National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Knox File Encryption 1.6.0 – Fall
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11540-2024
Dated: November 27, 2024
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jerome Myers, Ph.D.
Meredith Martinez
Mike Quintos
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Description................................................................................................. 3
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.3 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.4 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 5
4.2 User data protection............................................................................................ 5
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 5
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 5
4.5 Privacy ................................................................................................................ 5
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 6
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 6
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 7
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 8
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 9
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................... 9
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................... 9
8 Evaluated Configuration........................................................................................... 10
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 11
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 11
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ............................................................ 11
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)............................................... 11
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ................................... 12
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 12
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 12
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 12
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 14
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 15
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 16
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 17
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 18
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
1
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
validation team of the evaluation of Samsung Knox File Encryption solution provided by Samsung
Electronics Co., Ltd. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) by any
agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was completed in
November 2024. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical
Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The
evaluation determined that the product is compliant with both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
and Part 3 Extended, and meets the assurance requirements of the Protection Profile for
Application Software, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021 (ASPP14) with the PP-Module for File
Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019 (FE10).
The Target of Evaluation is the Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0.
The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version
3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev
5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The
evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria
Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive
versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product
satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target
(ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate,
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Samsung Electronics Co.,
Ltd. Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0 - Fall Security Target, Version 0.3, November 13, 2024
and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
2
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product evaluations.
Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing laboratories called
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common Evaluation Methodology
(CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a security
evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon successful
completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Application Software and File Encryption, Version 1.1, 07
April 2022 (CFG_APP-FE_v1.1) which includes the Base PP: Protection Profile
for Application Software, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021 (ASPP14) with the PP-
Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019 (FE10)
ST Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0 - Fall
Security Target, Version 0.3, November 13, 2024
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0, Version
0.2, November 13, 2024
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
Sponsor Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Developer Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Jerome Myers, Ph.D.
Meredith Martinez
Mike Quintos
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
3
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the Security
Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0. The TOE is a service
built into Samsung Knox that can provide an additional layer of file encryption when configured.
This is available on devices with Android 14 and Knox 3.10.
3.1 TOE Description
The TOE is a software service built into Samsung Android 14 with Knox 3.10 to provide file
encryption. Samsung Knox File Encryption is designed to provide a second encryption layer
similar to and on top of the file-based encryption (FBE) layer for the entire device. The Knox File
Encryption service runs in the background and utilizes Samsung Android cryptographic modules
to provide file encryption services. The service is designed to run without any user intervention as
all files will be encrypted automatically.
Knox File Encryption can be configured to encrypt files only in a Knox work profile or it can
alternately be configured to encrypt the entire device. When configured as part of a Knox work
profile, the service relies on the Knox work profile to provide the user’s password for
authentication (the password entered for the work profile), and then encrypts all files stored in the
Knox work profile. When configured to encrypt all contents of the device, Knox File Encryption
provides an authentication prompt (separate from the device lock screen). In this configuration all
files stored on the device will be encrypted.
The Master Key (MKDD) is protected by a Trusted App inside TrustZone by the user’s password.
Each encrypted file is protected by a uniquely generated FEK which is encrypted by the Master
Key as a KEK. The administrator can specify a period of inactivity after which the Master Key
and all FEKs are wiped from memory to fully lock the encrypted files.
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Details regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 of this document.
3.3 TOE Architecture
The TOE is software built into Samsung Knox. The TOE is designed as a framework for providing
file encryption for files on the device. The software is comprised of four major components: the
DualDAR Service, the DualDAR Client, the DualDAR Driver and cryptographic modules.
Management of the TOE is provided through normal device administration functions; the TOE
does not provide any configuration or management capabilities itself but relies on the platform to
provide a User Interface (UI) (such as for password entry or management) and Mobile Device
Management (MDM) control. Administration is limited to enabling the File Encryption feature.
The boundary of files being encrypted is called the File Encryption Boundary (FEB). Once the
FEB has been set, by creating a File Encryption-enabled work profile, the service for
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
4
encrypting/decrypting files is the same. The specific version listed for DualDAR denotes the FEB
that can be set.
The components provide the following functions within the TOE:
• DualDAR Service: manages the implementation of the configuration and monitoring
system status for the lock state
• DualDAR Client: handles access to the Master Key (unlock and wipe)
• DualDAR Driver: handles the encryption/decryption I/O of files with the Master Key
unlocked by the DualDAR Client
• Cryptographic Modules: handle the cryptographic operations of the TOE (Samsung
Kernel Cryptographic Module and Samsung SCrypto)
Depending on the FEB configuration, the TOE either utilizes the Knox work profile authentication
or provides its own authentication to unlock the 256-bit Master Key. Once the Master Key is
unlocked the DualDAR Driver can read an encrypted file to unlock the individual 256-bit FEK.
The unlocked FEK is then used to decrypt the contents. When using a Knox work profile, all open
files will be closed and all unlocked FEKs and the Master Key will be cleared from memory (this
is handled by the DualDAR Service) when the profile becomes locked. When not using a Knox
work profile, the administrator can specify an inactivity period to force a device restart to close all
open files and clear all FEKs and the Master Key.
By default (and in this configuration), the DualDAR Driver utilizes the Samsung Kernel
Cryptographic Module of the device for AES-CBC-256 to decrypt/encrypt the contents of the file.
The FEK is encrypted with AES-GCM using the 256-bit Master Key. All keys are generated using
platform-provided Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) functions and are 256-bit.
The TOE does not provide or utilize any communications services, nor does the TOE transmit or
receive data or keys from remote systems.
Samsung provides a Software Development Kit (SDK) which can be used to integrate a third-party
encryption library to be used by the DualDAR Service and Driver but this configuration is not
included as part of this evaluation.
3.4 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a software application running on a mobile device. The mobile device platform
provides a host Operating System and a Trusted Execution Environment.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
5
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Privacy
6. Protection of the TSF
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE runs as part of Samsung Android 14 with Knox 3.10 and includes several cryptographic
libraries for encryption/decryption/cryptographic hashing functions for securing file contents and
TOE keys.
4.2 User data protection
Depending on the FEB configuration, the TOE either protects all user data within the Knox work
profile or the entire device by providing an automatic encryption service for all stored files;
applications do not have to be made aware of the Knox File Encryption service to be protected.
All keys are AES 256-bit, using AES-GCM for FEK protection and AES-CBC for file content
protection.
4.3 Identification and authentication
Depending on the FEB configuration, the TOE either utilizes the authentication services provided
by the Knox work profile or its own authentication dialog to unlock the Master Key. Unsuccessful
authentication will prevent the Master Key from being unlocked, and hence no encrypted files can
be accessed.
4.4 Security management
The services provided by the TOE are not available until Knox File Encryption has been enabled.
Authentication management and the work profile lock settings are handled by the Knox work
profile management and are generic for all Knox work profile configurations. When the whole
device is configured for encryption authentication settings are handled by a combination of the
device authentication settings and additional Knox File Encryption settings. In either case, these
settings cannot be managed directly on the device but must be configured from the MDM.
4.5 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit Personally Identifiable Information over any network interfaces nor
does it request access to any applications that may contain such information.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
6
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE relies on the physical boundary of the evaluated platform as well as the Samsung Android
operating system for the protection of the TOE’s components.
The TOE relies on the Samsung Android operating system to provide updates as the software is
incorporated as part of the device image. The version of the Knox File Encryption software can be
seen in the About Device page of the mobile device with the Knox version information (as the
DualDAR version).
The TOE is a Samsung component, and all code is maintained solely by Samsung. Only
documented APIs available in Samsung Android (which includes the Knox work profile and
Samsung cryptographic libraries) are used.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE does not transmit Personally Identifiable Information over any network interfaces.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
7
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, 7 October 2021 (ASPP14)
• PP-Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, 25 July 2019 (FE10)
That information has not been reproduced here and the ASPP14/FE10 should be consulted if there
is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
ASPP14/FE10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the
devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities specified
in the Application Software Protection Profile with the File Encryption Module and
performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific File
Encryption Application models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and
therefore should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities that
were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines
an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding
of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements
specified in the ASPP14/FE10 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security
related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
8
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Samsung File Encryption 1.6.0 Administrator Guide, Version 1.6, November 13, 2024
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in
the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guide from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
9
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Samsung Knox File
Encryption, Version 0.2, November 13, 2024 (DTR), as summarized in Section 3.4 of the
Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification document
and ran the tests specified in the ASPP14/FE10 including the tests associated with optional
requirements. A list of the tested devices is provided in Section 1.2 of the AAR, and a diagram of
the test environment with a list of test tools is provided in Section 3.4.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
10
8 Evaluated Configuration
The following table shows the model numbers of the mobile devices tested during the evaluation
of Knox File Encryption 1.6.0 (the version is listed as “DualDAR”):
Device
Name
Chipset
Vendor
SoC Arch Kernel
DualDAR
Version
Build Number
Galaxy Z
Flip6 5G
Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 Gen 3 ARMv8 6.1 1.6.0 UP1A.231005.007
Galaxy
S24 FE
Samsung Exynos 2400 ARMv8 6.1 1.6.0 UP1A.231005.007
Evaluated Devices
In addition to the evaluated devices, the following device models are claimed as equivalent with a
note about the differences between the evaluated device and the equivalent models.
Evaluated
Device
SoC Equivalent
Devices
Differences
Galaxy Z Flip6
5G
Snapdragon 8
Gen 3
Galaxy Z Fold6
5G
Galaxy Z Fold
A
Z Fold6 > Z Flip6 in terms of display size
Galaxy S24 FE Exynos 2400 N/A
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
11
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of performing the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and
are presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Knox File Encryption TOE
to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the ASPP14/FE10.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains
a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0 products that are
consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the
requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the design
documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the security
functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in the
Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator performed the assurance
activities specified in the ASPP14/FE10 related to the examination of the information contained
in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely
administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the
evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
12
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the TOE
was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the ASPP14/FE10 and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The search was performed on November 13, 2024, and a
summary is included in Section 3.5 of the AAR. The public search for vulnerabilities did not
uncover any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: “Galaxy S24”, “SM-S721”,
“Galaxy Z Flip6”, “SM-F741”, “Galaxy Z Fold6”, “SM-F956”, “SM-F958”, “Knox”,
“BoringSSL”, “DualDAR”, “containercore”, “Android”, “Exynos”, “Qualcomm Snapdragon”.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in the
ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of the
claims in the ST.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
13
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
14
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The TOE is an application that functions as a component of a mobile device and is an early
participant in NIAP's SBOM evaluation requirement. The validation team notes that the evaluated
configuration is dependent upon the TOE being configured per the guidance document listed in
Section 6. No other versions of the TOE, either earlier or later, were evaluated.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified
in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this
evaluation.
Additional functionality provided by devices in the operational environment needs to be assessed
separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All other items and scope issues have been sufficiently addressed in other sections of this
document.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
15
11 Annexes
Not applicable
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
16
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Knox File Encryption
1.6.0 - Fall Security Target, Version 0.3, November 13, 2024.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
17
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given implementation
is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the Common
Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made are justified; or
the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent, technically sound
and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more TOEs that may be
evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and for
overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme.
Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6 - Fall Validation Report Version 1.0, November 27, 2024
18
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4, October 7, 2021 (ASPP14).
[5] PP-Module for File Encryption, Version 1.0, July 25, 2019 (FE10).
[6] Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0 - Fall Security Target,
Version 0.3, November 13, 2024 (ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0, Version 0.2,
November 13, 2024 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for Samsung Knox File Encryption 1.6.0, Version 0.2, November 13,
2024 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Samsung Knox File Encryption, Version 0.2, November
13, 2024 (ETR).