BSI-DSZ-CC-0535-2009
for
IBM Tivoli Directory Server
Version 6.2
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0535-2009
IBM Tivoli Directory Server
Version 6.2
from IBM Corporation
Functionality: Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of
the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 16 March 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0535-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0535-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0535-2009
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
7.1 Report on the Developer Testing Effort.................................................................17
7.2 Report on the Evaluator Testing Effort..................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................19
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................19
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................19
11 Security Target...........................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................20
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24
13.1 Guidance documentation.....................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0535-2009 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0535-2009
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006.
The evaluation of the product IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2 was conducted by
atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 24 February 2009.
The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: IBM Corporation
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0535-2009 Certification Report
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance
of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if
required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to
perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://www.bsi.bund.de)
and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
IBM Corporation
11501 Burnet Road
Internal mail drop 9015F000
Austin TX 78758
USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0535-2009 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0535-2009
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2.
IBM Tivoli Directory Server version 6.2 (TDS) is an implementation of the Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), which is compliant with the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) LDAP Version 2 specifications (i.e. RFC 1777) and LDAP Version 3
specifications (i.e. RFC 2251-2256). The server is a software only product and can be
installed and operated on a variety of hardware/software platforms.
LDAP is essentially a specialized database where the update operation is less frequent
and dedicated to the common goal within the enterprise of consolidating and unifying the
management of identities. TDS is built for identity management with role support, fine-
grained access control, and entry ownership.
It provides the foundation for improved security, rapid development and deployment of
Web applications. Using the power of the IBM DB2 Universal Database as a backend data
store, TDS provides high performance, reliability and stability in an enterprise or e-
business. As the central repository for data within an enterprise, it is a powerful, secure
and standards-compliant enterprise directory for corporate intranets and the Internet.
The IBM Tivoli Directory Server (TDS) is a software product only, delivered over the
Internet as a package including the TOE, user and administrative tools, a WebSphere
HTTP server, and a DB2 database. The user and administrator tools, the HTTP server and
the DB2 database are all excluded from the TOE and are considered part of the
environment.
The TOE environment must also include applications that are not delivered with the TDS
product, but are used as unprivileged tools, for example the Internet Explorer or Firefox
browser needed to administrate the TOE via the web GUI, and the Adobe Acrobat Reader
to access the supplied online documentation.
Directory clients and servers
Directories are usually accessed using the client-server model of communication. The
client and server processes might or might not be on the same machine. A server is
capable of serving many clients. An application that wants to read or write information in a
directory does not access the directory directly. Instead, it calls a function or application
programming interface (API) that causes a message to be sent to another process. This
second process accesses the information in the directory on behalf of the requesting
application. The results of the read or write are then returned to the requesting application.
An API defines the programming interface a particular programming language uses to
access a service. The format and contents of the messages exchanged between client
and server must adhere to an agreed-upon protocol. LDAP defines a message protocol
used by directory clients and directory servers. There is also an associated LDAP API for
the C language and ways to access the directory from a Java application using the Java
Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI).
In order to improve performance and availability, directories may be replicated. This
means that one master directory may be replicated to a number of copies, allowing
improved availability to read accesses. Any changes made to the master affecting the
replicas will be transmitted to them. A user accessing a server may then either go to the
master or to any of the replicas.
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Replication is enabled as replication agreements between a server and a client. A
replication agreement is part of the directory tree of the master. Definition of replication
agreements is controlled by access control mechanisms in the TOE and is restricted in the
evaluated configuration to the security roles of Primary Directory Administrator, Local
Administrative Group Members (with an administrative role of Directory Data Administrator
or Replication Administrator or Server Configuration Group Member), and Master Server
DN. Only these security roles are able to set up and change replication agreements.
In the evaluated configuration, there must not be more than one master for a given entry at
any particular point in time. Since gateway servers only serve a purpose in a configuration
including more than one master server that can be concurrently updated, they are not
meaningful in the evaluated configuration.
Conflict resolution is not included in the TOE. Since an entry can only be updated on one
server at any point in time, there should never be any replication conflicts.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus
the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security
Function
Addressed issue
Identification
and
authentication
Identification and authentication are used to determine the identity of the LDAP clients;
that is, verifying that users are who they say they are. A user name and password is a
basic authentication scheme. This user identity is used for determining access rights
and for user accountability. The administrator can manage users, set passwords for
users, and place restrictions on user-selected passwords by specifying rules in the
password policy managed by the administrator. Both end users and administrators are
subject to the password policy.
Access control After users are authenticated, it must be determined whether they have authorization or
permission to perform the requested operation on the specific object. Authorization is
often based on access control lists (ACLs). An ACL is a list of authorizations that can
be attached to objects and attributes in the directory. An ACL lists what type of access
each user or group of users is allowed or denied. To make ACLs shorter and more
manageable, users with the same access rights are often put into groups. The directory
administrator can manage access control by specifying the access rights to objects for
individual users or groups.
Auditing The IBM Tivoli Directory Server can perform auditing of security-relevant events, such
as user authentication and modification of the directory tree. The audit function
provides a means for accountability by generating audit records containing the time,
user identity, and additional information about the operation. The behaviour of the audit
function, such as selection of auditable events, as well as audit review and clearing of
audit files, is managed by the directory administrator.
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TOE Security
Function
Addressed issue
Management The IBM Tivoli Directory Server supports the roles of Primary Directory Administrator,
Local Administrative Group Members, Global Administrative Group Members, Master
DN and LDAP User, allowing the Primary Directory Administrator to manage the
functions for identification and authentication, authorization and audit. The Local
Administrative Group Members and the Global Administrative Group Members have a
well-defined subset of the rights of the Primary Directory Administrator. The Primary
Directory Administrator, the Local Administrative Group Members, and the Global
Administrative Group Members all can manage users and user attributes. The master
server DN is a role used for replication between LDAP servers. Finally, LDAP Users do
not have any administrative rights.
Reference
mediation
The IBM Tivoli Directory Server is designed so that all security policy enforcement
functions are invoked and must succeed before any function is allowed to proceed. This
means that any request for access to a directory entry is checked for access according
to the rules defined before access is granted.
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'moderate' (SOF-moderate) for specific functions
as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 1.5 is confirmed.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
The Security Target defines six different platforms for running the TOE:
● Microsoft Windows Server 2003 R2 Enterprise Edition
● IBM AIX 6.1
● Sun Solaris 10 (SPARC)
● HP-UX 11i v3 (Itanium)
● Red Hat Advanced Server 5.1
● SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 10 SP1
No explicit restrictions on the usable hardware were made in the Security Target [6]. For
details refer to chapter 8.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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No Type Identifier Form of
Delivery
TOE/ Not TOE
1 SW IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2
• LDAP server
• administration daemon executable
Download TOE
2 SW IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2
• Installation and configuration tools version 6.2
• GSKit version 7.0.4.14 (SSL packages only)
Download Not TOE
3 Doc Common Criteria Guide, document ID: SC23-9949-00 [9] Download TOE
4 SW IBM Tivoli Directory Server Client SDK version 6.2
Web Administration Tool version 6.1
IBM DB2 database version 9
IBM Tivoli Directory Integrator version 6.1.1
Download Not TOE
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
No hardware is delivered with the product. For further evaluated guidance see section
13.1.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE is an implementation of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). The
main purpose of the TOE is to provide identification and authentication, access control and
audit functionality. This is supplemented by management and reference mediation.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance: OE.MANAGE, OE.ENVMANAGE, OE.PHYSICAL, OE.DATABASE,
OE.SOPHISTICATED, OE.BACKUP,OE.COMMUNICATION, OE.ROUTE, OE.TIME and
OE.ENCRYPT. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of two components: the directory server component and the
administration daemon. User clients connect to both the LDAP server and to the
administration daemon using the LDAP protocol, but using different port numbers. The
directory server provides the LDAP functionality to users and administrators, while the
administration daemon is only used by the administrator for starting, stopping and querying
the status of the IBM Tivoli Directory Server. Figure 1 below provides a more detailed
overview of the TOE:
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Figure 1: IBM Tivoli Directory Architecture and TOE Boundary
The IBM Tivoli Directory Server provides a rich set of security features. The security
functions that were evaluated are summarized in the following list:
● Identification and authentication
● Access control
● Auditing
● Management
● Reference mediation
For further details refer to table 1 in this report or the ST [6], chapter 6.1.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 and
guidance documents as listed in section 13.1 of this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The Security Target defines six different platforms for running the TOE:
● Microsoft Windows Server 2003 R2 Enterprise Edition
● IBM AIX 6.1
● Sun Solaris 10 (SPARC)
● HP-UX 11i v3 (Itanium)
● Red Hat Advanced Server 5.1
● SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 10 SP1
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Developer tests have been performed on all platforms, whereas evaluator tests were
executed on a sampled subset of those platforms.
7.1 Report on the Developer Testing Effort
Test Configuration
All developer tests were performed on all the platforms listed above. Due to the identical
code base for the two Linux versions, only one Linux platform was tested. Each platform
was set up in accordance with the Security Target and all the relevant guidance.
Testing Approach
The developer provided evidence that the security functionality of the TOE was tested. All
security-relevant functionality of the TOE was covered by those tests.
Testing Results
The developer testing was performed successfully on all platforms comprising the
evaluated configuration of the TOE as listed above. The evaluator was able to verify this
for a sample of test cases chosen by the evaluator when inspecting the actual test results.
All actual test results did match the expected results for the corresponding test case as
documented in the developer test documentation.
Test Coverage/ Test Depth
The evaluator determined that the security functionality of the TOE as well as all except
one TSFI as detailed in the Functional Specification were completely covered by those
tests. The evaluator created an own test to verify that the Configuration Data Interface
(environment variables) are honored by the TOE. The developer’s philosophy on testing
was taken into account by the evaluator.
The developer stated that testing is only completed when 95% of the test cases have been
successfully executed. The evaluator verified that these 95% of the test cases contain all
security-relevant test cases.
The evaluator was able to verify that developer tests provide for a sufficient depth as
required by EAL4.
7.2 Report on the Evaluator Testing Effort
TOE Test Configuration
The evaluator performed the subset of developer tests on remote test machines provided
by the developer in Pune, India. Furthermore, the evaluator performed his own tests on
one test machine within the ITSEF testing facilities in Munich.
Test session one was performed on platforms Windows 2003 R2 Enterprise Edition,
RedHat Advanced Server 5.1, and HP-UX 11iv3, on systems provided by the developer.
Test session two was performed on Sun Solaris 10.
Summary of Evaluator Test Results
The evaluator tests were performed as planned using the selected platforms listed above.
All actual test results obtained by the evaluator matched the expected results as
documented in the evaluator test descriptions.
Report on the Evaluator Penetration Testing
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Within the vulnerability analysis, the evaluator identified potential vulnerabilities and
decided to determine their potential of being exploited by devising additional penetration
tests probing for ways a potential attacker might circumvent security functions.
Summary of the Evaluator Penetration Testing
By performing the penetration tests as part of the independent evaluator testing, the
evaluator was able to clarify open issues with respect to his analysis of potential
vulnerabilities.
All penetration tests passed, i.e., the evaluator could not determine any way by which the
security functionality of the TOE can be breached.
The actual test results obtained by the evaluator matched the expected test results as
documented in the evaluator test descriptions.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
Component TOE / Not TOE
The IBM Directory Server: The LDAP server and administration daemon executable,
being the core part of the TDS.
It also contains installation and configuration tools as well as the GSKit 7.0.4.14 (SSL
packages only).
TOE
Not TOE
The IBM Tivoli Directory Server Client SDK 6.2: The client package provides the tools
required to develop LDAP applications, including client executables, libraries, sample
programs in source code form, header files and documentation for the C language APIs.
Not TOE
Web Administration Tool: The Web-based GUI for administering the directory, including
the IBM WebSphere Application Server Express, Version 6.1.
Not TOE
IBM DB2 database: The IBM DB2 Universal Database version 9 used for storing the
LDAP entries.
Not TOE
IBM Tivoli Directory Integrator: Enables SNMP, Active Directory synchronization, and
the use of the idssupport server utility, Version 6.1.1.
Not TOE
Table 3: Components of the TOE
Only the following components from the IBM Tivoli Directory Server program package form
the TOE:
● the LDAP server and
● the administration daemon executable.
All other parts of the IBM Tivoli Directory Server such as the installation and configuration
tools as well as the GSKit are considered to be part of the TOE environment. All other
components listed in the table above are also part of the TOE environment.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used. As a result of the evaluation the verdict
PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0283-2006, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on new versions of the underlying
platforms as well as on new features like the restriction of the maximum number of
consecutively repeated characters for the password management .
The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the Functionality: Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: moderate
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptoalgorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part of the
assessment.
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
Especially at least the latest fixes, updates, or patches which were available up to end of
February 2009 must be installed on the operating systems that are considered for EAL4
evaluation.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Assets – Information or resources to be protected by the countermeasures of a TOE.
Assignment – The specification of an identified parameter in a component.
Assurance – Grounds for confidence that an entity meets its security objectives.
Attack potential – The perceived potential for success of an attack, should an attack be
launched, expressed in terms of an attacker's expertise, resources and motivation.
Augmentation – The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from Part3 to an
EAL or assurance package.
Authentication data – Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
Authorised user – A user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.
Class – A grouping of families that share a common focus.
Component – The smallest selectable set of elements that may be included in a PP, an
ST, or a package.
Connectivity – The property of the TOE which allows interaction with IT entities external
to the TOE. This includes exchange of data by wire or by wireless means, over any
distance in any environment or configuration.
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Dependency – A relationship between requirements such that the requirement that is
depended upon must normally be satisfied for the other requirements to be able to meet
their objectives.
Element – An indivisible security requirement.
Evaluation – Assessment of a PP, an ST or a TOE, against defined criteria.
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) – A package consisting of assurance components
from Part 3 that represents a point on the CC predefined assurance scale.
Evaluation authority – A body that implements the CC for a specific community by
means of an evaluation scheme and thereby sets the standards and monitors the quality of
evaluations conducted by bodies within that community.
Evaluation scheme – The administrative and regulatory framework under which the CC is
applied by an evaluation authority within a specific community.
Extension – The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in Part2
and/ or assurance requirements not contained in Part 3 of the CC.
External IT entity – Any IT product or system, untrusted or trusted, outside of the TOE
that interacts with the TOE.
Family – A grouping of components that share security objectives but may differ in
emphasis or rigour.
Formal – Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Human user – Any person who interacts with the TOE.
Identity – A representation (e.g. a string) uniquely identifying an authorised user, which
can either be the full or abbreviated name of that user or a pseudonym.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Internal communication channel – A communication channel between separated parts
of TOE.
Internal TOE transfer – Communicating data between separated parts of the TOE.
Inter-TSF transfers – Communicating data between the TOE and the security functions of
other trusted IT products.
Iteration – The use of a component more than once with varying operations.
Object – An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Organisational security policies – One or more security rules, procedures, practices, or
guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations.
Package – A reusable set of either functional or assurance components (e.g. an EAL),
combined together to satisfy a set of identified security objectives.
Product – A package of IT software, firmware and/or hardware, providing functionality
designed for use or incorporation within a multiplicity of systems.
Protection Profile (PP) – An implementation-independent set of security requirements for
a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
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Reference monitor – The concept of an abstract machine that enforces TOE access
control policies.
Reference validation mechanism – An implementation of the reference monitor concept
that possesses the following properties: it is tamperproof, always invoked, and simple
enough to be subjected to thorough analysis and testing.
Refinement – The addition of details to a component.
Role – A predefined set of rules establishing the allowed interactions between a user and
the TOE.
Secret – Information that must be known only to authorised users and/or the TSF in order
to enforce a specific SFP.
Security attribute – Information associated with subjects, users and/or objects that is
used for the enforcement of the TSP.
Security Function (SF) – A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Function Policy (SFP) – The security policy enforced by an SF.
Security objective – A statement of intent to counter identified threats and/or satisfy
identified organisation security policies and assumptions.
Security Target (ST) – A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Selection – The specification of one or more items from a list in a component.
Semiformal – Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function (SOF) – A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the
minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly
attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic – A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
System – A specific IT installation, with a particular purpose and operational environment.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE resource – Anything usable or consumable in the TOE.
TOE Security Functions (TSF) – A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware
of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
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TOE Security Functions Interface (TSFI) – A set of interfaces, whether interactive (man-
machine interface) or programmatic (application programming interface), through which
TOE resources are accessed, mediated by the TSF, or information is obtained from the
TSF.
TOE Security Policy (TSP) – A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TOE security policy model – A structured representation of the security policy to be
enforced by the TOE.
Transfers outside TSF control – Communicating data to entities not under control of the
TSF.
Trusted channel – A means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT product can
communicate with necessary confidence to support the TSP.
Trusted path – A means by which a user and a TSF can communicate with necessary
confidence to support the TSP.
TSF data – Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE.
TSF Scope of Control (TSC) – The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE
and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
User – Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the
TOE.
User data – Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the
TSF.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0535-2009, Version 2.2, 11.02.2009, IBM Tivoli Directory
Server Version 6.2, IBM Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 24.02.2009, atsec information security
GmbH (confidential document)
13.1 Guidance documentation
[8] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, Administration Guide (SC23-9941-00)
[9] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, Common Criteria Guide (SC23-9949-00)
[10] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, Command Reference (SC23-9945-00)
[11] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, Installation and Configuration Guide (SC23-
9939-00)
[12] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, Messages Guide (GC23-9943-00)
[13] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, What's New for This Release (SC23-9938-
00)
[14] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, Problem Determination Guide (GC23-9944-
00)
[15] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, Server Plug-ins Reference (GC23-9942-00)
[16] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, Programming Reference (SC23-9946-00)
[17] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, Quick Start Guide (GI11-8731-00)
[18] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, System Requirements (SC23-9947-00)
[19] IBM Tivoli Directory Server Version 6.2, Performance Tuning and Capacity Planning
Guide (GC23-9940-00)
8
specifically
• AIS 14, Version 4: Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt von Einzelprüfberichten für
Evaluationen nach CC, Stand 02.04.2007
• AIS 19, Version 3: Gliederung des ETR, Stand 02.04.2007
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/
or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately
resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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