails.
It also uses the Internet lines.
IP-Fax A generic term of Realtime-Internet Fax of RICOH,
conformant with the International Standard ITU-T T.38.
It assigns IP address to a fax that is connected to a telephone
line, instead of Fax number.
LAN-Fax Transmission One of the Fax Functions. A function that transmits fax data
and stores documents using the fax driver on client
computers.
Lockout The state of making the user accounts unavailable.
Lockout time The time from being locked out to automatically releasing the
user accounts.
Login password A password corresponding to each login user name.
Login user name An identifier assigned to normal users, an MFP
administrator, and a supervisor. The TOE identifies users by
this identifier.
Maintenance Function A function to perform maintenance service for machine
malfunctions. In the operation of this TOE, the Service Mode
Lock Function is set to "ON" for deactivating this function.
Number of Attempts
before Lockout
The number of consecutive failed attempts to identify and
authenticate users, which is allowable until locking out the
user accounts.
The MFP administrator can assign 1 to 5 as a setting value.
Stored Documents Documents stored in the TOE so that they can be used with
Document Server Function, Printer Function, and Fax
Function.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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User job A work, from beginning to end, for each of the following TOE
functions: Copy, Document Server, Scanner, Printer, and Fax.
A user job may be paused or cancelled during the process by a
user. If a user job is cancelled, the user job will end.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0635-01-2019
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12. Bibliography
[1] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document, July 2018,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCS-01
[2] Requirements for IT Security Certification, September 2018,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-02
[3] Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility, September 2018,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-03
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-001
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-002
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-003
[7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-001, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[8] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-002, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[9] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-003, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[10] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-004
[11] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-004, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[12] RICOH IM C6000/C5500/C4500 Security Target,
Version 1.00, February 5, 2019, RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
[13] RICOH IM C6000/C5500/C4500 Evaluation Technical Report,
Version 2.0, March 15, 2019, ECSEC Laboratory Inc. Evaluation Center
[14] U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile
for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std. 2600.2TM-2009)
[15] CCEVS Policy Letter #20, 15 November 2010, National Information Assurance
Partnership