PREMIER MINISTRE
Secretariat General for National Defence
French Network and Information Security Agency
Certification Report ANSSI-CC-2009/60
CC IDeal Pass Passport (on SB23YR80A),
version 1.3.3
Paris, 21st
December 2009
Courtesy Translation
Certification report ANSSI-CC-2009/60 CC IDeal Pass Passport (on SB23YR80A), version 1.3.3
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Warning
This report is designed to provide sponsors with a document enabling them to assess the
security level of a product under the conditions of use and operation defined in this report for
the evaluated version. It is also designed to provide the potential purchaser of the product with
the conditions under which he may operate or use the product so as to meet the conditions of
use for which the product has been evaluated and certified; that is why this certification report
must be read alongside the evaluated user and administration guidance, as well as with the
product security target, which presents threats, environmental assumptions and the supposed
conditions of use so that the user can judge for himself whether the product meets his needs in
terms of security objectives.
Certification does not, however, constitute a recommendation product from ANSSI (French
Network and Information Security Agency), and does not guarantee that the certified product
is totally free of all exploitable vulnerabilities.
Any correspondence about this report has to be addressed to:
Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale
Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information
Centre de certification
51, boulevard de la Tour Maubourg
75700 PARIS cedex 07 SP
France
certification.anssi@ssi.gouv.fr
Reproduction of this document without any change or cut is authorised.
CC IDeal Pass Passport (on SB23YR80A), version 1.3.3 Certification report ANSSI-CC-2009/60
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Certification report reference
ANSSI-CC-2009/60
Product name
CC IDeal Pass Passport (on SB23YR80A)
Product reference
Version 1.3.3
Protection profile conformity
[PP BAC]
Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control, version 1.10
Evaluation criteria and version
Common Criteria version 3.1
Evaluation level
EAL 4 augmented
ALC_DVS.2
Developers
SAGEM Sécurité
Etablissement d’Osny, 18 Chaussée Jules
César, 95520 Osny, France
ST Microelectronics
29 Boulevard Romain Rolland, 75669 Paris
cedex 14, France
Sponsor
SAGEM Sécurité
Etablissement d’Osny, 18 Chaussée Jules César, 95520 Osny, France
Evaluation facility
CEA - LETI
17 rue des martyrs, 38054 Grenoble Cedex 9, France
Phone: +33 (0)4 38 78 40 87, email : cesti.leti@cea.fr
Recognition arrangements
CCRA
The product is recognised at EAL4 level.
SOG-IS
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Introduction
The Certification
Security certification for information technology products and systems is governed by decree
number 2002-535 dated April, 18th 2002, and published in the "Journal Officiel de la
République Française". This decree stipulates that:
• The French Network and Information Security Agency draws up certification
reports. These reports indicate the features of the proposed security targets. They may
include any warnings that the authors feel the need to mention for security reasons.
They may or may not be transmitted to third parties or made public, as the sponsors
desire (article 7).
• The certificates issued by the Prime Minister certify that the copies of the products or
systems submitted for evaluation fulfil the specified security features. They also
certify that the evaluations have been carried out in compliance with applicable rules
and standards, with the required degrees of skill and impartiality (article 8).
The procedures are available on the Internet site www.ssi.gouv.fr.
CC IDeal Pass Passport (on SB23YR80A), version 1.3.3 Certification report ANSSI-CC-2009/60
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Content
1. THE PRODUCT........................................................................................................................... 6
1.1. PRESENTATION OF THE PRODUCT........................................................................................... 6
1.2. EVALUATED PRODUCT DESCRIPTION ..................................................................................... 6
1.2.1. Product identification.................................................................................................... 6
1.2.2. Security services............................................................................................................ 6
1.2.3. Architecture................................................................................................................... 7
1.2.4. Life cycle ....................................................................................................................... 8
1.2.5. Evaluated configuration................................................................................................ 9
2. THE EVALUATION.................................................................................................................. 10
2.1. EVALUATION REFERENTIAL ................................................................................................. 10
2.2. EVALUATION WORK ............................................................................................................. 10
2.3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MECHANISMS ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS..................................................... 10
2.4. RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 10
3. CERTIFICATION...................................................................................................................... 11
3.1. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 11
3.2. RESTRICTIONS...................................................................................................................... 11
3.3. RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE..................................................................................... 11
3.3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS).................................................................................. 11
3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)................................................... 12
ANNEX 1. EVALUATION LEVEL OF THE PRODUCT.......................................................... 13
ANNEX 2. EVALUATED PRODUCT REFERENCES .............................................................. 14
ANNEX 3. CERTIFICATION REFERENCES ........................................................................... 15
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1. The product
1.1. Presentation of the product
The evaluated product is the « CC IDeal Pass Passport (on SB23YR80A), Version 1.3.3 »
developed by SAGEM Sécurité and ST Microelectronics.
The evaluated product is a contactless smartcard with its antenna. It implements the travel
document features according to the specifications from the International Civil Aviation
Organization (cf. [ICAO]). This product is designed to check the authenticity of the travel
document, and to identify its holder during a border control, with the support of an inspection
system.
It is intended to be inserted into the cover page of traditional passport booklets. They can be
integrated into modules or inlays. The final product can be a passport, a plastic card, etc
1.2. Evaluated product description
The security target [ST] defines the evaluated product, its evaluated security functionalities
and its operational environment.
The security target is strictly conformant to the [PP BAC] protection profile
1.2.1. Product identification
The configuration list [CONF] identifies the product’s constituent elements.
The certified version of the product can be identified by the following elements:
- product’s name and version : CC IDeal Pass, version 1.3.3;
- microcontroller’s name and version: SB23YR80A;
- commercial reference (SAGEM) : IDEAL/ST23YR80/1.3.3;
- whole embededd software reference (SAGEM ORGA)
OFFICIEL_IDEAL_ST23YR80_1_3_3;
- ST Microelectronics reference: ST23YR80 QPV (masked chip).
Every version of the software components of the certified version of the product can be
checked according to the command and responses identified in the installation guidance of the
product (see [GUIDES]).
1.2.2. Security services
The product provides mainly the following security services:
- protection of integrity of the holder’s stored data: issuing state or organization, travel
document number, expiration date, holder’s name, nationality, birth date, sex, holder’s
face portrait, other optional data, additional biometric data and several other pieces of
data for managing the security of the document,
- authentication between the travel document holder and the inspection system prior to
any border control by the Basic Access Control mechanism,
- protection of integrity and confidentiality of data read by secure messaging.
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1.2.3. Architecture
The product consists of
- the SB23YR80A microcontroller, developed and produced by ST Microelectronics ;
- software parts, developed by SAGEM Sécurité, which CVS reference is
OFFICIEL_IDEAL_ST23YR80_1_3_0, masked in the microcontroller’s ROM,
composed of:
o the OPUCE operating system;
o the HAL hardware abtract layer;
o the AIP card initialization and personalization application;
o and the IDEAL Pass ICAO application, version 1.3.0;
- the ICAO application patch, developed by SAGEM Sécurité, loaded into the
microcontroller’s EEPROM, which CVS reference is
OFFICIEL_IDEAL_ST23YR80_1_3_3, that forms with the masked part the IDEAL
Pass ICAO application, version 1.3.3.
SB23YR80A
Operating system (OPUCE)
AIP data
AIP instance
AIP application
ICAO data
ICAO instance
ICAO application
Deactivated in user phase
Hardware abstract layer (HAL)
SB23YR80A
Operating system (OPUCE)
AIP data
AIP instance
AIP application
ICAO data
ICAO instance
ICAO application
Deactivated in user phase
Hardware abstract layer (HAL)
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1.2.4. Life cycle
The product’s life cycle is organised as follow:
Patch loading is protected by the AIP application.
The embedded software has been developed on the following site:
SAGEM Sécurité - Etablissement d’Osny
18 Chaussée Jules César
95520 Osny
France
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Embedded software
development
Development
IC design and dedicated
software development
Integration
Photomask fabrication
IC packaging and initialization
IC manufacturing, test and
possible pre
-
personalization
IC pre-personalization:
Create application/
Create LDS File System
Personalization
Usage
End of life
Manufacturing
Step 1
Personalization
Usage
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7
Legend
Trusted delivery and
verification procedures
Delivery supposed to
be done within
secure environment
Legend
Trusted delivery and
verification procedures
Delivery supposed to
be done within
secure environment
SAGEM (Osny)
STM (Rousset,
Singapour, Zaventem)
STM (Rousset)
DPE Agrape
DPE Tokyo
STM (Rousset)
Patch development
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
Embedded software
development
Development
IC design and dedicated
software development
Integration
Photomask fabrication
IC packaging and initialization
IC manufacturing, test and
possible pre
-
personalization
IC pre-personalization:
Create application/
Create LDS File System
Personalization
Usage
End of life
Manufacturing
Step 1
Personalization
Usage
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7
Legend
Trusted delivery and
verification procedures
Delivery supposed to
be done within
secure environment
Legend
Trusted delivery and
verification procedures
Delivery supposed to
be done within
secure environment
SAGEM (Osny)
STM (Rousset,
Singapour, Zaventem)
STM (Rousset)
DPE Agrape
DPE Tokyo
STM (Rousset)
Patch development
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The microcontroller development sites are identified in the [2009/28] certification report.
1.2.5. Evaluated configuration
The certificate applies to the closed configuration of this product (locking of the applet
loading feature after ICAO‘s loading).
The product tested by the evaluation facility is typical to the final product (phase 7).
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2. The evaluation
2.1. Evaluation referential
The evaluation has been performed in compliance with Common Criteria version 3.1 [CC],
with the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM], and with the following interpretation:
- the ATE_DPT.2 assurance component has been replaced by the ATE_DPT.1
assurance component at the EAL4 level in the third revision of the Common Criteria
version 3.1 (published after the beginning of this evaluation).
In order to meet the specificities of smart cards, the [CC AP] and [COMP] guides have been
applied.
2.2. Evaluation work
The evaluation has been performed according to the composition scheme as defined in the
guide [COMP] in order to assess that no weakness comes from the integration of the software
in the microcontroller already certified.
Therefore, the results of the evaluation of the microcontroller SB23YR80A at EAL5 level
augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5, compliant with the [PP0035] protection
profile, have been used. This microcontroller has been certified the 1st
December 2009 under
the reference ANSSI-CC-2009/28.
The evaluation technical report [ETR], delivered to ANSSI the 11th
December 2009, provides
details on the work performed by the evaluation facility and assesses that all evaluation tasks
are “pass”.
2.3. Cryptographic mechanisms robustness analysis
The robustness of cryptographic mechanisms has been analysed by ANSSI according to
[REF-CRY]. The results are stated in the cryptographic analysis report [ANA-CRY]
This analysis report established that thee analysed mechanisms are not compliant to the
requirements defined in ANSSI cryptographic referential [REF-CRY], due to cryptographic
weakness of the ICAO specification which the developer has to comply with.
Nevertheless, those results have been taken into account in the evaluator independent
vulnerability analysis and had not leaded to the identification of exploitable vulnerability for
the aimed AVA_VAN level.
2.4. Random number generator analysis
The random number generator used by this product is the one provided by the microcontroller
(see [2009/28] certification report).
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3. Certification
3.1. Conclusion
The evaluation was carried out according to the current rules and standards, with the required
competency and impartiality of a licensed evaluation facility. All the work performed permits
the release of a certificate in conformance with the decree 2002-535.
This certificate testifies that the product “CC IDeal Pass Passport (on SB23YR80A), Version
1.3.3” submitted for evaluation fulfils the security features specified in its security target [ST]
for the evaluation level EAL 4 augmented.
3.2. Restrictions
This certificate only applies on the product specified in chapter 1.2 of this certification report.
The user of the certified product shall respect the security objectives for the operational
environment specified in the security target [ST] at the 4.2 and 4.3 chapters, and shall respect
the recommendations in the guidance [GUIDES].
3.3. Recognition of the certificate
3.3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS)
This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the SOG-IS agreement [SOG-
IS].
The European Recognition Agreement made by SOG-IS in 1999 allows recognition from
Signatory States of the agreement1
, of ITSEC and Common Criteria certificates. The
European recognition is applicable up to ITSEC E6 and CC EAL7 levels. The certificates that
are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:
1 The signatory countries of the SOG-IS agreement are: Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
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3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)
This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA [CC RA].
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement allows the recognition, by signatory
countries1
, of the Common Criteria certificates. The mutual recognition is applicable up to the
assurance components of CC EAL4 level and also to ALC_FLR family. The certificates that
are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:
1 The signatory countries of the CCRA arrangement are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the
United States of America.
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Annex 1. Evaluation level of the product
Components by assurance level Assurance level of the product
Class Family
EAL
1
EAL
2
EAL
3
EAL
4
EAL
5
EAL
6
EAL
7
EAL
4+
Name of the component
ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6 4
Complete functional
specification
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2 1
Implementation representation
of the TSF
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV
Development
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6 3 Basic modular design
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Operational user guidance
AGD
Guidance AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 4
Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5 4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2 2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2 1
Developer defined life-cycle
model
ALC
Life-cycle
support
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3 1 Well-defined development tools
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Security problem definition
ASE
Security
Target
Evaluation
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 TOE summary specification
ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4 1
Testing: security enforcing
modules
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 Functional testing
ATE
Tests
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 Independent testing: sample
AVA
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5 3 Focused vulnerability analysis
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Annex 2. Evaluated product references
[ST] Reference security target for the evaluation:
- « Common Criteria security target - Machine Readable Travel
Document – Basic Access Control – CC IDeal Pass », reference
SSE-0000073785, révision 05,
For the needs of publication, the following security target has been
provided and validated in the evaluation:
- « Common Criteria security target - Machine Readable Travel
Document – Basic Access Control – CC IDeal Pass », reference
SSE-0000076322-01.
[ETR] Evaluation technical report :
- « SELENE - Rapport Technique d’Evaluation », référence
LETI.CESTI.SEL.RTE.001, édition 2.0.
[ANA-CRY] « Cotation de mécanismes cryptographiques- Qualification SELENE »,
n°2785/SGDN/ANSSI, 5 November 2009..
[CONF] « CC_IDEAL_PASS – Software Release Sheet - v1.3.3 », référence
SSE-0000073926, révision 06.
[GUIDES] Installation guidance:
- « Documentation d’installation, de génération et de démarrage »,
reference 0000075654, version 02,
Administration guidance:
- « ICAO Application Pre-personalization manual - Project : CC
Ideal Pass », reference SSE-0000074722, version 02,
- « ICAO Application Personalization manual - Project : CC Ideal
Pass », reference SSE-0000074723, version 04,
User guidance:
- « ICAO Application User manual - Project : CC Ideal Pass »,
reference SSE-0000074862, version 01.
[PP BAC] Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control, version 1.10, 25th
March 2009.
Certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik)
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009.
[PP0035] Protection Profile, Security IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1.0
June 2007. Certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik) under the reference BSI-PP-0035-2007.
[2009/28] Certification report ANSSI-CC-2009/28, issued the 1st
December 2009
for the “SB23YR80A secured microcontroller including the
cryptographic libray NesLib v2.0 in SB configuration”.
[ICAO] ICAO Doc 9303, Sixth Edition, 2007.
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Annex 3. Certification references
Decree number 2002-535 dated 18th
April 2002 related to the security evaluations and
certifications for information technology products and systems.
[CER/P/01] Procedure CER/P/01 - Certification of the security provided by IT
products and systems, DCSSI.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation :
Part 1: Introduction and general model,
September 2006, version 3.1, revision 1, ref CCMB-2006-09-001,
Part 2: Security functional components,
September 2007, version 3.1, revision 2, ref CCMB-2007-09-002,
Part 3: Security assurance components,
September 2007, version 3.1, revision 2, ref CCMB-2007-09-003.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation :
Evaluation Methodology,
September 2007, version 3.1, revision 2, ref CCMB-2007-09-004.
[CC AP] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - Application of attack potential to smart-cards, reference
CCDB-2009-03-001 version 2.7 revision 1, March 2009
[COMP] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - Composite product evaluation for smart cards and similar
devices, reference CCDB-2007-09-001 version 1.0, revision 1, September
2007.
[CC RA] Arrangement on the Recognition of Common criteria certificates in the
field of information Technology Security, May 2000.
[SOG-IS] «Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security
Evaluation Certificates», version 2.0, April 1999, Management
Committee of Agreement Group.
[REF-CRY] Cryptographic mechanisms - Rules and recommendations about the
choice and parameters sizes of cryptographic mechanisms with standard
robustness level version 1.11, 24th
of October 2008, see www.ssi.gouv.fr