National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on
Android 11
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11315-2022
Dated: December 16, 2022
Version: 0.1
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant
Lauren Hardy
Randy Heimann
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Clare Parran
Chris Thorpe
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tyler Catterton
Allison Keenan
Raymond Smoley
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.3 User data protection ............................................................................................ 5
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 6
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 6
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 7
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 7
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 8
6 Documentation.......................................................................................................... 10
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 11
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 11
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 11
8 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 12
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 13
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 13
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 13
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 13
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................... 14
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 14
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 14
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 15
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 16
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 17
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 18
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 19
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 20
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on
Android 11 solution provided by Panasonic Connect of North America. It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report
is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government,
and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in December 2022. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part
2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements of the PP-
Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals and Bluetooth, version 1.0, 15 April 2021.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on
Android 11.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Panasonic Connect
TOUGHBOOK Devices on Android 11 Security Target, version 1.4, December 7, 2022 and
analysis performed by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on Android 11
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals and Bluetooth, version 1.0,
April 15, 2021
ST Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on Android 11 Security Target,
version 1.4, December 7, 2022
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on
Android 11, version 0.3, December 7, 2022
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor & Developer Panasonic Connect of North America
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Sheldon Durrant, Lauren Hardy, Randy Heimann, Lisa Mitchell, Linda Morrison,
Clare Parran, Chris Thorpe
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on
Android 11.
The Panasonic Devices are rugged handheld with an SDM660 chipset, angled rear-facing
barcode reader, optional stylus pen, and battery that is warm-swappable. The N1 uses the
Android operating system, providing access to applications from the Google Play store or
Panasonic's partners. The N1 features built-in multi-carrier 4G LTE and FirstNet Ready with
Band 14, voice capabilities, and dual SIM cards. The TOE supports using client certificates
to connect to access points offering WPA2/WPA3 networks with 802.1x/EAP-TLS, or
alternatively connecting to cellular base stations when utilizing mobile data.
The TOE offers mobile applications an Application Programming Interface (API) including
that provided by the Android framework and supports API calls to the Android Management
APIs.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a rich API to mobile applications and provides users installing an
application the option to either approve or reject an application based upon the API access
that the application requires (or to grant applications access at runtime).
The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption,
including all user and mobile application data stored in the user’s data partition. The TOE
uses a key hierarchy that combines a REK with the user’s password to provide protection to
all user and application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE.
Finally, the TOE can interact with a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system (not part
of this evaluation) to allow enterprise control of the configuration and operation of the device
so as to ensure adherence to enterprise-wide policies (for example, restricting use of a
corporate provided device’s camera, forced configuration of maximum login attempts,
pulling of audit logs off the TOE, etc.) as well as policies governing enterprise applications
and data. An MDM is made up of two parts: the MDM agent and MDM server. The MDM
Agent is installed on the phone/mobile computer as an administrator with elevated
permissions (allowing it to change the relevant settings on the phone/device) while the MDM
Server is used to issue the commands to the MDM Agent. Neither portion of the MDM
process is considered part of the TOE, and therefore not being directly evaluated.
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The TOE includes several different levels of execution including (from lowest to highest):
hardware, a Trusted Execution Environment, Android’s Linux kernel, and Android’s user
space, which provides APIs allowing applications to leverage the cryptographic functionality
of the device.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE runs
Android as its software/OS, executing on a Qualcomm Snapdragon processor. The TOE does
not include the user applications that run on top of the operating system but does include
controls that limit application behavior. Further, the device provides support for
downloadable MDM agents to be installed to limit or permit different functionality of the
device. There is no built-in MDM agent pre-installed on the device.
The TOE communicates and interacts with 802.11-2012 Access Points and mobile data
networks to establish network connectivity, and through that connectivity interacts with
MDM servers that allow administrative control of the TOE.
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4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. User data protection
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE implements a security log and logcat that are each stored in a circular memory
buffer. An MDM agent can read/fetch the security logs, can retrieve logcat logs, and then
handle appropriately (potentially storing the log to Flash or transmitting its contents to the
MDM server). These log methods meet the logging requirements outlined by FAU_GEN.1
in MDFPPv3.2.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with CAVP certified algorithms for a
wide range of cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation
and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing
and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random
bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key
storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions may
be used to implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS, IPsec, and HTTPS and to
encrypt the media (including the generation and protection of data and key encryption keys)
used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to
applications running on the TOE allowing application developers to ensure their application
meets the required criteria to remain compliant to MDFPP standards.
4.3 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of
the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data
using File-Based Encryption (FBE) so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains
protected. The TOE’s evaluated configuration supports Android Enterprise profiles to
provide additional separation between application and application data belonging to the
Enterprise profile. Please see the Admin Guide for additional details regarding how to set
up and use Enterprise profiles.
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4.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a
user perspective, except for FCC mandated (making phone calls to an emergency number)
or non-sensitive functions (e.g., choosing the keyboard input method or taking screen shots),
a password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the
TOE. Also, even when unlocked, the TOE requires the user re-enter the password to change
the password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's
display and the frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of
failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed
using upper and lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords up
to 16 characters are supported.
The TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can both use X.509v3 and validate
certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified
throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile
devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are
restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once
the TOE has been enrolled.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and
integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic
keys so that they are not accessible or exportable through the use of the application
processor’s hardware. The TOE disallows all read access to the Root Encryption Key and
retains all keys derived from the REK within its Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).
Application software can only use keys derived from the REK by reference and receive the
result.
The TOE also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is
available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page
protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow
protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It also protects itself from
modification by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one
another to protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will
not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital
signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the
updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital
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signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation as all
applications must have signatures (even if self-signed).
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of
inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an administrator specified (using the
TOE’s MDM API) advisory message (banner) when the user unlocks the TOE for the first
use after reboot.
The TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS and TLS, HTTPS
to secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
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5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.2, 15 April 2021
• PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021
• General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals
Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February 2019
That information has not been reproduced here and the
MDFPP32/BT10/WLANCEP10/PKGTLS11 should be consulted if there is interest in that
material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP32/BT10/WLANCEP10/PKGTLS11 as described for this TOE in the Security
Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation.
All other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile with the
Bluetooth Module, the Wireless Local Area Network Clients Extended Package and
the TLS Package and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Mobile Device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore
should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
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• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDFPP32/BT10/WLANCEP10/PKGTLS11 and
applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional
capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Administrator Guidance Documentation, Version 1.0.2, December 7, 2022
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Panasonic
Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on Android 11, Version 0.3, December 7, 2022 (DTR), as
summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP32/BT10/WLANCEP10/PKGTLS11
including the tests associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 lists the
tested devices, provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE encompasses mobile devices that support enterprises and individual users alike and
this evaluation includes the following models and versions.
Product Model # CPU Kernel Android OS version Security Patch Level
TOUGHBOOK N1 SDM660 4.19.157 Android 11.0 November 2022
TOUGHBOOK S1 SDM660 4.19.157 Android 11.0 November 2022
TOUGHBOOK A3 SDM660 4.19.157 Android 11.0 November 2022
Some features and settings must be enabled for the TOE to operate in its evaluated
configuration. The following features and settings must be enabled:
1. Require a lockscreen password
2. Disable Smart Lock
3. Disable Debugging Features (Developer options)
4. Disable installation of applications from unknown sources
5. VPN Full Tunnel Configuration and disable Captive Portal checking
6. Enable Audit Logging
7. Enable Encryption of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth secrets by enabling CC mode
Doing this ensures that the device complies with the MDFPP requirements. Please refer to
the Admin Guide on how to configure these settings and features.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Panasonic
Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on Android 11 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the
SARs contained in the MDFPP32/BT10/WLANCEP10/PKGTLS11.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK
Devices on Android 11 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product
security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP32/BT10/WLANCEP10/
PKGTLS11 related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
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to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP32/BT10/WLANCEP10/PKGTLS11
and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 11/28/2022 with the following search terms: "Panasonic",
"Panasonic Toughbook", "Toughbook", "Toughbook N1", "Toughbook A3", "Toughbook
S1", "Android", "Android 11", "BoringSSL", "Android Locksettings service KBKDF",
"QTI Crypto Engine Core", "QTI Inline Crypto Engine", "QTI Random Number
Generation".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in Administrator Guidance
Documentation, Version 1.0.2, December 7, 2022. No versions of the TOE and software,
either earlier or later were evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product
was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by devices in
the operational environment, need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can
be drawn about their effectiveness
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11 Annexes
Not applicable
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12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on Android
11 Security Target, Version 1.4, December 7, 2022.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals and Bluetooth, version 1.0, 15
April 2021.
[5] Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 3.2, 15 April 2021
[6] PP-Module for Bluetooth, Version 1.0, 15 April 2021
[7] General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/Mobile Device Fundamentals
Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN)
Clients, Version 1.0, 08 February 2016
[8] Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, 12 February
2019
[9] Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on Android 11 Security Target, Version
1.4, 12/07/22 (ST).
[10] Assurance Activity Report for Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on
Android 11, Version 0.3, December 7, 2022 (AAR).
[11] Detailed Test Report for Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on Android 11,
Version 0.3, December 7, 2022 (DTR).
[12] Evaluation Technical Report for Panasonic Connect TOUGHBOOK Devices on
Android 11, Version 0.3, December 7, 2022 (ETR)