BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021
for
Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps
D11 and G12, with specific IC dedicated firmware,
including the Flash Loader enhanced by the
Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE)
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021(*)
Smartcard Controller
Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12,
with specific IC dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader
enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE)
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 11 October 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Matthias Intemann L.S.
Head of Branch
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................10
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................11
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................19
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................19
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................20
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................24
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with specific
IC dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication
Extension (MAE), has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-
certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V4-2019. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V4-2019 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps D11 and
G12, with specific IC dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the
Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE), was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 11 October 2021. TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021 Certification Report
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 11 October
2021 is valid until 10 October 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with specific
IC dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual Authentication
Extension (MAE), has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps
D11 and G12, with specific IC dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader
enhanced by the Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Technologies AG Security Controller
(Integrated Circuit IC), M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12 with specific IC dedicated
firmware. The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel
80251 architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central
Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit), and the MED (Memory
Encryption/Decryption Unit). The dual interface controller is able to communicate using
either the contact based or the contactless interface.
The TOE consists of the hardware part and the firmware part.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant
applications and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term
Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and
applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard
Embedded Software.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2.
Thus, the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management:
The life cycle of the TOE is split up into several
phases. Different operation modes help to protect
the TOE during each phase of its lifecycle.
SF_PS Protection against Snooping:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
The TOE uses various means to protect from
snooping of memories and busses and prevents
single stepping.
SF_PMA Protection against Modifying Attacks:
This TOE implements protection against
modifying attacks of memories, alarm lines and
sensors.
SF_CS Protection against Logical Attacks:
The memory access control of the TOE uses a
memory management unit (MMU) to control the
access to the available physical memory by using
virtual memory addresses and to segregate the
code and data to a privilege level model. The
MMU controls the address permissions of up to
seven privileged levels and gives the software the
possibility to define different access rights.
SF_MAE Mutual Authentication Extension (optional):
In TOE provides a mutual authentication between
production equipment and the TOE according to
ISO 9798-2. Only if the production equipment
was successfully authenticated by an external
authenticate command, the Flash Loader is
activated to download software to the TOE’s Non
Volatile Memory.
Furthermore, it contains an internal authenticate
command by which the authenticity of a copy of
the TOE can be verified.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.3. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.3, 4.1, 4.4.2.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results, as stated within this certificate, do not include a
rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021
Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with specific IC
dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual
Authentication Extension (MAE),
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by M7892 G12 and D11. Another characteristic
of the TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification data is accessible via
the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM).
Apart from the GCIM data, the individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by a lot
number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the chip on the wafer. Each individual
TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus assigned to the entire development
and production process.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW M7892 Security Controller D11 or G12 Complete modules, with or
without inlay mounting, in form of
plain wafers or in any IC case (for
example TSSOP28, VQFN32,
VQFN40, CCS-modules, etc.) or
in bare dies or whatever type of
package or even in no package.
2 FW STS Self-Test Software (the IC
Dedicated Test Software), RMS
Resource Management System (the IC
Dedicated Support Software), SAM
(Service Algorithm Minimal), NRG7
Software Interface Routines, and FL
(Flash Loader)
FW Identifier
78.015.14.0 or
78.015.14.1 or
78.015.14.2 or
78.015.18.2
Stored in reserved area of the
ROM on the IC (patch in NVM)
Mutual Authentication Extension (MAE) v8.00.006 Optional; depending on order.
3 SW NVM image (including Embedded
Software)
- NVM image (including Embedded
Software)
4 DOC M7892 SOLID FLASH™ Controller for
Security Applications Hardware
Reference Manual [17]
2019-06-24 -
5 SLx 70 Family Production and
Personalization User’s Manual [13]
2015-04-01 -
6 16-bit Controller Family SLE 70
Programmer’s Reference Manual [11]
2019-12-03 -
7 M7892 Security Guidelines [12] 2021-08-04 -
8 M7892 Errata Sheet [15] 2019-12-18 -
9 SLE70 Crypto@2304T User Manual [16] 2010-03-23 Optional; delivered if asymmetric
crypto co-processor is ordered.
10 AMM Advanced Mode for NRG SAM
Addendum to M7892 Hardware
Reference Manual [18]
2019-10-28 Optional; delivered if AMM is
ordered.
11 Production and Personalization Mutual
Authentication Extension for the SLx70
family in 90 nm [14]
2017-07-26 Optional; delivered if the MAE is
ordered.
7
NRG does not provide any TOE security functionality (TSF) and is not part of the evaluation.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021 Certification Report
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery documentation describes all procedures that are necessary to maintain
security when distributing versions of the TOE or parts of it to the user’s site including the
necessary intermediate delivery procedures.
The delivery documentation describes in a sufficient manner how the various procedures
and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications and any discrepancies
between the TOE respective parts of it send by the TOE Manufacturer and the version
received by the Composite Product Manufacturer.
In general, the TOE - or parts thereof - are delivered between the following three parties
(as defined in [8]):
● IC Embedded Software Developer,
● TOE Manufacturer (compromises all roles before TOE delivery),
● Composite Product Manufacturer (compromises all roles after TOE delivery except the
end consumer).
Accordingly, three different delivery procedures have to be taken into consideration:
1. Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance)
from the TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
2. Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-
personalisation data) from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE
Manufacturer.
3. Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product
Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers,
after phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
Respective distribution centers are listed in Appendix B (see below).
The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. The
identification data contains the lot number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the
chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus
assigned to the entire development and production process.
The hardware part of the TOE is identified as M7892 G12 and D11. Another characteristic
of the TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification data is accessible via
the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM).
This GCIM outputs a variety of unique information in order to uniquely determine the
underlying hardware configuration. Additionally, a dedicated RMS function (see [11]
section 9.16) allows a customer to extract the present hardware configuration and the
original Chip Identifier Byte, which was valid before blocking.
The firmware part of the TOE is also identified also via the GCIM for all of the firmware
parts.
For further, detailed information regarding TOE identification see [9], section 1.1.
Please also note, that as the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE
Manufacturer can only guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the
responsibility of the Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the
implemented software (developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows
detection of modifications after the delivery.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. In principle, the Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic
security functionalities to be used by the smart card operating system and the smart card
application thus providing an overall smart card system security.
These functionalities cover the following issues:
Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm
(TDES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to
support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a true random number generator
(TRNG).
Furthermore, the TOE provides the user with an optional MAE firmware component, which
safeguards the access to the Flash Loader and thus, the secure download of the user
software or parts of it to the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES or TDES cryptographic functions performed by the TOE),
against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations, and
against abuse of functionality.
In more general and CC formal terms, besides providing certain secrutiy functionalities, the
TOE shall
●maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE.
●maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
7 and 8 of the Security Target (ST) [6],[9].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
The ST includes one security objective for the IC Embedded Software Developer, the
objective OE.Resp-Appl:
● The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC Embedded Software Developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) appropriately. The IC Embedded Software Developer gets
sufficient information on how to protect user data adequately in the security guidelines
[12].
The ST includes four security objectives for the operational environment (for the
Composite Product Manufacturer), the objectives OE.Process-Sec-IC,
OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+ and OE.TOE_Auth:
● OE.Process-Sec-IC states that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE
by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality
and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021 Certification Report
copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use). This means that the phases after
TOE delivery are assumed to be protected appropriately.
The Composite Product Manufacturer therefore has to be informed only about the general
requirement resulting from OE.Process-Sec-IC. The Composite Product Manufacturer is
informed about these requirements resulting from OE.Process-Sec-IC in [13].
● OE.Lim_Block_Loader states that the Composite Product Manufacturer will protect the
Loader functionality against misuse, limit the capability of the Loader and terminate
irreversibly the Loader after intended usage of the Loader.
This objective is relevant for the Composite Product Manufacturer. He is responsible for
permanently deactivating the flash loader (if the flash loader is available) before delivery to
the end user.
● OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+ states that the authorized user must fulfil the access
conditions required by the Loader, whereby the OE.TOE_Auth states that the operational
environment shall support the authentication verification mechanism and know
authentication reference data of the TOE.
● The Composite Product Manufacturer is informed about these requirements resulting
from OE.Process-Sec-IC and OE.Lim_Block_Loader in [13] and [11, section 15.1].
The requirements resulting from OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+ and OE.TOE_Auth are
given in [14].
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251
architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central
Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit), and the MED (Memory
Encryption/Decryption Unit). The dual interface controller is able to communicate using
either the contact based or the contactless interface.
The flexible memory concept consists of ROM- and Flash-memory as part of the non
volatile memory (NVM), respectively Infineon® SOLID FLASH™. For the Infineon® SOLID
FLASH™ memory the Unified Channel Programming (UCP) memory technology is used.
Note that there is no user available on-chip ROM module anymore. The user software and
data are now located in a dedicated and protected part of the Infineon® SOLID FLASH™.
The TOE consists of the hardware part and the firmware part.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant
applications and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term
Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and
applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard
Embedded Software.
Regarding the security functionality of the TOE, the Symmetric Crypto coprocessor (SCP)
is of special importance. The SCP provides functionalities for symmetric cryptography. The
TOE can be ordered with or without the SCP. If a TOE is ordered without SCP, it is
deactivated during the manufacturing process and cannot be reactivated by the user.
Deselecting the SCP has no impact on any other security policy of the TOE. It is exactly
equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality.
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Further, the TOE can be ordered with or without the Asymmetric Crypto Coprocessor
(Crypto@2304T). If a TOE is ordered without Crypto@2304T, it is deactivated during the
manufacturing process and cannot be reactivated by the user. Please note that the
Crypto@2304T does not implement any SFR.
An overview of the hardware of the TOE is given in [6] chapter 1.1 / 2.2.1
The Flash Loader is a firmware located in the IFX-ROM (Read-Only Memory) and enables
the download of the user software or parts of it to the Infineon® SOLID FLASH™ memory.
After completion of the download, the Flash Loader shall be locked by the by the user.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The following groups of tests were performed by the developer:
● Simulation tests (design verification),
● Qualification tests,
● Verification tests,
● Security Evaluation tests and
● Production tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluator was able to repeat the tests of the developer by using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment, and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. For the developer tests, repeated by the evaluator, other test
parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE
realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during
layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the following classes of tests were carried out:
● Module tests,
● Simulation tests,
● Emulation tests,
● Tests in user mode,
● Tests in test mode,
● Hardware tests,
● MAE tests.
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With these kinds of tests the entire security functionality of the TOE was tested.
For penetration testing, the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks that do not modify the TOE physically.
The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack
potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Hardware tests,
● MAE tests.
Depending on the blocking configuration a M7892 product can have a different user
available configuration as described in Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 1.1 and 1.2.
● The available options are summed up in the Security Target [6] and [9], section 1.2:
● The available memory sizes of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM and RAM. Note that there is
no user available ROM on the TOE,
● The availability of the cryptographic coprocessors,
● The availability of the Flash Loader for available interfaces like ISO-7816, contactless
ISO-14443,
● The availability of various interface options,
● The possibility to tailor the product by blocking on his own premises,
● The degree of freedom of the chip configuration is predefined by Infineon Technologies
AG and made available via the order tool.
All possible TOE configurations are covered by the certificate. Note that there is no user
available on-chip ROM module anymore. The user software and data are now located in a
dedicated and protected part of the SOLID FLASH™ NVM. According to the BPU option, a
non limited number of configurations of the TOE may occur in the field. The number of
various configurations depends on the order and purchase contract only.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
● The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
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● Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report),
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V4-2019, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on penetration test
updates, changes to the software, security claims and guidance. As a result, guidance
documentation has been updated ([11],[12],[15]).
The evaluation has confirmed:
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-
2014 [8]
for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
augmented by ALC_FLR.1
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of
lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
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10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the Embedded Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes
guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the
developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which
measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
"ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [11], [12], [15] to [18] have to be
considered.
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [13] and [14] have to be considered.
In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has
to be considered:
● The IC Embedded Software Developer can deliver his software either to Infineon to let
them implement it in the TOE (in Flash memory) or to the Composite Product
Manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
● The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
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the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
API Application Programming Interface
BPU Bill Per Use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office
for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CI Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI)
CIM Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI), same as CI
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECC Error Correction Code
Flash EEPROM Flash Memory
FL Flash Loader software
FW Firmware
GCIM Generic Chip Identification Mode
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
N/A Not applicable
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NVM Non-Volatile Memory
PP Protection Profile
RMS Resource Management System
SAM Service Algorithm Minimal
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Symmetric Cryptographic Processor
SF Security Feature
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SO Security Objective
ST Security Target
STS Self-Test Software
SW Software
TDES triple DES
TOE Target of Evaluation
TM Test Mode (STS)
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UM Userr Mode (STS)
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
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Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
8
specifically
• AIS 1, Version 14, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report)
für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 19, Version 9, Verbindlich Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR
(Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
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[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021, Version 3.6, 2021-08-05, “Security
Target Common Criteria EAL6 augmented / EAL6+ M7892 Design Steps D11 and
G12”, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report for certification BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021, Version 4,
2021-10-08, “Evaluation Technical Report Summary (ETR Summary)”, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] Security Target Lite for BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021, Version 3.6, 2021-08-05 ,
“Security Target Lite Common Criteria EAL6 augmented / EAL6+ M7892 Design
Steps D11 and G12”, Infineon Technologies AG (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation (according to AIS 36) for BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021,
Version 4, 2021-10-08, “Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation (ETR
Comp)”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[11] 16-bit Security Controller Family SLE 70 Programmer’s Reference Manual, v9.14,
2019-12-03, Infineon Technologies AG
[12] M7892 Security Guidelines , 2021-08-04, Infineon Technologies AG
[13] SLx 70 Family Production and Personalization User’s Manual, 2015-04-01, Infineon
Technologies AG
[14] Production and Personalization Mutual Authentication Extension for SLx 70 family in
90 nm, Rev. 1.2, 2017-07-26, Infineon Technologies AG
[15] M7892 Errata Sheet, v7.1,2019-12-18, Infineon Technologies AG
[16] Crypto@2304T User Manual, 2010-03-23, Infineon Technologies AG
[17] M7892 SOLID FLASH™ Controller for Security Applications Hardware Reference
Manual, V3.0, 2019-06-24, Infineon Technologies AG
[18] AMM Advanced Mode for NRG SAM Addendum to M7892 Hardware Reference
Manual, V2 , 2019-10-28, Infineon Technologies AG
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Security Controller M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with
specific IC dedicated firmware, including the Flash Loader enhanced by the Mutual
Authentication Extension (MAE), (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 11 October 2021, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.3)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Distribution Center Name Address
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd.,
Advanced Regional Center
Tampines LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
G&D Neustadt Giesecke & Devrient Secure Data
Management GmbH
Austraße 101b
96465 Neustadt bei Coburg
Germany
K&N Großostheim Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10
63762 Großostheim
Germany
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong
Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
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Distribution Center Name Address
P.R. China
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V5-2021
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level above
100 Bits
1 Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES [NIST SP800-67] |k| = 112, 168 no, yes
AES [FIPS197] |k| = 128, 192, 256 yes
2 Confidentiality TDES in
ECB mode,
CBC mode
[NIST SP800-38A] |k| = 112, 168 no, yes (CBC)
no (ECB)
3 TDES in
Recrypt mode,
BLD mode
Proprietary
implementation
|k| = 112, 168 no (BLD)
4 AES in
ECB mode,
CBC mode
[FIPS197],
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 no (ECB)
yes (CBC)
5 RNG Physical True
RNG PTG.2
[AIS31] N/A N/A
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
Note: End of report
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