BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023
for
Bundesdruckerei Document Application with
tamper-evident casing 2.5.1
Firmware Version 1.5.8, TOE Casing Version 0
from
Bundesdruckerei GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.47
BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023 (*)
Electronic ID documents: Software
Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing
2.5.1
Firmware Version 1.5.8, TOE Casing Version 0
from Bundesdruckerei GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile for Document
Management Terminal DMT-PP, BSI-CC-PP-0064-
V2-2018, Version: 2.0, 2018-06-06, Federal Office
for Information Security (BSI)
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3
valid until: 19 July 2028
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 20 July 2023
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................23
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................24
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................24
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................24
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................27
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................28
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................29
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing 2.5.1,
Firmware Version 1.5.8, TOE Casing Version 0 has undergone the certification procedure
at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1181-2021. Specific results from
the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1181-2021 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident
casing 2.5.1, Firmware Version 1.5.8, TOE Casing Version 0 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23 June 2023. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Bundesdruckerei GmbH.
The product was developed by: Bundesdruckerei GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 20 July 2023
is valid until 19 July 2028. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing 2.5.1,
Firmware Version 1.5.8, TOE Casing Version 0 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Bundesdruckerei GmbH
Kommandantenstraße 18
10969 Berlin
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-
evident casing 2.5.1.
The Document Application is running on a Document Management Terminal (DMT). It is
used to read the German Passport (ePass), to read and update the electronic data of the
German Identity card (“Personalausweis (PA)”) and electronic residence permit card
(“elektronischer Aufenthaltstitel (eAT)”) as well as to verify the document’s authenticity and
the integrity of its data.
The TOE is operated by governmental organisations, e.g. municipal office, police,
government or other state approved agencies. The TOE is specifically applied in
registration offices to allow card holders to verify that their ePass, PA or eAT is working
correctly. In case of PA and eAT it is further possible to update the address information of
the card holder, the card holder’s PIN for eID applications, and the community ID
(“Gemeindeschlüssel”). In addition, the eID application functionality of the PA or eAT can
be activated or deactivated. Additionally, the TOE ensures secure communication to
external control software and provides a tamper-evident enclosure.
Necessary protocols for the communication of the TOE with the electronic identity
documents like the ePass, PA or eAT are described in [11], [12], [13] and [14].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Protection Profile for Document Management Terminal
DMT-PP, BSI-CC-PP-0064-V2-2018, Version: 2.0, 2018-06-06, Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.2. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.PROTOCOLS SF.PROTOCOLS ensures that the following protocols for
communication between itself and electronic identity documents are
enforced according to [11], [12], [13] and [14] (FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6 and FIA_API.1).
SF.MANAGEMENT SF.MANAGEMENT enforces that the following management functions
are accessible to the Administrator of the TOE (FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MTD. 1/TOE-Config,
FMT_MTD.1/EnableOpAccKeyStore and FMT_MTD.1/ReadVersion).
SF.AUDIT The TOE generates audit data (FAU_GEN.1) which is then stored by
the environment.
SF.PROTECTION SF.PROTECTION allows the user to detect physical tampering of the
base unit (the mainboard) (FPT_PHP.1/BaseUnit) and provides a
trusted communication path between TOE and control software
(FTP_TRP.1/ControlSoftware). Detection of physical tampering is
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
realized by a seal that is carried by the base unit. This seal will be
broken and therewith indicated physical tampering of the base unit.
The communication between Control Software and TOE is secured by
a trusted channel.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2 .
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.4 – 3.6.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Bundesdruckerei Document Application with tamper-evident casing 2.5.1,
Firmware Version 1.5.8, TOE Casing Version 0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Bundesdruckerei Document Application
with tamper-evident casing
2.5.1 Included in 2 below, or as a
Software update.
2 HW TOE Casing 0 Physical delivery.
3 DOC VISOTEC® V-ÄNDERUNGSTERMINAL
Handbuch Installation und Bedienung
1.201 Via web-portal.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
2.1. TOE Delivery Process
The complete terminal that operates the TOE is delivered to the user via standard delivery
services (e.g. DHL). The delivery however, is tracked and the terminal can only be
operated using an operator, administrator and revisor smart card which are shipped
separately. The delivery includes also non-TOE components like the computer hardware
and peripherals. In the case of a firmware update, the delivery of the TOE software will be
done by the TOE function for the firmware update. The TOE itself verifies the authenticity
of the updated TOE software.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023 Certification Report
The guidance documentation is not delivered together with the terminal as this would allow
an attacker to steal a packet and manipulate a terminal as well as the guidance. Instead,
the guidance documentation is downloaded by the users via a secured web portal.
The Guidance Version 1.201 has the following hash value (SHA256):
72099cc52e6b0dfff4bf8703dc43685e577f8df711a86ce77f63c500fc1003b0.
The Guidance [10] will inform the administrator about all important aspects that need to be
checked for a secure delivery.
2.2. TOE Identification
The guidance documentation informs the administrator about the security characteristics of
an authentic terminal. The following aspects ensure the authenticity:
• A Type-Label of Bundesdruckerei that is in fact a seal.
• Six seals on the terminal (4 on the bottom and 2 on the top of the terminal).
• The security characteristics of the box used for shipment.
• The version of the casing is “0” coded by the 7th character of the P/N, the “0” after
“V-AETD”, see [10, chap. 2.5.4].
The version of the software and casing can be verified, this enables the authorized users,
operator, and administrator to identify the TOE by its version number.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
• Security Audit,
• Communication,
• Cryptographic Support,
• User Data Protection,
• Identification and Authentication,
• Security Management,
• Protection of the TSF and
• Trusted Path/Channels.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
6 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
OE.AuthenticationMeans:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023
Operators (S1), Administrators (S2) and Revisors (S3) must be authenticated by at least
two authentication factors from different categories, whereby at least the categories
possession-based authentication factor and knowledge-based authentication factor must
be taken into account. [10, chap. 3.1], [10, chap. 4.4.2], [10, chap. 5.5.2].
OE.SecureBoot7
:
The components in the TOE environment that are required for the operation of the
Document Management Terminal must provide mechanisms to boot the Document
Management Terminal's OS and the device drivers in a secure way so that an initial secure
state without protection compromise is guaranteed. The devices drivers of any external
input and output device (O5+O6+O7) must also be protected by secure booting
mechanisms. [10, chap. 4.4.2], [10, chap. 5.5.2].
OE.Date:
The Operator (S1) shall check the correctness of the current date and time of the TOE at
the beginning of his duty. For this the Operator has to use a reliable reference (e.g. DCF-
77 Clock, GPS Clock). [10, chap. 5.5.2].
OE.ChipPassword:
The environment must enable the Operator (S1) or the Electronic identity document holder
(S5) to ensure during entering or updating the chip password (R.ChipPassword) or the
personal chip password (R.PersonalChipPassword) that any person who is not authorised
to know that password is not able to skim it. Therefore, a special distance between the
Document Management Terminal and any other person shall be enforced. Additionally, the
touchscreen is protected against skimming by a privacy filter. [10, chap. 3.2.2], [10, chap.
4.3].
OE.CheckLogData:
The stored log data (R.LogData) shall be revised regularly to discover malfunctions or
attacks. This shall be done by a Revisor (S3) who is not the same person as the
Administrator (S2). [10, chap. 5.7].
OE. CheckTerminalIntegrity
The integrity of the entire Document Management Terminal hardware shall be checked
regularly by Operator (S1), but at least at the beginning of his duty or if the terminal is
returned from state “PKSDisabled8
” (c.f. OE.TAKeyManagement).
The Operator (S1) shall verify that the Document Management Terminal is authentic and
has not been manipulated.
If external in- or output devices are connected to the Document Management Terminal the
Operator (S1) shall check their cable connection. [10, chap. 5.1] [10, chap. 5.2], [10, chap.
5.5.2], [10, chap. 9.1].
OE.TrainedUser:
The Users – Operators (S1), Administrators (S2) and Revisors (S3) – of the Document
Management Terminal shall be well-trained and trustworthy in a sense not to compromise
the TOE installation itself or the assets secured by the TOE and the TOE environment. [10,
chap. 3.2.1], [10, chap. 4.3].
7
See also Application Note 8 in [8]
8
PKSDisabled means that the certificates required for operational use are deleted. The TOE cannot be
operated regularly in this state.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023 Certification Report
OE.SecureAdministration:
The administration of the Document Management Terminal as well as the TOE itself shall
be maintained securely. Only authorised personnel shall be allowed to administer the
Document Management Terminal and the TOE. The administration personnel will not
install any malicious soft- or hardware at the Document Management Terminal. [10, chap.
3.1], [10, chap. 3.2.1], [10, chap. 4.3].
OE.SecureComponents:
If any input and/or output device (O5+O6+O7) necessary for the operation of the
Document Management Terminal is situated outside of the tamper-evident environment
according to OT.TamperEvidence, they must be directly connected to the base unit by
cable. In particular, no hubs or active cables are allowed in the connection between the
baseunit and the input and/or output device. The devices must remain in close proximity to
the base unit during operation, i.e. they must remain in sight of the Operator (S1). [10,
chap. 4.3].
OE.TAKeyManagement:
The terminal may only remain in the state "PKSLocked9
" if one of the following conditions
is fulfilled and must be returned to state "PKSDisabled" otherwise:
1. In case of stationary use, the Document Management Terminal must be installed
permanently at its intended environment (e.g. at the working places of a municipal office).
2. In case of mobile use, the terminal may remain in the state "PKSLocked" if the terminal
is left unattended by the Operator (S1) for a short time period or if the terminal is stored in
a secure environment. The environment is considered secure if physical and remote
access to that environment is restricted to the Operator (S1). The terminal must be
returned to state "PKSDisabled" if the Document Management Terminal shall be left
unattended and cannot be stored in a secure environment. [10, chap. 5.1], [10, chap.
5.5.3], [10, chap. 5.5.4].
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a software which is capable of reading or updating electronic identity
documents. Furthermore, the TOE includes a tamper-evident environment that protects the
software of the TOE itself as well as the required components for the operation of the TOE.
Subsystem Description
Reverse Proxy Provides the secure channel with Control PC.
Chip Daemon Communication with ID document and SAM.
Management Daemon Configuration of the connection to the Control PC.
Physical Enclosure The tamper-evident environment of the TOE.
Table 3: Subsystems of the TOE
9
PKSLocked means that the certificates required for operational use are installed but need to be unlocked by
the operator for the TOE to operate fully.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
As the TOE is a software application that is executed within an operating system that runs
on a smart card terminal, the developer of the TOE chooses a software based concept for
testing. They developed a dedicated test framework to test the TOE and that can be run on
the same hardware on which the TOE will be operated in practice.
TOE test configurations:
• C1: PKI TOE – This TOE is the TOE described in [6] with the only difference that a
reference PKI is used for document related operations. This enables the TOE to
connect to the developers PKI over the internet. This is not possible with the original
PKI since it is restricted to registration offices.
• C2: CC test TOE - It is used for developer testing and comes with SSH access and
further modification, like the CC test controller daemon, to allow the test suite to
access all TOE functionalities. This TOE uses long lasting certificates from the
developer PKI.
The C2 test configuration provides a dedicated test interface (accessible via SSH) that can
be used to start test cases that are contained in the test framework. This is the only way to
directly address the interfaces that the TOE provides during testing. The test cases of the
developer cover the complete security functionality of the TOE.
The evaluator conducted penetration tests based on all test configurations including direct
manipulations of the environment of the TOE (even though such manipulations are not
formally necessary due to dedicated assumptions in the Security Target).
The further penetration tests are performed regarding the physical tamper the enclosure.
For this the developer assessed the security label according to AIS 48 [4]. The penetration
tests included the whole enclosure to verify that the TOE fulfils the requirement of
detection of physical tampering.
7.1. Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
For the Re-evaluation the developer repeated all tests.
For the base evaluation these tests were performed:
• TOE test configurations:
The Security Target [6] has identified solely one configuration of the TOE under
evaluation. Nevertheless, the developer used a TOE with software additions for his
testing approach.
• TOE test environment configurations:
The test setup comprises a laptop, a COMPRION CL Verify A with antenna, a TOE
with display.
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• Testing approach:
◦ Tests considering the different roles that can access the TOE.
◦ Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design.
◦ Developer provides mappings to the tested TSFI(s), SFR(s) and subsystem(s).
◦ Different testing approaches are used:
▪ Test suite (automatic and manual test).
◦ The test descriptions comprise (inter alia):
▪ Pre-conditions: Preparative steps,
▪ Test steps: Core test steps,
▪ Post conditions: Clearance steps to tidy up before the next test.
Verdict for the activity:
The developer’s testing efforts have been proven sufficient to demonstrate that the
TSFIs and subsystems perform as expected.
All test cases in each test scenario were run successfully on the TOE and they all
PASSED according to their expected result.
7.2. Evaluator Tests
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
For the Re-evaluation the evaluator repeated all ATE developer tests. Additionally, the
evaluator repeated a subset of own IND tests and devised a set of new IND tests. A small
subset of the tests was conducted by the evaluator on the premises of the developer.
• TOE test configurations:
The evaluation body used the same test configurations and equivalent test
environment of the developer’s equipment during functional testing.
• TSFI selection criteria:
The evaluation body chose to broadly cover the existing interfaces without specific
restrictions.
• TSFI tested:
All interfaces were considered during testing.
• Developer tests performed:
The evaluation body chose to inspect all developer tests. They also chose to repeat
all tests.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
• No deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results.
7.3. Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Overview:
For this Re-evaluation the Evaluator ensured the up-to-dateness of the existing tests. He
performed additional tests since the changes of the TOE include the change of the crypto
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023
library and he repeated a subset of existing tests and therefore performed the work units
ATE_IND.2-1, ATE_IND.2-2, and ATE_IND.2-3:
Overview:
• The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing
environment, partially using the test environment of the ITSEF.
• The Security Target [6] has identified solely one configuration of the TOE under
evaluation. Nevertheless, there are two test configurations that were used for
penetration testing (C1 and C2).
• No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic has actually been successful.
Penetration testing approach:
• Based on a list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment created within the work unit AVA_VAN.2-5 the evaluators devised the
attack scenarios for penetration tests when they were of the opinion, that those
potential vulnerabilities could be exploited in the TOE’s operational environment.
• While doing this, also the aspects of the security architecture described in
ADV_ARC were considered for penetration testing. All other evaluation input was
used for the creation of the tests as well. Specifically, the test documentation
provided by the developer was used to find out if there are areas of concern that
should be covered by tests of the evaluation body.
• As the TOE is a document application with the enclosure of the Base Unit (the
mainboard) that heavily relies on the security measures of the environment
(including the terminal in, which the TOE is integrated), the ARC document also
covers some of the security measures that are applied by the terminal. The
evaluator considered the fact that the TOE is delivered in such a way and widened
the scope of the vulnerability analysis to cover specific security aspects of the whole
terminal.
• The evaluator also paid attention to the TSFI in the FSP. As the TSFI are quite
simple with few options that can be varied and the TOE in deeply integrated into a
terminal when it is delivered, the vulnerability assessment needed to focus on
mechanisms that are operational inside the TOE or the terminal.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
• No deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results.
• Regarding this Re-evaluation: The Evaluator repeated a subset of tests and devised
new tests, no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test
results.
7.4. Summary of Test Results and Effectiveness Analysis
Verdict for the sub-activity:
• No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was actually successful in the
TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all measures required
by the developer are applied.
Please note:
• The TOE is only a small part of the whole terminal and it heavily relies on the
secure functioning of the rest of the terminal. The overall security significantly
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depends on the secure environment in which the terminal is operated. Therefore, it
is strongly advised that the responsible personnel is well trained to uphold security,
i.e. secure operation, detection of manipulations, checking of seals, general security
awareness.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
Item Exact version
TOE software 2.5.1
Rest of the terminal firmware (including the operating system) 1.5.8
TOE Casing 0
Table 4: Exact version information of the TOE configuration
This certification covers only one configuration as described in table 4.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 3 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1181-2021, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the following aspects:
The TOE and the related developer evidence were updated to Version 2.5.1 for this Re-
Evaluation.
The hardware and the seals are not changed for this update of the TOE.
The focus of this Re-evaluation was on ATE and a subset of AVA and ATE_IND, with the
subset being chosen in conjunction with the performed changes of the TOE.
The developer updated the documents [6], [10], ADV aspects and the documents of ALC,
that include the TOE changes and new identification of the TOE.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance:Common Criteria Protection Profile for Document Management
Terminal DMT-PP, BSI-CC-PP-0064-V2-2018, Version: 2.0, 2018-06-06, Federal
Office for Information Security (BSI) [8]
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of Application
1. BAC
ChallengeGen
RNG DRG.3 [FIPS186-2]
Appendix 3,
Section 3.1
112 [ICAO_9303]#4.3.1
2. BAC
Encryption
of
Challenge/
Response
3DES-CBC
IV=0, No
Padding
[ANS X9.52]
(3DES)
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
112 [ICAO_9303]#4.3.3.1
[ICAO_9303]#9.7.1.2
3. BAC Key
Derivation
SHA1 [FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
128 [ICAO_9303]#9.7.1.1
4. BAC
Authentication
(MAC)
Retail-MAC
(DES-CBC)
IV=0, Padding
Method 2
MAClen=8Byte
s
[FIPS PUB 46-3]
(DES)
ISO/IEC 9797-
1:2011
(Retail MAC)
112 [ICAO_9303]#4.3.3.2
I[SO9797-1] Mode 3
5. PACE KeyGen
(Ephemeral)
RNG DRG.3 [FIPS186-2]
Appendix 3,
Section 3.1
256 [TR-03110-2]
[ICAO_9303]#4.4
[TR-03116]
6. PACE Nonce RNG DRG.3 [FIPS186-2]
Appendix 3,
Section 3.1
- [TR-03110-2]
[ICAO_9303]#4.4
7. PACE
Encryption/
Decryption
AES-CBC [FIPS 197]
(AES),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
128 [TR-03116]
[TR-03110-2]
[ICAO_9303]#4.4
8. PACE
KeyAgreemen
t
PACE
Mapping
ECKA/ECKA-
GM(ECDH)
[TR-03110-1] - [TR-03110-1]
[ICAO_9303]#4.4
[TR-03116]
9. PACE MAC AES-CMAC [FIPS 197]
(AES),
128 [TR-03110-2]
[ICAO_9303]#4.4
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of Application
[SP800-38B]
(CMAC)
[TR-03116]
10. PACE Key
Derivation
SHA1 [FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
128 [TR-03110-2]
[ICAO_9303]#4.4
[TR-03116]
[TR-03111]#4.3.3.2
11. TAv2 KeyGen
(Ephemeral)
(RNG DRG.3) [FIPS186-2]
Appendix 3,
Section 3.1
256 (brainpool
P256r1)
[TR-03110-2]#3.3
[TR-03116]
12. TAv1/TAv2
Sign
ECDSA-
SHA256
[ISO/IEC 15946-
2-2002], Part 2
(ECDSA)
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
256
(StaticKey:
brainpoolP
256r1)
[TR-03116]
[TR-03110-2]#3.3
[TR-03110-1]#3.5
13. PKI Passive
Authentication
(CSCA)
ECDSA-
SHA256
ECDSA-
SHA384
ECDSA-
SHA512
[ISO/IEC 15946-
2-2002], Part 2
(ECDSA)
256
384
512
[TR-03116]
[ICAO_9303]#5.1
[TR-03110-1]#1.1
14. Passive
Authentication
Document
Signer
ECDSA-
SHA224
ECDSA-
SHA256
ECDSA-
SHA384
ISO/IEC 15946-
2-2002], Part 2
(ECDSA)
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
224
256
384
[TR-03116]
[ICAO_9303]#5.1
[TR-03110-1]#1.1
15. PKI Passive
Authentication
DG-Hash
SHA256
SHA384
[TR-3110-1] none [TR-03116]
[ICAO_9303]#5.1
[TR-03110-1]#1.1
16. PKI Terminal
Authentication
CVCA
ECDSA-SHA2 ISO/IEC 15946-
2-2002], Part 2
(ECDSA)
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
256 [TR-03116]
[TR-03110-1]#3.5
[TR-03110-2]#3.3
17. CAv1 KeyGen (ECC: RNG
DRG.3)
[FIPS186-2]
Appendix 3,
Section 3.1
256
(brainpool
P256r1)
[TR-03116]
[TR-03110-1]#3.4
18. CAv2 KeyGen
(Generated
during TAv2)
(ECC: RNG
DRG.3)
[FIPS186-2]
Appendix 3,
Section 3.1
- [TR-03116]
[TR-03110-2]#3.4
19. CAv1/CAv2
KeyAgreemen
t
ECKA(ECDH) [TR-03116] 256 [TR-03116]
[TR-03110-1]#3.4
[TR-03110-2]#3.4
20. CAv1
Encryption
3DES- CBC
AES-CBC
[ANS X9.52]
(3DES)
SP800-38A
(CBC)
112
128
EUCOM (2006) 2909
[TR-03116]
[TR-03110-1]#3.4
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of Application
21. CAv1
Authentication
(MAC)
3DES
RetailMAC
AES-CMAC
[FIPS PUB 46-3]
(DES)
ANS X9.52
(3DES)
ISO/IEC 9797-
1:2011
(Retail MAC)
[FIPS 197], [FIPS
SP800-38B]
(AES-CMAC)
112
128
EUCOM (2006) 2909
[TR-03116]
[TR-03110-1]#3.4
22. CAv2
Encryption
AES-CBC [FIPS 197]
(AES),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
128 [TR-03116]
[TR-03110-2]#3.4
23. CAv2
Authentication
(MAC)
AES-CMAC [FIPS 197],
[FIPS SP800-
38B] (AES-
CMAC)
128 [TR-03116]
[TR-03110-2]#3.4
24. Firmware
Signature
Verification
ECDSA [ISO/IEC 15946-
2-2002], Part 2
(ECDSA)
256 [FIPS186-4]#Kap 6
25. Firmware
Signature
Hash
SHA256 [FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
- [FIPS180-4]
26. SAM-Access/
Authentication
PACE
ECKA/ECDH [TR-03111] 384 [TR-03111]
27. SAM-
SecureMessa
ging
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
[FIPS 197]
(AES),
[SP800-38A]
(CBC)
[FIPS 197], [FIPS
SP800-38B]
(AES-CMAC)
128 SYM)
AES: [FIPS197]
CBC: [SP800-38A]
CMAC: [SP800-38B]
28. TLS TLS_AES_256
_GCM_SHA38
4
TLS_AES_128
_GCM_SHA25
6
ECDHE-
ECDSA-
AES256-GCM-
SHA384
ECDHE-
ECDSA-
AES128-GCM-
ISO/IEC 15946-
2-2002], Part 2
(ECDSA)
[FIPS 197]
(AES),
[FIPS180-4]
(SHA)
128
256
[RFC5246]
[RFC5246]
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of Application
SHA256
ECDHE-
ECDSA-
AES256-
SHA384
ECDHE-
ECDSA-
AES128-
SHA256
ECDHE-RSA-
AES256-GCM-
SHA384
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
An explicit validity period is not given.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
In order to highlight the information provided for TOE users (Administrator, Operator, and
Revisor) in the guidance documentation [10] the following hints and requirements are of
specific importance and are therefore mentioned here explicitly:
• The Security Target [6] contains assumptions about the physical environment of the
TOE. The operators, administrators and revisors have to ensure that the TOE is
stored in a secure environment when left unattended or that it is brought into a
secure state (state PKSDisabled) otherwise.
• The terminal that operates the TOE shall be powered off every evening [10, chap.
5.1].
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• The correct operation of the software environment of the TOE (i.e. the Operating
System/Firmware) is of specific importance to the secure operation of the TOE. As
such, the certificate for the TOE shall only be valid for the operation using the exact
version of the Operating System/Firmware as it has been available during
evaluation.
• The use of the software HDSupport is mandatory. The requirements in [10, chap.
4.4.4] need to be fulfilled.
The overall security depends on the secure environment in which the terminal is operated.
Therefore, it is advised that the responsible personnel is well trained to uphold security, i.e.
secure operation, detection of manipulations, checking of seals, general security
awareness, see [10, chap. 2.5.2] for details regarding the checks of the seals.
The TOE is only a small part of the whole terminal and it relies on the secure functioning of
the rest of the terminal, see chapter 4 for further details and [8, chap. 4.2].
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
ADV Development
AGD Guidance Documents
AIS Application notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
ALC Life-Cycle Support
API Application Programming Interface
ARC Security Architecture
ASE Security Target Evaluation
ATE Tests
AVA Vulnerability Assessment
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(Federal Office for Information Security, Germany)
CC Common Criteria (referenced as [CC])
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field
of IT Security
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(referenced as [CEM])
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CM Configuration Management
CMC CM capabilities
CMS CM scope
COV Coverage of testing
DEL Delivery
DOC Documentation
DPT Depth of testing
DVS Development security
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EBT Evaluation Body Testing
ECD Extended components definition
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FW Firmware
FLR Flaw remediation
FSP Functional specification
FUN Functional tests
GUI Graphical User Interface
HW Hardware
IAR Impact Analysis Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IMP Implementation
IND Independent testing
INT TSF internals
IP Internet Protocol
IPA Information-Technology Promotion Agency
IT Information Technology
LCD Life-cycle definition
MB Mega Byte
N/A Not applicable
OBJ Security objectives
OPE Operational user guidance
OR Observation Report
OS Operating System
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PC Personal Computer
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PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
PRE Preparative procedures
RAM Random Access Memory
REQ Security requirements
RPC Remote Procedure Call
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SC Site Certification
SER Single Evaluation Report
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SPD Security problem definition
SSS Site Summary Specification (Section of the SST)
SST Site Security Target
ST Security Target
SVC Site Visit Checklist
SW Software
TAT Tools and techniques
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDS TOE design
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interfaces
TSFR TOE SFR
TSS TOE summary specification
TÜVIT TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
UID Unique Identification number
VAN Vulnerability analysis
VPN Virtual Private Network
WU Work Unit
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
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Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
10
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1215-2023, Version 1.62, 2023-02-06, Security Target
Bundesdruckerei Document Application, Bundesdruckerei GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2023-06-21, BSI-DSZ-CC-1215, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Common Criteria Protection Profile for Document Management Terminal DMT-PP,
BSI-CC-PP-0064-V2-2018, Version: 2.0, 2018-06-06, Federal Office for Information
Security (BSI)
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.43, 2023-04-26, ALC_CMS_DMT-
V1.xx.xlsx (confidential document)
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.201, 2023-04-18, VISOTEC®
V-ÄNDERUNGSTERMINAL Handbuch Installation und Bedienung, Bundesdruckerei
GmbH
[11] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents - Part 11: Security
Mechanisms for MRTDs, ICAO, 7th edition, September 2015
[12] BSI TR-03110-1: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents and eIDAS token, Part 1: eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1,
Version 2.20, 2015
[13] BSI TR-03110-2: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents and eIDAS token, Part 2: Protocols for electronic IDentification,
Authentication and Trust Services (eIDAS), Version 2.21, 2016
[14] BSI TR-03110-3: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents and eIDAS token, Part 3: Common Specifications, Version 2.21, 2016
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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