National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series
Switches running IOS-XE 17.15
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11603-2025
Dated: October 3, 2025
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Clare Parran
Sheldon Durrant
Lori Sarem
Randy Heimann
The MITRE Corporation
Michael Smeltzer
Johns Hopkins APL
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Matai Spivey
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Description................................................................................................. 3
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.3 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.4 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 4
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 7
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 7
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 8
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 9
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 9
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 9
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 9
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration .................................................................................... 9
8.1 Evaluated Configuration..................................................................................... 9
8.2 Excluded Functionality..................................................................................... 10
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 10
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 10
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ............................................................ 11
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)............................................... 11
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 11
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 11
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 12
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 12
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .............................................................. 13
11 Annexes................................................................................................................. 13
12 Security Target...................................................................................................... 13
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................ 13
14 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 14
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged
Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.15 solution provided by Cisco Systems, Inc. It presents
the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation
Report (VR) is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any agency of the
U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in October 2025. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part
2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the PP-
Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption, version 2.0, 25 April
2024 (CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_V2.0) which includes the Base PP: collaborative Protection
Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December 2023 (NDcPP30e) with the PP-
Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 2 March 2023 (MACsec10) and the
Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (SSH10).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series
Switches running IOS-XE 17.15.
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in
the ETR are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). The validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings
are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cisco Catalyst
Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.15 Security Target,
version 1.0, October 1, 2025 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
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evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE
17.15
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Network Devices and MACsec Ethernet Encryption, version
2.0, 25 April 2024 (CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_V2.0) which includes the Base PP:
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December
2023 (NDcPP30e) with the PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version
1.0, 2 March 2023 (MACsec10) and the Functional Package for SSH, Version
1.0, 13 May 2021 (SSH10)
ST Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE
17.15 Security Target, version 1.0, October 1, 2025
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged
Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.15, version 0.3, October 1, 2025
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Item Identifier
CCEVS Validators The MITRE Corporation, Johns Hopkins APL
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST.
The TOE is the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running
IOS-XE 17.15 all running Internetworking Operating System (IOS)-XE 17.15. The TOE is
a purpose-built, switching and routing platform with Open System Interconnection (OSI)
Layer2 and Layer3 traffic filtering capabilities. The TOE also supports Media Access
Control Security (MACsec) encryption for switch-to-switch (inter-network device) security.
3.1 TOE Description
The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.15
are switching and routing platforms that provide connectivity and security services, including
MACsec encryption, on a single, secure device. These switches offer broadband speeds and
simplified management to small businesses, enterprise small branch, and teleworkers.
The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches are single-device
security and switching solutions for protecting the network.
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.3 TOE Architecture
The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is comprised of both software and hardware. The software is comprised of the
Universal Cisco Internet Operating System (IOS) XE software image Release IOS-XE
17.15. The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches that comprise
the TOE have common hardware characteristics. These characteristics affect only non-TSF
relevant functions of the switches (such as throughput and amount of storage) and therefore
support security equivalency of the switches in terms of hardware. The Cisco Catalyst
Industrial Ethernet IE9300 Rugged Series Switches primary features include the following:
• Central processor that supports all system operations.
• Full Gigabit Ethernet switch:
o Total of 28 Gigabit Ethernet ports provide multiple resilient design options
o Provides secure access for new high-speed applications in the industrial space
• Memory:
o 4-GB DRAM
o 8-GB onboard flash memory
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• Available Interfaces:
o USB 2.0 (all models)
o RS-232 (via RJ-45) and 1 Micro USB Console Interfaces (all models)
▪ Note: an RJ-45-to-DB-9 adapter cable is supplied to be used to
connect the console port of the switch to a console PC.
o IE-9310-26S2C, IE-9320-26S2C
▪ 22 100/1000M SFP fiber ports
▪ 2 Combo (100/1000M SFP, 10/100/1000M RJ-45) ports
▪ 4 1G SFP fiber ports
o IE-9320-22S2C4X
▪ 22 100/1000M SFP fiber ports
▪ 2 Combo (100/1000M SFP, 10/100/1000M RJ-45) ports
▪ 4 1/10G SFP+ fiber ports
o IE-9320-24P4S
▪ 24 10/100/1000M RJ-45 PoE+
▪ 4 1G SFP fiber ports
o IE-9320-24T4X
▪ 24 10/100/1000M RJ-45
▪ 4 1/10G SFP+ fiber ports
o IE-9320-24P4X
▪ 24 10/100/1000M RJ-45 PoE+
▪ 4 1/10G SFP+ fiber ports
o IE-9320-16P8U4X
▪ 16 10/100/1000M PoE+
▪ 8 Combo (100/1000/2500M 4PPoE)
▪ 4 1/10G SFP+ fiber ports
Cisco IOS-XE is a Cisco-developed highly configurable proprietary operating system that
provides for efficient and effective routing and switching. Although IOS-XE performs
many networking functions, this TOE only addresses the functions that provide for the
security of the TOE itself as described in Section 4 below.
3.4 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the switch models.
The network on which they reside is considered part of the environment. The software is
pre-installed and is comprised of the Cisco IOS-XE software image Release 17.15. In
addition, the software image is also downloadable from the Cisco web site. A login id and
password are required to download the software image.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
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3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The Cisco Catalyst IE9300 Rugged Series Switches provide extensive auditing capabilities.
The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations.
For each event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the
subject identity, and the outcome of the event.
The TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to an external syslog server.
Communication with the syslog server is protected using IPsec and the TOE can determine
when communication with the syslog server fails. If that should occur, the TOE will store
all audit records locally and when the connection to the remote syslog server is restored, all
stored audit records will be transmitted to the remote syslog server.
The TOE also internally stores audit records in a circular log file where the oldest audit
records are overwritten when the audit trail becomes full. The audit logs can be viewed on
the TOE using the appropriate IOS-XE 17.15 commands. The records include the date/time
the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the event, and
additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The TOE does not have
an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available for the
Authorized Administrator to clear audit data stored locally on the TOE.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides the cryptography to support all security functions. All algorithms
claimed have Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates.
The TOE leverages the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M), firmware version
Rel5a (CAVP cert. #A1462).
The TOE supports MACsec using the proprietary UAPD MSC MACsec embedded in
ASICs v1.1 (CAVP Cert. #4848).
The TOE provides cryptographic support for IPsec, which is used to secure the session
between the TOE and the audit server. The TOE authenticates and encrypts packets
between itself and a MACsec peer. The MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) Protocol
provides the required session keys and manages the required encryption keys to protect
data exchanged by the peers.
Refer to the ST for detailed information on the mapping of certificates and cryptographic
methods to TOE functionality.
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4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote
device (TOE peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE.
Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted
peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other.
Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The IKE
phase authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and
authentication server and between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the
Identification and Authentication security functionality of the TOE.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s
secure Command Line Interface (CLI) Administrator interface. The TOE requires
Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the
management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password
length of 15 characters as well as mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE provides
Administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication
can be performed on the local serial console or SSHv2 interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also
supports authentication using SSH keys.
The TOE also provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and
enters invalid information. When the threshold for a defined number of failed
authentication attempts has exceeded the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked
out until an Authorized Administrator can reenable the user account.
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for
IPsec connections.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration
occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local serial console connection. The
TOE provides the ability to securely manage:
• Administration of the TOE locally and remotely
• Configuration of warning and consent access banners
• Configuration of session inactivity thresholds
• Updates of the TOE software
• Configuration of authentication failures
• Configuration of the audit functions of the TOE
• Configuration of the TOE provided services
• Configuration of the cryptographic functionality of the TOE
• Generate, install, and manage Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
• Manage the Key Server, Connectivity Association Key (CAK) and MKA participants
• Configure lockout time interval for excessive authentication failures
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The TOE supports two separate Administrator roles: non-privileged Administrator and
privileged Administrator. Only the privileged Administrator can perform the above security
relevant management functions. The privileged Administrator is the Authorized
Administrator of the TOE who can enable, disable, determine, and modify the behaviour of
the security functions of the TOE as described in this document.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized
Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
Additionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco
IOS-XE memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XE functions.
The TOE can verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the
TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.
The TOE detects replay of information received via secure channels (MACsec). The
detection is applied to network packets that terminate at the TOE, such as trusted
communications between the TOE and an IT entity (e.g., MACsec peer). If replay is detected,
the packets are discarded.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time information is used as
the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. The TOE provides the
Authorized Administrators the capability to update the TOE’s clock manually to maintain a
reliable timestamp.
Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the TOE itself and that of the
cryptographic module.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable
time-period. Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate
to establish a new session.
The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI
management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE allows a trusted path to be established to itself from remote Administrators over
SSHv2 and initiates outbound IPsec trusted channels to transmit audit messages to remote
syslog servers. In addition, IPsec is used as a trusted channel between the TOE and the remote
authentication servers.
The TOE supports MACsec secured trusted channels between itself and MACsec peers.
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5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December
2023 (NDcPP30e)
• PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 2 March 2023
(MACsec10)
• Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (SSH10)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP30e/MACsec10/SSH10
should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
Clarification of scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP30e/MACsec10/SSH10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other
functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices with
the MACsec PP-Module and SSH Package and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Network Device, MACsec Ethernet Encryption models was not included in the scope
of the evaluation and should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the
device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP30e/MACsec10/SSH10 and applicable
Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the
TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE
17.15 CC Configuration Guide, Version 0.3, September 26, 2025
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Cisco
Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.15, Version
0.2, September 29, 2025 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report
(AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP30e/MACsec10/SSH10 including the tests
associated with optional requirements. The Independent Testing activity is documented in
the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration
This section briefly identifies the evaluated configuration(s) and any excluded and out of
scope functionality.
8.1 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluation includes the following hardware models:
• IE-9310-26S2C
• IE-9320-26S2C
• IE-9320-22S2C4X
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• IE-9320-24T4X
• IE-9320-24P4X
• IE-9320-24P4S
• IE-9320-16P8U4X
8.2 Excluded Functionality
The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation.
Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of operation This mode of operation includes non-FIPS allowed operations
Telnet Telnet sends authentication data in plain text. This feature must remain disabled in
the evaluated configuration. SSHv2 must be used to secure the trusted path for
remote administration for all SSHv2 sessions.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) TLS is not associated with Security Functional Requirements claimed in [NDcPP] IPsec
is used instead.
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Remote Management is performed using SSH
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
(HTTPS)
Remote Management is performed using SSH
TOE Peer (Conditional) If the remote syslog server is directly connected to the TOE for the TOE’s use, then the
TOE Peer is not required.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Cisco Catalyst
Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.15 TOE to be Part 2
extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the NDcPP30e/MACsec10/SSH10.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300
Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.15 products that are consistent with the
Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
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was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP30e/MACsec10/SSH10 related to
the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP30e/MACsec10/SSH10 and recorded
the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
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was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluation team performed a public search against the following sources to ensure
there are no publicly known and exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE:
• National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search, ref NVD)
• MITRE CVE Database, National Vulnerability Database, and CVE details
(https://www.cve.org/, https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search, and
https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-search.php, ref CVE),
• Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/, ref VND),
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities, ref Rapid7)
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories, ref ZDI)
• Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search, ref TEN)
• Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/, ref EDB
The search was performed most recently on September 15, 2025 and conducted with the
following search terms:: “IC2M”, “IOS Common Cryptographic Module”, “Unified Access
Data Plane”, “UADP”, “Cisco Catalyst”, “IOS-XE 17.15”, “Cisco IOS XE 17.15”,
“MACsec”, “MACsec Controller”, “MSC”, “IE-9310-26S2C”, “IE-9320-26S2C”, “IE-
9320-22S2C4X”, “IE-9320-24T4X”, “IE-9320-24P4X”, “IE-9320-24P4S”, “IE-9320-
16P8U4X”, “ARM Cortex-A53”, “ARMv8 Cortex A53”.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Cisco Catalyst Industrial
Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.15 CC Configuration Guide,
Version 0.3, September 15, 2025. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated
functionality is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the
ST, and the only evaluated functionality was that which was described by the SFRs claimed
in the ST. All other functionality provided by the TOE needs to be assessed separately and
no further conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness.
Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated
configuration is established and maintained. It is important to note the excluded functionality
listed in Section 8.2 and follow the configuration instructions to ensure that this functionality
is disabled.
Evaluation activities are strictly bound by the assurance activities described in the
CFG_NDcPP-MACsec_V2.0 and accompanying Supporting Documents. Consumers and
integrators of this TOE are advised to understand the inherent limitations of these activities
and take additional measures as needed to ensure proper TOE behavior when integrated into
an operational environment.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series
Switches running IOS-XE 17.15 Security Target, Version 1.0, October 1, 2025.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
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technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, 06 December
2023 (NDcPP30e).
[5] PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 2 March 2023
(MACsec10).
[6] Functional Package for SSH, Version 1.0, 13 May 2021 (SSH10).
[7] Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE
17.15 Security Target, Version 1.0, October 1, 2025 (ST).
[8] Assurance Activity Report for Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series
Switches running IOS-XE 17.15, Version 0.3, October 1, 2025 (AAR).
[9] Detailed Test Report for Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged Series
Switches running IOS-XE 17.15, Version 0.2, September 29, 2025 (DTR).
[10] Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 9300 Rugged
Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.15, Version 1.0, October 1, 2025 (ETR).