Ärendetyp 5.3 Diarienummer: 24FMV6698-36
Dokument ID CSEC2024026
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2026-02-26
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
Issue: 1.0, 2026-feb-26
Authorisation: Michael Lindh Almér, Lead Certifier , CSEC
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024026 2 (17)
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 4
3 Security Policy 5
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
4.1 Usage Assumptions 6
4.2 Environmental Assumptions 6
4.3 Clarification of Scope 6
5 Architectural Information 7
6 Documentation 9
7 IT Product Testing 10
7.1 Developer Testing 10
7.2 Evaluator Testing 10
7.3 Penetration Testing 10
8 Evaluated Configuration 11
9 Results of the Evaluation 12
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 14
11 Glossary 15
12 Bibliography 16
Appendix A Scheme Versions 17
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 17
A.2 Scheme Notes 17
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024026 3 (17)
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the data diode Advenica DD1G Gen 2 with Product
ID BSF-DD18605C01.
A data diode is used for sending data from one independent network to another while
ensuring the networks remain physically isolated. The data diode guarantees that data
can only flow in the allowed direction.
The Security Target [ST] is the basis for this evaluation. It does not claim conform-
ance to any Protection Profile.
The TOE scope is the complete data diode, and can be uniquely identified by its label.
The TOE guidance can also be uniquely identified by its document ID and version.
The TOE is delivered to customer through a secure and validated delivery process.
The customer will receive customer order specific information, including the ID num-
ber of the sealed security bag. This ensures that the customer can verify that the prod-
uct has not been manipulated or tampered with upon receiving the product. Shipment
to customers is handled by Advenica AB.
The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB in their premises in Växjö,
Sweden and the developer's premises in Malmö, Sweden. Site-visit was performed in
Malmö and Lund, Sweden. The evaluation was completed on the February 25, 2026.
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Crite-
ria (CC), version 2022, and the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), version 2022. The evaluation conforms to evaluation assurance level EAL 4,
augmented by AVA_VAN.4.
Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe-
dish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also
accredited by the Swedish accreditation body according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Com-
mon Criteria.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports, and participated during site-visit and performed test
oversight. The certifier determined that the evaluation results confirm the security
claims in the Security Target (ST), the Common Methodology for evaluation assur-
ance level EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.4.
The technical information in this report is based on the Final Evaluation Report (FER)
produced by Combitech AB, and the Security Target (ST).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024026 4 (17)
2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2024026
Name and version of the
certified IT product
Advenica DD1G Gen 2, BSF-DD18605C01
Security Target Identification DD1G Gen2, Security Target, Document number
21537, version 2.1, 2026-02-25
EAL EAL 4 + AVA_VAN.4
Sponsor Advenica AB
Developer Advenica AB
ITSEF Combitech AB
Common Criteria version CC:2022
CEM version CEM:2022
QMS version 2.6.1
Scheme Notes Release 22.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS, EA/MLA
Certification date 2026-02-26
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
CSEC2024026 5 (17)
3 Security Policy
The TOE is a hardware only data diode that ensures unidirectional Ethernet data traf-
fic through the TOE. It is intended for installation in a network environment.
There are no dependencies to other hardware, firmware or software to use the func-
tionality of the TOE.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes one assumption on the usage of the TOE.
• A.NO_MALICIOUS_ADMINS
Personnel doing the installation of TOE are assumed to be authorized, trusted,
and have the necessary training.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes two assumptions on the operational environment of
the TOE.
• A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
TOE is installed such that only authorized personnel has access.
• A.NO_BYPASS
TOE is installed such that it forms a separation between upstream and down-
stream networks.
The network is configured such that all traffic from upstream to downstream
network must go through the TOE.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains two threats, which have been considered during the
evaluation.
• T.LEAKAGE_VIA_DIODE
A USER on the downstream network accidentally transmitting data through
TOE to the upstream network.
• T.ATTACK_VIA_DIODE
An ATTACKER tries to send data from downstream to upstream via the TOE
with the purpose to violate resources or access data at US-
ER_RESOURCES_US.
The Security Target contains no Organisational Security Policy (OSPs).
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE is the Advenica data diode DD1G Gen 2, BSF-DD18605C01.
A data diode is used for sending data from one independent network to another while
ensuring the networks remain physically isolated. The data diode guarantees that data
can only flow in the allowed direction.
The TOE consists of a single device with three subsystems, denoted Upstream [1],
Downstream [2], and Unidirectional Optical Link [3].
The TOE is physically connected to networks using the Upstream [4] and Downstream
Ethernet connector [5] respectively. These are the only network connectors and the
only offered communication ports on the TOE.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
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The Unidirectional Optical Link [3] is implemented using an optical fiber mounted to
a transmitter [6] and receiver [7]. It provides the physical separation between the Up-
stream [1] and the Downstream [2] subsystems. This removes any risk of data being
transferred in the reverse direction when installed correctly.
The upstream network (DATA_IN) should be configured to send all relevant network
traffic through the TOE and physically ensure that all connections between the up-
stream and downstream (DATA_OUT) networks pass through the TOE.
Full operability of the TOE is achieved by powering the device and connecting the
network interfaces.
There are several options for powering the device. By connecting to external power
supply unit(s) [8,9] or via Power over Ethernet (PoE) [4,5].
The device also supports redundant power supply.
The TOE has two operational states, on and off, with no intermediate or initial states
where the one-way functionality is inactive.
The TOE should be installed with visible tamper detection marking for ocular inspec-
tion to determine whether tampering has occurred. This tamper seal is already attached
on delivery, but a proper visual examination of the TOE before installation is recom-
mended.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
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6 Documentation
Document name Version
Recommended_Security_Management_SecuriCDS_DD1000A_DD1G 17113v1.3
QuickGuide_DD1G_Gen_2 21350v1.0
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer performed tests providing full coverage and dept, including positive
and negative tests. All SFRs were tested. Testing also including measuring voltage and
not only network traffic.
Testing was performed within developer's premises in Malmö, Sweden. All tests were
successful.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluator re-executed the developer tests within the developer's premises in
Malmö Sweden. All tests were successful and no deviations were identified. No addi-
tional tests were deemed necessary.
The evaluator testing was performed on October 9, 2025.
7.3 Penetration Testing
No penetration testing was conducted, as no potential vulnerabilities were identified
that could be exploited by an attacker with Moderate attack potential.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is an Ethernet-based data diode with 1 Gigabit performance and the TOE is
determined by the physical borders of the box. It is intended for installation in a net-
work environment.
There are no dependencies to other hardware, firmware or software to use the func-
tionality of the TOE. Since the TOE is a hardware-only device, it has no communica-
tion interface for administration or configuration.
The TOE should be installed with visible tamper detection marking for ocular inspec-
tion to determine whether tampering has occurred. This tamper seal is already attached
on delivery, but a proper visual examination of the TOE before installation is recom-
mended.
All personnel doing installation and administration of the TOE should be authorized to
do so, have the necessary training required to do this according to the requirements,
and follow the recommended steps when doing so.
The environment in which the TOE is installed should not be accessible by unauthor-
ized personnel to prevent the device from being tampered with, or even disconnected,
since it can then no longer fulfill its security function.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Moderate.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family
Name
Short name (includ-
ing component iden-
tifier for assurance
families)
Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Security architecture description ADV_ARC.1 PASS
Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.4 PASS
Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Modular design ADV_TDS.3 PASS
Guidance documents AGD PASS
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-cycle support ALC PASS
Production support, acceptance procedures
and automation
ALC_CMC.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 PASS
Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well defined developer tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
ST evaluation ASE PASS
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS
Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS
Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
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Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family
Name
Short name (includ-
ing component iden-
tifier for assurance
families)
Verdict
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment AVA PASS
Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 PASS
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
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11 Glossary
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security,
document describing the methodology used in Common Cri-
teria evaluations
CM Configuration Management
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility, test laboratory licensed to
operate within an evaluation and certification scheme
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target, document containing security requirements
and specifications, used as the basis of a TOE evaluation
SFR Security Functional Requirement
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
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12 Bibliography
ST DD1G Gen2 Security Target, Advenica AB, 2026-02-25,
document version 2.1, FMV ID 24FMV6698-32
QG Quick Guide, 21350, 2024, v1.0
SM SecuriCDS DD1000A & DD1G Recommended Security
Management, 17113, 2024, v1.3
CC/CEM Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Eval-
uation, and Common Methodology for Information Technol-
ogy Security Evaluation, CCMB-2022-11-001 through 006,
document versions CC:2022/CEM:2022 rev 1
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - Advenica DD1G Gen2
24FMV6698-36 1.0 2026-02-26
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Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
2.6.1 2025-10-16 No impact
2.6 2025-04-23 No impact
2.5.2 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
Scheme
Note
Version Title Applicability
SN-15 5.0 Testing Compliant
SN-18 4.0 Highlighted Requirements on the
Security Target
Compliant
SN-22 4.0 Vulnerability assessment Compliant
SN-27 1.0 ST requirements at the time of
application for certification
Compliant
SN-28 2.0 Updated procedures for application,
evaluation and certification
Compliant
SN-31 1.0 New procedures for site visit oversight
and testing oversight
Compliant