Certification Report Page 1
KECS-CR-23-31
OTACToken V1.0
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1237-2023
2023. 5. 3.
IT Security Certification Center
Certification Report Page 2
History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2023.05.03. -
Certification report for OTACToken V1.0
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for OTACToken V1.0 of SSenStone Inc.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KoSyAs)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ................................................................................................... 5
2. Identification............................................................................................................... 8
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................ 9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope .................................................................. 9
5. Architectural Information........................................................................................... 9
1. Physical Scope of TOE ................................................................................... 9
2. Logical Scope of TOE ................................................................................... 10
6. Documentation ......................................................................................................... 12
7. TOE Testing............................................................................................................... 13
8. Evaluated Configuration .......................................................................................... 13
9. Results of the Evaluation......................................................................................... 14
1. Security Target Evaluation (ASE) .................................................................. 14
2. Development Evaluation (ADV)..................................................................... 15
3. Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD) ....................................................... 15
4. Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)............................................................. 15
5. Test Evaluation (ATE).................................................................................... 15
6. Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) .................................................................... 16
7. Evaluation Result Summary.......................................................................... 16
10. Recommendations ................................................................................................... 17
11. Security Target.......................................................................................................... 18
12. Acronyms and Glossary .......................................................................................... 19
13. Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 20
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the evaluation result drawn by the evaluation facility on the
results of the OTACToken V1.0 developed by SSenStone Inc. with reference to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter)[1].
It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (“TOE” hereinafter) is simple authentication solution that
allows users to access the work systems through mobile devices using an OTAC
authentication code for various work services.
After being initialized, the TOE periodically performs integrity checks, performs
identification and authentication, and authentication failure response capabilities while
limiting duplicate logins for the same administrator. If the repository protection limit set
by the authorized administrator to protect the audit data repository is exceeded, a
warning email will be sent to the administrator, and TOE also provides TSF protection
functions such as security audit functions for recording and managing audit data,
protection function of data saved in the repository controlled by the TSF and TSF self-
test, etc. for major events during the operation of security functions and management
functions. In addition, the TOE provides access and integrity functions for managing
the authorized administrator's access sessions. The evaluation of the TOE has been
carried out by Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS) and completed on April 07, 2023.
The ST has no conformance claim to the Protection Profile (PP). All Security
Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component
in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1.
Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security
Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional components in CC
Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended Component Definition chapter
of the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the
resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure-1] shows the operational environment where the TOE is operated. TOE
operating environment consists of the OTACToken Server and the OTACToken APP
(Android) / OTACToken APP (iOS). The security management of TOE is performed
through a web browser (Chrome) that supports HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol
over Secure Socket Layer). OTACToken APP (Android) / OTACToken APP (iOS)
performs the function of generating a one-time authentication code for user
authentication of the work system when it is executed.
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[Figure 1] TOE Operational Environment
The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the
OTACToken Server are shown in [Table 1].
Classification Requirement
HW
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6400 CPU @ 2.70GHz 4core or higher
Memory 8 GB or higher
HDD Space required for TOE installation is 150 MB or higher
NIC 10/100/1000 Mbps * 1 EA or higher
SW
OS Ubuntu 18.04 (64bit) (kernel 5.4.0-139)
DBMS MariaDB 10.11.2
WAS Apache Tomcat 9.0.73
JRE jre 1.8.0_362
[Table 1] OTACToken Server Hardware and Software specifications
The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the
OTACToken APP(Android) are shown in [Table 2].
Product Model
OS
Version Kernel
SAMSUNG Galaxy S22 SM-S901N 13 5.10.81
[Table 2] OTACToken APP(Android) Hardware and Software specifications
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The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the OTACToken
APP(iOS) are shown in [Table 3].
Product Model
OS
Version Kernel
iPhone 13 A2633 15.4.1 -
[Table 3] OTACToken APP(iOS) Hardware and Software specifications
The requirements for software of Managed PC are shown in [Table 4]
Classification Requirement
SW Chrome 108.0
[Table 4] Managed PC Software specifications
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2. Identification
The TOE reference is identified as follows.
TOE OTACToken V1.0
TOE detailed version V1.0.02.02.02
TOE
Components
OTACToken
Server
OTACToken Server V1.0.02
OTACToken
APP(Android)
OTACToken App(Android) V1.0.02
OTACToken
APP(iOS)
OTACToken App(iOS) V1.0.02
Guidance
OTACToken V1.0 Administrator's Manual V1.4
OTACToken V1.0 User Manual V1.4
OTACToken V1.0 Installation Guide V1.4
[Table 5] TOE identification
[Table 6] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation,
facility, certification body, etc.
Scheme
Korea IT Security Evaluation and Certification Guidelines
(October 31, 2022)
Korea IT Security Evaluation and Certification Regulation (May
17, 2021)
TOE OTACToken V1.0
Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~
CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
EAL EAL1+ (ATE_FUN.1)
Protection Profile ST does not claim conformance to PP
Developer SSenStone Inc.
Sponsor SSenStone Inc.
Evaluation Facility Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
April 07, 2023
[Table 6] Additional identification information
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3. Security Policy
The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional classes:
- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access
- Trusted path
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the
Security Target (ST) [3]
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no Assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the ST. The scope of
this evaluation is limited to the functionality and assurance covered in the Security
Target. This evaluation covers only the specific software version identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process. (for the detailed
information of TOE version and TOE Components version refer to the [Table 4])
5. Architectural Information
1. Physical Scope of TOE
The physical scope that makes up the TOE is the OTACToken Server, OTACToken
App(Android), OTACToken APP(iOS) and guidelines (administrator manual, user manual,
Installation Guide) as shown in the below [Figure 3]. Hardware, operating system, DBMS,
WAS, JDK, Wrapper which are operating environments of the TOE are excluded from the
physical scope of the TOE. Hardware, operating system, DBMS which are operating
environments of the TOE are excluded from the physical scope of the TOE.
Classification Identification Type
TOE
component
OTACToken
Server
OTACToken Server V1.0.02
- OTACToken Server V1.0.02.tar
Software
(Distribut
ed as a
CD)
OTACToken
App(Android)
OTACToken App(Android) V1.0.02
- OTACToken App(Android) V1.0.02.apk
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OTACToken
App(iOS)
OTACToken App(iOS) V1.0.02
- OTACToken App(iOS) V1.0.02.ipa
Guidance
OTACToken V1.0 Administrator’s Manual
V1.4
- OTACToken V1.0 Administrator’s Manual
V1.4.pdf
PDF
(Distribut
ed as a
CD)
OTACToken V1.0 User Manual V1.4
- OTACToken V1.0 User Manual V1.4.pdf
OTACToken V1.0 Installation Guide V1.4
- OTACToken V1.0 Installation Guide
V1.4.pdf
[Table 7] Physical scope of TOE
2. Logical Scope of TOE
The logical scope of the TOE is as in [Figure 3] below.
[Figure 2] TOE Logical scope
▣ Security Audit
OTACToken Server generates audit data for TSF data management and security
management provided through a web browser.
Audit data will be generated for security management and configuration, information
changes, identification and authentication of TSF data, integrity checks, starting and ending
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of audit functions, and audit data for security violations.
The generated audit data includes the log creation time, the subject's identity, the event
result(success or failure), the items related to the event type, and audit data that is
additionally created.
The audit data will be stored in a DBMS and be provided to authorized administrators in an
appropriate format through a web browser.
▣ Cryptographic support
OTACToken Server generates symmetric keys through a random bit generator, encrypts the
generated OTAC information using the symmetric key, and then transmits the encrypted
data to the work system.
- Random Number Generator : SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG(Deterministic Random Bit
Generator)
- Symmetric Key Algorithm : AES 128 Bit
OTACToken APP(Android)/OTACToken APP(iOS) reads and decrypts the OTAC information
provided by the QR code, and generates a new symmetric key to encrypt the OTAC
information and store it in the APP storage space.
- Public Key Algorithm : RSA 2048 Bit
- Symmetric Key Algorithm : AES 128 Bit
OTACToken APP(Android)/OTACToken APP(iOS) also provides the OTAC data by
decrypting the stored OTAC information using the symmetric key when a request for OTAC
code generation is made for user authentication.
▣ Identification and authentication
When attempting identification and authentication, the administrator will be identified by ID
and the administration authentication will be performed before any action. The password for
authentication will be displayed as '•' and only information on the cause of authentication
failure is provided to prevent password exposure.
The administrator's password must be created according to password rules, and if
identification and authentication are successful, the administrator maintains security
management authority. When attempting authentication through a web browser, if the
authentication attempt failure count (5 times) is exceeded, the account will be locked for 5
minutes.
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▣ Security Management
OTACToken Server sets security policies for each service (work system) and manages
administrators and registered users.
▣ Protection of the TSF
OTACToken Server protects the TSF data transmitted between the TOE and web browsers
from exposure or modification and also protects the stored information from unauthorized
exposure or modification.
OTACToken Server also periodically performs integrity checks and self-tests after startup.
▣ TOE access
The administrator automatically terminates the session if it is not used for a period of
inactivity and requires reauthentication for reuse.
In addition, for administrator sessions for security management, the maximum number of
session connections is limited to one to prevent duplicate logins.
▣ Trusted path
OTACToken Server provides a communication path that protects communication data from
being altered or exposed by remote users through a trusted path.
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identification Date
OTACToken V1.0 Administrator’s Manual V1.4
- OTACToken V1.0 Administrator’s Manual V1.4.pdf
April 24, 2023
OTACToken V1.0 User Manual V1.4
- OTACToken V1.0 User Manual V1.4.pdf
April 24, 2023
OTACToken V1.0 Installation Guide V1.4
- OTACToken V1.0 Installation Guide V1.4.pdf
April 24, 2023
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[Table 8] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The evaluator conducted independent testing listed in Independent Testing Report [4],
based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The evaluator took a testing approach
based on the security services provided by each TOE components based on the
operational environment of the TOE. Each test case includes the following information:
- Test no.: Identifier of each test case
- Test Purpose: Includes the security functions to be tested
- Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
- Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
- Expected result: Result expected from testing
- Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
- Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected and
actual result
The evaluator set up the test configuration and testing environment consistent with the ST
[3]. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised
by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities. These
tests cover weakness analysis of privilege check of executable code, bypassing security
functionality, invalid inputs for interfaces, vulnerability scanning using commercial tools,
disclosure of secrets, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing
basic attack potential were found from penetration testing. The evaluator confirmed that all
the actual testing results correspond to the expected testing results. The evaluator testing
effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results are summarized in the
Penetration Testing Report [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: OTACToken V1.0 (V1.0.02.02.02)
- OTACToken Server V1.0.02
- OTACToken App(Android) V1.0.02
- OTACToken App(iOS) V1.0.02
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 7 were
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evaluated with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility wrote the evaluation result in the ETR which references Single
Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports. The
evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2]. The TOE was evaluated based on
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. (EAL1+).
1. Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in a
narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC
and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and it
is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for the
TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
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2. Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specifications specify a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing and SFR-
supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the verdict PASS
is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
3. Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been documented
and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality and
interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use of
the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates prevention
and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE in a
secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of users (e.g.
those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect actions could
adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
4. Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has clearly identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMC.1.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes the
TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
5. Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
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By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1. Thus, the TOE behaves as
described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation evidence (described in the ADV
class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
6. Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable vulnerabilities
by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational environment of the TOE.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t allow
attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
7. Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_INT.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1
ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
AGD
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1
ATE_IND.1.1E PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1
AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 9] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
⚫ The TOE must be installed and operated in a physically secure environment accessible
only by authorized administrators and should not allow remote management from
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outside.
⚫ The administrator shall maintain a safe state such as application of the latest security
patches, eliminating unnecessary service, change of the default password, etc., of the
operating system and DBMS in the TOE operation.
⚫ The administrator should periodically checks a spare space of audit data storage in
case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup to prvent audit data
loss.
11. Security Target
OTACToken V1.0 Security Target V1.7 [3] is included in this report for reference.
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12. Acronyms and Glossary
(1) Acronyms
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OR Observation Report
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
(2) Glossary
Random bit generator
A device or algorithm that outputs a binary string that is statistically independent and is
not biased. The RBG used for cryptographic application generally generates 0 and 1 bit
string, and the string can be combined into a random bit block. The RBG is classified
into the deterministic and non-deterministic type. The deterministic type RBG is
composed of an algorithm that generates bit strings from the initial value called a “seed
key,” and the non-deterministic type RBG produces output that depends on the
unpredictable physical source.
Attack potential
Measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE expressed as an attacker's
expertise, resources and motivation.
Management access
The access to the TOE by using the HTTPS, SSH, TLS, etc to manage the TOE by
administrator, remotely.
Symmetric cryptographic technique
Encryption scheme that uses the same secret key in mode of encryption and
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decryption, also known as secret key cryptographic technique.
Decryption
The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext using the decryption key.
Secret Key
The cryptographic key which is used in symmetric cryptographic algorithm and is
associated with on or more entity, it is not allowed to release.
Identity
Representation uniquely identifying entities (e.g. user, process or disk) within the
context of the TOE.
Encryption
The act that converting the plaintext into the ciphertext using the cryptographic key.
External Entity
any entity (human or IT) outside the TOE that interacts (or may interact) with the TOE.
Threat Agent
Unauthorized external entities that pose threats such as illegal access, alteration, or
deletion of assets.
Authorized Administrator
Users who can execute functions according to Security Functional Requirements
(SFRs)
Authentication Data
information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
13. Bibliography
The evaluation facility has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision
5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April, 2017
Certification Report Page 21
[3] OTACToken V1.0 Security Target V1.7, April 24, 2023
[4] OTACToken V1.0 Independent Testing Report (ATE_IND.1) V2.00, April 25, 2023
[5] OTACToken V1.0 Penetration Testing Report (AVA_VAN.1) V2.00, April 25, 2023