BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
for
MaxPatrol Vulnerability and Compliance
Management System, V8.25.1.20707
from
Positive Technologies
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015(*)
MaxPatrol Vulnerability and Compliance Management System
V8.25.1.20707
from Positive Technologies
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bonn, 29 April 2015
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Thomas Gast L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
This page is intentionally left blank.
6 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
5 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................14
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................18
11. Security Target............................................................................................................18
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................18
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................20
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................23
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................24
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
6 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural
Description (BSI 7138) [3]
● BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. This Domain is linked to
a conformance claim to one of the related SOGIS Recommended Protection Profiles. In
addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the
assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and certificates for Protection Profiles and
for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives
from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e.
for all assurance components selected.
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
8 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
The product MaxPatrol Vulnerability and Compliance Management System, V8.25.1.20707
has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product MaxPatrol Vulnerability and Compliance Management
System, V8.25.1.20707 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 31 March 2015. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Positive Technologies.
The product was developed by: Positive Technologies.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 29 April 2015
is valid until 28 April 2020. The validity date can be extended by re-assessment or
re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report and the
Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any
applicant of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
9 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the product's evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and
production sites or processes, occur or the confidentiality of documentation and
information related to the product or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the product or resulting from
the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the product
deliverables according to the Certification Report part B chapter 2 to third parties,
permission of the Certification Body at BSI has to be obtained.
4. to provide latest at of half of the certificate's validity period unsolicitedly and at his
own expense current qualified evidence to the Certification Body at BSI that
demonstrates that the requirements as outlined in the Security Target are up-to-date
and remain valid in view of the respective status of technology. In general, this
evidence is provided in the form of a re-assessment report according to the rules of
the BSI Certification Scheme.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product MaxPatrol Vulnerability and Compliance Management System, V8.25.1.20707
has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see
also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Positive Technologies
Schelkovskoe shosse 23A
107241 Moscow
Russian Federation
10 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
11 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the 'Max Patrol Compliance and Vulnerability
Management System (CC) and its related guidance documentation V8.25.1.20707' is part
of a Vulnerability and Compliance Management System that is used to detect potential
vulnerabilities within the scanned system or networks. Especially the TOE consists of parts
of the MaxPatrol Server and the MaxPatrol Console.
The MaxPatrol Server is the primary part of the Compliance and Vulnerability Management
System.
Figure 1.1 of the ST [6] illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the
overall solution and ties together all of the components of the TOE and the constituents of
the operational environment of the TOE. The TOE is a software only product and the TOE
components are specified in Table 1.3 of the ST [6].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF1 Security Audit
SF2 Access Control
SF3 Security Management
SF4 Scanning and Reporting
SF5 Identification and Authentication
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
12 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
MaxPatrol Vulnerability and Compliance Management System, V8.25.1.20707
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW/D
OC
TOE distribution kit
(installer) including the
Administrator guide
[11], Quick Start Guide
[12] and the MaxPatrol
Help File
(MaxPatrol_en) [10]
File MP-25.1.20707.100229.exe
Hash (SHA-512):
a5bf71d247d7943cbd6050de6d0c
cf4602952706f7e025716cb69eae
7ad72f7ffed90e558ff74626866aa
5ab0bc0232b7b2ac7163c3cb705
18fd2b169e089505
Helpfile Maxpatrol_en.chm, Hash
(SHA-512):
ee739d9debb30b4bddddf2dd5b3
62b6047f9dbe587824660e6d7c5c
ecbfc7fa691dd35b86f3154e32cd7
44a0fcdc3ff9be5daf155b8a3da42
d466b567273ad9
MaxPatrol Compliance and
Vulnerability Management System
Administrator Guide, Hash
(SHA-512):
cdd266ece7485edbb7b5040fac5f
0388c97241d714ceb3cb3c1e9ee
da128bf44c0935d6f4c804617950
66cc26a8ec2814deae2233384a8
6843c5fe610e060be3
MaxPatrol Compliance and
Vulnerability Management System
Quick Start Guide, Hash
(SHA-512):
595e7a71edfe94c156bef18dd9e3
39705fa4742896705880154963cf
7ddefca36c7b3c184055779e0a96
55baf5d1984739e39616feb75c47
f030ab2234240914
Download from
secure website as a
downloadable
archive, via mail or
on a DVD.
2 DOC MaxPatrol compliance
and vulnerability
management system
Installation guide [8]
File InstallationGuide(en).pdf
Hash (SHA-512):
c53dfa3ad49501f23c6beb78da06
5ce67e7cfbd807f29aedfb49143f0
6f4ae49a91f7b47ebbe34a27a39d
785be00bcf7885faa8a01905f904
d9c0fb213f589fa
Download from
secure website as a
downloadable
archive, via mail or
on a DVD.
13 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3 DOC MaxPatrol compliance
and vulnerability
management system.
Guidance Addendum
[9]
File PT_AGD_1.0.pdf.
Hash (SHA-512):
14aedda107065f2ff291ca27c360e
515328bdf7508b543300dfe31c27
884d9b30cfeb4bd0405700146fcf8
83ba81ae4076bf025bbd182eaeb
08f8325a3d5e06a
Download from
secure website as a
downloadable
archive, via mail or
on a DVD.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE accompanied by its guidance documentation and an individual license file is
provided to customers as a downloadable archive or via mail on a DVD. Further, a
notification letter that contains SHA-512 checksums for every file of the downloadable
archive or the DVD is sent to the respective customer separately via e-mail, fax or express
delivery.
The customer can use any SHA-512 calculation tool to verify that the archive is the correct
one that contains the evaluated version of the TOE.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. They cover security audit, identification and authentication,
security management, security access, and scanning and reporting. Some more details
can be found in chapter 1.3.3 od the ST [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The list of objectives
which have to be met by the the environment can be found in the Security Target [6] ,
chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The following components comprise the TOE:
● Scanning core (This component implements the scanning process for network checks
and brute force attacks in PenTest mode, system checks in Audit mode, and compliance
control in Compliance mode), as part of the MaxPatrol Server,
● Report service (This component generates reports based on the scanning results. The
content and structure of the reports depends on templates configured by authorized
TOE users), as part of the MaxPatrol Server,
● Control system (This component communicates with the MP Console and manages the
processes within the TOE), as part of the MaxPatrol Server, and
● MaxPatrol Console (This component is a graphical user interface. Its services are
employed by TOE users to communicate with the TOE and to configure the MP Server).
14 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
As the TOE is a software product it requires at least the following environment for its
operation:
● CPU: Intel Pentium 4 processor 2,2 GHz
● RAM: 4 GB
● HDD: 50 GB
● OS: Microsoft Windows 2008 R2 Enterprise (x64) (including the .NET framework 4.0)
● DB: Microsoft SQL Server 2008 R2
● Other Software: MP Server V8.25.1.20707
The TOE under evaluation has been tested in its scheduled configuration. According to the
operational environment of the TOE as specified in the ST the developer’s and evaluator’s
tests have been performed in the test configuration specified as follows:
Hardware:
● Intel Core 2 Quad CPU Q8200 2.33 GHz
● 4 GB RAM
● 200 GB HD
Software
● Microsoft Windows 2008 R2 Enterprise (x64)
● .Net Framework 4.0
● Microsoft SQL Server 2008 R2
● MaxPatrol Server Version 8.25.1.20707
7.1. Developer Testing
TOE Test configuration
The following configuration was in place:
● A computer complying with the TOE minimum requirements listed in the ST [6], Table
1.4,
● A group of target computers containing installed software from the list of products that
are supported by the TOE. Software that can be analysed by the TOE is given in the ST
[6], chapter 1.3.1.
15 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
All of these computers have been included into a TCP/IP network. The computer with the
TOE installed had network access to the target computer group to perform the different
kind of scans. Additionally the computer with the TOE installed had Internet access to
activate its license.
Testing approach
The developer decided to test every Security Function and every security function
requirement to have complete test coverage. For each test he described the test case
purpose, the tested SFRs, the used environment and prerequisites as well as each single
test step in a detailed way. Additionally the developer described for each single step the
expected and the actual result.
Because of the nature of the TOE (software product with a GUI), all tests have been
performed manually by the developer. Therefore among the TOE itself and the testing
environment including external clients no other tools or materials have been used by the
developer.
The TOE was systematically tested at the level of the TSFI and SFRs given in the
functional specification and the ST [6].
Conclusion
The developer’s test effort has been proven sufficient to demonstrate that the TOE security
functions perform as specified. Overall the TSF have been tested systematically , the test
results demonstrate that no discrepancy between the TOE behavior and the TOE
specification has been found
7.2. Evaluator Independent Testing
TOE Test configuration
The final TOE (version 8.25.1.20707) was tested in the abovementioned configuration.
Additionally, for testing the scanning functionality of the TOE Windows XP SP3 clients
have been used as targets.
Test subset size and selection criteria
The tests performed and provided by the developer had a complete coverage of all
security functions. The evaluator decided to repeat a subset developer tests in order to
verify the adequateness of the tests. Furthermore, the evaluator developed additional
manual test cases for functional testing. Thereby the evaluator chose the approach to
cover all TSF from all the functional areas of the TOE.
Conclusion
The overall judgment on the results of independent testing consisting of
● Developer test repetition (sampling),
● TSF subset and TSFI testing, and
● Other testing
is that the TOE security functionality and TSFI are successfully tested and actually have
the behaviour as specified.
16 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
7.3. Evaluator Penetration Testing
TOE Test configuration
The final TOE (version 8.25.1.20707) was tested in the abovementioned configuration.
Penetration testing approach:
The following attack scenarios have been tested:
● Try to read out the database tables which are public and available to a local attacker in
order to get information about the saved user credentials.
● Try to manipulate the connection between the SQL database and the TOE in order to
manipulate the role concept and get access to restricted information.
The following SFRs have been penetration tested:
FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.5, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1.
The remaining SFRs were analysed, but not penetration tested. Nevertheless they were
covered by the functional tests conducted by the developer and the evaluator.
Conclusion
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was successful in the
TOE’s operational environment as defined in the ST [6] provided that all measures
required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the configuration of the TOE as specified in the ST, chapter 1,
especially chapter 1.3.2.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2
17 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic mechanisms. Thus, no such mechanisms were
part of the assessment.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CPU Central Processing Unit
DB Database
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
18 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HDD Hard Drive disk
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MP MaxPatrol
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
19 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products,
protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation
Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC
and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Maxpatrol Compliance and Vulnerability Management System Common Criteria
Certification Security Target, BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015, Version 1.5, Date
29.09.2014, Positive Technologies
[7] Evaluation Technical Report for MaxPatrol Compliance and Vulnerability
Management System V8.25.1.20707, Version 3, Date 30.03.2015, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] MaxPatrol compliance and vulnerability management system Installation guide,
Checksum:
c53dfa3ad49501f23c6beb78da065ce67e7cfbd807f29aedfb49143f06f4ae49a91f7b4
7ebbe34a27a39d785be00bcf7885faa8a01905f904d9c0fb213f589fa, Positive
Technologies
[9] MaxPatrol compliance and vulnerability management system. Guidance Addendum,
Version 1, Date 01.07.2014, Positive Technologies
[10] Helpfile Maxpatrol_en.chm, Checksum:
ee739d9debb30b4bddddf2dd5b362b6047f9dbe587824660e6d7c5cecbfc7fa691dd3
5b86f3154e32cd744a0fcdc3ff9be5daf155b8a3da42d466b567273ad9, Positive
Technologies
[11] MaxPatrol Compliance and Vulnerability Management System Administrator Guide,
Checksum:
cdd266ece7485edbb7b5040fac5f0388c97241d714ceb3cb3c1e9eeda128bf44c0935
d6f4c80461795066cc26a8ec2814deae2233384a86843c5fe610e060be3, Positive
Technologies
[12] MaxPatrol Compliance and Vulnerability Management System Quick Start Guide,
Checksum:
595e7a71edfe94c156bef18dd9e339705fa4742896705880154963cf7ddefca36c7b3c
8
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
20 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
184055779e0a9655baf5d1984739e39616feb75c47f030ab2234240914, Positive
Technologies
21 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
This page is intentionally left blank.
22 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
23 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
24 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
25 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
26 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
27 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
28 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
29 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
30 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
31 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0931-2015
This page is intentionally left blank.
32 / 32