National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Check Point Software Blades R7x
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10387-2012
Dated: November 26, 2012
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary................................................................1
1.1 Evaluation Details.............................................................2
2 Identification.........................Error! Bookmark not defined.
3 Security Policy........................................................................6
3.1 Summary...........................................................................6
3.2 TOE Threats......................................................................7
4 Assumptions and Organizational Security Policies ..............11
4.1 Physical Assumptions.....Error! Bookmark not defined.
4.2 Virtualization OSPs ........Error! Bookmark not defined.
4.3 IDS System PP OSPs......Error! Bookmark not defined.
5 Architectural Information .....................................................12
5.1 Physical Boundaries........................................................14
6 Documentation......................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing ................................................................16
7.1 Developer Testing...........................................................16
7.2 Independent Testing........................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration .......................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation ......................................................17
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations ..............................18
11 Annexes.................................................................................18
12 Security Target......................................................................18
13 Acronym List ........................................................................19
14 Bibliography .........................................................................20
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List of Tables
Table 1 ST and TOE identification....................................................................................... 4
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1 Executive Summary
The evaluation of Check Point Software Blades R7x was performed by SAIC, in the United
States and was completed in November 2012. The evaluation and validation were consistent with
National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme (CCEVS) policies and practices as described on their web site www.niap-ccevs.org. The
criteria against which the Check Point Software Blades R7x TOE was judged are described in the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, revision 3. The
evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation was available in the
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation versions 3.1, revision 3.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) claims demonstrable compliance to U.S. Government Protection
Profile for Traffic Filter Firewall in Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.1, July 25, 2007
(TFF PP), U.S. Government Protection Profile for Application Level Firewall in Basic Robustness
Environments, Version 1.1, July 25, 2007 (APP PP), and the U.S. Government Protection Profile
Intrusion Detection System System For Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.7, July 25, 2007
(IDS System PP).
The TOE is a network perimeter security gateway that provides controlled connectivity between
two or more network environments. The TOE implements a broad set of information flow controls
including traffic filtering, application-level proxies, network address translation (NAT), and
intrusion detection and prevention. IKE/IPSEC and SSL virtual private networking (VPN)
functionality encrypts and authenticates network traffic.
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) determined that the product satisfies
evaluation assurance level (EAL) 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.3 as defined within the Common
Criteria (CC). The product, when configured as specified in the installation guides and user guides,
satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Check Point Software Blades R7x
Security Target, version 1.2, November 8, 2012. This Validation Report applies only to the
specific version of the TOE as evaluated. In this case the TOE is Check Point Software Blades R7x
running on Check Point specific appliances and Open Server hardware platforms running the Check
Point SecurePlatform operating system. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of Check
Point Software Blades R7x by any agency of the US Government and no warranty of the product is
either expressed or implied.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Final Evaluation Technical
Report for Check Point Software Blades R7x ETR parts 1 and 2 and the associated test report
produced by SAIC.
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2 Identification
Evaluated Product: Check Point Software Blades R7x
Sponsor & Developer:
Check Point Software Technologies LTD.
5 Ha’Solelim St
Tel Aviv, Israel 67897
CCTL:
Science Applications International Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive
Columbia, MD 21046
Completion Date: November 2012
CC: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 3, September 2009
Interpretations: There were no applicable interpretations used for this evaluation.
CEM: Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation: Version 3.1, Revision 3, September 2009
PP: U.S. Government Protection Profile for Traffic Filter Firewall in
Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.1, July 25, 2007
U.S. Government Protection Profile for Application-level Firewall
in Basic Robustness Environments, Version 1.1, July 25, 2007
U.S. Government Protection Profile Intrusion Detection System
System for Basic Robustness Environment, Version 1.7, July 25,
2007
Evaluation Class: Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4 Augmented with
ALC_FLR.3
Description The TOE is the Check Point Software Blades R7x, comprised of
Security Gateway Version R70.1 with R7x hotfix: Firewall,
IPSEC VPN, IPS Acceleration and Cluster; and Security
Management Version R71.10 with R7x hotfix: Network Policy
Management, Logging & Status Monitoring. The TOE is a
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network perimeter security gateway that provides controlled
connectivity between two or more network environments.
Disclaimer The information contained in this Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the Check Point Software Blades R7x by any
agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of Check Point
Software Blades R7x is either expressed or implied.
Evaluation Personnel: M. Evencie Pierre
Gary Grainger
Tammy Compton
Validation Scheme: NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
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2.1 Evaluation Details
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology
(CEM) for Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 1 through EAL 4 in accordance with National
Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation. Note that assurance
requirements outside the scope of EAL 1 through EAL 4 are addressed at the discretion of the
CCEVS.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful
completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
The following table serves to identify the evaluated Security Target and TOE.
Table 1 ST and TOE identification
ST Title: Check Point Software Blades R7x Security Target, Version 1.2,
November 8, 2012
TOE Identification: TOE Software Identification:
Check Point Software Blades R7x, comprised of the following
Check Point software blades1
:
 Security Gateway Version R70.1 with
R7x hotfix: Firewall, IPSEC VPN, IPS, Acceleration
and Clustering
 Security Management Version R71.10
with R7x hotfix: Network Policy Management,
Logging & Status, Monitoring
Operating Platform: The TOE includes the following hardware platforms for the
R7x Gateway Software
 Supported Check Point Security Appliances
o Power-1 507*
o Power-1 907*
o Power-1 1106*, 1107*, 1108*
o UTM-1 27*, 57*
o UTM-1 107*, 207*, 307*
o Check Point 22** Appliances
1
Software Blades are security modules purchased by customers independently or in pre-defined bundles, for
installation on a Check Point Security Gateway or Security Management server.
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o Check Point 42**, 46**, 48** Appliances
o Check Point 122**, 124**, 126** Appliances
o Check Point 214**, 216** Appliances
 Supported Hardware running the SecurePlatform R7x
operating System
o Check
Point
IAS Server L2, L6, L8, M2, M6, M8, D1, D2, D6, D8, R1,
R2, R6, R8, U1
o Dell PowerEdge 620, 720
o Fujitsu Primergy RX100 S6, S7
Primergy RX200 S6, S7
Primergy RX300 S6, S7
o HP ProLiant DL120 G7
ProLiant DL320e G8
ProLiant DL360 G7, G8
ProLiant DL380 G7, G8
o IBM System X x3550 M3, M4
System X x3650 M3, M4
 Supported Check Point Security Management
Appliances
o Smart-1 5
o Smart-1 25
o Smart-1 50
o Smart-1 150
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3 Security Policy
3.1 Summary
Check Point Software Blades R7x mediates information flows between clients and servers
located on internal and external networks governed by the firewall. Proxy servers on the
firewall, for the services FTP and Telnet, require authentication by client users before
requests for such services can be authorized.
User authentication may be achieved by a remote access client authenticating using IKE or
TLS, against authentication credentials held by the user. Administrators also need to
authenticate to the TOE before they can use the Management GUIs to access Security
Management. The TOE can be optionally configured to perform user authentication with
the support of external authentication servers in the IT environment.
Proxies are also provided for the services SMTP and HTTP that can optionally, as
determined by the authorized administrator, require the client user to authenticate.
The product additionally imposes traffic-filtering controls on mediated information flows
between clients and servers according to the site’s security policy rules. By default, these
security policy rules deny all inbound and outbound information flows through the TOE.
Only an authorized administrator has the authority to change the security policy rules.
Once an authorized administrator describes the network topology in terms of networks and
IP addresses, anti-spoofing controls prevent information flows that contain invalid source
addresses, i.e. source addresses that should not be received by the TOE interface on which
the information flow has arrived.
An IDS/IPS capability is integrated with the product’s traffic-filtering functionality,
matching traffic with predefined attack signatures, and providing recording, analysis, and
reaction capabilities.
IPSec VPN and SSL VPN capabilities are provided to encrypt network traffic to and from
selected peers, in order to protect traffic from disclosure or modification over untrusted
networks. External IT entities establishing VPN tunnels with the TOE can be VPN
gateways such as the TOE (site to site VPN), or may be single-user client workstations
(remote access VPN). The VPN identifies and authenticates the peer entity as part of the
process of establishing the VPN tunnel, via the IKE or TLS protocols, respectively.
Administrators can perform both local and remote management of the TOE. Administrator
sessions are protected via a trusted path between the Management GUI and the Security
Management server. Internal TOE communications between the Security Management
server and Security Gateway appliances is also protected from disclosure and undetected
modification.
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Audit trail and IDS System data is stored in log databases, stamped with a dependable date
and time when recorded. Auditable events include modifications to the group of users
associated with the authorized administrator role, all use of the identification and
authentication mechanisms (including any attempted reuse of authentication data), all
information flow control decisions made by the TOE according to the security policy rules,
and the use of all security functions. If log storage is exhausted, then the only recordable
events that may be performed are those performed by the authorized administrator. The
TOE includes tools to perform searching and sorting on the collected audit trail and IDS
System data according to attributes of the data recorded and ranges of some of those
attributes.
The Check Point Software Blades R7x Security Gateway appliance protects itself and the
Security Management server and Management GUIs against network-level attacks by
unauthorized users. Domain separation is provided between TOE interfaces. Self tests are
run during initial start-up and periodically during normal operation to ensure correct
operation. A hardware clock provides reliable timestamps.
Fault-tolerance is ensured by supporting multiple Security Gateway appliances and
Security Management hosts that synchronize databases and state tables among redundant
instances. Critical hardware, software, and networking components are constantly
monitored, allowing the TOE to reconfigure itself to bypass faulty components.
3.2 TOE Threats
3.2.1. Firewall-related Threats
The following threats are identified in [TFF-PP]
T.NOAUTH An unauthorized person may attempt to bypass the security of the
TOE so as to access and use security functions and/or non-security
functions provided by the TOE.
T.REPEAT An unauthorized person may repeatedly try to guess authentication
data in order to use this information to launch attacks on the TOE.
T.REPLAY An unauthorized person may use valid identification and
authentication data obtained to access functions provided by the
TOE.
T.ASPOOF An unauthorized person on an external network may attempt to
bypass the information flow control policy by disguising
authentication data (e.g., spoofing the source address) and
masquerading as a legitimate user or entity on an internal network.
T.MEDIAT An unauthorized person may send impermissible information
through the TOE which results in the exploitation of resources on
the internal network.
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T.OLDINF Because of a flaw in the TOE functioning, an unauthorized person
may gather residual information from a previous information flow
or internal TOE data by monitoring the padding of the information
flows from the TOE.
T.PROCOM An unauthorized person or unauthorized external IT entity may be
able to view, modify, and/or delete security related information that
is sent between a remotely located authorized administrator and the
TOE.
T.AUMACC Persons may not be accountable for the actions that they conduct
because the audit records are not reviewed, thus allowing an
attacker to escape detection.
T.SELPRO An unauthorized person may read, modify, or destroy security
critical TOE configuration data.
T.AUDFUL An unauthorized person may cause audit records to be lost or
prevent future records from being recorded by taking actions to
exhaust audit storage capacity, thus masking an attackers actions.
T.TUSAGE The TOE may be inadvertently configured, used, and administered
in an insecure manner by either authorized or unauthorized persons.
3.2.2. IDS-related Threats
The following threats are identified in [IDSSPP]
T.COMINT An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the integrity of
the data collected and produced by the TOE by bypassing a
security mechanism.
T.COMDIS An unauthorized user may attempt to disclose the data collected
and produced by the TOE by bypassing a security mechanism.
T.LOSSOF An unauthorized user may attempt to remove or destroy data
collected and produced by the TOE.
T.NOHALT An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the continuity of
the System’s collection and analysis functions by halting execution
of the TOE.
T.PRIVIL An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and exploit
system privileges to gain access to TOE security functions and
data
T.IMPCON An unauthorized user may inappropriately change the
configuration of the TOE causing potential intrusions to go
undetected.
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T.INFLUX An unauthorized user may cause malfunction of the TOE by
creating an influx of data that the TOE cannot handle.
T.FACCNT Unauthorized attempts to access TOE data or security functions
may go undetected.
T.FALACT The TOE may fail to react to identified or suspected vulnerabilities
or inappropriate activity.
T.FALREC The TOE may fail to recognize vulnerabilities or inappropriate
activity based on IDS data received from each data source.
T.FALASC The TOE may fail to identify vulnerabilities or inappropriate
activity based on association of IDS data received from all data
sources.
T.MISUSE Unauthorized accesses and activity indicative of misuse may occur
on an IT System the TOE monitors.
T.INADVE Inadvertent activity and access may occur on an IT System the
TOE monitors.
T.MISACT Malicious activity, such as introductions of Trojan horses and
viruses, may occur on an IT System the TOE monitors.
3.2.3. VPN-related Threats
The following threats are countered by the TOE's VPN functionality.
T.NACCESS An unauthorized person or external IT entity may be able to view
data that is transmitted between the TOE and a remote authorized
external IT entity.
T.NMODIFY An unauthorized person or external IT entity may modify data that
is transmitted between the TOE and a remote authorized external
IT entity.
3.2.4. Fault-related Threats
The following threat is countered by the TOE’s fault tolerance functionality.
T.FAULT A failure in a critical hardware or software entity may disrupt
TOE security functions.
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3.3 Assumptions and Organizational Security Policies
The following assumptions and Organizational Security Policies (OSP) are identified in the
Security Target:
3.3.1. Physical Assumptions
The following conditions are assumed to exist in the operational environment. Each of
these assumptions is consistent with the explicit or implicit assumptions made in each of
the PPs for which conformance is claimed: [TFF-PP] and[IDSSPP].
A.LOCATE The processing resources of the TOE will be located within
controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized
physical access.
A.NOEVIL Administrators are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and
will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE
documentation.
However, they are capable of error.
A.SINGEN Information can not flow among the internal and external networks
unless it passes through the TOE.
3.3.2. Firewall PP OSPs
The [APP-PP] defines the following OSP:
Federal agencies are required to protect sensitive but unclassified information with
cryptography. Products and systems compliant with this Protection Profile are expected to
utilize cryptographic modules for remote administration compliant with FIPS PUB
140-1 (level 1).
P.CRYPTO AES (Advanced Encryption Standard as specified in FIPS 197)
encryption must be used to protect remote administration
functions, and the associated cryptographic module must comply,
at a minimum, with FIPS 140-2 (level 1).
3.3.3. IDS System PP OSPs
The following OSPs are defined in [IDSSPP]. [IDSSPP] does not identify which
organization and which organizational security policy any of these OSPs are drawn from.
P.DETECT Static configuration information that might be indicative of the
potential for a future intrusion or the occurrence of a past intrusion
of an IT System or events that are indicative of inappropriate
activity that may have resulted from misuse, access, or malicious
activity of IT System assets must be collected.
P.ANALYZ Analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about
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intrusions (past, present, or future) must be applied to IDS data and
appropriate response actions taken.
P.MANAGE The TOE shall only be managed by authorized users.
P.ACCESS All data collected and produced by the TOE shall only be used for
authorized purposes.
P.ACCACT Users of the TOE shall be accountable for their actions within the
IDS.
P.INTGTY Data collected and produced by the TOE shall be protected from
modification.
P.PROTCT The TOE shall be protected from unauthorized accesses and
disruptions of TOE data and functions.
4 Architectural Information
Check Point Software Blades R7x is a network perimeter security gateway that provides
controlled connectivity between two or more network environments.
Check Point Software Blades R7x is a TOE in parts composed of three types of machines:
SmartConsole hosts, Management Server hosts, and Gateways. Each physically
independent machine is defined as a separate subsystem. Inter-subsystem interfaces are
manifested as network connections, which are protected by the SIC SF.
Subsystem Decomposition
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Smart Console Subsystem
The SmartConsole Subsystem is the Administrator’s point of access for performing
administration of the TOE, monitoring and viewing audit data of the TOE. It includes three
applications: SmartDashboard, which is the primary management GUI and provides all
configuration capabilities (i.e. user management, policy management, etc.); SmartView
Tracker, provides the ability to view the different audit logs; and SmartView Monitor
provides the means for monitoring the TOE status in real-time and receiving alerts.
Management Server Subsystem
The Management Server subsystem is responsible for:
 Administrator authentication and authorization
 Providing remote administrators with an encrypted trusted path
 Audit/log collection and log database management
 Management of security policy, functions and configuration settings
 Distribution of SIC and VPN public key credentials to TOE entities
 Management high-availability
 TOE component status collection
The Management Server subsystem is responsible for managing the TOE databases,
objects, users, and policies. It communicates with the SmartConsole subsystem for audit
management, audit review, and monitoring of TOE status and alerts. It provides the
interfaces for managing the gateways, transfers security policy configuration information to
the gateways, collect information managed by the gateways and exports audit and IDS
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information to the OPSEC clients. It provides a cryptographically protected trusted for all
security management server interfaces with other TOE subsystems and with OPSEC
clients.
A Management Server host runs Management Server software on the underlying platform,
which is comprised of a standard hardware platform and the SecurePlatform operating
system.
Gateway Subsystem
The Gateway subsystem is the policy enforcement point for traffic flowing through the
TOE. Traffic filtering is performed by kernel-level code to ensure maximum performance.
The Gateway subsystem is responsible for:
 Traffic filtering
 NAT
 Site-to-Site and remote access VPN
 IDS/IPS
 Non-administrative I&A
 Fault Tolerance (ClusterXL)
The Gateway subsystem receives security policy and other configuration information from
the security management subsystem. It applies the security policy to information sent by
users through the gateway subsystem, and sends log records and status information to the
security management subsystem. All external information flows into and through the
gateway subsystem are mediated by its stateful inspection capabilities. Security policy
rules protect the gateway and the other TOE subsystems from external unauthorized access.
The Gateway platform operating system is Check Point SecurePlatform R70.1 with R7x
hotfix.
4.1 Physical Boundaries
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) includes the following components:
 Check Point Software Blades R7x Security Gateway software;
 Check Point Software Blades R7x Security Management software;
 Hardware Platforms and operating systems on which TOE Security Gateway and Security
Management software is installed;
 Smart Console R7x Management GUI software;
 SSL Network Extender and SecureClient Mobile (SSL VPN) client software; and
 TOE Guidance
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5 Documentation
Check Point offers a number of guidance documents along with a CC-specific supplemental
document describing the installation process for the TOE as well as guidance for subsequent use
and administration of the applicable security features.
The documentation for the TOE is:
• Check Point Software Blades R7x CC Evaluated Configuration Installation Guide, March
2012
• Check Point Software Blades R7x CC Evaluated Configuration Administration Guide,
August 2012
The following documents are available for additional guidance, but it is the CC Specific document
above that serves to guide the user to operate the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
• SecurePlatform R71 Administration Guide, April 13, 2010
• Security Management Server R71 Administration Guide, April 22, 2010
• SmartView Monitor R71 Administration Guide, April 6, 2010
• Check Point IPS R71 Administration Guide, April 6, 2010
• Firewall Administration Guide Version R70, March 5, 2009
• Virtual Private Networks Administration Guide Version R70, April 23, 2009
• ClusterXL R70.1 Administration Guide, June 23, 2009
• VPN-1 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.9, October 2009
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6 IT Product Testing
The purpose of this activity was to determine whether the TOE behaves as specified in the design
documentation and in accordance with the TOE security functional requirements specified in the ST
for an EAL4 evaluation.
6.1 Developer Testing
The developer created test procedures specifically to fulfill the test requirements for an EAL4
evaluation. The tests were developed to provide good coverage of the security functions related to
each of the security requirements in the Security Target. The developer has documented their tests
in a test plan where the results of the tests are presented as prose conclusions, notes, screen shots,
and summaries for each of the applicable test platforms.
6.2 Independent Testing
Independent testing took place at the developer’s location in Rockville, Maryland from July 9
through July 19, 2012.
The evaluators received the TOE in the form that normal customers would receive it, installed and
configured the TOE (in three distinct but representative configurations) in accordance with the
provided guidance, and exercised a representative subset of the developers test plan on equipment
configured in the testing laboratory.
This effort involved installing and configuring the Check Point Software Blades R7x components in
their respective tiers on a representative subset of the supported operating systems. Subsequently,
the evaluators exercised a subset of the available developer’s test procedures for the Check Point
Software Blades R7x TOE. The subset of tests was selected in order to ensure that each of the
claimed security functions was meaningfully sampled.
Also, the evaluators devised independent tests to ensure that start-up and shutdown operations were
audited, to verify the claimed methods of audit storage, to verify use of management of audit and
audit of use of the TSF data consistency, to verify audit of cryptographic activity, to verify claimed
client-visible error codes, to verify correct cipher suite and key sizes, to verify filtering based on
connection-oriented protocols, to verify that users cannot re-use single-use authenticator for user
authentication, to verify management restrictions at the SmartConsole interfaces, and to verify
management of default security attributes.
In addition to the use of developer provided and independently devised security functional tests, the
evaluators also explored the possibility to penetrate or bypass the security mechanisms. Much of
this work was based on analysis of the design, source code, and actual configuration information
derived from the installed and configured products. However, the evaluators also devised some tests
including scans of the installed products (for open ports) attempts at account harvesting, and also
examination of actual network traffic between the client and server products
Given the complete set of test results from test procedures exercised by the developer and the
sample of tests directly exercised by the evaluators, the testing requirements for EAL4 are fulfilled.
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7 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is Check Point Software Blades R7x installed according to the Check Point Software
Blades R7x CC Evaluated Configuration Installation Guide.
8 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Team conducted the evaluation in accordance with the CC, the CEM, and the
CCEVS. The Evaluation Team assigned a Pass, Fail, or Inconclusive verdict to each work unit of
each EAL4 assurance component. For Fail or Inconclusive work unit verdicts, the Evaluation
Team advised the developer of the issue that needed to be resolved or the clarification that needed
to be made to the particular evaluation evidence.
The Evaluation Team accomplished this by providing notes, comments, or vendor actions in the
draft ETR sections for an evaluation activity (e.g., ASE, ADV) that recorded the Evaluation Team’s
evaluation results and that the Evaluation Team provided to the developer. The Evaluation Team
also communicated with the developer by telephone and electronic mail. If applicable, the
Evaluation Team re-performed the work unit or units affected. In this way, the Evaluation Team
assigned an overall Pass verdict to the assurance component only when all of the work units for that
component had been assigned a Pass verdict. Verdicts were not assigned to assurance classes. The
details of the evaluation are recorded in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), which is controlled
by SAIC.
Below lists the assurance requirements the TOE was required meet to be evaluated and
pass at Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.3. The following
components are taken from CC part 3:
 ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
 ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
 ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
 ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
 AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
 AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
 ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
 ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
 ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
 ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
 ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
 ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
 ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
 ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
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 ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
 ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
 ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
 ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
 ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
 ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
 ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
 ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
 ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
 ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
 AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
The evaluators concluded that the overall evaluation result for the target of evaluation is
Pass. The evaluation team reached Pass verdicts for all applicable evaluator action elements
and consequently all applicable assurance components.
 The TOE is CC Part 2 Extended
 The TOE is CC Part 3 Conformant.
The validators reviewed the findings of the evaluation team, and have concurred that the
evidence and documentation of the work performed support the assigned rating.
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validators have no comments or specific recommendations.
10 Annexes
Not applicable.
11 Security Target
Check Point Software Blades R7x Security Target, Version 1.2, November 8, 2012
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12 Acronym List
CC Common Criteria
CCTL CC Testing Laboratory
CI Configuration Item
CM Configuration Management
CMP Configuration Management Plan
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
CVS Concurrent Versioning System
DoD Department of Defense
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
FSP Functional Specification
GUI Graphical User Interface
HLD High-level Design
ID Identity/Identification
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
SAIC Science Applications International Corporation
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSS TOE Summary Specification
VALIDATION REPORT
Check Point Software Blades R7x
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction,
Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009.
[5] Check Point Software Blades R7x Security Target, Version 1.2, November 8, 2012.
[6] Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme - Guidance to CCEVS Approved
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 2.0, 8 Sep 2008.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report For Check Point Software Blades R7x, parts 1 and 2 (and
associated test report), version 1.0, October 15, 2012.