BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
for
Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit
RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 1
with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version 1.0
including specific IC Dedicated Software
from
Samsung Electronics
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 (*)
Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller
for Smart Card, Revision 1 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library
Version 1.0 including specific IC Dedicated Software
from Samsung Electronics
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Bonn, 12 August 2016
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
5 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................12
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................13
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................15
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................17
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11. Security Target............................................................................................................23
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................23
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................28
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................28
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................29
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................36
6 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000 this
certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up to and including CC
part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3, AVA_VAN.5
that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA-2000, for
mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
8 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for
Smart Card, Revision 1 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version 1.0 including
specific IC Dedicated Software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011.
Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC
Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 1 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version
1.0 including specific IC Dedicated Software was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 5 August 2016. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Samsung Electronics.
The product was developed by: Samsung Electronics.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 12 August
2016 is valid until 11 August 2021. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
9 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for
Smart Card, Revision 1 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version 1.0 including
specific IC Dedicated Software has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Samsung Electronics
B zone,17 Floor, B Tower, 1-1, Samsungjeonja-ro
Hwaseong-si, Gyeonggi-do, 45-330
South Korea
10 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
11 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC
Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 1 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version
1.0 including specific IC Dedicated Software.
The product variants S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 are identical in hardware and only
their EEPROM memory sizes are different.
It features the TORNADOTM
2MX2 cryptographic coprocessor, is a smartcard integrated
circuit which is composed of a processing unit, security components, contactless and
contact based I/O ports, hardware circuit for testing purpose during the manufacturing
process and volatile and non-volatile memories (hardware). The TOE also includes the IC
Designer/Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Software as long as it physically exists in
the smartcard integrated circuit after being delivered by the IC Manufacturer. Such
software (also known as IC firmware) is used for testing purpose during the manufacturing
process but also provides additional services to facilitate the usage of the hardware and/or
to provide additional services, including optional RSA/ECC asymmetric cryptography
library, an AIS20 compliant random number generation library and an AIS31 [4] compliant
random number generator. The RSA/ECC library further includes the functionality of hash
computation. The use for keyed hash operations like HMAC or similar security critical
operations involving keys and other secrets, is not subject of this TOE and requires
specific security improvements and DPA analysis including the operating system, which is
not part of this TOE. However, this functionality is intended to be used for signature
generation and verification only. All other software is called Smartcard Embedded Software
and is not part of the TOE.
The TOE is intended to be used in a range of high security applications like banking and
finance applications, communication highways Internet access and transaction
processing), transport and ticketing applications (access control cards) and Governmental
cards (ID cards, health cards, driving licenses). Several security features independently
implemented in hardware or controlled by software are provided to ensure proper
operations and the integrity and confidentiality of stored data. This includes measures for
memory protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only under
specified conditions.
Regarding the RSA/ECC library the user has the possibility to tailor this IC Dedicated
Software part of the TOE during the manufacturing process by deselecting the RSA/ECC
library. Hence the TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of the RSA/ECC
library which results in two TOE configurations. This is considered in this Security Target
and corresponding notes (indicated by “optional”) are added where required. If the user
decides not to use the RSA/ECC cryptographic library, the library is not delivered to the
user and the accompanying “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)”
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is not provided by
the TOE. Deselecting RSA/ECC library means excluding the code implementing
functionality, which the user decided not to use. Excluding the code of the deselected
functionality has no impact on any other security policy of the TOE, it is exactly equivalent
to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality. The S3CT9KA /
S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 single-chip CMOS microcontroller is designed and packaged
specifically for "Smart Card" applications.
The main security features of the S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 integrated circuit are:
12 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
● Security sensors or detectors including High and Low Temperature detectors, High and
Low Frequency detectors, High and Low Supply Voltage detectors, Supply Voltage
Glitch detectors, Light detector and the Passivation Removing Detector,
● Active Shields against physical intrusive attacks,
● Dedicated tamper-resistant design based on synthesizable glue logic and secure
topology,
● Dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel attacks such as Internal Variable
Clock, Random Current Generator, Random Waits Generator, RAM and EEPROM
encryption mechanisms,
● Secure DES and AES Symmetric Cryptography support,
● Optional Secure TORNADO™2MX2 coprocessor for RSA/ECC Asymmetric
Cryptographic Support,
● A Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG) for AIS 20-compliant Random
Number Generation and a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) for
AIS-31-compliant Random Number Generation.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF1 Environmental Security violation recording and
reaction: Via these functions, events noted by
sensors/detectors are recorded in registers.
TSF2 Access Control: The TSF concerns Security
register access control, invalid address access,
access rights for code executed in EEPROM and
privilege mode / user mode.
TSF3 Non-reversibility of TEST and NORMAL mode: it
serves to properly disable the TEST mode,
enable te NORMAL mode and deals with TEST
mode communication, functional tests,
identification and in general accessibility of the
TEST mode.
TSF4 Hardware countermeasures for unobservability
TSF5 Cryptography
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
13 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
For more detailson how these TSF are implemented on the level of Security Functional
Requirements, please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.1 – 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Card, Revision 1 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version 1.0 including
specific IC Dedicated Software.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 /
S3CT9K3 16-Bit RISC
Microcontroller for Smart
Card
Rev. 1 Wafer or Module
2 SW Test ROM Code 1.0 Included in S3CT9KA/
S3CT9K7/ S3CT9K3 Test ROM
3 SW
(optinal)
Secure RSA/ ECC Library 1.0 Software Library
4 SW DRNG 1.0 Software Library
5 SW TRNG 1.0 Software Library
6 DOC API manual for the secure
RSA/ECC library
[12]
1.095 Soft copy
7 DOC DRNG Application Note
[13]
1.1 Soft copy / encrypted email
8 DOC TRNG Application Note
[14]
1.2 Soft copy / encrypted email
9 DOC Hardware User’s manual
[16]
1.21 Soft copy / encrypted email
14 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
10 DOC Security Application Note
[11]
1.6 Soft copy / encrypted email
11 DOC Delivery Specification
[15]
0.1 Soft copy / encrypted email
12 DOC Architecture Reference:
SecuCalm16 CPU Core
[17]
AR14 Soft copy / encrypted email
13 SW TOE Manufacturer to the
Composite Product
Manufacturer:
Code as delivered by the
Embedded Software
Developer (ROM and
EEPROM, incl. optional
cryptographic libraries)
-- Stored in User ROM and user
EEPROM on the IC
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
This information is stored in the EEPROM and can be read out by the user of the card via
the normal EEPROM read command. It contains the following information at which among
others the production line indicator is part of the serial number. For example, the hex value
“06” at the beginning of the serial number indicates that the TOE is produced in Giheung
wafer line 6:
Address Contents Data
500000h – 500001h Chip status information Samsung’s internal management value
500002h – 500003h ROM code number ROM code number
500004h – 500005h Device Type 140A h (S3CT9KA)
1407 h (S3CT9K7)
1403 h (S3CT9K3)
500006h – 50000Fh Available for customer All FF h
500010h – 50001Bh Serial number Samsung’s internal management
valuebeginning with 06 h
50001Ch – 50001Dh IC Fabricator 4250 h
50001Eh – 50001Fh IC Fabrication Date YDDD h (where Y is the last digit of the
year and DDD is the number of the
daywithin the year)
500020h – 500021h IC Module Fabricator 4252 h
500022h – 500023h IC Module Packaging
date
YDDD h + 9 Format (If Samsung does not
ship the IC module, customer should use
other area for this purpose. “YDDD + 9 “
means 9 days will be need for finishing
module making)
500024h – 500027h IC Serial Number A proprietary binary number
500028h – 500029h IC Batch number A proprietary binary number
50002Ah IC Version 00 h
50002Bh Test ROM Code Version 10 h
15 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
Address Contents Data
50002Ch – 50002Dh Crypto. Library Version 010C h
50002Eh DRNG Library Version 01 h
50002Fh TRNG Library Version 01 h
500030h – 5000FFh Available for customer All FF h
Table 3: TOE version information
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The Security Policy of the TOE is
to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the smart card operating system and
the smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore,
the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the
confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication
protocols and it will provide a True Random Number Generator (TRNG).
The RSA/ECC library is used to provide a high level interface to RSA/ECC cryptography
implemented on the hardware component TORNADO™2MX2 and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The SHA library provides the
calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in the CPU.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA/ECC cryptographic functions performed
by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Usage of Hardware Platform, Treatment of User Data, Protection during TOE
Development and Production, Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is an integrated circuit (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating system
and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems
can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target Lite [9]. The complete
hardware description and the complete instruction set of the TOE is to be found in
guidance documents delivered to the customer, see table 2. The TOE consists of hardware
as well as software subsystems. For the implementation of the TOE security functionalities
16 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
basically the components processing unit (CPU) with ROM, EEPROM, RAM, I/O,
Deterministic (DRNG) and True Random Number Generator (TRNG), TORNADO™,
Clock, Timer / 16-bit Timer and 20-bit Watchdog, Detectors and Security Control, RESET,
Address and Data Bus, DES, Power Control, MPU / Memory Protection Unit,
Testrom_code, DRNG Library, TRNG Library and RSA/ECC Library are used. Security
measures for physical protection are realised within the layout of the whole circuitry. The
Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the various on-chip memories
provide the interface to the software using the security functionalities of the TOE.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
1. Technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against
the specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the
circuitry (this testing is not strictly related to Security Functionalities);
2. Tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. Regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4. Regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for
the IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a
software simulation of chip in special hardware;
5. Characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
a) used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different
operating conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to
as characterisation tests)
b) special verification tests for Security Functionalities which were done with
samples of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and
which include also layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in
order to verify statements concerning the layout;
6. Functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all Security Functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the Functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer were repeated by sampling, by
17 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with an evaluation operating system. For the
developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters were used and the test
equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data
and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities using bespoke equipment and expert
knowledge. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically. The penetration tests results confirm that
the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment for
the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following two versions of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 Revision 1,
● Smartcard IC S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 Revision 1 with Secure Crypto
Library Version 1.0.
No further generation of the TOE takes place after delivery to the customer. After delivery
the TOE only features one fixed configuration (normal mode), which cannot be altered by
the user. The TOE was tested in this configuration. All the evaluation and certification
results therefore are only effective for this version of the TOE. For all evaluation activities
performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid for the normal
mode, too.
Every information of how to use the TOE and its Security Functions by the software is
provided within the user documentation.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
● The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
18 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
generators
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report),
● The components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a
re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on specific Library
parts.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance:
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [8]
● for the Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
19 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
No. Purpose Cryptograph-
ic Mecha-
nism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Securit
y Level
above
100
Bits
Comm
ents
1 -- EC key
generation
[18] Key sizes corresponding to the
used elliptic curves P-192 [19],
brainpoolP{192}r1,
brainpoolP{192}t1 [26], and
secp { 192}k1, secp{192}r1
[20]
No --
2 -- EC key
generation
[18] Key sizes corresponding to the
used elliptic curves P-224,
P-256, and P-384 [19],
brainpoolP{224, 256, 320, 384,
and 512}r1, brainpoolP{224,
256, 320, 384, 512}t1 [26], and
secp { 224, 256}k1, secp{224,
256, 384}r1 [20]
Yes --
3 Cryptographic
Primitive
Triple DES in
ECB mode
[21] 112 and 168 No --
4 -- AES [22] 128, 192, and 256 No --
5 -- SHA224 [23] None -- --
6 -- SHA256 [23] None -- --
7 -- SHA384 [23] None -- --
8 -- SHA512 [23] None -- --
9 -- RSA
signature
generation
(exponentiatio
n only)
[ISO/IEC14888-2:
2008]
|Modulus|=1280 - 1975 No --
10 -- RSA
signature
generation
(exponentiatio
n only)
[ISO/IEC14888-2:
2008]
|Modulus|=1976 - 2048 Yes --
11 -- RSA
signature
verification
(exponentiatio
n only)
[ISO/IEC14888-2:
2008]
|Modulus|=1280 - 1975 No --
12 -- RSA
signature
verification
(exponentiatio
n only)
[ISO/IEC14888-
2:2008]
|Modulus|=1976 - 2048 Yes --
20 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptograph-
ic Mecha-
nism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Securit
y Level
above
100
Bits
Comm
ents
13 -- ECDSA
signature
generation /
verification
[18] Key sizes corresponding to the
used elliptic curves P-192 [19],
brainpoolP{192}r1,
brainpoolP{192}t1 [26], and
secp { 192}k1, secp{192}r1
[20]
No --
14 -- ECDSA
signature
generation /
verification
[18] Key sizes corresponding to the
used elliptic curves P-224,
P-256, and P-384 [19],
brainpoolP{224, 256, 320, 384,
512}r1, brainpoolP{224, 256,
320, 384, 512}t1 [26], and
secp { 224, 256}k1, secp{224,
256, 384}r1 [20]
Yes --
15 Key
Agreement
ECDH [24] Key sizes corresponding to the
used elliptic curves
brainpoolP{192}r1,
brainpoolP{192}t1 [2], and
secp { 192}k1, secp{192}r1
[20]
No --
16 -- ECDH [24] Key sizes corresponding to the
used elliptic curves P-224,
P-256, and P-384 [19],
brainpoolP{224, 256, 320, 384,
512}r1, brainpoolP{224, 256,
320, 384, 512}t1 [26], and
secp { 224, 256}k1, secp{224,
256, 384}r1 [20]
Yes --
17 Random
Number
Generation
Physical True
Random
Number
Generator
AIS 31 Class P2
[4]
None -- --
18 -- Digital True
Random
Number
Generator
AIS 20 Class K3
[4]
None -- --
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
21 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software or Embedded Software, using the TOE.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely
use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product
layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also
consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation
[10].
The TOE is delivered to the Composite Product Manufacturer and to the Security IC
Embedded Software Developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the
Composite Product Issuer together with the application which runs on the TOE.
The Security IC Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [16] and the delivered documents [11], [12], [13], [14] have
to be considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [15] have to be considered.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
22 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
23 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016, Version 2.3, 25.07.2016, Security
Target of Samsung S3CT9KA/S3CT9K7/S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for
Smart Card with optional Secure RSA and ECC Library including specific IC
Dedicated Software, Samsung Electronics (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 6, 2016-07-27, Evaluation Ttechnical Report
Summary (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential
document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
[9] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016, Version 2.2, 25.07.2016, Security
Target Lite of Samsung S3CT9KA/S3CT9K7/S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
24 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
for Smart Card with optional Secure RSA and ECC Library including specific IC
Dedicated Software, Samsung Electronics (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36, Version 6, 2016-07-27,
Evaluation Technical Report For Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP), TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Security Application Note S3CT9KA_K7_K3_PC_PA_P7_P3_AC_AA_A7, Version
1.6, 2016-05-03, Samsung Electronics
[12] Technical Report: TORNADO-2Mx2 RSA/ECC Library API Manual, Version 1.095,
2016-05-04, Samsung Electronics
[13] S3CT9KA/PC family AIS20 DRNG library application note, Version 1.1, 2016-05-06,
Samsung Electronics
[14] S3CT9KA/PC family AIS31 TRNG library application note, Version 1.2, 2015-07-23,
Samsung Electronics
[15] S3CT9KA/K7/K3 Chip Delivery Specification, Version 0.1, 2010-08, Samsung
Electronics
[16] User’s manual S3CT9XX 16-Bit CMOS Microcontroller for Smart Card, Supported
Device: S3CT9KW/KC/KA/K9/K7/K3/PC/PA/P7/P3/AC/AA/A7, v1.21, 2011-11
Including Errata, Version 1.00, Samsung Electronics
[17] Architecture Reference: SecuCalm16 CPU Core, AR14, 2011-03-03,
Samsung Electronics
[18] American National Standard X9.62-2005, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA),
November 16, 2005, American National Standards Institute.
[19] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-3, Digital
Signature Standard; U.S. department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), June 2009.
[20] Certicom Research, SEC 2: recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters,
Version 1.0, September 2000.
[21] NIST Special Publication 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Revised 19 May 2008, version 1.1, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S.
Department of Data Encryption Standard (DES).
[22] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001,
Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), National Institute
of Standards and Technology.
[23] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 180-3, Secure
Hash Standard (SHS), October 2008, U.S. department of Commerce / National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[24] American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2011, Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Key Agreement and Key
Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, December 21, 2011, American
National Standards Institute.
25 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
[25] Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Algorithms and Parameters for
Secure Electronic Signatures; Part 1: Hash functions and asymmetric algorithms,
2007-11, version 2.0.0.
[26] ECC Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, v. 1.0, 19.10.2005
26 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
27 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
28 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
29 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
30 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
31 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
32 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
33 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
34 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
35 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
This page is intentionally left blank.
36 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for
Smart Card, Revision 1 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version 1.0 including
specific IC Dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 12 August 2016, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Name of site /
Company name
Address Type of site
Giheung Plant Samsung Electronics.
Co., Ltd. San24,
Nongseo-dong,
Giheung-gu, Yongin-City,
Gyeonggido, 449- 711,
Korea
Production
(Mask House, Wafer Fab, Initialisation
and Pre-personalisation)
Hwasung Plant Samsung Electronics.
Co., Ltd. San #16,
Banwol-Ri,
Hwasung-Eup,
Gyeonggi-Do, 445-701,
Korea
Development
(Development, Server room, Mask data
preparation)
Onyang Plant Samsung Electronics.
Co., Ltd., San #74,
Buksoo-Ri,
Baebang-Myun,
Asan-City,
Chungcheongnam-Do,
449-711, Korea (Onyang
Plant)
Production
Cheonan Plant
(PKL)
PKL Co., Ltd. Plant,
493-3 Sungsung-Dong,
Cheonan-City,
Choongcheongnam-Do,
330-300, Korea
Production
(Mask House)
37 / 38
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-V2-2016
Name of site /
Company name
Address Type of site
Asan Plant
(Hanamicron)
HANAMICRON Co., Ltd.,
#95-1, Wonnam-Li,
Umbong-Myeon,
Asan-City,
Choongcheongnam-Do,
449-711, Korea
Production
(Grinding, Sawing, Module testing)
Shanghai Plant I
(Inesa)
Inesa Co., Ltd., No. 818
Jin Yu Road, Jin Qiao
Export Processing Zone
Pudong, Shanghai, China
Production
(Grinding, Sawing, COB Assembly,
Warehouse/Delivery)
Shanghai Plant II
(Eternal)
ETERNAL Co., Ltd.,
No.1755, Hong Mei South
Road, Shanghai, China
(Shanghai Plant II /
ETERNAL)
Production
(Sawing, COB Assembly,
Warehouse/Delivery)
Pyeungtaek Plant
(Tesna)
TESNA Co., Ltd., No.
450-2 Mogok-Dong,
Pyeungtaek-City,
Gyeonggi, Korea
Production
(Wafer Testing)
Paju Plant (ASE) ASE Korea Co., Ltd.,
Sanupdanjigil 76, Paju,
Korea
Production
(Grinding, Sawing, SIP Assembly)
Table 5: Relevant development/production sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
38 / 38