BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013
for
CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES, V1.0
from
Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.72
BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013
Digital signature: Secure Signature Creation Devices (SSCD)
CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES, V1.0
from Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 26 July 2013
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................19
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................19
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................20
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................21
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................21
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................23
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................24
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................26
11 Security Target............................................................................................................27
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................27
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................30
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................33
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................33
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................34
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................43
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in
accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4
components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES, V1.0 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES, V1.0 was conducted
by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 25 July 2013. TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH.
The product was developed by: Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013 Certification Report
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES, V1.0 has been included in the BSI list
of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 München
Deutschland
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES, V1.0
provided by Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH. The TOE is a smart card integrated
circuit product with the CardOS operating system and a Digital Signature Application,
based on the Infineon Chips SLE78CFX*P (M7892 B11: SLE78CFX2400P with 240kByte
flash, SLE78CFX3000P with 300kByte flash or SLE78CFX4000P with 404kByte flash).
In general, the TOE is intended to be used as Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD)
for qualified electronic signatures in accordance with the European Directive 1999/93/EC.
The related Protection Profile [21] has been used as a baseline, but with specific
deviations/additions. Specific configurations of the TOE can be used in order to fulfil the
requirments of the laws on digital signatures in Germany and Switzerland.
The TOE allows to generate electronic signatures over previously externally or internally
calculated hash values. The TOE generates a signature key pair (Signature Creation Data
SCD and Signature Verification Data SVD) based on RSA with a key length of up to
4096 bit. It is able to protect the secrecy of the internally generated and stored SCD (i.e.
secret key) and restricts the usage access to the authorized Signatory only. The restriction
on the access to the secret key is done via the well-known PIN authentication mechanism.
During initialisation and personalisation phase the TOE can be configured in three different
ways:
• the TOE can generate single signatures (i.e. re-authentication before each
signature) that fulfil the requirements for Qualified Electronic Signatures (QES) of
Germany or Switzerland (variants “QES-Germany” or “QES-Switzerland”)
• the TOE can generate limited (2-255) or an unlimited number of signatures in a row
(without intermediate re-authentication) that fulfil the requirements for Qualified
Electronic Signatures (QES) of Germany or Switzerland (variants “QES-Germany”
or “QES-Switzerland”)
• the TOE can generate an unlimited number of signatures, but secured by two PINs
(four-eyes principle, variant “QES-Two-PIN-Signatures”).
The TOE CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES, V1.0 was evaluated in all of its three
configurations as described in the ST:
• QES-Germany (according to [18] for single and mass signatures without four eyes
principle (4EP))
• QES-Switzerland (according to [20] for single and mass signatures without four
eyes principle)
• QES-Two-PIN-Signatures (similar to [18], for mass signatures with four eyes
principle)
In order to reflect the differences of the configurations, three sets of SFRs were made up
for the TOE. The SFRs were broken down in five parts:
SFRs QES-Germany QES-Switzerland QES-Two-PIN-
Signatures
Part ONE general SFRs X X X
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013 Certification Report
SFRs QES-Germany QES-Switzerland QES-Two-PIN-
Signatures
Part TWO SFRs according
to signatures
without four eyes
principle
X X
Part THREE SFRs based on
German QES
X X
Part FOUR SFRs according
to Swiss QES
only
X
Part FIVE SFRs according
to signatures
with four eyes
principle
X
Table 1: SFRs of the three TOE configurations
The TOE can be delivered in three different IC sizes: On IC SLE78CFX2400P (240 kByte
flash), SLE78CFX3000P (300 kByte flash) or SLE78CFX4000P (240kByte flash), that are
all certified under the same certification ID for the M7892 B11 (BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 8.2. The SFRs as defined in the Protection Profile for Secure
signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation [21] have been used as a
baseline. The SFR are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly
defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
SS1 User Identification and Authentication
SS2 Access Control
SS3 SCD/SVD Pair Generation
SS4 Signature Creation
SS5 Protection
Table 2: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 10.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 5.1 to 5.4.
This certification covers the CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES, V1.0. There are some
parameters that can be set to one or another value which results in different
configurations, for details refer to chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG
Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES, V1.0,
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
• the configured software (OS "CardOS V5.0", the service package (patches),
personalization script files and signature application),
• the underlying hardware (SLE78CFX*P8
(M7892 B11) from Infineon) used to
implement the secure signature-creation device (SSCD), and
• the pertaining guidance documentation
No Type Identifier Release
Version
Release Date Form of Delivery
1 Hardware (chip) SLE78CFX*P (M7892
B11)
M7892 B11 - IC package
2 Software CardOS for 240kByte flash C901 2012-05-16 loaded in
protected part of
Flash EEPROM
3 Software CardOS for 300kByte flash C901 2012-05-16 loaded in
protected part of
Flash EEPROM
4 Software CardOS for 404kByte flash C901 2012-05-16 loaded in
protected part of
Flash EEPROM
5a Software RSA-library 1.02.013 - loaded in
protected part of
Flash EEPROM
8
The term SLE78CFX*P stands as wildcard for the three sizes SLE78CFX2400P, SLE78CFX3000P or
SLE78CFX4000P
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release
Version
Release Date Form of Delivery
5b Software Toolbox 1.02.013 - loaded in
protected part of
Flash EEPROM
5c Software SHA-2-library 1.01 - loaded in
protected part of
Flash EEPROM
6 Personalization
script for QES
Germany
centralized
model
PersAppSigG.csf #2 2013-03-19 file
7 Pers. script for
QES Germany
centr. Model
without PUK
PersAppSigG_withoutPUK
.csf
#2 2013-03-19 file
8 Pers. script for
QES Germany
decentralized
model, file
system only (by
Trust Center)
Pre-PersAppSigG.csf #2 2013-03-19 file
9 Pers. script for
QES Germany
decentralized
model, end user
data + certificate
(by RA)
Post-PersAppSigG.csf #2 2013-03-19 file
10 Pers. script for
QES Germany
decentr. model,
file model only
(by TC), without
PUK
Pre-PersAppSigG_without
PUK.csf
#2 2013-03-19 file
11 Pers. script for
QES Germany
decentr. model,
end user data +
certificate (by
RA), without
PUK
Post-PersAppSigG_withou
tPUK.csf
#2 2013-03-19 file
12 Pers. script for
QES similar to
QES Germany
decentr. model,
file system only
(by TC), for 4EP
mass signature
Mass_Pre-PersAppSigG.c
sf
#2 2013-03-19 file
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No Type Identifier Release
Version
Release Date Form of Delivery
13 Pers. script for
QES similar to
QES Germany
decentr. model,
end user data +
certificate (by
RA), for 4EP
mass signature
Mass_Post-PersAppSigG.
csf
#2 2013-03-19 file
14 Constants
definitions for
RSA key pair,
length 1976 bits,
centr. and
decentr. mode
Defines_1976.csf #2 2013-03-19 file
15 Constants
definitions for
RSA key pair,
length 2048 bits,
centr. and
decentr. model
Defines_2048.csf #2 2013-03-19 file
16 Constants
definitions for
RSA key pair,
length 2560 bits,
centr. and
decentr. model
Defines_2560.csf #2 2013-03-19 file
17 Constants
definitions for
RSA key pair,
length 3072 bits,
centr. and
decentr. model
Defines_3072.csf #2 2013-03-19 file
18 Constants
definitions for
RSA key pair,
length 3584 bits,
centr. and
decentr. model
Defines_3584.csf #2 2013-03-19 file
19 Constants
definitions for
RSA key pair,
length 4096 bits,
centr. and
decentr. model
Defines_4096.csf #2 2013-03-19 file
20 Service Package V50_ServicePack_Packag
e.csf
1 2013-03-19 file
21 Documentation User Guidance 'CardOS
V5.0 with Application for
QES V1.0'
1.40 2013-03-27 paper or PDF file
22 Documentation CardOS V5.0 Package &
Release Notes
- 03/2013 paper or PDF file
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release
Version
Release Date Form of Delivery
23 Documentation Administrator Guidance
'CardOS V5.0 with
Application for QES V1.0'
1.30 2013-03-27 paper or PDF file
24 Documentation CardOS V5.0, User’s
Manual
- 03/2013 paper or PDF file
25 Documentation Application Digital
Signature 'CardOS V5.0
with Application for QES
V1.0'
1.10 2013-03-27 paper or PDF file
Table 3: Deliverables of the TOE
2.1 TOE Delivery
The items #1 to #5 are actually delivered as one item (IC platform containing the software
mask) to the customer trust center as the flash loading takes place in the production
environment at Infineon.
The three items #2, 3 and 4 represent the OS software mask, which is available in three
different sizes according the IC size they are used on. The SW image is firstly built as
generic mask and is then used to generate these custom-sized masks with the Infineon
Post Locater tool. These mask files are delivered to Infineon. The flash loader is
deactivated when the Infineon chip leaves the production site.
The items number #6 to #19 in the table above represent the personalisation script files,
which are required to prepare the TOE at the trust center and to initialize and personalize
it. The three different configurations (QES-Germany, QES-Switzerland and
QES-Two-PIN-Signatures) are generated with the help of these personalisation scripts in
the preparation phase by the trust center. All files are delivered to the trust center. Its
further use for generating the TOE and its different configurations is described in the
guidance for administration [11] chp. 4.2.
The preparation of the TOE can be processed by two different scenarios: The
decentralized model and the centralized model:
• Centralized model: Initialization and personalization take place only in the Trust
Center,
• Decentralized model: Initialization takes place in the Trust Center and
personalization takes place in the Registration Authority, which is locally separated
from the Certification Authority.
The trust center / certification authority (TC/CA)
• receives the TOE specific hardware including the embedded software (items #1 -
#5) from the Chip Manufacturer (by courier or direct by collection at the Infineon
Site) and
• receives the script files and documentation (items #6 to #25) from the SW-DVL Atos
IT Solutions and Services GmbH as signed and encrypted files.
The TC/CA is responsible for handling the TOE (hardware, software and documentation) in
such a way that its confidentiality, integrity and authenticity are guaranteed in the domain
of TC/CA according to the guidance documentation.
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Before finally reaching the card holder (CH), the manufactured hardware passes the
following logical entities whose work items may or may not be executed by separate
organizational entities (e.g. in the domain of one TC):
• Embedder (EMB): Initialisation
• Certification Authority (CA): Key generation
• Personalizer (PERS): Personalization
• (Local) Registration Authority (LRA): Certificate installation
Delivery of the script files and documentation (items #6 to #25) from the TC/CA to those
separate entities has to be as signed and encrypted files, too.
All these entities (EMB, CA, PERS, LRA) are compelled to accept the security policy
formulated and enforced by TC/CA. The TC/CA security policy should assert that each
entity applies the acceptance procedure detailed in the TOE’s administrator guidance and
that modification of the incomplete hardware is only possible after authentication with an
entity specific authentication key.
The delivery from the TC/CA to the card holder is subject to the TC/CA security policy, too.
The SW-DVL never interacts with the card holder (CH) (the end user) directly. Therefore,
there is no direct interface between SW-DVL and CH.
The delivery from the TC/CA to the terminal developer (TD) is subject to the TC/CA
security policy, too. Delivery of the related documentation (items #24) from the TC/CA to
the TD has to be as signed and encrypted files.
2.2 Identification of the TOE by the end user
The end user (card holder) can identify his signature card by reading out i) the card name
and version, ii) information about the loaded packages, and iii) information about the chip.
This information can be retrieved by using the following steps (xyh stands for a byte xy in
hexadecimal notation, x and y are variables):
• The version of the operating system can be identified with the command GET DATA
using specific modes (see [13], chapter 3.23):
Mode 82h must return the OS version "C9h 01h "
Mode 80h must return the product name, version and year: “CardOS V5.0, 2012."
(43h 61h 72h 64h 4Fh 53h 20h 56h 35h 2Eh 30h 2Ch 20h 32h 30h 31h 32h 00h).
• Information about loaded packages can be checked with the command GET DATA
using mode 88h (see [13], chapter 3.23). Its response has to show the mandatory
Service Package: E1h 0Bh 53h 06h 03h 04h 13h 02h C9h 01h 8Fh 01h 01h
• Identification of the chip (hardware, RMS, crypto library, STS) can be done via GET
DATA in mode 8Bh (see [13], chapter 3.23), that must show 76 bytes whereby the
bytes contain the following information (first index equals 1):
byte 1: irrelevant
byte 2: 78h
byte 3-5: irrelevant
byte 6-7: 00h 01h
byte 8-11: irrelevant
byte 12-14: 01h 0Bh 02h (02h = Dresden)
bye 15-n: irrelevant
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013 Certification Report
• The personalisation script files (.csf) can be identified by the version information
that can be found as last part of the header information at the beginning of the
CSF-file itself. This information is to be compared to the information given in table 1
above (identifier, release version). Example: In case of the TOE 'CardOS V5.0 with
Application for QES V1.0', the entry %VERSION% in the csf-file
Pre-PersAppSigG.csf version #2 is shown as
;>************************************* Version **************************************************;>
;> **** $Id: //Cardos/IsoSec/V5/REL5.0_EVAL/eval/APP/CSF/Pre-PersAppSigG.csf#2 $;>
;>**************************************************************************************************
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The TOE implements the Signature Creation Data (private key) used for signature creation
under sole control of the signatory. The TOE implements all IT security functionality which
is necessary to ensure the secrecy of the SCD. To prevent the unauthorised usage of the
SCD the TOE provides user authentication and access control.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against physical attacks through the TOE interfaces, against copying
and releasing of the signature-creation data, against deriving the signature-creation data,
against forgery and against misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE. Hence
the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security
Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
• OE.SVD_Auth: Authenticity of the SVD
• OE.CGA_QCert: Generation of qualified certificates
• OE.SSCD_Prov_Service: Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD provisioning service
• OE.HI_VAD: Protection of the VAD
• OE.DTBS_Intend: SCA sends data intended to be signed
• OE.DTBS_Protect: SCA protects the data intended to be signed
• OE.Signatory: Security obligation of the signatory
• OE.Attester: Security obligation of the attester for signatures with 4EP
• OE.Env_Admin: Administrator works in trusted environment
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• OE.Env_Mass_Signature: Mass signatures are generated in trusted environment
only
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.3.
As outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 2.1 the TOE and its components is delivered
after its development phase to the trust center (SSCD provisioning service provider).
Therefore, the trust center responsible for initialisation and personalisation has not been
part of the evaluation under the ALC assurance class. So the security objective
OE.Env_Admin is reflected in appropriate guidance documentation the trust center
organisation has to ensure to be fulfilled independently from the personalisation model
used (centralized or a decentralized model).
5 Architectural Information
The TOE (CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES, V1.0) is a secure signature-creation
device (SSCD) according to Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the
council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures [16].
The TOE consists of i) configured software (OS, packages and signature application) ii)
the underlying hardware (SLE78CFX*P from Infineon) used to implement the secure
signature-creation device (SSCD) and iii) the pertaining guidance documentation.
The operating system (the CardOS V5.0, mask number C901h) is loaded into the ROM
(the blocked part of the Flash memory), all packages are loaded in EEPROM (Flash
EEPROM) and the application data structure is created by personalization script files.
The external physical interface of the SSCD is given by a contact field for data exchange.
The TOE provides a logical interface being used to exchange commands and responses
between each IFD (interface device) and the TOE by transferring APDUs (application
protocol data unit).
The software description and instruction set of the CardOS V5.0 operating system can be
found in the “CardOS V5.0 User’s Manual” [13]. Additional information (e.g. modes of
operation and application specific command sequences) are given in “User Guidance
CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES V1.0” [12], and in the “Administrator Guidance
CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES V1.0” [11].
The TOE is divided into the following eight subsystems:
• Subsystem 1: Protocol Manager (monitors the correct data transfer)
• Subsystem 2: Command Manager (implements the command identification)
• Subsystem 3: Command Layer (contains the interpretation of all CardOS
commands)
• Subsystem 4: Service Layer (contains service and security routines)
• Subsystem 5: System Layer (contains system and basic routines)
• Subsystem 6: Firmware (contains writing routines for non-volatile memory, TRNG
tests and sensor checks, reading hardware information, provides a cryptographic
library)
• Subsystem 7: ADS (application digital signature)
• Subsystem 8: IC (contains the hardware with all its components)
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For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
mentioned above are realized within the software with the exception of subsystem 8 which
comprises the underlying IC and is therefore a hardware implementation.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation [11] to [15] and as outlined in table 2 is being provided with
the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for
secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Description of test configuration
The configurations that were tested differ in one access right from the TOE that is
evaluated. The smart cards and software used for testing were personalised with an
access right that allows erasing the EEPROM with the APDU command ERASE FILES. In
order to test the TOE as it will be delivered and is intended to be personalised by an
administrator, the Evaluation Body devised a test subset with test cards that do not allow
erasing the EEPROM. Hence, this configuration is exactly the same as the evaluated one.
For other purposes, where the test stimulation could not be done with means of the
external APDU interfaces, an emulator was used.
The Evaluation Body used the same testing equipment as the developer, who provided the
test equipment to the Evaluation Body.
7.2 Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
TOE configurations tested:
The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product CardOS V5.0 with
Application for QES, V1.0. All three possible configurations (QES-Germany,
QES-Switzerland and QES-Two-PIN-Signatures) were tested appropriately. The different
personalisation models (centralized/decentralized) and optional PUK were taken into
account. The tests were performed in different life-cycle phases, i.e. in all phases that are
in scope after the TOE delivery within the according operational environment.
Testing Approach:
Outgoing from the behaviour defined in the SFRs of the ST, the developer specified test
cases for all SFRs in order to cover the TSF. ATE_COV and ATE_DPT were taken into
account and mapped to these test cases. The focus of the test cases was the main
functionality in the operational state of the TOE, i.e. the creation of signatures and
authentication with PIN according to the three configurations.
Additional test cases that could not be performed on a real smartcard (e.g. memory faults
and manipulation) were performed in the emulator.
The testing approach has covered all TSFI as described in the functional specification and
all subsystems of the TOE design adequately. All configurations as described in the ST are
covered. All test results collected in the test reports are as expected and in accordance
with the TOE design and the desired TOE functionality.
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7.3 Evaluator Tests: Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
Approach for independent testing:
• Examination of developer’s testing amount, depth and coverage analysis and of the
developer’s test goals and plan for identification of gaps.
• Examination whether the TOE in its intended environment, is operating as specified
using iterations of developer’s tests.
• Independent testing was performed by the evaluator in Essen with the TOE
development environment using tests scripts and emulator based on developer test
tools.
• TOE test configurations:
• Tests with all three different configurations as described in the ST (QES-Germany,
QES-Switzerland, QES-Two-PIN-Signatures)
• Tests were done in different life-cycle phase (before initialization/personalisation
and focus on operational usage)
Subset size chosen:
• During sample testing the evaluator chose to sample the developer functional tests
using his own test equipment. Emulator tests were repeated but tests with similar
test focus were omitted.
• During independent testing the evaluator focussed on the main security functionality
as described in the ST, so that all TSF could be covered by at least one test case in
order to confirm that the TOE operates as specified.
• Developer tests performed
• The developer performed tests of all TSF and interfaces with script based tests and
emulator test cases.
• The evaluator selected a set of functional tests of the developer’s testing
documentation for sampling. Test cases with similar test focus were omitted.
During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE operated as specified.
7.4 Penetration testing
Overview:
The penetration testing was performed using the test environment of TÜViT. All
configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested.
Penetration testing approach:
Based on a list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment the evaluators devised the attack scenarios for penetration tests where those
potential vulnerabilities could possibly be exploited in the TOE’s operational environment.
While doing this, also the aspects of the security architecture described in ADV_ARC were
considered for penetration testing. All other evaluation input was used for the creation of
the tests as well. Specifically the test documentation provided by the developer was used
to find out if there are areas of concern that should be covered by tests of the evaluation
body.
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The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the
development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection also
supported the testing activity by enabling the evaluator to verify implementation aspects
that could hardly be covered by test cases.
In addition the evaluator applied tests and performed code reviews during the evaluation
activity of ADV_COMP.1 to verify the implementation of the requirements imposed by the
ETR for Composition and the guidance of the underlying platform. This ensured
confidence in the security of the TOE as a whole.
The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities
identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational environment for which an appropriate test
set was devised.
TOE test configurations:
The evaluators used TOE samples for testing that were configured according to the ST.
All three configurations as provided by the ST were tested:
• QES-Germany,
• QES-Switzerland,
• QES-Two-PIN-Signatures.
The tests were performed in different test scenarios:
• TOE smart card tested in the TOE development environment at the evaluator’s site
using developer test tools with automated comparison of expected and actual test
results.
• An emulator was used for test cases, which were not possible to perform with a real
smart card TOE.
• TOE smart card with dedicated images for the LFI tests at evaluator’s site.
The TOE was tested in all life cycle states that are in scope of the usage phase:
MANUFACTURING, ADMINISTRATION, OPERATIONAL, DEATH.
As result, no deviations were found between the expected and the actual test results;
moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually successful in the
TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all measures stipulated by
delivery procedures and guidance documentation are applied.
8 Evaluated Configuration
As mentioned above the TOE can be configured according to specific needs on the
number of allowed signatures (single signatures; limited (2-255) or unlimited number of
signatures in a row; unlimited number of signatures, but secured by two PINs) and in
accordance with either QES-Germany, QES-Switzerland, or QES-Two-PIN-Signatures.
Additionally the TOE can be delivered in three different IC sizes.
This certification also covers the following configuration of the TOE: CardOS V5.0 with
Application for QES, V1.0. Two personalization models are supported for the TOE:
• the centralized model, where the key generation, the generation of the certificate
and the storage of the personalization data all take place only in the TC, and
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• the decentralized model, where the certificate request and the storage of the
personalization data take place in a registration authority (RA), which is locally
separated from the certification authority (CA).
Apart from that, different configurations within the models are possible. The variants are
determined through the use of the appropriate personalization scripts or through other
personalization processes that guarantee the same result. The following parameters can
be set to one or another value:
• Both models:
- The PUK is optional in the DF_QES.
- The PUK is needed only if unblocking of the PIN shall be possible.
• Centralized model: The certificate(s) are optional in the DF_QES. If the certificate(s)
are stored in the DF_QES they cannot be updated later and no Issuer_CR_Key is
needed for the signature application. If the Issuer_CR_Key does not exist, all
access conditions set to this key must instead be set to never. If the certificate(s)
are stored in a separate DF, the Issuer_CR_Key is mandatory for a later update.
• Decentralized model: The certificate(s) have to be stored in a separate DF (MF) and
can be updated later after an authentication with the mandatory Issuer_CR_Key.
Concerning management of pre-personalized cards either a model using a central
database or a model using transport certificates has to be chosen. If the transport
certificate variant is used, the transport certificate will be stored in a container that
will later on be used for storage of the card holder’s certificate for qualified
electronic signatures.
• Unlimited mass signature module (Only decentralized model):
Two PIN Sets belonging to two different persons (Signatory and Attester).
PIN Set 1 = PIN_1, PUK_1, Transport PIN_1 (Signatory)
PIN Set 2 = PIN_2, PUK_2, Transport PIN_2 (Attester)
If PUK functionality shall not be provided, USECOUNT of PUKs must be set to
zero.
For identification of the TOE, please refer to Chapter 2.2 of this report.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 (AIS 34) and
guidance specific for the technology of the product [4].
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
• As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the ETR
[8] includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation activities in
accordance with CC Supporting Document, ETR for Composition: Annex A
Composite smart card evaluation [4, AIS 36].
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• The ETR [8] builds up on the ETR for Composition document [9] of the evaluation of
the underlying hardware certification [7].
• For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25 and AIS 26
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
• All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
• The components AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation was not carried out as a re-evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• PP Conformance: None 9
• for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
• for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
For QES-Germany and QES-Switzerland the following cryptographic algorithms are used
by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Standard of
Application
Authenticity RSA-signature
generation
(RSASSA-PSS and
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_
5) using SHA-{256,
384, 512}
PKCS1 v2.1
(RSA),
FIPS180-3 (SHA)
moduluslength=1976 - 4096 [17], [20]
RSA-signature
generation
(RSASSA-PSS and
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_
5)
PKCS1 v2.1 (RSA) moduluslength=1976 - 4096 [17], [20]
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality for QES-Germany and QES-Switzerland
9
The Protection Profile for Secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key generation [21]
has been used as a baseline but as the ST includes some additions to the PP, a PP claim "strict" was
not possible
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The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to [17] the algorithms are suitable for authenticity. The validity period as of today
of each algorithm is mentioned in the official catalogue [17].
According to [20] the algorithms are suitable for authenticity. An explicit validity period is
not given.
For QES-Two-PIN-Signatures the strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in
the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But
Cryptographic Functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be
regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore for this
functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for
the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level
above 100 Bits
Authenticity RSA-signature
generation
(RSASSA-PSS
and
RSASSA-PKCS1-v
1_5) using
SHA-{256, 384,
512}
PKCS1 v2.1 (RSA),
FIPS180-3 (SHA)
moduluslength=1976 -
4096
yes
RSA-signature
generation
(RSASSA-PSS
and
RSASSA-PKCS1-v
1_5)
PKCS1 v2.1 (RSA) moduluslength=1976 -
4096
yes
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality for QES-Two-PIN-Signatures
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
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The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user (trust center, card issuer) and his system risk management
process. Future updates of the catalogs [17] and [20] should be considered, too.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
• The security objectives for the operational environment have to be followed and
considered [6, ch. 6.3]
• The software developer (Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH) and the chip
manufacturer (Infineon Technologies AG) are responsible to prevent misuse of the
PackageLoadKey; especially they have to ensure the confidentiality of this key.
• The TOE configuration mass signature generation must be permitted only to be
used if the TOE has been personalised to be operated under an appropriate
external security policy. It does not mean any confinement of institution enforcing
such a security policy. For example, such a security policy is often applied by a
Trust Center for its services, e.g. like a time stamp. The fulfilment of this stipulation
is in the responsibility of the Trust Center issuing the TOE.
• Besides the general recommendations concerning the quality of a PIN/PUK (e.g.
length, retry count, etc.) as stated in the user guidance [12], sec. 4, the user must
be urged to choose a non trivial PIN/PUK before using the TOE in its operational
state.
• From the beginning of 2011 on the length of modulus for RSA are restricted to at
least 1976 Bit. This recommendation is valid at least up to the year 2019 [17].
• Acording to the User Guidance document [12], chapter 5.12 only specific
commands shall be used for the signature application. All other commands shall not
be provided for the SCA particularly the command PSO_H, see User Manual [13],
chapter 3.34.8, because PSO_H is not in the scope of the TOE. For TOE internally
calculated hash values PSO_CDS command has to be used only.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
ADS Application Digital Signature
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CA Certification authority
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
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CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CGA Certification Generation Application
CH Card Holder
CPM Chip Manufacturer
CSP Certification Service Provider
DOC Documentation /documents
DTBS Data to be signed
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMB Embedder
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FSP Functional Specification
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
ID Identification Number
IFD Interface Device
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LRA Local Registration Authority
OS Operating System
PERS Personalizer
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
PUK Personal Unblocking Key
QES qualifizierte elektronische Signatur, qualified electronic signature
RA Registration Authority
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCA Signature creation application
SCD Signature Creation Data (private key)
SFP Security Function Policy
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SFR Security Functional Requirement
SigG Signaturgesetz
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
SSCR Self Signed Certificate Request
ST Security Target
SVD Signature Verification Data
SW Software
SW-DVL Software developer
TC Trust Center
TD Terminal Developer
TDES Triple DES
TDS TOE Design Specification
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VAD Verification Authentication Data
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013, Rev. 2.00, Edition 03/2013, 27.03.2013,
Security Target 'CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES V1.0', Atos IT Solutions and
Services GmbH
[7] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012 for Infineon Security Controller M7892
A21 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and
Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) from
Infineon Technologies AG
Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012-MA-01,
Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC
v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC
dedicated software (firmware) from Infineon Technologies AG
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES V1.0,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0833, Version 4, 25.07.2013, TÜViT, (confidential document)
[9] ETR for Composite Evaluation (ETR-COMP), M7892 A21, BSI-DSZ-CC-0758,
Version 3, 16.07.2012, TÜViT
[10] Configuration List 'CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES V1.0', Rev. 1.10, Edition
04/2013, Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH, 08.04.2013 (confidential document)
[11] Administrator Guidance 'CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES V1.0', Rev. 1.30,
Edition 03/2013, Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH, 27.03.2013 (confidential
document)
[12] User Guidance 'CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES V1.0', Rev. 1.40, Edition
03/2013, Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH, 27.03.2013 (confidential document)
10
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 7, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 8,Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 3, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
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[13] CardOS V5.0 User's Manual, Edition 03/2013, Atos IT Solutions and Services
GmbH, 03.2013 (confidential document)
[14] CardOS V5.0 Package & Release Notes, Edition 03/2013, Atos IT Solutions and
Services GmbH, 03.2013 (confidential document)
[15] Application Digital Signature 'CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES V1.0', Rev.
1.10, Edition 03/2013, Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH, 27.03.2013
(confidential document)
[16] Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13 December
1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures
[17] Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem Signaturgesetz und der
Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete Algorithmen), Vom 20. Februar 2013,
Veröffentlicht am 27. März 2013 im Bundesanzeiger, Bundesnetzagentur für
Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen
[18] Gesetz über die Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische Signaturen (Signaturgesetz
- SigG) in der Fassung vom 16. Mai 2001 (BGBl. Jahrgang 2001 Teil I Nr. 22) zuletzt
geändert durch Artikel 4 des Gesetzes vom 17. Juli 2009 (BGBl. I S. 2091)
[19] Verordnung zur elektronischen Signatur (Signaturverordnung - SigV) in der Fassung
vom 16. November 2001 (BGBl. Jahrgang 2001 Teil I Nr. 59) zuletzt geändert durch
die Verordnung vom 15. November 2010 (BGBl. I S. 1542)
[20] Bundesamt für Kommunikation BAKOM, Technische und administrative Vorschriften
über Zertifizierungsdienste im Bereich der elektronischen Signatur, SR 943.032.1 /
Anhang, Ausgabe 4: 8.7.2011
[21] Protection Profiles for Secure signature creation device - Part 2: Device with key
generation, prEN 14169-1:2009, BSI-PP0059-2009
[22] PKCS1 v2.1: RSA Cryptographic Standard, RSA Laboratories, Version 2.1,
14.06.2002
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0833-2013
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product CardOS V5.0 with Application for QES, V1.0 (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 26 July 2013, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH, Otto-Hahn-Ring 6, 81739 Munich,
Germany (Software development, Testing, CMS, TOE (i.e. MASK) generation,
Documentation)
b) Atos IT Solutions and Services GmbH, Würzburger Str. 121,90766 Fürth,
Germany (Software development, Testing, CMS, Documentation)
c) Atos Information Technology GmbH, Lohberg 10, 49716 Meppen, Germany
(Documentation)
d) For development and production sites regarding the “M7892 A21 with optional
RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013
libraries and with specific IC dedicated software (firmware) from Infineon
Technologies AG“ refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0758-2012.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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