TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-06
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Certification Report
MF2DL(H)x0, MF2ID(H)10, NT4H2x21Gf and NT4H2x21Tf,
Version 01.1
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Beiersdorfstraße 12
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: Riscure B.V.
Delftechpark 49
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300128-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300128-01
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 27 December 2023
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 2/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300128-01-CR, dated 27 December 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 6
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Evaluation Results 8
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
Page: 3/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300128-01-CR, dated 27 December 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 4/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300128-01-CR, dated 27 December 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
Page: 5/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300128-01-CR, dated 27 December 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
MF2DL(H)x0, MF2ID(H)10, NT4H2x21Gf and NT4H2x21Tf, Version 01.1. The developer of the
MF2DL(H)x0, MF2ID(H)10, NT4H2x21Gf and NT4H2x21Tf, Version 01.1 is NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and
certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the
suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a Security IC comprising a hardware platform, a fixed software package implemented in
ROM and a set of data files stored in EEPROM. The software is stored in ROM and provides an
operating system which implements a set of functions used to manage various kinds of data files
stored in the non-volatile EEPROM memory. The operating system provides access control if required
by the configuration. The operating system is designed as platform, which supports command sets for
four different applications forming four different product variants.
The TOE was previously evaluated by Riscure B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was certified
under the accreditation of TÜV Rheinland Nederland on 28 January 2019 (CC-19-175197). The
current evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by Riscure B.V. and was completed on 27
December 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security
[NSCIB].
There are no changes in the TOE compared from previous evaluations.
The certification took into account that the security evaluation reused the evaluation results of
previously performed evaluations. A full, up-to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as
renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the MF2DL(H)x0, MF2ID(H)10, NT4H2x21Gf and
NT4H2x21Tf, Version 01.1, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation
assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of
the MF2DL(H)x0, MF2ID(H)10, NT4H2x21Gf and NT4H2x21Tf, Version 01.1 are advised to verify that
their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 assurance requirements for the evaluated security
functionality.
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
Page: 6/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300128-01-CR, dated 27 December 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the MF2DL(H)x0, MF2ID(H)10, NT4H2x21Gf and
NT4H2x21Tf, Version 01.1 from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware Analog Version A1 dated 15.03.2018
Digital Version A1 dated 15.03.2018
Software
Firmware / OS Version A1 dated 15.03.2018
Application Data Version A1 dated 15.03.2018
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the MF2DL(H)x0,
MF2ID(H)10, NT4H2x21Gf and NT4H2x21Tf, Version 01.1. For details, see section 2.5
“Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.4.4.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a contactless Security IC provided as an IC hardware platform with an Operating System
(OS) and four applications, one per TOE variant.
The TOE is to be used with a Proximity Coupling Device (PCD, also known as terminal) according to
the standard ISO14443 Type A. The TOE is primarily designed for secure contactless transport
applications, loyalty programs, access management, closed loop payment, account based services
and secure NFC applications.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The system design decomposes the TOE into three subsystems: Operating System (OS), Firmware
and Hardware, as shown in the figure below.
Page: 7/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300128-01-CR, dated 27 December 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
The TIE has two types of TSFIs: physical and logical. There are two physical TSFIs, and 42 logical
TSFIs – 34 logical native commands and 8 logical ISO 14443A commands. Detailed information about
the logical TSFIs can be found in the TOE datasheets.
Physical TSFIs do not have public documentation as they require no interaction from the user; they
are actively monitoring the conductivity of the wires. The status of these monitoring activities is
observable via the logical TSFIs.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
MF2DL(H)x0 - MIFARE DESFire Light contactless application IC, Product
Data Sheet
430712
05.11.2018
MF2DL(H)x0 - Information on Guidance and Operation, Guidance and
Operation Manual
447910
23.10.2018
MF2ID(H)10 - MIFARE IDentity - Smart Credential for Account Based
Services, Product Data Sheet
465612
05.11.2018
MF2ID(H)10 - Information on Guidance and Operation, Guidance and
Operation Manual
448010
23.10.2018
NT4H2421Gx - NTAG 424 DNA - Secure NFC T4T compliant IC, Product
Data Sheet
465411
13.11.2018
NT4H2621Gx - NTAG 426 DNA - Secure NFC T4T compliant IC, Product
Data Sheet
510310
13.11.2018
NT4H2x21Gf - Information on Guidance and Operation, Guidance and
Operation Manual
448111
14.11.2018
NT4H2421Tx - NTAG 424 DNA TT - Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with
Tag Tamper feature, Product Data Sheet
465511
13.11.2018
NT4H2621Tx - NTAG 426 DNA TT - Secure NFC T4T compliant IC with
Tag Tamper feature, Product Data Sheet
510410
13.11.2018
NT4H2x21Tf - Information on Guidance and Operation, Guidance and
Operation Manual
448211
14.11.2018
Page: 8/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300128-01-CR, dated 27 December 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level
(beyond EAL4 requirements). The testing was largely automated using industry standard and
proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used extensively to verify that the functions return the
expected values.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The Vulnerability Analysis is performed based on the structure of the attack methods defined by
JHAS. For each attack method, the evaluator has analysed and described the objective of the attack
and how the attack method applies to the TOE.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators during this re-evaluation was 5 weeks. During that test
campaign, 40% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks and 60% on side-channel testing.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST]. The evaluator concluded that the tests results apply to all TOE
variants.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been reused, but vulnerability
analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of multiple site certificates and Site Technical Audit Reports.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number MF2DL(H)x0, MF2ID(H)10,
NT4H2x21Gf and NT4H2x21Tf, Version 01.1.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. The verdict of each claimed assurance
requirement is “Pass”.
Page: 9/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300128-01-CR, dated 27 December 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the MF2DL(H)x0, MF2ID(H)10,
NT4H2x21Gf and NT4H2x21Tf, Version 01.1, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and
to meet the requirements of EAL 4. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: AES based Leakage Resilient Primitive (LRP)
Page: 10/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300128-01-CR, dated 27 December 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
3 Security Target
The MF2DL(H)x0, MF2ID(H)10, NT4H2x21Gf and NT4H2x21Tf Security Target, Revision 1.9, 28
November 2018 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
LRP AES based Leakage Resilient Primitive
NFC Near Field Communication
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
OS Operating System
PCD Proximity Coupling Device
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
Page: 11/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300128-01-CR, dated 27 December 2023
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report for MF2DL(H)x0, MF2ID(H)10, NT4H2x21Gf and
NT4H2x21Tf 01.1, 20220597-D1, version 2.2, 5 December 2023.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[ST] MF2DL(H)x0, MF2ID(H)10, NT4H2x21Gf and NT4H2x21Tf Security Target,
Revision 1.9, 28 November 2018
[ST-lite] MF2DL(H)x0, MF2ID(H)10, NT4H2x21Gf and NT4H2x21Tf Security Target
Lite, Revision 1.0, 31 December 2018
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)