



# Australian Information Security Evaluation Program

## Certification Report

Juniper Junos OS 22.4R2 for MX304,  
EX4100-48MP, EX4100-24MP,  
EX4100-24P, EX4100-24T, EX4100-  
48P, EX4100-48T

Version 1.0, 02 April 2024

Document reference: AISEP-CC-CR-2024-EFT-T040-CR-V1.0  
(Certification expires five years from certification report date)

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# Executive summary

This report describes the findings of the IT security evaluation of Juniper Networks Junos OS 22.4R2 for MX304, EX4100-48MP, EX4100-24MP, EX4100-24P, EX4100-24T, EX4100-48P and EX4100-48T against approved Protection Profiles (PPs).

This report concludes that the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has complied with the following PPs [4]:

- collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP)
- PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption Version 1.0, 2 March 2023

The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and the requirements of the Australian Information Security Evaluation Program (AISEP). The evaluation was performed by Teron Labs with the final Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) submitted on 29 February 2024.

With regard to the secure operation of the TOE, the Australian Certification Authority recommends that administrators:

- ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE security environment are understood
- configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor's product administrator guidance and pay attention to all security warnings
- maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity of the TOE Security Function is preserved
- verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the Juniper website
- have a system auditor review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically.

Potential purchasers of the TOE should review the intended operational environment and ensure that they are comfortable that the stated security objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.

This report includes information about the underlying security policies and architecture of the TOE, and information regarding the conduct of the evaluation.

It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that the TOE meets their requirements. For this reason, it is recommended that a prospective user of the TOE refer to the Security Target and read this Certification Report prior to deciding whether to purchase the product.

# Introduction

## Overview

This chapter contains information about the purpose of this document and how to identify the Target of Evaluation (TOE).

## Purpose

The purpose of this Certification Report is to:

- report the certification of results of the IT security evaluation of the TOE against the requirements of the Common Criteria and Protection Profiles [4]
- provide a source of detailed security information about the TOE for any interested parties.

This report should be read in conjunction with the TOE's Security Target [7] which provides a full description of the security requirements and specifications that were used as the basis of the evaluation.

## Identification

The TOE is Junos OS 22.4R2 for MX304, EX4100-48MP, EX4100-24MP, EX4100-24P, EX4100-24T, EX4100-48P, EX4100-48T

Description	Version
Evaluation scheme	Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
TOE	Junos OS 22.4R2 for MX304, EX4100-48MP, EX4100-24MP, EX4100-24P, EX4100-24T, EX4100-48P, EX4100-48T
Software version	22.4R2
Hardware platform	MX304, EX4100-48MP, EX4100-24MP, EX4100-24P, EX4100-24T and EX4100-48P, EX4100-48T
Security Target	Security Target Junos OS 22.4R2 for MX304, EX4100-48MP, EX4100-24MP, EX4100-24P, EX4100-24T and EX4100-48P, EX4100-48T Version 1.1, 22 February 2024
Evaluation Technical Report	Evaluation Technical Report 1.0, dated 29 February 2024 Document reference EFT-T040-ETR 1.0
Criteria	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, April 2017, Version 3.1 Rev 5
Methodology	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version 3.1 Rev 5
Conformance	collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e dated 23 March 2020

PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption Version 1.0, 2  
March 2023

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# Target of Evaluation

## Overview

This chapter contains information about the Target of Evaluation (TOE), including a description of functionality provided, its architectural components, the scope of evaluation, its security policies and its secure usage.

## Description of the TOE

The TOE is Juniper Networks, Inc. Junos OS 22.4R2 for MX304, EX4100-48MP, EX4100-24MP EX4100-24P, EX4100-24T and EX4100-48P, EX4100-48T.

The TOE is an Ethernet-optimized edge router with 400-Gbps capacity. It implements both switching and carrier-class Ethernet routing. The TOE delivers an end-to-end infrastructure security solution for enterprises looking to move business-critical applications to public clouds. The TOE can be deployed in campus and branch access layer networks in the EVPN-VXLAN architectures.

The TOE allows definition and enforcement of information flow policies among subnetworks. Each information flow from one subnetwork to another passes through an instance of the TOE. The TOE makes a decision, based on the defined policies, whether the traffic is forwarded or dropped. Forwarding decisions are made on the basis of network addresses and protocols. The TOE also ensures that security-relevant activity is audited and provides the necessary functions to manage the security functions.

Each TOE is a secure network device that protects itself by offering only a minimal logical interface to the network and attached nodes. Junos OS 22.4R2 is a special purpose operating system that provides no general purpose computing capability. It implements both management and control functions as well as all IP routing.

The TOE also implements Media Access Control Security (MACsec) encryption and decryption for a trusted channel at the Data Link Layer.

## TOE Functionality

The TOE functionality that was evaluated is described in section 1.6 of the Security Target [7].

## TOE physical boundary


The TOE is the complete appliance consisting of the Junos OS 22.4R2 firmware running on the MX304, EX4100-48MP, EX4100-24MP, EX4100-24P, EX4100-24T, EX4100-48P, EX4100-48T chassis. The TOE includes an ARM-cortex A72 64-bit, single core processor. The MX304 variant includes an Intel Xeon D1735-TR CPU. The TOE also includes a line card which implements MACsec. The line card used by the MX304 variant of the TOE is JNP304-LMIC16.

The install image provided for the TOE is:

- EX4100 variants of the TOE: junos-install-ex-arm-64-22.4R2.8.tgz
- MX304 variant of the TOE: junos-vmhost-install-mx-x86-64-22.4R2.8.tgz

The firmware version reflects the detail reported for the components of the Junos OS when the “show version” command is executed on the device.

The physical boundary of the MX304, EX4100-48MP, EX4100-24MP, EX4100-24P, EX4100-24T, EX4100-48P, EX4100-48T devices is shown in the figure below.



The TOE interfaces comprise the following:

- network interfaces which control the traffic between the connected subnetworks
- management interface, which handles administrative actions.

## Architecture

The TOE consists of the following major architectural components.

The Routing Engine (RE) runs the Junos OS 22.4R2 software and implements Layer 3 routing services and Layer 2 switching services. The RE also implements a network management interface for the configuration and operation of the TOE. The RE controls the flow of information through the TOE, including support for appliance interface control and control plane functions such as chassis component, system management and user access to the appliance

The Packet Forwarding Engine (PFE) provides all operations necessary for transit packet forwarding.

The RE and the PFE function independently while constantly communicating through a high-speed internal link. This enables streamlined forwarding and routing control and the capability to run Internet-scale networks at high speeds.

Power supply bays allow flexibility for provisioning and redundancy. The power supplies distribute the different output voltages produced by the power supplies to the TOE components depending on their voltage requirements.

The TOE can be administered using a Command Line Interface (CLI) through the Junos OS. The CLI can be accessed from a connected terminal console or over a network connection. Management over a network connection is secured using the SSH protocol. All management accesses require successful authentication.

The TOE implements IEEE 802.1AE conformant MACsec for a Data Link Layer trusted channel between two instances of the TOE. The MACsec PHYs used by the variants of the TOE are given in the following:

TOE Variant	MACSEC PHY-1	MACSEC PHY-2
<b>MX304</b>	Juniper Trio 6	N/A
<b>EX4100-48MP</b>	BCM54998EM	BCM82756



<b>EX4100-24MP</b>	BCM84898M	BCM82756
<b>EX4100-24P</b>	BCM82756	N/A
<b>EX4100-24T</b>	BCM82756	N/A
<b>EX4100-48P</b>	BCM82756	N/A
<b>EX4100-48T</b>	BCM82756	N/A

## Clarification of scope

The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria and associated methodologies. The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target [7].

### Evaluated functionality

Functional tests performed during the evaluation were taken from the Protection Profile and Supporting Document and sufficiently demonstrate the security functionality of the TOE. Some of the tests were combined for ease of execution.

### Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware

The TOE relies on the provision of the following items in the network environment:

- Syslog server supporting SSHv2 connections to send audit logs
- A Management station with a SSHv2 client for remote administration
- Serial connection client for local administration

### Non-evaluated functionality and services

Potential users of the TOE are advised that some functions and services have not been evaluated as part of the evaluation. Potential users of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services outside of the evaluated configuration.

Australian Government users should refer to the *Australian Government Information Security Manual* [5] for policy relating to using an evaluated product in an unevaluated configuration.

The following components are considered outside of the scope of the TOE:

- use of telnet, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
- use of File Transfer Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
- use of Simple Network Management Protocol, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
- use of Secure Sockets Layer, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set
- use of Command Line Interface account super-user and linux root account.

## Security

The CCRA Security Function Policy is a set of rules that defines how information within the TOE is managed and protected. The Security Target [7] contains a summary of the functionality that is evaluated.

## Usage

### Evaluated configuration

The evaluated configuration is based on the default installation of the TOE with additional configuration implemented from specific guidance instructions. The Common Criteria document for this evaluation is *Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX304 Device with JNP304-LMIC16 Line Card, Published 2024-03-28, Release 22.4R2; Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX4100 Series Devices, Published 2024-03-27, Release 22.4R2* [6].

### Secure delivery

There are several mechanisms provided in the delivery process to ensure that a customer receives a product that has not been tampered with. The customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the integrity of the platform:

- shipping label - Ensure that the shipping label correctly identifies the correct customer name and address as well as the device
- outside packaging - Inspect the outside shipping box and tape. Ensure that the shipping tape has not been cut or otherwise compromised. Ensure that the box has not been cut or damaged to allow access to the device
- inside packaging - Inspect the plastic bag and seal. Ensure that the bag is not cut or removed. Ensure that the seal remains intact.

If the customer identifies a problem during the inspection, they should immediately contact the supplier providing the order number, tracking number and a description of the identified problem to the supplier.

Additionally, there are several checks that can be performed to ensure that the customer has received a box sent by Juniper Networks and not a different company masquerading as Juniper Networks. The customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the authenticity of the device:

- verify that the device was ordered using a purchase order. Juniper Networks devices are never shipped without a purchase order
- when a device is shipped, a shipment notification is sent to the e-mail address provided by the customer when the order is taken. Verify that this e-mail notification was received and contains the following information:
  - purchase order number
  - Juniper Networks order number used to track the shipment
  - carrier tracking number used to track the shipment
  - list of items shipped including serial numbers
  - address and contacts of both the supplier and the customer
- verify that the shipment was initiated by Juniper Network, performing the following tasks:
  - compare the carrier tracking number of the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks shipping notification with the tracking number on the package received

- log on to the Juniper Networks online customer support portal at <https://www.juniper.net/customers/csc/management> to view the order status
- compare the carrier tracking number or the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks shipment notification with the tracking number on the package received.

## Installation of the TOE

The configuration guides [6] contain all relevant information for the secure configuration of the TOE.

## Version verification

The verification of the TOE is largely automatic, including the verification using hashes. The TOE cannot load a modified image. Valid software images can be downloaded from the <https://www.juniper.net> support pages. In addition to the automated verification, the site includes individual hashes for each image. The administrator should verify the hash of the software before installing it into the hardware platform.

Security Administrators are able to query the current version of the TOE firmware using the CLI command 'show version'.

## Documentation and guidance

It is important that the TOE is used in accordance with guidance documentation in order to ensure secure usage. The following documentation is available to the consumer when the TOE is purchased. The evaluated configuration guide (system admin guide) document for the MX304 device and EX4100 series devices running Junos OS 22.4R2 is available for download at <https://www.juniper.net/documentation>. The documents are: *Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX304 Device with JNP304-LMIC16 Line Card, Published 2024-03-28, Release 22.4R2*; *Junos® OS, Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX4100 Series Devices, Published 2024-03-27, Release 22.4R2* [6].

Common Criteria material is available at <https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

The *Australian Government Information Security Manual* is available at <https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism> [5].

## Secure usage

The evaluation of the TOE took into account certain assumptions about its operational environment. These assumptions must hold in order to ensure the security objectives of the TOE are met.

The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device's physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains.

The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).

The administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organisation. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy. The network device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.

The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known security vulnerabilities.

The administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by the platform on which they reside.

The administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorised access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.

# Evaluation

## Overview

This chapter contains information about the procedures used in conducting the evaluation, the testing conducted as part of the evaluation and the certification result.

## Evaluation procedures

The criteria against which the Target of Evaluation (TOE) has been evaluated are contained in the relevant Protection Profiles [4] and Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Revision 5, Parts 2 and 3 [1, 2].

Testing methodology was drawn from Common Methodology for Information Technology Security, April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5 [3] and the relevant Supporting Documents [12].

The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the operational procedures of the Australian Information Security Evaluation Program [10].

In addition, the conditions outlined in the *Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security* [9] and the document *CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs* [13] were also upheld.

## Functional testing

All functional tests performed by the evaluators were taken from the Supporting Documents [12]. The tests were designed to provide the required testing coverage for the security functions claimed by the TOE.

## Entropy testing

The entropy design description, justification, operation and health tests are assessed and documented in a separate report [11].

## Penetration testing

The evaluators performed the evaluation activities for vulnerability assessment specified by the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices and Protection Profile Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption Supporting Documents [12] which follow a flaw hypothesis methodology. Accordingly, four types of flaw hypotheses have been considered:

- public vulnerabilities
- ND iTC (Network Device international Technical Community) sourced
- evaluation team generated
- tool generated.

Based on the results of this testing, the evaluators determined that the TOE is resistant to an attacker possessing a basic attack potential.

# Certification

## Overview

This chapter contains information about the result of the certification, an overview of the assurance provided and recommendations made by the certifiers.

## Assurance

This certification is focused on the evaluation of product compliance with Protection Profiles that cover the technology area of network devices. Organisations can have confidence that the scope of an evaluation against an ASD-approved Protection Profile covers the necessary security functionality expected of the evaluated product and known threats will have been addressed.

The analysis is supported by testing as outlined in the Protection Profile Supporting Documents and a vulnerability survey demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack potential. Compliance also provides assurance through evidence of secure delivery procedures. Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities.

The effectiveness and integrity of cryptographic functions are also within the scope of product evaluations performed in line with the Protection Profiles (PPs). PPs provide assurance by providing a full Security Target, and an analysis of the Security Functional Requirements in that Security Target, guidance documentation, and a basic description of the architecture of the TOE.

## Certification result

Terion Labs **has determined** that the TOE upholds the claims made in the Security Target [7] and **has met** the requirements of the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (CPP\_ND) and Protection Profile Module for Media Access Control Security (PP\_MOD\_MACsec) [4].

After due consideration of the conduct of the evaluation as reported to the certifiers, and of the Evaluation Technical Report [8], the Australian Certification Authority **certifies** the evaluation of Juniper Junos OS 22.4R2 for MX304 and EX4100-48MP, EX4100-24MP, EX4100-24P, EX4100-24T, EX4100-48P, EX4100-48T devices performed by the Australian Information Security Evaluation Facility, Terion Labs.

## Recommendations

Not all of the evaluated functionality present in the TOE may be suitable for Australian Government users. For further guidance, Australian Government users should refer to the Australian Government Information Security Manual [5].

In addition to ensuring that the assumptions concerning the operational environment are fulfilled, and the guidance document is followed, the Australian Certification Authority also recommends that users and administrators:

- ensure that the TOE is operated in the evaluated configuration and that assumptions concerning the TOE security environment are understood
- configure and operate the TOE according to the vendor's product administrator guidance and pay attention to all security warnings
- maintain the underlying environment in a secure manner so that the integrity of the TOE Security Function is preserved

- verify the hash of any downloaded software, as present on the <https://www.juniper.net> website
- have a system auditor review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE periodically.

# Annex A – References and abbreviations

## References

1. *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5*
2. *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5*
3. *Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, April 2017, Version 3.1 Revision 5*
4. Protection Profiles:
  - a) *collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP)*
  - b) *PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption Version 1.0, 2 March 2023 (PP\_MOD\_MACsec)*
5. *Australian Government Information Security Manual: <https://www.cyber.gov.au/ism>*
6. Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guides:
  - a) *Junos® OS Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for EX4100 Series Devices, Release 22.4R2, 27 March 2024*
  - b) *Junos® OS Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for MX304 Device with JNP304-LMIC16 Line Card, Release 22.4R2, 28 March 2024*
7. *Security Target Junos OS 22.4R2 for MX304, EX4100-48MP, EX4100-24MP EX4100-24P, EX4100-24T and EX4100-48P, EX4100-48T, Version 1.1, 22 February 2024*
8. *Evaluation Technical Report - Junos OS 22.4R2 for MX304, EX4100-48MP, EX4100-24MP EX4100-24P, EX4100-24T and EX4100-48P, EX4100-48T, dated 29 February 2024 (Document reference EFT-T040-ETR 1.0)*
9. *Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of Information Technology Security, 2 July 2014*
10. *AISEP Policy Manual (APM): [https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-03/2022\\_AUG\\_REL\\_AISEP\\_Policy\\_Manual\\_6.3.pdf](https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-03/2022_AUG_REL_AISEP_Policy_Manual_6.3.pdf)*
11. Entropy Reports:
  - a) *Junos OS Entropy Source version 22.4 Entropy Assessment and SP 800-90B Compliance Report, Version 1.0, 27 September 2023, EX4100 (ARM-cortex A72 64-bit, single core)*
  - b) *Junos OS Entropy Source version 22.4 Entropy Assessment and SP 800-90B Compliance Report, Version 1.0, 10 October 2023, MX304 (Intel Xeon D-1735TR)*
12. Supporting Documents:
  - a) *Supporting Document, Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 2.2, December-2019 (CPP\_ND\_SD)*
  - b) *Supporting Document, Mandatory Technical Document, PP-Module for MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.0, 02 March 2023*
13. *CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs 30 September 2021, Version 2.0 CCDB-013-v2.0*



## Abbreviations

AISEP	Australian Information Security Evaluation Program
ASD	Australian Signals Directorate
CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CLI	Command Line Interface
EVPN-VXLAN	Ethernet Virtual Private Network-Virtual Extensible Local Area Network
Gbps	Gigabit per second
MACsec	Media Access Control Security
NDcPP	CCRA-approved collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
ND iTC	Network Device international Technical Community
PFE	Packet Forwarding Engine
PHY	Physical Layer
PP	Protection Profile
RE	Routing Engine
SSH	Secure Shell
TOE	Target of Evaluation