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LUNA® PCI CONFIGURED FOR USE IN LUNA® SA 4.5.1
(RF) WITH BACKUP SECURITY TARGET
DOCUMENT NUMBER: CR-3636
AUTHOR: Terry Fletcher
DEPARTMENT: Engineering
LOCATION OF ISSUE: Ottawa
DATE ORIGINATED: January 19, 2012
REVISION LEVEL: 5
REVISION DATE: July 24, 2013
SUPERSESSION DATA: CR-3636, Revision 4 dated January 28, 2013
SECURITY LEVEL: Non-sensitive
© Copyright 2012-2013 SafeNet, Inc.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
SafeNet, Inc. reserves the right to make changes in the product or its specifications mentioned in
this publication without notice. Accordingly, the reader is cautioned to verify that information in
this publication is current before placing orders. The information furnished by SafeNet, Inc. in
this document is believed to be accurate and reliable. However, no responsibility is assumed by
SafeNet, Inc. for its use, or for any infringements of patents or other rights of third parties
resulting from its use.
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DOCUMENT CHANGE HISTORY
Revision Date Reason for Change Sections Affected
Original January 19, 2012 First release of document All
1 February 19, 2012 Minor edits. All
2 October 23, 2012 Updates incorporated based on lab feedback. Section 6.2.1,
3 December 12, 2012 Updated to provide guidelines on RPED. 2.6.1, 5.2.4.1, 6.2.1,
6.3.15
4 January 28, 2013 Updated to reflect SA software version change to
4.5.1 and provide guidelines on RPED.
1.1, 1.2, 2.6.1, 5.1.4.3,
5.2.4.1, 6.2.1
5 July 24, 2013 Update to provide additional guidance regarding
RPED.
2.6.1, 6.2.1, 6.3.15
Figure 2
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. ST INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................1
1.1. ST Identification...........................................................................................................................1
1.2. ST Overview................................................................................................................................1
1.3. CC Conformance Claim...............................................................................................................2
2. TOE DESCRIPTION...........................................................................................................................3
2.1. TOE Roles...................................................................................................................................5
2.2. Cryptographic Services................................................................................................................6
2.3. Non-cryptographic Security Services ...........................................................................................7
2.4. Trusted Path – Luna® PED..........................................................................................................7
2.5. User Authentication .....................................................................................................................8
2.6. Configurable Policy Settings ........................................................................................................9
2.6.1. Cryptographic Module Capabilities........................................................................................9
2.6.2. Partition Capabilities ...........................................................................................................10
2.7. TOE Usage................................................................................................................................11
2.8. Backup and Restoration.............................................................................................................11
2.9. Firmware Upgrade.....................................................................................................................12
2.10. User and Administrator Guidance Documentation ..................................................................12
2.11. Environment...........................................................................................................................12
3. TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................................................13
3.1. Assets to protect........................................................................................................................13
3.2. Assumptions..............................................................................................................................13
3.3. Threats......................................................................................................................................15
3.3.1. Threats Statements ............................................................................................................15
3.4. Organisational Security Policies.................................................................................................17
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................18
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................19
4.2. Security Objectives for the IT Environment.................................................................................21
4.3. Security Objectives for the non-IT Environment..........................................................................21
4.4. Mapping of Objectives ...............................................................................................................22
5. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................................23
5.1. TOE Security Functional Requirements .....................................................................................23
5.1.1. Security audit (FAU) ...........................................................................................................23
5.1.1.1. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation ..............................................................................23
5.1.1.2. FAU_GEN.2 User identity association..........................................................................25
5.1.1.3. FAU_STG.2 (TOE) Guarantees of audit data availability ..............................................25
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5.1.2. Cryptographic support (FCS) ..............................................................................................25
5.1.2.1. FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation..................................................................25
5.1.2.2. FCS_CKM.2 (BACKUP) Cryptographic key distribution................................................25
5.1.2.3. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction .................................................................26
5.1.2.4. FCS_COP.1 (SIGN) Cryptographic operation - Digital signature...................................26
5.1.2.5. FCS_COP.1 (BACKUP_ENC) Cryptographic operation................................................26
5.1.2.6. FCS_COP.1 (BACKUP_INT) Cryptographic operation .................................................26
5.1.2.7. FCS_RND.1 Quality metrics for random numbers ........................................................27
5.1.3. User data protection (FDP) .................................................................................................27
5.1.3.1. FDP_ACC.1 (CRYPTO) Subset access control............................................................27
5.1.3.2. FDP_ACC.1 (AUDIT) Subset access control................................................................28
5.1.3.3. FDP_ACC.1 (BACKUP) Subset access control ............................................................28
5.1.3.4. FDP_ACF.1 (CRYPTO) Security attribute based access control...................................28
5.1.3.5. FDP_ACF.1 (AUDIT) Security attribute based access control.......................................28
5.1.3.6. FDP_ACF.1 (BACKUP) Security attribute based access control...................................29
5.1.3.7. FDP_BKP.1 Backup and recovery ...............................................................................30
5.1.3.8. FDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security attributes...........................................31
5.1.3.9. FDP_IFC.1 (BACKUP) Subset information flow control ................................................31
5.1.3.10. FDP_IFC.1 (CRYPTO) Subset information flow control ................................................31
5.1.3.11. FDP_IFF.4 (BACKUP) Partial elimination of illicit information flows ..............................31
5.1.3.12. FDP_IFF.4 (CRYPTO) Partial elimination of illicit information flows ..............................32
5.1.3.13. FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection.......................................................32
5.1.3.14. FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action................................................32
5.1.4. Identification and authentication (FIA) .................................................................................33
5.1.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 (SO) Authentication failure handling ...........................................................33
5.1.4.2. FIA_AFL.1 (User) Authentication failure handling.........................................................33
5.1.4.3. FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition..............................................................................33
5.1.4.4. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets................................................................................33
5.1.4.5. FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication ............................................................................34
5.1.4.6. FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification................................................................................34
5.1.5. Security management (FMT) ..............................................................................................34
5.1.5.1. FMT_MSA.1 (ROLE_CRYPTO) Management of security attributes..............................34
5.1.5.2. FMT_MSA.1 (ROLE_AUDIT) Management of security attributes..................................34
5.1.5.3. FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes ........................................................................34
5.1.5.4. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization ......................................................................34
5.1.5.5. FMT_MTD.1 (Access Control) Management of TSF data .............................................35
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5.1.5.6. FMT_MTD.1 (USER_Crypto) Management of TSF data...............................................35
5.1.5.7. FMT_MTD.1 (USER_Audit) Management of TSF data .................................................35
5.1.5.8. FMT_MTD.1 (RAD) Management of TSF data .............................................................35
5.1.5.9. FMT_MTD.1 (AUDIT) Management of TSF data ..........................................................35
5.1.5.10. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions...................................................35
5.1.5.11. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles ..........................................................................................35
5.1.6. Protection of the TOE Security Functions (FPT)..................................................................36
5.1.6.1. FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing..........................................................................36
5.1.6.2. FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state ...................................................36
5.1.6.3. FPT_ITC.1 Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission..............................................36
5.1.6.4. FPT_ITI.1 Inter-TSF detection of modification ..............................................................36
5.1.6.5. FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack ...................................................................37
5.1.6.6. FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack ...................................................................37
5.1.6.7. FPT_RCV.1 Manual recovery ......................................................................................38
5.1.6.8. FPT_TST.1 TSF testing...............................................................................................38
5.1.7. Trusted path (FTP) .............................................................................................................39
5.1.7.1. FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path.............................................................................................39
5.2. Additions to the PP ....................................................................................................................39
5.2.1. Cryptographic support (FCS) ..............................................................................................39
5.2.1.1. FCS_CKM.2 (FW Update) Cryptographic key distribution.............................................39
5.2.1.2. FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access........................................................................40
5.2.1.3. FCS_COP.1 (DIGEST) Cryptographic operation - Message digest...............................40
5.2.1.4. FCS_COP.1 (RSA ENC/DEC) Cryptographic operation - RSA Encrypt/Decrypt............40
5.2.1.5. FCS_COP.1 (TDES ENC/DEC) Cryptographic operation - TDES Encrypt/Decrypt .......40
5.2.1.6. FCS_COP.1 (AES ENC/DEC) Cryptographic operation - AES Encrypt, Decrypt...........40
5.2.2. User data protection (FDP) .................................................................................................40
5.2.2.1. FDP_ACC.1 (TAC) Subset access control ...................................................................40
5.2.2.2. FDP_ACF.1 (TAC) Security attribute based access control ..........................................41
5.2.2.3. FDP_DAU.1 Basic data authentication.........................................................................42
5.2.2.4. FDP_DAU.2 Data authentication with identity of guarantor...........................................42
5.2.2.5. FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes ............................................42
5.2.2.6. FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection ............................................................43
5.2.2.7. FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality..........................................................43
5.2.2.8. FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity.............................................................................43
5.2.3. Identification and authentication (FIA) .................................................................................43
5.2.3.1. FIA_SOS.2 TSF generation of secrets .........................................................................43
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5.2.3.2. FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms......................................................43
5.2.3.3. FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms ..........................................................43
5.2.3.4. FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding..................................................................................44
5.2.4. Security management (FMT) ..............................................................................................44
5.2.4.1. FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour...........................................44
5.2.4.2. FMT_MSA.1 (Object Attributes) Management of security attributes ..............................45
5.2.4.3. FMT_MSA.2 (Object Attributes) Secure security attributes ...........................................45
5.2.4.4. FMT_MSA.3 (Object Attributes) Static attribute initialization .........................................45
5.2.4.5. FMT_MTD.1 (Login Failures) Management of TSF data...............................................45
5.2.4.6. FMT_MTD.1 (UAV) Management of TSF data .............................................................45
5.2.4.7. FMT_MTD.1 (SOV) Management of TSF data .............................................................46
5.2.4.8. FMT_SMF.1 (Policies) Specification of Management Functions ...................................46
5.2.5. Protection of the TOE Security Functions (FPT)..................................................................46
5.2.5.1. FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP...................................................................46
5.2.5.2. FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation ............................................................................46
5.2.6. Resource utilization (FRU)..................................................................................................46
5.2.6.1. FRU_FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerance...........................................................................46
5.2.7. Trusted path (FTP) .............................................................................................................46
5.2.7.1. FTP_ITC.1 (FW Update) Inter-TSF trusted channel......................................................46
5.2.7.2. FTP_ITC.1 (Key Cloning) Inter-TSF trusted channel ....................................................46
5.3. Requirements for IT Environment ..............................................................................................47
5.3.1. Security audit (FAU) ...........................................................................................................47
5.3.1.1. FAU_SAR.1 (ENV) Audit review...................................................................................47
5.3.1.2. FAU_STG.1 (ENV) Guarantees of audit data availability ..............................................47
5.3.2. Cryptographic support (FCS) ..............................................................................................47
5.3.2.1. FCS_CKM.1 (ENV/FW Update) Cryptographic key generation.....................................47
5.3.2.2. FCS_CKM.2 (ENV/FW Update) Cryptographic key distribution.....................................47
5.3.2.3. FCS_CKM.2 (ENV/BACKUP) Cryptographic key distribution........................................48
5.3.2.4. FCS_COP.1 (ENV/ENC FW Update) Cryptographic operation .....................................48
5.3.2.5. FCS_COP.1 (ENV/SIGN FW Update) Cryptographic operation ....................................48
5.3.2.6. FCS_COP.1 (ENV/BACKUP_ENC) Cryptographic operation .......................................48
5.3.2.7. FCS_COP.1 (ENV/BACKUP_INT) Cryptographic operation .........................................48
5.3.3. User data protection (FDP) .................................................................................................48
5.3.3.1. FDP_ACC.1 (CLIENT) Subset access control..............................................................48
5.3.3.2. FDP_ACF.1 (CLIENT) Security attribute based access control.....................................48
5.3.3.3. FDP_ACC.1 (ENV/BACKUP) Subset access control....................................................49
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5.3.3.4. FDP_ACF.1 (ENV/BACKUP) Security attribute based access control...........................49
5.3.3.5. FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity.............................................................................49
5.3.4. Identification and authentication (FIA) .................................................................................49
5.3.4.1. FIA_UAU.1 (CLIENT) Timing of authentication.............................................................49
5.3.4.2. FIA_UID.1 (CLIENT) Timing of identification ................................................................50
5.3.5. Trusted path (FTP) .............................................................................................................50
5.3.5.1. FTP_TRP.1 (CLIENT) Trusted path .............................................................................50
5.3.6. Trusted path (FTP) .............................................................................................................50
5.3.6.1. FTP_ITC.1 (ENV/FW Update) Inter-TSF trusted channel .............................................50
5.3.6.2. FTP_ITC.1 (ENV/Key Cloning) Inter-TSF trusted channel ............................................50
5.4. Non-IT Requirements ................................................................................................................51
5.5. TOE Security Assurance Requirements .....................................................................................52
5.5.1. Security Assurance Requirements Augmentation to EAL 4..................................................52
5.5.1.1. ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF........................................................................52
5.5.1.2. ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ........................................................................52
5.5.1.3. Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA.1) ........................................................................53
5.5.1.4. Analysis and testing for insecure states (AVA_MSU.3).................................................54
5.5.1.5. Highly resistant (AVA_VLA.4) ......................................................................................55
5.6. Strength of Function Claim.........................................................................................................56
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION...................................................................................................57
6.1. Overview ...................................................................................................................................57
6.1.1. Object Model ......................................................................................................................57
6.1.2. Multi-Session Capability......................................................................................................57
6.1.3. TOE Roles..........................................................................................................................57
6.1.4. Multi-User Capability...........................................................................................................58
6.2. Capability and Policy Settings....................................................................................................58
6.2.1. HSM Level Capabilities.......................................................................................................59
6.2.2. Partition Level Capabilities..................................................................................................59
6.3. IT Security Functions .................................................................................................................60
6.3.1. Audit Data Generation ........................................................................................................60
6.3.2. Trusted Path – Luna PED ...................................................................................................61
6.3.3. User Identification and Authentication .................................................................................61
6.3.3.1. M of N Activation .........................................................................................................62
6.3.3.2. Unidentified and Unauthenticated Users ......................................................................63
6.3.4. Authentication Data Selection .............................................................................................63
6.3.5. User Account Data..............................................................................................................63
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6.3.6. Access Control ...................................................................................................................64
6.3.7. Object Reuse......................................................................................................................65
6.3.8. Data Authentication ............................................................................................................65
6.3.9. Key Pair Integrity Checking.................................................................................................65
6.3.10. Key Export and Import Protection ....................................................................................65
6.3.11. Cryptographic Material Management ...............................................................................66
6.3.11.1. Key Storage and Access Protection .............................................................................66
6.3.12. Cryptography ..................................................................................................................66
6.3.13. Data Exchange ...............................................................................................................67
6.3.14. Specification of Security Management Functions.............................................................67
6.3.15. Security Function Management .......................................................................................68
6.3.16. Security Data Management .............................................................................................69
6.3.17. Logical Self-Protection of Security Functions ...................................................................69
6.3.17.1. Memory and Firmware Integrity Check.........................................................................69
6.3.17.2. Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................69
6.3.17.3. Prevention of By-pass and Separate Execution Domain...............................................70
6.3.17.4. Preservation of Secure State .......................................................................................70
6.3.17.5. Firmware Loading and Firmware Update......................................................................70
6.3.18. Cloning ...........................................................................................................................70
6.3.19. Physical Self-Protection...................................................................................................71
6.3.20. Failure Handling..............................................................................................................71
6.3.21. Backup and Recovery .....................................................................................................71
6.4. Strength of Function ..................................................................................................................72
6.5. Assurance Measures .................................................................................................................72
7. PP CLAIMS......................................................................................................................................74
7.1. Statement of PP Compliance.....................................................................................................74
7.2. Identification of IT Security Requirements Satisfying the PP.......................................................74
7.3. Identification of Security Objectives and IT Security Requirements Additional to the PP .............79
7.3.1. Security Objectives.............................................................................................................79
7.3.2. IT Security Requirements....................................................................................................79
8. RATIONALE ....................................................................................................................................80
8.1. Security Objectives Rationale ....................................................................................................80
8.2. IT Security Requirements Rationale...........................................................................................80
8.2.1. Explicitly Stated Security Requirements ..............................................................................80
8.2.2. Appropriateness of Strength of Function .............................................................................80
8.2.3. Appropriateness of Assurance Requirements......................................................................80
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8.2.4. Applicability and Appropriateness of Assurance Requirements for Explicitly Stated
Requirements...................................................................................................................................81
8.3. Assurance Measures .................................................................................................................81
APPENDIX A – REFERENCES.............................................................................................................116
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2-1 – CMCSOB PP to TOE Role Comparison.............................................................................. 6
Table 5-1 – Operation Abbreviations .................................................................................................. 41
Table 5-2 – Access Matrix ................................................................................................................... 42
Table 8-1 – Necessity of Security Objectives..................................................................................... 82
Table 8-2 – Mapping of Objectives to Threats.................................................................................... 83
Table 8-3 – Mapping of Objectives to Assumptions and Policies ..................................................... 86
Table 8-4 – Necessity of Security Functional Requirements............................................................. 88
Table 8-5 – Mapping of Security Functional Requirements to Objectives ........................................ 91
Table 8-6: Dependency Rationale for Security Functional Requirements ....................................... 98
Table 8-7 – Mapping of IT Security Functions to IT Security Requirements and SFRs.................. 102
Table 8-8 – Mapping of Security Functional Requirements to IT Security Functions .................... 104
Table 8-9 – Assurance Measures...................................................................................................... 110
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Luna PCI Cryptographic Module .............................................................................................. 3
Figure 2 Luna SA with Local PED and iKeys........................................................................................... 4
Figure 3 Illustration of the TOE and TSF in the Context of Luna SA.................................................. 5
Figure 4 Luna® PED with PED Keys.................................................................................................... 8
Figure 5 Luna® PED with iKeys......................................................................................................... 61
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
1
Administrator means a CSP user role that performs TOE initialisation or other TOE administrative functions.
These tasks are mapped to the Security Officer role of the TOE.
Advanced electronic signature means an electronic signature which meets the following requirements:
(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory;
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control, and
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is
detectable.
Approved algorithms and parameters means cryptographic algorithms and parameters approved for use in
electronic signatures, secure signature creation devices and trustworthy systems under the Directive or by the
appropriate national standards body.
Authentication data is information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
Auditor means a user exporting the TOE audit data and reviewing the audit data with tools in the TOE
environment.
Backup means secure export and external storage of the CSP-SCD, the TSF data and the system data
(backup data) sufficient to recreate the state of the TOE at the time the backup was created. Note that backup
is the only function which is allowed to export CSP-SCD.
CEN European Committee for Standardization (CEN). The Protection Profiles used as the basis for this
Security Target were developed through CEN Workshop Agreements (CWA) under the European Electronic
Signature Standardisation Initiative (EESSI) CEN/ISSS electronic signature (E-SIGN) workshop, Area F on
secure signature-creation devices (SSCD) and Area D2 on trustworthy systems.
Certificate means an electronic attestation which links the SVD to a person and confirms the identity of that
person.
CSP signature creation data (CSP-SCD) means SCD which is used by the CSP, e.g. for the creation of
advanced electronic signatures in qualified certificates or for signing certificate status information.
CSP signature verification data (CSP-SVD) means SVD which corresponds to the CSP-SCD and which is
used to verify the advanced electronic signature in the qualified certificate.
Certification Authority (CA) is a synonym for CSP, defined below.
Certification-Service-provider (CSP) means an entity or a legal or natural person who issues certificates or
provides other services related to electronic signatures.
Data to be signed (DTBS) means the complete electronic data to be signed, such as QC content data or
certificate status information.
Data to be signed representation (DTBS-representation) means the data sent to the TOE for signing and is
(a) a hash-value of the DTBS or
(b) an intermediate hash-value of a first part of the DTBS and a remaining part of the DTBS or
(c) the DTBS itself.
The client indicates to the TOE the case of DTBS-representation, unless implicitly indicated. The hash-value
in case (a) or the intermediate hash-value in case (b) is calculated by the client. The final hash-value in case
(b) or the hash-value in case (c) is calculated by the TOE.
1
This Glossary of Terms is based on the Glossaries provided in the SSCD PP and the CMCSOB PP.
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Directive The Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13 December 1999 on a
Community framework for electronic signatures [1] is also referred to as the ‘Directive’ in the remainder of the
ST.
Digital signature means data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data unit that allows a
recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery e.g. by
the recipient. [ISO 7498-2]
Dual person control means a special form of access control of a task which requires two users with different
identities to be authenticated and authorised to the defined roles at the time this task is to be performed.
Hardware security module (HSM) means a cryptographic module used to generate the advanced signature
in qualified certificates. The TOE specified in this Security Target is an HSM.
Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) is a data bus standard used in most PCs and servers.
Qualified certificate means a certificate which meets the requirements laid down in Annex I of the Directive
and is provided by a CSP who fulfils the requirements laid down in Annex II of the Directive.
Reference authentication data (RAD) means data persistently stored by the TOE for verification of the
authentication attempt as authorised user. Note that the TOE does not store such data.
Restore means import of the backup data to recreate the state of the TOE at the time the backup was
created.
Secure signature-creation device (SSCD) means configured software or hardware which is used to
implement the SCD and which meets the requirements laid down in Annex III of the Directive.
Side-channel means illicit information flow resulting from observation of the physical behavior of the technical
implementation of the TOE. Side-channels are limited to interfaces not intended for data output like power
consumption, timing of any signals and radiation. Side-channels might be enhanced by influencing the TOE
behavior from outside.
Signature-creation data (SCD) means unique data, such as codes or private cryptographic keys, which are
used by the signatory to create an electronic signature.
Signature-verification data (SVD) means data, such as codes or public cryptographic keys, which are used
for the purpose of verifying an electronic signature. (defined in the Directive [1], article 2.7)
SSCD provision service means a service that prepares and provides a SSCD to subscribers.
User means any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.
User data means data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF.
Verification authentication data (VAD) means authentication data provided as input by knowledge or
authentication data derived from user’s biometric characteristics.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
API Application Programming Interface
CA Certificate Authority
CC Common Criteria
CIMS Certificate Issuing and Management System
CLI Command Line Interface
CMCSO(B) Cryptographic Module for Certificate Signing Operations (with Backup)
COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf
CSP Certification Service Provider
DES Data Encryption Standard
DLL Dynamic Linked Library
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DTBS Data to be Signed
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HSM Hardware Security Module
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IT Information Technology
IT Information Technology
PC Personal Computer
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
PED PIN Entry Device
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKC Public Key Confirmation
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standard
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator
RAD Reference Authentication Data
RAM Random Access Memory
RF Refresh
RNG Random Number Generator (Generation)
ROM Read-Only Memory
RSA Asymmetric algorithm developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirements
SCD Signature Creation Data
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirements
SHA Secure HASH Algorithm
SO Security Officer
SoF Strength of Function
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
ST Security Target
SVD Signature Verification Data
TDES Triple DES
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSA Time Stamp Authority
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
UAV User Authorization Vector
VAD Verification Authentication Data
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Document Organisation
A Glossary of Terms and a List of Acronyms and Abbreviations list is provided to define frequently used
terms and acronyms.
Section 1 provides the introductory material for the Security Target.
Section 2 provides general purpose and TOE description.
Section 3 provides a discussion of the expected environment for the TOE. This section also defines the set of
threats that are to be addressed by either the technical countermeasures implemented in the TOE hardware,
the TOE software, or through the environmental controls.
Section 4 defines the security objectives for both the TOE and the TOE environment.
Section 5 contains the functional requirements and assurance requirements derived from the Common
Criteria (CC), Part 2 [2] and Part 3 [3], that must be satisfied by the TOE.
Section 6 provides the TOE Summary Specification.
Section 7 contains the Protection Profile conformance claims.
Section 8 provides the rationale to explicitly demonstrate that the information technology security objectives
satisfy the policies and threats. Arguments are provided for the coverage of each policy and threat. The
section then explains how the set of requirements are complete relative to the objectives, and that each
security objective is addressed by one or more component requirements. Arguments are provided for the
coverage of each objective. Next section 8 provides a set of arguments that address dependency analysis,
strength of function issues, and the internal consistency and mutual supportiveness of the protection profile
requirements
Appendix A contains the list of references used in compiling this ST.
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1. ST INTRODUCTION
1.1. ST Identification
Title: Luna® PCI Configured for Use in Luna® SA 4.5.1 (RF) With Backup Security Target
TOE Name Luna® PCI Configured for Use in Luna SA 4.5.1 (RF)
TOE Version Luna PCI Hardware Version VBD-03-0100 (part numbers 216-010031-001 [legacy part
number 900691-000] and 216-010031-002 [legacy part number 900691-001]), Firmware
Version 4.8.7
Assurance level: EAL 4-augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_FLR.2, AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4
Keywords: Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), hardware security module, certification authority,
certification service provider, key management, cryptographic services, key generation,
key protection, digital certificate management, public-key infrastructure, digital
signature, encryption, confidentiality, integrity, networked information systems, baseline
information protection.
1.2. ST Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) described by this Security Target (ST) is an implementation of the certified
Protection Profile – CWA 14167-2 [Crypto Module for Certificate Signing Operations with Backup (CMCSOB) PP,
version 0.28 dated 27 October 2003] published in the Official Journal of the European Commission in May 2004
as a generally recognized standard for electronic signature products. The TOE also implements security
functions in addition to those specified in the CMCSOB PP.
The TOE, Luna® PCI configured for use in the Luna SA 4.5.1 (RF), includes the following:
• the Luna® PCI cryptographic module in a PCI Card form factor (216-010031-001 [legacy part number
900691-000] and 216-010031-002 [legacy part number 900691-001] with Firmware Version 4.8.7),
• a Luna® PIN Entry Device (PED) (Local PED – Firmware Versions 2.0.2 and 2.4.0-3) and iKeys,
• API library and driver software (version 4.5.1),
• Luna SA 4.5 / 4.5.1 Guidance Documentation (700-010478-002, Revision B).
The TOE Security Functions are all implemented within the Luna® PCI cryptographic module. The Luna® PCI
cryptographic module is a Hardware Security Module (HSM) in the form of a PCI card that typically resides within
a custom computing or secure communications appliance. It is contained in its own secure enclosure that
provides physical resistance to tampering and zeroization of plaintext key material and security parameters in the
event a tamper signal is received. The boundary of the cryptographic module is defined to encompass all
components inside the secure enclosure on the PCI card.
SafeNet's Luna® HSMs comprise a range of hardware security solutions for digital identity applications. Luna
products feature true hardware key management to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of digital signature
and encryption keys. Key material is generated, stored, and used exclusively within the secure confines of the
Luna hardware security module (HSM) to prevent compromise.
SafeNet's HSMs provide advanced features like direct hardware-to-hardware backup, split user role
administration, multi-person authentication, and trusted path authentication coupled with proven security and
operational deployment experience in some of the largest PKI deployments in the world.
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1.3. CC Conformance Claim
This ST is conformant with:
1) CC Version 2.3 Part 2- extended. The following non Part 2 Security Functional Requirements are
included to meet specific requirements of the TOE:
• FCS_RND.1 (Quality metrics for random numbers)
• FDP_BKP.1 (CMCSO PP Backup)
2) CC Version 2.3 Part 3-EAL 4 augmented. The EAL 4 package has been augmented by the addition of
the following Part 3 requirements:
• ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF)
• ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw Reporting Procedures)
• AVA_CCA.1 (Covert channel analysis)
• AVA_MSU.3 (Analysis and testing for insecure states)
• AVA_VLA.4 (Highly resistant)
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2. TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE provides a physically and logically protected component for the performance of cryptographic functions
for key generation, key storage, encryption and decryption, digital signature and verification used by application
systems that provide cryptographic support functions such as a Certificate Authority/Certification Service Provider
(CA/CSP) or Time Stamp Authority (TSA). It includes processors, read-only and random-access memory, and
firmware packaged in a tamper-resistant form along with Cryptographic API software that resides on the host
computer.
Figure 1 shows the TOE in its appliance deployment configuration – as part of the Luna® SA network-attached
appliance.
Figure 1. Luna PCI Cryptographic Module
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Figure 2 Luna SA with Local PED and iKeys
The boundary of the TOE described in this ST encompasses the following:
1. The Luna® PCI cryptographic module – a printed circuit board in PCI card format enclosed within tamper-
resistant metal covers. The printed circuit board hosts volatile and non-volatile memory, a
microprocessor, with its associated firmware, data, control and key transfer signal paths, an FPGA that
provides an entropy selection function for the on-board random bit generator, input/output controller,
power management and a local oscillator.
2. The Luna® PIN Entry Device (Local PED), which is housed in a separate physical enclosure and, through
a physically and electrically separate data port connection to the module, provides a trusted path for the
communication of critical security parameters (authentication data and plaintext cryptographic
parameters) to and from the module.
3. iKeys, which are USB token devices used to securely store authentication data and other critical security
parameters for entry through the PED.
4. PKCS #11 client library and driver software provides the programming and communications interface
normally used to access the cryptographic module.
5. User and Administrative Guidance documentation for the TOE is provided on CD-ROM along with client
PKCS #11 software.
The TSF boundary is the Luna® PCI cryptographic module.
The TOE in the evaluated configuration is supported on the CentOS 5.4 operating system.
The TOE supports backup and restoration of cryptographic objects, such as the CSP-SCD, with the TSF data
needed to re-establish an operational state after recovery from a failure. Backup and restoration is done using
cryptographic protocols and mechanisms that protect the confidentiality of the backup data and detect loss of the
integrity of the backup data. Measures must be taken within the non-IT environment to ensure the availability of
the backup data.
Figure 3 below illustrates the relationship between the TOE and the Luna SA appliance and also shows the
division between the TSF and non-TSF portions of the TOE, specifically the Luna PCI HSM and the supporting
Luna PED and library and driver software.
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Figure 3 Illustration of the TOE and TSF in the Context of Luna SA
2.1. TOE Roles
The following authenticated roles are supported by the TOE:
• Security Officer (SO) – authorized to install and configure the TOE, set and maintain security policies, and
create and delete users (Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles). The TOE can have only one SO.
• Crypto Officer – authorized to create, use, destroy and backup/restore cryptographic objects.
• Crypto User – authorized to use cryptographic objects (e.g., sign, encrypt/decrypt).
The Crypto Officer and Crypto User communicate with the Luna® PCI for cryptographic operations using the
PKCS #11 API. The Security Officer uses a separate Command Line Interface (CLI), which is part of the interface
software, to perform configuration, security policy settings and user creation/deletion. The CLI is also used by the
Crypto Officer to perform backup and restoration of cryptographic objects.
The TOE allows for the creation of multiple users in the Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles. Each user is
created within a cryptographically separated partition in the Luna® PCI cryptographic module and each partition
must have one and only one user in the Crypto Officer role. A partition may also have one and only one user in
the Crypto User role. Throughout the remainder of the ST, the term User will be used to refer to a partition user,
in either the Crypto User or Crypto Officer role, when it is either not required or not appropriate to distinguish
between the roles. The term user will be used to refer to a generic user, either unauthenticated or authenticated
in any one of the 3 roles.
In Table 2-1 the roles supported by the TOE are compared to the roles defined in the CMCSOB PP and
PKCS#11.
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Table 2-1 – CMCSOB PP to TOE Role Comparison
Function PP Role TOE Role PKCS#11 Role
Initialisation, configuration Crypto Officer Security Officer Security Officer
Key Management Crypto Officer Crypto Officer User
Use Crypto User Crypto User User
2.2. Cryptographic Services
The TOE provides the full range of cryptographic and key management functions. The major functions supported
by the TOE are outlined below:
Random Number Generation
A trustworthy Random Number Generator is required to support secure generation of symmetric keys and
asymmetric key pairs.
• FIPS 140-2 validated Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Pseudo-random Number Generator) seeded
by internal Hardware Non-deterministic Random Bit Generator
• Based on ANSI X9.31, Appendix A section 2.4
Generate Public/Private Key Pairs
It is important that key pairs are properly generated in accordance with approved standards. The TOE provides
key pair generation in accordance with the following standards.
• RSA 1024, 2048, 4096 bits key pairs in accordance with ANSI X9.31
• DSA 1024 bits key pairs in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-2
• ECDSA in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-2 and ANSI X9.62
Generate Secret (Symmetric) Keys
It is important that symmetric keys are properly generated in accordance with approved standards. The TOE
provides key generation in accordance with the following standards.
• TDES 112, 168 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 46-3 and ANSI X9.52
• AES 128, 192, 256 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 197
Secure Key Material Storage and Access
Sensitive key values must be strongly protected and never be visible in plaintext form. The TOE ensures this in
the following ways.
• Key material stored in hardware and strongly encrypted
• Access to private keys and symmetric keys is provided via key handles only
Compute Digital Signatures and Verify Digital Signatures
The TOE computes and verifies digital signatures in accordance with the following standards.
• RSA 1024 bits, 2048 bits, 4096 bits (PKCS #1 V1.5, PKCS #1 PSS, ANSI X9.31) with SHA-1
• RSA 1024 bits, 2048 bits, 4096 bits (PKCS #1 V1.5, PKCS #1 PSS) with SHA-256, 384, 512
• DSA 1024 bits (FIPS PUB 186-2) with SHA-1
• ECDSA (FIPS PUB 186-2 Appendix 6 recommended curves) with SHA-1
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Encrypt / Decrypt Data
The TOE performs encryption and decryption operations on user data in accordance with the following standards.
• RSA 1024, 2048 and 4096 bits in accordance with PKCS #1 V1.5 and OAEP
• TDES (ECB and CBC mode) 112 and 168 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 46-3
• AES (ECB and CBC mode) 128 and 256 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 197
Import (Unwrap) Private Keys
The TOE can import private keys using an Unwrap operation in accordance with the following standard.
• RSA 1024, 2048 and 4096 bit private keys in PKCS #8 format with TDES and AES in CBC mode
Export (Wrap) and Import (Unwrap) Secret Keys
The TOE can export and import symmetric keys using Wrap and Unwrap operations in accordance with the
following standards.
• TDES, AES with TDES and AES in ECB mode
• TDES, AES with RSA 1024, 2048 and 4096 bits in accordance with PKCS #1 V1.5
Handling of key material and the use of cryptographic functions must be done in accordance with the key
management procedures and policies of the user organization.
2.3. Non-cryptographic Security Services
The TOE provides the following security services to support the protection of key material and cryptographic
services:
• User authentication,
• Access control for the creation and destruction of keys,
• Access control for security administration functions,
• Access control for usage of keys with cryptographic functions,
• Self-test of the TOE.
2.4. Trusted Path – Luna® PED
User authentication data and other critical security parameters are protected through the use of a separate port
and data path for their transfer, and by providing mechanisms to protect their confidentiality and integrity.
Attached to this separate data port is the Luna® PIN Entry Device or Luna® PED.
The Luna® PED, with accompanying iKeys, is depicted in Figure 4. It houses a number of input/output interfaces
that, in combination, provide a trusted path device for the communication of authentication data and critical
security parameters to and from the Luna® PCI cryptographic module. The Luna® PED has a graphics display
used to display status and prompt messages, and a challenge secret that is output by the cryptographic module at
the time a partition is created [see sub-section 2.5]. It has a keypad used to enter simple responses
(Yes/No/Enter) and to enter an optional PIN that is combined with the authentication data stored on a iKey as part
of the authentication process. It has a USB receptacle for the input/output of data to the iKey and it has a serial
communications cable that connects to the separate data port, which is wired directly to the cryptographic
module. Because the PED has a direct serial communications interface to the cryptographic module, only local
entry of iKey authentication data is possible.
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The following types of iKey are used with the Luna® PED:
• Blue (SO) iKey – for the storage of SO authentication data,
• Black (User) iKey – for the storage of User authentication data,
• Red (Domain) iKey – for the storage of the cloning domain data, used to control the ability to clone from a
cryptographic module to a backup token,
• Green (M of N) iKeys – used to store M of N secret shares, used for multi-person control of critical
functions,
Any iKey, once data has been written to it, is an Identification and Authentication device and must be safeguarded
accordingly by the administrative or operations staff responsible for the operation of the TOE within the
customer’s environment.
Figure 4 Luna® PED with PED Keys
2.5. User Authentication
The TOE requires that all users (SO, Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles) be authenticated by proving
knowledge of a secret shared by the user and the cryptographic module.
The TOE generates the authentication secrets using its Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG). For the
SO, the authentication secret is a 48-byte random secret and it is generated at the time the cryptographic module
is initialised. For Users, the authentication secrets consist of a 48-byte random secret and separate challenge
secret(s); these are generated at the time the partition is created by the SO. The authentication secret(s) are
provided to the operator via the Luna® PED and iKey, described in sub-section 2.4, and must be entered by the
operator via the Luna® PED and via a logically separate trusted channel (in the case of the response based on
the challenge secret) during the login process. Both the Crypto Officer and Crypto User use the same 48-byte
random secret. If a Partition is created with Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles, a separate challenge secret is
generated for each role.
SO authentication requires the transmission to the cryptographic module of the Blue (SO) iKey data combined
with the optional PIN through the trusted path.
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User authentication is a two-stage process. The first stage is termed “Activation” and is performed using the
Luna® PED. Activation requires the transmission to the cryptographic module of the Black (User) iKey data
combined with the optional PIN through the trusted path. Once Activation has been performed, the partition data
is ready for use within the cryptographic module. Access to key material and cryptographic services, however, is
not allowed until the second stage of authentication, equivalent to “User Login”, has been performed. This
typically requires the input of a partition’s challenge secret as part of an application program’s login operation.
The authentication challenge secret (or secrets if the Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles are used) for the
partition is generated by the cryptographic module as a 75-bit random value that is displayed as a 16-character
string on the visual display of the trusted path device. The challenge secret is then provided, via a secure out-of-
band means, to each external entity authorized to connect to the partition and is used by the external entity to
form the response to a random one-time challenge from the cryptographic module. The encrypted one-time
response is returned to the cryptographic module where it is verified to confirm the “User Login”.
2.6. Configurable Policy Settings
The Luna® PCI was designed with the flexibility needed to support a number of different product variants. The
main method used to control the behaviour of different products is a fixed set of “capabilities” set at the factory.
The settings that are possible to make for the TOE configuration are shown below. For each of the capabilities, a
corresponding policy element exists. The TOE provides security management functions by giving the SO the
ability to establish the policy that will govern the cryptographic module’s operation, according to the requirements
of the customer organization, by enabling/disabling or refining the corresponding policy elements to equate to or
to be more restrictive than the pre-assigned capabilities.
Policy set elements can only refine capability set elements to more restrictive values. Specifically, if a capability is
set to allow, the corresponding policy element may be set to either enable or disable. However, if a capability is
set to disallow, the corresponding policy element is set to disabled and is not SO-configurable. Thus, an SO
cannot use policy configuration to lift a restriction set in a capability definition.
There are also several elements of the cryptographic module’s behaviour that are truly fixed for all product
variants and, therefore, are never subject to configuration by the SO. These fixed elements are the following:
• Non-sensitive secret keys are not allowed.
• Non-sensitive private keys are not allowed.
• Non-private (Public) secret keys are not allowed.
• Non-private (Public) private keys are not allowed.
• Creation of secret keys and private keys through the PKCS #11 create object interface is not allowed.
That is, the API cannot be used to create keys by passing in known plaintext values.
In the next two sub-sections, all capability elements described as “allow/disallow some functionality” are Boolean
values where false (or zero) equates to disallow the functionality and true (or one) equates to allow the
functionality. Except as noted, all Boolean capabilities are Allowed, thus leaving them configurable by the SO.
The remainder of the elements are integer values with either the default value or the maximum in number of bits
shown.
2.6.1. Cryptographic Module Capabilities
The following is the set of capabilities supported at the cryptographic module level:
• Allow/disallow non-FIPS algorithms available.
• Allow/disallow password authentication (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow trusted path authentication (allowed and must be enabled in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow Remote PED Usage (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow M of N.
• Allow/disallow cloning.
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• Allow/disallow masking (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow M of N auto-activation.
• Allow/disallow ECC mechanisms.
• Allow/disallow Remote Authentication.
• Allow/disallow SO reset of partition PIN.
• Allow/disallow network replication.
• Allow/disallow forcing change of User authentication data.
• Number of failed SO logins allowed before the HSM is zeroized (set to 3, non-configurable).
Note that the module policy “Allow/disallow Remote PED Usage” is disallowed with the TOE in the evaluated
configuration. The TOE must be purchased in the “Local PED” configuration. Use of a Remote PED, which
requires the module policy “Allow/disallow Remote PED Usage” to be changed to “Allow” means that the TOE can
no longer be considered an evaluated configuration.
2.6.2. Partition Capabilities
The following is the set of capabilities supported at the partition level:
• Allow/disallow partition reset.
• Allow/disallow activation.
• Allow/disallow automatic activation.
• Allow/disallow High Availability.
• Allow/disallow multipurpose keys.
• Allow/disallow changing of certain key attributes once a key has been created.
• Allow/disallow operation without RSA blinding.
• Allow/disallow signing operations with non-local keys.
• Allow/disallow raw RSA operations.
• Allow/disallow private key wrapping (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow private key unwrapping.
• Allow/disallow secret key wrapping
• Allow/disallow secret key unwrapping.
• Allow/disallow Level 3 operation without a challenge (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow user key management capability. (Allowed in TOE configuration. This would be disabled
by the SO at the policy level to prevent any key management activity in the partition, even by a user in the
Crypto Officer role. This could be used, for example, at a CA once the root signing key pair has been
generated and backed up, if appropriate, to lock down the partition for signing use only.)
• Allow/disallow incrementing of failed login attempt counter on failed challenge response validation.
• Allow/disallow RSA signing without confirmation.
• Allow/disallow RA type wrapping (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Minimum/maximum password length (not applicable in TOE configuration).
• Level of storage space available for key storage (4 bits).
• Number of failed Partition User logins allowed before partition is locked out/cleared.(default is 10, SO can
configure to be 3 <= N <= 10).
The following capabilities are only configurable if cloning is allowed and enabled at the cryptographic module
level:
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• Allow/disallow private key cloning (allowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow secret key cloning (allowed in TOE configuration).
The following capabilities are only configurable if masking is allowed and enabled at the cryptographic module
level:
• Allow/disallow private key masking (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow secret key masking (disallowed in TOE configuration).
2.7. TOE Usage
The TOE provides a physically and logically protected component for the performance of cryptographic functions
such as key generation, key storage, encryption and decryption, digital signature and verification used by
application systems that provide cryptographic support services such as a Certification Service Provider (CSP). It
includes processors, read-only and random-access memory, and firmware packaged in a tamper-resistant form
along with Cryptographic API software that resides on the host computer.
It is accessed directly (i.e., electrically) via either the PIN Entry Device (PED) serial interface or via the PCI bus
interface. Logical access to key material and cryptographic services for users and user application software is
provided indirectly through the Cryptographic API software on the host computer and on the network-attached
Luna® SA appliance.
Before the TOE can be used to perform any cryptographic or key management functions, it must first be
initialised. Initialisation causes the cryptographic module’s contents (if any) to be erased and creates the SO for
the cryptographic module. The SO must then set the configurable policies at the cryptographic module level and
create at least one partition, with its corresponding user in the Crypto Officer role (creating a user in the Crypto
User role is optional), to make the cryptographic module ready for use. There is no theoretical limit on the
number of partitions that can be created by the SO. However, due to cryptographic module data storage
constraints, a limit of 20 partitions per cryptographic module has been imposed. The SO may also be required to
make policy settings at the partition level to conform to the organization’s security requirements.
In operation, the TOE requires users in any of the 3 roles to be identified and authenticated before they are
authorized to perform any cryptographic and/or key management operations. Authentication is performed using
the Luna® PED or a combination of Luna® PED and a one-time challenge-response mechanism for the Crypto
Officer and Crypto User roles.
In order to support requirements for strict separation of duties and/or multi-person control of critical security
functions, the TOE also supports an optional M of N secret sharing mechanism in addition to the authentication
data stored on the users’ iKeys.
The TOE supports access by multiple users. Each user establishes one or more sessions with the cryptographic
module, by which requests for services are transmitted to the cryptographic module and responses received.
Session states are kept separate based on the user authentication state ensuring that sessions cannot be shared
among users. Although there may be many users authenticated to the cryptographic module, there is effectively
only one thread of execution within the module and, therefore, only one command being executed from request
through to response at any given time.
2.8. Backup and Restoration
In order to support backup and transparent recovery of the cryptographic keys and supporting data stored within
the Luna PCI cryptographic module, an optional backup and restoration capability can be provided. Each partition
on the Luna PCI cryptographic module may have its cryptographic objects backed up to a Luna® Backup Token
using the Luna® Key Cloning protocol. Conversely, the cryptographic objects stored on a Backup Token may be
restored to a partition on a properly initialised Luna PCI cryptographic module.
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2.9. Firmware Upgrade
The Luna PCI cryptographic module provides a capability to upgrade the module’s firmware. Only the SO can
perform a firmware upgrade. Each valid firmware upgrade package is digitally signed by SafeNet and encrypted.
The customer must possess the correct authorization code in order to open the firmware upgrade package and
the signature must be verified by the cryptographic module before the module will accept the upgrade.
2.10. User and Administrator Guidance Documentation
User and Administrator Guidance documentation is provided through the Luna on-line help system provided to the
customer on CD-ROM as part of the delivered TOE.
2.11. Environment
The TOE is normally used as the cryptographic module for the Luna SA appliance. As such, it is delivered to the
customer complete with the most important components of the environment. These environmental components
provided with the Luna SA are the following:
• The Luna SA appliance platform running the CentOS 5.4 operating system.
• The Luna SA 4.5.1 software, which includes a Command Line Interface (CLI) that presents the visible
user interface for administration of the TOE and the PKCS #11 Cryptographic API software, provided as a
Linux shared-object library.
• A Luna Backup Token (PC Card) used to securely store cryptographic objects and TSF data needed for
recovery from a failure.
The client PKCS #11 Cryptographic API software, provided as part of the TOE as a Windows DLL or Unix-type
shared-object library depending on the host platform configuration, runs within the appliance environment and
provides the programming interface to the host software application, which normally acts as the user of the TOE.
The TOE is normally operated in a physically secured environment by users who have been specifically
authorized to do so by the owning organization. Because the TOE is typically used within a larger system, such
as a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), as part of a Certification Authority (CA) or Certification Service provider
(CSP), the environment will often also include a variety of hardware, software, telecommunications and
networking devices as well as uninterruptible power supplies and environmental controls.
Note also that the TOE does not, in itself, provide full security audit functionality. It does export the raw data (with
identifying sequence numbers but without time stamps) needed to compile an audit record. If security audit is
required for the system within which the TOE is operating, the host IT environment must provide the means of
recording security relevant events, so as to assist an administrator in the detection of potential attacks or mis-
configuration of the system, of which the TOE is a part, that could leave the host system and/or the TOE itself
susceptible to attack, and also to hold users accountable for any actions they perform that are relevant to the
security of the system.
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3. TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
3.1. Assets to protect
The primary assets that need to be protected by the TOE are the following:
Services ensured by the TOE:
R.Services: integrity and availability of the TOE services as well as protection against misuse is required.
TOE internal data:
R.User_Data: confidential user data (CSP-SCD, other user related private and secret keys (if any), etc.). Such
data must be protected both in confidentiality and integrity. Data to be signed with CSP-SCD has to be protected
in integrity.
2
R.TOE_Data: TSF data (especially VAD and RAD) and other sensitive TOE data not related to a user or role
(TOE configuration data, audit data) which have to be protected in confidentiality, integrity and availability.
3
R.USERMGMT_DATA: non-confidential user / role related data (identifier, access control lists, role definitions,
etc.). Those data has to be protected in integrity.
Data shared between the TOE and its environment:
R.Backup: backup data exported by the TOE to the TOE environment and restored in the TOE. This data needs
to be protected in integrity and confidentiality by the TOE. Availability of this data has to be ensured in the TOE
environment.
R.Exch_Data: data exchanged by the TOE through its interface (parameters for services that can be activated
through the interface). They have to be protected in integrity. Some of those imported data shall also be protected
in confidentiality (encipher keys, verification authentication data).
3.2. Assumptions
Some of the assumptions of this ST are either more specific than or in addition to those of the CMCSO PP. The
following assumptions have been added to the ST for the reasons indicated.
1. A.Admin. Because of the overall complexity of the TOE, the personnel responsible for its administration
(installation, configuration, audit review, etc.) must be adequately trained.
2. A.Controlled_Access. This ST assumes that physical and procedural access controls are in place and
maps O.ENV_Protect_Access to this assumption. The CMCSO PP maps O.ENV_Protect_Access to a
number of different threats to be countered by the TOE. Both approaches are equivalent. It is felt that
the assumption of controlled access is more in keeping with the actual conditions present in the expected
operating environment of the TOE.
3. A.Legitimate_FW_Update. The TOE allows the cryptographic module firmware to be updated, provided
that the firmware update code is properly packaged and signed by the vendor. This assumption covers
the proper packaging and signing of the firmware update, which must be done in the environment.
4. A.User_Management has been added and A.User_Authentication has been re-worded to more accurately
reflect the actual conditions related to user authentication and the handling of user roles. These two
assumptions are meant to capture the intent of A.User_Authentication and its associated Application Note
in the PP.
2
This is changed from the PP text to complete a sentence and improve readability.
3
This is changed from the PP text to make it clear that it is TOE data that must be protected and not overall system data (which also includes
data related to the environment). It also clarifies that it is sensitive data which must be protected.
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A.Audit_Support CSP audit review
The CSP reviews the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE. The client application receives and stores
the audit trail of the TOE for review by the System auditor of the CSP according to the audit procedure of the
CSP.
A.Correct_DTBS Correct DTBS Content Data
The DTBS-representation submitted to the TOE is assumed to be correct. This requires that the DTBS (e.g. the
certificate content data) has been generated and formatted correctly and maintains this correctness until it is
passed to the TOE.
4
A.Data_Store Storage and Handling of TOE data
The TOE environment ensures the confidentiality, integrity and availability of their security relevant data for TOE
initialisation, start-up and operation if stored or handled outside the TOE. The TOE environment ensures the
availability of the backup data. Examples of these data are verification authentication data, cryptographic key
material and documentation of TOE configuration data.
A.Human_Interface Interface with Human Users
The client application will provide an appropriate interface and communication path between human users and the
TOE because the TOE does not have a human interface for authentication and management services. The TOE
environment transmits identification, authentication and management data of TOE users correctly and in a
confidential way to the TOE.
A.User_Authentication Authentication of Users
The client application software is assumed to be operating as the TOE user on behalf of a human user and
interacts directly, including authenticating, as the user of the TOE. Individual human users authorised to access
the TOE cryptographic services may not be known to the TOE itself. The TOE environment performs
identification and authentication for the individual users and allows successfully authenticated users to use the
client application as their agent for the cryptographic services.
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A.Admin Trustworthy TOE Administration
When in operation, it is assumed that there will be a competent authority assigned to manage the TOE and the
security of the information that it contains and who can be trusted not to deliberately abuse their privileges so as
to undermine security.
A.Controlled_Access Physical Security Controls
When in operation and when stored as a backup, the TOE is assumed to be located within a controlled access
facility providing physical security that is adequate to prevent physical access by unauthorized persons.
A.Legitimate_FW_Update Legitimate Firmware Update Signed by the Vendor
It is assumed that legitimate firmware update packages are digitally signed by the vendor using a private key
whose use is restricted to this purpose and that the digital signature is verifiable by an instance of the TOE.
A.User_Management User Management
The TOE will not, in general, be aware of the identities of end-users authorised for the TOE services. It is
assumed that the management of the individual user assignments for the 3 TOE roles is done in the environment
in a trustworthy fashion according to a well-defined policy.
4
The wording has been changed from the PP for readability. A portion of the assumption description in the PP has been omitted because it is
not necessary. The omitted part describes the overall context in which the DTBS might be generated. While this is interesting, it is not
essential to the assumption regarding DTBS correctness and could be interpreted as restricting the nature of the DTBS that may be signed by
the TOE.
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The wording has been changed from the PP for clarity and readability.
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3.3. Threats
Threat agents may include both unauthorized and authorized
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users (persons or software entities) acting out of
deliberate intent or through errors and omissions. Threat agents may also include malicious code of varying levels
of sophistication, many of which are readily available on the Internet.
Relevant expertise required by threat agents may be in general semiconductor technology, software engineering,
hacking techniques, and the resources may range from personal computers and peripherals to general-purpose
test and measurement devices.
Motivation may include economic reward, a desire to damage an organization or the satisfaction and notoriety of
defeating expert security.
Unauthorized users are assumed to be moderately motivated and to have a low to moderate level of relevant
expertise and a low level of access to required resources. Attack potential for unauthorized users would be rated
as Moderate.
Authorized users are assumed to be highly motivated (if they are acting deliberately) and to have at least a
moderate level of relevant expertise and a high level of access to the required resources. Attack potential for
authorized users would be rated as High.
The following threats have been added to those stated in the PP:
T.Exchange – This threat statement has been added because the TOE is often used in a role in which secure
exchange of user data is important.
T.Key_Management – This threat statement has been added to emphasize the possibility of attacks through
potential weaknesses in the TOE’s key management functions.
T.PIN_Compromise – This threat statement has been added to emphasize the possibility of attacks to be
mounted through the capture of user authentication data.
T.Unauth_Function – This threat statement has been added to address the potential to mount an attack on the
TOE by causing unauthorized functions to be invoked. This could include, for example, discovery of a means to
bypass the TSF or the use of a buffer overflow type of attack.
3.3.1. Threats Statements
T.Bad_FW_Load Loading Malicious Firmware into the TOE
An authorized user or an unauthorized user who has gained access to the TOE may modify the existing firmware
and compromise the security functions of the TOE by loading unauthorized code.
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T.CSP-SCD_Derive Deriving All or Parts of a Secret or Private Key
An authorized user or an unauthorized user who has gained access to the TOE derives all or parts of a secret or
private key, in particular the CSP-SCD, in any way (including the legitimate use of the TOE services).
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This
includes also any ability to derive all or part of the CSP-SCD using knowledge about the CSP-SCD generation
and signing processes.
T.CSP-SCD_Disclose Disclosing All or Part of a Secret or Private Key
An authorized user or an unauthorized user who has gained access to the TOE discloses all or part of a secret or
private key, in particular the CSP-SCD, over any physical or logical TOE interface.
7
6
Authorized user in this context means a person or software entity with organizational permission to access the TOE and its services.
7
This threat is worded to make the general statement in the PP T.Bad_SW specific to the characteristics of the TOE.
8
This sentence was re-worded to make the statement in terms of a threat agent acting through a vulnerability.
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T.CSP-SCD_Distortion Distortion of the CSP-SCD
An authorized user or an unauthorized user who has gained access to the TOE signs the DTBS using a distorted
CSP-SCD causing the signed data (e.g. qualified certificates or CRLs) to be invalid.
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Although the use of a
distorted CSP-SCD can be detected, the impacts for the organisation issuing the signed data using the CSP-SCD
(e.g. qualified certificates) can be high. There is also the danger that by the use of a distorted CSP-SCD, parts of
the original CSP-SCD can be derived.
T.Data_Manipul Manipulating Data outside of the TOE
User data that is transmitted to the TOE from the client application may be manipulated within the TOE
environment before it is passed to the TOE. This may result in the effect that the TOE signs data without the
approval of the user under whose control the data is submitted to the TOE. When performed within the client
application such manipulations may not be detectable by the TOE itself and therefore this threat needs to be
countered within the TOE environment.
T.Insecure_Init Insecure Initialisation of the TOE
Unauthorised CSP personnel or authorised CSP personnel without using adequate organisational controls may
initialise the TOE with insecure system data, management data or user data.
An attacker may manipulate the backup data to initialise the TOE insecurely by the restore procedure.
T.Insecure_Oper Insecure Operation of the TOE
The TOE may be operated in an insecure way not detectable by the TOE itself. This includes the use and
operation of the TOE within another environment than the intended one (e. g. the TOE may be connected to a
hostile system).
T.Malfunction Malfunction of TOE
Internal malfunction of TOE functions may result in the modification of DTBS-representation, misuse of TOE
services, disclosure or distortion of CSP-SCD or denial of service for authorized users. This includes the
destruction of the TOE as well as hardware failures which prevent the TOE from performing its services. This
includes also the destruction of the TOE by deliberate action or environmental failure. Technical failure may result
in a insecure operational state violating the integrity and availability of the TOE services. The correct operation of
the TOE also depends on the correct operation of critical hardware components. A failure of such a critical
hardware component could result in the disclosure or distortion of the CSP-SCD, the modification of DTBS-
representation or the ability to misuse services of the TOE. Critical components might be:
• the central processing unit
• a coprocessor for accelerating cryptographic operations
• a physical random number generator
• storage devices used to store the CSP-SCD or the DTBS-representation
• physical I/O device drivers
T.Management Misuse of Management
CSP personnel may misuse the TOE services to forge user data as CSP-SCD, user management data, system
data or TSF data.
T.Misuse_Sign Misuse of signature-creation function
A user of the client application or of the TOE misuses the TOE service for signature-creation to sign with the CSP-
SCD forged qualified certificates or forged certificate status information.
T.Phys_Manipul Physical Manipulation of the TOE
An unauthorized user who has gained access to the TOE may try to physically manipulate the TOE with the intent
to discover all or part of a key stored or used within the TOE, to manipulate the DTBS within the TOE or to misuse
services of the TOE.
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T.Signature_Forgery Forgery of digital signature
An unauthorised user may exploit weaknesses in the cryptography and/or key management in the TOE in order to
forge a digital signature in a way that is not detectable by the verifier of the signature.
T.Exchange Compromise of Exchanged Data
An unauthorized entity may gain access to sensitive user data or may cause undetected modifications of sensitive
user data exchanged between the TOE and other IT entities.
T.Key_Management Exploiting Weaknesses in Key Management
An authorized user or an unauthorized user who has gained access to the TOE may compromise the security of
key material in the cryptographic module by accidentally or deliberately exploiting weaknesses in key
management, including key generation, storage and destruction.
T.PIN_Compromise Compromise of Authentication data
An unauthorized user may gain access to the authentication data of authorized users by intercepting the
authentication data as it is entered or by guessing weak authentication data, and may impersonate an authorised
user of the TOE.
T.Unauth_Function Exploiting Unauthorized Functions
An unauthorized person who has gained access to the TOE may reveal, discover or modify security data within
the TOE by exploiting unauthorized functions of the TOE
9
.
3.4. Organisational Security Policies
P.Algorithms Use of Approved Algorithms and Algorithm Parameters
Only algorithms and algorithm parameters (e. g. key length) defined as acceptable for being used for signature-
creation by trustworthy systems shall be used to generate qualified certificates or to sign certificate status
information. Where confidentiality protection is required such as for backup of CSP-SCD, only algorithms and
algorithm parameters defined as acceptable for that purpose shall be used.
9
An unauthorized function in this context is one which is not permitted in authorized versions of the TOE firmware, but which an unauthorized
person is able to execute by causing malicious code to execute through some form of attack, such as a buffer overflow attack.
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4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This section identifies and defines the security objectives for the TOE and its environment. Security objectives
reflect the stated intent and counter the identified threats, as well as comply with the identified organisational
security policies and assumptions.
Because the TOE has a broader range of functionality and potential applications than those envisaged by the
CMCSOB PP, this ST has objectives that are more specific than or in addition to the objectives stated in the
CMCSOB PP. The table below demonstrates that all of the objectives of the CMCSOB PP are also included in
this ST and indicates those that are in addition to the objectives of the PP.
CMCSOB PP Security Objectives
ST Security Objectives
O.Audit_CM
O.CSP-SCD_Secure
O.Check_Operation
O.Control_Services
O.Detect_Attack
O.Error_Secure
O.Protect_Exported_Data
O.Sign_Secure
O.User_Authentication
O.Admin
O.Approved_Algorithms X X X
O.Audit_CM X
O.Auth_Data_Protect
O.Backup X
O.Check_Operation X
O.Control_Access X
O.Data_Exchange_Protect
O.Detect_Attack X
O.Error_Secure X
O.Import_Code
O.Key_Secure X
O.Multi-Person_Control
O.Secure_Init
O.Self_Protect
O.Sign_Secure X
O.User_Authentication X
O.User_Data_Protect
The following objectives have been added or represent refinements of the PP objectives.
O.Admin – has been added to address the need for secure management of the TOE.
O.Approved_Algorithms – is a refinement of the PP objectives in that the statement requiring use of approved
algorithms is found in three of the PP objectives and it has simply been pulled out to stand as its own objective
statement.
O.Auth_Data_Protect – has been added to counter T.PIN_Compromise.
O.Backup and O.Data_Exchange_Protect – refine O.Protect_Exported_Data by setting separate objectives for
backup and for the export of user symmetric keys and data for data exchange purposes.
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O.Import_Code – has been added to counter T.Bad_FW_Load.
O.Key_Secure – expands the objective O.CSP-SCD_Secure to include all key material handled by the TOE.
O.Multi-Person_Control – has been added to assist in countering T.Key_Management and T.Management.
O.Secure_Init – has been added to assist in countering many of the threats by ensuring that the TOE is always in
a secure state when it starts up.
O.Self_Protect – has been added to assist in countering many of the threats by ensuring that the TSF are
protected from external influence and cannot be bypassed.
O.User_Data_Protect – has been added to address the protection of user data confidentiality and integrity by the
TSF and to allow users to verify the authenticity of data.
Objectives from the PP are listed first, followed by the added or refined objectives.
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
O.Audit_CM Generation and Export of Audit Data
The TOE shall generate and export data needed to support audit record generation of the following events:
• TOE initialisation
• TOE start-up
• Generation of secret key and asymmetric key pair
• Destruction of key material
• Use of secret key and private key
• Unsuccessful authentication
• Modification of TOE management data
• Adding new users
• Deleting users
• Execution of the TSF self tests during initial start-up and at the request of the authorised user
• Unsuccessful self test operations
• Reading and deleting audit trail records
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• Execution of the cloning functions for key backup and restore operations
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The audit data shall associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event. The
integrity of the audit trail shall be ensured. The TOE shall export the audit data upon request the Auditor and the
Crypto-officer. The TOE shall provide the management function for the audit to the Auditor only.
O.Check_Operation Check for Correct Operation
The TOE shall perform checks to verify that its components operate correctly and shall ensure the checks
succeed before allowing any privileged or cryptographic operations by the TOE. This includes integrity checks of
TOE software, firmware, internal TSF data or user data during installation, start-up and at the request of the
authorised user.
12
10
Deleted from the list of audited events because it is the TSF itself that acts as the Auditor and deletes records when the circular buffer wraps
around.
11
This replaces the last 4 items in the PP list of audited events.
12
The wording has been changed slightly from the PP for readability and to better reflect the TOE.
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O.Control_Access Access Control for Data and TOE Services
The TOE shall control access to mediated commands, information, and services based on a user’s identification
and role, the requested command or service and the security attributes associated with the object to which access
is requested. Roles and assignment of services to roles are predefined in the production phase.
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O.Detect_Attack Tamper Resistance and Detection
The TOE must be constructed in a manner that resists physical tampering and attempts at probing and shall
detect tamper events and securely destroy all plaintext key material and other security critical data in this case.
O.Error_Secure Secure State in Case an Error is Detected
The TOE shall enter a secure state whenever it detects an error that would prevent its normal operation. The
secure state shall prevent the loss of confidentiality of the key material and other security critical data.
O.Sign_Secure Secure advanced signature-creation
The TOE creates signatures such as the advanced signature in qualified certificates that do not reveal the CSP-
SCD and cannot be forged without knowledge of the CSP-SCD.
O.User_Authentication Authentication of Users interacting with the TOE
The TOE shall be able to identify and authenticate the users acting with a defined role, before allowing any
access to TOE protected assets and services. Identification and authentication shall be identity
14
-based.
O.Admin TOE Administration
The TOE must provide facilities to enable the Security Officer (SO) to effectively manage the TOE and its security
functions, and must ensure that only authorized users are able to access such functionality.
O.Approved_Algorithms Use of Approved Algorithms
The TOE must implement approved cryptographic algorithms and algorithm parameters (e.g., key length) for
encryption/decryption, authentication, and signature generation/verification.
O.Auth_Data_Protect Protection of User Authentication data by the TOE
The TOE must protect authentication data in a way that ensures that user authentication data cannot be easily
guessed or captured.
O.Backup Backup and Restore for the TOE
The TOE shall protect the confidentiality of the backup data and detect loss of the integrity of the backup keys,
other user data and TSF data needed to restore an operational state after failure.
O.Data_Exchange_Protect Protection of Data Exported by the TOE
The TOE shall provide integrity and confidentiality protection measures for all assets listed in the asset list
requiring integrity or confidentiality protection when they are exported from or imported to the TOE.
O.Import_Code Prevention of Unauthorised Code Loading
The TOE must prevent executable code from being loaded on the TOE unless it is signed as per an authorized
firmware update.
O.Key_Secure Secure Key and Key Pair Generation and Management
The confidentiality and integrity of cryptographic keys shall be ensured during their whole life-cycle. The TOE
shall ensure secure key and key pair generation, use and management. This includes protection against
disclosing completely or partly any cryptographic key through any physical or logical TOE interface.
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13
This is a generalized form of O.Control_Services that addresses all aspects of access control.
14
User-based has been changed to identity-based for accuracy (a user can be authenticated by either role or identity) and to ensure common
usage with the FIPS 140-2 Level 3 Security Policy requirements.
15
This is a generalized form of O.CSP-SCD_Secure that addresses the security of all key material, not only the CSP-SCD.
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O.Multi-Person_Control Multi-person Control of Sensitive Functions
The TOE must provide a capability for multi-person control of sensitive functions.
O.Secure_Init Secure Initialisation of TOE
The TOE must assume its initial secure state immediately upon power-up, reset, or after other restart conditions.
O.Self_Protect TOE Logical Self-Protection
The TOE must protect itself against attempts to logically subvert or bypass the TOE security functions.
O.User_Data_Protect Protection of User Data by the TOE
The TOE shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of user data stored within the TOE and shall provide the
means for the user to verify the authenticity of stored data.
4.2. Security Objectives for the IT Environment
O.ENV_Application Security in the Client Application
The applications which use the TOE shall perform the necessary security checks on the data passed to the TOE.
The applications shall also perform the required user authentication and access control functions that cannot be
performed within the TOE. Security controls in the TOE environment shall also prevent unauthorised manipulation
of data submitted to the TOE.
O.ENV_Audit Audit Trail Generation
The environment ensures the availability of the generated and exported by the TOE audit trails and provides a
review of the audit trail recorded by the TOE.
O.ENV_Backup Backup and Restore Protection in the Environment
The IT environment shall provide a means to protect the confidentiality of the backup data and detect loss of the
integrity of the backup keys, other user data and TSF data needed to restore an operational state after failure
when it is transmitted and stored in the TOE environment.
O.ENV_Human_Interface Reliable Human Interface
If the client application provides a human interface and a communication path between human users and the
TOE, the client application will ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the data transferred between the TOE
and the human user.
O.ENV_Signed_FW_Update Firmware Updates Signed by the Vendor
Procedures shall exist to ensure that legitimate firmware update packages are digitally signed by the vendor using
a private key whose use is restricted to this purpose and that the digital signature is verifiable by an instance of
the TOE.
4.3. Security Objectives for the non-IT Environment
O.ENV_AuthData Personal Protection of Authentication Data
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the authentication data for each user account for the TOE is held
securely and not disclosed to persons not authorized to use that account.
O.ENV_Outage_Protection Protection From Unplanned Outages
Those responsible for the host IT environment must ensure that the power supplied to the TOE is adequately
protected against unexpected interruptions and the effects of surges and voltage fluctuations outside the normal
operating range of the device and that the TOE is operated in an environment that is provided adequate
protection against disasters such as fire and flood.
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O.ENV_Personnel Reliable Personnel
The personnel using the TOE services shall be aware of civil, financial and legal responsibilities, as well as the
obligations they have to face, depending on their role. The personnel shall be trained on correct usage of the
TOE and have a level of competence sufficient to ensure the correct management and operation of the TOE.
O.ENV_Protect_Access Prevention of Unauthorised Physical Access
The TOE shall be protected by physical, logical and organisational protection measures to restrict access to the
TOE and its IT environment to authorised persons only, in order to prevent any TOE theft, modification or
disclosure of protected assets.
O.ENV_Recovery Secure Recovery in Case of Major Failure
Recovery plans and procedures shall exist that allow a secure and timely recovery in the case of a major problem
with the TOE. These procedures shall ensure that the confidentiality and integrity of TOE assets are maintained
during recovery and that the recovery does not result in a situation that allows personnel to extend the TOE
services they are allowed to use.
O.ENV_Secure_Init Secure Initialisation Procedures
Procedures and controls in the TOE environment shall be defined and applied that allow to securely set-up and
initialise the TOE for the generation of signatures for qualified certificates or certificate status information. This
includes the secure key generation / key import as well as the initial configuration of other TSF data such as roles,
users and user authentication information.
O.ENV_Secure_Oper Secure Operating Procedures
Procedures and controls in the TOE environment shall be defined that allow operating the TOE within a CA
system in compliance with the requirements of the EU directive and the Policy for certification authorities issuing
qualified certificates.
4.4. Mapping of Objectives
The correspondence or mapping showing the necessity of the security objectives to counter the threats and meet
stated assumptions is shown in Table 8-1. Tables relating assumptions and threats to objectives as well as the
rationale for the sufficiency of the objectives is presented in Table 8-2 and Table 8-3.
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5. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
This chapter gives the security functional requirements (SFR) and the security assurance requirements (SAR) for
the TOE and the IT environment.
Security functional requirements components given in section 5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements match
those of the CMCSOB PP and are drawn from the Common Criteria (ISO 15408) part 2 [2]. Some security
functional requirements represent extensions to [2], with the rationale for these given with the explicit
requirements statement. Operations for assignment, selection and refinement have been made.
Security functional requirements components given in section 5.2 are additional to those of the CMCSOB PP and
are drawn from the Common Criteria (ISO 15408) part 2 [2].
Section 5.3 Requirements for IT Environment identifies the IT security requirements that are to be met by the IT
environment of the TOE.
Section 5.4 Non-IT Requirements specifies the non-IT requirements to be satisfied by the environment.
TOE Security Assurance Requirements, section 5.5, are drawn from the security assurance components from
Common Criteria part 3 [3].
The following non Part 2 Security Functional Requirements are included to meet specific requirements of the
TOE:
• FCS_RND.1 Quality metrics for random numbers
• FDP_BKP.1 Backup and recovery
The following convention is used to indicate operations that have been performed on the CC functional
components:
• Assignment is indicated by bold lettering.
• Selection is indicated by underlining the selection(s).
• Refinement is indicated by italic lettering.
• Iterations are indicated by supplementary bracketed information with the functional component, such as
FIA_AFL.1.1 (SO) and FIA_AFL.1.1 (User).
• Deletion of PP wording is indicated by strikeout of the words in question. Rationale for such deletion is
provided in the footnotes.
5.1. TOE Security Functional Requirements
5.1.1. Security audit (FAU)
5.1.1.1. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) The following specifically auditable events:
(1) Initialisation of the TOE,
(2) Start-up after power up,
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(3) Shutdown of the TOE
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,
(4) Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1),
(5) Cryptographic key distribution (FCS_CKM.2): negotiation of back-up key(s) as part of the
cloning protocol,
(6) Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4),
(7) Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1 (Sign),
(8) Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1): reaching the threshold for the unsuccessful
authentication attempts,
(9) Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1): all unsuccessful use of the authentication
mechanism,
(10)Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1): all modifications of the values of security
attributes,
(11)Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3): modifications of the default setting of
permissive or restrictive rules, all modifications of the initial values of security attributes,
(12)Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1): modification to the threshold for unsuccessful
User authentication attempts,
(13)Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1/ACCESS_CONTROL): All modifications to the
values of TSF data
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(14)Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1/AUDIT: Export of audit data, Clear of audit data,18
(15)Abstract machine testing (FPT_AMT.1): results of the tests of the underlying abstract
machine,
(16)Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1): Failure detection of the TSF and
secure state,
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(17)Inter-TSF detection of modification (FPT_ITI.1): The detection of modification of imported
TSF backup data
(18)Notification of physical attack (FPT_PHP.2): Detection of intrusion
(19)TSF testing (FPT_TST.1): Execution of the TSF self tests and the results of the tests,
(20)Backup and recovery (FDP_BKP.1): Use of the backup and recovery functions,
Refined by adding:
The auditable event Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions is not applicable as these are always
present.
Audit data generated by the TOE is in raw form and requires interpretation by an application in the TOE
environment before it can be included in a security audit trail.
Unless invoked by an authorised user, results of abstract machine tests and self-tests are only reported in
the case of a failure.
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
16
It is not possible to audit shutdown because there is no shutdown command. Shutdown is done by simply removing power and there is no
opportunity to write an audit record in this case.
17
FMT_MTD.1 (Access Control) does not apply to the TOE.
18
These items are not applicable in the TOE.
19
There is no specific TOE event corresponding to FPT_FLS.1.
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a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the
event. Date and time of the event shall be given by the sequence data correlated to time of export of
the audit data to the TOE environment; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components
included in the PP/ST, identity of the user and sequence data.
Refined by adding:
The audit data for the Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles may only be sufficient to identify the client
application. Further refinement of audit data might be provided by audit functions in the TOE environment
distinguishing between end-users using the services of the client application.
5.1.1.2. FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2.1 The TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that
caused the event.
5.1.1.3. FAU_STG.2 (TOE) Guarantees of audit data availability
FAU_STG.2.1 (TOE) The TSF shall protect the stored audit records from unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.2.2 (TOE) The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the stored audit
records in the audit trail.
FAU_STG.2.3 (TOE) The TSF shall ensure that 60 kB of audit records will be maintained when the
following conditions occur: audit storage exhaustion.
Application note:
The TSF writes audit data to a circular buffer and overwrites the first record in the audit trail data after
reaching the end of the buffer. Provided that the audit data is read frequently enough based on the typical
operation rate of the customer application, there is effectively no reason for the audit data storage to be
exhausted.
5.1.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.1.2.1. FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified cryptographic
key generation algorithms listed below and specified cryptographic key sizes specified for each
algorithm that meet the following standards noted for each algorithm:
(1) RSA 1024, 2048, 4096 bits key pairs in accordance with ANSI X9.31.
(2) TDES 112, 168 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 46-3 and ANSI X9.52.
(3) AES 128, 192, 256 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 197.
(4) DSA 1024 bits key pairs in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-2.
(5) ECDSA in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-2 and ANSI X9.62.
5.1.2.2. FCS_CKM.2 (BACKUP) Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.2.1 (BACKUP) The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method key entry that meets the following: TDES 168 bits.
Refined by adding:
All encrypted secret or private keys entered into the TOE shall be encrypted using a cryptographic
algorithm from the list of approved algorithms and parameters [5]. The key entry shall be performed using
either manual or electronic methods.
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Secret and private keys established using manual methods shall be entered either
(1) in encrypted form or
(2) using split knowledge procedures.
Manually-entered keys shall be verified during entry into the TOE for accuracy.
Secret and private keys established using electronic methods shall be entered in encrypted form.
If split knowledge procedures are used:
(1) The TOE shall separately authenticate the crypto-officer entering each key component.
(2) At least two key components shall be required to reconstruct the original cryptographic key.
Application note:
The Luna® Key Cloning Protocol is used to negotiate a session key to encrypt the data transferred
between the TSF and the backup token. The protocol uses cryptographic techniques to provide mutual
authentication, proof of origin, integrity and confidentiality of the objects being transferred from source to
target token within a domain. The key management scheme used within the cloning protocol also
protects against replay attacks and minimizes the impact of possible key compromise by ensuring that a
unique AES key is used for each cloning operation.
5.1.2.3. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method logical or physical (by overwriting) deletion of the memory space that meets
the following: FIPS 140-2 Level 3.
Application note:
The TSF will destroy the CSP-SCD and all other plaintext secret or private keys, if the TSF required by
FPT_PHP.2 detects physical tampering.
5.1.2.4. FCS_COP.1 (SIGN) Cryptographic operation - Digital signature
FCS_COP.1.1 (SIGN) The TSF shall perform digital signature generation and verification in
accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithms listed below and cryptographic key sizes
specified for each algorithm that meet the following: standards noted for each algorithm.
(1) RSA 1024 bits, 2048 bits, 4096 bits with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (PKCS #1 V1.5,
PKCS #1 PSS),
(2) RSA 1024 bits, 2048 bits, 4096 bits with SHA-1 (FIPS PUB 186-2/ANSI X9.31),
(3) Signature generation/verification DSA 1024 bits with SHA-1 (FIPS PUB 186-2),
(4) Signature generation/verification ECDSA with SHA-1 (FIPS PUB 186-2 Appendix 6
recommended curves).
5.1.2.5. FCS_COP.1 (BACKUP_ENC) Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 (BACKUP_ENC) The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm TDES and cryptographic key sizes 168 bits that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 46-3.
5.1.2.6. FCS_COP.1 (BACKUP_INT) Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 (BACKUP_INT) The TSF shall perform calculation and verification of cryptographic
checksums in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes
N/A that meet the following: FIPS PUB 180-2.
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Refined by adding:
The cryptographic checksum for backup data shall use a backup key and shall be based on symmetric
cryptographic algorithms (e.g. keyed hash) or asymmetric cryptographic algorithms (e.g. digital
signatures).
Application Note:
The SHA-1 checksum is calculated by the TSF and by the equivalent function within the backup token. It
can be compared before and after backup and before and after recovery to validate integrity. Because it
is calculated within the TSF and backup token at the time it is requested, there is no chance of
substituting an illegitimate key value and corresponding digest value. A keyed hash or digital signature is,
therefore, not required.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality metrics for generating random numbers intended for cryptographic
purposes.
Component levelling
FCS_RND.1 The generation of random numbers by the TOE requires the random numbers to
meet the defined quality metrics.
Management
There are no applicable management functions.
Audit
There are no auditable events applicable to FCS_RND generation of random numbers.
5.1.2.7. FCS_RND.1 Quality metrics for random numbers
Hierarchical to: no other components.
FCS_RND.1.1 The TOE shall provide a mechanism for generating random numbers that meet the
requirements of ETSI SR 002 176 V1.1.1, dated 2003-03.
FCS_RND.1.2 The TOE shall be able to enforce the use of TOE-generated random numbers for
FCS_CKM.1, authentication data generation and random number generation.
Dependencies: FPT_TST.1 TSF testing.
Rationale:
High quality random numbers are important to key and key pair generation. This component allows for
the specification of a particular quality metric to be met by the TOE and enforces the use of the specified
random number generator.
5.1.3. User data protection (FDP)
5.1.3.1. FDP_ACC.1 (CRYPTO) Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 (CRYPTO) The TSF shall enforce the Crypto-SFP on User; CSP-SCD, CSP-SVD, DTBS
representation; generate CSP-SCD/CSP-SVD pair (FCS_CKM.1), destruction of CSP-SCD and CSP-
SVD (FCS_CKM.4); sign DTBS representation (FCS_COP.1(SIGN)).
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5.1.3.2. FDP_ACC.1 (AUDIT) Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 (AUDIT) The TSF shall enforce the Audit-SFP on User; Audit data; export and delete.
5.1.3.3. FDP_ACC.1 (BACKUP) Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 (BACKUP) The TSF shall enforce the Backup SFP on User; CSP-SCD, backup key(s),
backup data; backup (FDP_BKP.1), restore (FDP_BKP.1), backup key entry (FCS_CKM.2).
5.1.3.4. FDP_ACF.1 (CRYPTO) Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 (CRYPTO) The TSF shall enforce the CRYPTO SFP to objects based on Identity and
Role.
FDP_ACF.1.2 (CRYPTO) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. User with security attribute Role Crypto Officer is allowed to generate (FCS_CKM.1) the
objects CSP-SCD and CSP-SVD under dual person control.
2. User with security attribute Role Crypto Officer is allowed to destruct (FCS_CKM.4) the
objects CSP-SCD and CSP-SVD.
3. User with security attribute Role Crypto Officer is allowed to export CSP-SVD.
4. User with security attribute Role Crypto User is allowed to create signature of the DTBS-
representation with CSP-SCD (FCS_COP.1/SIGN).
5. User with security attribute Role Crypto User is allowed to export CSP-SVD.
FDP_ACF.1.3 (CRYPTO) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 (CRYPTO) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following rules: User with security attribute Role Crypto User is not allowed to:
(a) generate (FCS_CKM.1) the objects CSP-SCD and CSP-SVD,
(b) destroy (FCS_CKM.4) the objects CSP-SCD and CSP-SVD.
Application note:
The dual person control requires two users to be authenticated – one with the role Crypto Officer and one
with the role Security Officer. The Security Officer must ensure that the partition policy for Key
Management Operations is set properly to enforce the dual control.
5.1.3.5. FDP_ACF.1 (AUDIT) Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 (AUDIT) The TSF shall enforce the AUDIT SFP to objects based on Role.
FDP_ACF.1.2 (AUDIT) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. Users with security attribute Role Auditor are allowed
a. to export Audit data,
b. to clear Audit data.
2. Users with security attribute Role Crypto Officer are allowed to export Audit data.
FDP_ACF.1.3 (AUDIT) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
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FDP_ACF.1.4 (AUDIT) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following rules:
1. Users with security attribute Role Crypto Officer are not allowed to delete Audit data
2. Users with security attribute Role Crypto User are not allowed to export or to delete Audit
data.
Application Note:
In the TOE, the Auditor role is held by the TSF. Users are only provided read access to audit data. This
is obtained via an administrative interface command.
5.1.3.6. FDP_ACF.1 (BACKUP) Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 (BACKUP) The TSF shall enforce the BACKUP SFP to objects based on Identity and
Role.
FDP_ACF.1.2 (BACKUP) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: User with security attribute Role Crypto Officer
is allowed under dual person control:
1. to backup CSP-SCD and CSP-SVD (FDP_BKP.1),
2. to restore CSP-SCD and CSP-SVD (FDP_BKP.1),
3. to enter backup keys (FCS_CKM.2)
Application Note:
The CKM.2 key entry requirement is met in the TOE by key negotiation between the TSF and the backup
token. Therefore, there is no user involvement in key entry.
FDP_ACF.1.3 (BACKUP) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: User with security attribute Role Crypto Officer is allowed under dual
person control to backup all partition objects.
FDP_ACF.1.4 (BACKUP) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the User
with security attribute Role Crypto User is not allowed:
1. to backup CSP-SCD (FDP_BKP.1),
2. to restore CSP-SCD (FDP_BKP.1),
3. to enter a backup key (FCS_CKM.2).
Application note:
If the TSF implementing FDP_BKP.1 does not support separate backup for CSP-SCD and for other
backup data the additional rules in FDP_ACF.1.3 may allow the Crypto Officer to backup and to restore
all backup data.
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Backup and recovery (FDP_BKP)
Family behaviour
This family defines export and import of the backup data. The TOE ensures the confidentiality of
the backup data and detects loss of the integrity of the backup data. The availability of the
backup data will be ensured by the TOE environment.
Management: FDP_BKP.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FDP_BKP.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) Use of the backup function,
b) Use of the recovery function,
c) Unsuccessful recovery because of detection of modification of the backup data.
5.1.3.7. FDP_BKP.1 Backup and recovery
FDP_BKP.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of invoking the backup function on demand.
FDP_BKP.1.2 The data stored in the backup shall be sufficient to recreate the state of the TOE at the
time the backup was created using only:
1. a copy of the same version of the TOE as was used to create the backup data;
2. a stored copy of the backup data;
3. the cryptographic key(s) needed to decrypt the CSP-SCD and any other encrypted critical
security parameters;
4. the cryptographic key(s) needed to verify the cryptographic checksum of the backup data.
FDP_BKP.1.3 The TSF shall include a recovery function that is able to restore the state of the TOE from
a backup.
FDP_BKP.1.4 The CSP-SCD, other critical security parameters and other confidential information shall
be exported in encrypted form only.
FDP_BKP.1.5 The backup data shall be checked for modification through the use of cryptographic
checksums. Modified backup data shall not be used for recovery.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation or FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
or FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes] FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Rationale:
The HSM supports backup of CSP-SCD, other user data and TSF data to restore the operational state of
the same HSM or for a new HSM in the event of a system failure or other serious error. The export, import
and protection of the backup data are combined in a specific way. The HSM ensures the confidentiality of
the backup data and detects loss of the integrity of the backup data. The availability of the backup data
will be ensured by the TOE environment.
This component is necessary to specify a unique requirement of certificate issuing and management
components that is not addressed by the Common Criteria. The specific requirements address the
protection of CSP-SCD, other cryptographic keys and TSF data for backup and recovery.
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Application Note:
The SHA-1 checksum is calculated by the TSF and by the equivalent function within the backup token. It
can be compared before and after backup and before and after recovery to validate integrity. Because it
is done within the TSF and backup token, there is no chance of substituting an illegitimate key value and
corresponding digest value. A keyed hash or digital signature is, therefore, not required.
5.1.3.8. FDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security attributes
FDP_ETC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Crypto SFP, Token Access Control (TAC) SFP when
exporting user data, controlled under the SFPs, outside of the TSC.
FDP_ETC.1.2 The TSF shall export the user data without the user data’s associated security attributes.
Application Note:
All user data whose CKA_SENSITIVE attribute is set is exported in encrypted form.
5.1.3.9. FDP_IFC.1 (BACKUP) Subset information flow control
FDP_IFC.1.1 (BACKUP) The TSF shall enforce the Side-channel of backup-functions SFP on
Anybody; Information about CSP-SCD; backup (FDP_BKP.1, FCS_COP.1/BACKUP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/BACKUP_INT), restore (FDP_BKP.1, FCS_COP.1/BACKUP_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/BACKUP_INT), key entry (FCS_CKM.2).
5.1.3.10. FDP_IFC.1 (CRYPTO) Subset information flow control
FDP_IFC.1.1 (CRYPTO) The TSF shall enforce the Side-channels of Crypto-functions SFP on
Anybody; Information about CSP-SCD; generation of CSP-SCD/SVD pair (FCS_CKM.1),
destruction of CSP-SCD (FCS_CKM.4), signing DTBS representation (FCS_COP.1/SIGN).
5.1.3.11. FDP_IFF.4 (BACKUP) Partial elimination of illicit information flows
FDP_IFF.4.1 (BACKUP) The TSF shall enforce the Side-channel of backup-functions SFP to limit the
capacity of covert channels information flow of:
1. the backup function including encryption of the backup data (FDP_BKP.1),
2. the backup key(s) entry (FCS_CKM.2),
3. the encryption and decryption of the backup data (FCS_COP.1/BACKUP_ENC)
through physical behaviour of the TOE interfaces and emanation [assignment: none]
compromising information about the CSP-SCD to a maximum 0 bits/sec for covert channels and
resistance to an attacker with attack potential ‘high’ for side channels.
FDP_IFF.4.2 (BACKUP) The TSF shall prevent the following types of side-channels information flow
within the backup data (FDP_BKP.1) about the CSP-SCD.
Application note:
The TOE shall prevent side-channel attacks against the CSP-SCD and other secret data where the attack
is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE as mentioned in the application note to
FDP_IFF.4/Crypto. The maximum capacity of the side channels shall be defined by the ST allowing the
SCP to prevent any remaining side channels by appropriate security measures in the TOE environment.
The TOE shall prevent side-channel attacks against the CSP-SCD through the intended output data of
the TOE e.g. the backup data encrypted with an initial vector containing information about the used
backup key.
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5.1.3.12. FDP_IFF.4 (CRYPTO) Partial elimination of illicit information flows
FDP_IFF.4.1 (CRYPTO) The TSF shall enforce the Side-channels of Crypto-functions SFP to limit the
capacity of side-channels information flow of (1) the CSP-SCD/SVD generation (FCS_CKM.1), (2)
the signature-creation (FCS_COP.1/SIGN), through physical behaviour of the TOE interfaces and
emanation [assignment: none] compromising information about the CSP-SCD to a maximum
0 bits/sec for covert channels and resistance to an attacker with attack potential ‘high’ for side
channels.
FDP_IFF.4.2 (CRYPTO) The TSF shall prevent side-channels information flow within the data
exported
(1) by the TSF CSP-SCD / SVD pair generation (FCS-CKM.1),
(2) by the TSF signature-creation function (FCS-COP.1/SIGN) about the CSP-SCD.
Application note:
The TSF requires the TOE to prevent side-channel attacks against the CSP-SCD and other secret data
where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. The set of
measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the TOE.
Examples of measurable phenomena are variations in the timing of transitions of internal states, the
power consumption and the electromagnetic radiation. Such phenomena may be caused by normal
internal operation of the TOE or may be forced by an attacker who varies the physical environment under
which the TOE operates (e. g. power supply, temperature, radio emission or emission of light). Due to the
heterogeneous nature of the technologies that may cause such emanations, evaluation is assumed
against state-of-the-art attacks applicable to the technologies employed by the TOE. Examples of such
attacks are, but are not limited to, evaluation of the TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power
analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. The maximum capacity of the side
channels should be defined by the ST allowing the CSP to prevent any remaining side channels by
appropriate security measures in the TOE environment. The TSF requires the TOE to prevent side-
channel attacks against the CSP-SCD through the intended output data of the TOE e.g. the random
padding bits in the signature may contain information about the CSP-SCD if both are generated by the
same pseudo-random number generator.
5.1.3.13. FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource from the following objects: RAD, private keys, in
particular CSP-SCD, and secret keys.
5.1.3.14. FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored within the TSC for integrity errors on all objects,
based on the following attributes: error detecting code.
FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall enter the secure blocking state
20
.
Refined by adding:
The TSF are not required to monitor the DTBS representation for integrity errors.
Application Note:
The error detecting code to check the integrity of a private key object is generated before output of a
digital signature by verifying the digital signature created with the private key using the corresponding
public key object for signature verification.
20
In this context, secure blocking state means a state where the only data returned to the user is an error code and the TOE does not
continue to produce a signature value.
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5.1.4. Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.1.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 (SO) Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 (SO) The TSF shall detect when three (3) unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to Security Officer authentication.
FIA_AFL.1.2 (SO) When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or
surpassed, the TSF shall change the state of the TOE to require re-initialization.
5.1.4.2. FIA_AFL.1 (User) Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 (User) The TSF shall detect when an SO configurable positive integer within the range
of three (3) to ten (10) unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to User authentication.
FIA_AFL.1.2 (User) When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or
surpassed, the TSF shall block the identity for authentication.
Application Note:
The TOE blocks the identity for authentication by terminating the session establishment and, according to
the SO configurable policy:
• removing the User and clearing the User’s memory space and permanent storage, or
• disabling the User account by setting the User locked flag in the User’s attributes (FIA_ATD.1).
5.1.4.3. FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:
User ID number
User checkword (RAD)
User role
User failed login count
User “locked” flag.
Application Note:
User role is derived from the type of PED Key used – Blue Key for SO and Black Key for User, plus the
type of Challenge-response authentication – either Crypto Officer or Crypto User. The Crypto Officer and
Crypto User each have a different challenge secret, which is stored encrypted by the User Security Key
(retrieved from the encrypted checkword).
5.1.4.4. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet the minimum length
established by the TOE for each authentication secret.
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5.1.4.5. FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions on behalf of the user to be performed before the
user is authenticated:
• Perform start-up, self-test (FPT_TST.1), detection of the secure blocking state
(FPT_FLS.1), detection of violation of physical integrity (FPT_PHP.2),
• Perform basic diagnostic functions, such as checking the communications from the
host to the card, checking firmware level and token info and checking information on
mechanisms supported.
• Open a session
• Access Public data objects
• Identification (FIA_UID.1).
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.1.4.6. FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions on behalf of the user to be performed before the
user is identified:
• Perform start-up, self-test (FPT_TST.1), detection of the secure blocking state
(FPT_FLS.1), detection of violation of physical integrity (FPT_PHP.2),
• Perform basic diagnostic functions, such as checking the communications from the
host to the card, checking firmware level and token info and checking information on
mechanisms supported.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.1.5. Security management (FMT)
5.1.5.1. FMT_MSA.1 (ROLE_CRYPTO) Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1 (ROLE_CRYPTO) The TSF shall enforce the Backup SFP and Crypto-SFP to restrict the
ability to query, modify and delete [assignment: none] the security attributes Role Crypto User and
Role Crypto Officer to Crypto Officer.
5.1.5.2. FMT_MSA.1 (ROLE_AUDIT) Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1 (ROLE_AUDIT) The TSF shall enforce the Audit-SFP to restrict the ability to query,
modify and delete [assignment: none] the security attributes Role Auditor to Auditor.
5.1.5.3. FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security attributes.
5.1.5.4. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the Audit SFP, Backup SFP and Crypto SFP to provide restrictive
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow Auditor and Crypto Officer to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
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5.1.5.5. FMT_MTD.1 (Access Control) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1 (ACCESS_CONTROL) The TSF shall restrict the ability to query and modify the access
control lists to Crypto-officer.
Application note:
The Crypto-officer is allowed to change the access control lists only within the limits of the defined roles.
Application Note: This SFR is included because it is required by the PP. It is, however, satisfied by
default because the TOE does not implement access control lists. Access is granted only to the owner of
an object as specified in FDP_ACF.1 (TAC).
5.1.5.6. FMT_MTD.1 (USER_Crypto) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1 (USER_CRYPTO) The TSF shall restrict the ability to change default and delete the
Identity and RAD for user with role attribute Crypto Officer and Crypto User to Security Officer.
Application Note: The Security Officer is a more restrictive role than Crypto Officer as specified in the
PP for the purposes of change default and delete Identity and RAD.
5.1.5.7. FMT_MTD.1 (USER_Audit) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1 (USER_AUDIT) The TSF shall restrict the ability to change default and delete the Identity
and RAD for user with role attribute Auditor to Auditor.
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5.1.5.8. FMT_MTD.1 (RAD) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1 (RAD) The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the RAD to Crypto Officer for the
identity associated with the RAD.
5.1.5.9. FMT_MTD.1 (AUDIT) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1 (AUDIT) The TSF shall restrict the ability to query the audit data of the TSF required by
FAU_GEN.1 to Crypto Officer and Auditor.
Application Note: The Crypto Officer role has been added to the roles capable of performing the
specified operations because the SFR as stated in the PP contradicts O.Audit_CM and the SFR has been
adapted to agree with the Objective.
5.1.5.10. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions:
1. User management (FMT_MSA.1/ROLE_CRYPTO, FMT_MSA.1/ROLE_AUDIT,
FMT_MTD.1/RAD, FMT_MTD.1/USER_CRYPTO and FMT_MTD.1/USER_AUDIT),
2. Management of audit data (FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1/AUDIT),
3. Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1/ACCESS_CONTROL).
5.1.5.11. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles Security Officer, Crypto Officer, Crypto User and
Auditor.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
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The Auditor role is held by the TSF.
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Application note:
The Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles may be associated with only one user – the client application.
The client application in the TOE environment may act as agent for more than one user demanding
signing of DTBS by the HSM.
In the TOE, the Auditor role is held by the TSF.
5.1.6. Protection of the TOE Security Functions (FPT)
5.1.6.1. FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing
FPT_AMT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of tests during initial start-up and at the request of an authorized
user to demonstrate the correct operation of the security assumptions provided by the abstract machine
that underlies the TSF.
Application note:
Even though the CMCSOB PP includes requirements to the hardware as physical protection, the TOE
might not include all hardware of the cryptographic module. The TSF shall perform testing to demonstrate
the security assumptions made about the underlying abstract machine upon which the TSF relies. This
“abstract” machine could be a hardware/firmware platform, or it could be some known and assessed
hardware/software combination acting as a virtual machine. An example of a security assumption is
memory management unit providing support for information flow control (as required by FDP_IFF.4) or
access control (as required by FDP_ACF.1 (AUDIT)) in the TOE.
5.1.6.2. FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: failures
detected by the TSF FPT_AMT.1 and FPT_TST.1.
Refined by adding:
The TSF shall destroy plaintext CSP-SCD and other secret and private keys if failures occur.
5.1.6.3. FPT_ITC.1 Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission
FPT_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall protect all TSF data transmitted from the TSF to a remote trusted IT product
from unauthorised disclosure during transmission.
Application note:
The SFR FPT_ITC.1 addresses the confidentiality protection of the TSF data if they are exported as part
of the backup data.
5.1.6.4. FPT_ITI.1 Inter-TSF detection of modification
FPT_ITI.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to detect modification of all TSF data during
transmission between the TSF and a remote trusted IT product within the following metric: cryptographic
checksum according to the list of approved algorithms and parameters SHA-1 digest.
FPT_ITI.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of all TSF data transmitted between
the TSF and a remote trusted IT product and perform alarm error indication
22
to the Crypto Officer if
modifications are detected.
22
The TSF notifies the Crypto Officer by means of error indicators rather than aural or visual alarm signals.
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Application note:
The SFR FPT_ITI.1 addresses the integrity protection of the TSF data if they are imported as part of the
backup data.
The SHA-1 checksum is calculated by the TSF and by the equivalent function within the backup token. It
can be compared before and after backup and before and after recovery to validate integrity. Because it
is done within the TSF and backup token, there is no chance of substituting an illegitimate key value and
corresponding digest value. A keyed hash or digital signature is, therefore, not required.
FPT_ITC.1 and FPT_ITI.1 are included because they are specified by the PP. However, the cloning
mechanism used to implement backup and restoration securely transfers individual key objects and TSF
data is limited to a few object attributes used in the enforcement of the access control policy. The
requirement for confidentiality and integrity protection of the backup data is best stated by FTP_ITC.1,
which is included as an addition to the PP.
5.1.6.5. FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack
FPT_PHP.2.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might
compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.2.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the
TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
FPT_PHP.2.3 For TOE, the TSF shall monitor the devices and elements and notify local user when
physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
Refined by adding:
The TSF shall detect physical tampering performed by opening the device or removal of a cover. Note
that the TOE does not have a door or removable cover. Opening the TOE would, therefore, require the
use of tools that would necessitate the removal of the TOE from its intended operating environment.
Application Note:
The notification about detected physical attacks may be given e.g. through functional interfaces (stopping
any other services but alarm signalisation), acoustic or optic signals. The TOE non-IT environment should
ensure that notification about physical tampering attempts given by the TOE shall be noticed by the CSP
security personnel.
5.1.6.6. FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical tampering by opening the device or removal of a cover
to the components which:
• generate CSP-SCD (FCS_CKM.1),
• create the signature with CSP-SCD (FCS_COP.1),
• store CSP-SCD,
• store other secret or private keys
by responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated.
Refined by adding:
The TSF shall resist the tampering by destruction of plaintext CSP-SCD and other confidential secret and
private keys if physical tampering performed by opening the device or removal of a cover is detected.
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Application Note:
The TOE shall protect the confidentiality of the CSP-CSD and other secret and private keys in case of
physical maintenance or physical tampering. If the detection of opening the device or removal of a cover
might not be effective for the switched off device the TOE will destroy the CSP-SCD in case of loss of
power. The TOE will invoke the TSF required by FCS_CKM.4 to destroy the CSP-SCD and all other
plaintext secret and private keys. The destruction of the CSP-SCD will prevent the use of an attacked
TOE for signing until restoring the operational state
5.1.6.7. FPT_RCV.1 Manual recovery
FPT_RCV.1.1 After a failure or service discontinuity
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, the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where
the ability to return to a secure state is provided.
5.1.6.8. FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up and at the request of the
authorised user to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
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FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored
TSF executable code.
Refined by adding:
The TSF shall perform the self-tests as follows:
Initialisation
Extended firmware integrity test.
Power-Up and On-request Tests
Firmware integrity test,
Internal TSF data integrity test,
Cryptographic algorithm test,
Random number generator tests
Critical functions test.,
Conditional Tests
Pair-wise consistency test (for public and private keys),
Continuous random number generator test
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For the TOE, failure in this context refers to self-test failure. Any other failure would be catastrophic, leaving the TOE in a secure but non-
recoverable state. In the case of a service discontinuity, the module will always return to service in a secure state. The details of its
operational state when it returns to service are determined by the configurable policy set by the SO.
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The selection “at the conditions installation and maintenance” has been removed because there are no states of the TOE that correspond to
installation and maintenance.
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Application note:
The TSF performs self-tests according to FPT_TST.1 to ensure that the TOE is functioning properly. The
extended software/firmware integrity test might verify error detecting codes, cryptographic checksums or
digital signatures generated by the software/firmware developer or by other authorities. A digital signature
might prove that the firmware or software is part of the evaluated product. The power-up
software/firmware integrity test and internal TSF data integrity test may detect modification of these data if
the device was switched off. The tests may be implemented by internally generated error detecting codes,
cryptographic checksums or digital signatures. The cryptographic algorithm test may detect errors in
hardware, firmware or software implementing critical cryptographic mechanisms (see FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/SIGN). The test might be a known-answer-test (e.g. for encryption) or a pair-wise
consistency test (e.g. verifying a generated signature before the signature is exported). Supplementary
tests shall detect error of the random number generator used for the generation of CSP-SCD (see
FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_RND.1), cryptographic keys or parameters. If any critical function is not covered
by these tests the TSF should implement additional self-tests. The pair-wise consistency test for public
and private keys may detect errors in the key generation process. Other consistency tests may check the
correctness of the signing process and other cryptographic processes to prevent e.g. differential fault
attacks. Manual key entry test may detect errors to prevent use of incorrect keys if manual key entry is
implemented. Continuous random number generator test may detect failure in operation of the generator
to prevent use of wrong random number.
The TOE shall verify the integrity and authenticity of the TSF executable code at installation, maintenance
and initialisation to prevent malicious software running on the TOE.
5.1.7. Trusted path (FTP)
5.1.7.1. FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and local users that is
physically and logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the communicated data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit local users to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial user authentication (FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UAU.1), TSF management (FMT_MSA.1/ROLE, FMT_MTD.1/USER_CRYPTO,
FMT_MTD.1/USER_AUDIT, FMT_MTD.1/RAD, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1/ACCESS,
FMT_MTD.1/AUDIT, FMT_SMR.1) and the following additional functions:
• Upload of the TSF-generated authentication data to the iKey
• Upload of the TSF-generated challenge secret to the PED display
• Entry of M of N Activation secret shares
• Entry of the Token Cloning Domain key
5.2. Additions to the PP
For ease of identification, all TOE security functional requirements additional to the PP are collected in this
section.
5.2.1. Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.2.1.1. FCS_CKM.2 (FW Update) Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.2.1 (FW Update) The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method key exchange that meets the following: Luna® firmware update
protocol.
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5.2.1.2. FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access
FCS_CKM.3.1(Access) The TSF shall perform key access in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key access method, return of a key handle, that meets the following: PKCS #11 standard.
5.2.1.3. FCS_COP.1 (DIGEST) Cryptographic operation - Message digest
FCS_COP.1.1 (DIGEST) The TSF shall perform message digest in accordance with the specified
cryptographic algorithms listed below:
(1) SHA-1 (FIPS PUB 180-2),
(2) SHA-256 (FIPS PUB 180-2),
(3) SHA-384 (FIPS PUB 180-2),
(4) SHA-512 (FIPS PUB 180-2).
5.2.1.4. FCS_COP.1 (RSA ENC/DEC) Cryptographic operation - RSA Encrypt/Decrypt
FCS_COP.1.1 (RSA ENC/DEC) The TSF shall perform asymmetric encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA and cryptographic key sizes 1024 bits, 2048
bits and 4096 bits that meet the following: PKCS #1 V1.5 and OAEP.
5.2.1.5. FCS_COP.1 (TDES ENC/DEC) Cryptographic operation - TDES Encrypt/Decrypt
FCS_COP.1.1 (TDES Enc/Dec) The TSF shall perform symmetric encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple DES (ECB and CBC mode) and
cryptographic key sizes 112 bits, and 168 bits that meet the following: FIPS PUB 46-3.
5.2.1.6. FCS_COP.1 (AES ENC/DEC) Cryptographic operation - AES Encrypt, Decrypt
FCS_COP.1.1 (AES Enc/Dec) The TSF shall perform symmetric encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES (ECB and CBC mode) and cryptographic key
sizes 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits that meet the following: FIPS PUB 197.
5.2.2. User data protection (FDP)
5.2.2.1. FDP_ACC.1 (TAC) Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 (TAC) The TSF shall enforce the Token Access Control (TAC) SFP on the following:
(1) Device sessions (subjects).
(2) Private keys, public keys, secret keys, certificates, data objects.
(3) Operations:
a. Read (Query Attribute Value)
b. Modify
c. Destroy
d. Generate25
e. Wrap (export)
f. Use26
g. Clone
25
The Generate operation is intended primarily to indicate symmetric key or asymmetric key pair generation. However, it also includes other
methods of creating an object in the TOE, such as importing (unwrapping) a key and generic data object creation.
26
The Use operation includes symmetric key encryption/decryption, private key signing and decryption, and public key verification and
encryption.
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5.2.2.2. FDP_ACF.1 (TAC) Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 (TAC) The TSF shall enforce the Token Access Control (TAC) SFP to objects based on
the following:
(1) Subject attributes:
a. Session and Access ID
b. User ID associated with session (Access Owner)
c. Role.
(2) Object attributes:
a. Private. If True, object is Private. If False, object is Public.
b. Owner. Object ownership is assigned to the object creator.
c. Sensitive. If True, object is Sensitive. If False, object is Non-Sensitive.
d. Extractable. If True, object may be extracted. If False, object may not be extracted.
e. Modifiable. If True, object may be modified. If False, object may not be modified.
f. Type. Public key, private key, secret key.
FDP_ACF.1.2 (TAC) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
A subject may perform an allowed operation on an object if one of the following two conditions
holds:
(1) The object is a “Public” object, i.e., the PRIVATE attribute is FALSE, or
(2) The User ID of the subject is the same as the object’s owner.
An allowed operation is one permitted by the object attribute definitions within the constraints of
the HSM and Partition level capability and policy settings. Table 5-2 summarizes the operations
allowed by the object attribute settings.
The operations allowed for each user type in Table 5-2 have been abbreviated as indicated in
Table 5-1 below.
Table 5-1 – Operation Abbreviations
Operation Abbreviation Operation Abbreviation
Clone C Read R
Destroy D Use U
Generate G Wrap W
Modify M
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Table 5-2 – Access Matrix
Object Attribute Subject (ID/Role)
Private Sensitive Modifiable Extractable User ID/CO User ID/CU Public/Nil
0 0 0 N/A C,D,G,R R D,G,R
0 0 1 N/A C,D,G,M,R R D,G,M,R
1 0 0 N/A C,D,G,R R ---
1 0 1 N/A C,D,G,M,R R ---
1 1 0 0 C,D,G,R(1),U R(1),U ---
1 1 1 0 C,D,G,M,R(1),U R(1),U ---
1 1 0 1 C,D,G,R(1),U,W R(1),U ---
1 1 1 1 C,D,G,M,R(1),U,W R(1),U ---
1. The plaintext value of key material stored in objects whose CKA_SENSITIVE attribute is set cannot be read
although other object values, such as the object label, are accessible.
2. A “0” in the Table 5-2 indicates that the attribute labelling the column has not been set. A “1” indicates that the
attribute has been set.
FDP_ACF.1.3 (TAC) The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: None.
FDP_ACF.1.4 (TAC) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
• A subject shall not have access to the plaintext value of an object whose CKA_SENSITIVE
attribute is set.
5.2.2.3. FDP_DAU.1 Basic data authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1 The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee
of the validity of user objects.
FDP_DAU.1.2 The TSF shall provide the Users with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the
indicated information.
Refined by adding:
The evidence is provided by the SHA-1 fingerprint of the object. It is generated by the TOE and can be
queried at any time by the user.
5.2.2.4. FDP_DAU.2 Data authentication with identity of guarantor
FDP_DAU.2.1 The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee
of the validity of private and public keys.
FDP_DAU.2.2 The TSF shall provide the Users with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the
indicated information and the identity of the user that generated the evidence.
Refined by adding:
The evidence is provided by the Public Key Confirmation (PKC). It is generated in an X.509 certificate
format by the TOE and is signed by either the internal Hardware Origin Key, whose public key is certified
by the SafeNet trust anchor or by a customer private key, whose public key certificate has been issued by
a third party CSP or Trust Centre.
5.2.2.5. FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Token Access Control (TAC) SFP when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside of the TSC.
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FDP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported
from outside the TSC.
FDP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data, controlled under the
SFP, from outside the TSC: The CKA_SENSITIVE attribute of the object storing user data imported
via an Unwrap operation shall be set.
5.2.2.6. FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection
FDP_RIP.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to all objects.
5.2.2.7. FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Token Access Control (TAC) SFP to be able to transmit and
receive objects in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
5.2.2.8. FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Token Access Control (TAC) SFP to be able to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from modification errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification has
occurred.
5.2.3. Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.2.3.1. FIA_SOS.2 TSF generation of secrets
FIA_SOS.2.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate secrets that meet the minimum lengths
for each function for which they are required and that are random:
• SO and User PED authentication data 48 bytes
• User Challenge secret 75 bits
• M of N activation 32 bytes
• Cloning 24 bytes.
FIA_SOS.2.2 The TSF shall be able to enforce the use of TSF generated secrets for the following TSF
functions:
• SO and User PED authentication
• M of N activation
• Cloning.
5.2.3.2. FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to Challenge-response
authentication for Users.
5.2.3.3. FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide the following authentication mechanisms to support user
authentication:
• M of N secret sharing (SO and User).
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• PED Key entry (SO and User)
• PED PIN entry (SO and User)
• Challenge-response (User)
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the following rules:
• The user must enter their authentication data using, at a minimum, the PED and an
iKey.
• Optionally, the user enters a Personal Identification Number (PIN) via the PED in
addition to the entering the iKey.
• If required by the policy defined for the TOE, M out of N secret shares must first be
entered via the Luna® PIN Entry Device (PED) in order to enable the TOE for operation.
• The User, in the Crypto User and Crypto Officer roles, must enter the challenge secret
corresponding to one of the roles via the application interface in order to access
cryptographic data and services.
5.2.3.4. FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the
behalf of that user:
• User ID
• User checkword
• User role.
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes
with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
• User ID is Public (unidentified)
• User checkword is Nil.
• User role is Nil.
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes
associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
When the user is successfully authenticated the user security attributes change from their initial
values to the values appropriate for that authenticated user.
5.2.4. Security management (FMT)
5.2.4.1. FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable, enable and modify the behaviour of the
functions listed below to the Security Officer role:
HSM Level
M of N Activation – SO may enable and disable.
M of N Auto-activation – SO may enable and disable.
HSM Cloning – SO may enable and disable.
Remote Authentication – SO may enable and disable.
Network Replication – SO may enable and disable.
Force change of User authentication data – SO may enable and disable.
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Partition Level
Partition reset – SO may enable and disable.
Partition activation – SO may enable and disable.
Partition auto-activation – SO may enable and disable.
High Availability – SO may enable and disable.
Multi-purpose keys – SO may enable and disable.
Changing key attributes once a key has been created – SO may enable and disable.
Operation without RSA blinding – SO may enable and disable.
Signing operations with non-local keys – SO may enable and disable.
Performing raw RSA operations – SO may enable and disable.
Private key unwrapping – SO may enable and disable.
Secret key wrapping – SO may enable and disable.
Secret key unwrapping – SO may enable and disable.
User key management capability – SO may enable and disable.
Increment failed login attempt counter on failed challenge response validation – SO may
enable and disable.
RSA signing without confirmation – SO may enable and disable.
5.2.4.2. FMT_MSA.1 (Object Attributes) Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1 (Object Attributes) The TSF shall enforce the TAC SFP to restrict the ability to modify the
security attributes CKA_PRIVATE (for data and certificate objects only), CKA_EXTRACTABLE (for
secret keys only), CKA_DERIVE (for secret keys only) and CKA_MODIFIABLE to the Crypto Officer
role.
5.2.4.3. FMT_MSA.2 (Object Attributes) Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.2.1 (Object Attributes) The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for
security attributes.
5.2.4.4. FMT_MSA.3 (Object Attributes) Static attribute initialization
FMT_MSA.3.1 (Object Attributes) The TSF shall enforce the TAC SFP to provide restrictive default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 (Object Attributes) The TSF shall allow Crypto Officer to specify alternative initial values
to override the default values when an object or information is created.
5.2.4.5. FMT_MTD.1 (Login Failures) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1 (Login Failures) The TSF shall restrict the ability to change_default the Number of User
Login Failures Allowed (FIA_AFL.1.1 (User)) to the Security Officer.
5.2.4.6. FMT_MTD.1 (UAV) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1 (UAV – User Locked Flag) The TSF shall restrict the ability to change_default, query,
modify and delete the User Locked Flag to the Security Officer role.
FMT_MTD.1.1 (Challenge Secret – Crypto Officer) The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the
Crypto Officer Challenge Secret to the Crypto Officer role.
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5.2.4.7. FMT_MTD.1 (SOV) Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1 (SOV) The TSF shall restrict the ability to change_default and modify the SO Checkword
to the Security Officer role.
5.2.4.8. FMT_SMF.1 (Policies) Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 (Policies) The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management
functions:
1. disable, enable and modify the behaviour of configurable policy settings at the HSM and
Partition levels (FMT_MOF.1),
2. change_default the Number of User Login Failures Allowed.
5.2.5. Protection of the TOE Security Functions (FPT)
5.2.5.1. FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_RVM.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before
each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
5.2.5.2. FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FPT_SEP.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.1.2 The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects in the TSC.
5.2.6. Resource utilization (FRU)
5.2.6.1. FRU_FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerance
FRU_FLT.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the operation of TOE’s user data protection capabilities when the
following failures occur: power failure or data input/output failure.
5.2.7. Trusted path (FTP)
5.2.7.1. FTP_ITC.1 (FW Update) Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 (FW Update) The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 (FW Update) The TSF shall permit the remote trusted IT product to initiate communication
via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 (FW Update) The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for firmware
load and update.
5.2.7.2. FTP_ITC.1 (Key Cloning) Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 (Key Cloning) The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
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FTP_ITC.1.2 (Key Cloning) The TSF shall permit the TSF, the remote trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 (Key Cloning) The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for key
cloning.
Application Note:
The function specified by FTP_ITC.1 (Key Cloning) is used to establish a trusted channel between the
TOE and the Backup Token. The session key used to encrypt the data being backed up or restored is
negotiated as part of the establishment of the trusted channel.
5.3. Requirements for IT Environment
5.3.1. Security audit (FAU)
5.3.1.1. FAU_SAR.1 (ENV) Audit review
FAU_SAR.1.1 (ENV) The IT environment shall provide System auditor of the CSP with the capability to
read all audit information produced by the TOE from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2 (ENV) The IT environment shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user
to interpret the information.
5.3.1.2. FAU_STG.1 (ENV) Guarantees of audit data availability
FAU_STG.1.1 (ENV) The IT environment shall protect the stored audit records from unauthorised
deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 (ENV) The IT environment shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the audit
records in the audit trail.
Application note:
The SFR FAU_STG.1 (ENV) addresses the protection of the audit trail generated and exported by the
TOE that is provided by the IT environment.
5.3.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.3.2.1. FCS_CKM.1 (ENV/FW Update) Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 (ENV/FW Update) The firmware update application system shall generate cryptographic
keys in accordance with the specified cryptographic key generation algorithms listed below and specified
cryptographic key sizes specified for each algorithm that meet the following standards noted for each
algorithm:
RSA 2048 bits key pairs in accordance with ANSI X9.31.
TDES 112 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 46-3 and ANSI X9.52.
5.3.2.2. FCS_CKM.2 (ENV/FW Update) Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.2.1 (ENV/FW Update) The firmware update application system shall distribute cryptographic
keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method key exchange that meets the
following: Luna® firmware update protocol.
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5.3.2.3. FCS_CKM.2 (ENV/BACKUP) Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.2.1 (ENV/BACKUP) The Backup Token shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key distribution method key negotiation that meets the following: RSA 4096
bits and TDES 168 bits.
5.3.2.4. FCS_COP.1 (ENV/ENC FW Update) Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 (ENV/ENC FW Update) The firmware update application system shall perform encryption
and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm TDES and cryptographic key
sizes 112 bits that meet the following: ANSI X9.52.
5.3.2.5. FCS_COP.1 (ENV/SIGN FW Update) Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 (ENV/SIGN FW Update) The firmware update application system shall perform digital
signature generation in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA with SHA-1 and
cryptographic key sizes 1024 bits that meet the following: standards noted for each algorithm.
RSA – PKCS #1 V1.5
SHA-1 – FIPS PUB 180-2.
5.3.2.6. FCS_COP.1 (ENV/BACKUP_ENC) Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 (ENV/BACKUP_ENC) The Backup Token shall perform encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm TDES and cryptographic key sizes 168 bits that
meet the following: FIPS PUB 46-3.
5.3.2.7. FCS_COP.1 (ENV/BACKUP_INT) Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 (ENV/BACKUP_INT) The Backup Token shall perform calculation and verification of
cryptographic checksums in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and
cryptographic key sizes N/A that meet the following: FIPS PUB 180-2.
5.3.3. User data protection (FDP)
The client application shall provide the TOE signing function to its authorised end-user only and shall
prevent unauthorised transmission and manipulation of DTBS representation to be signed by the TOE.
5.3.3.1. FDP_ACC.1 (CLIENT) Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 (CLIENT) The IT environment shall enforce the Client application SFP on end-user,
Cryptographic module signing function, use.
5.3.3.2. FDP_ACF.1 (CLIENT) Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 (CLIENT) The IT environment shall enforce the Client application SFP to objects based
on authorisation for Cryptographic module signing function.
FDP_ACF.1.2 (CLIENT) The IT environment shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: authorised end-user is allowed to use
Cryptographic module signing function.
FDP_ACF.1.3 (CLIENT) The IT environment shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: none.
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FDP_ACF.1.4 (CLIENT) The IT environment shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule: non-authorised end-user is not allowed to use Cryptographic module signing function.
Application Note:
The security attribute “authorisation for Cryptographic module signing function” is assigned to end-users
of the client application with two possible values:
(a) authorised to use Cryptographic module signing function,
(b) not authorised to use Cryptographic module signing function.
5.3.3.3. FDP_ACC.1 (ENV/BACKUP) Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 (ENV/BACKUP) The Backup Token shall enforce the Backup Token SFP on User; CSP-
SCD, backup key(s), backup data; backup (FDP_BKP.1), restore (FDP_BKP.1), backup key
distribution (FCS_CKM.2).
5.3.3.4. FDP_ACF.1 (ENV/BACKUP) Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 (ENV/BACKUP) The Backup Token shall enforce the Backup Token SFP to objects
based on Identity and Role.
FDP_ACF.1.2 (ENV/BACKUP) The Backup Token shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: User with security attribute Role
Crypto Officer is allowed to restore CSP-SCD and CSP-SVD (FDP_BKP.1) to the TOE.
FDP_ACF.1.3 (ENV/BACKUP) The Backup Token shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: User with security attribute Role Crypto Officer is allowed to
restore all partition objects to a partition in the TOE.
FDP_ACF.1.4 (ENV/BACKUP) The Backup Token shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the none
5.3.3.5. FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1 The IT environment shall enforce the Client application SFP to be able to transmit user
data in a manner protected from modification, deletion and insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The IT environment shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion and insertion has occurred.
Application note:
The user data to be protected by the IT environment are data to be signed by the Cryptographic module.
5.3.4. Identification and authentication (FIA)
The client application shall identify and authenticate its end-user for use of the Cryptographic module
services.
5.3.4.1. FIA_UAU.1 (CLIENT) Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 (CLIENT) The IT environment shall allow user login on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 (CLIENT) The IT environment shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other actions on behalf of that user.
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5.3.4.2. FIA_UID.1 (CLIENT) Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 (CLIENT) The IT environment shall allow user login on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 (CLIENT) The IT environment shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other actions of the IT environment on behalf of that user.
5.3.5. Trusted path (FTP)
5.3.5.1. FTP_TRP.1 (CLIENT) Trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.1 (CLIENT) The IT environment shall provide a communication path between itself and local
users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the communicated data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2 (CLIENT) The IT environment shall permit local users to initiate communication via the
trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3 (CLIENT) The IT environment shall require the use of the trusted path for communication
with TOE for identification, authentication and management.
Application note:
The Cryptographic module does provide a human user interface for authentication and management on
the host system. The client application will provide this interface and a trusted path for the
communication between the user and the Cryptographic module. The client application shall support the
trusted path as one for the communication entity.
5.3.6. Trusted path (FTP)
5.3.6.1. FTP_ITC.1 (ENV/FW Update) Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 (ENV/FW Update) The firmware update application system shall provide a communication
channel between itself and a remote Luna PCI that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 (ENV/FW Update) The firmware update application system shall permit the firmware update
application Luna PCI to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 (ENV/FW Update) The firmware update application system shall initiate communication via
the trusted channel for firmware load and update.
5.3.6.2. FTP_ITC.1 (ENV/Key Cloning) Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 (ENV/Key Cloning) The Backup Token shall provide a communication channel between
itself and a remote trusted Luna PCI that is logically distinct from other communication channels and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 (ENV/Key Cloning) The Backup Token shall permit the Backup Token, the remote trusted
Luna PCI to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 (ENV/Key Cloning) The Backup Token shall initiate communication via the trusted channel
for key cloning.
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5.4. Non-IT Requirements
RE.ENV_Outage_Protection
The CSP personnel shall ensure that the power supplied to the TOE is adequately protected against
unexpected interruptions and the effects of surges and voltage fluctuations outside the normal operating
range of the device and that the TOE is operated in an environment that is provided adequate protection
against disasters such as fire and flood.
RE.ENV_Personnel Personnel security measures
The CSP shall define the obligations and the services of management and operation roles for the TOE.
The CSP shall inform and train the personnel for their roles. The CSP shall inform the personnel using the
TOE about their civil, financial and legal responsibilities.
RE.ENV_Protect_Access Physical protection of the TOE
The CSP shall establish physical and organisational security measures to protect the TOE against
modification of TOE hardware, firmware and software. These measures shall restrict the access to the
TOE and protected assets to authorised persons. If the TOE detects and notifies about physical
tampering the local users shall inform the CSP security staff. The TOE shall not be used until the physical
integrity of the TOE is established.
RE.ENV_Recovery Recovery procedures for the TOE
The CSP shall define and apply recovery plans and procedures which allow a secure and timely recovery
of the TOE operational state. These procedures shall ensure at least
(1) secure initialisation of new TOE devices replacing other TOE devices,
(2) re-initialisation of TOE devices establishing the secure state by the TSF FPT_FLS.1 after detecting
failures by the TSF FPT_AMT.1 and FPT_TST.1,
(3) integrity check of the TOE hardware, firmware and software and re-initialisation of TOE devices if the
TOE indicates physical tampering by TSF FPT_PHP.2 and destroyed the plaintext SCP-SCD and other
confidential secret and private keys by TSF FPT_PHP.3.
To support the TOE backup of the CSP-SCD, other user data and TSF data the CSP will ensure the
availability of the backup data and the cryptographic quality, confidentiality and availability of the backup
keys.
RE.ENV_Secure_Init Secure initialisation of the TOE
The CSP shall define and apply procedures and controls in the TOE environment which allow to securely
set-up and initialise the TOE for the generation of CSP-SCD and signatures. This includes
(1) dual control for secure installation and initialisation of the TOE in the CSP,
(2) the CSP-SCD / CSP-SVD pair generation,
(3) the export of the CSP-SVD by the TOE and the securing the authenticity of the CSP-SVD,
(4) the secure initial configuration of the TSF data user’s identity, roles and user authentication
information.
RE.ENV_Secure_Oper Secure operation of the TOE
The CSP shall define and apply procedures and controls in the TOE environment which allow operating
the TOE within a CA system in compliance with the requirements of the EU directive, the Qualified
Certificates Policy for the issued certificates, the secure operation of the client application and the TOE
guidance. The TOE user shall ensure that notification about physical tampering attempts given by the
TOE will be noticed by the CSP security personnel.
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5.5. TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance requirements for this TOE are as specified in the Common Criteria Version 2.3 Part 3-EAL 4
package with augmentation. The EAL 4 package has been augmented by the addition of the Part 3 requirements:
ADV_IMP.2, ALC_FLR.2, AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3, and AVA_VLA.4.
5.5.1. Security Assurance Requirements Augmentation to EAL 4
5.5.1.1. ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
Dependencies: ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
Application notes
The ADV_IMP.2.2E element defines a requirement that the evaluator determine that the implementation
representation is an accurate and complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements. This
provides a direct correspondence between the TOE security functional requirements and the
implementation representation, in addition to the pairwise correspondences required by the
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR) family. It is expected that the evaluator will use the
evidence provided in Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR) as an input to making this
determination.
Developer action elements:
ADV_IMP.2.1D The developer shall provide the implementation representation for the entire TSF.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
ADV_IMP.2.1C The implementation representation shall unambiguously define the TSF to a level of
detail such that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions.
ADV_IMP.2.2C The implementation representation shall be internally consistent.
ADV_IMP.2.3C The implementation representation shall describe the relationships between all portions
of the implementation.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_IMP.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_IMP.2.2E The evaluator shall determine that the implementation representation is an accurate and
complete instantiation of the TOE security functional requirements.
5.5.1.2. ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Objectives
In order for the developer to be able to act appropriately upon security flaw reports from TOE users, and
to know to whom to send corrective fixes, TOE users need to understand how to submit security flaw
reports to the developer. Flaw remediation guidance from the developer to the TOE user ensures that
TOE users are aware of this important information.
Developer action elements:
ALC_FLR.2.1D The developer shall provide flaw remediation procedures addressed to TOE developers.
ALC_FLR.2.2D The developer shall establish a procedure for accepting and acting upon all reports of
security flaws and requests for corrections to those flaws.
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ALC_FLR.2.3D The developer shall provide flaw remediation guidance addressed to TOE users.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
ALC_FLR.2.1C The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the procedures used to
track all reported security flaws in each release of the TOE.
ALC_FLR.2.2C The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect
of each security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw.
ALC_FLR.2.3C The flaw remediation procedures shall require that corrective actions be identified for
each of the security flaws.
ALC_FLR.2.4C The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to
provide flaw information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users.
ALC_FLR.2.5C The flaw remediation procedures shall describe a means by which the developer receives
from TOE users reports and enquiries of suspected security flaws in the TOE.
ALC_FLR.2.6C The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall ensure that any reported
flaws are corrected and the correction issued to TOE users.
ALC_FLR.2.7C The procedures for processing reported security flaws shall provide safeguards that any
corrections to these security flaws do not introduce any new flaws.
ALC_FLR.2.8C The flaw remediation guidance shall describe a means by which TOE users report to the
developer any suspected security flaws in the TOE.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_FLR.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
5.5.1.3. Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA.1)
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.2 Fully defined external interfaces
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
AGD_USR.1 User guidance
Objectives
The objective is to identify covert channels that are identifiable, through an informal search for covert
channels.
Developer action elements:
AVA_CCA.1.1D The developer shall conduct a search for covert channels for each information flow
control policy.
AVA_CCA.1.2D The developer shall provide covert channel analysis documentation.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
AVA_CCA.1.1C The analysis documentation shall identify covert channels and estimate their capacity.
AVA_CCA.1.2C The analysis documentation shall describe the procedures used for determining the
existence of covert channels, and the information needed to carry out the covert channel analysis.
AVA_CCA.1.3C The analysis documentation shall describe all assumptions made during the covert
channel analysis.
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AVA_CCA.1.4C The analysis documentation shall describe the method used for estimating channel
capacity, based on worst case scenarios.
AVA_CCA.1.5C The analysis documentation shall describe the worst case exploitation scenario for each
identified covert channel.
Evaluator action elements:
AVA_CCA.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_CCA.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the results of the covert channel analysis show that the
TOE meets its functional requirements.
AVA_CCA.1.3E The evaluator shall selectively validate the covert channel analysis through testing.
5.5.1.4. Analysis and testing for insecure states (AVA_MSU.3)
Dependencies: ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
AGD_USR.1 User guidance
Objectives
The objective is to ensure that misleading, unreasonable and conflicting guidance is absent from the
guidance documentation, and that secure procedures for all modes of operation have been addressed.
Insecure states should be easy to detect. In this component, an analysis of the guidance documentation
by the developer is required to provide additional assurance that the objective has been met, and this
analysis is validated and confirmed through testing by the evaluator.
Application notes
In this component the evaluator is required to undertake testing to ensure that if and when the TOE
enters an insecure state this may easily be detected. This testing may be considered as a specific aspect
of penetration testing.
Developer action elements:
AVA_MSU.3.1D The developer shall provide guidance documentation.
AVA_MSU.3.2D The developer shall document an analysis of the guidance documentation.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
AVA_MSU.3.1C The guidance documentation shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE
(including operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for
maintaining secure operation.
AVA_MSU.3.2C The guidance documentation shall be complete, clear, consistent and reasonable.
AVA_MSU.3.3C The guidance documentation shall list all assumptions about the intended environment.
AVA_MSU.3.4C The guidance documentation shall list all requirements for external security measures
(including external procedural, physical and personnel controls).
AVA_MSU.3.5C The analysis documentation shall demonstrate that the guidance documentation is
complete.
Evaluator action elements:
AVA_MSU.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
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AVA_MSU.3.2E The evaluator shall repeat all configuration and installation procedures, and other
procedures selectively, to confirm that the TOE can be configured and used securely using only the
supplied guidance documentation.
AVA_MSU.3.3E The evaluator shall determine that the use of the guidance documentation allows all
insecure states to be detected.
AVA_MSU.3.4E The evaluator shall confirm that the analysis documentation shows that guidance is
provided for secure operation in all modes of operation of the TOE.
AVA_MSU.3.5E The evaluator shall perform independent testing to determine that an administrator or
user, with an understanding of the guidance documentation, would reasonably be able to determine if the
TOE is configured and operating in a manner that is insecure.
5.5.1.5. Highly resistant (AVA_VLA.4)
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design
ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF
ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
AGD_USR.1 User guidance
Objectives
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer to ascertain the presence of security vulnerabilities,
and to confirm that they cannot be exploited in the intended environment for the TOE.
The evaluator performs independent penetration testing, supported by the evaluator's independent
vulnerability analysis, to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by attackers
possessing a high attack potential.
Developer action elements:
AVA_VLA.4.1D The developer shall perform a vulnerability analysis.
AVA_VLA.4.2D The developer shall provide vulnerability analysis documentation.
Content and presentation of evidence elements:
AVA_VLA.4.1C The vulnerability analysis documentation shall describe the analysis of the TOE
deliverables performed to search for ways in which a user can violate the TSP.
AVA_VLA.4.2C The vulnerability analysis documentation shall describe the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities.
AVA_VLA.4.3C The vulnerability analysis documentation shall show, for all identified vulnerabilities, that
the vulnerability cannot be exploited in the intended environment for the TOE.
AVA_VLA.4.4C The vulnerability analysis documentation shall justify that the TOE, with the identified
vulnerabilities, is resistant to obvious penetration attacks.
AVA_VLA.4.5C The vulnerability analysis documentation shall show that the search for vulnerabilities is
systematic.
AVA_VLA.4.6C The vulnerability analysis documentation shall provide a justification that the analysis
completely addresses the TOE deliverables.
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Evaluator action elements:
AVA_VLA.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for
content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VLA.4.2E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, building on the developer vulnerability
analysis, to ensure the identified vulnerabilities have been addressed.
AVA_VLA.4.3E The evaluator shall perform an independent vulnerability analysis.
AVA_VLA.4.4E The evaluator shall perform independent penetration testing, based on the independent
vulnerability analysis, to determine the exploitability of additional identified vulnerabilities in the intended
environment.
AVA_VLA.4.5E The evaluator shall determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed
by an attacker possessing a high attack potential.
5.6. Strength of Function Claim
The minimum Strength of Function (SoF) required for the TOE is SoF - high. This applies to the following
security functional requirements:
FCS_RND.1 Quality metrics for random numbers
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_SOS.2 TSF generation of secrets
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (The cloning domain identifier is generated and used as part of the
cloning protocol in authenticating the TOE and Backup Token as part of the same cloning domain and,
therefore, allowed to participate in the trusted channel.)
This is considered to be necessary and reasonable for the TOE because its primary function of protecting
user key material in all environments relies heavily on the authentication processes.
The assessment of algorithmic strength of cryptographic functions does not form part of the evaluation.
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6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
6.1. Overview
The TOE is used primarily as a hardware security module for the protection of the private signing keys at the
Certification Authority (CA), or Certification Service Provider (CSP), within a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). As
such, its primary functions are to securely generate and protect the private signing key used by the CA or CSP
when signing digital certificates.
The Luna® PCI cryptographic module provides storage capability for cryptographic material generated by the
module or generated by the host application as well as storage for non-cryptographic data provided by the host
application. Non-cryptographic data can be stored in the form of certificate objects or in the form of data objects.
When storing or generating keys (secret or private), the module imposes some restrictions on how these keys are
handled. Security policy enforcement is described in more detail in section 6.2.
6.1.1. Object Model
All user data is managed by the module as objects. Objects are owned by external processes/users and
manipulated by the module. They are characterized by different attributes used by the module to determine the
handling rules to be applied. The module provides two ways of storing objects: permanent (also known as PKCS
#11 token objects) and volatile (also known as session objects). Permanent objects are kept inside the module
even when no power is applied to it. They are stored encrypted in a flash memory device. Session objects only
exist when power is applied to the module and they are stored in volatile RAM.
The Luna object model is very closely related to the PKCS#11 standard. More details on the Luna interface
exists in the Luna Interface Control Document [8].
6.1.2. Multi-Session Capability
The Luna PCI cryptographic module manages communication with external processes on a per session basis.
Applications running on the host system requiring data and cryptographic services from the module have to open
a session with the module before gaining access to the module’s functions and objects. The session provides a
logical connection between the application and the module and it is the session to which the authentication state
is bound. It is possible for an application to open multiple sessions with the module or have multiple applications
each opening various sessions with the module.
The module provides a higher level of connection abstraction based on an access id that associates a group of
sessions to a particular application. This approach allows an application or applications to share sessions, and
associated authentication state, within the scope of that access id.
6.1.3. TOE Roles
The following roles are supported by the TOE:
• Security Officer (SO) – authorized to install and configure the TOE, set and maintain security policies, and
create and delete users (Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles). The TOE can have only one SO.
• Crypto Officer – authorized to create, use, destroy and backup/restore cryptographic objects.
• Crypto User – authorized to use cryptographic objects (e.g., sign, encrypt/decrypt).
The Crypto Officer and Crypto User interface to the Luna PCI for cryptographic operations using the PKCS #11
API. The Security Officer uses a separate Command Line Interface (CLI), which is part of the interface software,
to perform configuration, security policy settings and user creation/deletion. The CLI is also used by the Crypto
Officer to perform backup and restoration of cryptographic objects.
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The TOE allows for the creation of multiple users in the Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles. Each user is
created within a cryptographically separated partition in the Luna PCI cryptographic module and each partition
must have one and only one user in the Crypto Officer role. A partition may also have one and only one user in
the Crypto User role. It is possible to have up to twenty (20) partitions defined within the Luna PCI cryptographic
module.
6.1.4. Multi-User Capability
A user must access the module through a session. Sessions are opened as Public sessions and may remain
Public or become Private (authenticated) following a successful user authentication. Session states are kept
separate based on the user authentication state ensuring that sessions cannot be shared among users. The
module allows multiple user identities to be authenticated at a time. Once authenticated, a session becomes
bound to the user identity and has access to all cryptographic operations appropriate to the user’s role and may
access private objects generated on behalf of the user in previous sessions. Although there may be many users
authenticated to the cryptographic module, there is effectively only one thread of execution within the module and,
therefore, only one command being executed from request through to response at any given time.
6.2. Capability and Policy Settings
The Luna PCI was designed with the flexibility needed to support a number of different product variants. The
main method used to control the behaviour of different products is a fixed set of “capabilities” set at the factory.
The settings made for the TOE configuration are shown in sub-sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. For each of the
capabilities, a corresponding policy element exists. The SO establishes the policy that will govern the
cryptographic module’s operation, according to the requirements of the customer organization, by
enabling/disabling or refining the corresponding policy elements to equate to or to be more restrictive than the
pre-assigned capabilities. See section 6.3.14 for a description of the specific policy elements that are
configurable by the SO in the TOE configuration.
Policy set elements can only refine capability set elements to more restrictive values. Specifically, if a capability is
set to allow, the corresponding policy element may be set to either enable or disable. However, if a capability is
set to disallow, the corresponding policy element is set to disabled and is not SO-configurable. Thus, an SO
cannot use policy configuration to lift a restriction set in a capability definition.
There are also several elements of the cryptographic module’s behaviour that are truly fixed for all product
variants and, therefore, are never subject to configuration by the SO. The specific elements are the following:
• Non-sensitive secret keys are not allowed.
• Non-sensitive private keys are not allowed.
• Non-private (Public) secret keys are not allowed.
• Non-private (Public) private keys are not allowed.
• Creation of secret keys and private keys through the PKCS #11 create object interface is not allowed.
That is, the API cannot be used to create keys by passing in known plaintext values.
In the next two sub-sections, all capability elements described as “allow/disallow some functionality” are Boolean
values where false (or zero) equates to disallow the functionality and true (or one) equates to allow the
functionality. Except as noted, all Boolean capabilities are Allowed, thus leaving them configurable by the SO.
The remainder of the elements are integer values with either the default value or the maximum in number of bits
shown.
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6.2.1. HSM Level Capabilities
The following is the set of capabilities supported at the HSM level:
• Allow/disallow non-FIPS algorithms available.
• Allow/disallow password authentication (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow Remote PED Usage (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow M of N.
• Allow/disallow cloning.
• Allow/disallow masking (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow M of N auto-activation.
• Allow/disallow ECC mechanisms.
• Allow/disallow Remote Authentication.
• Allow/disallow SO reset of partition PIN.
• Allow/disallow network replication.
• Allow/disallow forcing change of User authentication data.
• Number of failed SO logins allowed before the HSM is zeroized (set to 3, non-configurable).
Note that the module policy “Allow/disallow Remote PED Usage” is disallowed with the TOE in the evaluated
configuration. The TOE must be purchased in the “Local PED” configuration. Use of a Remote PED, which
requires the module policy “Allow/disallow Remote PED Usage” to be changed to “Allow” means that the TOE can
no longer be considered an evaluated configuration.
6.2.2. Partition Level Capabilities
The following is the set of capabilities supported at the partition level.
• Allow/disallow partition reset.
• Allow/disallow activation.
• Allow/disallow automatic activation.
• Allow/disallow High Availability.
• Allow/disallow multipurpose keys.
• Allow/disallow changing of certain key attributes once a key has been created.
• Allow/disallow operation without RSA blinding.
• Allow/disallow signing operations with non-local keys.
• Allow/disallow raw RSA operations.
• Allow/disallow private key wrapping (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow private key unwrapping.
• Allow/disallow secret key wrapping
• Allow/disallow secret key unwrapping.
• Allow/disallow Level 3 operation without a challenge (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow user key management capability. (Allowed in TOE configuration. This would be
disabled by the SO at the policy level to prevent any key management activity in the partition, even by
a user in the Crypto Officer role. This could be used, for example, at a CA once the root signing key
pair has been generated and backed up, if appropriate, to lock down the partition for signing use
only.)
• Allow/disallow incrementing of failed login attempt counter on failed challenge response validation.
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• Allow/disallow RSA signing without confirmation.
• Allow/disallow RA type wrapping (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Minimum/maximum password length (not applicable in TOE configuration).
• Level of storage space available for key storage (4 bits).
• Number of failed Partition User logins allowed before partition is locked out/cleared (default is 10, SO
can configure it to be 3 <= N <= 10)
The following capabilities are only configurable if cloning is allowed and enabled at the cryptographic module
level:
• Allow/disallow private key cloning (allowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow secret key cloning (allowed in TOE configuration).
The following capabilities are only configurable if masking is allowed and enabled at the cryptographic module
level:
• Allow/disallow private key masking (disallowed in TOE configuration).
• Allow/disallow secret key masking (disallowed in TOE configuration).
6.3. IT Security Functions
6.3.1. Audit Data Generation
The TOE provides raw audit data that can be read and interpreted by an audit application on the host computer
system. The audit data consists of the session handle, command code and input parameters transmitted to the
TOE, the output parameters in response to the command and the error return code (0 if the command was
successful). The session handle associates the user to the command code. Each command code and
corresponding response has a sequence number associated with it. This allows the audit application to maintain
sequence ordering and to unambiguously associate responses to commands. The following events are covered
by the audit data:
• TOE initialisation
• TOE start-up
• Generation of secret key and asymmetric key pair
• Destruction of key material
• Use of secret key and private key
• Unsuccessful authentication
• Modification of TOE management data
• Adding new users
• Deleting users
• Execution of the TSF self tests during initial start-up and at the request of the authorised user
• Unsuccessful self test operations
• Execution of the cloning functions for key backup and restore operations
The audit records are written by the TSF to a circular storage buffer that can be read but not written by an audit
administrative application. The buffer ensures the availability of approximately 60 kB of stored records.
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6.3.2. Trusted Path – Luna PED
User authentication data and other critical security parameters are protected through the use of a separate port
and data path for their transfer, and by providing mechanisms to protect their confidentiality and integrity.
Attached to this separate data port is the Luna PIN Entry Device or Luna PED.
The Luna PED, with accompanying iKeys, is depicted in Figure 4. It houses a number of input/output interfaces
that, in combination, provide a trusted path device for the communication of authentication data and critical
security parameters to and from the Luna PCI cryptographic module. The Luna PED has a character display
used to display status and prompt messages, and a challenge secret that is output by the cryptographic module at
the time a partition is created [see sub-section 6.1.3]. It has a keypad used to enter simple responses
(Yes/No/Enter) and to enter an optional PIN that is combined with the authentication data stored on an iKey as
part of the authentication process. It has a USB receptacle for the input/output of data to the iKey and it has a
serial communications cable that connects to the separate data port, which is wired directly to the cryptographic
module. Because the PED has a direct serial communications interface to the cryptographic module, only local
entry of iKey authentication data is possible.
The following types of iKey are used with the Luna PED:
• Blue (SO) iKey – for the storage of SO authentication data,
• Black (User) iKey – for the storage of User authentication data,
• Red (Domain) iKey – for the storage of the cloning domain data, used to control the ability to clone
from a cryptographic module to a backup token,
• Green (M of N) iKeys – used to store M of N secret shares, used for multi-purpose control of critical
functions,
Any iKey, once data has been written to it, is an Identification and Authentication device and must be safeguarded
accordingly by the administrative or operations staff responsible for the operation of the TOE within the
customer’s environment.
Figure 5 Luna® PED with iKeys
6.3.3. User Identification and Authentication
The iKey contains the user’s identification number and the pseudo-randomly generated 48-byte authentication
secret for the user and is entered into the key receptacle in the PED in order to identify and authenticate the user.
A user is defined as an entity that acts to perform an operation on the TOE. In most instances, this will be a host
application program such as a PKI Certification Authority implementation. The TOE supports three user roles;
Security Officer (SO), Crypto Officer and Crypto User. For a user to assume any role the module enforces user
identification and authentication.
The TOE requires that all users (SO, Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles) be authenticated by proving
knowledge of a secret shared by the user and the cryptographic module.
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The TOE generates the authentication secrets using its PRNG. For the SO, the authentication secret is a 48-byte
random secret and it is generated at the time the cryptographic module is initialised. For Users, the
authentication secrets consist of a 48-byte random secret and separate challenge secret(s); these are generated
at the time the partition is created by the SO. The authentication secret(s) are provided to the operator via the
Luna PED display and iKey, as described in sub-section 6.3.2, and must be entered by the operator via the Luna
PED and via a logically separate trusted channel (in the case of the response based on the challenge secret)
during the login process. Both the Crypto Officer and Crypto User use the same 48-byte random secret. If a
Partition is created with Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles, a separate challenge secret is generated for each
role.
SO authentication requires the transmission to the cryptographic module of the Blue iKey data combined with the
optional PIN through the trusted path.
User authentication is a two-stage process. The first stage is termed “Activation” and is performed using the Luna
PED. Activation requires the transmission to the cryptographic module of the Black iKey data combined with the
optional PIN through the trusted path. Once Activation has been performed, the partition data is ready for use
within the cryptographic module. Access to key material and cryptographic services, however, is not allowed until
the second stage of authentication, equivalent to “User Login”, has been performed. This typically requires the
input of a partition’s challenge secret as part of an application program’s login operation.
The authentication challenge secret (or secrets if the Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles are used) for the
partition is generated by the cryptographic module as a random 75-bit value that is displayed as a 16-character
string on the visual display of the trusted path device. The challenge secret is then provided, via a secure out-of-
band means, to each external entity authorized to connect to the partition and is used by the external entity to
form the response to a random one-time challenge from the cryptographic module. The encrypted one-time
response is returned to the cryptographic module where it is verified to confirm the “User Login”.
Following a successful login, the user is bound to the subject acting on its behalf by having the User Authorization
Vector (UAV) data included in the state data maintained by the session manager. In the case of the Luna PCI
cryptographic module the subject acting on behalf of a user is a session. The relationship between the user and
the session is discussed in more detail in section 6.1.4 and the data contained in the UAV is described in
section 6.3.5.
The TOE also enforces a maximum login attempts policy. This feature serves to prevent an exhaustive search
approach to find the authentication data of the SO or a User. The implementation of this feature differs for an SO
authentication data search and a User authentication data search.
In the case of a user:
If “y” consecutive user logon attempts fail (“y” is defined by the SO in the configurable policy for the
partition), the TOE will either lock the partition or erase the partition, as defined by the SO in the
configurable policy. If it has been locked, the partition must be unlocked by the SO in order to allow user
login. If it has been erased, the partition cannot be recovered directly. If recovery is required, the SO
must create a new partition and the new Crypto Officer must recover the partition’s data from a backup
token.
In the case of the SO, if three (3) consecutive SO logon attempts fail, the module is zeroized and must be re-
initialized.
6.3.3.1. M of N Activation
The TOE can also be configured by the SO to require the use of an M of N secret sharing authentication scheme
to enable the module for operation. The M of N activation protocol provides the capability to enforce multi-person
integrity over SO operations and activation of each partition.
The M of N capability is based on Shamir’s threshold scheme. The Luna PCI cryptographic module generates a
32 byte secret and protects it by “splitting” it into “N” pieces and storing each piece on an iKey dedicated to that
purpose (Green Key). Any “M” of these “N” pieces must be transmitted to the Luna PCI cryptographic module by
inserting the corresponding iKeys into the Luna PED in order to reconstruct the original secret.
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6.3.3.2. Unidentified and Unauthenticated Users
The TOE allows the following actions on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified:
• Perform start-up, self-test (FPT_TST.1), detection of the secure blocking state (FPT_FLS.1), detection of
violation of physical integrity (FPT_PHP.2),
• Perform basic diagnostic functions, such as checking the communications from the host to the card,
checking firmware level and token info and checking information on mechanisms supported.
The user must be identified before any other TSF-mediated action is allowed to proceed.
The TOE allows the following actions on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated:
• Perform start-up, self-test (FPT_TST.1), detection of the secure blocking state (FPT_FLS.1), detection of
violation of physical integrity (FPT_PHP.2),
• Perform basic diagnostic functions, such as checking the communications from the host to the card,
checking firmware level and token info and checking information on mechanisms supported.
• Open a session
• Access Public data objects
• Identification (FIA_UID.1).
The user must be authenticated before any other TSF-mediated action is allowed to proceed.
6.3.4. Authentication Data Selection
The User authentication data is a 48 byte value that is randomly generated by the module and stored on an iKey
(Blue for SO or Black for User) plus the Crypto Officer and Crypto User Challenge Secrets, which are initially
provided to the user via the PED display. The iKey represents the user to the module and, therefore, must be
properly protected within the environment in which the module operates. A User, in the Crypto Officer role, and
the SO can request to change their respective authentication data at any time using the Command Line Interface.
6.3.5. User Account Data
The Security Officer is the only role allowed to create users, modify user status and delete users. The TOE
maintains a user’s account data in a User Authorization Vector (UAV) that is stored in memory reserved for the
TOE’s use. The UAV includes the following data:
• User ID number
• User checkword
• User function vector
• User failed login count
• User “lockout” status
The User checkword contains the User’s secret key, Crypto Officer and Crypto User Challenge Secrets, and a
validation string encrypted using a key derived from the User’s authentication data. The secret key is randomly
generated by the module at the time the User is created and is used to encrypt a User’s objects on the module.
The validation string is a known byte string used to verify that the checkword has been decrypted correctly.
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6.3.6. Access Control
The TOE enforces an identity-based access control policy that applies to all objects on the module, in particular to
private key and secret key objects, and governs a subject’s access to an object using the following operations:
• Read (Query Attribute Value)
• Modify
• Destroy
• Generate
27
• Wrap (export)
• Use
28
• Clone
A subject’s access to objects stored on the module is mediated on the basis of the following subject and object
attributes:
• Subject attributes:
o Session and Access ID
o User ID associated with session (Access Owner)
o Role.
• Object attributes:
o Private. If True, object is Private. If False, object is Public.
o Owner. Object ownership is assigned to the object creator, if the object is Private. Public objects
are not owned by a user. Ownership is enforced by user identity and internal key management.
o Sensitive. If True, object is Sensitive. If False, object is Non-Sensitive.
o Extractable. If True, object may be extracted. If False, object may not be extracted.
o Modifiable. If True, object may be modified. If False, object may not be modified.
Private data objects are labelled with a number corresponding to their owner and sensitive attributes are
encrypted using the owner’s secret key. Private data objects are only accessible by the object owner. Public
data objects may be accessed by any user with an active session on the module. Secret key and private key
objects are always created as Private, Sensitive objects and can only be used for cryptographic operations by a
logged in User. Only data and certificate objects can be non-sensitive. Secret key objects that are marked as
extractable may be exported from the module using the Wrap operation. Private keys are never extractable from
the Luna PCI cryptographic module.
The module does not allow any granularity of access other than owner or public (i.e., a Private data object cannot
be accessible by two users and restricted to other users). Ownership of an object gives the owner access to the
object through the allowed operations but does not allow the owner to assign a subset of rights to other users.
Allowed operations are those permitted by the configurable policy settings and the access matrix in section
5.1.3.4.
27
The Generate operation is intended primarily to indicate symmetric key or asymmetric key pair generation. However, it also includes other
methods of creating an object in the TOE, such as importing (unwrapping) a key and generic data object creation.
28
The Use operation includes symmetric key encryption/decryption, private key signing and decryption, and public key verification and
encryption.
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6.3.7. Object Reuse
The TOE enforces an object reuse policy in that every object is allocated its own portion of memory (flash or
volatile RAM). Permanent objects (stored in flash) are maintained in an encrypted state at all times, and their
information content is, therefore, never available except when decrypted for use in volatile memory within the TSF
boundary. The policy also ensures that no permanent object is placed in a previously allocated memory location
unless all previous memory content is purged and zeroized. When cryptographic functions are performed, a
cryptographic context is created to hold data required by the function (e.g., a DES key schedule for a DES
function). The cryptographic context only exists in volatile RAM memory and is not accessible to any functions
except those defined by its owner function. The memory assigned to a cryptographic context is always purged of
its content before being handed over to another function. Direct access to either volatile or flash memory
locations is never provided to users; all user interaction with the objects within the module is via memory handles.
6.3.8. Data Authentication
The TOE provides data authentication at two different levels. At the first level, the TOE calculates the SHA-1
fingerprint of each object it stores and the user may query the value of the fingerprint at any time. This allows the
user to verify the continuing validity of the object.
At the second level, the TOE will generate evidence of the validity of a private key and its corresponding public
key in a special digitally signed certificate format, known as a Public Key Confirmation. The signature is
performed using a private key that is either generated by SafeNet specifically for this purpose and whose public
key certificate has been signed by the SafeNet trust anchor or generated by a customer organization and whose
public key certificate has been signed by a third-party CSP or Trust Centre. The Public Key Confirmation permits
a user to verify the validity of an asymmetric key pair, verify that the TOE generated it and identify the trusted third
party providing the guarantee of validity and origin.
6.3.9. Key Pair Integrity Checking
The TOE provides a function to verify the integrity of an asymmetric key pair before outputting a digital signature
performed using the private key from the pair. The integrity of the private key is checked before output of a digital
signature by verifying the digital signature created with the private key using the corresponding public key object
for signature verification. If the verification fails, the signature is not output and an error code only is returned.
6.3.10. Key Export and Import Protection
Secret keys may only be exported from the TOE boundary in a wrapped (encrypted) form if the Extractable
attribute is True. Private keys may never be exported from the TOE boundary. Secret keys are exported from the
module without their associated security attributes. If the Extractable attribute is False, the key may not be
exported from the module boundary under any condition.
Objects may be imported into the module under the control of the Access Control policy. Secret keys and/or
private keys generated in the host IT environment may only be imported into the module by an unwrapping
operation on the module. Any attributes of keys imported in this way are ignored by the TOE and their attributes
are set to default values by the TOE. Unwrapped keys have their Sensitive attribute set to True by the TOE. The
configurable policy for a partition may also be set to prohibit the use of externally generated private keys for
signing operations.
Wrapping and unwrapping of key material between the TOE and other entities can only take place if prior
agreement has been reached regarding the key to be used for the wrap and unwrap operations. This can either
be through key sharing of a secret key for use with a symmetric encryption algorithm or through the use of the
public key of the intended recipient with an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
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6.3.11. Cryptographic Material Management
Cryptographic material (key) management functions protect the confidentiality of key material throughout its life-
cycle. The key management functions provided by the TOE are the following:
• Cryptographic key generation in accordance with the following indicated standards:
o RSA 1024, 2048, 4096 bits key pairs in accordance with ANSI X9.31.
o TDES 112, 168 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 46-3 and ANSI X9.52.
o AES 128, 192, 256 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 197
o DSA 1024 bits key pairs in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-2.
o ECDSA in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-2 and ANSI X9.62.
• Secure key access following the PKCS #11 standard.
• Destruction of cryptographic keys in accordance with the FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 standard.
An object on the module that is destroyed using the PKCS #11 function C_DestroyObject (the user delete
command available through the API) is marked invalid and remains encrypted with the user's secret key until such
time as its flash locations are re-allocated for additional data on the module; at which time they are purged and
zeroized before re-allocation. The same strategy of marking an object invalid and purging the memory content
before re-allocation is followed for volatile memory as well as flash.
Objects on the module that are destroyed as a result of authentication failure are zeroized (all flash blocks in
user’s memory turned to 1's). If it is an SO authentication failure all flash blocks on the module are zeroized.
Objects on the module that are destroyed through C_InitToken (the SO function to initialize the module available
through the API) are zeroized, along with the rest of the flash memory being used by the SO and User.
All cryptographic material management functions are performed in the module in accordance with the appropriate
cryptographic standards using algorithms and mechanisms that have been formally validated as meeting the FIPS
PUB 140-2 Level 3 standard.
6.3.11.1. Key Storage and Access Protection
Keys are always stored as secret key or private key objects with the Sensitive attribute set and, therefore, with the
key value encrypted. Access to keys is never provided directly to a calling application. A handle to a particular
key is returned that can be used by the application in subsequent calls to perform cryptographic operations. Key
storage and access is performed in accordance with the PKCS #11 object model and function specifications.
6.3.12. Cryptography
Because of its generic nature, the Luna PCI cryptographic module firmware supports a wide range of
cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms, a number of which are not relevant to the CMCSOB PP specifically.
The cryptographic functions and algorithms that are relevant to the TOE are the following:
• Random Number Generation
o FIPS 140-2 validated Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Pseudo-random Number Generator)
seeded by internal Hardware Non-deterministic Random Bit Generator
o Based on ANSI X9.31, Appendix A section 2.4
• Compute Digital Signatures And Verify Digital Signatures
o RSA 1024 bits, 2048 bits, 4096 bits (PKCS #1 V1.5, PKCS #1 PSS, ANSI X9.31) with SHA-1
o RSA 1024 bits, 2048 bits, 4096 bits (PKCS #1 V1.5, PKCS #1 PSS) with SHA-256, 384, 512
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o DSA 1024 bits (FIPS PUB 186-2) with SHA-1
o ECDSA (FIPS PUB 186-2 Appendix 6 recommended curves) with SHA-1
• Encrypt / Decrypt Data
o RSA 1024, 2048 and 4096 bits in accordance with PKCS #1 V1.5 and OAEP
o TDES (ECB and CBC mode) 112 and 168 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 46-3
o AES (ECB and CBC mode) 128 and 256 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 197
• Export (Wrap) and Import (Unwrap) Secret Keys
o TDES, AES with TDES and AES in ECB mode
o TDES, AES with RSA 1024, 2048 and 4096 bits in accordance with PKCS #1 V1.5
The necessary keying material needed by these algorithms may be generated or derived on-board. Random data
needed to produce sound key material is generated by the module’s PRNG. In some cases, key material may be
imported from an external source in an encrypted (wrapped) form and decrypted (unwrapped) inside the module.
6.3.13. Data Exchange
The TOE provides security functions that support secure data exchange in two main ways:
• Data integrity and authenticity is protected through the use of RSA and DSA digital signatures. The
digital signature of the data object provides evidence of data validity. The TOE provides logged in Users
the ability to generate evidence in the form of a digital signature provided they have access to the private
signing key and to verify the evidence and the identity of the originator who generated the evidence
provided they have possession of the digitally signed information and access to the signer's verification
public key.
• Data confidentiality is protected through the use of symmetric and/or asymmetric encryption/decryption of
user data and in the Wrapping and Unwrapping operations.
6.3.14. Specification of Security Management Functions
The TOE provides the following security management functions:
• disable, enable and modify the behaviour of configurable policy settings at the HSM and Partition levels
(FMT_MOF.1),
• change_default, query, modify and delete the security attributes User Locked Flag,
• modify the security attributes UAV – Checkword,
• change_default and delete the security attributes User ID and UAV – Checkword,
• change_default and modify the security attributes SOV – Checkword,
• modify the security attributes CKA_PRIVATE (for data and certificate objects only), CKA_EXTRACTABLE
(for secret keys only), CKA_DERIVE (for secret keys only) and CKA_MODIFIABLE,
• change_default the Number of User Login Failures Allowed.
Details of these management capabilities are provided in sections 6.3.15 and 6.3.16.
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6.3.15. Security Function Management
The TOE provides security management capabilities for the Security Officer (SO) to disable, enable and modify
the behaviour of the functions listed below.
The following is the set of policies supported at the HSM level:
• Enable/disable non-FIPS algorithms available.
• Enable/disable trusted path authentication (allowed and must be enabled in TOE configuration).
• Enable/disable M of N.
• Enable/disable cloning.
• Enable/disable M of N auto-activation.
• Enable/disable ECC mechanisms.
• Enable/disable Remote Authentication.
• Enable/disable SO reset of partition PIN.
• Enable/disable network replication.
• Enable/disable forcing change of User authentication data.
• Enable/disable Remote PED Usage (disallowed in TOE configuration).
Note that the module policy “Allow/disallow Remote PED Usage” is disallowed with the TOE in the evaluated
configuration. The TOE must be purchased in the “Local PED” configuration. Use of a Remote PED, which
requires the module policy “Allow/disallow Remote PED Usage” to be changed to “Allow” means that the TOE can
no longer be considered an evaluated configuration.
The following is the set of policies supported at the partition level:
• Enable/disable partition reset.
• Enable/disable activation.
• Enable/disable automatic activation.
• Enable/disable High Availability.
• Enable/disable multipurpose keys.
• Enable/disable changing of certain key attributes once a key has been created.
• Enable/disable operation without RSA blinding.
• Enable/disable signing operations with non-local keys.
• Enable/disable raw RSA operations.
• Enable/disable private key unwrapping.
• Enable/disable secret key wrapping
• Enable/disable secret key unwrapping.
• Enable/disable user key management capability. (This would be disabled by the SO at the policy level to
prevent any key management activity in the partition, even by a user in the Crypto Officer role. This could
be used, for example, at a CA once the root signing key pair has been generated and backed up, if
appropriate, to lock down the partition for signing use only.)
• Enable/disable incrementing of failed login attempt counter on failed challenge response validation.
• Enable/disable RSA signing without confirmation.
• Enable/disable private key cloning.
• Enable/disable secret key cloning.
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6.3.16. Security Data Management
The TOE allows the Security Officer and the Crypto Officer to manipulate security-relevant data stored on the
module. Specifically, it allows only the Security Officer to change the default values of the settings listed below:
• Number of failed Partition User logins allowed before partition is locked out/cleared. (Default is 10, SO
can configure to be 3 <= N <= 10)
The User Authorization Vector, described in section 6.3.5, is the data structure used by the module to store the
user’s security attributes. The TOE restricts the ability to manipulate the UAV data as described below:
• Only the Security Officer role can change_default, query, modify and delete the UserLockedFlag.
• Only the Security Officer role can change_default and delete the:
o UserID.
o Checkword, which includes the user secret key plus a fixed value used for authentication in
encrypted form.
• Only the Security Officer and User roles can modify the Checkword (for the SO or applicable User ID).
The Token Access Control policy also restricts the ability to modify, the security attributes CKA_PRIVATE (for
data and certificate objects only), CKA_EXTRACTABLE (for secret keys only), CKA_DERIVE (for secret keys
only) and CKA_MODIFIABLE to the Crypto Officer role.
The TOE assigns default attributes to objects as they are created. The creator of the object may specify values
different from the defaults with the exceptions described below.
There are security-relevant object attributes that are set to restrictive default values that cannot be changed by
anyone. These attributes and their settings are the following:
• The CKA_SENSITIVE attribute is set TRUE for all secret and private key objects.
• The CKA_EXTRACTABLE attribute is set FALSE for all private key objects.
The TOE restricts the ability to query the audit data to the Crypto Officer role. The SFR (5.1.5.9) also refers to the
Auditor role; this role is, however, held by the TSF.
6.3.17. Logical Self-Protection of Security Functions
The TOE ensures the logical protection of its security functions from attempts to subvert or bypass security
enforcement by implementing a number of self-protection measures. The main self-protection features are
described below.
6.3.17.1. Memory and Firmware Integrity Check
The firmware integrity is protected by an error detection code based on a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) and a
cryptographic hash function. The firmware’s integrity is checked by the bootblock using the CRC when the
firmware is initially loaded or updated and every time the module is started. The firmware also verifies the SHA-1
hash of the loaded firmware before it starts executing. The module will halt if the firmware integrity is not verified.
Similarly, the module’s memory is checked for consistency every time the module is started and the module will
halt if the memory consistency check fails.
6.3.17.2. Self-Tests
The TOE performs a number of tests of security-critical functions each time it is activated and on demand from a
user. The TOE offers three categories of self-tests that can be called up by the user at any time: Hardware,
cryptographic and PRNG checks. The hardware self test verifies access to all of the volatile RAM memory. The
cryptographic self-tests perform a test of all of the cryptographic algorithms provided by the module. The
cryptographic and PRNG self-tests are based on a known answer test methodology where a known key, or initial
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configuration, is used to process a known data input and the result obtained is compared to a previously-
calculated answer.
6.3.17.3. Prevention of By-pass and Separate Execution Domain
The TOE prevents bypass by ensuring that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before allowing
a subsequent firmware function to proceed. It maintains a separate domain for its own execution that is protected
from external agents. It also separates users by encrypting private objects with the user’s secret key and by
allowing only one thread of execution on the module at any one time and, therefore, allowing only one user’s
command to be active at any time.
6.3.17.4. Preservation of Secure State
The TOE preserves itself in a secure state in the event of failures detected by the abstract machine test and self-
test functions. Behaviour in the event of other failure conditions is described in sub-section 6.3.20.
6.3.17.5. Firmware Loading and Firmware Update
The Luna® PCI cryptographic module requires the use of a cryptographically protected trusted channel for initial
firmware loading at the factory prior to delivery to the customer and when the firmware is later updated at the
customer’s site. The trusted channel is provided as described in the following two paragraphs.
Firmware can only be initially loaded onto Luna® PCI cryptographic module from a separate module dedicated for
the purpose and containing a firmware image that has been digitally signed by SafeNet and encrypted using a
secret key generated specifically for this purpose and if the module itself is a valid Luna® PCI cryptographic
module.
For firmware updates, the updated image is signed and encrypted using a dedicated module at SafeNet and
distributed to customer sites in software form along with a separately distributed authorization code. The TOE
verifies the digital signature to ensure that the updated image originated at SafeNet and that it has not been
modified. The TOE decrypts the image using a key derived from the authorization code to ensure that its
confidentiality has been protected while in transit. The use of the authorization code ensures that only authorized
customers may perform the update and ensures that only valid Luna® PCI cryptographic modules can decrypt the
image in order to perform the update. The trusted channel for communicating the firmware image from the
dedicated SafeNet module to the target Luna® PCI cryptographic module is initiated by the dedicated module
because it is the one that generates the symmetric keys and authorization code, digitally signs the image and
encrypts it for transmission to the target. The actual firmware update process is performed by the target module
and the first part of that process completes the communication that was initiated by the dedicated SafeNet module
by verifying the digital signature of the image and decrypting it for loading into the TOE.
6.3.18. Cloning
For performance and secure backup purposes, Luna PCI cryptographic modules and Luna backup tokens may be
grouped in clusters that are referred to as "domains." A domain is established by generating a 24 byte secret,
known as a cloning domain key or cloning domain identifier, on one module (that could be considered to be the
“master” for the domain) and transferring the secret securely via the PED to other modules or backup tokens that
are to be part of the domain. The cloning domain key is then used during the mutual authentication and key
agreement exchange that takes place between modules, or between a Luna PCI and a backup token, as
described briefly below. This mutual authentication ensures that the two modules participating in the cloning
operation belong to the same cloning domain and can thus participate in the cloning process.
When modules are members of a domain, they must be capable of operating in such a way that they behave as
one identical module to the calling application. The cloning function provides the capability to duplicate the
cryptographic state of a module by cloning token objects from a source module to a target module within the
same cryptographic domain in a cryptographically protected fashion that prevents modification and disclosure.
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When cloning is invoked, the cloning protocol protects security-relevant data from disclosure and modification
when it is transferred between the TOE and the remote trusted component (backup token or another Luna PCI
module). The protocol is designed such that source and target modules both participate in ensuring that objects
are all transferred correctly between modules. It also ensures that any data exchanged during the cloning
operation cannot be replayed in order to gain unauthorized access to the module. The source module maintains
its original state and, therefore, any sort of failure of the cloning function will not result in a loss of use of the
original objects.
The cloning protocol implements a mutual authentication mechanism to ensure that both modules are members of
the same domain by providing mutual authentication of the two modules. The mechanism uses cryptographic
techniques to provide mutual authentication, proof of origin, integrity and confidentiality of the objects being
transferred from source to target module within a domain. The key management scheme used within the cloning
protocol also protects against replay attacks and minimizes the impact of possible key compromise by ensuring
that a unique TDES key is used for each cloning operation.
6.3.19. Physical Self-Protection
Tamper-evident features are implemented in the manufacture of the module. Any tampering that might
compromise the module’s security is detectable by visual inspection of the physical integrity of the module. The
enclosure covers are bonded to the circuit card assembly and an attempt to remove either of the covers will result
in significant damage to the card, rendering the module inoperable.
The module’s physical design resists visual inspection of the device design, physical probing of the device and
attempts to access sensitive data on individual components of the device and provides evidence of the
occurrence of such physical tampering.
The module responds automatically to attempts to open its enclosure by ensuring that plaintext key material and
other sensitive data is erased from the module.
6.3.20. Failure Handling
If power is lost to the module for whatever reason, permanent objects (private keys, etc.) are preserved and
remain cryptographically protected; session objects are cleared from the module. The module can be placed
back into operation without compromise of its functionality or permanently stored data. In case of power failure in
the host IT environment, host system restart or other circumstances that do not affect the module’s operational
capability, the module will ensure continued protection of sensitive material and will permit recovery from the last
logged in state.
Data input/output failures would only affect the processing of the current command and, because no PKCS #11
API function returns sensitive plaintext data, there could be no compromise of the user data protection
capabilities. Because of the way in which commands are handled, the module would remain in the state it was at
the last successful command completion. When data input/output capability is restored the module would resume
operation in that state.
6.3.21. Backup and Recovery
As described in sub-sections 6.3.17.4 and 6.3.20, the module maintains its secure state in the event of a failure.
Depending on the nature of the failure, the module will maintain its secure state and resume operation as
described below:
• In the event of host system discontinuity the module maintains its current logged in state and resumes
that state when the host system restarts.
• In the event that power is lost to the module for a short time (less than 1.5 hours), it can maintain its
authentication state using the Auto-activation feature. This allows it to resume operation after power has
been restored without requiring the User to activate the partition using the PED and iKey. It will resume
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operation with all security properties intact but the operational state of the module prior to loss of power
will be lost.
• In the event that power is lost to the module for a longer period of time, it maintains its secure state by
maintaining the encryption of all sensitive data and it requires the User to activate the partition prior to
resuming operation. It will resume operation with all security properties intact but the operational state of
the module prior to loss of power will be lost.
• In the event of a catastrophic damage to or failure of the module itself, recovery is accomplished by
inserting and activating a backup module, as described below.
The TOE provides the capability to securely backup a module using the cloning function. Because the cloning
function securely duplicates all objects from the primary module to the backup token, the backup token allows
recovery from the backup token by cloning the backed up objects to a new module that has been initialized with
the same cloning domain. The basic data authentication mechanism described in section 6.3.8 can be used at
both the TOE and the backup token before and after cloning operations to ensure the integrity of backed up and
restored key objects.
6.4. Strength of Function
The minimum Strength of Function (SoF) required for the TOE is SoF - high. This applies to the following security
functions:
• Cryptography – Random Number Generation, section 6.3.12
• User Identification and Authentication, section 6.3.3
• Authentication Data Selection, section 6.3.4
• Cloning, section 6.3.18 (The cloning domain identifier, generated and used as part of the cloning transfer,
authenticates the source and target modules as part of the same cloning domain and, therefore, trusted
to communicate.)
The above listed functions are those that utilize probabilistic or permutational mechanisms.
The TOE provides this Strength of Function based on the following:
• Authentication requires a protected data storage device to hold one component of the authentication data,
a specially constructed PIN Entry Device and the use of designated PCI Card pins in order to input
authentication data to the module.
• The authentication data stored on the protected data storage device is 48 bytes in length and is
generated by the TOE’s pseudo-Random Number Generator (RNG), which itself has a rating of SoF-high.
• The M of N secret sharing scheme that may also be employed for authentication is based on a
recognized strong secret sharing algorithm, with the base secret being 256 bits in length.
• The cloning domain identifier used to authenticate source and target modules as part of the cloning
protocol is generated using the TOE’s PRNG and is 168 bits in length.
The Strength of Function (SoF) claimed for the Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) used by the
authentication mechanism is SoF-high based on its having been validated as part of the Luna PCI validation
against the FIPS 140-2 standard for cryptographic modules, and on evidence provided and testing for
conformance to the standard established by the scheme.
6.5. Assurance Measures
The assurance requirements for this TOE are as specified in the EAL 4 package augmented by:
• ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF)
• ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw Reporting Procedures)
• AVA_CCA.1 (Covert channel analysis)
• AVA_MSU.3 (Analysis and testing for insecure states)
• AVA_VLA.4 (Highly resistant)
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Evidence, in the form of documentation, plans and procedures that meet the content and presentation
requirements of Part 3 of the Common Criteria, is provided to satisfy the specified assurance requirements.
References to the appropriate supporting documentation are provided in Table 8-9 – Assurance Measures.
The evidence includes deliverables in the following categories:
1. Security Target
2. ST Rationale
3. Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.2)
4. High Level Design (ADV_HLD.2)
5. Low Level Design (ADV_LLD.1)
6. Implementation Representation (ADV_IMP.2)
7. Representation Correspondence (ADV_RCR.1)
8. Security Policy Model (ADV_SPM.1)
9. Developer’s Tests (ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.1, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_IND.2)
10. Configuration Management (ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2)
11. Life-Cycle Documentation (ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC.TAT.1)
12. Delivery and Operation Documents (ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1)
13. Guidance Documents (AGD_ADM.1)
14. Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA.1)
15. Strength of TOE Security Functions (AVA_SOF.1)
16. Misuse Documentation (AVA_MSU.3)
17. Vulnerabilities Documentation (AVA_VLA.4)
18. Flaw Remediation Documentation (ALC_FLR.2)
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7. PP CLAIMS
7.1. Statement of PP Compliance
This Security Target complies with the CWA 14167-2 version 0.28 dated 27 October 2003 Cryptographic Module
for CSP Signing Operations with Backup (CMCSOB) Protection Profile (PP).
7.2. Identification of IT Security Requirements Satisfying the PP
The IT requirements that satisfy the PP operations are those contained within section 5.1 TOE Security
Functional Requirements. The requirements listed below have either been completed as required by the PP or
refined as indicated.
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation – refined as follows:
FAU_GEN.1.1
The auditable event Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions is not applicable as these are always
present.
Audit data generated by the TOE is in raw form and requires interpretation by an application in the TOE
environment before it can be included in a security audit trail.
Unless invoked by an authorised user, results of abstract machine tests and self-tests are only reported in
the case of a failure.
Events “Shutdown of the TOE”, “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1/Access Control”, “Management
of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1/Audit” and “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1” have been
deleted for the reasons stated in the footnotes.
FAU_GEN.1.2
Date and time of the event shall be given by the sequence data correlated to time of export of the audit
data to the TOE environment.
The audit data for the Crypto Officer and Crypto User roles may only be sufficient to identify the client
application. Further refinement of audit data might be provided by audit functions in the TOE environment
distinguishing between end-users using the services of the client application.
FAU_STG.2 (TOE) Guarantees of audit data availability – Assignment of “metric for saving audit records”
completed as shown below:
FAU_STG.2.3 (TOE) The TSF shall ensure that 60 kB of audit records will be maintained when the
following conditions occur: audit storage exhaustion.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation – Assignment of “cryptographic key generation algorithms”,
“cryptographic key sizes” and “list of standards” completed as shown below:
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified cryptographic
key generation algorithms listed below and specified cryptographic key sizes specified for each
algorithm that meet the following standards noted for each algorithm:
(1) RSA 1024, 2048, 4096 bits key pairs in accordance with ANSI X9.31.
(2) TDES 112, 168 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 46-3 and ANSI X9.52.
(3) AES 128, 192, 256 bits in accordance with FIPS PUB 197.
(4) DSA 1024 bits key pairs in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-2.
(5) ECDSA in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-2 and ANSI X9.62.
FCS_CKM.2 (BACKUP) Cryptographic key distribution – Assignment of “list of standards” completed as
shown below:
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FCS_CKM.2.1 (BACKUP) The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method key entry that meets the following: TDES 168 bits.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction – Assignment of “cryptographic key destruction method” and “list of
standards” completed as shown below:
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method logical or physical (by overwriting) deletion of the memory space that meets
the following: FIPS 140-2 Level 3.
FCS_COP.1 (SIGN) Cryptographic operation - Digital signature – Assignment of “cryptographic algorithms”,
“cryptographic key sizes” and “list of standards” completed as shown below:
FCS_COP.1.1 (SIGN) The TSF shall perform digital signature generation and verification in
accordance with the specified cryptographic algorithms listed below and cryptographic key sizes
specified for each algorithm that meet the following: standards noted for each algorithm.
(1) RSA 1024 bits, 2048 bits, 4096 bits with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 (PKCS #1 V1.5,
PKCS #1 PSS),
(2) RSA 1024 bits, 2048 bits, 4096 bits with SHA-1 (FIPS PUB 186-2/ANSI X9.31),
(3) Signature generation/verification DSA 1024 bits with SHA-1 (FIPS PUB 186-2),
(4) Signature generation/verification ECDSA with SHA-1 (FIPS PUB 186-2 Appendix 6
recommended curves).
FCS_COP.1 (BACKUP_ENC) Cryptographic operation – Assignment of “cryptographic algorithms”,
“cryptographic key sizes” and “list of standards” completed as shown below:
FCS_COP.1.1 (BACKUP_ENC) The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm TDES and cryptographic key sizes 168 bits that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 46-3.
The portions of the refinement added by the PP that deal specifically with manual key entry have been deleted
because they do not apply to the TOE.
FCS_COP.1 (BACKUP_INT) Cryptographic operation – Assignment of “cryptographic algorithms”,
“cryptographic key sizes” and “list of standards” completed as shown below:
FCS_COP.1.1 (BACKUP_INT) The TSF shall perform calculation and verification of cryptographic
checksums in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes
N/A that meet the following: FIPS PUB 180-2.
The refinement added by the PP has been deleted and an explanatory Application Note added, as follows:
Refined by adding:
The cryptographic checksum for backup data shall use a backup key and shall be based on symmetric
cryptographic algorithms (e.g. keyed hash) or asymmetric cryptographic algorithms (e.g. digital
signatures).
Application Note:
The SHA-1 checksum is calculated by the TSF and by the equivalent function within the backup token. It
can be compared before and after backup and before and after recovery to validate integrity. Because it
is calculated within the TSF and backup token at the time it is requested, there is no chance of
substituting an illegitimate key value and corresponding digest value. A keyed hash or digital signature is,
therefore, not required.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metrics for random numbers – Assignment of the quality metric is shown below:
FCS_RND.1.1 The TOE shall provide a mechanism for generating random numbers that meet the
requirements of ETSI SR 002 176 V1.1.1, dated 2003-03.
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Two elements have been added to the assignment made by the PP for the purpose of the random numbers, as
follows:
FCS_RND.1.2 The TOE shall be able to enforce the use of TOE-generated random numbers for
FCS_CKM.1, authentication data generation and random number generation.
FDP_ACF.1 (CRYPTO) Security attribute based access control – The Application Note has been re-worded
as shown below to reflect the actual TOE behaviour.
PP wording: The dual person control requires two users to be authenticated with different identities and
with the same role Crypto Officer at the same time.
ST wording: The dual person control requires two users to be authenticated – one with the role Crypto
Officer and one with the role Security Officer.
FDP_ACF.1 (BACKUP) Security attribute based access control – One part of the assignment made by the
PP, “to enter backup keys (FCS_CKM.2)”, has been deleted and an explanatory Application Note added as
follows:
The CKM.2 key entry requirement is met in the TOE by key negotiation between the TSF and the backup
token. Therefore, there is no user involvement in key entry.
The following assignment has been made:
FDP_ACF.1.3 (BACKUP) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: User with security attribute Role Crypto Officer is allowed under dual
person control to backup all partition objects.
FDP_BKP.1 Backup and recovery – The following element has been deleted from the PP text because it does
not apply to the TOE:
the cryptographic key(s) needed to verify the cryptographic checksum of the backup data.
The following Application Note has been added:
The SHA-1 checksum is calculated by the TSF and by the equivalent function within the backup token. It
can be compared before and after backup and before and after recovery to validate integrity. Because it
is done within the TSF and backup token, there is no chance of substituting an illegitimate key value and
corresponding digest value. A keyed hash or digital signature is, therefore, not required.
FDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security attributes – “Token Access Control (TAC) SFP” has been
added as an assignment. The SFR has been refined by adding:
All user data whose CKA_SENSITIVE attribute is set is exported in encrypted form via the wrap
command.
FDP_IFF.4 (BACKUP) Partial elimination of illicit information flows – Assignments have been completed as
follows:
• [assignment: other relevant side-channels] is completed as [assignment: none}
• [assignment: maximum capacity] is completed as maximum 0 bits/sec for covert channels and
resistance to an attacker with attack potential ‘high’ for side channels.
FDP_IFF.4 (CRYPTO) Partial elimination of illicit information flows – Assignments have been completed as
follows:
• [assignment: other relevant side-channels] is completed as [assignment: none}
• [assignment: maximum capacity] is completed as maximum 0 bits/sec for covert channels and
resistance to an attacker with attack potential ‘high’ for side channels.
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection – The assignment has been added to as shown below
(additional elements are italicised):
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FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource from the following objects: RAD, private keys, in
particular CSP-SCD, and secret keys.
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling – This SFR has two instantiations in the ST, FIA_AFL.1 (SO) and
FIA_AFL.1 (User). Assignments have been made in each instantiation as follows:
FIA_AFL.1.1 (SO) The TSF shall detect when three (3) unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to Security Officer authentication.
FIA_AFL.1.1 (User) The TSF shall detect when an SO configurable positive integer within the range
of three (3) to ten (10) unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to User authentication.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition – The assignment has been added to as shown below (additional attributes
are italicised):
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:
User ID number
User checkword (RAD)
User role
User failed login count
User “locked” flag.
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets – Assignment has been completed as follows:
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet the minimum length
established by the TOE for each authentication secret.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication – The wording of the assignment has been changed for readability and
some elements have been added to the assignment as shown below (additional elements are italicised):
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions on behalf of the user to be performed before the
user is authenticated:
• Perform start-up, self-test (FPT_TST.1), detection of the secure blocking state
(FPT_FLS.1), detection of violation of physical integrity (FPT_PHP.2),
• Perform basic diagnostic functions, such as checking the communications from the
host to the card, checking firmware level and token info and checking information on
mechanisms supported.
• Open a session
• Access Public data objects
• Identification (FIA_UID.1).
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification – The wording of the assignment has been changed for readability and some
elements have been added to the assignment as shown below (additional elements are italicised):
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions on behalf of the user to be performed before the
user is identified:
• Perform start-up, self-test (FPT_TST.1), detection of the secure blocking state
(FPT_FLS.1), detection of violation of physical integrity (FPT_PHP.2),
• Perform basic diagnostic functions, such as checking the communications from the
host to the card, checking firmware level and token info and checking information on
mechanisms supported.
FMT_MSA.1 (ROLE_CRYPTO) Management of security attributes – The assignment was completed by
specifying [assignment: other operations] as [assignment: none].
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FMT_MSA.1 (ROLE_AUDIT) Management of security attributes – The assignment was completed by
specifying [assignment: other operations] as [assignment: none].
FMT_MTD.1 (Access Control) Management of TSF data – This SFR does not apply in the case of the TOE. An
explanatory Application Note was added.
FMT_MTD.1 (USER_Crypto) Management of TSF data – This SFR was refined as shown below to change the
role that is capable of performing the specified operations from Crypto Officer to Security Officer, a more
restrictive role.
FMT_MTD.1.1 (USER_CRYPTO) The TSF shall restrict the ability to change default and delete the
Identity and RAD for user with role attribute Crypto Officer and Crypto User to Security Officer.
FMT_MTD.1 (RAD) Management of TSF data – This SFR was refined as shown below to change the role that is
capable of performing the specified operations from “User for its own RAD” to “Crypto Officer for the identity
associated with the RAD”, a more restrictive role.
FMT_MTD.1.1 (RAD) The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the RAD to Crypto Officer for the
identity associated with the RAD.
FMT_MTD.1 (AUDIT) Management of TSF data – The Crypto Officer role has been added to the roles capable
of performing the specified operations because restricting the ability to query audit data to only the Auditor role
contradicts FDP_ACF.1.2 (AUDIT).
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles – The Security Officer role was added to the list of roles maintained by the TOE.
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing – The condition “during initial startup” was added to the assignment
made by the PP.
FPT_ITI.1 Inter-TSF detection of modification – The assignment made by the PP in FPT_ITI.1.1 has been
changed from “cryptographic checksum according to the list of approved algorithms and parameters” to SHA-1
digest to make the algorithm choice explicit. The wording of the assignment made by the PP in FPT_ITI.1.2 was
changed from “alarm indication” to “error indication” to more accurately reflect the TOE behaviour. The following
text has been added to the Application Note for this SFR:
The SHA-1 checksum is calculated by the TSF and by the equivalent function within the backup token. It
can be compared before and after backup and before and after recovery to validate integrity. Because it
is done within the TSF and backup token, there is no chance of substituting an illegitimate key value and
corresponding digest value. A keyed hash or digital signature is, therefore, not required.
FPT_ITC.1 and FPT_ITI.1 are included because they are specified by the PP. However, the requirement
for confidentiality and integrity protection of the backup data is best stated by FTP_ITC.1, which is
included as an addition to the PP.
FPT_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack – The following text was added to the Refinement statement for this
SFR:
Note that the TOE does not have a door or removable cover. Opening the TOE would, therefore, require
the use of tools that would necessitate the removal of the TOE from its intended operating environment.
FPT_RCV.1 Manual recovery – The assignment was completed as shown below:
FPT_RCV.1.1 After a self-test failure, the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to
return to a secure state is provided.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing – The selection “at the conditions installation and maintenance” has been removed
because there are no states of the TOE that correspond to installation and maintenance.
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path – The SFR statement in FTP_TRP.1.1 has been refined to “physically and logically
distinct” to reflect the actual nature of the TOE’s trusted path device. The following additional functions have been
added in FTP_TRP.1.3:
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• Upload of the TSF-generated authentication data to the iKey
• Upload of the TSF-generated challenge secret to the PED display
• Entry of M of N Activation secret shares
• Entry of the Token Cloning Domain key
7.3. Identification of Security Objectives and IT Security Requirements Additional to the PP
7.3.1. Security Objectives
The following objectives have been added or represent refinements of the PP objectives.
O.Admin – has been added to address the need for secure management of the TOE.
O.Approved_Algorithms – is a refinement of the PP objectives in that the statement requiring use of approved
algorithms is found in three of the PP objectives and it has simply been pulled out to stand as its own objective
statement.
O.Auth_Data_Protect – has been added to counter T.PIN_Compromise.
O.Backup and O.Data_Exchange_Protect – refine O.Protect_Exported_Data by setting separate objectives for
backup and for the export of user symmetric keys and data for data exchange purposes.
O.Import_Code – has been added to counter T.Bad_FW_Load.
O.Key_Secure – expands the objective O.CSP-SCD_Secure to include all key material handled by the TOE.
O.Multi-Person_Control – has been added to assist in countering T.Key_Management and T.Management.
O.Secure_Init – has been added to assist in countering many of the threats by ensuring that the TOE is always in
a secure state when it starts up.
O.Self_Protect – has been added to assist in countering many of the threats by ensuring that the TSF are
protected from external influence and cannot be bypassed.
O.User_Data_Protect – has been added to address the protection of user data other than key material.
7.3.2. IT Security Requirements
The IT Security Requirements for the TOE additional to those of the PP are all collected in section 5.2.
The IT Security Requirements for the Environment additional to those of the PP are all collected in section 5.3.5.
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8. RATIONALE
The mappings and descriptions of the rationale for the Security Objectives, IT Security Requirements and
Dependencies, and Assurance Measures are presented in the tables at the end of this section.
8.1. Security Objectives Rationale
The tables Table 8-1, Table 8-2 and Table 8-3 demonstrate the necessity of the security objectives and their
appropriateness in countering the stated threats and providing for the stated assumptions.
8.2. IT Security Requirements Rationale
Table 8-4 shows the necessity of the Security Functional Requirements and Table 8-5 maps Security Functional
Requirements to Security Objectives and provides the rationale that the SFRs, singly or in combination, meet the
Security Objectives. Table 8-6 demonstrates that all dependencies for the SFRs have been met. Table 8-7 maps
IT Security Functions to IT Security Requirements and Security Functional Requirements. This shows the
necessity of each of the IT Security Functions presented in the TOE Summary Specification. Table 8-8 maps
Security Functional Requirements to IT Security Functions and presents the rationale for why each IT Security
Function satisfies the requirements of a Security Functional Requirement.
8.2.1. Explicitly Stated Security Requirements
This Security Target specifies two explicitly stated Security Functional Requirements. The two explicitly stated
requirements with the rationale for their inclusion are as follows:
FCS_RND.1 – This requirement is drawn from the document “Functionality classes and evaluation
methodology for true random number generators” (AIS 31) [8]. It is used in this ST because of the
importance of high quality random numbers to the process of key and key pair generation and for
TSF-generated secrets.
FDP_BKP.1 – This requirement is explicitly stated in this ST to address a unique requirement for the TOE
to be capable of performing a secure backup of cryptographic material that can be used in the
recovery of the host processing environment.
8.2.2. Appropriateness of Strength of Function
The minimum Strength of Function requirement is SoF-high. This is above the SoF-basic required for the EAL 4
assurance requirements that assume a low attack potential. It is considered to be appropriate for the TOE
security functions given its assumed (and intended) operating environment because attackers can be assumed to
have low to moderate/high attack potential, as described in section 3.3. The explicit Strength of Function claims
of SoF-high for the authentication mechanisms and the Pseudo-Random Number Generator are considered to be
necessary given the intended role of the TOE as the hardware cryptographic module in what is typically a critical
infrastructure system.
8.2.3. Appropriateness of Assurance Requirements
The assurance requirements chosen for the TOE, EAL 4 augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_FLR.2, AVA_CCA.1,
AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 are considered to be appropriate for the TOE in its assumed (and intended)
operating environment for the following reasons:
1. There are specific customer requirements for Certification Authority (CA) or Certification Service Provider
(CSP) components that meet the EAL 4 assurance requirements. The TOE, as part of a larger CA or
CSP system, must meet the EAL 4 requirements at a minimum, but does not need to exceed them.
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2. Because the CA and CSP systems, for example, are critical infrastructure systems, customers require a
relatively high level of assurance that the components that make them up have been developed and are
maintained using sound engineering security practices.
3. It is assumed that, for most of its life-cycle, the TOE will be contained within a larger secure environment.
It will, therefore, not be exposed to a threat environment that allows easy access by highly capable
outsiders. The main exception to this is when it is in transit when it will be in a state that is either zeroized
or where all of its sensitive data will be encrypted using Triple DES encryption. Thus, the assumption of
moderate attack potential for outsiders is considered appropriate.
4. Although the TOE will normally be contained within a secure environment, the potential value of the key
material stored within the TOE may be sufficient to result in insider attacks. Because insiders would
typically have access to the TOE or components of it and would be likely to have detailed knowledge of
the TOE and its configuration in their environment, they are considered to have High attack potential.
5. The augmentation of including ALC_FLR.2 is in response to existing company practice that has been
implemented to meet customer requirements for flaw reporting and fixing.
6. The augmentation of including AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 is in response to the attack
potentials described in sub-paragraphs 3 and 4 above. The augmentation of including ADV_IMP.2 is
made because it is a dependency of AVA_CCA.1.
8.2.4. Applicability and Appropriateness of Assurance Requirements for Explicitly Stated
Requirements
The explicitly stated requirements, FCS_RND.1, specifies a metric to be achieved with Strength of Function High
for the RNG employed by the TOE. AVA_SOF.1 and AVA_VLA.4, as an augmentation to the EAL 4 package are
directly applicable in demonstrating that the TOE meets the required metric. These are supported by the
remaining Assurance Requirements within the EAL 4 package and the specified augmentations. FDP_BKP.1
requires that key material be protected during the backup and recovery process. The rationale presented in
section 8.2.3 above applies to this SFR.
8.3. Assurance Measures
Table 8-9 – Assurance Measures shows each of the security assurance requirements of the TOE and maps each
to the applicable assurance evidence provided for the evaluation.
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Table 8-1 – Necessity of Security Objectives
Objective Necessitated by:
O.Admin T.Management
O.Approved_Algorithms P.Algorithms
O.Audit_CM T.Insecure_Init, T.Key_Management, T.Management, T.Misuse_Sign
O.Auth_Data_Protect T.PIN_Compromise
O.Backup T.CSP_SCD_Disclose, T.CSP_SCD_Distortion, T.Management
O.Check_Operation
T.Bad_FW_Load, T.CSP_SCD_Disclose, T.CSP_SCD_Distortion, T.Malfunction,
T.Phys_Manipul, T.Unauth_Function
O.Control_Access
T.Bad_FW_Load, T.Insecure_Init, T.Key_Management, T.Management,
T.Misuse_Sign
O.Data_Exchange_Protect T.Exchange
O.Detect_Attack T.CSP_SCD_Distortion, T.Phys_Manipul
O.Error_Secure T.CSP_SCD_Distortion, T.Malfunction, T.Phys_Manipul, T.Unauth_Function
O.Import_Code T.Bad_FW_Load
O.Key_Secure
T.CSP_SCD_Derive, T.CSP_SCD_Disclose, T.CSP_SCD_Distortion,
T.Key_Management, T.Phys_Manipul
O.Multi-Person_Control T.Key_Management, T.Insecure_Init, T.Management, T.Misuse_Sign
O.Secure_Init T.Insecure_Init, T.Malfunction
O.Self_Protect T.Malfunction, T.Unauth_Function
O.Sign_Secure T.CSP_SCD_Derive, T.CSP_SCD_Disclose, T.Signature_Forgery
O.User_Authentication T.Key_Management, T.Management, T.Misuse_Sign
O.User_Data_Protect T.CSP_SCD_Disclose, T.CSP_SCD_Distortion, T.Misuse_Sign
O.ENV_Application A.Correct_DTBS, A.User_Authentication, T.Data_Manipul
O.ENV_Audit A.Audit_Support
O.ENV_AuthData A.Admin, A.User_Authentication, A.User_Management
O.ENV_Backup A.Data_Store
O.ENV_Human_Interface A.Human_Interface, A.User_Authentication
O.ENV_Outage_Protection T.Malfunction
O.ENV_Personnel T.Insecure_Oper, A.Admin, A.Audit_Support, A.User_Management
O.ENV_Protect_Access T.Insecure_Oper, A.Controlled_Access
O.ENV_Recovery T.Insecure_Init, T.Malfunction, A.Data_Store
O.ENV_Secure_Init T.Insecure_Init, A.Data_Store
O.ENV_Secure_Oper T.Insecure_Oper, A.Data_Store, A.Correct_DTBS, T.Data_Manipul
O.ENV_Signed_FW_Update A.Legitimate_FW_Update
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Table 8-2 – Mapping of Objectives to Threats
Threats Objectives Rationale
T.Bad_FW_Load
O.Check_Operation,
O.Control_Access,
O.Import_Code
This combination of objectives counters the threat
by ensuring that the TOE will control the loading of
firmware code, will load only valid firmware images
and will check to verify that the integrity of the code
is preserved prior to each activation of the code.
T.CSP_SCD_Derive O.Key_Secure, O.Sign_Secure
O.Key_Secure is responsible to ensure that no
information about keys, such as the CSP-SCD, is
directly transmitted to any entity outside the TOE.
O.Sign_Secure ensures that the algorithms and the
specific implementation will not reveal the CSP-
SCD.
T.CSP_SCD_Disclose
O.Backup, O.Check_Operation,
O.Key_Secure, O.Sign_Secure,
O.User_Data_Protect
Unencrypted export of the CSP_SCD is prohibited
by O.Key_Secure and O.Backup, and the incorrect
operation is addressed by O.Check_Operation. In
addition O.Sign_Secure ensures that the CSP-SCD
is not disclosed as part of the signed data exported
to the user. O.User_Data_Protect assists by
ensuring that user data in all forms, including
residual data, is protected from disclosure.
T.CSP_SCD_Distortion
O.Backup, O.Check_Operation,
O.Detect_Attack,
O.Error_Secure, O.Key_Secure,
O.User_Data_Protect
O.Check_Operation will ensure that the TOE will
check the CSP-SCD regularly. O.Error_Secure will
prevent the TOE to use distorted CSP-SCD after it
has detected the distortion and O.Detect_Attack
will prohibit the use of a distorted CSP-SCD after a
physical attack (of course in the case of a physical
attack the TOE will itself destroy the CSP-SCD and
enter a state where it can only be reused after a
secure re-initialisation). O.Backup addresses the
integrity and confidentiality protection measures to
CSP-SCD when they are exported from the TOE
e.g. for the purpose of backup and restore.
O.User_Data_Protect assists by allowing the user
to verify the authenticity of key material before it is
used.
T.Exchange O.Data_Exchange_Protect
This objective counters the threat by ensuring that
the TOE has the capability to protect data
exchanges from unauthorised disclosure and
modification.
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Threats Objectives Rationale
T.Insecure_Init
O.Audit_CM, O.Control_Access,
O.Multi-Person_Control,
O.Secure_Init, O.ENV_Recovery,
O.ENV_Secure_Init
This threat is countered by O.Key_Secure with
respect to the secure CSP-SCD generation and
management, O.Control_Access with respect to
the unauthorised use of services (also in the
initialization phase) as well as by objectives on the
TOE environment O.ENV_Secure_Init and
O.ENV_Recovery. O.Secure_Init ensures that the
TOE assumes its initial secure state immediately
upon power-up, reset, or after other restart
conditions. In addition, O.Multi-Person_Control
provides the ability to enforce multi-person control
to ensure that everything is correct before
initialization is performed and O.Audit_CM provides
the ability to check if the initialization process has
been performed correctly.
T.Key_Management
O.Audit_CM, O.Control_Access,
O.Key_Secure, O. Multi-
Person_Control,
O.User_Authentication
This combination of objective counters the threat
by ensuring that keys can only be generated and
managed through their life-cycle to destruction on
the module using secure techniques
(O.Key_Secure). O.Control_Access supports this
by ensuring that access to key management
functions is only granted to authorised users. O
User_Authentication and O.Multi-Person_Control
support this. O.Audit_CM provides the ability to
check that key management functions are used
properly.
T.Malfunction
O.Check_Operation,
O.Error_Secure, O.Secure_Init,
O.Self_Protect,
O.ENV_Outage_Protection,
O.ENV_Recovery
This threat is countered by O.Check_Operation
and O.Error_Secure (which ensures that the TOE
will not continue to operate with the CSP-SCD
when it has detected a malfunction). Due to the
criticality of the TOE and the requirement for
resistance to physical attacks, maintenance of the
TOE is also critical and repairing the TOE might be
impossible without deleting the CSP-SCD. The
combination of O.Secure_Init and O.Self_Protect
ensures that the TOE will start in a secure state
and will protect itself from deliberate attempts to
subvert its security enforcement by inducing faults.
The TOE should also be protected as far as
possible from defects caused by accidental
mishandling amd environmental failures (this is
covered by the objective
O.ENV_Outage_Protection). On the other hand, if
a defect occurs, procedures within the TOE
environment have to exist that allow the
organisation operating the TOE to recover in a
secure way from this defect. This is covered by the
objective O.ENV_Recovery.
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Threats Objectives Rationale
T.Management
O.Admin, O.Audit_CM,
O.Backup, O.Control_Access,
O.Multi-Person_Control,
O.User_Authentication
This threat is countered by O.Control_Access,
which restricts the use of TOE management
functions to authorised users,
O.User_Authentication and O.Multi-
Person_Control, which ensures that invoking a
management function has the authorisation and
O.Audit_CM, which allows to trace the actions of
those users. In addition the objective O.Backup
prohibits the modification of data exported by the
TOE when it is imported again (which otherwise
could be used to manipulate TSF management
data).
T.Misuse_Sign
O.Audit_CM, O.Control_Access,
O.Multi-Person_Control,
O.User_Authentication,
O.User_Data_Protect
O.Control_Access counters this threat for the user
known to the TOE. O.User_Authentication and
O.Multi-Person_Control prevents the misuse by
persons not authorised to use the TOE and
O.Audit_CM allows checking, if an unauthorised
user has attempted to get access to the TOE or if
an authorized user has attempted to misuse the
TOE by attempting to use functions he is not
allowed to use. O.User_Data_Protect assists by
allowing the user to verify the authenticity and the
correctness of key material before it is used.
T.Phys_Manipul
O.Detect_Attack,
O.Check_Operation,
O.Error_Secure, O.Key_Secure,
O.ENV_Protect_Access
O.Detect_Attack counters this threat as long as the
TOE is directly able to detect that it is under attack.
This includes manipulation by authorised users.
O.Check_Operation counters the case where the
TOE does not detect the physical manipulation
directly but detects an error during operation that
might have been caused by a physical attack.
O.Error_Secure and O.Key_Secure enforce a
secure state of the TOE if such error is detected,
particularly for key protection. Since it is obvious
that the TOE is not able to withstand all kind of
physical manipulation, O.ENV_Protect_Access
shall prohibit (as far as possible) the likelihood that
an attacker is able to perform any physical
manipulation on the TOE.
T.PIN_Compromise O.Auth_Data_Protect
This objective counters the threat by ensuring that
users’ authentication data used for authentication
cannot be easily guessed or captured via the host
computer. Any attempt to impersonate a legitimate
user will also be made significantly more difficult by
imposing a limit on the number of authentication
attempts before the user is locked or erased.
T.Signature_Forgery O.Sign_Secure
This objective counters the threat by ensuring that
the TOE employs signature creation mechanisms
that are technically impractical to compromise and
that protect the security of the private key.
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Threats Objectives Rationale
T.Unauth_Function
O.Check_Operation,
O.Error_Secure, O.Self_Protect
This combination of objectives counters the threat
by ensuring that the TOE provides self-protection
capability plus ensuring that error conditions do not
leave the TOE is a non-secure state. This ensures
that unauthorised functions cannot be executed
either by subverting the TOE or by introducing
malicious code through exploitation of errors such
as buffer overflows.
T.Data_Manipul
O.ENV_Application,
O.ENV_Secure_Oper
This objective counters the threat by ensuring that
the application in the host environment can be
trusted to operate correctly and not manipulate
data, such as the DTBS, that is passed to the TOE.
T.Insecure_Oper
O.ENV_Personnel,
O.ENV_Protect_Access,
O.ENV_Secure_Oper
This threat is addressed by the objective
O.ENV_Secure_Oper. Physical protection of the
TOE, which is also necessary to operate the TOE
securely, is addressed by O.ENV_Protect_Access.
In addition all personnel performing operational
activities with the TOE or within the TOE
environment must be aware of their duties and
responsibilities and must be trained to perform their
actions in accordance with the defined procedures.
This is addressed by the objective
O.ENV_Personnel.
Table 8-3 – Mapping of Objectives to Assumptions and Policies
Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.Admin O.ENV_AuthData,
O.ENV_Personnel
O.ENV_Personnel satisfies the assumption by
providing for competent administrators for the
TOE and O.ENV_AuthData ensures that
authentication data for the administrators is
properly protected, thus ensuring that only the
proper administrators have access to the
administrative functions.
A.Audit_Support O.ENV_Audit,
O.ENV_Personnel
This combination of objectives satisfies the
assumption by ensuring that the environment
provides adequate audit processing and review to
support the secure operation of the TOE and that
there are competent personnel to review and
manage the audit data.
A.Controlled_Access O.ENV_Protect_Access
This objective satisfies the assumption by
ensuring that adequate physical security and
procedural measures are in place to control
access to the facility hosting the TOE. This
protects against attacks requiring direct physical
access to the TOE or host system and leakage of
information via monitoring the power consumption
or via radiation.
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Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.Correct_DTBS O.ENV_Application,
O.ENV_Secure_Oper
O_ENV_Application ensures that the applications
that use the TOE will perform the required checks
on the data they pass to the TOE.
O.ENV_Secure_Oper ensures that the necessary
operational procedures are in place for the
organisation operating the TOE as part of their
certification system. With the sum of these
objectives the assumption is covered.
A.Data_Store
O.ENV_Backup,
O.ENV_Recovery,
O.ENV_Secure_Init,
O.ENV_Secure_Oper
This combination of objectives satisfies the
assumption by ensuring that the TOE
environment protects the integrity and availability
of data required for TOE initialisation, start-up,
operation and recovery if stored or handled
outside the TOE.
A.Human_Interface
O.ENV_Application,
O.ENV_Human_Interface
The client application will provide the human
interface for interaction with the TOE and ensures
the confidentiality and integrity of data passed to
the TOE..
A.Legitimate_FW_Update O.ENV_Signed_FW_Update
This objective satisfies the assumption by
ensuring that a process is in place within the
environment to digitally sign firmware update
packages to prove their legitimacy.
A.User_Authentication
O.ENV_Application,
O.ENV_AuthData,
O.ENV_Human_Interface
This combination of objectives satisfies the
assumption by ensuring that the environment
provides an application that interacts correctly
with human users for the purpose of
authentication, protects the authentication data
provided by the users and represents those users
correctly to the TOE. Also, that the human users
exercise proper control over their authentication
data.
A.User_Management O.ENV_AuthData,
O.ENV_Personnel
This combination of objectives satisfies the
assumption by ensuring that the management
policies and procedures governing the
assignment of individual human users to roles on
the TOE are properly followed and that the users
protect their authentication data so as to support
their role assignments.
P.Algorithms O.Approved_Algorithms
This objective satisfies the assumption by
ensuring that the TOE provides the algorithms
required by organizational policy.
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Table 8-4 – Necessity of Security Functional Requirements
SFR Necessitated by:
FAU_GEN.1 O.Audit_CM, O.Backup, O.Check_Operation
FAU_GEN.2 O.Audit_CM, O.Backup
FAU_STG.2 O.Audit_CM
FCS_CKM.1 O.Approved_Algorithms, O.Key_Secure
FCS_CKM.2 (BACKUP) O.Approved_Algorithms, O.Key_Secure, O.Backup
FCS_CKM.4 O.Approved_Algorithms, O.Key_Secure
FCS_COP.1 (SIGN) O.Approved_Algorithms, O.Key_Secure, O.Sign_Secure
FCS_COP.1 (BACKUP_ENC) O.Approved_Algorithms, O.Backup
FCS_COP.1 (BACKUP_INT) O.Approved_Algorithms, O.Backup
FCS_RND.1 O.Approved_Algorithms, O.Key_Secure
FDP_ACC.1 (CRYPTO) O.Control_Access, O.Key_Secure
FDP_ACC.1 (AUDIT) O.Audit_CM, O.Control_Access
FDP_ACC.1 (BACKUP) O.Backup, O.Control_Access
FDP_ACF.1 (CRYPTO) O.Control_Access, O.Key_Secure
FDP_ACF.1 (AUDIT) O.Audit_CM, O.Control_Access
FDP_ACF.1 (BACKUP) O.Backup, O.Control_Access
FDP_BKP.1 O.Backup, O.Key_Secure
FDP_ETC.1 O.Data_Exchange_Protect
FDP_IFC.1 (BACKUP) O.Backup. O.Key_Secure, O.Sign_Secure
FDP_IFC.1 (CRYPTO) O.Key_Secure, O.Sign_Secure
FDP_IFF.4 (BACKUP) O.Backup. O.Key_Secure, O.Sign_Secure
FDP_IFF.4 (CRYPTO) O.Key_Secure, O.Sign_Secure
FDP_RIP.1 O.Key_Secure, O.User_Data_Protect
FDP SDI.2 O.Key_Secure, O.User_Data_Protect
FIA_ATD.1 O.User_Authentication
FIA_UID.1 O.User_Authentication
FIA_UAU.1 O.User_Authentication
FIA_AFL.1 (SO) O.User_Authentication, O.Auth_Data_Protect
FIA_AFL.1 (User) O.User_Authentication, O.Auth_Data_Protect
FIA_SOS.1 O.User_Authentication, O.Auth_Data_Protect
FMT_MSA.1 (ROLE_CRYPTO) O.Backup, O.Control_Access
FMT_MSA.1 (ROLE_AUDIT) O.Control_Access
FMT_MSA.2 O.Control_Access
FMT_MSA.3 O.Backup, O.Control_Access
FMT_MTD.1 (Access Control) O.Control_Access
FMT_MTD.1 (AUDIT) O.Audit_CM
FMT_MTD.1 (RAD) O.User_Authentication
FMT_MTD.1 (USER_Crypto) O.User_Authentication
FMT_MTD.1 (USER_Audit) O.User_Authentication
FMT_SMF.1 O.Admin, O.Audit_CM, O.Control_Access, O.User_Authentication
FMT_SMR.1 O.Control_Access
FPT_AMT.1 O.Check_Operation, O.Error_Secure, O.Secure_Init
FPT_FLS.1 O.Error_Secure, O.Secure_Init
FPT_ITC.1 O.Backup
FPT_ITI.1 O.Audit_CM, O.Backup
FPT_PHP.2 O.Detect_Attack
FPT_PHP.3 O. Detect_Attack
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SFR Necessitated by:
FPT_RCV.1 O.Error_Secure
FPT_TST.1 O.Check_Operation, O.Control_Access, O.Error_Secure , O.Secure_Init
FTP_TRP.1 O.Auth_Data_Protect, O.User_Authentication
Additions to the PP
FCS_CKM.2 (FW Update) O.Import_Code
FCS_CKM.3 O.Key_Secure
FCS_COP.1 (DIGEST) O.Approved_Algorithms
FCS_COP.1 (RSA ENC/DEC) O.Approved_Algorithms, O.Data_Exchange_Protect
FCS_COP.1 (TDES ENC/DEC) O.Approved_Algorithms, O.Data_Exchange_Protect, O.Import_Code
FCS_COP.1 (AES ENC/DEC) O.Approved_Algorithms, O.Data_Exchange_Protect
FDP_ACC.1 (TAC) O.Control_Access, O.Data_Exchange_Protect, O.Key_Secure
FDP_ACF.1 (TAC) O.Control_Access, O.Data_Exchange_Protect, O.Key_Secure
FDP_DAU.1 O.User_Data_Protect
FDP_DAU.2 O.Sign_Secure, O.User_Data_Protect
FDP_ITC.1 O.Data_Exchange_Protect
FDP_RIP.2 O.User_Data_Protect
FDP_UCT.1 O.Data_Exchange_Protect
FDP_UIT.1 O.Data_Exchange_Protect
FIA_SOS.2 O.User_Authentication, O.Auth_Data_Protect
FIA_UAU.4 O.User_Authentication, O.Auth_Data_Protect
FIA_UAU.5 O.Multi-Person_Control
FIA_USB.1 O.User_Authentication
FMT_MOF.1 O.Admin
FMT_MSA.1 (Object Attributes) O.Control_Access
FMT_MSA.2 (Object Attributes) O.Control_Access
FMT_MSA.3 (Object Attributes) O.Control_Access
FMT_MTD.1 (Login Failures) O.Admin, O.User_Authentication
FMT_MTD.1 (UAV) O.Admin, O.User_Authentication
FMT_MTD.1 (SOV) O.Admin, O.User_Authentication
FMT_SMF.1 (Policies) O.Admin
FPT_RVM.1 O.Self_Protect
FPT_SEP.1 O.Self_Protect
FRU_FLT.1 O.Error_Secure
FTP_ITC.1 (FW Update) O.Import_Code
FTP_ITC.1 (Key Cloning) O.Backup
SFRs for TOE Environment
FAU_SAR.1 (ENV) O.ENV_Audit
FAU_STG.1 (ENV) O.ENV_Audit
FCS_CKM.1 (ENV/FW Update) O.ENV_Signed_FW_Update
FCS_CKM.2 (ENV/FW Update) O.ENV_Signed_FW_Update
FCS_CKM.2 (ENV/BACKUP) O.ENV_Backup
FCS_COP.1 (ENV/ENC FW Update) O.ENV_Signed_FW_Update
FCS_COP.1 (ENV/SIGN FW Update) O.ENV_Signed_FW_Update
FCS_COP.1 (ENV/BACKUP_ENC) O.ENV_Backup
FCS_COP.1 (ENV/BACKUP_INT) O.ENV_Backup
FDP_ACC.1 (CLIENT) O.ENV_Application
FDP_ACF.1 (CLIENT) O.ENV_Application
FDP_ACC.1 (ENV/BACKUP) O.ENV_Backup
FDP_ACF.1 (ENV/BACKUP) O.ENV_Backup
FDP_UIT.1 O.ENV_Application
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SFR Necessitated by:
FIA_UAU.1 (CLIENT) O.ENV_Application, O.ENV_Human_Interface
FIA_UID.1 (CLIENT) O.ENV_Application, O.ENV_Human_Interface
FTP_ITC.1 (ENV/FW Update) O.ENV_Signed_FW_Update
FTP_ITC.1 (ENV/Key Cloning) O.ENV_Backup
FTP_TRP.1 (CLIENT) O.ENV_Human_Interface
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Table 8-5 – Mapping of Security Functional Requirements to Objectives
Objectives
Security Functional
Requirements
Rationale
O.Admin
FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MTD.1,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
This combination of SFRs satisfies the
objective by requiring that the TOE provide
suitable roles and management functions to
administer the TOE.
O.Approved_Algorithms
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2
(BACKUP), FCS_CKM.3,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1
(BACKUP_ENC), FCS_COP.1
(BACKUP_INT), FCS_COP.1
(RSA ENC/DEC), FCS_COP.1
(TDES ENC/DEC),
FCS_COP.1 (AES ENC/DEC),
FCS_COP.1 (SIGN),
FCS_COP.1 (DIGEST),
FCS_RND.1
This combination of SFRs satisfies the
objective by requiring that the TOE provide
approved algorithms and key management
techniques.
O.Audit_CM
FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2,
FAU_STG.2 (TOE),
FDP_ACC.1 (AUDIT),
FDP_ACF.1 (AUDIT),
FMT_MTD.1 (AUDIT),
FMT_SMF.1, FPT_ITI.1
Audit generation is implemented by the SFR
FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 with the audit
events matching the list in O.Audit_CM.
Additional audit is implemented by the SFR
FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2. The TOE stores
the audit data according to the SFR
FAU_STG.2 (TOE) until the audit trail is
exported upon request of the Auditor or Crypto-
officer under control of the SFR FDP_ACC.1
(AUDIT), FDP_ACF.1 (AUDIT) and
FMT_MTD.1 (AUDIT). FMT_SMF.1 and
FMT_MTD.1 (AUDIT) require management
function for the audit. These management
functions are provided to the Auditor only. The
integrity of the audit data will be ensured by the
SFR FAU_STG.2 (TOE) inside the TOE.
O.Auth_Data_Protect
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_AFL.1 (SO),
FIA_AFL.1 (User), FIA_SOS.1,
FIA_SOS.2, FTP_TRP.1
This combination of SFRs satisfies the
objective by requiring that the TOE:
• prevent reuse/replay of authentication
data (FIA_UAU.4),
• prevent brute force attacks on
authentication data (FIA_AFL.1)
• ensure that authentication data meets
the required minimum strength
requirements (FIA_SOS.1)
• enforce the use of TSF-generated
authentication data (FIA_SOS.2), and
• utilise a trusted path to protect
authentication data from
eavesdropping (FTP_TRP.1).
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Objectives
Security Functional
Requirements
Rationale
O.Backup
FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2,
FCS_CKM.2 (BACKUP),
FCS_COP.1 (BACKUP_ENC),
FCS_COP.1 (BACKUP_INT),
FDP_ACC.1 (BACKUP),
FDP_ACF.1 (BACKUP), FDP_
BKP.1, FDP_IFC.1, FDP_IFF.4,
FMT_MSA.1
(ROLE_CRYPTO),
FMT_MSA.3, FPT_ITC.1,
FPT_ITI.1, FTP_ITC.1 (Key
Cloning)
The TOE backup and restore functions
requires the SFR FDP_BKP.1 the
confidentiality and integrity protection of
backup data. The backup and restore of CSP-
SCD, other user data and TSF data is
described in the SFR FDP_BKP.1. The
confidentiality and integrity protection of the
TSF data as part of the backup data is
implemented by the SFR FPT_ITC.1 and SFR
FPT_ITI.1 The FDP_BKP.1 needs the
cryptographic functions implemented by the
following SFR: (i) import the backup keys by
FCS_CKM.2, (ii) encryption of backup data by
FCS_COP.1/BACKUP_ENC, (iii) data integrity
protection by FCS_COP.1 (BACKUP_INT).
The SFR FDP_BKP.1 requires encrypting the
CSPSCD and electronically exported keys if
they are exported. The backup and restore
TSF will be under access control required by
the SFR FDP_ACF.1 (BACKUP) according to
FDP_ACC.1 (BACKUP). The SFR FMT_MSA.1
(ROLE_BACKUP) and FMT_MSA.3 extend the
management functions of security attributes to
the Backup SFP. The SFR FAU_GEN.1 and
FAU_GEN.2 require audit data specific for the
use of the backup and restore function
associated with the identity of the users.
Because FDP_BKP.1 handles and exports the
CSP-SCD outside the TSC the TOE shall
protect against side-channels to prevent any
illicit information flow. The SFR
FDP_IFC.1/BACKUP and FDP_IFF.4
(BACKUP) implements this protection. For the
TOE, FTP_ITC.1 (Key Cloning) ensures that
backup data is protected when transmitted
from the TOE to a backup token and vice
versa.
O.Check_Operation
FAU_GEN.1, FPT_AMT.1,
FPT_TST.1
This security objective is implemented in the
TOE by the SFR for abstract machine testing
FPT_AMT.1 and TSF testing FPT_TST.1. If
these tests detect an error the TOE will transit
into a secure state (see O.Error_secure) and
prevent the normal operation. FAU_GEN.1
generates audit records about the test results
of the SFR FPT-AMT.1 and FPT_TST.1 to
inform the user (Auditor or Crypto-officer) about
the performed self-tests and their results. The
FPT_TST.1 includes checks of the executable
code.
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Objectives
Security Functional
Requirements
Rationale
O.Control_Access
FDP_ACC.1 (CRYPTO),
FDP_ACF.1 (CRYPTO),
FDP_ACC.1 (BACKUP),
FDP_ACF.1 (BACKUP),
FDP_ACC.1 (AUDIT),
FDP_ACF.1 (AUDIT),
FDP_ACC.1 (TAC),
FDP_ACF.1 (TAC),
FMT_MSA.1
(ROLE_CRYPTO),
FMT_MSA.1 (ROLE_AUDIT),
FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3,
FMT_MSA.1 (Object
Attributes), FMT_MSA.2
(Object Attributes),
FMT_MSA.3 (Object
Attributes), FMT_MTD.1
(Access Control), FMT_MTD.1
(AUDIT), FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
Access control is implemented in the TOE
FDP_ACC.1 (CRYPTO), FDP_ACF.1
(CRYPTO), FDP_ACC.1 (BACKUP),
FDP_ACF.1 (BACKUP), FDP_ACC.1 (AUDIT),
FDP_ACF.1 (AUDIT), FDP_ACC.1 (TAC),
FDP_ACF.1 (TAC), with the roles Auditor,
Crypto-officer and Crypto-user as defined by
the SFR FMT_SMR.1. The SFRs FMT_MSA.1
(ROLE_CRYPTO), FMT_MSA.1
(ROLE_AUDIT), FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3,
FMT_MTD.1 (ACCESS_CONTROL),
FMT_MTD.1 (AUDIT) and FMT_SMF.1 assign
the management functions for the
cryptographic to the Crypto-officer and audit
functions to the Auditor. The SFR FMT_MSA.1
(ROLE_CRYPTO) extend the Crypto-officer’s
management functions to backup and restore.
The SFR require the TSF to enforce the Audit-
SFP, Backup- SFP and Crypto-SFP to provide
restrictive default values for security attributes
which may be changed by the Auditor and the
Crypto-officer. FMT_MSA.1 (Object
Attributes), FMT_MSA.2 (Object Attributes),
FMT_MSA.3 (Object Attributes) require
controls over the management of object
attributes needed to support access control.
The user identification and authentication
needed to support enforcement of the access
control policy is provided by the SFRs
satisfying O.User_Authentication and O.Multi-
Person_Control.
O.Data_Exchange_Protect
FCS_COP.1 (RSA Enc/Dec),
FCS_COP.1 (TDES Enc/Dec),
FCS_COP.1 (AES Enc/Dec),
FCS_COP.1 (SIGN),
FCS_COP.1 (DIGEST),
FDP_ACC.1 (TAC),
FDP_ACF.1 (TAC),
FDP_ETC.1, FDP_ITC.1,
FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1
This combination of SFRs satisfies the
objective by requiring that the TOE provide
controls over export and import of user data
(FDP_ACC.1 (TAC), FDP_ACF.1 (TAC),
FDP_ETC.1, FDP_ITC.1, FDP_UCT.1,
FDP_UIT.1) plus the cryptographic functions
and approved algorithms needed to protect
data being exchanged (FCS_COP.1 (RSA
Enc/Dec), FCS_COP.1 (TDES Enc/Dec),
FCS_COP.1 (AES Enc/Dec), FCS_COP.1
(SIGN), FCS_COP.1 (DIGEST)).
O.Detect_Attack FPT_PHP.2, FPT_PHP.3
The SFR FPT_PHP.2 implements notification
of and FPT_PHP.3 resistance to physical
attack. The refinements limit the tamper
scenarios to opening the device or removal of a
cover. This limitation is reasonable because
RE.ENV_Protect_Access requires CSP
security measures for physical protection of the
TOE.
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Objectives
Security Functional
Requirements
Rationale
O.Error_Secure
FPT_AMT.1, FPT_FLS.1,
FPT_RCV.1, FPT_TST.1,
FRU_FLT.1
The SFR FPT_AMT.1 and FPT_TST.1 require
tests for error detection and the SFR
FPT_FLS.1 requires preservation of a secure
state when errors are detected. The TSF shall
destroy the plaintext SCP-SCD and other
confidential secret and private keys if failures
occur. The SFR FPT_RCV.1 requires a mode
where the ability to return the TOE to a secure
state is provided. FRU_FLT.1 requires that the
TOE’s data protection continues to be in place
in the event of power or data I/O failure.
O.Import_Code
FTP_ITC.1 (FW Update),
FCS_CKM.2 (FW Update),
FCS_COP.1 (TDES Enc/Dec)
This combination of SFRs satisfies the
objective by requiring that the TOE provide the
mechanisms and approved algorithms needed
to receive a firmware update package from the
vendor in a trusted manner and for the TOE to
verify the authenticity of the firmware update.
O.Key_Secure
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2
(BACKUP), FCS_CKM.3,
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1
(SIGN), FCS_RND.1,
FDP_ACC.1 (CRYPTO),
FDP_ACF.1 (CRYPTO),
FDP_ACC.1 (TAC),
FDP_ACF.1 (TAC),
FDP_BKP.1, FDP_IFC.1
(CRYPTO), FDP_IFF.4
(CRYPTO), FDP_RIP.1,
FDP_SDI.2
The SFRs ensure the cryptographically secure
key and key pair generation by FCS_CKM.1
and FCS_RND.1 as well as operation by
FCS_COP.1/SIGN according to the list of
approved algorithms and parameters.
FCS_CKM.3 ensures the security of keys in
storage and when accessed by a user. The
confidentiality and integrity of the keys will be
protected by SFR FDP_RIP.1 and FDP_SDI.2
during internal processing. The SFR
FCS_CKM.4 requires secure key destruction to
prevent any misuse of keys after their
operational life time. FDP_BKP.1 and
FCS_CKM.2 (BACKUP) ensure that keys
remain secure when they are backed up. The
overall key management and operation is
under access control of the SFR FDP_ACC.1
(CRYPTO), FDP_ACF.1 (CRYPTO),
FDP_ACC.1 (TAC) and FDP_ACF.1 (TAC).
The TOE shall protect keys against side-
channels by the SFR FDP_IFC.1 (CRYPTO)
and FDP_IFF.4 (CRYPTO).
O.Multi-Person_Control FIA_UAU.5
This SFR satisfies the objective by requiring
that the TOE provide a mechanism for multi-
person control over access to the TOE’s
functions.
O.Secure_Init
FPT_AMT.1, FPT_FLS.1,
FPT_TST.1
This combination of SFRs satisfies the
objective by requiring that the TOE ensure that
it is in its initial secure state immediately upon
power-up, reset, or after other restart
conditions.
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Objectives
Security Functional
Requirements
Rationale
O.Self_Protect FPT_RVM.1, FPT_SEP.1
This combination of SFRs satisfies the
objective by requiring that the TOE protect its
own functions by requiring that enforcement
functions are invoked and succeed before
allowing operations to proceed and maintaining
a separate execution space for its functions.
O.Sign_Secure
FCS_COP.1 (SIGN),
FDP_DAU.2, FDP_IFC.1,
FDP_IFF.4
The cryptographic security of signatures is
implemented by the SFR FCS_COP.1 (SIGN)
with reference a list of approved algorithms and
parameters. The SFR FDP_IFC.1 (CRYPTO)
and FDP_IFF.4 (CRYPTO) requires TSF to
prevent illicit information flow about the CSP-
SCD through side-channels in the signatures.
FDP_DAU.2 supports secure signature by
providing evidence that guarantees the
authenticity of the signing key and the fact that
it was generated in an approved crypto
module, plus providing the identity of the
guarantor.
O.User_Authentication
FIA_ATD.1, FIA_AFL.1 (SO),
FIA_AFL (User), FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_SOS.1, FIA_SOS.2,
FIA_USB.1, FMT_MTD.1
(RAD), FMT_MTD.1
(USER_Crypto), FMT_MTD.1
(USER_Audit), FMT_MTD.1
(Login_Failures), FMT_MTD.1
(UAV), FMT_MTD.1 (SOV),
FMT_SMF.1, FTP_TRP.1
This combination of SFRs satisfies the
objective because the requirements, FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.4 FIA_SOS.1 FIA_SOS.2,
FIA_USB.1, provide identification/authentication
mechanisms, using randomly generated secrets
of specified minimum lengths, and that users
are bound to subjects. FIA_AFL.1 (SO),
FIA_AFL (User) protect against password
guessing attacks and FTP_TRP.1 protects
against snooping attacks. The SFRs ,
FMT_MTD.1 (RAD), FMT_MTD.1
(USER_Crypto), FMT_MTD.1 (USER_Audit),
FMT_MTD.1 (Login_Failures), FMT_MTD.1
(UAV), FMT_MTD.1 (SOV), FMT_SMF.1
provide management functions for identification
and authentication.
O.User_Data_Protect
FDP_DAU.1, FDP_DAU.2,
FDP_RIP.1, FDP_RIP.2, FDP
SDI.2
This combination of SFRs satisfies the
objective by requiring that the TOE provide
mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of user objects within the TOE and
provide the means for the user to verify the
integrity of the user object data.
O.ENV_Application
FDP_ACC.1 (CLIENT),
FDP_ACF.1 (CLIENT),
FDP_UIT.1, FIA_UAU.1
(CLIENT), FIA_UID.1 (CLIENT)
The client application shall implement end-user
identification and authentication required by the
SFR FIA_UID.1 (CLIENT) and FIA_UAU.1
(CLIENT). It shall implement access control for
the DTBS representation sent to the TOE for
signing according to the SFR FDP_ACC.1
(CLIENT) and FDP_ACF.1 (CLIENT). Security
controls in the TOE environment shall also
prevent unauthorised manipulation of data
submitted to the TOE as required by SFR
FDP_UIT.1.
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Objectives
Security Functional
Requirements
Rationale
O.ENV_Audit
FAU_SAR.1 (ENV),
FAU_STG.1 (ENV)
The audit review of TOE’s audit data is
implemented in the IT environment by the SFR
FAU_SAR.1. Because the TOE implements
access control on reading the TOE’s audit trail
only the SFR FAU_STG.1 (ENV) ensures the
availability of the TOE audit trail and prevents
the modification of the TOE audit trail outside
the TOE.
O.ENV_AuthData RE.ENV_Personnel
The non-IT requirement, RE.ENV_Personnel,
ensures that personnel are aware of their
obligations, including the obligation to properly
protect their authentication data.
O.ENV_Backup
FCS_CKM.2 (ENV/BACKUP),
FCS_COP.1
(ENV/BACKUP_ENC),
FCS_COP.1
(ENV/BACKUP_INT),
FDP_ACC.1 (ENV/BACKUP),
FDP_ACF.1 (ENV/BACKUP),
FTP_ITC.1 (ENV/Key Cloning)
This combination security requirements for the
IT environment satisfies the objective by
ensuring that there is a means provided by the
environment to protect the confidentiality of the
backup data and detect loss of the integrity of
the backup keys, other user data and TSF data
needed to restore an operational state after
failure when it is transmitted and stored in the
TOE environment.
O.ENV_Human_Interface
FIA_UAU.1 (CLIENT),
FIA_UID.1 (CLIENT),
FTP_TRP.1 (CLIENT)
These SFRs require that the IT environment
provide a human interface for identification and
authentication that communicates with the TOE
via a trusted path.
O.ENV_Outage_Protection RE.ENV_Outage_Protection
RE.ENV_Outage_Protection requires the CSP
to ensure that the power supplied to the TOE is
adequately protected against unexpected
interruptions and the effects of surges and
voltage fluctuations outside the normal
operating range of the device and that the TOE
is operated in an environment that is provided
adequate protection against disasters such as
fire and flood.
O.ENV_Personnel RE.ENV_Personnel
RE.ENV_Personnel implements the definition
of the obligations, the services and the roles of
the TOE users. The CSP shall inform about
their civil, financial and legal responsibilities
and train the personnel for their roles.
O.ENV_Protect_Access RE.ENV_Protect_Access
RE.ENV_Protect_Access requires the CSP to
establish physical and organisational security
measures against modification of TOE
hardware, firmware and software. These
measures shall restrict the access to the TOE
and protected assets to authorised persons.
Note that the TOE itself protects by
FPT_PHP.2 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentiality
of the CSP-SCD against physical access
because even the CSP personnel do not need
to know the CSP-SCD in plaintext.
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Objectives
Security Functional
Requirements
Rationale
O.ENV_Recovery RE.ENV_Recovery
RE.ENV_Recovery implements recovery plans
and procedures using the TOE TSF according
to FDP_BKP.1 and other SFR. It takes
recovery in case of detected errors or physical
tampering into account.
O.ENV_Secure_Init RE.ENV_Secure_Init
RE.ENV_Secure_Init implements the definition
and application of procedures and controls set-
up the TOE for the secure generation of
CSPSCD and initialisation of the signature
function.
O.ENV_Secure_Oper RE.ENV_Secure_Oper
RE.ENV_Secure_Oper requires the
implementation of such procedures and
controls and the observance of the TOE
guidance.
O.ENV_Signed_FW_Update
FCS_CKM.1 (ENV/FW
Update), FCS_CKM.2
(ENV/FW Update), FCS_COP.1
(ENV/ENC FW Update),
FCS_COP.1 (ENV/SIGN FW
Update), FTP_ITC.1 (ENV/FW
Update)
This combination of SFRs satisfies the
objective by requiring that the IT environment
provide an application to generate signed and
encrypted firmware update packages in a
manner that allows the receiving TOE instance
to verify its authenticity and decrypt and load
the updated firmware.
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Table 8-6: Dependency Rationale for Security Functional Requirements
Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Rationale
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_STM.1 is not included as an
SFR. FAU_GEN.1 2 is refined to
state that time stamps are not
available in the TOE and
sequence numbers are used
instead.
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1, FIA_UID.1 Met by inclusion of FAU_GEN.1,
FIA_UID.1.
FAU_STG.2 FAU_GEN.1 Met by inclusion of FAU_GEN.1
FCS_CKM.1 [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Met by inclusion of FCS_COP.1,
FCS_CKM.4 and FMT_MSA.2 as
SFRs
FCS_CKM.2 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Met by inclusion of FDP_ITC.1,
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4 and
FMT_MSA.2 as SFRs.
FCS_CKM.3 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Met by inclusion of FDP_ITC.1
and FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
and FMT_MSA.2 as SFRs
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Met by inclusion of FDP_ITC.1
and FCS_CKM.1 and
FMT_MSA.2 as SFRs
FCS_COP.1 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Met by inclusion of FDP_ITC.1
and FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
and FMT_MSA.2 as SFRs
FCS_RND.1 FPT_TST.1 Met by inclusion of FPT_TST.1 –
self-tests include test of RNG.
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access
control
Met by inclusion of FDP_ACF.1
for each iteration
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Met by inclusion of FDP_ACC.1
for each iteration and
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_BKP.1 [FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation or
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes] FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation
Met by inclusion of FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.2 (BACKUP),
FCS_COP.1(BACKUP_ENC) and
FCS_COP.1(BACKUP_INT)
FDP_DAU.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FDP_DAU.2 FIA_UID.1 Met by inclusion of FIA_UID.1 as
SFR
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Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Rationale
FDP_ETC.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
Met by inclusion of FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ITC.1 [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Met by inclusion of FDP_ACC.1
and FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.1 FDP_IFC.1 is defined without
reference to any security
attributes.
FDP_IFF.4
FDP_IFC.1, AVA_CCA.1 Met by inclusion of FDP_IFC.1,
AVA_CCA.1.
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FDP_RIP.2 No dependencies No dependencies
FDP SDI.2 No dependencies No dependencies
FDP_UCT.1
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
Met by inclusion of FTP_TRP.1
and FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
Met by inclusion of FTP_TRP.1
and FDP_ACC.1
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Met by inclusion of FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FIA_SOS.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FIA_SOS.2 No dependencies No dependencies
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Met by inclusion of FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4 No dependencies No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies No dependencies
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition Met by inclusion of FIA_ATD.1
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Met by inclusion of FMT_SMF.1
and FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Met by inclusion of FDP_ACC.1
and FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.2
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy
model
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security
attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Met by inclusion of FDP_ACC.1,
FMT_MSA.1, FMT_SMR.1 and
ADV_SPM.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security
attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Met by inclusion of FMT_MSA.1
and FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Met by inclusion of FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Met by inclusion of FIA_UID.1
FPT_AMT.1 No dependencies No dependencies
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Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Rationale
FPT_FLS.1
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy
model
Met by provision of Informal
Security Policy Model
FPT_ITC.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FPT_ITI.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FPT_PHP.2
FMT_MOF.1 Local user is informed of tamper
event by removal/non-availability
of TOE. No management of
security functions is required.
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies No dependencies
FPT_RCV.1
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy
model
Met by inclusion of AGD_ADM.1
and ADV_SPM.1.
FPT_RVM.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FPT_SEP.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FPT_TST.1 FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing Met by inclusion of FPT_AMT.1.
FRU_FLT.1
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of
secure state
Met by inclusion of FPT_FLS.1.
FTP_ITC.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FTP_TRP.1 No dependencies No dependencies
SFRs for TOE
Environment
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation Met because audit records
provided by FAU_GEN.1 in TOE.
FAU_STG.1
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation Met because audit records
provided by FAU_GEN.1 in TOE.
FCS_CKM.1
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1, FCS_CKM.4 are
included as SFRs for the
environment. Because the full
specification of the firmware
update application system is
outside the scope of this ST,
dependencies for FMT_MSA.2
are impossible to satisfy and it
has therefore not been included
as an SFR for the environment.
FCS_CKM.2
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4 are
included as SFRs for the
environment. Because the full
specification of the firmware
update application system is
outside the scope of this ST,
dependencies for FMT_MSA.2
are impossible to satisfy and it
has therefore not been included
as an SFR for the environment.
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Security Functional
Requirement
Dependencies Rationale
FCS_COP.1
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
security attributes or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Met by inclusion of FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4 as SFRs for the
environment. Because the full
specification of the firmware
update application system is
outside the scope of this ST,
dependencies for FMT_MSA.2
are impossible to satisfy and it
has therefore not been included
as an SFR for the environment.
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_AFC.1 Met by inclusion of FDP_ACF.1
as a SFR for the environment.
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.1 is included as a SFR
for the environment. FMT_MSA.3
is not included because the
cryptographic module does not
need to specify requirements for
management of security attributes
of the client application. It is up to
the CSP to define which kind of
static attribute initialisation of the
client application (either
permissive or restrictive in nature)
ensures that the default values of
security attributes are
appropriate.
FDP_UIT.1
FDP_ACC.1, FTP_TRP.1 Met by inclusion of FDP_ACC.1,
FTP_TRP.1
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Met by inclusion of FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FTP_ITC.1 No dependencies No dependencies
FTP_TRP.1 No dependencies No dependencies
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Table 8-7 – Mapping of IT Security Functions to IT Security Requirements and SFRs
IT Security Function TSS
Reference
CC Requirement Title
CC Functional
Component
Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1
User identity association FAU_GEN.2
Audit Data Generation 6.3.1
Guarantees of audit data
availability
FAU_STG.2
Timing of identification FIA_UID. 1
Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1
Single-use authentication
mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4
Multiple authentication
mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5
Authentication failure handling FIA_AFL.1
User Identification and Authentication 6.3.3
User subject binding FIA_USB.1
Trusted Path – Luna PED 6.3.2 Trusted path FTP_TRP.1
Verification of secrets FIA_SOS.1
Authentication data selection 6.3.4
TSF generation of secrets FIA_SOS.2
User account data 6.3.5 User attribute definition FIA_ATD.1
TOE Roles 6.1.3 Security roles FMT_SMR.1
Subset access control FDP_ACC.1
Access Control 6.3.6
Security attribute based access
control
FDP_ACF.1
Subset residual information
protection
FDP_RIP.1
Object Re-Use 6.3.7
Full residual information
protection
FDP_RIP.2
Basic data authentication FDP_DAU.1
Data Authentication 6.3.8
Data authentication with identity
of guarantor
FDP_DAU.2
Key Pair Integrity Checking 6.3.9 Stored data integrity monitoring
and action
FDP_SDI.2
Imported user data without
security attributes
FDP_ITC.1
Key Export and Import Protection
6.3.10
Exported user data without
security attributes
FDP_ETC.1
6.3.11 Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.1
6.3.11.1 Cryptographic key access FCS_CKM.3
6.3.11 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic Material Management
6.3.11 Subset information flow control FDP_IFC.1
Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1
Quality metrics for random
numbers
FCS_RND.1
Cryptography 6.3.12
Subset information flow control FDP_IFC.1
Basic data exchange
confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1
Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1
Data Exchange 6.3.13
Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1
Specification of Security Management
Functions
6.3.14 Specification of management
functions
FMT_SMF.1
Security Function Management 6.3.15 Management of security
functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1
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IT Security Function TSS
Reference
CC Requirement Title
CC Functional
Component
Management of security
attributes
FMT_MSA.1
Secure security attributes FMT_MSA.2
Static attribute initialization FMT_MSA.3
Security Data Management 6.3.16
Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1
Memory and Firmware Integrity
Check
6.3.17.1
Abstract machine testing FPT_AMT.1
Self-Tests 6.3.17.2 TSF testing FPT_TST.1
Non-bypassibility of the TSP FPT_RVM.1
Prevention of By-pass and Separate
Execution Domain
6.3.17.3
TSF domain separation FPT_SEP.1
Preservation of Secure State 6.3.17.4 Failure with preservation of
secure state
FPT_FLS.1
Preservation of Secure State 6.3.17.4 Manual recovery FPT_RCV.1
Cryptographic key distribution FCS_CKM.2
Firmware Loading and Firmware
Update
6.3.17.5
Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1
Cryptographic key distribution FCS_CKM.2
TSF generation of secrets FIA_SOS.2
Cloning 6.3.18
Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1
Passive detection of physical
attack
FPT_PHP.2
Physical Self-Protection 6.3.19
Resistance to physical attack FPT_PHP.3
Failure handling 6.3.20 Degraded fault tolerance FRU_FLT.1
Cryptographic key distribution FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1
Exported user data without
security attributes
FDP_ETC.1
Backup FDP_BKP.1
Subset information flow control FDP_IFC.1
Partial elimination of illicit
information flows
FDP_IFF.4
Inter-TSF confidentiality during
transmission
FPT_ITC.1
Inter-TSF detection of
modification
FPT_ITI.1
Backup and Recovery 6.3.21
Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1
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Table 8-8 – Mapping of Security Functional Requirements to IT Security Functions
CC Requirement Title
CC Functional
Component
ST Reference IT Security Function TSS Reference Rationale
Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1 5.1.1.1 Audit Data Generation 6.3.1
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing audit data,
in the form of commands and responses with associated
sequence numbers, that is accessible by an audit review
application in the environment.
User identity association FAU_GEN.2 5.1.1.2 Audit Data Generation 6.3.1
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing audit data
that can be associated with the user responsible for invoking a
command.
Guarantees of audit data
availability
FAU_STG.2 5.1.1.3 Audit Data Generation 6.3.1
The security function satisfies the SFR by ensuring that 60kB
of audit data is always available to be read by the application
in the environment.
Cryptographic key
generation
FCS_CKM.1 5.1.2.1
Cryptographic Material
Management
6.3.11
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing
mechanisms for the generation of RSA, DSA and TDES keys
of the specified lengths in accordance with the appropriate
standards.
Cryptographic key
distribution
FCS_CKM.2 5.1.2.2 Backup and Recovery 6.3.21
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing a secure
means to derive a key, as part of the cloning protocol, that is
used to encrypt the backup data when it is transferred from the
TOE to a backup token.
Cryptographic key
distribution
FCS_CKM.2 5.2.1.1
Firmware Loading and
Firmware Update
6.3.17.5
The security function satisfies the SFR by implementing a
symmetric key distribution protocol for the protection of
firmware upgrade packages.
Cryptographic key access FCS_CKM.3 5.2.1.2
Key Storage and
Access Protection
6.3.11.1
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing
mechanisms for key storage and access in accordance with
the PKCS #11 standard.
Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_CKM.4 5.1.2.3
Cryptographic Material
Management
6.3.11
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing
mechanisms that destroys keys in accordance with the PKCS
#11 and FIPS 140-2 Level 3 standards.
Cryptographic operation FCS_COP.1
5.1.2.4, 5.1.2.5,
5.1.2.6 & 5.2.1.3,
5.2.1.4, 5.2.1.5,
5.2.1.6
Cryptography 6.3.12
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing
mechanisms that implement the specified set of cryptographic
algorithms in accordance with the appropriate standards.
Quality metrics for random
numbers
FCS_RND.1 5.1.2.7 Cryptography 6.3.12
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing a Random
Number Generator that conforms to a FIPS 140-2 Level 3
validated Random Number Generator (RNG).
Subset access control FDP_ACC.1
5.1.3.1, 5.1.3.2,
5.1.3.3, 5.2.2.1
Access Control 6.3.6
The security function satisfies the SFR by enforcing the Token
Access Control policy on subjects (sessions), objects and a
set of controlled operations.
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CC Requirement Title
CC Functional
Component
ST Reference IT Security Function TSS Reference Rationale
Security attribute based
access control
FDP_ACF.1
5.1.3.4, 5.1.3.5,
5.1.3.6, 5.2.2.2
Access Control 6.3.6
The security function satisfies the SFR by enforcing the TAC
Policy based on the specified sets of subject and object
attributes. The access rules for subjects, objects and
operations are as given by table 5-2.
Backup and recovery FDP_BKP.1 5.1.3.7 Backup and Recovery 6.3.21
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing backup
and recovery functions that can be invoked on demand by an
authorised user and that protects the confidentiality of the
backup data by encryption and the integrity with SHA-1
checksums. The backup data is sufficient to re-create the
stored state of one instance of the TOE on a second instance
of the TOE for recovery purposes.
Basic data authentication FDP_DAU.1 5.2.2.3 Data Authentication 6.3.8
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing a SHA-1
fingerprint for stored objects that can be queried by the user in
order to validate the integrity of the object.
Data authentication with
identity of guarantor
FDP_DAU.2 5.2.2.4 Data Authentication 6.3.8
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing a Public
Key Confirmation mechanism that can be used to guarantee
the validity of data objects and verify the identity of the
originator who performed the digital signature.
Export of user data without
security attributes
FDP_ETC.1 5.1.3.8
Key Export and Import
Protection, Backup and
Recovery
6.3.10, 6.3.21
The security function satisfies the SFR by enforcing the TAC
when data is exported through a Wrap operation. Objects are
exported without security-related attributes.
Subset information flow
control
FDP_IFC.1
5.1.3.9
5.1.3.10
Backup and Recovery,
Cryptographic Material
Management,
Cryptography
6.3.21, 6.3.11,
6.3.12
These security functions satisfy the SFR by ensuring that there
is no illicit information flow associated with backup recovery,
key management and cryptographic operations that could
compromise the CSP_SCD.
Partial elimination of illicit
information flows
FDP_IFF.4
5.1.3.11,
5.1.3.12
Backup and Recovery,
Cryptographic Material
Management,
Cryptography
6.3.21, 6.3.11,
6.3.12
These security functions satisfy the SFR by ensuring that there
is no illicit information flow associated with backup recovery,
key management and cryptographic operations that could
compromise the CSP_SCD.
Imported user data without
security attributes
FDP_ITC.1 5.2.2.5
Key Export and Import
Protection
6.3.10
The security function satisfies the SFR by enforcing the TAC
when data is imported through an Unwrap operation. The TSF
ignores any security-related attributes that may have been
associated with the imported object and sets the object’s
attributes to the appropriate values for its type and, in
particular, the CKA_SENSITIVE attribute is always set.
Subset residual information
protection
FDP_RIP.1 5.1.3.13 Object Reuse 6.3.7
The security function satisfies the SFR by ensuring that the
information content of private keys and secret keys is made
unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource associated
with a key.
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CC Requirement Title
CC Functional
Component
ST Reference IT Security Function TSS Reference Rationale
Full residual information
protection
FDP_RIP.2 5.2.2.6 Object Reuse 6.3.7
The security function satisfies the SFR by ensuring that the
information content of resources is made unavailable when the
resource is re-allocated.
Stored data monitoring and
action
FDP_SDI.2 5.1.3.14
Key Pair Integrity
Checking
6.3.9
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing a means
to check the integrity of a private key object before output of a
digital signature by verifying the digital signature created with
the private key using the corresponding public key object for
signature verification.
Basic data exchange
confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1 5.2.2.7 Data Exchange 6.3.13
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing encryption
mechanisms and a logical trusted channel to protect
transmitted and received objects from unauthorised disclosure
using the Wrap and Unwrap operations.
Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT.1 5.2.2.8 Data Exchange 6.3.13
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing digital
signature mechanisms to protect transmitted and received
objects from modification and insertion errors.
Authentication failure
handling
FIA_AFL.1 5.1.4.1 & 5.1.4.2
User Identification and
Authentication
6.3.3
The security function satisfies the SFR by detecting when the
maximum number of login failures occur (3 for SO, set in the
TPV for Token User) and performing on of the following:
Zeroize the device in the case of SO authentication failure
Remove the user and zeroize the user’s memory space, if a
Token User authentication failure.
User attribute definition FIA_ATD.1 5.1.4.3 User Account Data 6.3.5
The security function satisfies the SFR by maintaining the
required list of security attributes within the UAV for each
Token User.
Verification of secrets FIA_SOS.1 5.1.4.4
Authentication Data
Selection
6.3.4
The security function satisfies the SFR by requiring that PIN
values meet the minimum and maximum length constraints
established by the SO via the TPV.
TSF generation of secrets FIA_SOS.2 5.2.3.1
Authentication Data
Selection
6.3.4
The security functions satisfy the SFR by generating random
authentication data of the required lengths for each of the
functions for which they are required.
Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1 5.1.4.5
User Identification and
Authentication
6.3.3
The security function satisfies the SFR by allowing a user to
perform a specified set of actions before authentication and by
requiring the user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing the user to perform any other actions on the module.
Single-use authentication
mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4 5.2.3.2
User Identification and
Authentication
6.3.3
The security function satisfies the SFR by implementing the
challenge-response scheme as a single-use authentication
mechanism.
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CC Requirement Title
CC Functional
Component
ST Reference IT Security Function TSS Reference Rationale
Multiple authentication
mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5 5.2.3.3
User Identification and
Authentication
6.3.3
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing multiple
authentication mechanisms including PED key, PED key and
PED PIN and M of N.
Timing of identification FIA_UID. 1 5.1.4.6
User Identification and
Authentication
6.3.3
The security function satisfies the SFR by allowing a user to
perform a specified set of actions before identification and by
requiring the user to be successfully identified before allowing
the user to perform any other actions on the module.
User subject binding FIA_USB.1 5.2.3.4
User Identification and
Authentication
6.3.3
The security function satisfies the SFR by specifying that the
user identity be bound to the subject (session) acting on behalf
of the user by including the UAV data within the session state.
Management of security
functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1 5.2.4.1
Security Function
Management
6.3.15
The security function satisfies the SFR by restricting the ability
to perform the specified security management operations to
the SO role.
Management of security
attributes
FMT_MSA.1
5.1.5.1, 5.1.5.2,
5.2.4.2
Security Data
Management
6.3.16
The security function satisfies the SFR by enforcing the TAC
Policy to restrict the ability to manipulate user and object
security attributes as specified.
Secure security attributes FMT_MSA.2 5.1.5.3, 5.2.4.3
Security Data
Management
6.3.16
The security function satisfies the SFR by ensuring that only
secure values are accepted for security attributes.
Static attribute initialization FMT_MSA.3 5.1.5.4, 5.2.4.4
Security Data
Management
6.3.16
The security function satisfies the SFR by requiring restrictive
values for security attributes that cannot be changed based on
the capability and policy settings.
Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1
5.1.5.5, 5.1.5.6,
5.1.5.7, 5.1.5.8,
5.1.5.9, 5.2.4.5,
5.2.4.6, 5.2.4.7
Security Data
Management
6.3.16
The security function satisfies the SFR by enforcing the TAC
Policy to restrict the ability to manipulate the policy settings to
the SO.
Specification of
management functions
FMT_SMF.1 5.1.5.10, 5.2.4.8
Specification of Security
Management Functions
6.3.14
The security function satisfies the SFR by specifying the
security management functions that may be performed.
Security roles FMT_SMR.1 5.1.5.11 TOE Roles 6.1.3
The security function satisfies the SFR by specifying the
security roles that are implemented by the TOE – Security
Officer, Crypto Officer and Crypto User.
Abstract machine testing FPT_AMT.1 5.1.6.1
Memory and Firmware
Integrity Check
6.3.17.1
The security function satisfies the SFR by running a suite of
tests at startup and upon user request to verify the correct
operation of the security-relevant aspects of the underlying
module hardware.
Failure with preservation of
secure state
FPT_FLS.1 5.1.6.2
Preservation of Secure
State
6.3.17.4
The security function satisfies the SFR by preserving the
module in a secure state when the specified failure conditions
occur.
Inter-TSF confidentiality
during transmission
FPT_ITC.1 5.1.6.3 Backup and Recovery 6.3.21
The security function satisfies the SFR by encrypting the
transmitted data according to the cloning protocol.
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CC Requirement Title
CC Functional
Component
ST Reference IT Security Function TSS Reference Rationale
Inter-TSF detection of
modification
FPT_ITI.1 5.1.6.4 Backup and Recovery 6.3.21
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing the same
data authentication mechanism (FDP_DAU.1) at both the TOE
and backup token.
Notification of physical
attack
FPT_PHP.2 5.1.6.5 Physical Self-Protection 6.3.19
The security function satisfies the SFR by implementing
physical security mechanisms that provide unambiguous
evidence of physical tampering and the ability to determine
whether physical tampering with security-relevant devices has
occurred.
Resistance to physical
attack
FPT_PHP.3 5.1.6.6 Physical Self-Protection 6.3.19
The security function satisfies the SFR by implementing
physical security mechanisms that resist tampering such that
opening the module’s enclosure results in plaintext key
material and other sensitive data being erased from the
module.
Manual recovery FPT_RCV.1 5.1.6.7
Preservation of Secure
State
6.3.17.4
The security function satisfies the SFR by ensuring that the
module maintains its secure state in the event of failure or
service discontinuity and can be returned to operation in its
secure state once the failure has been resolved.
Non-bypassibility of the
TSP
FPT_RVM.1 5.2.5.1
Prevention of By-pass
and Separate Execution
Domain
6.3.17.3
The security function satisfies the SFR by ensuring that TSP
enforcement functions are invoked and succeed before each
function within the module firmware is allowed to proceed.
TSF domain separation FPT_SEP.1 5.2.5.2
Prevention of By-pass
and Separate Execution
Domain
6.3.17.3
The security function satisfies the SFR by maintaining a
separate domain for the execution of the TOE security
functions and by separating subject domains by maintaining
cryptographic separation of user data, by allowing only one
logged in user to be active on the module and by allowing a
single thread of execution on the module.
TSF testing FPT_TST.1 5.1.6.8 Self-Tests 6.3.17.2
The security function satisfies the SFR by providing a suite of
self-tests to verify the correct operation of the security
functions on start-up and at the request of an authorised user.
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CC Requirement Title
CC Functional
Component
ST Reference IT Security Function TSS Reference Rationale
Degraded fault tolerance FRU_FLT.1 5.2.6.1 Failure Handling 6.3.20
The security function satisfies the SFR by ensuring that the
user data protection capabilities are maintained when power
failures or data I/O failures occur. The module maintains all
Sensitive permanent objects in an encrypted state and,
therefore, such failures cannot affect the protection of
permanent objects. Volatile objects are wiped from memory
when power to the module is lost. Data I/O failures result in
suspension of user operations on the module, but data
protection capabilities are maintained and the module will
return to operation once data I/O is restored in the same state
it was prior to the failure.
Inter-TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC.1 5.2.7.1, 5.2.7.2
Firmware Loading and
Firmware Update,
Cloning
6.3.17.5, 6.3.18
The security functions satisfy the SFR by:
providing a logical trusted channel between a customer
module and a separate module containing a firmware
image to initially load the customer module or update
the firmware on the customer module,
providing a logical trusted channel between a customer
module and a remote trusted product (backup token)
for the purpose of protected key backup and
recovery.
Trusted path FTP_TRP.1 5.1.7.1
Trusted Path – Luna
PED
6.3.2
The security function satisfies the SFR by requiring the use of
a logically distinct trusted path via the PED and dedicated
serial port.
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Table 8-9 – Assurance Measures
Assurance Measures Document Title Document Description
Configuration Management
Manual for Luna Product
This document describes the CM procedure
for Luna product design, development,
testing, release and manufacture and
maintenance.
Configuration Management
Plan for Luna® SA 4.5.1 with
Firmware 4.8.7
This document defines CM procedures to be
used during development of the Luna® PCI.
SafeNet Engineering Change
Request Procedure
This procedure establishes the requirements
for requesting action that may initiate a
release or change to released hardware,
software, or controlled documentation during
the various product life cycles.
SafeNet Engineering Change
Procedure
This procedure establishes the requirements
for documenting and approving Engineering
Change Notices (ECNs) to release new items
as well as for released hardware, software, or
controlled documentation during the various
product life cycles.
Luna Product Identification
and Traceability
(Sections 2 to 4)
This document describes product
identification and marking on all Luna
products and specifies the process of
maintaining product information for traceability
purposes.
Luna Product Development
Access Controls
This document defines the high-level access
controls in place to develop Luna products.
Luna Critical Security Material
Handling for Contract
Manufacturers
This document describes the various
administrative procedures and security
policies for handling critical key material that
is used during the manufacture of Luna
devices.
Luna Product Process Flow for
Contract Manufacturers
The checklist is intended to show the process
flow of Luna finished goods through the
Contract Manufacturer’s facility.
Luna Board Level
Development Process
This document describes the design
procedure for board level development of
Luna products. This document does not
cover mechanical or system level design
procedures.
Luna Products Life Cycle –
Assuring Integrity
This document provides an overview of the
procedures and steps taken to assure the
integrity of Luna products from development
through to delivery.
Statement of Work (SOW) for
Luna SA Release 4.0.5
This document defines the statement of work
and product requirements for the release of
Luna® SA 4.0.5.
Configuration
Management
Statement of Work (SOW) for
Luna SA Release 4.5.1
This document defines the statement of work
and product requirements for the release of
Luna® SA 4.5.1.
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Assurance Measures Document Title Document Description
Luna SA Checkoff/Quick
Start Guide v4.5
Quick Start Guide applicable to Luna® SA
Release v4.5 and v4.5.1. Describes the
procedures for secure initialization of the
product. The Content Sheet identifies the
TOE components that the customer should
expect to find in the delivered product.
Luna Critical Security Material
Handling for Contract
Manufacturers
This document describes the various
administrative procedures and security
policies for handling critical key material that
is used during the manufacture of Luna
devices.
Delivery and
operation
documentation
Luna Product Process Flow for
Contract Manufacturers
The checklist is intended to show the process
flow of Luna finished goods through the
Contract Manufacturer’s facility.
Luna® Functional
Specification
Presents a high-level overview of the
architecture of the Luna® PCI, its
cryptographic capabilities and its security
features with a full definition of all relevant
external interfaces.
PKCS #11: Cryptographic
Token Interface Standard, V
2.20
This document is offered by RSA Laboratories
to developers of computer systems employing
public-key and related technology.
Functional
Specification – fully
defined external
interfaces
Extensions to PKCS#11,
Cryptographic Token Interface
Standard
Describes a set of extensions to the standard
application programming interface (API),
called Cryptoki. Specifies the data types and
functions available to an application requiring
cryptographic services using the ANSI C
programming language.
Luna® High-Level Design Provides an overview of the cryptographic
module’s firmware architecture and a
foundation for further design documents that
address each module in more detail.
Security enforcing
high-level design
Luna Interface Control
Document (ICD)
Defines the command set and associated
parameters that are used to communicate to
the Luna® cryptographic module.
Luna Memory Management
Subsystem Design
Identifies the set of requirements met by the
Luna Memory Management Subsystem
Design and provides detailed notes on its
implementation.
Luna Session Manager
Subsystem Design
Presents the Luna Session Manager
Subsystem capabilities and describes the
implementation, internal interface and external
command processing details.
Luna Object Management
Subsystem Design
Identifies the set of requirements to be met by
the Luna Object Management Subsystem
Design and provides detailed notes on its
design and implementation.
Descriptive low-level
design
Luna Interface Control
Document (ICD)
Defines the command set and associated
parameters that are used to communicate to
the Luna® module.
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Assurance Measures Document Title Document Description
Luna Boot Block Subsystem
Design
Identifies the set of requirements met by the
Luna® boot block and provides detailed notes
on its implementation.
Luna® Communication
Subsystem Design
Identifies the set of requirements to be met by
the Luna® Communication Subsystem design
and provides detailed notes on its
implementation.
Luna® Param Subsystem
Design
Describes the Luna® Param Subsystem
Design implementation and defines the
internal interface.
Luna Cryptographic Module
Self Tests
Identifies the set of requirements to be met by
the Luna® PCI self tests and provides
detailed notes on their implementation.
Luna® PCI User Subsystem
Design
Design and validation document for Luna®
firmware user subsystem design.
Luna Cryptographic Algorithms
Subsystem Design
Describes the generation, distribution,
loading, storing, use, updating and destruction
of the cryptographic material – keys and
vectors – necessary for all of the
cryptographic operations performed by the
cryptographic module.
Luna Key Cloning Protocol Describes the key cloning protocol.
Luna Key Management
Subsystem Design
Describes the generation, distribution,
loading, storing, use, updating and destruction
of the cryptographic material – keys and
vectors – necessary for all of the
cryptographic operations performed by the
cryptographic module.
Luna M of N Activation
Protocol
Describes the M of N activation capability
implemented on the Luna® cryptographic
modules.
Luna Main Subsystem
Design
This document presents the Luna Main
Subsystem low-level design in terms of
subordinate modules, their roles within the
subsystem and their interactions to provide
the Main Subsystem services.
Luna® Random Number
Generation (RNG) process
This document describes the Random
Number Generation (RNG) process used to
generate the random bits required by the
cryptographic functions running on the Luna®
family of cryptographic hardware modules
hereinafter referred to as Luna® modules.
Luna® Firmware (F/W) Update
High Level Design
Defines the process used to perform a secure
update to the firmware on cryptographic
modules in the field. The firmware update
process maintains all user information that
exists on the cryptographic module prior to the
update.
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Assurance Measures Document Title Document Description
Luna Serial Communication
Protocol for Luna® PCI
This document describes the Luna Serial
Communication Protocol (SCP) used to
transfer data over the serial communication
port interface defined for the Luna PCI
cryptographic module
Luna® PCI Key Card HW
Assembly Drawings
Top Assembly, Luna® SA Key
Card (Luna® PCI) Drawings
Implementation of
the TSF
Firmware code, hardware schematics, FPGA
code to be provided in accordance with
evaluator’s request.
Informal
correspondence
demonstration
Correspondence mappings for TSS to
Functional Specification, Functional
Specification to HLD and HLD to LLD are
provided as part of the appropriate
documents.
Informal TOE
security policy
model
Luna® PCI Informal Security
Policy Model
The Informal Security Policy Model describes
the security behaviour of the Luna® PCI.
Guidance documents provided with the TOE are primarily intended as
Administrator guidance. The administration functions are normally carried out
by the Security Officer, or possibly a designated User, using the CLI software as
the interface. In most cases, these functions will be performed very
infrequently.
User guidance documents are not provided because the normal user of the
TOE is an application program making function calls to the TOE via the
PKCS #11 Cryptographic API. Direct access to the TOE’s functions by a
human user only occurs in the course of performing administration functions.
Luna SA Checkoff/Quick
Start Guide v4.5
Quick Start Guide applicable to Luna® SA
Release v4.5 and v4.5.1.
Luna SA v4.5 Online Help The Online Help system provides the detailed
Administrator/User guidance for the operation
of the product (applicable to Luna® SA
Release v4.5 and v4.5.1).
Luna SA v4.5.1 Customer
Release Notes (CRN)
The Release Notes identify major issues from
previous releases that have been fixed in the
current release and any outstanding known
issues.
Guidance documents
Technical Support Service
Note for Luna SA 4.0.5
Luna Software Development
Process
This document defines the high-level software
development process used for Luna product.
Luna Product Identification
and Traceability
This document describes product
identification and marking on all Luna
products and specifies the process of
maintaining product information for traceability
purpose
Life cycle support
Corporate Encryption Policy Policies regarding protection of confidential
corporate data.
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Assurance Measures Document Title Document Description
Luna Board Level
Development Process
This document describes the design
procedure for board level development of
Luna product. This document does not cover
mechanical or system level design
procedures.
Return Material Authorization
Process
RMA Process for Sales, Service and Logistics
Luna Life Cycle – Assuring
Integrity
This document provides an overview of the
procedures and steps taken to assure the
integrity of Luna products from development
through to delivery.
Luna Development Tools This document identifies and explains the use
of the various tools used within Luna
development environment.
Luna Product Development
Access Controls
This document defines the high-level access
controls in place to develop Luna products.
Luna Critical Security Material
Handling for Contract
Manufacturers
This document describes the various
administrative procedures and security
policies for handling critical key material that
is used during the manufacture of Luna
devices.
Luna Product Process Flow for
Contract Manufacturers
The checklist is intended to show the process
flow of Luna finished goods through the
Contract Manufacturer’s facility.
SafeNet Canada Security
Policies
This document presents the security policies
to be followed by all SafeNet Canada full-time,
part-time and contract employees.
Luna Problem Reporting
Process
This document discusses the problem
reporting process employed for Software,
Firmware and Hardware related problems.
SafeNet PED Test Description This document presents the detailed
procedures to test SafeNet Canada’s PED.
The procedures verify that the product
features are ready for release to customers.
ScriptHelp.txt Help text describing the use of the Scripter
tool.
List of Scripts Used in
Engineering Testing and run
by Scripter
List of Scripts Used in PV Testing and run by
Scripter. Demonstrates tests coverage.
Cloning Scripts Script used by PV to test the cloning
functionality. Demonstrates tests coverage
Engineering Test Report for
Luna SA 4.5.1
This document provides a view of testing
performed on Luna SA 4.5.1 by the
Engineering Test team and its readiness to be
released to the Quality Assurance (QA) team.
Developer Tests
Engineering Test Report for
Luna SA 4.0.5
This document provides a view of testing
performed on Luna SA 4.0.5 by the
Engineering Test team and its readiness to be
released to the Quality Assurance (QA) team.
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Assurance Measures Document Title Document Description
SVT Test Report for Luna SA
4.5.1
This document provides the Release
Authorization and Test Cases executed for
the Luna SA 4.5,1 patch release.
SVT Test Report for Luna SA
4.0.5
This document provides the Release
Authorization and Test Cases executed for
the Luna SA 4.0.5 release.
Testing Coverage and Depth
Analysis
This document has been prepared for the
Common Criteria evaluation of the Luna® PCI
(K5) and describes the functional coverage of
the test plan and the depth of testing related
to the high-level design interfaces.
Independent testing - sample To be performed by evaluator.
Strength of Function Analysis This document presents the analysis of the
Strength of Function for the permutational and
probablisitic mechanisms employed within the
Luna PCI to implement several of its
security functions.
Covert channel Analysis This document presents the analysis of
potential cover channels.
Vulnerability
assessment
Misuse Analysis This document presents the misuse analysis
of the Luna® PCI Common Criteria
evaluation.
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APPENDIX A – REFERENCES
Reference
Number
Document
Number
Revision
Author Title
[1] ISO/IEC
15408-1
V2.3 Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1:
Introduction and General Model
[2] ISO/IEC
15408-2
V2.3 Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2:
Security Functional Requirements
[3] ISO/IEC
15408-3
V2.3 Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3:
Security Assurance Requirements
[4] FIPS 140-2 December 2002 National Institute of
Standards and
Technology
Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules
[5] Version 2.20,
June 2004
RSA Laboratories PKCS #11: Cryptographic Token
Interface Standard
[6] Version 2.1,
June 2002
RSA Laboratories PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard
[7] CR-2384 SafeNet Canada Overview of Documentation Required to
Support Luna® PCI Common Criteria
Evaluation
[8] CR-3127 SafeNet Canada Luna Interface Control Document (ICD)