Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003
for
Processor Resource/ System Manager (PR/SM) for
the IBM eServer zSeries 900
from
IBM Corporation
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003
Processor Resource/ System Manager
(PR/SM) for the IBM eServer zSeries 900
from
IBM Corporation SOGIS-MRA
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1
(ISO/IEC 15408:1999).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL5
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 27.02.2003
The Vice-President of the Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Hange L.S.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and
no warranty of the IT product by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003 Certification Report
V
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003
VI
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003 Certification Report
A-1
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
- Part 1, Version 0.6
- Part 2, Version 1.0
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4
2
Act setting up the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-
Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003
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2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates based on the CC
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003 Certification Report
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3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Processor Resource/ System Manager (PR/SM) for the IBM
eServer zSeries 900 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Processor Resource/ System Manager (PR/SM)
for the IBM eServer zSeries 900 was conducted by CSC Ploenzke AG,
Competence Center IT-Security and Technology. The CSC Ploenzke AG,
Competence Center IT-Security and Technology is an evaluation facility
recognised by BSI (ITSEF)6
.
The sponsor vendor and distributor is the IBM Corporation.
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 27.02.2003.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003
A-4
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18.
The product Processor Resource/ System Manager (PR/SM) for the IBM
eServer zSeries 900 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline 0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
IBM Corporation, 2455 South Road, P329, Poughkeepsie, NY 12601, USA
BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003 Certification Report
B-1
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003
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Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 6
3 Security Policy 6
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
5 Architectural Information 9
6 Documentation 13
7 IT Product Testing 13
8 Evaluated Configuration 14
9 Results of the Evaluation 14
10 Comments/Recommendations 15
11 Annexes 15
12 Security Target 15
13 Definitions 16
14 Bibliography 17
BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003 Certification Report
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1 Executive Summary
The TOE is the Microcode kernel of the Processor Resource/ System Manager
(PR/SM) for the IBM eServer zSeries 900 (z900). PR/SM is intended for use in
environments where separation of workloads is a requirement, but where the
use of a single hardware platform is desirable for reasons of economy,
flexibility, security or management.
Leasing or purchase costs may be lower for a single large machine than for a
number of smaller machines of equivalent total processing capacity. There may
also be savings in operational costs resulting from lower machine room capacity
and fewer operations staff.
PR/SM provides flexibility by allowing the single machine to be set up to provide
a wide range of virtual machine configurations. As one workload grows, more
resources can be allocated to it, providing significant advantages where the
required configuration is subject to frequent change.
PR/SM provides the facility to partition a single platform to run any combination
of z/OS, OS/390, z/VM, VIF, VM/ESA, VSE/ESA, TPF or LINUX allowing
requirements for different operating system environments to be met.
Where confidentiality is a concern, PR/SM provides separation of workloads,
and prevents the flow of information between partitions. This trusted separation
may be used where the separation is based on need to know, or where data at
different national security classifications must be isolated.
The IT product Processor Resource/ System Manager (PR/SM) for the IBM
eServer zSeries 900 was evaluated by CSC Ploenzke AG, Competence Center
IT-Security and Technology. The evaluation was completed on 14.01.2003.
CSC Ploenzke AG, Competence Center IT-Security and Technology is an
evaluation facility approved by BSI (ITSEF)8
.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is the IBM Corporation.
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components and classes defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see
Annex C of [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements
of assurance level EAL5 (Evaluation Assurance Level5).
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003
B-4
1.2 Functionality
The TOE security functions are:
Logical Partition Identity: The TOE implements an Image profile to define the
initial operational characteristics of a logical partition. In a given configuration
each logical partition is uniquely named and has a corresponding Image profile.
One of the parameters in the Image profile is the logical partition identifier (i.e.
zone number). If a logical partition is in the current configuration, then the zone
number uniquely identifies that partition.
Authorized Administration: The authority level of a subject determines which
tasks are available for that subject. Subjects are System Administrators and
logical partitions.
Authorized Operations: The TOE implements the IO Configuration Data Set
(IOCDS) used to define the logical partitions and the allocation of resources to
these logical partitions. The TOE ensures that resources are allocated to a
logical partition as specified in the IOCDS.
Audit and Accountability: The TOE implements a Security Log that is always
enabled and contains a record of security relevant events. The View Security
Log task allows an administrator to view the log recorded while the Archive
Security Log task allows an administrator to create an archival copy of the
security log. The View Security Log task also allows an administrator to search
or sort the security relevant events based on date or event criteria.
Object Reuse: The TOE ensures that the contents of physical processors,
storage or I/O utilized by different logical partitions will be cleared of any
residual information before being utilized by the receiving logical partition.
Reliability of Service: The TOE implements a Reset profile to define the initial
operational characteristics of the physical processors. Two of the parameters in
the Reset profile are the processor running time and wait completion. These
parameters provide the ability to share physical processor resources on either
an event-driven basis or a time-driven basis. Disabling event driven dispatching
causes shared physical processor resources to be distributed on the basis of
time intervals according to the weights specified to effectively prevent
unauthorized denial of service.
Self Test: The TOE implements a set of self-test functions that are executed
when the TOE is started or reset, and periodically during normal execution.
Alternate Support Element: The TOE implements functions that permit a quick
switch to another Support Element when the primary Support Element has a
hardware problem. Mirroring functions are performed on a regular basis to
communicate any hard disk changes from the primary Support Element to the
alternate Support Element.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003 Certification Report
B-5
1.3 Strength of Function
The strength of function claim is not applicable since no TOE security function is
based on permutational or probabilistic mechanisms.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The assumed threats can be classified into the following two cases:
• Users may gain access to data belonging to another partition, for which they
do not have clearance, specific authorization, or a need-to-know. This may
be achieved either directly (for example, by reading storage allocated to
another partition, or by failure to clear a resource before reallocation), or
indirectly (for example, through a covert channel). Unauthorized access to
audit data may lead to a false record of System Administrator actions.
• Users may gain unauthorized access to system resources (i.e. channel path,
control unit, I/O device, physical or logical processor): such actions being
contrary to the security or resource policy of an organization.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
There is only one configuration of the TOE.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The operating environment of the TOE comprises the following models of the
IBM eServer zSeries 900 hardware platform. The 1Cx models utilize an MCM
with fewer PU chips than the MCM used for the 10X and 11X models.
Model
Number
Number of
CPU
Model
Number
Number of
CPU
101 1 115 15
102 2 116 16
103 3 1C1 1
104 4 1C2 2
105 5 1C3 3
106 6 1C4 4
107 7 1C5 5
108 8 1C6 6
109 9 1C7 7
110 10 1C8 8
111 11 1C9 9
112 12
113 13
114 14
Table 1: z900 Models
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1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of
the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to
this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The TOE is the Microcode kernel, Microcode Driver Level: D3CG, Date: 31 Oct.
2001 of the Processor Resource/ System Manager (PR/SM) for the IBM
eServer zSeries 900 hardware platform. The TOE comprises the following
modules:
EC# DESCRIPTION MCL
E26943 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-PSCNSE LIC 014
E26944 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-SOS LIC 015
E26945 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-MISR DATA LIC
E26946 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-PSCNCC LIC 014
E26947 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-POWERC LIC 003
E26949 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-IQDIO LIC 007
J10627 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-FICON BRIDGE LIC 001
J10628 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-CHANNEL DIAGS
J10629 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-PCX
J10630 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-HYDRA 006
J10631 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-PCI CRYPTO CHAN 004
J10632 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-FCS (Disruptive) 004
J10633 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-CFCC (Disruptive) 004
J10634 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-LPAR HV LIC 002
J10635 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-CHANNEL CODE LIC 001
J10636 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-OSA FLASH ROM
J10637 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-I390/PU ML LIC 025
J10638 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-CODE (SSE/SP) 028
J10640 DR-3C-F6/D3CG SSE-C-PART (2647 TP)
J10645 DR-3C-F6/D3CG HHMC-D-PART 015
J10646 DR-3C-F6/D3CG HHMC/TKEWS-ISA-C-PART 001
Table 2: Microcode Driver Level: D3CG, Date: 31 Oct. 2001:
3 Security Policy
The TOE implements several policies which are specified in the security
functional requirements. Those policies are:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003 Certification Report
B-7
Access Control Security Function Policy (SFP)
The TOE implements an access control policy between subjects and objects.
The subjects are the logical partitions (LPARS) defined in the IOCDS and the
System Administrator. The objects are the physical resources of the processor,
the logical processors and the TSF data. Access to objects by subjects will be
mediated by this policy to ensure that subjects are only able to gain
unauthorized access to objects.
Information Flow Control Security Function Policy (SFP)
The TOE implements an information flow control policy between subjects and
objects, and between objects and objects. The subjects are the logical partitions
(LPARS) defined in the IOCDS and the System Administrator. The objects are
the physical resources of the processor and the logical processors instantiated
on a physical processor on behalf of a logical partition. Flow of information
between objects and subjects, and between objects and objects will be
mediated by this policy to ensure that information flow is only possible when
subjects and objects are associated with the same logical partition.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
A.LPAR_Only – LPAR mode is the only valid mode of operation for the
evaluated product.
The administrator may power-on reset the machine only in logical partition
(LPAR) mode.
A.Sep_Mode - Strict Separation Mode
A strict separation virtual machine monitor (SVMM) restricts the allocation of
resources so that there is absolutely no sharing of objects amongst logical
partitions. To be used as a strict separation virtual machine monitor, PR/SM
should be configured in the following manner:
1. The devices should be configured so that no device is accessible by more
than one partition (although they may be accessible by more than one
channel path);
2. Each I/O (physical) control unit should be allocated to a single partition in the
current configuration;
3. The Security Administrator should not reconfigure a channel path unless all
attached devices and control units are attached to that path only;
4. The Security Administrator should ensure that all devices and control units
on a reconfigurable path are reset before the path is allocated to another
partition;
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5. No channel paths should be shared between partitions;
6. The amount of reserved storage for a partition should be zero;
7. Dynamic I/O configuration changes should be disabled (i.e. changes require
a power-on reset);
8. Partitions should be prevented from receiving performance data from
resources that are not allocated to them (no partition should have global
performance data control authority);
9. At most one partition should have I/O configuration control authority (i.e. no
more than one partition should be able to update any IOCDS);
10.The Security Administrator should ensure that write access is disabled for
each IOCDS, unless that IOCDS is to be updated (the current IOCDS should
not be updated);
11.The Security Administrator should verify any changed IOCDS after a power-
on reset with that IOCDS, before any partitions have been activated (the
Security Administrator may determine whether the IOCDS has been
changed by inspecting the date of the IOCDS);
12.No partition should have cross-partition control authority (i.e. no partition
should be able to reset or deactivate another partition).
13.No partition should have coupling facility channels which would allow
communication with a Coupling Facility partition.
14.No partition should be configured to allow hipersockets.
15.No partition should have WorkLoad Manager, Dynamic CHPID Management
or I/O Priority Queuing enabled.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
A.No_Remote - The remote support facility must be disabled.
The modem connection to the remote support center must be disabled to
prohibit unauthorized connections for remote service.
A.Data_Secure – Backup of audit data
The TOE records security-relevant actions performed by the System
Administrator in an audit log. The TOE will prune the audit log to two-thirds (2/3)
of its capacity when the audit log has been filled. It is the customer’s
responsibility to backup the audit log prior to the log reaching capacity.
A.Phys_Secure – Physical protection of processor, I/O and HMC is
required
The hardware must be physically secure and the access to I/O devices must be
restricted to authorized personnel. In particular the Hardware Management
Console (HMC) and the Support Element (SE) must be physically protected
from access other than by authorized system administrators.
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B-9
A.Admin_Secure – Administrative Personnel Security
The System Administrators of the system must be cleared for the highest
security classification of work being performed on the system.
A.Logical_Secure – Logical Access Security
1. The HMC Operator Logon controls the access of individuals to the HMC.
The HMC Operator Logon can also be used to limit the objects to be
controlled and the tasks available to an individual.
2. Secure desktop can prohibit any application from being started.
The SE provides the following mechanisms to help restrict unauthorized access:
1. Logical access security - logical access is controlled by the SE code in
conjunction with the HMC:
a. Secure desktop is standard and unchangeable.
b. Disruptive actions are recorded.
c. Direct logon to the SE is for service only.
d. HMC Operator Logon controls individuals who have access to the SE
control facilities and can limit the objects controlled and available controls
to the individual.
2. SE Connections - the SE can make connections only through its LANs.
a. Automation APIs can be enabled or disabled and require a password.
b. Telnet daemon cannot be started.
c. FTP daemon requires a password; only known to the HMC.
d. Domain name and password customizable to limit HMC access.
e. No browser access available.
f. No NetOp access is available.
g. No DTOC/DCAF access without HMC.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is implemented in LIC (licensed internal code), which is microcode
licensed by IBM. The use of LIC prevents untrusted code from masquerading as
part of the TOE and abusing TOE privileges. The TOE is composed of:
a) Logical partition (LPAR) LIC, which is the LIC that is responsible for
maintaining the isolation of partitions;
b) Hardware Management Console/Support Element LIC, which provides the
system administration functions to maintain the current configuration;
c) Central processor (PU, i390) LIC:
CP Millicode:
CP Millicode performs the more complex instructions in the z900
architecture. The millicode is written and assembled in a manner very similar
to the z900 Assembler Language Code. Through a combination of millicode,
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003
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and the less complex hardwired instructions, the z900 processor is able to
support the complete z900 instruction set.
I390 code (Internal 390 code):
The i390 code runs on the SAP (System Assist Processor). Most of its
functions are I/O related involving the running of the channel subsystem. In
addition, i390 code is involved in FEDC (First Error Data Capture), RMF
(Resource Management Facility) and SMF (Storage Management Facility).
I390 code is frequently invoked during certain SCLP (Service Call Logical
Processor) commands, sometimes issued by LPAR, as well as various resets
and machine initialization/set-up during IML.
d) The LIC in the channel subsystem (CHNL) responsible for maintaining data
separation in the handling of I/O requests and responses.
From the Hardware Management Console (HMC) / Support Element (SE)
workplace the tasks for monitoring and operating the CPC are started. The user
mode of the System Administrator determines which tasks and controls he can
use on the workplace. Not all tasks are available for each user mode. The
following user modes are defined:
Access
Administrator
A person with Access Administrator authority has the
ability to create, modify, or delete user profiles for the
user modes on the Hardware Management Console or for
service mode on the support element. A user profile
consists of a user identification, password, and user
mode.
Advanced Operator A person with Advanced Operator authority possesses
Operator authority plus the ability to perform some
additional recovery and maintenance tasks.
Operator A person with Operator authority typically performs basic
system startup and shutdown operations using predefine
procedures.
Security
Administrator
Any user(s) of the HMC which are defined with a user
mode of System Programmer or Service Representative.
Service
Representative
A person with Service Representative authority has
access to tasks related to the repair and maintenance of
the system.
System
Administrator
The System Administrator is defined to be any user(s)
with access to the Hardware Management Console
(HMC).
System
Programmer
A person with System Programmer authority has the
ability to customize the system in order to determine its
operation.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0179-2003 Certification Report
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The Security Administrator uses an I/O configuration utility (IOCP) to define an
Input/Output configuration data set (IOCDS) of the I/O resources and their
allocation to specific logical partitions. The IOCDS may be verified by the
Security Administrator prior to activating the partitions. PR/SM allows I/O
resources to be dedicated to a single partition, relocatable amongst a defined
set of partitions, or shared by a defined set of partitions. When a System
Administrator wishes to activate a partition, the activation request is initiated
from the HMC. LPAR will receive an external interrupt identified as coming from
a BFYCALL command and issue the PCCALL instruction to obtain the
description of the partition the System Administrator wishes to activate. LPAR
will attempt to construct the partition and will inform the HMC of the success or
failure of the command via the PCCALL instruction.
Several different configurations may be stored, but only one is in effect at any
time. The configuration becomes effective as part of the activation sequence.
Standard hardware resources such as a central processor, including
computation and control registers, timers, clocks and optional co-processors,
storage and I/O resources are objects allocated to logical partitions. These
objects are subject to a non-discretionary access control policy under which
each logical partition is only permitted access to resources allocated to it.
Logical objects fall into one of three classes:
a) Logical processor facilities, which are supported by similar physical objects.
Each such logical object is represented by an internal control block which
contains current state information each time context is switched to a different
logical partition.
b) Logical storage, both central and expanded, is represented by the same
amount of contiguous physical storage. PR/SM does not perform paging or
move logical partitions once they have been placed in real storage. Physical
storage can be de-allocated from one logical partition and reallocated to
another. This feature can be disabled, and is subject to full object reuse control.
c) Logical I/O resources (channels) are implemented by physical resources of
the same type. Such resources can be configured so that they are not shared
by partitions. A channel can be de-allocated from one logical partition and
reallocated to another, under the control of the Security Administrator.
zSeries and ESA/390 architecture support two instruction states: problem and
supervisor. Problem state instructions can be executed in either problem or
supervisor state. Semi-privileged instructions can be executed in supervisor
state, or in problem state subject to one or more additional authorizations.
Privileged instructions can be executed only in supervisor state. PR/SM exports
a virtual machine including all instructions, and initiates the execution in
supervisor state, so that all three classes of instruction can be executed within
the logical partition. Thus each logical partition has both execution states
available. PR/SM does not interfere with the logical partition's use of those
states.
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A system control program (SCP) running in a logical partition can support
zSeries and ESA/390 architectural mode. This is set when a partition is defined,
and cannot be altered while the partition is activated.
PR/SM supports and uses the "start interpretive execution" (SIE) instruction to
create an interpretative execution environment in which the logical partitions
execute. PR/SM begins execution in non-SIE mode.
When a logical partition is to be activated PR/SM establishes the parameters for
each logical processor allocated to the partition in a control block called a "state
description". PR/SM executes a SIE instruction, which dispatches the logical
processor in SIE mode. The PR/SM hardware executes instructions in the
logical processor in SIE mode until an exception condition occurs which causes
control to return to PR/SM in non-SIE mode. The exception conditions are
events that cannot be handled in interpretative mode. PR/SM receives control in
non-SIE mode. PR/SM maintains a state description for each logical processor
of each logical partition so that each time a logical processor is dispatched, it is
in the same context as when it last had control. Since this state description is
updated by the hardware, it is impossible for one logical partition to acquire
control with the wrong context (i.e. the context of another logical partition). The
non-SIE/SIE distinction is a powerful privilege differentiation between PR/SM
and the logical partitions.
In LPAR mode, the z900 provides support for several features that are very
helpful in many customer environments. However, these features are not
recommended in a secure environment. As a result, the TOE provides security
related controls to disable such features assuring separation of the logical
partition(s). The security related controls are outlined below:
Logical Partition Isolation
This control reserves reconfigurable unshared channel paths for the exclusive
use of a logical partition. Channel paths assigned to an isolated logical partiton
are not available to other logical partitions and remain reserved for that LP
when they are configured offline.
I/O Configuration Control Authority
This control can limit the ability of the LP to read or write any IOCDS in the
configuration locally or remotely. Logical partitions with control authority for the
I/O conf iguration data can read and write any non-write protected IOCDS in the
configuration, and can change the I/O configuration dynamically.
Global Performance Data Control Authority
This control limits the ability of a logical partition to view CP activity data for
other logical partitions. Logical partitions with control authority for global
performance data can view CP utilization data and Input/Output (IOP) busy data
for all of the logical partitions in the configuration. A logical partition without
control authority for the performance data can view only the CP utilization data
for itself.
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Cross-Partition Authority
This control can limit the capability of the logical partition to issue certain control
program instructions that affect other logical partitions. Logical partitions with
cross-partition authority can issue instructions to perform a system reset of
another LP, deactivate any other LP, and provide support for the automatic
reconfiguration facility.
In addition to the security controls mentioned above, the TOE also ensures that
central and expanded storage for each logical partition is isolated and cannot be
shared with other logical partitions. The TOE rigidly enforces this “no sharing”
rule during logical partition definition, logical partition activation, logical partition
reconfiguration and during logical partition execution.
The TOE also “removes” central processors (CPs) from logical partitions by
virtualizing physical CPs. Virtualized physical CPs are referred to as logical
processors. Within the TOE, each logical CP is represented as a data structure
that is associated with its specific logical partitions preventing the transfer of
data between partitions.
Thus, when the PR/SM is initialized for secure operation, one partition cannot
gain access to the data within another partition nor modify any aspect of
another partition.
6 Documentation
• PRSM Planning Guide sb10-7033-01
• Trusted Facility Manual, Version 4.0, April 3, 2002
• HMC Operation Guide SC28-6812-00, Version 1.7.2
• SE Op Guide SC28-6813-00, Version 1.7.2
• IOCP User Guide SB10-7029-00
• Stand Alone IOCP User Guide SB10-7032-00
7 IT Product Testing
The TOE is available on different models of the developer’s zSeries 900
servers. All models possess the common ESA/390 architecture, system
software, applications, channel I/O and operational environment. Therefore, the
TOE can be used on each model that is part of that family of servers without
any modification. For a list of supported models see table 1 in chapter 1.6. The
tests of the TOE were run on a zSeries 900 server model 109 with 9 central
processors.
There was no need identified to run the tests on a zSeries server with another
number of central processors (CPs), because a machine with 9 CPs provides
enough flexibility for assigning CPs to logical partitions that all reasonable test
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scenarios are covered. Additionally, this configuration having a large number of
CPs covers all scenarios with a lower number, because a server with more CPs
can be made equivalent to one with less CPs by deactivating processors. For
the same reasons, the results of the evaluation of PR/SM for the IBM eServer
zSeries 900 are valid for all models that belong to the models listed in table 1 in
chapter 1.6.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is the PR/SM Microcode kernel, Microcode Driver Level Driver D3CG,
Date 31.10.2001 on the IBM eServer zSeries 900 models listed in table 1 in
chapter 1.6. There is only one configuration of the TOE.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [15] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL5. For components beyond EAL5 advice of the Certification Body was
used.
The verdicts for the CC, part 3 assurance classes and components (according
to EAL5 and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summarised
in the following table.
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 n.a.
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration Management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Development tools CM coverage ACM_SCP.3 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Semiformal functional specification ADV_FSP.3 PASS
Semiformal high-level design ADV_HLD.3 PASS
Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 PASS
Modularity ADV_INT.1 PASS
Semiformal low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.2 PASS
Formal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.3 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Standardised life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 PASS
Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.2 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Covert Channel Analysis AVA_CCA.1 PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 n.a.
Independant vulnerability Analysis AVA_VLA.3 PASS
Verdicts for the assurance components (n.a.= not applicable)
A strength of function claim is not applicable since no TOE security function is
based on a permutational or probabilistic mechanism.
10 Comments/Recommendations
For guidance on installation see chapter 4.1
11 Annexes
none
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version
according to AIS 35 [14] of the complete security target [13] used for the
evaluation performed.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
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Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
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[6] Security Target for PR/SM for the IBM eServer zSeries 900, Version
1.22, Public Version for EAL5 Certification dated December 5th
2002
[7] PRSM Planning Guide sb10-7033-01
[8] Trusted Facility Manual, Version 4.0, April 3, 2002
[9] HMC Operation Guide SC28-6812-00, Version 1.7.2
[10] SE Op Guide SC28-6813-00, Version 1.7.2
[11] IOCP User Guide SB10-7029-00
[12] Stand Alone IOCP User Guide SB10-7032-00
[13] Security Target for PR/SM for the IBM eServer zSeries 900, Version
1.22, July 30, 2002 (confidential document)
[14] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS): AIS 35
Version 1, 29.07.2002, Öffentliche Fassung eines Security Target (ST-
lite), including CC Supporting Document „ST-lite“, Version 1.1
[15] EAL5 Final Evaluation Report, Version 1.2, 13.01.2003, IBM PR/SM
LPAR Evaluation (confidential document)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
CM automation ACM_AUT
CM capabilities ACM_CAP
CM scope ACM_SCP
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Delivery ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGS
Class ADV:
Development
Functional specification ADV_FSP
High-level design ADV_HLD
Implementation representation ADV_IMP
TSF internals ADV_INT
Low-level design ADV_LLD
Representation correspondence ADV_RCR
Security policy modeling ADV_SPM
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM
User guidance AGD_USR
Class ALC: Life cycle
support
Development security ALC_DVS
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR
Life cycle definition ALC_LCD
Tools and techniques ALC_TAT
Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COV
Depth ATE_DPT
Functional tests ATE_FUN
Independent testing ATE_IND
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA
Misuse AVA_MSU
Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“