TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Certification Report
Secure Signature Creation Device with Key Import (SSCD)
configuration of SECORA™ ID v2.01 Infineon Applet
Collection - eSign V1.0
Sponsor and developer: Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1 - 15,
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2400178-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2400178-01
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 21 July 2025
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
Page: 5/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2400178-01-CR, dated 21 July 2025
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Secure
Signature Creation Device with Key Import (SSCD) configuration of SECORA™ ID v2.01 Infineon
Applet Collection - eSign V1.0. The developer of the Secure Signature Creation Device with Key
Import (SSCD) configuration of SECORA™ ID v2.01 Infineon Applet Collection - eSign V1.0 is
Infineon Technologies AG located in Neubiberg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the
evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when
judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a Dual Interface chip with Java Card Applet “Secure Signature Creation Device with Key
import (SSCD) configuration of SECORA™ ID v2.01 Infineon Applet Collection-eSign V1.0” a
combination of hardware and software configured to securely create, use and manage signature
creation data (SCD). The SSCD protects the SCD during its whole lifecycle as to be used in a
signature creation process solely by its signatory, configured to perform signature creation operations.
Applet also supports authentication mechanisms like PACE, Active Authentication, Chip
Authentication and Terminal Authentication.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 21 July 2025 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in
the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Secure Signature Creation Device with Key
Import (SSCD) configuration of SECORA™ ID v2.01 Infineon Applet Collection - eSign V1.0, the
security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Secure Signature Creation Device
with Key Import (SSCD) configuration of SECORA™ ID v2.01 Infineon Applet Collection - eSign V1.0
are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures) and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, CEM:2022 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, CC:2022 [CC].
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
The TOE is stated as a Qualified Signature Creation Device for the purposes of electronic
identification and trust services as detailed by the [EU-REG]. The evaluation by SGS Britghtsight B.V.
included an examination of the TOE according to the eIDAS Dutch Conformity Assessment Process
Version 6 0.
TrustCB B.V., as the Dutch eIDAS-Designated Body responsible in The Netherlands for the
assessment of the conformity of qualified electronic signature and/or qualified electronic seal creation
devices declares that the evaluation meets the conditions for eIDAS certification for listing on the EU
eIDAS compiled list of Qualified Signature/Seal Creation Devices.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Secure Signature Creation Device with Key
Import (SSCD) configuration of SECORA™ ID v2.01 Infineon Applet Collection - eSign V1.0 from
Infineon Technologies AG located in Neubiberg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware Hardware Platform IFX_CCI_00005D
Software
Asymmetric Crypto Library (ACL) 03.35.001
Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL) 02.15.000
Hardware Support Library (HSL) 03.52.9708
Hash Crypto Library (HCL) version 01.13.002
UMSLC version 01.30.0564
Firmware version 80.309.05.0
Embedded OS version
CONF1: '01 00 02 FA
15 00 00 13 05'
CONF2: '01 00 0C FA
15 00 00 13 05'
eSign applet
1.3.0.0 (build number
coded as ‘01 03 00
00’)
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Secure Signature
Creation Device with Key Import (SSCD) configuration of SECORA™ ID v2.01 Infineon Applet
Collection - eSign V1.0. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.6.6.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following features (from the underlying platform):
• The standard Java Card features like API, the Java Card Runtime Environment and the Java
Card Virtual Machine;
• Proprietary PACE API providing special countermeasures against side channel leakage;
• GP for content management;
• Crypto operations (hash, EC, RSA, TDES and AES);
• Communication via the contactless interface and contact interface.
The TOE has the following features (from the SSCD applet):
• Generation of Asymmetric key pair for ECC and RSA algorithm;
• Computation of Digital Signature using a combination of hash algorithm and digital signature
algorithm;
• Encipher and Decipher of Data;
• Active authentication using RSA or ECDSA algorithm;
• Chip authentication using ECDH algorithm;
• Terminal authentication using ECDSA algorithm;
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• PACE with ECDH generic mapping, Chip Authentication Mapping and password types MRZ,
CAN, PIN and PUK;
• PACE password management feature;
• Secure messaging based on 3DES and AES as per the ICAO specification;
• Support for PIN and its management;
• Optionally supports Match on Card with comparison of stored reference data with data from
interface
• device (not claimed in the certification).
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 3 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The two lower layers in the picture represent the smart card controller referenced by IFX_CCI_00005D
together with the Firmware, Asymmetric Cryptographic Library (ACL) and a Symmetric Crypto Library
(SCL). Note that these components are certified by the same CC certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1169-V4-
2024. The hardware platform provides effective protection mechanisms against fault attacks. The
platform contains hardware co-processors, which support cryptographic standards such as TDES,
AES, RSA and EC. The hardware co-processor SCP has integrated measures against successful
SCA.
The white colour indicates optional components which are not in the scope of the security claims of
this ST, in CC terminology these are non interfering with the TSF of the TOE. The eSign V1.0 applet
optionally supports the Match on Card (MoC) operations. This does not interfere with the any of the
claimed security features. That means, both PIN and Biometric assets maintains its own control
parameters. The personalizer could configure the required verification operation either with PIN or
Biometric or both. However, the Biometric operation is not part of the certification claim in the eSign
v1.0 Applet.
Page: 8/13 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2400178-01-CR, dated 21 July 2025
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2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
SLJ38Gxymm1ap Infineon Applet Collection - eSign
V1.0 Administration Guide, dated 05 June 2025
Rev.1.2
SLJ38Gxymm1ap Infineon Applet Collection - eSign
V1.0 Extended datasheet, dated 14 June 2025
Rev.1.1
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing
module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were
tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The
testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were
used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers
whether potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified
behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis the protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge
gained from all previous evaluation classes. This results in the identification of (additional)
potential vulnerabilities. For this analysis will be performed according to the attack methods in
[JIL-AM]. An important source for assurance in this step is the technical report [ETR_COMP]
of the underlying platform.
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation
classes and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that
these potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed
by penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 1 week. During that test campaign, 50% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, and 50% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE was tested in the following configurations:
• Applet version 1.2.0.0 with Key Import and PACE-PIN/User-PIN authentication method on OS
CONF1.
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• Since the functionality the code that the vulnerability was found and testing was performed on
is similar in other configurations of TOE (Key Gen, OS CONF 2), it is concluded that the
results obtained from the test applies for other TOE configurations as well.
• TOE was updated with applet version 1.3.0.0. Delta code review was performed to check the
updated functionality. No impact was detected on the Vulnerability analysis and therefore the
performed test on TOE with applet version 1.2.0.0 is valid for the final TOE version.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused
by composition.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Secure Signature Creation Device with
Key Import (SSCD) configuration of SECORA™ ID v2.01 Infineon Applet Collection - eSign V1.0.
Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. This document provides details of the TOE
evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Secure Signature Creation
Device with Key Import (SSCD) configuration of SECORA™ ID v2.01 Infineon Applet Collection -
eSign V1.0, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL
5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. This implies that the product satisfies the security
requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [EN419211-3].
2.9 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
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The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The Secure Signature Creation Device with Key Import (SSCD) configuration of SECORA™ ID v2.01
Infineon Applet Collection - eSign V1.0 Rev_0.8, 2025-06-05 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
DCAP eIDAS Dutch Conformity Assessment Process
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts 1 to
5, CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
CEM:2022 Revision 1, November 2022
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.6, April 2024
[eIDAS-REP] Assessment Reporting Sheet eIDAS, 25-RPT-788, version 2.0, dated 21 July
2025
[EN419211-3] EN 419 211-3:2013, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device -
Part 3: Device with key import, V1.0.2, registered under the reference BSI-
CC-PP-0075-2012-MA-01
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “Secure Signature Creation Device with Key
Import (SSCD) configuration of SECORA™ ID v2.01 Infineon Applet
Collection – eSign, v1.0” – EAL5+, 25-RPT-789, Version 2.0, Dated 23 June
2025
[EU-REG] REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust
services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing
Directive 1999/93/EC
[HW-CERT] BSI-DSZ-CC-1169-V4-2024 for IFX_CCI_00003Bh, 000043h, 00005Dh,
00005Eh, 00005Fh, 000060h, 000061h, 000062h, 000063h, 000064h,
design step S11 with firmware 80.309.05.0, optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097,
optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, optional SCL v2.15.000,
optional ACL v3.33.003 and v3.34.000 and v3.35.001, optional RCL
v1.10.007, optional HCL v1.13.002 and user guidance from Infineon
Technologies AG, 13 September 2024
[HW-ST] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1169-V3-2024, IFX_CCI_00003Bh,
IFX_CCI_000043h, IFX_CCI_00005Dh, IFX_CCI_00005Eh,
IFX_CCI_00005Fh, IFX_CCI_000060h, IFX_CCI_000061h,
IFX_CCI_000062h, IFX_CCI_000063h, IFX_CCI_000064h S11 Security
Target, Version 5.9, 2024-08-20, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential
document)
[PLAT-CERT] Certificate NSCIB-CC-2400062-01, SECORA™ ID v2.01
(SLJ38Gxymm1ap), issued 20 December 2024
[PLAT-ST] SECORA™ ID v2.01 (SLJ38Gxymm1ap) Security Target, Rev 1.1, 19
December 2024
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2.1, February
2024
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, May 2022
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
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[JIL_QSCD] Security Evaluation and Certification of Qualified, Electronic Signature/Seal
Creation Devices, JIL Interpretations for Security Certification according to
eIDAS Regulation 910/2014, Version 1.0, July 2022
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[ST] Secure Signature Creation Device with Key Import (SSCD) configuration of
SECORA™ ID v2.01 Infineon Applet Collection - eSign V1.0 Rev_0.8, 2025-
06-05
(This is the end of this report.)