Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client
v4.6.3 Security Target
Version 2.1
04 April 2024
Enveil
6000 Headquarters Drive,
Suite 600
Plano, Texas 75024
www.enveil.com
2400 Research Blvd
Suite 395
Rockville, MD 20850
www.acumensecurity.net
Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client v4.6.3 Security Target Version v2.1, 04 April 2024
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................1
1.1 Security Target and TOE Reference ..........................................................................................1
1.2 TOE Overview ..........................................................................................................................1
1.3 TOE Description .......................................................................................................................2
1.3.1 Evaluated Configuration .....................................................................................................2
1.3.2 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................................2
1.3.3 Logical Boundaries..............................................................................................................4
1.3.4 TOE Documentation ...........................................................................................................5
1.3.5 Product Functionality not Included in the Scope of the Evaluation......................................5
2 Conformance Claims........................................................................................................................7
2.1 CC Conformance ......................................................................................................................7
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance ...............................................................................................7
2.3 Conformance Rationale............................................................................................................7
2.3.1 Technical Decisions.............................................................................................................8
3 Security Problem Definition ...........................................................................................................10
3.1 Threats...................................................................................................................................10
3.2 Assumptions ..........................................................................................................................10
3.3 Organizational Security Policies..............................................................................................10
4 Security Objectives ........................................................................................................................11
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ..............................................................................................11
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.............................................................11
5 Security Requirements...................................................................................................................13
5.1 Extended Requirements.........................................................................................................13
5.2 Conventions...........................................................................................................................14
5.3 Security Functional Requirements..........................................................................................14
5.3.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS).............................................................................................15
5.3.2 User Data Protection (FDP)...............................................................................................20
5.3.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA) .............................................................................21
5.3.4 Security Management (FMT) ............................................................................................22
5.3.5 Privacy (FPR).....................................................................................................................22
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5.3.6 Protection of TSF (FPT) .....................................................................................................23
5.3.7 Trusted Path/Channel (FTP)..............................................................................................24
5.4 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs..............................................................................25
5.5 Security Assurance Requirements ..........................................................................................25
5.6 Rationale for Security Assurance Requirements .....................................................................25
6 TOE Summary................................................................................................................................26
6.1 TOE Summary Specification....................................................................................................26
6.2 CAVP Certificates ...................................................................................................................33
7 Acronyms and Abbreviations .........................................................................................................35
Appendix A............................................................................................................................................37
Appendix B............................................................................................................................................46
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Representative TOE Deployment...............................................................................................2
Figure 2: ZeroReveal Client Host..............................................................................................................4
Table of Tables
Table 1: TOE and ST Identification ...........................................................................................................1
Table 2: Hardware and Software Environmental Components .................................................................2
Table 3: Provided Cryptography...............................................................................................................4
Table 4: Application Technical Decisions..................................................................................................8
Table 5: Threats.....................................................................................................................................10
Table 6: Assumptions ............................................................................................................................10
Table 7: Security Objectives...................................................................................................................11
Table 8: Objectives for the Operational Environment ............................................................................12
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Table 9: SFRs .........................................................................................................................................14
Table 10: Security Assurance Requirements...........................................................................................25
Table 11: TOE Summary Specification....................................................................................................26
Table 12: CAVP Algorithm Testing..........................................................................................................33
Table 13: Acronyms and abbreviations ..................................................................................................35
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Revision History
Version Date Description
0.1 03.15.2023 Initial Draft
1.2 04.19.2023 Mods per customer.
1.3 06.15.2023 Added TD0736.
1.4 08.18.2023 Added TDs
1.5 01.21.2024 Revisions
1.6 02.15.2024 Revisions
2.0 02.20.2024 Revisions
2.1 04.04.2024 Addressed ECRs
Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client v4.6.3 Security Target Version v2.1, 04 April 2024
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1 Introduction
The Security Target (ST) serves as the basis for the Common Criteria (CC) evaluation and identifies the
Target of Evaluation (TOE), the scope of the evaluation, and the assumptions made throughout. This
document will also describe the intended operational environment of the TOE, and the functional and
assurance requirements that the TOE meets.
1.1 Security Target and TOE Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.
Table 1: TOE and ST Identification
Category Identifier
ST Title Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client v4.6.3 Security Target
ST Version 2.1
ST Date 04 April 2024
ST Author Acumen Security, LLC.
TOE Identifier Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client v4.6.3
TOE Software Version 4.6.3
TOE Developer Enveil
Key Words Enveil, ZeroReveal, APP_PP, TLS_PKG
1.2 TOE Overview
The TOE is the Enveil ZeroReveal Compute Fabric Client (otherwise referred to as the ZeroReveal Client or
the TOE) software application which communicates to one or more instances of the Enveil ZeroReveal
Compute Fabric Client software application via REST API over mutually authenticated HTTPS over TLS.
The TOE is a homomorphic encryption engine for database queries. In normal database operation, a query
is submitted in plain text, and a plain text answer retrieved for the querier. While the communication
between the querier and the database engine itself may be transmitted through a tunnel such as IPsec,
TLS, or SSH, the contents of the query are always in plaintext. The ZeroReveal Compute Fabric Client takes
an authenticated user’s database query and encrypts it using Enveil’s proprietary homomorphic
encryption process. This encrypted query is passed via a mutually authenticated TLS trusted channel from
ZeroReveal Client to ZeroReveal Server. The encrypted query is never decrypted during this process,
which prevents ZeroReveal Server and its owners/administrators from being able to tell what the query
was searching for and what items in the database (if any) matched the query. The output of this process
is an encrypted response that is sent back to ZeroReveal Client. In this way, the database itself is not
strictly aware of what the query was and no individual point in the chain between the user and the
information know what was requested.
The ZeroReveal Client (the TOE) and ZeroReveal Server are evaluated separately as software applications
only and the homomorphic encryption techniques used for the ZeroReveal Client and ZeroReveal Server
operations are outside the scope this evaluation.
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1.3 TOE Description
1.3.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE has been evaluated on the following host platform:
 Rocky Linux 8.7 with SELinux on Intel Core i7-10710U (Comet Lake)
1.3.2 Physical Boundaries
The diagram below depicts a representative TOE deployment.
Figure 1: Representative TOE Deployment
The following items are required for the operational environment.
Table 2: Hardware and Software Environmental Components
Components
Mandatory/
Optional
Description
Hardware
Enveil ZeroReveal
Compute Fabric Client
4.6.3 Host
Mandatory The hardware running the TOE. The client platform must include
OpenJDK and Rocky Linux operating system installed.
Local Access Mandatory Local access to the ZeroReveal Client platform that enables an
administrator to modify configuration files using a text editor and read
log files. Access is via the local keyboard.
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Components
Mandatory/
Optional
Description
Enveil ZeroReveal®
Compute Fabric Server
4.6.3 software and
host platform
Mandatory The Enveil ZeroReveal Server application which communicates with
the ZeroReveal Client to process data queries. The TOE communicates
with the ZeroReveal Server by sending REST API commands using
HTTPS over TLS.
LDAP Server Mandatory LDAP is used for external authentication and identification of users.
The TOE communicates with an LDAP Server using TLS.
REST API User
Workstation
Optional* A user workstation which must support a REST API application used to
communicate to the TOE using REST API over HTTPS over TLS.
Web GUI User
Workstation
Optional* A user workstation which must support a browser used to
communicate with the TOE using HTTPS over TLS.
Software
Rocky Linux 8.7 with
SELinux OS
Mandatory The operating system installed on the TOE’s host.
OpenJDK 8 Mandatory Java Platform that includes the Java Runtime Environment (JRE)
installed on the TOE’s host.
*Note: One of the workstations must exist in the TOE Environment.
The TOE is the ZeroReveal Compute Fabric Client software that includes the following libraries:
 Java JSSE Library v8
 Bouncy Castle FIPS Provider v1.0.2.3
 Bouncy Castle FIPS TLS Provider v1.0.12.3
 GMP Library v6.2.0
 SEAL Homomorphic Encryption Library v3.7.2.0
Additionally, the TOE boundary includes configuration files that include key strings that must be
completed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration. The configuration files are modified by
administrators and are accessed using the local keyboard.
The TOE’s operational environment requires the TOE platform to have:
 Rocky Linux 8.7 with SELinux OS installed and running and
 OpenJDK 8 JRE installed.
The following diagram depicts the TOE and the Operational Environment of the ZeroReveal Compute
Fabric Client Host.
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Figure 2: ZeroReveal Client Host
1.3.3 Logical Boundaries
The TOE provides the security functions required by the Protection Profile for Application Software,
Version 1.4 and the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1.
1.3.3.1 Cryptographic Support
The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described below.
Table 3: Provided Cryptography
Cryptographic
Method
Use within the TOE
AES-GCM TLS encryption
ECDSA TLS key generation, signature generation and verification
RSA TLS key generation, signature generation and verification
HMAC Message integrity and authentication for TLS
AES-CCM Storage of credentials
DRBG Random bit generation for all cryptographic functions
Each of these cryptographic algorithms have been validated for conformance to the requirements
specified in their respective standards (refer to Table 12).
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1.3.3.2 User Data Protection
The ZeroReveal Client network communication is restricted to user-initiated communication for
authentication via LDAP directory, responses to API requests, and initiation of communications with the
ZeroReveal Server.
1.3.3.3 Identification and Authentication
The ZeroReveal Client relies on X.509v3 certificate validation functions provided by the platform to
authenticate the certificate(s) during the establishment of the TLS trusted channel. All trusted paths and
channels are first authenticated using X.509v3 certificates.
Individual users are authenticated to the TOE by X.509v3 certificate during TLS with mutual authentication
trusted channel establishment and by authentication via LDAP server (the first shows that the user is
authorized to communicate with the TOE at all, the secondshows that the user is authorized to run queries
using the TOE).
1.3.3.4 Security Management
Administrators manages the TOE via configuration files on each installation platform. The access interface
and file editor used to modify the files is outside the scope of the TOE.
The TOE does not include any predefined or default credentials and utilizes the platform recommended
storage process for configuration files.
1.3.3.5 Privacy
The TOE does not collect or transmit Personally Identifiable Information (PII) over the network.
1.3.3.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE leverages platform provided package management for secure installation and updates. The TOE
installation package includes only those third-party libraries necessary for its intended operation. The
TOE utilizes compiler-provided anti-exploitation capabilities.
1.3.3.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE communicates to the ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server via REST API over mutually
authenticated HTTPS over TLS. The TOE communicates to the LDAP server via mutually authenticated TLS.
Users communicate with the TOE by running a REST API application and sending REST API commands over
HTTPS over TLS or using a browser and communicating using HTTPS over TLS.
1.3.4 TOE Documentation
● Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Configuration Guide for Common Criteria v3.1, Version 4.6.3.
1.3.5 Product Functionality not Included in the Scope of the Evaluation.
The TOE is a software application, and as such many of the functions of the application itself are out of
scope of a Common Criteria Evaluation. The following functionality is explicitly excluded from the scope
of evaluation; it was not evaluated during the common criteria evaluation, and no claims are made
regarding the applicability, suitability, or functionality of the following TOE functions:
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 The homomorphic encryption process, including the algorithms, uses and the security strength of
the resultant ciphertext.
 The user interface to modify the local configuration files.
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance
This TOE is conformant to:
● Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017: Part 2 extended.
● Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 2: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017: Part 3 extended.
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance
This ST and the TOE it describes claim exact conformance to the following CC specifications:
● Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 07 October 2021 [AppPP] with the
following optional and selection based SFRs.
o FCS_CKM.1/AK
o FCS_CKM.1/SK
o FCS_CKM.2
o FCS_COP.1/Hash
o FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
o FCS_COP.1/Sig
o FCS_COP.1/SKC
o FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client
o FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server
o FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2
o FCS_RBG_EXT.2
o FIA_X509_EXT.1
o FIA_X509_EXT.2
o FPT_TUD_EXT.2
● Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019 [TLSPkg]
with the following optional and selection based SFRs:
o FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
o FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
o FCS_TLSC_EXT.3
o FCS_TLSC_EXT.5
o FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
o FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
o FCS_TLSS_EXT.3
2.3 Conformance Rationale
This Security Target provides exact conformance to Version 1.4 of the Protection Profile for Application
Software and Version 1.1 of the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS). The security
problem definition and security objectives in this Security Target are taken from the Protection Profile
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unmodified. The security requirements in this Security Target are all taken from the Protection Profile and
Functional Package performing only operations defined there.
The security requirements in this Security Target are all taken from the Protection Profile and Functional
Package performing only operations defined there. All mandatory SFRs are claimed. The [AppPP] and
[TLSPkg] Selection-Based SFRs are claimed and are consistent with the selections made in the mandatory
SFRs that prompt their inclusion. Additionally, the [AppPP]’s optional FCS_CKM.1/SK SFR is claimed and
the [TLSPkg]’s objective SFR FCS_TLSS_EXT.3 is claimed.
2.3.1 Technical Decisions
The following table identifies the NIAP Technical Decisions that apply to the TOE and have been
accounted for in the ST development and the conduct of the evaluation or were considered to be non-
applicable.
Table 4: Application Technical Decisions
Identifier Applicable Notes and Exclusion Rationale (if
applicable)
App PP
TD0815: Addition of Conditional TSS Activity for
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5.
Yes Applies to AA only.
TD0798: Static Memory Mapping Exceptions Yes Applies to Test and AA only.
TD0780: FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4 Clarification Yes Applies to Test only.
Archives TD0669.
TD0756: Update for platform-provided full disk
encryption
Yes Applies to Test only.
TD0747: Configuration Storage Option for Android Yes The TOE does not run on Android systems
however, the TD applies because it
archived an APP PP 1.4 TD.
Applies to Test only.
Archives TD0624
TD0743: FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 Selection exclusivity Yes Archives TD0655.
TD0736: Number of elements for iterations of
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
Yes Archives TD0709.
TD0719: ECD for PP APP V1.3 and V1.4 Yes
TD0717: Format changes for PP_APP_V1.4 Yes Archives TD0659 and TD0626.
Applies to SFRs, Test, and AA.
TD0664: Testing activity for FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 Yes Applies to Test only.
TD0650: Conformance claim sections updated to
allow for MOD_VPNC_V2.3 and 2.4
No VPN configuration is not claimed for the
TOE.
TD0628: Addition of Container Image to Package
Format
Yes Applies to SFR and Test.
TLS Package
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Identifier Applicable Notes and Exclusion Rationale (if
applicable)
TD0779: Updated Session Resumption Support in TLS
package V1.1.
Yes Archives TD0588.
TD0770: TLSS.2 connection with no client cert Yes Applies to SFR, Tests, and AA.
TD0739: PKG_TLS_V1.1 has 2 different publication
dates
Yes Applies to Test only.
TD0726: Correction to (D) TLSS SFRs in TLS 1.1 FP Yes
TD0513: CA Certificate Loading Yes Applies to Test only.
TD0499: Testing with Pinned certificates Yes Applies to Test only.
TD0469: Modification of test activity for
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 test 4.1
Yes Applies to Test only.
TD0442: TLS Ciphersuites for TLS Package Yes
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3 Security Problem Definition
The security problem definition has been taken from [AppPP] and is reproduced here for the convenience
of the reader. The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the TOE is expected to
address, assumptions about the operational environment, and any organizational security policies that
the TOE is expected to enforce.
3.1 Threats
The following threats are drawn directly from the [AppPP].
Table 5: Threats
ID Threat
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with the
application software or alter communications between the application software and
other endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged
between the application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing platform
on which the application executes. Attackers may provide maliciously formatted
input to the application in the form of files or other local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
3.2 Assumptions
The following assumptions are drawn directly from the [AppPP].
Table 6: Assumptions
ID Assumption
A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for
its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime
environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the
software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software in compliance with the applied enterprise
security policy.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no OSPs for the application.
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4 Security Objectives
The security objectives have been taken from [AppPP] and are reproduced here for the convenience of
the reader.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The following security objectives for the TOE were drawn directly from the [AppPP].
Table 7: Security Objectives
ID TOE Objective
O.INTEGRITY Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their installation and update packages, and
also leverage execution environment-based mitigations. Software is seldom, if ever,
shipped without errors. The ability to deploy patches and updates to fielded
software with integrity is critical to enterprise network security. Processor
manufacturers, compiler developers, execution environment vendors, and
operating system vendors have developed execution environment-based
mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of
compromising systems. Application software can often take advantage of these
mechanisms by using APIs provided by the runtime environment or by enabling the
mechanism through compiler or linker options.
O.QUALITY To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs leverage services and APIs
provided by the runtime environment rather than implementing their own versions
of these services and APIs. This is especially important for cryptographic services
and other complex operations such as file and media parsing. Leveraging this
platform behavior relies upon using only documented and supported APIs.
O.MANAGEMENT To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant TOEs provide
consistent and supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and
maintenance. This includes the deployment of applications and application updates
through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and formats, as
well as providing mechanisms for configuration. This also includes providing control
to the user regarding disclosure of any PII.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in the event of loss of
physical control of the storage medium, conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest
protection. This involves encrypting data and keys stored by the TOE in order to
prevent unauthorized access to this data. This also includes unnecessary network
communications whose consequence may be the loss of data.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network
attack threats, conformant TOEs will use a trusted channel for sensitive data.
Sensitive data includes cryptographic keys, passwords, and any other data specific
to the application that should not be exposed outside of the application.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The following security objectives for the operational environment assist the TOE in correctly providing its
security functionality. These track with the assumptions about the environment.
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Table 8: Objectives for the Operational Environment
ID Objective for the Operation Environment
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This
includes the underlying operating system and any discrete execution environment
provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses
the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software within compliance of the applied enterprise
security policy.
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5 Security Requirements
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) for the TOE. The Security Functional
Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, the Protection Profile for Application Software,
Version 1.4, and the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1 and all international
interpretations.
5.1 Extended Requirements
All the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the [AppPP] or [TLSPkg] and are itemized
below. This document defines the extended SFRs; since they have not been redefined in this ST, the
[PP_APP] or [PKG_TLS] should be consulted for more information regarding these extensions to CC Parts
2 and 3.
Extended requirements from the [AppPP].
 FCS_CKM_EXT.1
 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client
 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server
 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2
 FCS_RBG_EXT.1
 FCS_RBG_EXT.2
 FCS_STO_EXT.1
 FCS_TLS_EXT.1
 FDP_DAR_EXT.1
 FDP_DEC_EXT.1
 FDP_NET_EXT.1
 FIA_X509_EXT.1
 FIA_X509_EXT.2
 FMT_CFG_EXT.1
 FMT_MEC_EXT.1
 FPR_ANO_EXT.1
 FPT_AEX_EXT.1
 FPT_API_EXT.1
 FPT_IDV_EXT.1
 FPT_LIB_EXT.1
 FPT_TUD_EXT.1
 FPT_TUD_EXT.2
 FTP_DIT_EXT.1
Extended requirements from the [TLSPkg].
 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
 FCS_TLSC_EXT.3
 FCS_TLSC_EXT.5
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 FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
 FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
 FCS_TLSS_EXT.3
5.2 Conventions
The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections, assignments
within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font conventions to identify the
operations defined by the CC.
● Assignment: Indicated with italicized text.
● Selection: Indicated with underlined text.
● Refinement: Indicated with bold text for additions and strike-through for deletions.
● Iteration: Indicated by a slash followed by a descriptor for the purpose of the iteration. For
example, FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client indicates that the FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 requirement applies
specifically to HTTPS client functionality.
● The ST does not show operations that have been completed by the PP authors, though it does
preserve brackets to show where such operations have been made.
● The ST does not retain the formatting conventions of the PPs.
5.3 Security Functional Requirements
Table 9: SFRs
Requirement Description
FCS_CKM_EXT.11
Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1/SK Cryptographic Symmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation - Hashing
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation - Signing
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client HTTPS Protocol for the Client
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server HTTP Protocol for the Server
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 HTTPS Protocol with Mutual Authentication
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
1
Applied TD0717 renaming FCS_CKM.1 to FCS_CKM_EXT.1.
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Requirement Description
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.3 TLS Client Support for Signature Algorithms Extension
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSS_EXT.3 TLS Server Support for Signature Algorithms Extension
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
5.3.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM_EXT.12
Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.13
The application shall [implement asymmetric key generation].
FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/AK4
The application shall [implement functionality] to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [
2
The SFR was renamed per TD0717 ([AppPP]).
3
The SFR was renamed per TD0717 ([AppPP]).
4
Applied TD0717 ([AppPP]).
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● [RSA schemes] using cryptographic key sizes of [2048 bits and 3072-bits5
or greater] that meet
the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3],
● [ECC schemes] using [“NIST curves” P-384 and [P-256]] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4,
“Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4]
].
FCS_CKM.1/SK Cryptographic Symmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/SK
The application shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random Bit Generator as specified
in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bit].
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1
The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key establishment in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: [
● [Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meets the following: [NIST Special
Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”]
].
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation - Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash6
The application shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [
● SHA-256,
• SHA-384,
• SHA-512,
] and message digest sizes [
• 256,
• 384,
• 512,
] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 180-4].
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash7
The application shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [
5
Applied CSfC selection (v11.3.2022).
6
Applied TD0717 ([AppPP]).
7
Applied TD0717 ([AppPP]).
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● HMAC-SHA-256,
● HMAC-SHA-384,
● HMAC-SHA-512,
] and [
● no other algorithms
] with key sizes [256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits] and message digest sizes [256, 384, 512] and [no other size]
bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 198-1, ‘The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code’ and FIPS
Pub 180-4 ‘Secure Hash Standard’].
FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing
FCS_COP.1.1/Sig8
The application shall perform [cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [2048-bit and 3072 bits or greater9
] that meet the
following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5],
• ECDSA schemes using [“NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [no other curves] that meet the
following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6]
].
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1/SKC10
The application shall perform [encryption/decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [
 AES-CCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38C) mode,
 AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D) mode
] and cryptographic key sizes [256-bit].
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client HTTPS Protocol
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1/Client
The application shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2/Client
The application shall implement HTTPS using TLS as defined in the TLS package.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3/Client
The application shall [notify the user and not establish the user-initiated connection] if the peer
certificate is deemed invalid.
8
Applied TD0717 ([AppPP]).
9
Applied CSfC selections.
10
Applied TD0717 ([AppPP]).
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FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1/Server
The application shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2/Server
The application shall implement HTTPS using TLS as defined in the TLS package.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3/Server11
The application shall [establish or not establish the connection based on an administrative or user
setting] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 HTTPS Protocol with Mutual Authentication
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2.1
The application shall [establish or not establish the connection based on an administrative or user
setting12
] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
● implement DRBG functionality
] for its cryptographic operations.
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.1
The application shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) services in accordance
with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [HMAC_DRBG (any)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from a platform-
based DRBG and [
● no other noise source
] with a minimum of [
● 256 bits
] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and
hashes that it will generate.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
● implement functionality to securely store [TLS server and client certificates and private keys]
according to [FCS_COP.1/SKC]
11
Applied TD0736 ([AppPP]) and added the element.
12
Refined based on CSfC selection (11.3.2022).
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] to non-volatile memory.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1
The product shall implement [
● TLS as a client,
● TLS as a server
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.113
The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a client that supports
the cipher suites [
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
] and also supports functionality for [mutual authentication].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The product shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC
6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid [with no exceptions].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1
The product shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.3 TLS Client Support for Signature Algorithms Extension
FCS_TLSC_EXT.3.1
The product shall present the signature_algorithms extension in the Client Hello with the
supported_signature_algorithms value containing the following hash algorithms: [SHA384, SHA512] and
no other hash algorithms.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5.1
The product shall present the Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello with the supported groups
[secp384r1].
13
Applied TD0442.
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FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.114 15
The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a server that supports
the cipher suites [
● TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
● TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
] and no other cipher suites, and also supports functionality for [
● mutual authentication,
● session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC 4346 (TLS1.1) or RFC 5246 (TLS
1.2)
].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2
The product shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 and [TLS 1.1].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.316
The product shall perform key establishment for TLS using [ECDHE parameters using elliptic curves [
secp384r1] and no other curves].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.1
The product shall support authentication of TLS clients using X.509v3 certificates.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.217
The product shall [not establish a trusted channel] if the client certificate is invalid.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.3
The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the Distinguished Name (DN) or Subject Alternative
Name (SAN) contained in a certificate does not match one of the expected identifiers for the client.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.3 TLS Server Support for Signature Algorithms Extension
FCS_TLSS_EXT.3.1
The product shall present the HashAlgorithm enumeration in supported_signature_algorithms in the
Certificate Request with the following hash algorithms: [SHA256, SHA384] and no other hash algorithms.
5.3.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
14
Applied TD0442.
15
Applied TD0588.
16
Applied TD0726.
17
Applied TD0770.
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● leverage platform-provided functionality to encrypt sensitive data,
● protect sensitive data in accordance with FCS_STO_EXT.1
] in non-volatile memory.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict its access to [network connectivity].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2
The application shall restrict its access to [[no sensitive information repositories]].
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict network communication to [
● respond to [REST API requests from external clients, Web UI interactions],
● [initiate communication to LDAP Server, Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Server]
] .
5.3.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
The application shall [implement functionality] to validate certificates in accordance with the following
rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
• The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints
extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are
met.
• The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage
field.
• The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [
o CRL as specified in RFC 8603 Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
]
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have
the Code Signing Purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1
with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2
with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email
Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
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o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9
with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose
(id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is
present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for
[HTTPS, TLS].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the
application shall [allow the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate in these cases].
5.3.4 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1
The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured with
default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2
The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application
binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and
setting configuration options].
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [no management
functions].
5.3.5 Privacy (FPR)
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1
The application shall [not transmit PII over a network].
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5.3.6 Protection of TSF (FPT)
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no exceptions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2
The application shall [allocate memory regions with write and execute permissions for only [Java
runtime performing just-in-time compilation]].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4
The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless
explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1
The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1
The application shall be versioned with [[major_version.minor_version.patch number]].
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1
The application shall be packaged with only [
 Java JSSE Library v8
 Bouncy Castle FIPS Provider v1.0.2.3
 Bouncy Castle FIPS TLS Provider v1.0.12.3
 GMP Library v6.2.0
 SEAL Homomorphic Encryption Library v3.7.2.0
].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The application shall [leverage the platform] to check for updates and patches to the application
software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The application shall [leverage the platform] to query the current version of the application software.
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FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4
Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can cryptographically
verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5
The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.118
The application shall be distributed using [the format of the platform-supported package manager].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the
application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3
The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can cryptographically
verify them prior to installation.
5.3.7 Trusted Path/Channel (FTP)
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.119
The application shall [
● encrypt all transmitted [data] with [
o HTTPS as a server using mutual authentication in accordance with FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 for
[communication with a remote workstation],
o TLS as a server as defined in the Functional Package for TLS and also supports functionality
for [mutual authentication] for [communication with a remote workstation accessing the
TOE’s GUI and communication with a remote workstation sending REST API data],
o HTTPS as a client in accordance with FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client for [communication with an
Enveil ZeroReveal Server to send REST API data],
o TLS as a client as defined in the Functional Package for TLS for [communication with the
LDAP Server to resolve FQDNs and communication with an Enveil ZeroReveal Server to send
REST API over HTTPS data]
]
] between itself and another trusted IT product.
18
Applied TD0628 ([AppPP]).
19 Applied TD0743.
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5.4 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs
The Protection Profile for Application Software contains all the requirements claimed in this Security
Target. As such, the dependencies are not applicable since the PP has been approved.
5.5 Security Assurance Requirements
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from the Protection Profile for Application
Software which are derived from Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 5. The assurance requirements
are summarized in the table below.
Table 10: Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Components Components Description
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational
environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
5.6 Rationale for Security Assurance Requirements
The functional specification describes the external interfaces of the TOE, such as the means for a user to
invoke a service and the corresponding response of those services. The description includes the
interface(s) that enforces a security functional requirement, the interface(s) that supports the
enforcement of a security functional requirement, and the interface(s) that does not enforce any security
functional requirements. The interfaces are described in terms of their purpose (general goal of the
interface), method of use (how the interface is to be used), parameters (explicit inputs to and outputs
from an interface that control the behavior of that interface), parameter descriptions (tells what the
parameter is in some meaningful way), and error messages (identifies the condition that generated it,
what the message is, and the meaning of any error codes). The development evidence also contains a
tracing of the interfaces to the SFRs described in this ST.
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6 TOE Summary
6.1 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met
by the TOE.
Table 11: TOE Summary Specification
SFR Rationale
FCS_CKM_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1/AK
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_COP.1/Sig
The TOE implements ECDSA Key Generation, Signature Generation, and
Signature Verification as part of TLS trusted channel establishment. NIST
curves P-256 and P-384 are supported.
The TOE implements RSA Key Generation, Signature Generation and
Signature Verification as part of TLS trusted channel establishment. Key sizes
of 2048 and 3072-bits and greater are supported.
Key establishment for TLS is performed using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
with NIST curves P-384.
FCS_CKM.1/SK The TOE generates symmetric AES 256-bit keys for use in AES-GCM as part of
TLS and for use in AES-CCM for protection of stored credentials.
Refer to the ancillary Entropy Assessment Report for information about
entropy details.
FCS_COP.1/SKC The TOE performs encryption and decryption using AES-GCM for use in TLS
trusted channels and using AES-CCM for use as part of protecting stored
credentials.
FCS_COP.1/Hash
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
The TOE performs hashing and HMAC using:
● SHA-256, using a 512-bit block size and 256-bit message digest size as
part of digital signatures
● SHA2-384, using a 1024-bit block size and 384-bit message digest size
as part of TLS and digital signatures.
● SHA2-512, using a 1024-bit block size and 512-bit message digest size
as part of the authentication function used in key store and
certificate formatting, and as the underlying DRBG function.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client The TOE acts as an HTTPS Client when communicating to the ZeroReveal
Servers and the LDAP Servers.
The TOE implements the HTTPS protocol according to RFC 2818 by
implementing all SHALL, MUST, and SHOULD statements and by not
implementing any SHALL NOT, MUST NOT, or SHOULD NOT statements.
HTTPS is implemented using TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246).
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SFR Rationale
The TOE’s REST API interface to ZeroReveal Servers and interface to LDAP
Servers rejects a connection when a server’s certificate is invalid. If a Server’s
certificate is deemed invalid, the TOE will notify the user by writing into the
var/log/enveil/zeroreveal-client/client.log log file.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2
The TOE acts as an HTTPS Server when receiving REST API and GUI requests
from clients.
The TOE implements the HTTPS protocol according to RFC 2818 by
implementing all SHALL, MUST, and SHOULD statements and by not
implementing any SHALL NOT, MUST NOT, or SHOULD NOT statements.
HTTPS is implemented using TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246).
The TOE REST interface and GUI interface reject a connection if a User
Workstation’s certificate is invalid (mutual authentication) based on an
administrator configurable parameter and notify the user.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_RBG_EXT.2
The TOE implements HMAC_DRBG functionality to generate random bits for
use in the rest of the cryptographic functions. The TOE utilizes a platform
based DRBG as its noise source and seeds with a minimum of 256 bits of
entropy. This is achieved using the SecureRandom Java class which is
configured to use the /dev/random system device.
The CAVP details are given in Table 12.
Additional information related to entropy functionality of the TOE can be
reviewed in the Entropy Assessment Report (EAR) provided as an ancillary
document.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 TOE implements secure storage of TLS certificates and private keys used as
part of establishing the TLS trusted channel with the Enveil ZeroReveal
Server, LDAP Server, GUI Users, and REST API Users by encrypting them with
AES-CCM and storing them in /etc/enveil/zeroreveal-client/certs.
The TOE uses its Bouncy Castle cryptographic library to encrypt/decrypt.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5
FCS_COP.1/Hash
The TOE acts as a TLS client when establishing connection to LDAP directory
for authentication and when establishing connection to ZeroReveal Compute
Fabric Server for operation requests and responses.
When acting as a TLS client, the TOE supports mutual authentication using
X.509v3 certificates. The TOE’s certificate must contain the hostname or the
IP address of the TOE’s host machine as a Subject Alternative Name (SAN).
The TOE validates the presented identifier in accordance with RFC 6125, and
permits the reference identifier to be the CN, DN, or SAN-DNS. Where
present, the SAN-DNS identifier supersedes the DN or CN values. Wildcards
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SFR Rationale
are supported, only in the leftmost label of the DNS identifier (i.e.,
“*.example.server.com” but not “example.*.server.com”).
The TOE does not support certificate pinning.
When acting as a TLS client, the TOE implements TLSv1.2 and rejects all older
TLS and SSL versions, and supports the following cipher suites:
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
The TOE supports Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello with the
secp384r1 NIST curve. The supported curves are hardcoded and there are no
configuration options.
The TOE supports SHA384 and SHA512 signature hash algorithms after
having configured the TOE according to the [AGD].
The TOE performs X.509v3 certification validation. The TOE will reject trusted
channel establishment if the certificate is invalid.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.3 The TOE presents the signature_algorithm extension in the client_Hello
message with a supported_signature_algorithms value containing only the
SHA-384 and SHA-512 hash algorithms.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 The TOE implements the supported_Groups extension with groups
secp384r1 and no others.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
FCS_TLSS_EXT.3
The TOE acts as a TLS server when accepting HTTPS connection requests from
an end user.
When acting as a TLS server, the TOE supports mutual authentication using
X.509v3 certificates. The TOE validates the presented reference identifier in
accordance with RFC 6125, and permits the reference identifier to be the CN,
DN, or SAN-DNS. Where present, the SAN-DNS identifier supersedes the DN
or CN values. When acting as a server, the TOE does not accept wildcards.
When acting as a TLS server, the TOE performs ECDH key establishment using
the secp384r1 elliptic curve.
The TOE does not support certificate pinning.
When acting as a TLS server, the TOE implements TLSv1.2 and rejects all
older versions of TLS and SSL, and supports the following cipher suites:
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
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SFR Rationale
The TOE supports Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello with the
secp384r1 NIST curve. The supported curves are hardcoded and there are no
configuration options.
The TOE supports SHA256 and SHA384 signature hash algorithms.
The TOE performs X.509v3 certification validation. The TOE will reject
trusted channel establishment if the certificate is invalid.
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 The TOE protects application log files and configuration data (stored in
/var/log/enveil/zeroreveal-client/client.log,
/var/log/enveil/zeroreveal-client/stacks.log, and
/etc/enveil/zeroreveal-client/client.conf ) using Linux
filesystem encryption. The log files are considered sensitive data because the
files are very verbose and include certificate information. The configuration
file includes passwords that enable the TOE to decrypt the files using the
Linux file system.
The TOE implements secure storage of TLS certificates and private keys
(stored in /etc/enveil/zeroreveal-client/certs) in accordance with
FCS_STO_EXT.1 which uses the TOE’s Bouncy Castle cryptographic library to
encrypt with AES-CCM. The TLS certificates and private keys are encrypted
again by the Linux platform provided encryption/decryption functions.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 The TOE does not utilize any platform resources except network
functionality. The TOE does not access sensitive information repositories.
The guidance documentation identifies when the TOE requires network
connectivity.
FDP_NET_EXT.1 The TOE permits the user to initiate communication to the LDAP server using
TCP port 636 or 5636 or ZeroReveal Compute Fabric Server using TCP port
18443.
The TOE responds to authenticated REST API and GUI requests over TCP port
17443.
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SFR Rationale
FIA_X509_EXT.1 The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates to authenticate network endpoints for the
HTTPS/TLS trusted channel communications. The TOE complies with RFC
5280 by implementing all SHALL, SHOULD, and MUST statements and not
implementing any SHALL NOT, SHOULD NOT, or MUST NOT statements.
The TOE uses the Java PKIX and Bouncy Castle validation tools. The notBefore
and notAfter dates included in certificates will be checked to be before and
after the current time respectively. Certificates received as part of TLS
connections are checked for a valid path up to the certificate authority roots
(which must have the X509v3 Basic Constraint CA: True). The TOE performs all
of the required checks on trust path requirements, CA validity, key usages, and
extended key usages. In the process, it ensures certificates presented for client
authentication have the digitalSignature keyUsage and TLS Client
extendedKeyUsage.
CRL checking as specified in RFC 8603 revocation checking will be attempted
on certificates that have listed distribution points. It is a configuration option
for administrators to decide if failure to determine a certificate’s status (if
that certificate lists an endpoint and the endpoint is unreachable) should
result in certificate rejection. Enveil enables this platform-provided
functionality by adding the java.security.cert.PKIXRevocationChecker class to
the chain of X509 TrustManagers associated with TLS contexts used to form
connections.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates for TLS mutual authentication with REST
API clients, GUI clients, and connections to the ZR Server and to LDAP
servers. An administrator sets the certificate to be used for each distinct
purpose in the TOE configuration file. When presented with an invalid
certificate, the connections are rejected.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1
The TOE is not installed with default credentials.
The TOE installer package makes sure all configuration and data directories
are configured with appropriate permissions to restrict against modification
by unprivileged users.
Once the TOE has been installed, the following configuration steps must be
completed:
• Set up TLS for the TOE.
• Configure the TOE’s LDAP interaction.
• Assign the TOE client permissions in LDAP.
• Configure at least one ZeroReveal Compute Fabric Server connection.
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SFR Rationale
The TOE does not provide any functionality until an administrator provides
configuration files.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Configuration files (modifiable by a text editor) are used to manage TOE
configuration. Non-functional configuration file templates are put in place by
the installer package. Global configuration options are stored in the
/etc/enveil/zeroreveal-client directory.
The TOE invokes the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for
storing and setting configuration options.
The following parameters are required to be configured: Refer to Appendix B.
FMT_SMF.1 An enterprise manages the TOE via configuration files on each platform.
There is no management CLI, GUI, or interface to manage the TOE that is
included within the scope of the evaluation.
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 The TOE does not collect or transmit PII over a network.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 The main TOE application code is written in Java which places calls out to
native C/C++ binaries.
The Java binaries rely on the JRE for memory and stack protection, which are
compiled into the JRE used in the OE by the JRE vendor.
The two native code libraries in the TOE: SEAL and GMP.
GMP and SEAL are compiled using GCC with the required compiler flags for
ASLR (GCC CFLAG –fPIC, “Generate position-independent code”) and stack
protection (-fstackprotector-all).
The memory protections for the GMP and SEAL native code portion were
verified through static analysis. The TOE allocates memory regions with write
and execute permissions for OpenJDK Java runtime performing just-in-time
compilation.
The TOE installs data and library files to /usr/local/enveil/* and
configuration files to /etc/enveil/*. By default, the installed directories
containing user-modifiable files do not have executables in them.
FPT_API_EXT.1 Enveil only uses public APIs in the TOE. The TOE uses the Linux APIs identified
in Appendix A.
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 The TOE is versioned with version information published in the installation
guidance. The TOE versioning methodology is Major Version.Minor
Version.Patch Level.
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SFR Rationale
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 The TOE is packaged with the following libraries. No other third-party
libraries are included with the TOE.
 Java JSSE Library v8
 Bouncy Castle FIPS Provider v1.0.2.3
 Bouncy Castle FIPS TLS Provider v1.0.12.3
 GMP Library v6.2.0
 SEAL Homomorphic Encryption Library v3.7.2.0
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.2
Enveil will publish Yum repositories for updates and patches to the TOE. The
TOE relies on Yum to periodically poll the repositories for updates and notify
the user. The TOE does not check for or apply updates on its own.
The TOE relies on the platform to secure communication with the Enveil
repositories. If Enveil's repository server is not accessible over the network
from the location of the TOE (for example, if the TOE has been installed on a
machine without internet access), the enterprise will need to mirror the
repositories locally. The TOE supports packages running on Red Hat and Red
Hat derivatives in RPM format. Official Enveil RPMs are signed using Enveil’s
private signing key. When using Yum to install Enveil TOE packages, the GPG
signatures on the RPM files will automatically be checked. If they are missing
a signature or signed with the wrong GPG key, then an error indicating that
the GPG keys for the repository do not match the package will be displayed
and the install will automatically abort. These checks are also run during the
installation of every update.
The TOE records its version in the RPM package file. An administrator can
determine the current version by running the command yum info
zeroreveal-client.
The update/install packages include the required information so that the
package manager will perform removal and deletion of all traces of the
application when an uninstall command is issued through that package
manager.
The TOE is updated using the platform package manager. When Enveil
developers finish a new version of any component, they sign then upload it
to the package repositories, which make it available to users. Updates are
initiated by users via the package manager; the TOE will never download,
modify, replace or update its own binary code.
Enveil provides a changelog as part of the documentation accompanying
every update. This changelog communicates any changes to security
properties or configuration that occurred as part of the update.
Enveil provides a public-facing e-mail address (bugs@enveil.com) that users
can use to report security vulnerabilities involving any part of the TOE. This
Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client v4.6.3 Security Target Version v2.1, 04 April 2024
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SFR Rationale
address is communicated to users in the ZeroReveal Platform guide and the
Enveil website. A public PGP key is provided on the website at
https://enveil.com/bugs, which can be used to encrypt reports sent to
this e-mail.
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Users communicate with the TOE through REST interfaces via mutually
authenticated HTTP/TLS and GUI interfaces via mutually authenticated
HTTPS/TLS.
Communication between the TOE and a ZeroReveal Compute Fabric Server is
via REST over HTTPS/TLS.
The TOE communicates with an authentication server using Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) secured with TLS.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Enveil uses commercial software to automatically check for active CVEs in
any third-party dependencies, as part of its software development and
release process.
The window between public disclosure of a vulnerability and availability of a
security update on the package manager will be 14 - 90 days.
6.2 CAVP Certificates
Table 12: CAVP Algorithm Testing
Algorithm Standard Modes Supported CAVP Certificate
Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation (FCS_CKM.1/AK)
RSA KeyGen FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Appendix B.3
2048 bits and 3072
bits and greater
A4651
ECC KeyGen FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Appendix B.4
Curves P-256 and P-
384
A4651
Cryptographic Key Establishment (FCS_CKM.2)
ECDHE Key Establishment NIST SP 800-56A,
“Recommendation for Pair-
Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography”
Curves P-384 A4651
Cryptographic Operation – Hashing (FCS_COP.1/Hash)
SHA2-256 FIPS Pub 180-4 Digest size 256 bits A4651
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Algorithm Standard Modes Supported CAVP Certificate
SHA2-384 FIPS Pub 180-4 Digest size 384 bits A4651
SHA2-512 FIPS Pub 180-4 Digest size 512 bits A4651
Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication (FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash)
HMAC-SHA2-256 FIPS Pub 198-1, ‘The Keyed-
Hash Message Authentication
Code’ and FIPS Pub 180-4
‘Secure Hash Standard’
Key size 256 bits,
block size 512 bits,
digest size 256 bits
A4651
HMAC-SHA2-384 FIPS Pub 198-1, ‘The Keyed-
Hash Message Authentication
Code’ and FIPS Pub 180-4
‘Secure Hash Standard’
Key size 384 bits,
block size 512 bits,
digest size 384 bits
A4651
HMAC-SHA2-512 FIPS Pub 198-1, ‘The Keyed-
Hash Message Authentication
Code’ and FIPS Pub 180-4
‘Secure Hash Standard’
Key size 512 bits,
block size 512 bits,
digest size 512 bits
A4651
Cryptographic Operation – Signing (FCS_COP.1/Sig)
RSA FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 5.
2048-bit or greater A4651
ECDSA FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 6.
P-256, P-384, A4651
Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption (FCS_COP.1/SKC)
AES-CCM NIST SP 800-38C 256 bits A4651
AES-GCM NIST SP 800-38D 256 bits A4651
Random Bit Generation from Application (FCS_RBG_EXT.2)
HMAC_DRBG NIST SP 800-90A AES-256 A4651
Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client v4.6.3 Security Target Version v2.1, 04 April 2024
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7 Acronyms and Abbreviations
The acronyms and abbreviations used in this document are defined below.
Table 13: Acronyms and abbreviations
Acronym Definition
AppPP Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CA Certification Authority
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CC Common Criteria
CLI Command Line Interface
CM Configuration Management
CN Common Name
CTR Counter-Mode
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EC Elliptic Curve
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EP Extended Package
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name
JDK Java Development Kit
JRE Java Runtime Environment
JSSE Java Secure Socket Extension
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GMP GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic
GNU GNU’s Not Unix
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol Security
IP Internet Protocol
ISO International Standards Organization
LAN Local Area Network
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client v4.6.3 Security Target Version v2.1, 04 April 2024
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Acronym Definition
OID Object Identifier
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
REST Representational State Transfer
RFC Request For Comments
RSA Rivest, Shamir & Adleman
SAN Subject Alternate Name
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SEAL Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell Protocol
ST Security Target
TD Technical Decision
TLS Transport Layer Security
TLSPkg Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1
TOE Target of Evaluation
YUM Yellowdog Updater Modified
Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client v4.6.3 Security Target Version v2.1, 04 April 2024
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Appendix A
Enveil only uses public APIs in the TOE. The TOE uses the following Linux APIs:
java.awt.geom.Point2D
java.beans.PropertyVetoException
java.io.BufferedInputStream
java.io.BufferedOutputStream
java.io.BufferedReader
java.io.BufferedWriter
java.io.ByteArrayInputStream
java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
java.io.DataInputStream
java.io.DataOutputStream
java.io.EOFException
java.io.Externalizable
java.io.File
java.io.FileInputStream
java.io.FileNotFoundException
java.io.FileOutputStream
java.io.FileReader
java.io.FileWriter
java.io.FilterInputStream
java.io.IOException
java.io.InputStream
java.io.InputStreamReader
java.io.ObjectInput
java.io.ObjectInputStream
java.io.ObjectOutput
java.io.ObjectOutputStream
java.io.ObjectStreamException
java.io.OutputStream
java.io.OutputStreamWriter
java.io.PipedInputStream
java.io.PipedOutputStream
java.io.PrintWriter
java.io.Reader
java.io.SequenceInputStream
java.io.Serializable
java.io.StringWriter
java.io.UnsupportedEncodingException
java.io.Writer
java.lang.annotation.Annotation
java.lang.annotation.ElementType
java.lang.annotation.Inherited
java.lang.annotation.Repeatable
Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client v4.6.3 Security Target Version v2.1, 04 April 2024
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java.lang.annotation.Retention
java.lang.annotation.RetentionPolicy
java.lang.annotation.Target
java.lang.ref.WeakReference
java.lang.reflect.Array
java.lang.reflect.Field
java.lang.reflect.InvocationTargetException
java.lang.reflect.Method
java.lang.reflect.ParameterizedType
java.lang.reflect.Proxy
java.lang.reflect.Type
java.math.BigDecimal
java.math.BigInteger
java.net.ConnectException
java.net.InetAddress
java.net.MalformedURLException
java.net.Proxy
java.net.Socket
java.net.SocketException
java.net.URI
java.net.URISyntaxException
java.net.URL
java.net.UnknownHostException
java.nio.ByteBuffer
java.nio.ByteOrder
java.nio.charset.Charset
java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets
java.nio.file.DirectoryStream
java.nio.file.FileAlreadyExistsException
java.nio.file.FileStore
java.nio.file.FileSystem
java.nio.file.FileSystems
java.nio.file.Files
java.nio.file.NoSuchFileException
java.nio.file.Path
java.nio.file.Paths
java.nio.file.StandardOpenOption
java.nio.file.attribute.PosixFilePermission
java.nio.file.attribute.PosixFilePermissions
java.security.DigestInputStream
java.security.DigestOutputStream
java.security.GeneralSecurityException
java.security.InvalidAlgorithmParameterException
java.security.InvalidKeyException
java.security.InvalidParameterException
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java.security.Key
java.security.KeyFactory
java.security.KeyManagementException
java.security.KeyPair
java.security.KeyPairGenerator
java.security.KeyStore
java.security.KeyStoreException
java.security.MessageDigest
java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException
java.security.NoSuchProviderException
java.security.Principal
java.security.PrivateKey
java.security.Provider
java.security.PublicKey
java.security.SecureRandom
java.security.Security
java.security.SignatureException
java.security.UnrecoverableEntryException
java.security.UnrecoverableKeyException
java.security.cert.CertPathBuilder
java.security.cert.Certificate
java.security.cert.CertificateEncodingException
java.security.cert.CertificateException
java.security.cert.CertificateExpiredException
java.security.cert.CertificateFactory
java.security.cert.CertificateNotYetValidException
java.security.cert.CertificateParsingException
java.security.cert.PKIXBuilderParameters
java.security.cert.PKIXRevocationChecker
java.security.cert.X509CertSelector
java.security.cert.X509Certificate
java.security.interfaces.ECPrivateKey
java.security.interfaces.ECPublicKey
java.security.interfaces.RSAPrivateCrtKey
java.security.interfaces.RSAPrivateKey
java.security.interfaces.RSAPublicKey
java.security.spec.ECGenParameterSpec
java.security.spec.ECParameterSpec
java.security.spec.InvalidKeySpecException
java.security.spec.PKCS8EncodedKeySpec
java.security.spec.RSAKeyGenParameterSpec
java.sql.Connection
java.sql.DatabaseMetaData
java.sql.Date
java.sql.DriverManager
Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client v4.6.3 Security Target Version v2.1, 04 April 2024
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java.sql.PreparedStatement
java.sql.ResultSet
java.sql.SQLException
java.sql.Timestamp
java.sql.Types
java.text.DecimalFormat
java.text.Normalizer
java.text.NumberFormat
java.text.ParseException
java.text.SimpleDateFormat
java.time.Duration
java.time.Instant
java.time.LocalDateTime
java.time.ZoneId
java.time.ZoneOffset
java.time.ZonedDateTime
java.time.format.DateTimeFormatter
java.time.temporal.ChronoUnit
java.util.AbstractList
java.util.AbstractMap
java.util.ArrayList
java.util.Arrays
java.util.Base64
java.util.Calendar
java.util.Collection
java.util.Collections
java.util.Comparator
java.util.Date
java.util.EnumSet
java.util.Enumeration
java.util.Formatter
java.util.HashMap
java.util.HashSet
java.util.Iterator
java.util.LinkedHashMap
java.util.LinkedHashSet
java.util.LinkedList
java.util.List
java.util.Locale
java.util.Map
java.util.NoSuchElementException
java.util.Objects
java.util.Optional
java.util.OptionalInt
java.util.PrimitiveIterator
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java.util.Properties
java.util.Random
java.util.ResourceBundle
java.util.ServiceLoader
java.util.Set
java.util.Spliterator
java.util.Spliterators
java.util.Stack
java.util.TimeZone
java.util.TimerTask
java.util.TreeMap
java.util.TreeSet
java.util.UUID
java.util.concurrent.ArrayBlockingQueue
java.util.concurrent.BlockingQueue
java.util.concurrent.Callable
java.util.concurrent.CancellationException
java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap
java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentLinkedQueue
java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentMap
java.util.concurrent.CountDownLatch
java.util.concurrent.ExecutionException
java.util.concurrent.ExecutorService
java.util.concurrent.Executors
java.util.concurrent.Future
java.util.concurrent.LinkedBlockingQueue
java.util.concurrent.ScheduledExecutorService
java.util.concurrent.ScheduledFuture
java.util.concurrent.ThreadFactory
java.util.concurrent.ThreadLocalRandom
java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit
java.util.concurrent.TimeoutException
java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicBoolean
java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicInteger
java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicLong
java.util.concurrent.atomic.AtomicReference
java.util.concurrent.locks.ReadWriteLock
java.util.concurrent.locks.ReentrantLock
java.util.concurrent.locks.ReentrantReadWriteLock
java.util.function.BiConsumer
java.util.function.BiFunction
java.util.function.BiPredicate
java.util.function.Consumer
java.util.function.DoubleConsumer
java.util.function.Function
Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client v4.6.3 Security Target Version v2.1, 04 April 2024
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java.util.function.Predicate
java.util.function.Supplier
java.util.logging.Level
java.util.logging.LogManager
java.util.logging.LogRecord
java.util.logging.Logger
java.util.regex.Matcher
java.util.regex.Pattern
java.util.stream.Collectors
java.util.stream.IntStream
java.util.stream.Stream
java.util.stream.StreamSupport
java.util.zip.GZIPInputStream
java.util.zip.GZIPOutputStream
javax.annotation.Generated
javax.annotation.processing.AbstractProcessor
javax.annotation.processing.RoundEnvironment
javax.annotation.processing.SupportedAnnotationTypes
javax.annotation.processing.SupportedSourceVersion
javax.crypto.BadPaddingException
javax.crypto.Cipher
javax.crypto.IllegalBlockSizeException
javax.crypto.KeyGenerator
javax.crypto.Mac
javax.crypto.NoSuchPaddingException
javax.crypto.SecretKey
javax.crypto.SecretKeyFactory
javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec
javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec
javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
javax.inject.Inject
javax.inject.Provider
javax.inject.Singleton
javax.jms.ConnectionFactory
javax.lang.model.SourceVersion
javax.lang.model.element.Element
javax.lang.model.element.ElementKind
javax.lang.model.element.TypeElement
javax.naming.AuthenticationNotSupportedException
javax.naming.CommunicationException
javax.naming.NamingEnumeration
javax.naming.NamingException
javax.naming.directory.Attribute
javax.naming.directory.SearchControls
javax.naming.directory.SearchResult
Enveil ZeroReveal® Compute Fabric Client v4.6.3 Security Target Version v2.1, 04 April 2024
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javax.naming.ldap.LdapContext
javax.net.SocketFactory
javax.net.ssl.CertPathTrustManagerParameters
javax.net.ssl.KeyManager
javax.net.ssl.KeyManagerFactory
javax.net.ssl.SSLContext
javax.net.ssl.SSLEngine
javax.net.ssl.SSLException
javax.net.ssl.SSLPeerUnverifiedException
javax.net.ssl.SSLServerSocket
javax.net.ssl.SSLSession
javax.net.ssl.SSLSessionContext
javax.net.ssl.SSLSocket
javax.net.ssl.SSLSocketFactory
javax.net.ssl.TrustManager
javax.net.ssl.TrustManagerFactory
javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager
javax.persistence.AttributeConverter
javax.persistence.CascadeType
javax.persistence.Column
javax.persistence.Converter
javax.persistence.DiscriminatorColumn
javax.persistence.DiscriminatorValue
javax.persistence.ElementCollection
javax.persistence.Embeddable
javax.persistence.Embedded
javax.persistence.EmbeddedId
javax.persistence.Entity
javax.persistence.EnumType
javax.persistence.Enumerated
javax.persistence.FetchType
javax.persistence.GeneratedValue
javax.persistence.Id
javax.persistence.Index
javax.persistence.Inheritance
javax.persistence.InheritanceType
javax.persistence.JoinColumn
javax.persistence.JoinTable
javax.persistence.Lob
javax.persistence.ManyToMany
javax.persistence.ManyToOne
javax.persistence.OneToMany
javax.persistence.OneToOne
javax.persistence.OrderBy
javax.persistence.OrderColumn
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javax.persistence.Query
javax.persistence.Table
javax.persistence.Transient
javax.persistence.TypedQuery
javax.persistence.criteria.CriteriaBuilder
javax.persistence.criteria.CriteriaQuery
javax.persistence.criteria.Expression
javax.persistence.criteria.Predicate
javax.persistence.criteria.Root
javax.persistence.criteria.Selection
javax.security.auth.login.Configuration
javax.security.auth.x500.X500Principal
javax.servlet.ServletConfig
javax.servlet.ServletContext
javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest
javax.sql.DataSource
javax.tools.Diagnostic
javax.tools.FileObject
javax.tools.StandardLocation
javax.validation.ValidationException
javax.validation.constraints.Min
javax.validation.constraints.NotNull
javax.validation.constraints.Size
javax.ws.rs.Consumes
javax.ws.rs.DELETE
javax.ws.rs.DefaultValue
javax.ws.rs.ForbiddenException
javax.ws.rs.GET
javax.ws.rs.HeaderParam
javax.ws.rs.InternalServerErrorException
javax.ws.rs.NotAllowedException
javax.ws.rs.NotFoundException
javax.ws.rs.POST
javax.ws.rs.PUT
javax.ws.rs.Path
javax.ws.rs.PathParam
javax.ws.rs.ProcessingException
javax.ws.rs.Produces
javax.ws.rs.QueryParam
javax.ws.rs.WebApplicationException
javax.ws.rs.client.Client
javax.ws.rs.client.WebTarget
javax.ws.rs.container.ContainerRequestContext
javax.ws.rs.container.ContainerRequestFilter
javax.ws.rs.container.ContainerResponseContext
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javax.ws.rs.container.ContainerResponseFilter
javax.ws.rs.container.PreMatching
javax.ws.rs.core.Application
javax.ws.rs.core.Context
javax.ws.rs.core.Cookie
javax.ws.rs.core.Feature
javax.ws.rs.core.FeatureContext
javax.ws.rs.core.HttpHeaders
javax.ws.rs.core.MediaType
javax.ws.rs.core.MultivaluedMap
javax.ws.rs.core.NewCookie
javax.ws.rs.core.Request
javax.ws.rs.core.Response
javax.ws.rs.core.Response.Status
javax.ws.rs.core.SecurityContext
javax.ws.rs.core.StreamingOutput
javax.ws.rs.core.UriBuilder
javax.ws.rs.core.UriInfo
javax.ws.rs.ext.ExceptionMapper
javax.ws.rs.ext.MessageBodyReader
javax.ws.rs.ext.MessageBodyWriter
javax.ws.rs.ext.ParamConverter
javax.ws.rs.ext.ParamConverterProvider
javax.ws.rs.ext.Provider
javax.ws.rs.ext.Providers
javax.ws.rs.ext.ReaderInterceptor
javax.ws.rs.ext.ReaderInterceptorContext
javax.xml.XMLConstants
javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter
javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder
javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory
javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException
javax.xml.transform.OutputKeys
javax.xml.transform.Source
javax.xml.transform.Transformer
javax.xml.transform.TransformerException
javax.xml.transform.TransformerFactory
javax.xml.transform.dom.DOMSource
javax.xml.transform.stream.StreamResult
javax.xml.transform.stream.StreamSource
javax.xml.validation.Schema
javax.xml.validation.SchemaFactory
javax.xml.validation.Validator
sun.security.provider.certpath.BuildStep
sun.security.provider.certpath.SunCertPathBuilderException
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Appendix B
The following parameters are required to be configured to put the TOE in the evaluated configuration
(FMT_MEC_EXT.1).
enveil.security.tls.keystore.path
Path to the key store on ZeroReveal Server’s local disk.
enveil.security.tls.keystore.type
Type of the key store (possible options are jks, pkcs12, or bcfks).
enveil.security.tls.keystore.password
The key store’s password.
enveil.security.tls.truststore.path
Path to the trust store on ZeroReveal Server’s local disk.
enveil.security.tls.keystore.type
Type of the key store (possible options are jks or bcfks).
enveil.security.tls.truststore.password
The trust store’s password.
If the certificate keys are generated using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, ensure that the curve used is
either secp256r1 or secp384r1. If RSA keys are used, they must be 2048, 3072 bits, or 4096 bits.
Ensure that all TLS key stores and TLS trust stores are stored in /etc/enveil/zeroreveal-
client/certs/ and are readable only by the enveil user.
enveil.common.niap.enforce
(boolean) Enforces that the server is configured to meet the NIAP requirements.
Must be set to true.
enveil.client.auth.mechanisms
Comma‐separated list of authentication mechanisms to use.
Must be set to [certificate].
enveil.client.auth.require.user.cert
(boolean) Whether to require users to present valid TLS client certificates.
Must be set to true.
enveil.client.auth.certificate.user.source.mechanisms
(string) A comma‐separated list of user stores for use with certificate authentication.
Must be set to [ldap].
enveil.client.auth.certificate.ldap.ssl.enabled
(boolean) Whether to connect to the LDAP server under TLS for certificate enveil.client.auth.
Must be set to true.
enveil.client.auth.certificate.ldap.connect.with.sasl.external
(boolean) Whether to authenticate to the LDAP server using a TLS client certificate or not for
certificate auth.
Must be set to true.
enveil.client.gateway.specification.dir
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(path) Path to a directory containing specifications for ZeroReveal Servers to connect to. Each
ZeroReveal Server is represented by a separate properties file.
Must be set to /etc/enveil/zeroreveal-client/gateways.
enveil.security.tls.conscrypt.aes.enabled
(boolean) true enables the use of native AES ciphers from a bundled BoringSSL implementation.
false will disable the native ciphers and use default Java implementation.
Must be set to false.
enveil.security.tls.keystore.check
(boolean) Validates the key store on startup.
Must be set to true.
enveil.security.tls.strict
(string) If true, requires TLSv1.2 and an AES‐256 cipher suite for all connections. If false, accepts any
valid TLS protocol and cipher suite available in the local Java installation.
Must be set to true.
enveil.security.tls.client.certificate.check
(boolean) Whether to check the validity of a certificate presented by any TLS client (currently only
ZeroReveal Client).
Must be set to true.
enveil.security.random.blockingDevice
(boolean) Whether to use a blocking device for random number generation. That is, wait for enough
entropy to be available before generating random numbers.
Must be set to true.
enveil.security.tls.niap.signature.algorithms
(boolean) Only used NIAP‐approved signature algorithms.
Must be set to true.
enveil.security.cert.revocation.check.mode
(string) Whether to check for certificate revocation using any provided CRL endpoint. Defaults to
NONE.
Must be set to “HARD_FAIL”.
ZeroReveal Client automatically restricts all TLS connections to TLS version 1.2, denying all other TLS
versions. No further configuration is required to configure the cryptographic engine beyond the
parameters described above.