Certification Report Page 1
KECS-CR-14-21
Samsung CLX-9252 CLX-9352 CLX-9258
CLX-9358 CLX-9821 CLX-9822 SCX-8230
SCX-8240 SCX-8238 SCX-8248 SCX-8821
SCX-8822 Multi-Function Printers
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-0501-2014
2014. 4. 21
IT Security Certification Center
Certification Report Page 2
History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2014.4.21 -
Certification report for Samsung CLX-9252 CLX-9352
CLX-9258 CLX-9358 CLX-9821 CLX-9822 SCX-8230
SCX-8240 SCX-8238 SCX-8248 SCX-8821 SCX-8822
Multi-Function Printers
- First documentation
Certification Report Page 3
This document is the certification report for Samsung CLX-9252 CLX-9352 CLX-9258 CLX-
9358 CLX-9821 CLX-9822 SCX-8230 SCX-8240 SCX-8238 SCX-8248 SCX-8821 SCX-8822
Multi-Function Printers of SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory (KSEL)
Certification Report Page 4
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary .............................................................................................. 5
2. Identification.......................................................................................................... 7
3. Security Policy....................................................................................................... 8
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ............................................................ 9
5. Architectural Information ................................................................................... 10
6. Documentation .................................................................................................... 15
7. TOE Testing.......................................................................................................... 15
8. Evaluated Configuration..................................................................................... 17
9. Results of the Evaluation ................................................................................... 17
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE) .........................................................................18
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)....................................................................18
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)..............................................................19
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)............................................................................21
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)...........................................................................................21
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)............................................................................22
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary .................................................................................22
10. Recommendations .............................................................................................. 24
11. Security Target .................................................................................................... 26
12. Acronyms and Glossary..................................................................................... 27
13. Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 29
Certification Report Page 5
1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the results
of the EAL3+ evaluation of Samsung CLX-9252 CLX-9352 CLX-9258 CLX-9358 CLX-9821
CLX-9822 SCX-8230 SCX-8240 SCX-8238 SCX-8248 SCX-8821 SCX-8822 Multi-
Function Printers from SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd. with reference to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter)[1].
It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is MFPs (Multi- Function Peripherals) as an IT
product. It controls the operation of the entire MFP, including copy, print, scan, and fax
functions on the MFP controller.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory
(KSEL) and completed on April 15, 2014. This report grounds on the evaluation
technical report (ETR) KSEL had submitted [3] and the Security Target (ST) [4]. The ST
has conformance claim to IEEE std 2600.1TM
– 2009 Protection Profile [5]. All Security
Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component in
CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL3
augmented by ALC_FLR.2. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3
conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based only upon
functional components in CC Part 2, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST.
Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE is operated in an internal network protected by a firewall. U.USER is connected to
the TOE and may perform jobs that are allowed (see Figure 1).
Certification Report Page 6
[Figure 1] TOE Operational Environment
The TOE is intended to operate in a network environment that is protected by a firewall
from external malicious attacks, and with reliable PCs and authenticated servers. U.USER
is able to access the TOE by using local user interface (LUI) or remote user interface (RUI).
The LUI is designed to be accessed by U.USER. The U.USER can operate copy, scan, and
fax functions through the LUI. In the case of a scanning job, U.USER can operate the
scanning job using the LUI and transfer the scanned data to a certain destination by email
addresses and servers. U.USER can also use their PCs to print out documents or to
access the TOE through the internal network. U.ADMINISTRATOR can enable/disable
Automatic Image Overwrite; start/stop Manual Image Overwrite, and change a Password
via the LUI. U.ADMINISTRATOR can access TOE through the RUI using a web browser
through IPSec protocol. If IPSec is not configured in the TOE, all of network connection
would be blocked. From there, U.ADMINISTRATOR can add/change/delete user accounts,
change the U.ADMINISTRATOR’s ID and password, review the security audit service, and
download the security audit report. The U.USER’s account information that requires asking
for internal authentication by TOE can be stored on the hard disk drive of the TOE. All of
the information stored on the hard disk drive is protected by the TOE. In the case of
external authentication using Kerberos, LDAP, SMB server, the external authentication
servers will perform the user authentication using database of authentication server. The
authentication server is assumed to be protected from external environmental space.
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Certification Report Page 7
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is identified as follows:
[Table 1] TOE identification
Developer SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
Name Samsung CLX-9252 CLX-9352 CLX-9258 CLX-9358 CLX-9821 CLX-
9822 SCX-8230 SCX-8240 SCX-8238 SCX-8248 SCX-8821 SCX-8822
Multi-Function Printers
Version 01.CCC.81
Hardware
(MFP Model)
Samsung CLX-9252 CLX-9352 CLX-9258 CLX-9358 CLX-9821 CLX-
9822 SCX-8230 SCX-8240 SCX-8238 SCX-8248 SCX-8821 SCX-8822
Certification Report Page 8
[Table 2] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 8, 2013)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security
(November 1, 2012)
TOE Samsung CLX-9252 CLX-9352 CLX-9258 CLX-9358 CLX-9821
CLX-9822 SCX-8230 SCX-8240 SCX-8238 SCX-8248 SCX-
8821 SCX-8822 Multi-Function Printers
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 , CCMB-2012-
09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
EAL EAL3+(augmented by ALC_FLR.2)
Protection Profile IEEE Std 2600.1-2009
(2600.1, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational
Environment A, Version 1.0)
Developer SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
Sponsor SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory (KSEL)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
April 15, 2014
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 2] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The TOE complies security policies defined in the ST [4] by security objectives and
security requirements. The TOE provides security features to identify and authenticate
authorized users, to generate audit records of the auditable events, and to securely
manage the TOE functionality and authorized user accounts information.
For more details refer to the ST [4].
Certification Report Page 9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational
environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed
and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST [4], chapter 3.3):
 The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides
protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data
interfaces of the TOE.
 TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization and are trained and competent to follow those policies and
procedures.
 Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer’s guidance
and documentation, and to correctly configure and operate the TOE in
accordance with those policies and procedures.
 Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
[Table 3] shows the specification for TOE.
MFP
Model
CLX-9252
CLX-9258
CLX-9821
CLX-9352
CLX-9358
CLX-9822
SCX-8230
SCX-8238
SCX-8821
SCX-8240
SCX-8248
SCX-8822
Color/Mono Color Color Mono Mono
PPM 25ppm 35ppm 30ppm 40ppm
Interface High-Speed USB 2.0 Host, High-Speed USB 2.0 Peripheral,
Ethernet 10/100/1000 Base TX
FAX Option Kit, ITU-T G3, Super G3, 33.6 Kbps, MH/MR/MMR/JBIG
Display 8.9" Color Touch-Panel LCD, 1024 x 600 (WSVGA)
HDD 320 GB
[Table 3] General Specification for TOE
Certification Report Page 10
5. Architectural Information
[Figure 2] and [Figure 3] show the scope of the TOE.
[Figure 2] Physical Structure of MFP
Certification Report Page 11
[Figure 3] Logical boundary of the TOE
The following security functions are provided by the TOE:
 Identification & Authentication
The TOE provides two types of user identification and authentication methods. If
U.ADMINISTRATOR configures the local authentication, the MFP will authenticate the
U.USER against an internal database. If U.ADMINISTRATOR selects the external
authentication as an authentication method, then MFP will authenticate the U.USER
using an external authentication server.
U.USER should be identified and authenticated by entering both ID and Password to
access to the TOE management functions. If U.USER fails to login specific times, the
system blocks the session of the U.USER during predefined duration.
U. ADMINISTRATOR can configure Identification & Authentication Policy by using LUI
or RUI. U. ADMINISTRATOR can also give specific permission for U.USER to only use
certain feature of the machine.
The TOE provides the Common Access Control & TOE Function Access Control based
on the user role assigned to a user group ID by U.ADMINISTRATOR when U.NORMAL
performs read/delete/modify operations on the data owned by U.NORMAL or when
U.NORMAL accesses print/scan/copy/fax functions offered by the MFP.
The TOE shall terminate an interactive session after predefined time interval of user
Certification Report Page 12
inactivity.
 Network Access Control
The MFP system has a network interface connected to a network. The MFP system can
send/receive data and MFP configuration information and thus is able to configure MFP
settings.
There are a couple of methods to access and communicate with the MFP from outside
of the TOE through the network, and the TOE manages all incoming packets via a
network interface.
1) Protocol and Port Control:
The TOE can only allow protocols and ports configured by U.ADMINISTRATOR.
U.ADMINISTRATOR can configure this information via the LUI or RUI.
2) IP and MAC address filtering:
U.ADMINISTRATOR can make filtering rules for IPv4/IPv6 addresses and MAC
addresses. After that, packets are only allowed as per the IP filtering rule registered by
U.ADMINISTRATOR. Packets via MAC addresses registered by U.ADMINISTRATOR
are not allowed.
 Security Management
The TOE accomplishes security management for the security function, TSF data, and
security attribute.
Only U.ADMINISTRATOR can manage the security functions: security functions can be
start and stop by U.ADMINISTRATOR.
TSF data and their possible operations are specified by U.ADMINISTRATOR.
Security attributes can be operated by U.ADMINISTRATOR.
 Security Audit Data
The TOE creates an audit record security audit event including job log, security event
log, and operation log. The audit data consist of the type of event, date and time of the
event, success or failure, log out and access of log data.
Only U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to view (or export) the audit data but even
U.ADMINISTRATOR shall not delete log data manually.
The TOE protects Security Audit Data stored on the hard disk drive. It prevents any
unauthorized alteration to the Security Audit Data, and when each log events exceeds
the maximum number, the TOE overwrites the oldest stored audit records and generates
Certification Report Page 13
an audit record of overwriting.
 Image Overwrite
The TOE provides Image Overwrite functions that delete the stored file from the MFP’s
hard disk drive. The Image Overwrite function consists of Automatic Image Overwrite
and Manual Image Overwrite. The TOE implements an Automatic Image Overwrite to
overwrite temporary files created during the copying, printing, faxing and scanning (scan
to e-mail, scan to FTP, scan to SMB task processes). The image overwrite security
function can also be invoked manually only by U.ADMINISTRATOR through the LUI.
Once invoked, the Manual Image Overwrite cancels all print and scan jobs, halts the
printer interface (network), overwrites the hard disk according to the procedures set by
U. ADMINISTRATOR. If there are any problems during overwriting, the Manual
Image Overwrite job automatically restarts to overwrite the remaining area.
 Data Encryption
The TOE provides an encryption function during the data storage procedure and a
decryption function in the process of accessing stored data from hard disk drive. The
TOE generates cryptographic keys when the TOE is initialized at the first setout the
secret key is used for encrypting and decrypting user data and TSF data that is stored
on the HDD. Access to this key is not allowed to any U.USER including
U.ADMINISTRATOR.
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with overwriting a used
cryptographic key with a newly generated cryptographic key. Before storing temporary
data, document data, and system data on the HDD of the MFP, the TOE encrypts the
data using AES 256 algorithm and cryptographic key.
When accessing stored data, the TOE decrypts the data using the same algorithm and
key.
Therefore, the TOE protects data from unauthorized reading and falsification even if the
HDD is stolen.
 Fax Data Control
The TOE provides a fax data control function to examine fax image data formats (MMR,
MR, or MH of T.4 specification) received via the PSTN port and check whether received
data is suitable. If the received fax data includes malicious content, it may threaten the
TOE asset. To prevent this kind of threat, the TOE inspects whether the received fax
Certification Report Page 14
image is standardized with MMR, MR, or MH of T.4 specification or not before
forwarding the received fax image to e-mail or SMB/FTP. U. ADMINISTRATOR can
restrict this forwarding function. When non-standardized format data are discovered, the
TOE destroys the fax image.
 Self-testing
During initial start-up, the TOE performs self test. Self testing executes TSF function to
verify the correct operation of the HDD encryption function. Also, the TOE verifies the
integrity of the encryption key data and TSF executable code by the self testing.
 Secure Communication
The TOE also provides secure communication between the TOE and the other trusted
IT product to protect communicated data from modification or disclosure by IPSec. The
network which connected without IPSec shall not be allowed to communicate with MFP.
Certification Report Page 15
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
[Table 4] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE component based on the operational environment of the TOE. The
developer’s tests were performed on each distinct operational environment of the TOE
(see chapter 1 of this report for details about operational environment of the TOE).
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results according to the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined in the functional specification, and demonstrated that the TSF behaves as
described in the functional specification.
The developer tested subsystems including their interactions, and analyzed testing
results according to the assurance component ATE_DPT.1.
Therefore the developer tested all SFRs defined in the ST [4].
The evaluator performed all the developer’s tests, and conducted independent testing
listed in ETR [3], based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The evaluator set
up the test configuration and testing environment consistent with the ST [4]. The
evaluator considered followings when devising a test subset:
 TOE security functionality: The TOE is an embedded software product for
MFPs (Multi-Function Peripherals) as an IT product. It controls the operation of
Identifier Version
Samsung CLX-9252 CLX-9352 CLX-9258 CLX-9358 CLX-9821 CLX-
9822 SCX-8230 SCX-8240 SCX-8238 SCX-8248 SCX-8821 SCX-8822
Multi-Function Printers Administrator’s Guide
V1.3
Samsung CLX-9252 CLX-9352 CLX-9258 CLX-9358 CLX-9821 CLX-
9822 SCX-8230 SCX-8240 SCX-8238 SCX-8248 SCX-8821 SCX-8822
Multi-Function Printers Administrator’s Guide
V1.3
Samsung CLX-9252 CLX-9352 CLX-9258 CLX-9358 CLX-9821 CLX-
9822 SCX-8230 SCX-8240 SCX-8238 SCX-8248 SCX-8821 SCX-8822
Multi-Function Printers Administrator’s Guide
V1.3
Certification Report Page 16
the entire MFP, including copy, print, scan, and fax functions on the MFP
controller, and
Certification Report Page 17
 Developer's testing evidence: The evaluator analyzed evaluation deliverables
for ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.1, and ATE_FUN.1 to understand behavior of the
TOE security functionality and to select the subset of the interfaces to be
tested, and
 Balance between evaluator's activities: The targeted evaluation assurance
level is EAL3+, and the evaluator tried to balance time and effort of evaluator's
activities between EAL3+ assurance components.
In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised
by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities.
These tests cover weakness analysis of source code, privilege check of executable
code, bypassing security functionality, invalid inputs for interfaces, flaws in networking
protocol implementation, vulnerability scanning using commercial tools, disclosure of
secrets, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack
potential were found from penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [3].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is Samsung CLX-9201 CLX-9251 CLX-9301 CLX-9206 CLX-9256 CLX-9306
CLX-8650 CLX-8640 CLX-9811 CLX-9812 CLX-9813 SCX-8128 Multi-Function
Printers. The TOE is an embedded software product for MFPs as an IT product. It
controls the operation of the entire MFP, including copy, print, scan, and fax functions
on the MFP controller.
The TOE is identified by TOE name and version number including release number. The
TOE identification information is provided GUI.
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 4] were evaluated with
the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [3] which references
Certification Report Page 18
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all
assurance components of EAL3+.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security
problem definition and the division of this problem between the TOE
and its operational environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_OBJ.2. The ST doesn't define any extended component. Therefore
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be use as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
Certification Report Page 19
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
The developer uses a CM system that uniquely identifies all configuration items, and
the ability to modify these items is properly controlled. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_CMC.3.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, and the
evaluation evidence. These configuration items are controlled in accordance with CM
capabilities. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.3.
The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Therefore
the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.1.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
The evaluator shall examine the flaw remediation documentation provided to determine
that discovered security flaws be tracked and corrected by the developer. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_FLR.2
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
Certification Report Page 20
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
Certification Report Page 21
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems sufficient to
determine the TSF boundary. It provides a detailed description of the SFR-enforcing
subsystems and enough information about the SFR-supporting and SFR-non-
interfering subsystems for the evaluator to determine that the SFRs are completely and
accurately implemented. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.2.
The developer has provided a description of the TSFIs in terms of their purpose,
method of use, and parameters. In addition, the actions, results and error messages of
each TSFI are also described sufficiently that it can be determined whether they are
SFR-enforcing, with the SFR-enforcing TSFI being described in more detail than other
TSFIs. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.3.
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1.
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), and a TOE design description (which describes
the architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed). In addition, there is a security architecture
description (which describes the architectural properties of the TSF to explain how its
security enforcement cannot be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested the TSF subsystems against the TOE design and the
security architecture description. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_DPT.1.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Certification Report Page 22
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had
confidence in the developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing Basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.2.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing Basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
Certification Report Page 23
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.3 ALC_CMS.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.3 ALC_CMC.4.1E PASS PASS
Certification Report Page 24
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ALC_DVS.1 ALC_DVS.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.1.2E PASS
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC_FLR.2 ALC_FLR.2.1.E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_TDS.2 ADV_TDS.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_TDS.2.2E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.3 ADV_FSP.3.1E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.3.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_DPT.1 ATE_DPT.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.2 AVA_VAN.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.2.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.2.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.2.4E PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
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complying with the followings:
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 Since the TOE is assumed to be evaluated product under specific configuration
settings in connection with TSF, administrator should operate the TOE
according to the settings specified in Evaluated Configuration in evaluation
technical report. Therefore, administrator should keep in mind that the TOE is
not considered to be evaluated product if it is operated with different settings
specified in the Evaluated Configuration.
 All of the external IT entities (User/Administrator’s PC, External storage server,
External authentication server, NTP server, etc.) that communicate with the
TOE over a network should support IPSEC protocol that is compatible with the
security policy of the TOE. It should be remembered that all network
communications are not allowed if there is no IPSEC channel to securely
communicate with the TOE.
 If there are any problems, such as blackout or power failure, during manual
image overwriting, the image overwriting function is terminated remaining the
image overwriting of the memory area uncompleted. Therefore, administrator
should keep in mind that the manual image overwriting function automatically
restarts to overwrite the remaining memory area if the power is supplied again.
 There are two types of users, administrator(role of admin) allowed to manage
the security functions of the TOE and general user(role of general user,
restricted info. user, limited resource user, guest) allowed to use the MFP basic
functions such as printing, copying, scanning and faxing. Therefore,
administrator should be careful not to grant the role of admin to general user.
 The TOE is delivered with the default password of the system administrator. A
system administrator who will operate the TOE should first change the
password. It is recommended that Web and local system administrators
change the password periodically for the sake of security.
 Use the TOE function to configure allowed administrator’s IP’s so that
unauthorized access can be blocked.
11. Security Target
Samsung CLX-9252 CLX-9352 CLX-9258 CLX-9358 CLX-9821 CLX-9822 SCX-8230
SCX-8240 SCX-8238 SCX-8248 SCX-8821 SCX-8822 Multi-Function Printers Security
Target v1.5, April 8, 2014 [4] is included in this report by reference.
Certification Report Page 27
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
LUI Local User Interface
RUI Remote User Interface
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
PP Protection Profile
RFC Request For Comments
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
PPM Pages Per Minute
MMR Secure Socket Layer
MR Modified Modified READ coding
MH Modified Huffman Coding
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Multi-Function Printer, MFP MFP is a machine that incorporates the functionality of
multiple devices (copy, print, scan, or fax) in one
U.ADMINISTRATOR A User who has been specifically granted the authority to
manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions
may affect the TOE security policy. Administrators may
possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override
portions of the TSP.
U.NORMAL A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data
processing functions of the TOE
U.USER Any authorized User
Manual Image Overwrite The Manual Image Overwrite function overwrites all stored files,
including image files and preserved files on the hard disk drive,
and the function should only be manually performed by a
U.ADMINISTRATOR through the LUI. The image data is
completely overwritten 1 ~ 9 times by using DoD 5200.28-M,
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Australian ACSI 33, VSITR (German standard) standard, and
Custom setting methods
Automatic Image Overwrite The Automatic Image Overwrite automatically carries out
overwriting operations on temporary image files at the end of
each job such as copy, scan, scan-to-email, scan-to-FTP, or
scan-to-SMB. Or the Automatic Image Overwrite overwrites the
files on the hard disk drive when a user initiates a delete
operation.
Image file Temporarily stored file that is created during scan, copy, or fax
job processing.
Image Overwrite This is a function to delete all stored files on the hard disk drive.
There are two kinds of image overwriting: Automatic Image
Overwrite and Manual Image Overwrite.
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004, September 2012
[3]
오류! 참조 원본을 찾을 수 없습니다. Evaluation Technical Report V1.0, April
14, 2014
[4]
오류! 참조 원본을 찾을 수 없습니다. Security Target V1.5, April 8, 2014
[5] IEEE Std 2600.1TM
– 2009, IEEE Standard for a Protection Profile in Operational
Environment A, Version 1.0, June 2009