BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025
for
Swissbit Cloud CSPL, Version 1.0.7
from
Swissbit AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.49
BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025 (*)
Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL)
Swissbit Cloud CSPL, Version 1.0.7
from Swissbit AG
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019,
Version 1.0, 12 November 2019
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration with PP-
Modules BSI-CC-PP-0112-2020 and BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020
each in Version 1.0 from 26 February 2020
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_CMS.3 and ALC_LCD.1
valid until: 26 March 2030
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For
details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 27 March 2025
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................19
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................20
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................20
13. Definitions................................................................................................................20
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................24
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Swissbit Cloud CSPL, Version 1.0.7 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Swissbit Cloud CSPL, Version 1.0.7 was conducted by SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 13 March 2025.
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised
by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Swissbit AG
The product was developed by: Swissbit AG
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 27 March
2025 is valid until 26 March 2030. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Swissbit Cloud CSPL, Version 1.0.7 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Swissbit AG
Industriestraße 4
9552 Bronschhofen
Schweiz
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of evaluation (TOE) is the product Swissbit Cloud CSPL, Version 1.0.7,
provided by Swissbit AG running on FIPS 140-3 Level 4 certified version of the Private
Machines Enforcer R2 compute blades as the execution platform. The hardware is not part
of the TOE.
The TOE is a Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL or CSP-L) claiming the following
Common Criteria Protection Profile configuration:
● Cryptographic Service Provider Light, Version 1.0, registered under BSI-CC-PP-0111-
2019, 12 November 2019, Federal Office for Information Security.
In combination with the following PP-Modules:
● Protection Profile-Module CSPLight Time Stamp Service and Audit, registered under
BSI-CC-PP-0112-2020, 26 February 2020, Federal Office for Information Security.
● Protection Profile-Module CSPLight Time Stamp Service and Audit – Clustering, Version
1.0, registered under BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020, 26 February 2020, Federal Office for
Information Security.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the above mentioned
certified Common Criteria Protection Profiles [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_CMS.3 and ALC_LCD.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Key management The key management functionality covers several management
functionalities with regards to cryptographic keys, including an access
control security functional policy on the corresponding cryptographic
keys. This policy governs all functions of the TOE that use (or result in) a
key, including but not limited to key creation, key derivation, key
deletion, key property modification, key import and key export.
Cryptographic operations for
encryption & decryption
The TOE supports symmetric data encryption and decryption using AES
in CBC mode with cryptographic key lengths of 128 and 256 bits.
Hybrid encryption for user data The TOE provides hybrid data encryption/decryption and MAC
calculation/verification of user data.
Data integrity mechanisms The TOE provides data integrity protection by symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography.
Authentication & attestation of
the TOE, trusted channel
The TOE provides a cryptographically protected trusted communication
channel between the TOE and external entities as well as the
authentication of external entities.
Access control The TOE enforces a strict role based access control. The roles
associated with the authenticated user and user’s current status define
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
the authorization and allowed use of services and objects.
Security management The TOE provides administrative services such as management of
security functions, roles and attributes.
Protection of the TSF The TOE performs tests of the configuration of the TOE, availability of
the time source, access control system, availability of entropy and
cryptographic subroutines.
Secure Update The TOE supports downloading, integrity and authenticity verification
and decryption of Update Code Packages (UCP) and is provided to the
Administrator only.
Time stamping The TOE provides a time stamp service. All time-related services take
place using access to the TOE’s internal system clock which is
synchronized using a secure local trusted Network Time Protocol (NTP)
Server.
Security Audit The TOE generates audit records on selected user activities and
security events of the TOE. Audit records are exported by the TOE in
signed and time stamped form.
Clustering The TOE supports clustering of a single master node and one slave
node to improve the availability of the TOE.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies which are outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapters 3.4, 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025 Certification Report
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Swissbit Cloud CSPL, Version 1.0.7
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
Type Identifier Description/ Additional Information Release Form of Delivery
SW TOE (as
software)
For its operation, the TOE needs the
following hardware and software
requirements fulfilled in its environment.
The Enforcer R2 by Private Machines
as the execution platform which has
been certified according to FIPS 140-2
level 4 with following characteristics has
to be used:
Manufacturer: PMI
Product: E-RX2
Hardware version: R2-XD1736NT
Firmware Version: 2.1.2
Libucl Version: 2.7.1
Libdrbg Version: 2.0.0
Ubuntu server version: 24.04
1.0.7 The signed jar file is stored
in the fiscal3- fabric git
repository of Swissbit AG
and the corresponding
commit is tagged with cspl-
v1.0.7 (1.0.7 is the version
of the Swissbit Cloud CSP-
L of the current Common
Criteria certification
process).
DOC Associated
guidance
documentation
, [10]
Swissbit Cloud CSP-L - Guidance
Documentation, Version 1.1.5,
06.11.2024, Swissbit AG
SHA256:
e9705ebece421ed28895b0fd60fd48986
9522815a9369f2ff28be045256a97d0
1.1.5 The guidance document
and the TOE are delivered
to the customer via a
personal delivery,
encrypted and signed
email or a secure
download portal.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The CSP-L (as a software) is delivered from the developer (and sponsor of the
certification) (Swissbit AG) to the operator of the CSP-L (again Swissbit AG). This is done
by storing the software and guidance document in the corresponding git repository and
tagging it accordingly.
Identification of the TOE by the User
Before the actual installation, it shall be ensured that the provided *.jar file that implements
the Swissbit Cloud CSP-L is authentic. This can be achieved by either checking the hash
value of the *.jar file and compare it to the known value. This known value has to be
received from the developer of the Swissbit Cloud CSP-L via a secured channel (e.g. a
signed email). Alternatively, the signature of the *.jar file can be verified using the following
command:
jarsigner -verify -verbose -keystore truststore cspl-1.0.7.jar
The required truststore file has to be received from the developer of the Swissbit Cloud
CSPL via a secured channel (e.g. a signed email).
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3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE implements a role-based access control policy to control administrative access to
the system. In addition, the TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security
functional classes:
● Key management
● Data encryption
● Hybrid encryption with MAC for user data
● Data integrity mechanisms
● Time Stamp
● Authentication and attestation of the TOE, trusted channel
● User identification and authentication
● Access control
● Security Management
● Security Audit
● Protection of the TSF
● Import and verification of Update Code Package
● Clustering
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in chapter
7 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.CommInf: Communication infrastructure
● OE.AppComp: Support of the Application component
● OE.SecManag: Security management
● OE.SecComm: Protection of communication channel
● OE.SUCP: Signed Update Code Packages
● OE.SecPlatform: Secure Hardware Platform
● OE.Audit: Review and availability of audit records
● OE.TimeSource: External time source
● OE.ClusterCtrl: Control of the cluster
● OE.TSFdataTrans: Transfer of TSF data within the CSPLight cluster
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Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a software-only TOE running on dedicated non-TOE hardware (Private
Machines Enforcer R2) as well as dedicated non-TOE software (Ubuntu Linux), which
together build the platform. The TOE is operated on the hardware platform “Enforcer R2”
which is certified according to FIPS 140-2 Level 4. The non-TOE Enforcer R2 platform is
expected to provide protection against physical intrusion and tampering. Additionally, the
TOE protects itself from tampering by untrusted entities due to its SFR-enforcing
subsystems. The non-TOE software is Ubuntu Linux distribution with a minimal
functionality.
The SFR-enforcing subsystems of the TOE are:
● Frontend subsystem:
● Management of the three external interfaces of the TOE
● Responsible for the start-up of the CSPL and thereby for the correct initialization
of all other subsystems
● Performs extraction of the message contained in the request,
● User identity checks, MAC verification, Decryption
● Forwarding to the respective handler, the handler performs formal validity
checks, checks on the authentication level based on the claimed user and
execution of actions belonging to the respective handler,
● Starts a timer which performs a self-test once every time the timer runs out
● Handles five different authentication ways
● Crypto subsystem:
● Implements all cryptographic functionality needed by the TOE. It is also
responsible for secure key storage and export based on access control
attributes.
● The crypto subsystem is also responsible to seed the DRNG of Bouncy Castle
at startup and during every self-test.
● Audit subsystem: Generates audit log messages and to write an application log.
The audit log is signed and stored on the persistent memory of the hardware
platform.
● Storage subsystem: Writes to and reads data from the persistent storage of the
system. The persisted storage is used to store configuration files.
● Timekeeping subsystem: Handles the system time via chrony daemon and via a
dedicated command. The chrony daemon synchronizes the clock of the local
machine against an authenticated time server at PTB. The time can be adjusted
manually, if the chrony daemon stops working.
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6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
TOE test configuration
The TOE Swissbit Cloud CSPL is a pure software implementation and it is dedicated to
provide cryptographic services for the protection of the confidentiality and the integrity of
user data, and for entity authentication. The TOE has to be initialized/personalized in terms
of a clustering behaviour (each master is assigned exactly one slave).
The current test environment comprises the following components:
● The TOE as JAR file
● The CSP-L Repository, which includes the test scripts
● Instantiation of a TOE-master and a TOE-slave on an Enforcer R2 (by Private
Machines)
● A Test-PC with an SSH connection to a controller instance which has an SSH
connection to the TOE-master and TOE-slave
Tests of the Developer
Testing approach
The developer tests cover all interfaces. The tests performed can be categorized into three
groups: unit, manual tests and source code review tests. Some unit tests are implemented
as parameterized test which are executed in multiple iterations for a number of parameter
combinations.
Testing Results
All developer test results are either ‘pass’ or ‘skipped’. Skipped tests are either code
review tests or parameterized test cases which are executed in multiple iterations for a
number of parameter combinations.
Independent Evaluator Tests
Subset size chosen:
The evaluators repeated all developer tests, including TSFI, unit and manual tests.
Evaluator tests performed:
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The developer tests cover all TSFIs. Since the evaluators repeated the complete list of
developer tests, all given interfaces are covered by the testing. In addition some
independent evaluator tests were performed.
All tests were executed successfully.
Penetration tests performed
Penetration testing approach:
For the general communication with the TOE for external entities connecting from the
internet the interface IF.REST is used. The approach is to try to inject arbitrary data into
the TOE by a fuzzing attack on the interface IF.REST. Since the TOE accepts only
communication via the PACE protocol, this means to overcame the protection of the PACE
protocol.
Some SFRs were covered by the penetration tests. The remaining SFRs were analysed,
but not penetration tested due to non-exploitability of the related attack scenarios in the
TOE’s operational environment also including an attacker with a Basic attack potential.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the Security Target [6]
provided that all measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
The TOE test configuration is defined by the notation:
● Swissbit Cloud CSP-L, version 1.0.7
● The document Swissbit Cloud CSP-L 1.0.7, Guidance Documentation [10]
The evaluators verified in the documentation and the test environment, that the correct
version is used for testing by analysing the test result of a “PerformSelftestRequest” as
part of the test case “checkSelftestFormat”. The test case checks for a correct TOE
identification which is “Swissbit Cloud CSP-L, Version 1.0.7”.
The TOE is running on a special hardware platform, the Enforcer R2 (by Private Machines)
(hardware version: R2-XD1736NT, firmware version: 2.1.2 with libucl version: 2.7.1 and
libdrbg version: 2.0.0). The installation of a productive system on a different hardware (or a
different version of the hardware) is not allowed. In addition the developer states, that the
user has to setup the Enforcer R2 by installing a Ubuntu server.
The evaluator confirmed the following versions by querying the enforcer blade version:
● Manufacturer: PMI
● Product: E-RX2
● Firmware version: 2.1.2
● Libucl version: 2.7.1
● Libdrbg version: 2.0.0
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The hardware carries a certification according to FIPS 140-3 level 4.
A Ubuntu server (non-TOE) with version 24.04 is used.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20/31 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_CMS.3 and ALC_LCD.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance to the following PP configuration:
Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL) Version 1.0, 12
November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider
Light – Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au) Version 1.0, 26
February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0112-2020,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider
Light - Time Stamp Service and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl),
Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020[8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_CMS.3 and ALC_LCD.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
1 Establishing
trusted
channel
PACE TR-03110 [11] 256 CSPL PP [8] ST, [6],
chap. 6.1
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard of
Application
Comments
2 Establishing
trusted
channel
Terminal
Authentication
TR-03110 [11] 256
(ECDSA)
CSPL PP [8] ST, [6],
chap. 6.1
3 Establishing
trusted
channel
Chip Authentication TR-03110 [11] 256
(ECDSA)
CSPL PP [8] ST, [6],
chap. 6.1
4 Trusted
channel
AES CBC/CMAC TR-03110 [11] 128, 256 CSPL PP [8] ST, [6],
chap. 6.1
5 Serving
pseudo
random
numbers
Serving Random
Numbers
Iterated hash RNG
as in Example 39
of SP-800-38E [12]
≥ 125 bits
of entropy
CSPL PP [8] ST, [6],
chap. 6.1
6 Serving
random
numbers
Serving Random
Numbers
By (non-TOE)HW-
platform
≥ 125 bits
of entropy
CSPL PP [8] ST, [6],
chap. 6.1
7 Signing user
data
(ECDSA with
SHA-256) or
(RSA-4096 with
SHA-256)
FIPS186-4 [13] or
(ISO/IEC 14888-2
[14] and
PKCS #1 [15])
256 CSPL PP [8] ST, [6],
chap. 6.1
8 Verifying
user data
(ECDSA with
SHA-256) or
(RSA-4096 with
SHA-256)
FIPS186-4 [13] or
(ISO- IEC_14888-
2 [14] and
PKCS #1 [15])
256 CSPL PP [8] ST, [6],
chap. 6.1
9 Attestation ECDSA with
SHA-256
FIPS186-4 [13] 256 CSPL PP [8] ST, [6],
chap. 6.1
10 Clustering of
keys
keywrap and
unwrap
NIST-SP800- 38F
[16]
128, 256 PP-
Configuration
CSPLight- TS-
Au-Cl [8]
ST, [6],
chap. 6.3
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to the Common Criteria Protection Profile Configurations [8] the algorithms are
suitable for the corresponding purpose. An explicit validity period is not given.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
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techniques to be covered, he or she should define the period of time until a re-assessment
of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSP Cryptographic Service Provider
CSPL Cryptographic Service Provider Light
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JAR Java Archive
JVM Java Virtual Machine
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTP Network Time Protocol
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PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMAERS Security Module Application for Electronic Record-keeping Systems
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
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Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025, Swissbit Cloud CSP-L - Common Criteria
Security Target, Version 1.2.6, 06.11.2024, Swissbit AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Evaluation Report - Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)
- Summary -, Version 0.6, 15.11.2024, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL) Version 1.0, 12
November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider
Light – Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au) Version 1.0, 26
February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0112-2020,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider
Light - Time Stamp Service and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl),
Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020
[9] Configuration List including the implementation representation, File name: Swissbit-
CSPL-SourceCodeList-v0.9.0.csv, Version 0.9.0, SHA256-value:
3696775b4517d1e08eee55c306b6b92e5d75b06698315166b68953e927b079fc
[10] Swissbit Cloud CSP-L - Guidance Documentation, Version 1.1.5, 06.11.2024,
Swissbit AG
7
specifically
• AIS14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt von Einzelprüfberichten für Evaluationen
nach CC
• AIS19, Version 9, Gliederung des ETR
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[11] Technical Guideline TR-03110 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token – Part 2 - Protocols for electronic
IDentification, Authentication and trust Services (eIDAS), Version 2.21, 2016, BSI
[12] [SP800-38E], Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the XTS-AES
Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, January 2010
[13] [FIPS186-4], Digital Signature Standard (DSS), 2013, NIST
[14] [ISO/IEC 14888-2], Information technology – Security techniques, Digital signatures
with appendix – Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms, 2008
[15] [PKCS #1 v2.2], RSA Cryptographic Standard, 27.10.2012, RSA Laboratories
[16] [SP800-38F], Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for
Key Wrapping, 2012, NIST
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1238-2025
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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Note: End of report
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