Copyright 2024 TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION All rights reserved.
with FAX Unit
Security Target
Version 0.20
This document is a translation of
the evaluated and certified
security target written in Japanese.
Copyright© 2024 TOSHIBA TEC. All rights reserved.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. ST INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................1
1.1. ST Reference ......................................................................................................................1
1.2. TOE Reference ...................................................................................................................1
1.3. TOE Overview.....................................................................................................................2
1.3.1. TOE Type..................................................................................................................................................2
1.3.2. Usage and Major Security Features of the TOE..................................................................................2
1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware and Software.......................................................................................3
1.4. TOE Description.................................................................................................................3
1.4.1. Physical Boundary ..................................................................................................................................3
1.4.2. Logical Boundary ....................................................................................................................................5
1.4.2.1. Basic Functions..................................................................................................................................5
1.4.2.2. Security Functions.............................................................................................................................6
1.4.2.3. Terminology........................................................................................................................................7
2. Conformance Claim ..........................................................................................................8
2.1. CC Conformance Claim....................................................................................................8
2.2. PP Conformance Claim.....................................................................................................8
2.3. Package Conformance Claim ..........................................................................................8
2.4. Conformance Rationale....................................................................................................8
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITIONS..................................................................................9
3.1. Users ....................................................................................................................................9
3.2. Assets...................................................................................................................................9
3.2.1. User Data ...............................................................................................................................................10
3.2.2. TSF Data.................................................................................................................................................10
3.3. Threats.............................................................................................................................. 11
3.4. Organization Security Policies...................................................................................... 11
3.4.1. Organizational Security Policy Definitions........................................................................................11
3.5. Assumption Definitions.................................................................................................. 12
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................... 13
4.1. Security Objectives for Operational Environment..................................................... 13
5. EXTENDED COMPONENT DEFINITIONS ..................................................................... 14
5.1. FAU_STG_EXT Extended: External Audit Trail Storage ......................................... 14
5.2. FCS_CKM_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Management ............................... 14
5.3. FCS_HTTPS_EXT Extended: HTTPS selected ......................................................... 15
5.4. FCS_KDF_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Derivation ..................................... 16
Copyright© 2024 TOSHIBA TEC. All rights reserved.
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5.5. FCS_KYC_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Key Chaining).................. 17
5.6. FCS_RBG_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)18
5.7. FCS_SMC_EXT Extended: Submask Combining .................................................... 19
5.8. FCS_TLS_EXT Extended: TLS selected .................................................................... 19
5.9. FDP_DSK_EXT Extended: Protection of Data on Disk........................................... 21
5.10. FDP_FXS_EXT Extended: Fax Separation ........................................................... 22
5.11. FIA_PMG_EXT Extended: Password Management............................................. 22
5.12. FPT_KYP_EXT Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material ........................ 23
5.13. FPT_SKP_EXT Extended: Protection of TSF Data.............................................. 24
5.14. FPT_TST_EXT Extended: TSF testing................................................................... 24
5.15. FPT_TUD_EXT Extended: Trusted Update.......................................................... 25
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................ 27
6.1. Notation............................................................................................................................ 27
6.2. Class FAU: Security Audit.............................................................................................. 27
6.2.1. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation ..................................................................................................27
6.2.2. FAU_GEN.2 User identity association .............................................................................................27
6.2.3. FAU_STG_EXT.1 Extended: External Audit Trail Storage.............................................................28
6.3. Class FCS: Cryptographic Support .............................................................................. 28
6.3.1. FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) .......................................28
6.3.2. FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys) ...............................................28
6.3.3. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction...................................................................................28
6.3.4. FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction ......................................29
6.3.5. FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption).........................29
6.3.6. FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification) ....................29
6.3.7. FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a) Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) ...............29
6.3.8. FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)...............30
6.3.9. FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)..........................................................30
6.3.10. FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) .....................30
6.3.11. FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)......................................................30
6.3.12. FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining .....................................................................31
6.3.13. FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)..........31
6.3.14. FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication) .........31
6.3.15. FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected ..................................................................................31
6.3.16. FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected........................................................................32
6.3.17. FCS_KDF_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Derivation .......................................................32
6.3.18. FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining.................................................................................32
6.4. Class FDP: User Data Protection ................................................................................. 33
6.4.1. FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control..................................................................................................33
6.4.2. FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control ....................................................................36
6.4.3. FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation....................................................................................36
6.4.4. FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk ..............................................................36
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6.5. Class FIA: Identification and Authentication ............................................................. 36
6.5.1. FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling.....................................................................................36
6.5.2. FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition ................................................................................................37
6.5.3. FIA_PMG_EXT Extended:Password Management.........................................................................37
6.5.4. FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication...............................................................................................37
6.5.5. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback.............................................................................38
6.5.6. FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification ..................................................................................................38
6.5.7. FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding......................................................................................................38
6.6. Class FMT: Security Management ............................................................................... 38
6.6.1. FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior...........................................................38
6.6.2. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes ...........................................................................38
6.6.3. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization .......................................................................................39
6.6.4. FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data ...........................................................................................39
6.6.5. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ..................................................................40
6.6.6. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles...................................................................................................................44
6.7. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF.................................................................................. 44
6.7.1. FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data ......................................................................44
6.7.2. FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps.....................................................................................................44
6.7.3. FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing...........................................................................................44
6.7.4. FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update .................................................................................45
6.7.5. FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material.................................................45
6.8. Class FTA: TOE Access .................................................................................................. 45
6.8.1. FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination .................................................................................................45
6.9. Class FTP: Trusted Paths/Channels............................................................................ 45
6.9.1. FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel..............................................................................................45
6.9.2. FTP_TRP.1(a) Trusted path (for Administrators)............................................................................46
6.9.3. FTP_TRP.1(b) Trusted path (for Non-administrators)...................................................................46
6.10. Security Assurance Requirements........................................................................... 47
6.11. Security Functional Requirements Rationale ........................................................ 47
6.11.1. Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements Documents ...........................................47
6.11.2. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale...............................................................................49
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION.................................................................................... 50
7.1. Audit.................................................................................................................................. 50
7.2. Cryptographic Support .................................................................................................. 52
7.3. Storage Encryption (Conditionally mandatory) ......................................................... 56
7.4. Storage Encryption (Selective requirements) ............................................................ 60
7.5. Communication Protection (Selective requirements).............................................. 61
7.6. Trusted Update (Selective requirements) .................................................................. 63
7.7. User Data Protection...................................................................................................... 64
7.8. PSTN Fax-Network Separation ..................................................................................... 70
7.9. Identification and Authentication................................................................................ 70
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7.10. Security Management................................................................................................ 72
7.11. Protection of the TSF................................................................................................. 74
7.12. TOE Access.................................................................................................................. 76
7.13. Trusted Path/Channel............................................................................................... 77
APENDIX.................................................................................................................................... 79
Copyright© 2024 TOSHIBA TEC. All rights reserved.
v
List of Tables
Table 1 TOE Configuration Item ..............................................................................................................................1
Table 2 Hardware which composes TOE ...............................................................................................................3
Table 3 Guidance which composes TOE ...............................................................................................................4
Table 4 Terminology ...................................................................................................................................................7
Table 5 User Categories.............................................................................................................................................9
Table 6 Asset Classification.......................................................................................................................................9
Table 7 User Data types...........................................................................................................................................10
Table 8 TSF Data types ............................................................................................................................................10
Table 9 Threats ..........................................................................................................................................................11
Table 10 Organization Security Policies ..............................................................................................................11
Table 11 Assumptions ..............................................................................................................................................12
Table 12 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment .....................................................................13
Table 13 Auditable Events.......................................................................................................................................27
Table 14 D.USER.DOC Access Control SFP ........................................................................................................33
Table 15 D.USER.JOB Access Control SFP ..........................................................................................................34
Table 16 Other Available Characters....................................................................................................................37
Table 17 Security Attributes List ............................................................................................................................39
Table 18 Management of TSF Data.......................................................................................................................39
Table 19 Management Functions..........................................................................................................................40
Table 20 Time Interval of User Inactivity..............................................................................................................45
Table 21 TOE Security Assurance Requirements...............................................................................................47
Table 22 Analysis Results of Dependencies for Security Functional Requirements..................................47
Table 23 Recorded Events and Audit Logs..........................................................................................................50
Table 24 Print Access Control for D.USER.DOC ................................................................................................64
Table 25 Scan Access Control for D.USER.DOC ................................................................................................65
Table 26 Copy Access Control for D.USER.DOC ...............................................................................................65
Table 27 Fax Transmission Access Control for D.USER.DOC .........................................................................66
Table 28 Fax Reception Access Control for D.USER.DOC...............................................................................67
Table 29 Print Access Control for D.USER.JOB ..................................................................................................67
Table 30 Scan Access Control for D.USER.JOB..................................................................................................68
Table 31 Copy Access Control for D.USER.JOB .................................................................................................68
Table 32 Fax Transmission Access Control for D.USER.JOB ...........................................................................69
Table 33 Fax Reception Access Control for D.USER.JOB ................................................................................70
Table 34 Definition of TSFI......................................................................................................................................78
Table 35 Definition of Acronyms ...........................................................................................................................79
Copyright© 2024 TOSHIBA TEC. All rights reserved.
vi
List of Tables
Figure1 Environment for the usage of the MFP ....................................................................................................2
Figure 2 Logical Boundary.........................................................................................................................................5
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1. ST Introduction
ST Reference, TOE Reference, TOE Overview, and TOE Description are described in this Chapter.
1.1. ST Reference
The identity of the ST is described below.
Title： TOSHIBA e-STUDIO6526AC/6527AC/7527AC with FAX Unit Security
Target
Version： 0.20
Date Created： May 30, 2024
Author： TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION
1.2. TOE Reference
The identity of the TOE is described below.
TOE Name： TOSHIBA e-STUDIO6526AC/6527AC/7527AC with FAX Unit
Version： SYS V5.1
TOE Type： Multifunction Product
Developer Name：TOSHIBA TEC CORPORATION
The TOE shown above is consists of the MFP, Fax unit and software as shown in Table 1.
Table 1 TOE Configuration Item
Required components Identification information of TOE Sales Area
MFP
Either TOSHIBA e-STUDIO6527AC or TOSHIBA
e-STUDIO7527AC
Japan
FAX unit GD-1370J
Software SYS V5.1
MFP
Either TOSHIBA e-STUDIO6526AC, TOSHIBA e-
STUDIO6527AC or TOSHIBA e-STUDIO7527AC North
America
FAX unit GD-1370NA-N
Software SYS V5.1
MFP
Either TOSHIBA e-STUDIO6526AC, TOSHIBA e-
STUDIO6527AC or TOSHIBA e-STUDIO7527AC
Europe
FAX unit GD-1370EU
Software SYS V5.1
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1.3. TOE Overview
1.3.1. TOE Type
The TOE is the Multifunction Products that work in a network environment and provide capabilities
of print, copy, scan, and fax.
1.3.2. Usage and Major Security Features of the TOE
The TOE is intended to be installed in a general office and used in a network environment.
The network environment to be used is an internal network (LAN) protected by a firewall from
unauthorized access from the external network, where the TOE is connected to the client PCs,
servers (FTP server, mail server, SYSLOG server), and public telephone network. Also, users use
the basic functions of the MFP on the control panel of the MFP or from a client PC through a web
browser or printer driver. Figure 1 shows the operational environment.
FTP
Server
Client PC
LAN
Firewall
Internet
Communication
Network
Mail
Server
SYSLOG
Server
Public Switched
Telephone
Networks
MFP (TOE)
Figure1 Environment for the usage of the MFP
The TOE is a digital multifunction product equipped with the basic functions, such as copying,
printing, scanning, and faxing. In addition, in order to protect user document data and security-
related data, the TOE has the following functions: a function to identify and authenticate users, an
access control function based on user authority, a function to record a log of TOE use history and
send it to the audit server, a function to encrypt data stored in the storage in the TOE, a function to
protect communication data on the LAN, a setting function that limits security setting operations to
administrators, a function to guarantee the normal operation of the security functions of the TOE,
and a function to prohibit bridge connections between the public telephone network （PSTN） and
the LAN. In addition, data clearing and purging functions are excluded from the security functions
evaluated.
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1.3.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware and Software
Required hardware and firmware other than the TOE are shown below.
• Client PC
U.NORMAL(a) can request printing of the document data through the LAN to the TOE. The
U.ADMIN(a) can refer to or change the setting data in the MFP using the Web browser.
The browser and printer driver are as follows:
‒ Web browser：Microsoft Edge
‒ Printer Driver：TOSHIBA Universal Printer Driver2 (Version：7.222.5412.30)
• Mail Server
The Mail Server is a server which transmits email using SMTP. The TOE and the Mail Server is
connected with TLS communication. (This operation assumes a server using Sendmail 8.15.2.)
• FTP Server
The FTP Server is a server which activates the File Transfer Protocol Server Software. The TOE
and the FTP Server is connected with TLS communication.（This operation assumes a server using
ProFTPD 1.3.6.）
• SYSLOG Server
The SYSLOG Server is a server which transmits/receives TOE log data which is transferred using
the Syslog protocol. The TOE and the SYSLOG Server is connected with TLS communication.
（This operation assumes a server using Syslog-ng 3.14.）
1.4. TOE Description
1.4.1. Physical Boundary
The TOE comprises the MFP unit equipped with the Fax unit, which is a mandatory option, and
guidance. The TOE is composed of the following:
Table 2 Hardware which composes TOE
MFP Fax unit
Sales
Area
Format
Distribution
method
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO6527AC GD-1370J Japan The MFP and
the fax unit are
hardware
components
that
incorporate
firmware in
binary format.
The MFP unit
and the fax unit
are each
shipped to the
user as separate
distribution
items, packaged
in cardboard
boxes by the
shipping carrier.
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO7527AC GD-1370J
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO6526AC GD-1370NA-N North
America
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO6527AC GD-1370NA-N
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO7527AC GD-1370NA-N
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO6526AC GD-1370EU Europe
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO6527AC GD-1370EU
TOSHIBA e-STUDIO7527AC GD-1370EU
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The MFP versions are as follows:
・ SYSTEM FIRMWARE： TS20SF0W1806
・ SYSTEM SOFTWARE： TS20SD0W1805
・ ENGINE FIRMWARE： TK180MWW06
・ SCANNER FIRMWARE： TK160SLGWW15
The Fax unit versions are as follows:
・ FAX1 FIRMWARE： FAXH625TA13
Table 3 Guidance which composes TOE
Title Identifier Format
Distribution
method
Sales
Area
かんたん操作ガイド OMJ210011B0
PDF and Printed
documents
It is
distributed
to the user
bundled
with the
MFP.
Japan
安全にお使いいただくために OMJ210013B0
PDF and Printed
documents
コピー OMJ210017B0 PDF
スキャン OMJ210019B0 PDF
設定/登録 OMJ210027B0 PDF
インストール OMJ210031B0 PDF
印刷 OMJ210033B0 PDF
TopAccess OMJ210035B0 PDF
よくあるご質問 OMJ210029B0 PDF
困ったときは OMJ210009A0 PDF
ハイセキュリティモード OMJ210039E0 PDF
用紙の準備 OMJ210007A0 PDF
本機の仕様 OMJ210037B0 PDF
機体の情報 OMJ210015B0 PDF
ファクス OMJ210021B0 PDF
Quick Start Guide OME210012B0
PDF and Printed
documents
It is
distributed
to the user
bundled
with the
MFP.
North
America,
Europe
Safety Information OME210014B0
PDF and Printed
documents
Copy OME210018B0 PDF
Scan OME210020B0 PDF
User Functions OME210028B0 PDF
Installation OME210032B0 PDF
Print OME210034B0 PDF
TopAccess OME210036B0 PDF
Frequently Asked Questions OME210030B0 PDF
Troubleshooting OME21001000 PDF
High Security Mode OME210040E0 PDF
Preparation of Paper OME21000800 PDF
Information About Equipment OME210016C0 PDF
Specifications OME210038C0 PDF
Fax OME210022B0 PDF
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1.4.2. Logical Boundary
The logical boundary of the TOE is defined by the TOE security function and a basic function which
are described in the following section.
Logical
Boudary
TOE
TSF Self
Protection
Audit Function
User
Control Panel Unit
TSF Data Protection
Trusted Communication Function
Mail
Server
User Authentication Function
FTP
Server
Client PC
Public
Switched
Telephone
Networks
SYSLOG
Server
SSD
D.USER.DOC
D.TSF.PROT D.TSF.CONF
D.USER.JOB
Data Encryption
Basic Functions
Copy
Function
Scan
Function
Print
Function
FAX
Function
Access Control
Function
FROM
D.TSF.PROT
D.TSF.CONF
NVRAM
D.TSF.PROT
D.TSF.CONF
Function
which
separate
PSTN
Fax
and
Network
Software
Update
Verification
Figure 2 Logical Boundary
1.4.2.1. Basic Functions
The TOE is provided with a series of functions associated with images, such as Copy, Print, and Scan,
as the Basic Functions, and controls these functions integrally.
• Copy function
A Copy function is a function to read the original with the scanner and print it out from the printer
according to the general user’s operation from the control panel.
• Print function
A Print function is a function which transmits the print data from the client PC to the TOE through
the LAN and prints the data on a paper.
• Scan function
The Scan function can attach and send a paper documentby user operation on the control panel
and readingthe paper document with the Scanner to an email and the FTP server.
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• Fax function
The Fax function consists of the Fax transmission function and the Fax reception function.
The Fax transmission function is a function which transmits the paper document data read with
the Scanner Unit to the external Fax machine through the PSTN. The Fax reception function is
a function which receives the document data transmitted from the ex ternal Fax machine through
the PSTN.
1.4.2.2. Security Functions
The security functions provided by the TOE are as follows:
• Function which gives permission to use the identity, authentication, and HCD functions
It is a function which verifies whether a user who wants to use the TOE is an authorized user, and
gives the user a permission to use the TOE only when the user is identified.
The TOE prompts a user to enter the user ID and user password from the control panel or the
client PC for user authentication, and has the feedback protection function which displays
dummy characters during user password entry and the lockout function which locks a user who
failed in authentication out. In addition, if there is no operation for a predetermined time after
logging in, it has a function to automatically log out.
• Access Control Function
The TOE controls access to the user data and functions that are secured assets to the authorized
users.
• Audit Function
The TOE generates audit log s for tracking the state of the TOE. All logs recorded per event are
transferred to the audit server and viewable from the audit server.
• Trusted Communication Function
The TOE supports the cryptographic communication protocol in order to prevent communic
ation data from being leaked or tampered on the network during connection and communication
with the LAN.
The TOE communicates with the client PC, mail server, SYSLOG server, and FTP server in the
operational environment using TLS for data encryption. The TOE protects the print data by using
TLS and print protocol IPPS during communication with the client PC when IPP print is performed
by the client PC using the printer driver.
• TSF Self Protection
The TOE perfor performs integrity tests on its static executables and configuration files using
verification of their digital signatures against the known signatures. This allows the TOE to detect
any tampering of its trusted state.
• TSF Data Protection
Only an administrator role user authenticated by the Identity Authentication function has the
capability to manage the TSF data from the control panel or TopAccess. For example, you can
change the date and time, register/delete users, and enable or disable available services and
protocols.
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• Data Encryption
The Data Encryption is a function to encrypt user data saved in the SSD to protect them from
being leaked.
• Function which separate PSTN Fax and Network
This function prohibits bridge connections between the public telephone network and the LAN
by restricting entry from PSTN to Fax reception.
• Software Update Verification
This function is a function which verifies whether software to be updated is authorized when
software of the TOE is updated.
1.4.2.3. Terminology
The terms which are defined by CC and PP in Chapter 2 out of the specific terms associated with
the ST should follow the definition thereof. The other terms are defined as shown in Table 4.
Table 4 Terminology
Terminology Definition
User ID An identifier given to a general user and MFP administrator. The TOE
specifies the user by the identifier.
User Password A password which is used to log into the TOE by a user.
Job Log The job information such as Print Job, Transmission Journals, Reception
Journals and Scan Job.
Message Log Logs regarding MFP's device information or operations executed by users.
TopAccess A web-based job and device control tool. The MFP information can be
retrieved by using this tool through network.
Auto Logout Time Time to log out when a logged in user does not operate the MFP for a
certain period of time.
Lockout Time Time until the locked out account is released.
Date and Time Time information for log management. Year/moth/day/hour/min/sec
Role U.NORMAL、U.ADMIN.
U.NORMAL is refined to U.NORMAL(a) and U.FAXOPERATOR.
U.ADMIN is refined to U.ADMIN(a), U.ACCOUNTMANAGER, and
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR.
Firmware Software which is embedded into the device to control hardware.
Cipher Suite Combination of the cryptographic algorithms used for TLS communication,
which consists of the combination of “Key
replacement_Signature_Encryption_Hash function”.
Address Book Fax numbers and email addresses can be registered and displayed in the
destination list. It enables simple specification of the fax transmission
destinations and scan email transmission destinations.
User Authentication
Failure Handling
An administrator can change the number of retries for entering the login
password and lockout time and clear the locked out account status.
Secure Channel A communication channel in which data is encrypted to prevent wiretapping
by the third party.
European Special
Characters
Words with the German umlauts and French cedilla.
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2. Conformance Claim
2.1. CC Conformance Claim
The following shows the CC Conformance Claim of the ST and TOE.
Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Release 5
・ Part1： Introduction and general model April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5
・ Part2： Security functional components April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5
・ Part3： Security assurance components April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5
・ Conformance of ST to CC part2: CC part 2 Extended
・ Conformance of ST to CC part3： CC part 3 Conformant
2.2. PP Conformance Claim
The ST and TOE conform to the following PP.
PP Name： Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices
PP Version： 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
Certification Identification： JISEC-C0553
Errata： Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices – v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
2.3. Package Conformance Claim
The ST does not conform to the packages.
2.4. Conformance Rationale
The following conditions requested by PP have been satisfied and must be “Exact Conformance” as
requested by PP. Therefore, the TOE type is consistent with PP.
・ Required Uses
Printing, Scanning, Copying、Networking communications, Addministration
・ Conditionally Mandatory Uses
PSTN faxing, Fileld-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage
・ Optional Uses
None
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3. Security Problem Definitions
3.1. Users
The User and role of the TOE are defined as shown below in the ST.
Table 5 User Categories
Role Category name Definition
U.NORMAL
A User who has
been identified
and
authenticated
and does not
have an
administrative
role
U.NORMAL(a) Normal User A User who is authorized to
execute Copy, Print, Scan, and
Fax functions which are the
basic functions of the TOE.
A Normal User is authorized to
operate each function and can
execute only the authorized
function
U.FAXOPERATOR Normal User A user who can execute the Fax
transmission/reception
functions
U.ADMIN
A User who has
been identified
and
authenticated
and has an
administrative
role
U.ADMIN(a) Administrator An administrator who is
authorized to manage the
entire TOE, such as setting of
the TOE security functions,
change of the user account
information, and browse of the
audit log
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER Administrator An administrator who can
perform the settings for the
user account management
(setting of the user ID and role
of the user and operation
authority of the basic functions)
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR Administrator A user who can edit the
address book
3.2. Assets
Two asset classifications are defined in the ST.
Table 6 Asset Classification
Designation Asset category Definition
D.USER User Data Data created by and for Users that do not affect the
operation of the TSF.
D.TSF TSF Data Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the
operation of the TSF.
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3.2.1. User Data
The two User Data is defined in the ST.
Table 7 User Data types
Designation
User Data
type
Definition Details
D.USER.DOC User
Document
Data
Information contained in a
User’s Document, in electronic
or hardcopy form
Copy Document Data
Print Document Data
Scan Document Data
Fax Transmission Document Data
Fax Reception Document Data
D.USER.JOB User Job
Data
Information related to a User’s
Document or Document
Processing Job
Print Job
Scan Job
Copy Job
Fax Transmission Job
Fax Reception Job
3.2.2. TSF Data
The TSF Data consist of the following 2 types.
Table 8 TSF Data types
Designation
TSF Data
type
Definition Details
D.TSF.PROT Protected
TSF Data
TSF Data for which alteration
by a User who is neither the
data owner nor in an
Administrator role might affect
the security of the TOE, but for
which disclosure is acceptable
Enable/Disable of the Secure
Channel
User ID
Role
Allowable Number of entry for
Login Password
Lockout Time
Locked Account Status
Auto Logout Time
Date and Time Information
Minimum Password Length
Address Book
SYSLOG Server Settings
FTP Server Settings
Software update
D.TSF.CONF Confidential
TSF Data
TSF Data for which either
disclosure or alteration by a
User who is neither the data
owner nor in an Administrator
role might affect the security of
the TOE
User Password
Encryption Key
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3.3. Threats
The Threats to the TOE which are countered by the conforming products are as shown below.
Threats are defined by a threat agent that performs an action resulting in an outcome that has the
potential to violate TOE security policies.
Table 9 Threats
Designation Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete)
USER.DOCument Data or change (modify or delete) User Job
Data in the TOE through one of the TOE’s interfaces.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF Data in the
TOE through one of the TOE’s interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security if the TOE is
permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE An attacker may cause the installation of unauthorized software
on the TOE.
T.NET_COMPROMISE An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise compromise
the security of the TOE by monitoring or manipulating network
communication.
3.4. Organization Security Policies
The following are Organizational Security Policies3 (OSPs) that are upheld by conforming products.
3.4.1. Organizational Security Policy Definitions
Organizational Security Policies are used to provide a basis for Security Objectives that are not
practical to define on the basis of Threats to Assets or that originate primarily from customer
expectations.
Table 10 Organization Security Policies
Designation Definition
P.AUTHORIZATION Users must be authorized before performing Document
Processing and administrative functions.
P.AUDIT Security-relevant activities must be audited and the log of such
actions must be protected and transmitted to an External IT
Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION The TOE must be able to identify itself to other devices on the
LAN.
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION
(conditionally mandatory)
If the TOE stores USER.DOCument Data or Confidential TSF Data
on Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt
such data on those devices.
P.KEY_MATERIAL
(conditionally mandatory)
Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or any other values
that contribute to the creation of encryption keys for Field-
Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage of USER.DOCument Data or
Confidential TSF Data must be protected from unauthorized
access and must not be stored on that storage device.
P.FAX_FLOW
(conditionally mandatory)
If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will ensure separation
between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.
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3.5. Assumption Definitions
Assumptions are conditions that must be satisfied in order for the Security Objectives and functional
requirements to be effective.
Table 11 Assumptions
Designation Definition
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and
the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be provided by the
environment.
A.NETWORK The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the TOE
from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE according
to site security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to site
security policies.
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4. Security Objectives
4.1. Security Objectives for Operational Environment
The details of the Security Objectives for the Operational Environment are as described in Table 12.
Table 12 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Designation Definition
OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Operational Environment shall provide physical security,
commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it stores or
processes.
OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION The Operational Environment shall provide network security to
protect the TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
OE.ADMIN_TRUST The TOE Owner shall establish trust that Administrators will not
use their privileges for malicious purposes.
OE.USER_TRAINING The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of site security
policies and have the competence to follow them.
OE.ADMIN_TRAINING The TOE Owner shall ensure that Administrators are aware of site
security policies and have the competence to use manufacturer’s
guidance to correctly configure the TOE and protect passwords
and keys accordingly.
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5. Extended Component Definitions
Extended component definitions are listed below.
5.1. FAU_STG_EXT Extended: External Audit Trail Storage
Family Behavior:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure that secure transmission of audit data from
TOE to an External IT Entity.
Component leveling:
FAU_STG_EXT.1: Extended: External Audit Trail Storage 1
FAU_STG_EXT.1 External Audit Trail Storage requires the TSF to use a trusted channel
implementing a secure protocol.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• The TSF shall have the ability to configure the cryptographic functionality.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
• There are no auditable events foreseen.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Extended: Protected Audit Trail Storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation,
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an External IT
Entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
Rationale:
The TSF is required that the transmission of generated audit data to an External IT Entity which relies
on a non-TOE audit server for storage and review of audit records. The storage of these audits
records and the ability to allow the administrator to review these audit records is provided by the
Operational Environment in that case. The Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the
transmission of audit data to an External IT Entity.
This extended component protects the audit records, and it is therefore placed in the FAU class with
a single component.
5.2. FCS_CKM_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Management
Family Behavior:
This family addresses the management aspects of cryptographic keys. Especially, this extended
component is intended for cryptographic key destruction.
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Component leveling:
FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction 4
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Material Destruction ensures not only keys but also key
materials that are no longer needed are destroyed by using an approved
method.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
• There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys), or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Rationale:
Cryptographic Key Material Destruction is to ensure the keys and key materials that are no longer
needed are destroyed by using an approved method, and the Common Criteria does not provide a
suitable SFR for the Cryptographic Key Material Destruction.
This extended component protects the cryptographic key and key materials against exposure, and
it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
5.3. FCS_HTTPS_EXT Extended: HTTPS selected
Family Behavior:
Components in this family define requirements for protecting remote management sessions
between the TOE and a Security Administrator. This family describes how HTTPS will be
implemented. This is a new family defined for the FCS Class.
Component leveling:
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected 1
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 HTTPS selected, requires that HTTPS be implemented according to RFC
2818 and supports TLS.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
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Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
• Failure of HTTPS session establishment
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS as specified in FCS_TLS_EXT.1.
Rationale:
HTTPS is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a
suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.
This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and it
is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
5.4. FCS_KDF_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Derivation
Family Behavior:
This family specifies the means by which an intermediate key is derived from a specified set of
submasks.
Component leveling:
FCS_KDF_EXT: Cryptographic Key Derivation 1
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Derivation requires the TSF to derive intermediate keys from
submasks using the specified hash functions.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
• There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Key Derivation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication),
[if selected: FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)]
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FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall accept [selection: a RNG generated submask as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1, a conditioned password submask, imported submask] to
derive an intermediate key, as defined in [selection: NIST SP 800-108
[selection: KDF in Counter Mode, KDF in Feedback Mode, KDF in Double-
Pipeline Iteration Mode], NIST SP 800-132], using the keyed-hash functions
specified in FCS_COP.1(h), such that the output is at least of equivalent
security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.
Rationale:
The TSF is required to specify the means by which an intermediate key is derived from a specified
set of submasks using the specified hash functions.
This extended component protects the Data Encryption Keys using cryptographic algorithms in the
maintained key chains, and it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
5.5. FCS_KYC_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Key Chaining)
Family Behavior:
This family provides the specification to be used for using multiple layers of encryption keys to
ultimately secure the protected data encrypted on the storage.
Component leveling:
FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining 1
FCS_KYC_EXT Key Chaining requires the TSF to maintain a key chain and specifies the
characteristics of that chain.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
• There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic operation (Key Wrapping),
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining,
FCS_COP.1(i) Cryptographic operation (Key Transport),
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Key Derivation),
and/or
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)].
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [selection: one, using a submask as
the BEVor DEK; intermediate keys originating from one or more submask(s)
to the BEV or DEK using the following method(s): [selection: key wrapping
as specified in FCS_COP.1(e), key combining as specified in
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FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key encryption as specified in FCS_COP.1(f), key
derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1, key transport as specified in
FCS_COP.1(i)]] while maintaining an effective strength of [selection: 128
bits, 256 bits].
Rationale:
Key Chaining ensures that the TSF maintains the key chain, and also specifies the characteristics of
that chain. However, the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the management of
multiple layers of encryption key to protect encrypted data.
This extended component protects the TSF data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore
placed in the FCS class with a single component.
5.6. FCS_RBG_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
Family Behavior:
This family defines requirements for random bit generation to ensure that it is performed in
accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.
Component leveling:
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation 1
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation requires random bit generation to be performed in
accordance with selected standards and seeded by an entropy source.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
• There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Random Bit Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with [selection: ISO/IEC 18031:2011, NIST SP 800-90A] using
[selection: Hash_DRBG (any), HMAC_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that
accumulates entropy from [selection: [assignment: number of software-
based sources] software-based noise source(s), [assignment: number of
hardware-based sources] hardware-based noise source(s)] with a minimum
of [selection: 128 bits, 256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest
security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security
strength table for hash functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
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Rationale:
Random bits/number will be used by the SFRs for key generation and destruction, and the Common
Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the random bit generation.
This extended component ensures the strength of encryption keys, and it is therefore placed in the
FCS class with a single component.
5.7. FCS_SMC_EXT Extended: Submask Combining
Family Behavior:
This family defines the means by which submasks are combined, if the TOE supports more than one
submask being used to derive or protect the BEV.
Component leveling:
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining 1
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Submask combining requires the TSF to combine the submasks in a
predictable fashion.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
• There are no auditable events foreseen.
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_SMC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method [selection:
exclusive OR (XOR), SHA-256, SHA-512] to generate an intermediary key or
BEV.
Rationale:
Submask Combining is to ensure the TSF combine the submasks in order to derive or protect the
BEV.
This extended component protects the TSF data using cryptographic algorithms, and it is therefore
placed in the FCS class with a single component.
5.8. FCS_TLS_EXT Extended: TLS selected
Family Behavior:
This family addresses the ability for a server and/or a client to use TLS to protect data between a
client and the server using the TLS protocol.
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Component leveling:
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected 1
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS selected, requires the TLS protocol implemented as specified.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
• Failure of TLS session establishment
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols [selection: TLS
1.0 (RFC 2246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] supporting the
following ciphersuites:
Mandatory Ciphersuites:
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
Optional Ciphersuites:
[selection:
• None
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
].
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Rationale:
TLS is one of the secure communication protocols, and the Common Criteria does not provide a
suitable SFR for the communication protocols using cryptographic algorithms.
This extended component protects the communication data using cryptographic algorithms, and
it is therefore placed in the FCS class with a single component.
5.9. FDP_DSK_EXT Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
Family Behavior:
This family is to mandate the encryption of all protected data written to the storage.
Component leveling:
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk 1
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk, requires the TSF to encrypt all the
Confidential TSF and User Data stored on the Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage Devices in order to avoid storing these data in plaintext on the
devices.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
• There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [selection: perform encryption in accordance with
FCS_COP.1(d), use a self-encrypting Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage
Device that is separately CC certified to conform to the FDE EE cPP] such
that any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device contains no plaintext
User Document Data and no plaintext confidential TSF Data.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
Rationale:
Extended: Protection of Data on Disk is to specify that encryption of any confidential data without
user intervention, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Protection of
Data on Disk.
This extended component protects the Data on Disk, and it is therefore placed in the FDP class with
a single component.
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5.10. FDP_FXS_EXT Extended: Fax Separation
Family Behavior:
This family addresses the requirements for separation between Fax PSTN line and the LAN to which
TOE is connected.
Component leveling:
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax Separation 1
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Fax Separation, requires the fax interface cannot be used to create a network
bridge between a PSTN and a LAN to which TOE is connected.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
• There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except
transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols.
Rationale:
Fax Separation is to protect a LAN against attack from PSTN line, and the Common Criteria does
not provide a suitable SFR for the Protection of TSF or User Data.
This extended component protects the TSF Data or User Data, and it is therefore placed in the
FDP class with a single component.
5.11. FIA_PMG_EXT Extended: Password Management
Family Behavior:
This family defines requirements for the attributes of passwords used by administrative users to
ensure that strong passwords and passphrases can be chosen and maintained.
Component leveling:
FIA_PMG _EXT.1 Extended: Password Management 1
FIA_PMG _EXT.1 Password management requires the TSF to support passwords with varying
composition requirements, minimum lengths, maximum lifetime, and
similarity constraints.
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Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no auditable events foreseen.
FIA_PMG _EXT.1 Extended: Password management
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_PMG _EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
User passwords:
• Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case
letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [selection: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”,
“^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”, [assignment: other characters]];
• Minimum password length shall be settable by an Administrator, and have the capability to
require passwords of 15 characters or greater.
Rationale:
Password Management is to ensure the strong authentication between the endpoints of
communication, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the Password
Management.
This extended component protects the TOE by means of password management, and it is therefore
placed in the FIA class with a single component.
5.12. FPT_KYP_EXT Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
Family Behavior:
This family addresses the requirements for keys and key materials to be protected if and when
written to nonvolatile storage.
Component leveling:
FPT_ KYP _EXT.1 Protection of key and key material 1
FPT_ KYP _EXT.1 Extended: Protection of key and key material, requires the TSF to ensure that
no plaintext key or key materials are written to nonvolatile storage.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
• There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_ KYP _EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FPT_ KYP _EXT.1.1 The TSF shall not store plaintext keys that are part of the keychain specified
by FCS_KYC_EXT.1 in any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device,
and not store any such plaintext key on a device that uses the key for its
encryption.
Rationale:
Protection of Key and Key Material is to ensure that no plaintext key or key material are written to
nonvolatile storage, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the protection
of key and key material.
This extended component protects the TSF data, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a
single component.
5.13. FPT_SKP_EXT Extended: Protection of TSF Data
Family Behavior:
This family addresses the requirements for managing and protecting the TSF data, such as
cryptographic keys. This is a new family modelled as the FPT Class.
Component leveling:
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data 1
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading all symmetric keys), requires preventing
symmetric keys from being read by any user or subject. It is the only
component of this family.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private
keys.
Rationale:
Protection of TSF Data is to ensure the pre-shared keys, symmetric keys and private keys are
protected securely, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable SFR for the protection
of such TSF data.
This extended component protects the TOE by means of strong authentication using Pre-shared
Key, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single component.
5.14. FPT_TST_EXT Extended: TSF testing
Family Behavior:
This family addresses the requirements for self-testing the TSF for selected correct operation.
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Component leveling:
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing 1
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing requires a suite of self-testing to be run during initial start-up in
order to demonstrate correct operation of the TSF.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
• There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (and power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
Rationale:
TSF testing is to ensure the TSF can be operated correctly, and the Common Criteria does not
provide a suitable SFR for the TSF testing. In particular, there is no SFR defined for TSF testing.
This extended component protects the TOE, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single
component.
5.15. FPT_TUD_EXT Extended: Trusted Update
Family Behavior:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to ensure that only administrators can update the TOE
firmware/software, and that such firmware/software is authentic.
Component leveling:
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update 1
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update, ensures authenticity and access control for updates.
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
• There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included
in the PP/ST:
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• There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification),
or
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the
current version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate
updates to TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the
TOE using a digital signature mechanism and [selection: no other functions]
prior to installing those updates.
Rationale:
Firmware/software is a form of TSF Data, and the Common Criteria does not provide a suitable
SFR for the management of firmware/software. In particular, there is no SFR defined for importing
TSF Data.
This extended component protects the TOE, and it is therefore placed in the FPT class with a single
component.
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6. Security Requirements
6.1. Notation
・Bold typeface indicates the portion that has been “completed” or “refined” in this PP.
・Bold italic typeface indicates the portion that has been “assigned”, “selected” or “refined” in
this ST.
・Letters in brackets indicate the “assigned” or “selected” results.
・SFR components that are followed by a letter in parentheses, e.g., (a), (b)… represent required
iterations.
6.2. Class FAU: Security Audit
6.2.1.FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
(for O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All auditable events specified in Table 13, [none].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, additional information specified in
Table 13, [none].
Table 13 Auditable Events
Auditable events Relevant SFR
Additional
information
Job completion FDP_ACF.1 Type of job
Unsuccessful User authentication FIA_UAU.1 None
Unsuccessful User identification FIA_UID.1 None
Use of management functions FMT_SMF.1 None
Modification to the group of Users that
are part of a role
FMT_SMR.1 None
Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 None
Failure to establish session FTP_ITC.1,
FTP_TRP.1(a),
FTP_TRP.1(b)
Reason for
failure
6.2.2.FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
(for O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
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FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
6.2.3.FAU_STG_EXT.1 Extended: External Audit Trail Storage
(for O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation,
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an External IT
Entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
6.3. Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
6.3.1.FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/ verification)
FCS_COP.1(i) Cryptographic operation (Key Transport)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1(a) Refinement: The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for key
establishment in accordance with [
• NIST Special Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography” for RSA-based key establishment
schemes
] and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a
symmetric key strength of 112 bits.
6.3.2.FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION, O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping)
FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_CKM.1.1(b)Refinement: The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a
Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified
cryptographic key sizes [128 bit, 256 bit] that meet the following: No Standard.
6.3.3.FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION, O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION, O.PURGE_DATA))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys), or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
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FCS_CKM.4.1 Refinement: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method [
For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by [powering off a device].
For nonvolatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single] overwrite
of key data storage location consisting of [a static pattern], followed by a [none].
If read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the process shall be repeated
again;
] that meets the following: [no standard].
6.3.4.FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION, O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION, O.PURGE_DATA)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys), or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall destroy all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and
cryptographic critical security parameters when no longer needed.
6.3.5.FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption)
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(a) Refinement: The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm AES operating in [CBC modes] and
cryptographic key sizes 128-bits and 256-bits that meets the following:
• FIPS PUB 197, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”
• [NIST SP 800-38A]
6.3.6.FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification)
(for O.UPDATE_VERIFICATION, O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(b) Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in
accordance with a [RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes
(modulus) of [2048 bits]] that meets the following [FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard”].
6.3.7.FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a) Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
(for O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1(a) The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with [NIST SP 800-90A] using [Hash_DRBG (any)].
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FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2(a) The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that
accumulates entropy from [[single] hardware-based noise source(s)] with a
minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security
strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength
Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
6.3.8.FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1(b)The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with [NIST SP 800-90A] using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2(b)The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that
accumulates entropy from [[single] hardware-based noise source(s)] with a
minimum of [128bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security
strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength
Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
6.3.9.FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
(selected in FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3, or with FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_COP.1.1(c) Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance
with [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] that meet the following: [ISO/IEC
10118-3:2004].
6.3.10. FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
(for O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(d) The TSF shall perform data encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [CBC] mode and cryptographic key
sizes [128 bits] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3,
[CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116].
6.3.11. FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)
(selected from FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
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FCS_COP.1.1(f) Refinement: The TSF shall perform key encryption and decryption in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [[CBC] mode] and
cryptographic key sizes [128 bits] that meet the following: [AES as specified in ISO
/IEC 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO/IEC 10116].
6.3.12. FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining
(selected in FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_SMC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall combine submasks using the following method
[exclusive OR (XOR)] to generate an intermediary key or BEV.
6.3.13. FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
(selected with FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(g) Refinement: The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[SHA-1, SHA-256],
key size [160, 256]bits, and message digest sizes [160, 256] bits that meet the
following: FIPS PUB 198-1, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, and
FIPS PUB 180-3, “Secure Hash Standard.”
6.3.14. FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
(selected with FCS_PCC_EXT.1, FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1(b) Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys)]
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Extended: Cryptographic Key Material Destruction
FCS_COP.1.1(h) Refinement: The TSF shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in
accordance with [HMAC-SHA-256] and cryptographic key sizes [256] that meet
the following: [ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”; ISO/IEC
10118].
6.3.15. FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected
(selected in FTP_ITC.1.1, FTP_TRP.1.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_CKM.1(a) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric Keys)
FCS_COP.1(a) Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification)
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1(g) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement one or more of the following protocols [TLS 1.2
(RFC 5246)] supporting the following ciphersuites:
Mandatory Ciphersuites:
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
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Optional Ciphersuites:
[
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
].
6.3.16. FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS as specified in FCS_TLS_EXT.1.
6.3.17. FCS_KDF_EXT Extended: Cryptographic Key Derivation
(for O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication),
[if selected: FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)]
FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall accept [a RNG generated submask as specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1] to derive an intermediate key, as defined in [NIST SP 800-
108 [KDF in Counter Mode]], using the keyed-hash functions specified in
FCS_COP.1(h), such that the output is at least of equivalent security strength
(in number of bits) to the BEV.
6.3.18. FCS_KYC_EXT.1 Extended: Key Chaining
(for O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_COP.1(e) Cryptographic operation (Key Wrapping),
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 Extended: Submask Combining,
FCS_COP.1(i) Cryptographic operation (Key Transport),
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 Cryptographic Operation (Key Derivation),
and/or FCS_COP.1(f) Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)].
FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [intermediate keys originating from
one or more submask(s) to the BEV or DEK using the following method(s):
[key combining as specified in FCS_SMC_EXT.1, key encryption as specified
in FCS_COP.1(f), key derivation as specified in FCS_KDF_EXT.1]] while
maintaining an effective strength of [128 bits].
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6.4. Class FDP: User Data Protection
6.4.1.FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
(for O.ACCESS_CONTROL and O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 Refinement:The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP on subjects,
objects, and operations among subjects and objects specified in Table 14 and
Table 15.
Table 14 D.USER.DOC Access Control SFP
"Create" "Read" "Modify" "Delete"
Print
Operation:
Submit a
document to
be printed
View
image or
Release
printed
output
Modify
stored
document
Delete
stored
document
Job owner (note 1) denied
U.ADMIN(a) denied denied
U.NORMAL(a) denied denied denied
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER denied denied denied denied
U.FAXOPERATOR denied denied denied denied
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERA
TOR
denied denied denied denied
Unauthenticated (condition 1) denied denied denied
Scan
Operation:
Submit a
document
for
scanning
View
scanned
image
Modify
stored
image
Delete
stored
image
Job owner (note 2)
U.ADMIN(a) denied denied
U.NORMAL(a) denied denied denied
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER denied denied denied denied
U.FAXOPERATOR denied denied denied denied
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERA
TOR
denied denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Copy
Operation:
Submit a
document
for
copying
View
scanned
image or
Release
printed
copy
output
Modify
stored
image
Delete
stored
image
Job owner (note 2) denied
U.ADMIN(a) denied denied
U.NORMAL(a) denied denied denied
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER denied denied denied denied
U.FAXOPERATOR denied denied denied denied
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"Create" "Read" "Modify" "Delete"
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERA
TOR
denied denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Fax send
Operation:
Submit a
document
to send as
a fax
View
scanned
image
Modify
stored
image
Delete
stored
image
Job owner (note 2)
U.ADMIN(a) denied denied
U.NORMAL(a) denied denied denied
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER denied denied denied denied
U.FAXOPERATOR denied denied denied
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERA
TOR
denied denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Fax receive
Operation:
Receive a
fax and
store it
View fax
image or
Release
printed
fax
output
Modify
image of
received
fax
Delete
image of
received
fax
Job owner (note 3) denied
U.ADMIN(a) (note 4) denied
U.NORMAL(a) (note 4) denied denied denied
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER (note 4) denied denied denied
U.FAXOPERATOR (note 4) denied
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERA
TOR
(note 4) denied denied denied
Unauthenticated (note 4) denied denied denied
Table 15 D.USER.JOB Access Control SFP
"Create" * "Read" "Modify" "Delete"
Print
Operation:
Create print
job
View print
queue / log
Modify print
job
Cancel print
job
Job owner (note 1) denied
U.ADMIN(a) denied
U.NORMAL(a) denied denied
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER denied denied denied
U.FAXOPERATOR denied denied denied
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERA
TOR
denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied
Scan
Operation:
Create scan
job
View scan
status / log
Modify scan
job
Cancel scan
job
Job owner (note 2) denied
U.ADMIN(a) denied
U.NORMAL(a) denied denied
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER denied denied denied
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"Create" * "Read" "Modify" "Delete"
U.FAXOPERATOR denied denied denied
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERA
TOR
denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Copy
Operation:
Create copy
job
View copy
status / log
Modify copy
job
Cancel copy
job
Job owner (note 2) denied
U.ADMIN(a) denied
U.NORMAL(a) denied denied
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER denied denied denied
U.FAXOPERATOR denied denied denied
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERA
TOR
denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Fax send
Operation:
Create fax
send job
View fax job
queue / log
Modify fax
send job
Cancel fax
send job
Job owner (note 2) denied
U.ADMIN(a) denied
U.NORMAL(a) denied denied
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER denied denied denied
U.FAXOPERATOR denied denied
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERA
TOR
denied denied denied
Unauthenticated denied denied denied denied
Fax receive
Operation:
Create fax
receive job
View fax
receive
status / log
Modify fax
receive job
Cancel fax
receive job
Fax owner (note 3) denied denied
U.ADMIN(a) (note 4) denied denied
U.NORMAL(a) (note 4) denied denied denied
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER (note 4) denied denied denied
U.FAXOPERATOR (note 4) denied denied
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERA
TOR
(note 4) denied denied denied
Unauthenticated (note 4) denied denied denied
Application note:
Condition 1: Jobs submitted by unauthenticated users must contain a credential that the TOE
can use to identify the Job Owner.
Note 1: Job Owner is identified by a credential or assigned to an authorized User as part of
the process of submitting a print or storage Job.
Note 2: Job Owner is assigned to an authorized User as part of the process of initiating a
scan, copy, fax send, or retrieval Job.
Note 3: Job Owner of received faxes is assigned by default or configuration. Ownership of
received faxes is assigned to U.FAXOPERATOR and U.ADMIN(a) role.
Note 4: PSTN faxes are received from outside of the TOE, they are not initiated by Users of
the TOE.
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6.4.2.FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
(for O.ACCESS_CONTROL and O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following: subjects, objects, and attributes specified in Table 14 and
Table 15.
FDP_ACF.1.2 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules governing
access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects specified in Table 14 and Table 15.
FDP_ACF.1.3 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: [none].
6.4.3.FDP_FXS_EXT.1 Extended: Fax separation
(for O.FAX_NET_SEPARATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prohibit communication via the fax interface, except
transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols.
6.4.4.FDP_DSK_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Data on Disk
(for O.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(d) Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption).
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [perform encryption in accordane with FCS_COP.1(d)], such
that any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Device contains no plaintext
User Document Data and no plaintext Confidential TSF Data.
FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
6.5. Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
6.5.1.FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
(for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [an administrator configurable positive integer within
[1 - 30]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [the unsuccessful
user authentication attempts of following the last successful authentication or
clear of user account lock].
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FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [met],
the TSF shall [lockout each account in lockout time, U.ADMIN(a) and
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER can release a lockout account].
6.5.2.FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
(for O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users: [User ID, Role].
6.5.3.FIA_PMG_EXT Extended:Password Management
(for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
User passwords:
• Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case
letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “^”, “*”, “(“, “)”,
[refer to Table 16]];
• Minimum password length shall be settable by an Administrator, and have the capability to
require passwords of 15 characters or greater;
Table 16 Other Available Characters
Type of
Characters
Available Characters
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ђѓєѕіїјљњћќўџҐΆΈΉΊΌΎΏΐάέήίΰαβγδεζηθικλμνξοπρςσ
τυφχψωϊϋόύώ
6.5.4.FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
(for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall allow [storing the document data from printer driver,
receive PSTN Fax data] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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6.5.5.FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
(for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [display dummy characters] to the user while the
authentication is in progress.
6.5.6.FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
(for O.USER_I&A and O.ADMIN_ROLES)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall allow [receive PSTN fax data] on behalf of the user to
be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.5.7.FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
(for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting
on the behalf of that user: [User ID, Role].
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security
attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [none].
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security
attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [none].
6.6. Class FMT: Security Management
6.6.1.FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
(for O.ADMIN_ROLES)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [disable, enable] the functions [Secure
Channel] to U.ADMIN(a).
6.6.2.FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
(for O.ACCESS_CONTROL and O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
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FMT_MSA.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to restrict
the ability to [query, modify, delete, [create, export]] the security attributes [User
ID, Role] to [refer to Table 17].
Table 17 Security Attributes List
Security Attributes Operation Role
User ID create, modify, query , delete,
export
U.ADMIN(a)
query, export U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
query U.NORMAL,
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
User ID
(Except for
U.ADMIN(a))
create, modify, delete U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
Role create, modify, query, delete,
export
U.ADMIN(a)
query, export U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
query U.NORMAL
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
Role
(Except for
U.ADMIN(a))
create, modify, delete U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
6.6.3.FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
(for O.ACCESS_CONTROL and O.USER_AUTHORIZATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the User Data Access Control SFP to provide
[restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 Refinement: The TSF shall allow the [no role] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
6.6.4.FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
(for O.ACCESS CONTROL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the specified operations on
the specified TSF Data to the roles specified in Table 18.
Table 18 Management of TSF Data
Data Operation Authorised role(s)
User Password of U.NORMAL modify the owning U.NORMAL
modify, export U.ADMIN(a)
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
User Password of U.ADMIN(a) modify, export U.ADMIN(a)
User Password of
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
modify, export U.ADMIN(a),
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
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Data Operation Authorised role(s)
User Password of
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
modify the owning
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
modify, export U.ADMIN(a),
U.ACCOUNTMANGER
Allowable Number of entry for
Login Password
modify U.ADMIN(a)
Lockout Time modify U.ADMIN(a)
Locked-out Account Status clear U.ADMIN(a),
U.ACCOUNTMANGER
Auto Logout Time modify U.ADMIN(a)
Date and Time Information modify U.ADMIN(a)
Minimum Password Length modify U.ADMIN(a)
Address Book create, modify,
delete
U.ADMIN(a),
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
SYSLOG Server Settings modify U.ADMIN(a)
FTP Server Settings modify U.ADMIN(a)
Software query,
modify
U.ADMIN(a)
6.6.5.FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
(for O.USER_AUTHORIZATION, O.ACCESS_CONTROL, and O.ADMIN_ROLES)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1: The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[refer to Table 19].
Table 19 Management Functions
SFR Management Management Functions Reason
FAU_GEN.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None
-
FAU_GEN.2 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None
-
FAU_STG_EXT.1 The TSF shall have the ability
to configure the
cryptographic functionality.
None This function
is not
provided.
FCS_CKM.1(b) There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_CKM.4 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_COP.1(b) There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_COP.1(c) There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_COP.1(d) There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
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SFR Management Management Functions Reason
FCS_COP.1(f) There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_COP.1(g) There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_COP.1(h) There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a) There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FDP_ACC.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FDP_ACF.1 a) Management of attributes
used for decision based on
explicit access or denial.
None The default
value of an
attribute is
fixed and
cannot be
changed.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None -
FIA_AFL.1 a) Management of the
threshold for unsuccessful
authentication attempts
Management of
unsuccessful user
authentication
processing
-
b) Management of actions
which are taken for the
unsuccessful authentication
events
None It is a
predefined
action and not
managed.
FIA_ATD.1 a) If “assigned”, an
authorized administrator can
define additional security
attributes to a user.
None This function
is not
provided.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
Minimum Password
Length management
-
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SFR Management Management Functions Reason
FIA_UAU.1 a) Authentication data
management by an
administrator
･Management of User
Password
(U.ACCOUNTMANAGE
R/U.ADMIN(a)
/U.NORMAL
/U.ADDRESSBOOKOP
ERATOR)
by U.ADMIN(a).
･Management of User
Password
(U.ACCOUNTMANAGE
R/U.NORMAL/U.ADDR
ESSBOOKOPERATOR)
by
U.ACCOUNTMANAGE
R
-
b) Authentication data
management by a relative
user
･Management of own
User Password by
U.NORMAL
･Management of own
User Password by
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPE
RATOR
-
c) List of actions to be taken
before user authentication
shall be managed.
None It is a
predefined
action and not
managed.
FIA_UAU.7 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None
-
FIA_UID.1 a) Management of User
Identity
Management of User ID
-
b) If an authorized
administrator can change the
authorized actions before
identification, the action list
must be controlled.
None It is a
predefined
action and not
managed.
FIA_USB.1 a) An authorized
administrator can define
security attributes for a
default subject.
None There are no
permitted
roles.
b) An authorized
administrator can change
security attributes of a
subject.
None There are no
permitted
roles.
FMT_MOF.1 a) Groups of roles which may
affect reciprocally with the
TSF Functions shall be
managed.
None It is a
predefined
action and not
managed.
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SFR Management Management Functions Reason
FMT_MSA.1 a) Groups of roles which may
affect reciprocally with the
Security Attributes shall be
managed.
None It is a
predefined
action and not
managed.
b) Rules for which the
Security Attributes take over
any particular values shall be
managed.
None It is a
predefined
action and not
managed.
FMT_MSA.3 a) Groups which may be able
to identify the default value
shall be managed.
None There are no
roles to
specify the
default value.
b) Restrictive or permissive
settings of the default value
for the prescribed access
control SFP shall be
managed.
None The default
value is fixed
and cannot
be changed.
c) Rules for which the
Security Attributes take over
any particular values shall be
managed.
None The rules
cannot be
changed.
FMT_MTD.1 a) Groups of roles which may
affect reciprocally with the
TSF Data shall be managed.
None It is a
predefined
action and not
managed.
FMT_SMF.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None
-
FMT_SMR.1 a) Management of Groups of
Users who are part of the
Role.
None It is a
predefined
action and not
managed.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None
-
FPT_STM.1 a) Maqnagement of time Management of the
time stamp settings
-
FPT_TST_EXT.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
None
-
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 There are no management
activities foreseen.
Management of the
Software
-
FTA_SSL.3 a) Specification of the time in
which an user who may cause
termination of the interactive
session between each user is
non-active
None Users cannot
configure the
setting
individually.
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SFR Management Management Functions Reason
b) Specification of the default
time in which an user who
may cause termination of the
interactive session is non-
active
Specification of the
default time in which a
user is non-active after
a session finishes.
-
FTP_ITC.1 a) Configuration of actions
which require the trusted
channle, if supported.
Secure channel settings
-
FTP_TRP.1(a) a) Configuration of actions
which require the trusted
path, if supported.
None It is a
predefined
action and not
managed.
FTP_TRP.1(b) a) Configuration of actions
which require the trusted
path, if supported.
None It is a
predefined
action and not
managed.
- -
･Address Book
management
･SYSLOG Server
Settings
･FTP Server Settings
-
6.6.6.FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
(for O.ACCESS_CONTROL, O.USER_AUTHORIZATION, and O.ADMIN_ROLES)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles U.ADMIN(a), U.ACCOUNTMANAGER,
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR, and U.NORMAL.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.7. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
6.7.1.FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of TSF Data
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and
private keys.
6.7.2.FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
(for O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
6.7.3.FPT_TST_EXT.1 Extended: TSF testing
(for O.TSF_SELF_TEST)
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (and power on) to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
6.7.4.FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
(for O.UPDATE_VERIFICATION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FCS_COP.1(b) Cryptographic Operation (for signature generation/verification),
FCS_COP.1(c) Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to query the
current version of the TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators the ability to initiate updates
to TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE
using a digital signature mechanism and [no other functions] prior to installing
those updates.
6.7.5.FPT_KYP_EXT.1 Extended: Protection of Key and Key Material
(for O.KEY_MATERIAL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall not store plaintext keys that are part of the
keychain specified by FCS_KYC_EXT.1 in any Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage Device.
6.8. Class FTA: TOE Access
6.8.1.FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
(for O.USER_I&A)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [refer to Table 20].
Table 20 Time Interval of User Inactivity
Interface Auto Logout Time
Control Panel 15 - 150 Sec.
Web Browser 5 - 999 Min.
Printer Driver There is no inactive sessions
6.9. Class FTP: Trusted Paths/Channels
6.9.1.FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION, O.AUDIT)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected, or
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FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected].
FTP_ITC.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall use [TLS] to provide a trusted communication channel
between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities:
[[SYSLOG server, Ftp server, mail server]] that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and
protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of
the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2 Refinement: The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT entities, to initiate
communication via the trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.3 Refinement: The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
[SYSLOG service, FTP service, mail service].
6.9.2.FTP_TRP.1(a) Trusted path (for Administrators)
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected].
FTP_TRP.1.1(a) Refinement: The TSF shall use [TLS, TLS/HTTPS] to provide a trusted
communication path between itself and remote administrators that is logically
distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of
its end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and
detection of modification of the communicated data.
FTP_TRP.1.2(a) Refinement: The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate communication
via the trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.3(a) Refinement: The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial
administrator authentication and all remote administration actions.
6.9.3.FTP_TRP.1(b) Trusted path (for Non-administrators)
(for O.COMMS_PROTECTION))
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Extended: IPsec selected, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 Extended: TLS selected, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Extended: SSH selected, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Extended: HTTPS selected].
FTP_TRP.1.1(b) Refinement: The TSF shall use [TLS, TLS/HTTPS] to provide a trusted
communication path between itself and remote users that is logically distinct from
other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points
and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and detection of
modification of the communicated data.
FTP_TRP.1.2(b) Refinement: The TSF shall permit [remote users] to initiate communication via the
trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.3(b) Refinement: The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial user
authentication and all remote user actions.
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6.10. Security Assurance Requirements
Table 21 lists the security assurance requirements for the Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices
– v1.0. ASE_SPD.1 is added to the component set defined in EAL1 of the evaluation assurance
level in this table.
Table 21 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class
Assurance
Component
Assurance Components Description
Security Target Evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the
operational environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security Problem Definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Assurance Class ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – Conformance
Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
6.11. Security Functional Requirements Rationale
6.11.1. Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements Documents
Table 22 shows the analysis results of dependencies for the TOE Security Functional Requirements
in this ST.
Table 22 Analysis Results of Dependencies for Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security
Functional
Requirements
Dependencies
Required by CC and PP
Fulfilled
Dependencies in ST
Un-fulfilled
Dependencies
in ST
Reason
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 None
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1,
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1,
FIA_UID.1
None
FAU_STG_EXT.1 FAU_GEN.1,
FTP_ITC.1
FAU_GEN.1,
FTP_ITC.1
None
FCS_CKM.1(a) [FCS_COP.1(b), or
FCS_COP.1(i)],
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_COP.1(b),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
None
FCS_CKM.1(b) [FCS_COP.1(a), or
FCS_COP.1(d), or
FCS_COP.1(e), or
FCS_COP.1(f), or
FCS_COP.1(g), or
FCS_COP.1(h)],
FCS_CKM_EXT.4,
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_COP.1(a),
FCS_COP.1(g),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4,
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a),
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b)
None
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TOE Security
Functional
Requirements
Dependencies
Required by CC and PP
Fulfilled
Dependencies in ST
Un-fulfilled
Dependencies
in ST
Reason
FCS_CKM.4 [FCS_CKM.1(a), or
FCS_CKM.1(b)]
FCS_CKM.1(a),
FCS_CKM.1(b)
None
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 [FCS_CKM.1(a) or
FCS_CKM.1(b)],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1(a),
FCS_CKM.1(b),
FCS_CKM.4
None
FCS_COP.1(a)
[FCS_CKM.1(b)],
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM.1(b),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
None
FCS_COP.1(b)
[FCS_CKM.1(a)],
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM.1(a)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
None
FCS_COP.1(c) None None None
FCS_COP.1(d)
[FCS_CKM.1(b)],
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM.1(b),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
None
FCS_COP.1(f)
FCS_CKM.1(b),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM.1(b),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
None
FCS_COP.1(g)
[FCS_CKM.1(b)],
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM.1(b),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
None
FCS_COP.1(h)
FCS_CKM.1(b),
FCS_COP.1(c),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_CKM.1(b),
FCS_COP.1(c),
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
None
FCS_SMC_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1(c) FCS_COP.1(C) None
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a) None None None
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) None None None
FCS_TLS_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1(a),
FCS_COP.1(a),
FCS_COP.1(b),
FCS_COP.1(c),
FCS_COP.1(g),
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1(a),
FCS_COP.1(a),
FCS_COP.1(b),
FCS_COP.1(c),
FCS_COP.1(g),
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b)
None
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 FCS_TLS_EXT.1 None
FPT_KYP_EXT.1 None None None
FCS_KYC_EXT.1
[FCS_COP.1(e),
FCS_SMC_EXT.1,
FCS_COP.1(i),
FCS_KDF_EXT.1,
and/or FCS_COP.1(f)]
FCS_KDF_EXT.1,
FCS_SMC_EXT.1,
FCS_COP.1(f)
None
FCS_KDF_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1(h) FCS_COP.1(h) None
FDP_DSK_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1(d) FCS_COP.1(d) None
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 None
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1,
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1,
FMT_MSA.3
None
FDP_FXS_EXT.1 None None None
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 None
FIA_ATD.1 None None None
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None None None
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 None
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 None
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TOE Security
Functional
Requirements
Dependencies
Required by CC and PP
Fulfilled
Dependencies in ST
Un-fulfilled
Dependencies
in ST
Reason
FIA_UID.1 None None None
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 None
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
None
FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1],
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1,
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
None
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_SMR.1
None
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
None
FMT_SMF.1 None None None
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 None
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None None None
FPT_STM.1 None None None
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None None None
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1(b),
FCS_COP.1(c)
FCS_COP.1(b),
FCS_COP.1(c)
None
FTA_SSL.3 None None None
FTP_ITC.1 [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1]
FCS_TLS_EXT.1,
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
None
FTP_TRP.1(a) [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1]
FCS_TLS_EXT.1,
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
None
FTP_TRP.1(b) [FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1, or
FCS_TLS_EXT.1, or
FCS_SSH_EXT.1, or
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
FCS_TLS_EXT.1,
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
None
6.11.2. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The rationale for choosing these security assurance requirements is that they define a minimum
security baseline that is based on the anticipated threat level of the attacker, the security of the
Operational Environment in which the TOE is deployed, and the relative value of the TOE itself.
The assurance activities throughout the ST are used to provide tailored guidance on the specific
expectations for completing the security assurance requirements.
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7. TOE Summary Specification
Summary Specification of the TOE Security Functionality (TSF) is described in this Chapter.
7.1. Audit
The Summary Specification of the Class FAU Requirements is described as follows.
FAU_GEN.1
The TOE generates audit logs and record them in the audit log file when audit-relevant events occur.
This causes FAU_GEN.1 to be realized.
Table 23 Recorded Events and Audit Logs
Auditableevents Events Recorded User ID Result
Start-up of audit
functions
MFP power-on None None
Shutdown of audit
functions
MFP power-off None None
Job completion Print job completion Job owner Success or failure
Scan job completion Job owner Success or failure
Copy job completion Job owner Success or failure
Fax transmission job completion Job owner Success or failure
Fax reception job completion Job owner Success or
deletion
Unsuccessful user
authentication and
identification
Failure of login Logged in User Success or failure
Unsuccessful user
identification
Failure of login
（Print Job）
User not
registered in the
TOE
Failure
Use of management
functions
Addition of User User who made
modifications
Success or failure
Change of User ID User who made
modifications
Success or failure
Deletion of User User who made
modifications
Success
Management of unsuccessful user
authentication processing、Minimum
Password Length management、
Management of User Password
(U.ACCOUNTMANAGER/U.ADMIN(a)
/U.NORMAL/U.ADDRESSBOOKOPE
RATOR) by U.ADMIN(a)、
Management of User
Password(U.ACCOUNTMANAGER/U.
NORMAL/U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERAT
OR) by U.ACCOUNTMANAGER、
Management of own User Password
by U.NORMAL、
Management of own User Password
by U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR、
User who made
modifications
Success
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Auditableevents Events Recorded User ID Result
Management of the Software、
Specification of the default time in
which a user is non-active after a
session finishes、
Secure channel settings、
Address Book management、
SYSLOG Server Settings、
FTP Server Settings
Modification to the
group of Users that
are part of a role
Change of the role information User who made
modifications
Success
Changes to the time Modification of the time User who made
modifications
Success
Failure to establish
session
Failure of TLS session establishment None Success or failure
The TOE adds the following data to the events to be audited.
・ Date and Time: Time when an error/event occurred.
・ Message: Sentence which describes the event content (Reason of failure when session
failed)
・ Error Code: An event is defined as a code, and represented as 4-digit hexadecimal
numbers.
・ User ID: Identifier of a Logged in user
・ Result: Result of event implementation
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login, Home screen, Copy, Simple Copy, Scan, Simple Scan, Fax transmission,
Print, Job display and Log display, Admin settings, Power key
・ TopAccess: Login, Job status, Account, User management, Admin settings
・ Printer Driver: Interface to a Print request
・ Others: Main switch, PSTN Fax interface
FAU_GEN.2
If an auditable event occurs, the TOE realizes FAU_GEN.2 by attaching the user ID of a user who
caused the event to the audit log.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login, Home screen, Copy, Simple Copy, Scan, Simple Scan, Fax transmission,
Print, Job display and Log display, Admin settings, Power key
・ TopAccess: Login, Job status, Account, User management, Admin settings
・ Printer Driver: Interface to a Print request
・ Others: Main switch, PSTN Fax interface
FAU_STG_EXT.1
U.ADMIN(a) can set the SYSLOG server as the server where an audit log is transferred from the
Admin settings in TopAccess.
The TOE can save the generated audit log to the internal storage device first, then transfer the
data to the SYSLOG server which is the external audit log server using the communication
protocol TLS1.2. The maximum number of records which can be stored in the storage area of
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the audio log in the internal storage is as follows: 10,000 message logs, 5,000 print logs, 5,000
scan logs, 5,000 Fax transmission journals, and 5,000 Fax reception journals. When the
maximum number of records of each log reaches the limit, the oldest audit data will be deleted
to save the newest one.
Only U.ADMIN(a) can refers to all the audit logs which were saved to the internal storage and
other users can refer to own job log only by access control.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login, Home screen, Copy, Simple Copy, Scan, Simple Scan, Fax transmission,
Print, Job display and Log display, Admin settings, Power key
・ TopAccess: Login, Job status, Account, User management, Admin settings
・ Printer Driver: Interface to a Print request
・ Others: Main switch, PSTN Fax interface
7.2. Cryptographic Support
The following describes the summary specifications for requirements of Class FCS.
FCS_CKM.1(a)
The TOE creates the RSA key pair as the asymmetric cryptographic key used for server certificate for
TLS communication by the rsakpg1-crt method described in Section 6.3.1.3. of NIST SP 800-56B,
Revision 1. Random numbers used for key creation is created by CTR_DRBG (AES) according to
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b). In accordance with FDP_DSK_EXT.1 and FCS_CKM.1(d), the server certificate
and server private key, including the generated public key, are encrypted and stored on the SSD.
The TOE does not include the TOE-specific extensions, unique processing which is not written in
HCD-PP, or another implementation which is permitted, for the TSF.
The following shows the TSFI related to this requirement.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ TopAccess: Admin settings
FCS_CKM.1(b)
The TSF creates a session key and HMAC key for communication at the TLS communication
negotiation. The session key and HMAC key are created from the random number shared between
the server and client. The random number is created by CTR_DRBG (AES) according to
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b). The parameters of each key differ depending on the selected Cipher Suite as
shown below.
⚫ Session key
A session key is used for encrypting the communication data. The used cryptographic
algorithm and key length differ depending on the selected Cipher Suite. The cryptographic
algorithm uses AES-CBC, and 128bit and 256bit can be selected as the session key length.
⚫ HMAC key
A HMAC key is used to verify the integrity of communication data, with the selected cipher suite
determining the cryptographic algorithms and key lengths used. The cryptographic algorithms
employed are HMAC-SHA-1 or HMAC-SHA-256, in accordance with FCS_COP.1(g), with HMAC
key lengths of 160 bits and 256 bits, respectively.
These keys are saved to the volatile memory and deleted by turning off the power.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login, Home screen, Copy, Simple Copy, Scan, Simple Scan, Fax transmission,
Print, Job display and Log display, Admin settings, Power key
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・ TopAccess: Login, Job status, Account, User management, Admin settings
・ Printer Driver: Interface to a Print request
・ Others: Main switch, PSTN Fax interface
The TSF generates the following keys for storage encryption. These keys are protected in
accordance with FPT_KYP_EXT.1.
⚫ KEK Derivation Key and Key Material Encryption Key
These keys are used to protect keys and key materials, with one generated for each at the time
of TOE setup. In accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a), a 256-bit random number is generated
using Hash_DRBG (SHA-512), which is then split into two 128-bit segments to form the 128-bit
KEK derivation key and the 128-bit key material encryption key, stored in volatile memory and
FROM.
⚫ DEK
This key used to protect user document data and confidential TSF data is generated individually
for each encryption partition at the time of TOE setup. In accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b),
a 128-bit random number is generated using CTR_DRBG (AES) and stored in volatile memory
as the DEK for that encryption partition. In accordance with FPT_KYP_EXT.1 and
FCS_COP.1(f), the key materials, including the DEK, are encrypted and stored in an encrypted
state on the SSD.
⚫ DEK for the Swapping Partition
This key is used to protect swapped-out data and is generated once at TOE start-up. In
accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b), a 128-bit random number is generated using CTR_DRBG
(AES) and stored only in volatile memory as the DEK for the swapping partition. This key is
changed with each TOE start-up.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Power key
・ Others: Main switch
FCS_CKM_EXT.4/FCS_CKM.4
The following plaintext secret keys, private cryptographic keys, and cryptographic critical
parameters handled by the TSF shall be destroyed of when they are no longer needed.
⚫ KEK derivation key and key material encryption key in the FROM
The keys used to decrypt user data and confidential TSF data stored in an encrypted state on
the SSD are no longer needed when the TOE is decommissioned. Therefore, all CSPs used for
decryption become unnecessary. Upon decommissioning the TOE, the areas in the FROM
where the keys are stored are treated as unnecessary keys or key materials and are destroyed
of by overwriting them once with a fixed value.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Power key
・ Others: Main switch
KEK derivation key, key material encryption key, KEK, DEK, DEK for the swapping partition,
submask, LUKS key, context for KEK derivation, session keys for communication, HMAC keys,
and server secret key stored in volatile memory. All CSPs used for the encryption of user data
and secret TSF data, as well as all CSPs for communication, are no longer needed between the
time the TOE's power is turned off and on.
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When the power is off, these are treated as unnecessary keys or key material, and the plaintext
secret keys and cryptographic critical parameters stored in volatile memory are destroyed.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Power key
・ Others: Main switch
FCS_COP.1(a)
The TSF encrypts and decrypts the communication data by operating the 128 bit or 256 bit
cryptographic key generated by FCS_CKM.1(b) and AES cryptographic algorithm conforms to FIPS
PUB197 in the CBC mode complies with NIST SP 800-38A so as to protect the communication data
in FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1(a), and FTP_TRP.1(b).
The TSFI related to this requirement is as shown below.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Conform to TSFI of FTP_ITC.1, FTP_TRP.1(a), and FTP_TRP.1(b)
FCS_COP.1(b)
The TSF uses the RSA digital signature algorithm (rDSA) of which the key length is 2048bit which
complies with the Digital Signature Standard prescribed in FIPS PUB 186-4 for creation of signatures
during device certificate creation and verification of the server certificate by FTP_ITC.1 and firmware
update by FPT_TUD_EXT.1. The TSF uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 for creation of the signatures
during device certificate creation and verification of the server certificate, and RSASSA-PSS for
verification of firmware update. Also, the RSA key generated by FCS_CKM.1 (a) is used for creation
of the certificate.
The TSFI related to this requirement is as shown below.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Conform to TSFI of FCS_ITC.1 and FPT_TUD_EXT.1.
・ TopAccess： Admin settings
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a)
The TSF generates random numbers using an entropy source and DRBG to generate the KEK
derivation key and the key material encryption key for TOE storage encryption. This DRBG uses
Hash_DRBG (SHA-512) to generate random numbers according to NIST SP 800-90A. The entropy
source includes a hardware-based noise source, and the amount of entropy provided to the DRBG
is described below. The noise source uses the ES of the hardware embedded in SoC (Intel Atom
Processor x5-E3930) of the TOE. Output from the noise source is used for seeding the DRBG in
SoC, and outputted by the RDRAND instruction after processing according to CTR_DRBG (AES) of
NIST SP 800-90A. It is known that the noise source includes the minimum entropy, 0.5bit or more
per 1bit, by the description in [Rambus 2012], the RDRAND instruction is the output of the DRBG
with the security strength of 128 bits which was initialized at the seed of 256 bit entropy from the
noise source. The RDRAND instruction is reseeded from the ES after outputting 511 of 128 bits.
Thus, the rngd daemon process which constitutes the entropy source collects the RDRAND
instruction output of which the seed differs per 16 bytes by compressing
128*512=65,536bit=8,192bytes acquired by the RDRAND instruction into 16 bytes by the AES-
CBC-MAC processing, and temporarily compiles almost full entropy data in the three 2,500 bytes
buffers of rngd. When this TSF is used, the parameters are set such that the Linux PRNG holds
more than 2048 bits of entropy, so the 128 bytes of data that the TSF's Hash_DRBG (SHA-512) reads
from the Linux PRNG's /dev/urandom output is , which is assumed to be almost full entropy. Of
the 128 bytes, 96 bytes are used as Entropy Input and Nonce, and are supplied as a seed value for
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Hash_DRBG(SHA-512). From the Minimum entropy estimate in Section 6 of NIST SP800-90B, the
TSF developer confirmed that the /dev/urandom output included the minimum entropy, 0.88 bits
or more per 1 bit, within the TOE operation conditions range. Even if it is pessimistically estimated
that it is not full entropy, it is estimated that the 96 bytes bit string of the /dev/urandom output
contains 675.84(=96*8*0.88) bits of entropy by evaluating the lower limit of the amount of entropy
according to Section 3.1.5 of NIST SP800-90B.
FCS_RGB_EXT.1 (a) is realized by making this bit string as the Entropy Input and Nonce and
supplying the seed value to Hash_DRBG (SHA-512).
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Power key (Only for the first start-up after TOE establishment)
・ Others: Main switch (Only for the first start-up after TOE establishment)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b)
The TSF generates the following random numbers using the entropy source and DRBG: random
numbers for generating keys and key material (KEK derivation context, DEK, submask and LUKS key)
for each encryption partition for storage encryption of TOE and random numbers for generating
server secret keys for TLS communications and for negotiation of TLS communications to protect
communication data in FTP_ITC.1、FTP_TRP.1(a) and FTP_TRP.1(b). The CTR_DRBG of the TOE
consists of a master DRBG and a private DRBG with the same structure as the CTR_DRBG (AES)
according to NIST SP 800-90A. The output of the private DRBG is the random number generated by
the TSF, which is used to produce keys and key materials. The entropy source includes a hardware-
based noise source, and the amount of entropy supplied to the DRBG is described later. The noise
source uses the ES of the hardware embedded in SoC (Intel Atom Processor x5-E3930) of the TOE.
Output from the noise source is used for seeding the DRBG in SoC, and outputted by the RDRAND
instruction after processing according to CTR_DRBG (AES) of NIST SP 800-90A. It is known that
the noise source includes the minimum entropy, 0.5bit or more per 1bit, by the description in
[Rambus 2012], the RDRAND instruction is the output of the DRBG with the security strength of 128
bits which was initialized at the seed of 256 bits entropy from the noise source. The RDRAND
instruction is reseeded from the ES after outputting 511 of 128 bits. Thus, the rngd daemon
process which constitutes the entropy source collects the RDRAND instruction output of which the
seed differs per 16 bytes by compressing 128*512=65,536bit=8,192bytes acquired by the RDRAND
instruction into 16 bytes by the AES-CBC-MAC processing, and temporarily compiles almost full
entropy data in the three 2,500 bytes buffers of rngd. The necessary entropy is sufficiently supplied
from rngd to Linux PRNG. So the data read from the /dev/random output of Linux PRNG by the
TSF is supposed to be almost full entropy. The TSF developers confirmed that the /dev/random
output contains a minimum entropy of more than 0.90 bits per bit over the range of the TOE
operating conditions, according to the minimum entropy estimate in Section 6 of NIST SP800-90B.
Even if pessimistically estimating that it is not full entropy, it is estimated that the 32 bytes bit string
of /dev/random output contains 230.40 (=32*8*0.90) bits of entropy, based on a lower bound
evaluation of the amount of entropy according to section 3.1.5 of NIST SP800-90B. Similarly, it is
estimated that the 16 bytes bit string in the /dev/random output contains 115.20 (=16*8*0.90) bits
of entropy. This 48 bytes bit sequence, referred to as the master DRBG, is used as a seed by
concatenating the 32 bytes entropy_input and 16 bytes nonce for initializing the CTR_DRBG (AES).
The master DRBG's CTR_DRBG (AES) has a security strength of 128 bits. Additionally, the private
DRBG receives the same 32 bytes entropy_input and 16 bytes nonce from the master DRBG. The
private DRBG is also considered to have 128-bit security. The use of FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) invokes the
random number generation function of the private DRBG's CTR_DRBG (AES). Regarding reseeding,
the master DRBG performs reseeding using a 32 bytes entropy_input derived from /dev/random
before up to 232
calls to the private DRBG, along with reseeding of the private DRBG using the master
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DRBG output as its 32 bytes entropy_input. These processes ensure that the private DRBG achieves
the 128-bit security strength defined by FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b).
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Conform to TSFI of FTP_ITC_EXT.1, FTP_TRP.1(a) and FTP_TRP.1(b)
・ Control Panel: Power key (Only for the first start-up after TOE establishment)
・ Others: Main switch (Only for the first start-up after TOE establishment)
7.3. Storage Encryption (Conditionally mandatory)
The following describes the summary specifications for the conditional requirements B.1.
FPT_KYP_EXT.1
Keys and key materials identified by the key chain of FCS_KYC_EXT.1 are generated during TOE
setup and are protected until TOE decommissioning. As described below for the key storage
locations and protection status, the plaintext keys are not stored on nonvolatile storage devices,
FRAM or SSD, that is Field-Replaceable. The sizes of the keys and key materials are described in
the TSS of FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
⚫ KEK derivation key and Key material encryption key
The KEK derivation key and the key material encryption key are each generated as a single key
in the TOE in accordance with FCS_COP.1(b) and stored in plaintext on the volatile memory
and nonvolatile storage device, FROM, that is Field-nonReplaceable.
⚫ KEK Derivation Context
The KEK derivation context is generated individually from random numbers for each encryption
partition of the SSD that stores user data or confidential TSF data, and is stored in volatile
memory. The KEK derivation context is encrypted with the key material encryption key in
accordance with FCS_COP.1(f) and is then stored in an encrypted state within the management
header area at the beginning of the SSD's encryption partition.
⚫ KEK
The KEK is generated individually for each encryption partition of the SSD that stores user data or
confidential TSF data, in accordance with FCS_KDF_EXT.1, using the KEK derivation key, key material
encryption key, and KEK derivation context, and is stored only in volatile memory.
⚫ DEK
The DEK is a separate key generated for each encryption partition of the SSD that stores user data
or confidential TSF data, in accordance with FCS_COP.1(b), and is stored only in volatile memory.
⚫ Submask and LUKS Key
The LUKS data used to derive the submask is generated individually from random numbers for each
encryption partition of the SSD that stores user data or confidential TSF data, and is stored in volatile
memory. The submask is derived from a specific range of the LUKS data according to the coding
generation rules and is stored only in volatile memory. In generating the LUKS key, the submask is
XORed with the DEK in accordance with FCS_SMC_EXT.1 to derive the LUKS key, which is stored in
volatile memory at the end of the LUKS data (unused portion). The LUKS data, including the LUKS
key, is encrypted with the KEK according to FCS_COP.1(f) and is then stored in an encrypted state
within the management header area at the beginning of the SSD's encryption partition.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ None
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FCS_KYC_EXT.1
The BEV in the TOE's key chain defined by FCS_KYC_EXT.1 is the Data Encryption Key (DEK). During
TOE setup, the keys and key materials that constitute the key chain of FCS_KYC_EXT.1 are
generated. The key chain consists of the following keys and key materials.
⚫ KEK derivation key and Key material encryption key
During TOE setup, a 256-bit random number is generated using Hash_DRBG (SHA-512) in
accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a), which is then split into two 128-bit segments to create
the KEK derivation key and the key material encryption key. The KEK derivation key and key
material encryption key are stored in plaintext in both volatile memory and the FROM. The
FROM is a nonvolatile storage that is Field-nonReplaceable. At the time of TOE start-up, the
KEK derivation key and key material encryption key read from the FROM are used.
⚫ KEK derivation context
During TOE setup, a 256-bit random number generated using CTR_DRBG (AES) in accordance
with FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) serves as the KEK derivation context. This context is generated for each
encryption partition and is stored in volatile memory as well as in an encrypted state on the
SSD. The KEK derivation context is included in the management header, which is encrypted
using the 128-bit key material encryption key with AES-CBC in accordance with FCS_COP.1(f)
and stored in encrypted form on the SSD. At the time of TOE start-up, the encrypted
management header read from the SSD is decrypted using the key material encryption key with
AES-CBC in accordance with FCS_COP.1(f), and the KEK derivation context is extracted and
stored in volatile memory.
⚫ KEK
During TOE setup, the KEK derivation key, key material encryption key, and KEK derivation
context stored in volatile memory are used in accordance with FCS_KDF_EXT.1. Following the
KDF counter mode defined in SP800-108, a 128-bit key is derived using HMAC-SHA-256 as
specified in FCS_COP.1(h) and is stored in volatile memory as the KEK. At the time of TOE
start-up, the same procedure is followed to derive a 128-bit key, which is again stored in volatile
memory as the KEK.
⚫ DEK, Submask, and LUKS key
During TOE setup, a 128-bit random number generated using CTR_DRBG (AES) in accordance
with FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) serves as the DEK. The DEK is generated for each encryption partition
and stored in volatile memory. Next, a 63,984 bytes random number generated using
CTR_DRBG (AES) in accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) is saved in volatile memory as LUKS
data. A 128-bit submask is derived from a specific range of the LUKS data according to coding
generation rules and is stored in volatile memory. For LUKS key generation, a 128-bit LUKS
key is derived by XORing the 128-bit DEK with the 128-bit submask in accordance with
FCS_SMC_EXT.1, and the LUKS key is stored in volatile memory at the end of the LUKS data
(unused portion). Then, the 64,000 bytes LUKS data, including the LUKS key, is encrypted using
AES-CBC with the 128-bit KEK in accordance with FCS_COP.1(f) and stored in an encrypted
state on the SSD. At the time of TOE start-up, the encrypted LUKS data read from the SSD is
decrypted using AES-CBC with the 128-bit KEK in accordance with FCS_COP.1(f), from which
the submask is derived and the LUKS key is extracted. In generating the DEK, a 128-bit DEK is
derived by XORing the 128-bit LUKS key with the 128-bit submask in accordance with
FCS_SMC_EXT.1, and the DEK is stored in volatile memory.
⚫ Strength of the key chain
The KEK derivation key and key material encryption key are each 128 bits, and sufficient
entropy is provided in accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a) and FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b), ensuring a
key strength of 128 bits. Since the key derivation processes defined by FCS_KDF_EXT.1 and
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FCS_COP.1(f) also provide 128-bit security strength, 128-bit security strength is maintained at
each stage of the key chain.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Power key
・ Others: Main switch
FDP_DSK_EXT.1
The TOE's Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile storage consists of two types: FRAM and SSD. In the TOE
state, the FRAM stores only non-sensitive data, such as MFP's printing settings and adjustments, and
the TOE does not write user document data or confidential TSF data to the disk. User document
data and confidential TSF data are stored in an encrypted state only on the SSD. The SSD is divided
into partitions, each with its own file system. The following describes the types of the three SSD
partitions and the areas that are not encrypted. Details of the keys and key materials used are
outlined in the TSS under the section for FCS_KYC_EXT.1.
⚫ Non-encrypted Partition
This type of partition is used to store any data that is not user document data or confidential
TSF data, and it does not include any data subject to data protection requirements outlined in
this document.
⚫ Encrypted Partition
This type of partition is used to store user document data, confidential TSF data, and related
data such as core dumps. The transparent encryption function for the encrypted partition starts
when the partition is mounted. All files and metadata written to the regular file system created
in this partition must be encrypted according to FCS_COP.1(d) before being stored on the SSD
in encrypted form via the block device driver. During the read process, the data is decrypted
according to FCS_COP.1(d) using the reverse procedure and is read from the file system in
plaintext. A 128-bit DEK specific to each encrypted partition is used for the encryption and
decryption processes in accordance with FCS_COP.1(d).
During TOE installation, keys and key materials are generated. First, a single KEK derivation key
and key material encryption key are generated in the TOE, and these are stored in plaintext in
volatile memory and in Field-nonReplaceable Nonvolatile storage area known as FROM. Next,
the transparent encryption functionality for each encrypted partition that stores user data and
confidential TSF data is enabled. At this time, the KEK derivation context, KEK, DEK, LUKS data,
submask, and LUKS key are generated for each encrypted partition. The KEK derivation context
and LUKS data, which includes the LUKS key, are saved in encrypted form on the SSD, excluding
the submask derived from the KEK, DEK, and LUKS data.
First, a 128-bit KEK is derived from the KEK derivation key, key material encryption key, and
KEK derivation context in accordance with FCS_KDF_EXT.1 and is stored in volatile memory.
The management header containing the KEK derivation context is encrypted with the key
material encryption key according to FCS_COP.1(f), while the LUKS data, which includes the
LUKS key, is encrypted with the KEK in accordance with FCS_COP.1(f). Each of these encrypted
forms is stored in encrypted state at specific locations in the management header area at the
beginning of the encrypted partition. Finally, a file system is created in the encrypted partition
with the transparent encryption functionality enabled.
In the TOE state, during start-up, the KEK derivation key and key material encryption key are
read from FROM and stored in volatile memory. Next, the ciphertext containing the KEK
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derivation context and the ciphertext of the LUKS data, which includes the LUKS key, are read
from the management header area at the beginning of the encrypted partition and stored in
volatile memory. The ciphertext containing the KEK derivation context is decrypted using the
key material encryption key according to FCS_COP.1(f), and the KEK derivation context is saved
in volatile memory. Then, a 128-bit KEK is derived from the KEK derivation key, key material
encryption key, and KEK derivation context in accordance with FCS_KDF_EXT.1 and stored in
volatile memory.
Next, the ciphertext of the LUKS data containing the LUKS key is decrypted using the KEK
according to FCS_COP.1(f), and both the LUKS data and the LUKS key are stored in volatile
memory. A DEK is derived by XORing the LUKS key with the submask derived from the LUKS
data and stored in volatile memory. The encryption and decryption processes, in accordance
with FCS_COP.1(d), using the DEK derived from this series of operations, are then initiated.
⚫ Swap Partition
The TOE’s swap function is a type of partition used to store lower-priority data (swap-out data)
when the TOE’s volatile memory is under pressure. The transparent encryption function for the
swap partition is initiated when the swap partition is mounted. All swap-out data and
metadata written to the swap file system of this partition must be encrypted according to
FCS_COP.1(d) before being stored in ciphertext state on the SSD via the block device driver.
This provides protection under FDP_DSK_EXT even if the swap-out data contains user
document data or confidential TSF data. During the read process, the data is decrypted in
reverse order according to FCS_COP.1(d), allowing the swap-out data to be read in plaintext
from the file system.
The transparent encryption function for the swap partition is enabled during TOE setup and at
the start-up of the TOE state. A 128-bit random number generated using CTR_DRBG(AES) in
accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) is saved in volatile memory as the DEK for the swap
partition. Encryption and decryption processes according to FCS_COP.1(d) are then initiated
using this DEK for the transparent encryption function. Following this, the swap file system is
created, and the partition is put into use as a swap partition.
⚫ Non-encrypted Area
The non-encrypted area of the SSD includes the bootloader, partition table, partitions that store
data that is neither user document data nor confidential TSF data, and non-encrypted areas for
management headers at the beginning of each partition that stores user document data and
confidential TSF data. More specifically, the first 1 MiB of each encrypted partition on the SSD
is designated for management headers. The management header stored in the ciphertext
state occupies 1 KiB starting from 1 KiB of the partition's beginning, and the LUKS data stored
in the ciphertext state occupies 64,000 bytes starting from 4 KiB of the partition's beginning.
Other areas within the management header area are non-encrypted, but no confidential data
is stored there.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login, Home screen, Copy, Simple Copy, Scan, Simple Scan, Fax transmission,
Print, Job display and Log display, Admin settings
・ TopAccess: Login, Job status, Account, User management, Admin settings
・ Printer Driver: Interface to a Print request
・ Others: PSTN Fax interface
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7.4. Storage Encryption (Selective requirements)
The following describes the summary specifications for the requirements D.1 and D.4 selected in
Storage Encryption.
FCS_COP.1(f)
The TSF is used for processing the plaintext management header (including the KEK derivation
context) and plaintext LUKS data (including the LUKS key), as well as for processing the ciphertext
management header (including the KEK derivation context) and ciphertext LUKS data (including the
LUKS key) read from the SSD. During TOE installation, the TSF uses the 128-bit key material
encryption key generated according to the TSS of FCS_KYC_EXT.1 to encrypt the plaintext
management header using AES in CBC mode as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3 and ISO/IEC 10116.
The resulting ciphertext management header is then stored on the SSD. The TSF uses the 128-bit
KEK generated in accordance with the TSS of FCS_KYC_EXT.1 during TOE installation to encrypt
the plaintext LUKS data using AES in CBC mode as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3 and ISO/IEC
10116, storing the resulting ciphertext LUKS data on the SSD.
At TOE state start-up, the TSF uses the 128-bit key material encryption key read from FROM in
accordance with the TSS of FCS_KYC_EXT.1 to decrypt the ciphertext management header read
from the SSD using AES in CBC mode as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3 and ISO/IEC 10116, storing
the resulting plaintext management header in volatile memory.
Additionally, at TOE state start-up, the TSF uses the 128-bit KEK generated in accordance with the
TSS of FCS_KYC_EXT.1 to decrypt the ciphertext LUKS data read from the SSD using AES in CBC
mode as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3 and ISO/IEC 10116, storing the resulting plaintext LUKS
data in volatile memory.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Power key
・ Others: Main switch
FCS_KDF_EXT.1
The TSF utilizes the counter mode KDF defined in NIST SP800-108, employing HMAC-SHA-256 as
the PRF, which is specified as the keyed-hash function in FCS_COP.1(h), to derive a 128-bit KEK.
The submask for input to the counter mode KDF defined in NIST SP800-108 consists of a 256-bit
KIN, which is formed by concatenating the KEK derivation key and the key material encryption key
generated as 256-bit random numbers by Hash_DRBG(SHA-512) in accordance with
FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a) and split into 128-bit segments. Additionally, a 256-bit KEK derivation context
is defined as Context, generated using CTR_DRBG(AES) in accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b).
Therefore, the output meets the conditions for 128-bit security strength. Here, both KIN and
Context are submasks generated by the RNG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, thereby satisfying the
requirements of the SFR. During TOE setup, a 256-bit value formed by concatenating the KEK
derivation key and the key material encryption key, along with the KEK derivation context, is used
as the submask for the TSF input. Upon booting after TOE installation, a 256-bit value formed by
concatenating the KEK derivation key and the key material encryption key read from FROM, along
with the KEK derivation context decrypted from the ciphertext read from the SSD, is used as the
submask for the TSF input.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Power key
・ Others: Main switch
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FCS_SMC_EXT.1
The TSF generates a 128-bit LUKS key during TOE setup by XORing a 128-bit DEK with a 128-bit
submask.
The TSF generates a 128-bit DEK during TOE start-up by XORing a 128-bit LUKS key with a 128-bit
submask.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Power key
・ Others: Main switch
FCS_COP.1(h)
At the derivation of the KEK from the KEK derivation key, key material encryption key, and KEK
derivation context, the TSF uses HMAC-SHA-256 which conforms to ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section
7 “MAC Algorithm 2” and ISO/IEC 10118 to calculate the keyed-hash message function in
FCS_KDF_EXT.1. The HMAC key length is 256 bits, hash function is SHA-256, block length is 512
bits, and outputted MAC output length is 256 bits.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Power key
・ Others: Main switch
FCS_COP.1(d)
The TSF transparently encrypts user document data, confidential TSF data, and related data such
as core dumps when writing them to the assigned encrypted partitions on the SSD for each data
category. To enable transparent encryption of data written to the SSD and decryption of data read
from the SSD as the encryption method for storage encryption, encryption and decryption are
performed with AES-CBC which is a combination of AES in ISO/IEC 18033-3 and CBC in ISO/IEC
10116 using the 128-bit DEK identified by FCS_KYC_EXT.1 that is generated according to
FCS_CKM.1(b) at the time of start-up in TOE state.
The TSF transparently encrypts swap-out data swapped out of the main memory when it is written
to the swap partition of the SSD. To enable transparent encryption of data written to the SSD and
decryption of data read from the SSD as the encryption method for storage encryption, encryption
and decryption are performed with AES-CBC which is a combination of AES in ISO/IEC 18033-3 and
CBC in ISO/IEC 10116 using the 128-bit DEK for swap partition that is generated according to
FCS_CKM.1(b) at the time of start-up in TOE state.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login, Home screen, Copy, Simple Copy, Scan, Simple Scan, Fax transmission,
Print, Job display and Log display, Admin settings, Power key
・ TopAccess： Login, Job status, Account, User management, Admin settings
・ Printer Driver: Interface to a Print request
・ Others： Main switch, PSTN Fax interface
7.5. Communication Protection (Selective requirements)
The following describes the summary specifications for the selective requirements D.2.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1
The TSF supports the TLS communication for communication with each type of servers mentioned
in FTP_ITC.1 and communication with the client PC mentioned in FTP_TRP.1(a)/FTP_TRP.1(b).
The TLS communication supported by the TSF is TLS1.2 (RFC 5246).
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• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
Communication between TSF and Client PC
• The TSF generates the server secret key and public key of the RSA used for the TLS
communication according to FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) and FCS_CKM.1(a). The signature of the
server certificate is generated by using the secret key and hash algorithm according to
FCS_COP.1(b) and FCS_COP.1(c).
• The following shows how to share the secret random number data.
 The TSF decrypts the secret random number encrypted by the RSA public key which was
sent from the client PC using the server secret key. The TSF generates the session key
and HMAC key from the secret random numbers using the keyed-hash message
authentication code (HMAC) according to FCS_COP.1(c) and FCS_COP.1(g).
• The following shows how to encrypt and verify the communication data.
 The TSF verifies alteration of the communication data by using the HMAC key according to
FCS_COP.1(c) and FCS_COP.1(g).
 The TSF encrypts and decrypts the communication data in the AES-CBC mode according
to FCS_COP.1 (a).
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Conform to TSFI of FTP_TRP.1(a) and FTP_TRP.1(b).
Communication between TSF and Servers
• The following shows how TSF verifies the digital signature of the server certificate sent from
various servers.
 TSF calculates the hash value for server certificate verification according to FCS_COP.1(c).
 TSF decrypts the digital signature of the server certificate by RSA signature verification
according to FCS_COP.1 (b), and verifies the tampering of the server certificate by
comparing it with the hash value for server certificate verification described above.
• The following shows how to share the secret random number data.
 The TSF generates a secret random number according to FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) for
generating the session key and the HMAC key.
 The TSF encrypts the secret random number using the RSA public key included in server
certificate which was sent from each server. The TSF generates the session key and the
HMAC key from the secret random numbers using the keyed-hash message authentication
Code (HMAC) according to FCS_COP.1(c) and FCS_COP.1(g).
• The following shows how to encrypt and verify the communication data.
 The TSF verifies alteration of the communication data by using the HMAC key according to
FCS_COP.1(c) and FCS_COP.1(g).
 The TSF encrypts and decrypts the communication data in the AES-CBC mode according
to FCS_COP.1 (a).
[Relevant TSFI]
Conform to TSFI of FTP_ITC.1.
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Communication between TSF and Client PC using IPPS
• The TSF generates the server secret key and public key of the RSA used for the TLS
communication according to FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) and FCS_CKM.1(a). The signature of the
server certificate is generated by using the secret key and hash algorithm according to
FCS_COP.1(b) and FCS_COP.1(c).
• The TSF decrypts the secret random number encrypted by the RSA public key which was sent
from the client PC using the server secret key. The TSF generates the session key and the
HMAC key from the secret random numbers using the keyed-hash message authentication
code (HMAC) according to FCS_COP.1(c) and FCS_COP.1(g).
• The TSF verifies alteration of the communication data by using the HMAC key according to
FCS_COP.1(c) and FCS_COP.1(g).
• The TSF encrypts and decrypts the communication data in the AES-CBC mode according to
FCS_COP.1(a).
[Relevant TSFI]
Printer Driver: Interface to a Print request
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
The HTTP protocol which complies with RFC2818 is implemented so as to establish the trusted
communication path between the TOE and the remote users. FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 is realized by
enabling the HTTPS communication using the TLS protocol which is specified at FCS_TLS_EXT.1.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ TopAccess: Login, Job status, Account, User management, Admin settings
FCS_COP.1(g)
The TSF is used in HMAC which is included in the processing to generate the session key and the
HMAC key from a secret random number during the TLS communication. Additionally, the TSF is
used in HMAC to verify tampering of communication data in TLS communication. The keyed-hash
message authentication is performed according to HMAC-SHA-1 with a message length and key
length of 160 bits and HMAC-SHA256 with a message length and key length of 256 bits that satisfy
FIPS PUB 198-1 “The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code” and FIPS PUB 180-3 “Secure
Hash Standard”. The hash function used at this time conforms to FCS_COP.1(c). From the above,
FCS_COP.1(g) is realized.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Conform to FTP_TRP.1(a)、FTP_TRP.1(b) and FTP_ITC.１
7.6. Trusted Update (Selective requirements)
The following describes the summary specifications for the selective requirements D.3.
FCS_COP.1(c)
The TSF is used for the following three processes.
A digital signature must be attached to the firmware to verify the authenticity of the firmware during
firmware update at FPT_TUD_EXT.1. The cryptographic hash function conforms to SHA-256 which
complies with ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004. The TSF performs signature generation or verification of
the server certificate for TLS communication according to FCS_TLS_EXT.1. The cryptographic
hash function used in that case complies with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 conforming
to ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004. The TSF authenticates the hash message with a key according to
FCS_COP.1(g) during verification of the communication data integrity. The cryptographic hash
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function which is used at that time conforms to SHA-1 and SHA-256 which comply with ISO/IEC
10118-3:2004.
From the above, FCS_COP.1(c) is realized.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Conform to FTP_TRP.1(a), FTP_TRP.1(b) and FTP_ITC.1
7.7. User Data Protection
The following describes the summary specifications for the requirements for Class FDP.
FDP_ACC.1/FDP_ACF.1
The TOE performs access control for the user document data and operation for the user document
data. Access control for the user document data allows access only when the user ID linked to the
document data matched the user ID of a user who has been identified and authenticated at login.
The access control for the user document operation is performed according to the roles retained by
the user as shown in Table 14 and Table 15.
FCC_ACC.1 and FDP.AFC.1 are realized by the access control shown in the table below.
Table 24 Print Access Control for D.USER.DOC
User Access Control Rules
Job Owner ・ Assign U.ADMIN(a) and U.NORMAL(a) as the Job owners
who submit the documents to be printed.
・ Allow browse and output of the documents submitted by
the Job Owner.
・ Deny modification of the documents submitted by the
Job Owner.
・ Allow deletion of the documents submitted by the Job
Owner.
U.ADMIN(a) ・ Allow submission of the documents to be printed.
・ Deny browse of the print documents submitted by other
users.
・ Deny modification of the print documents submitted by
other users.
・ Allow deletion of the print documents stored by other
users.
U.NORMAL(a) ・ Allow submission of the documents to be printed.
・ Deny browse of the print documents submitted by other
users.
・ Deny modification of the print documents submitted by
other users.
・ Deny deletion of the print documents stored by other
users.
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
U.FAXOPERATOR
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
・ Deny submission of the documents to be printed.
・ Deny browse of all submitted print documents.
・ Deny modification of all submitted print documents.
・ Deny deletion of all stored print documents.
Unauthorized User ・ Allow the print documents submitted by the identified
U.ADMIN(a) and U.NORMAL(a).
・ Deny browse of all submitted print documents.
・ Deny modification of all submitted print documents.
・ Deny deletion of all stored print documents.
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[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Print
・ Printer Driver: Interface to a Print request
Table 25 Scan Access Control for D.USER.DOC
User Access Control Rules
Job Owner ・ Assign U.NORMAL(a) as the Job owner who submits the
document to be scanned.
・ Allow browse of the images scanned by the Job Owner.
・ Allow modification and deletion of the image scanned by
the Job Owner.
U.ADMIN(a) ・ Allow submission of the documents to be scanned.
・ Deny browse of the images scanned by other users.
・ Deny modification of the images scanned by all users.
・ Allow deletion of the images scanned by the self and deny
deletion of the images scanned by other users.
U.NORMAL(a) ・ Allow submission of the documents to be scanned.
・ Deny browse of the images scanned by other users.
・ Deny modification and deletion of images scanned by
other users.
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
U.FAXOPERATOR
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
・ Deny submission of the documents to be scanned.
・ Deny browse of all scanned images.
・ Deny modification and deletion of the images scanned
by all users.
Unauthorized User ・ Deny submission of the documents to be scanned.
・ Deny browse of all scanned images.
・ Deny modification and deletion of all scanned images.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Scan, Simple Scan
Table 26 Copy Access Control for D.USER.DOC
User Access Control Rules
Job Owner ・ Assign U.ADMIN(a) and U.NORMAL(a) as the Job owners
who submit the documents to be copied.
・ Allow output of the copied documents printed by the Job
Owner.
・ Deny modification of images saved by the job owner.
・ Allow deletion of images saved by the job owner.
U.ADMIN(a) ・ Allow submission of the documents to be copied.
・ Deny browse of the images copied by the other users.
・ Deny modification of the images copied and saved by
the other users.
・ Allow deletion of the images copied and saved by the
other users.
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User Access Control Rules
U.NORMAL(a) ・ Allow submission of the documents to be copied.
・ Deny browse of the images copied by the other users.
・ Deny modification of the images copied and saved by
the other users.
・ Deny deletion of the images copied and saved by the
other users.
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
U.FAXOPERATOR
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
・ Deny submission of the documents to be copied.
・ Deny browse of all copied images.
・ Deny modification of all copied and saved images.
・ Deny deletion of all copied and saved images.
Unauthorized User ・ Deny submission of the documents to be copied.
・ Deny browse of all copied images.
・ Deny modification of all copied and saved images.
・ Deny deletion of all copied and saved images.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Copy, Simple Copy, Job display and Log display
Table 27 Fax Transmission Access Control for D.USER.DOC
User Access Control Rules
Job Owner ・ Assign U.ADMIN(a), U.NORMAL(a) and U.FAXOPERATOR
as the Job owners of Fax transmission documents.
・ Allow browse of the images scanned by the Job Owner.
・ Allow modification of the images saved by the job owner.
・ Allow deletion of the images saved by the job owner.
U.ADMIN(a) ・ Allow submission of Fax transmission documents.
・ Deny browse of the images scanned by the other users.
・ Deny modification of the images saved by the other
users.
・ Allow deletion of the images saved by the other users.
U.NORMAL(a)
U.FAXOPERATOR
・ Allow submission of Fax transmission documents.
・ Deny browse of the images scanned by other users.
・ Deny modification of images saved by the other users.
・ Deny deletion of images saved by the other users.
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
・ Deny submission of Fax transmission documents.
・ Deny browse of all scanned images.
・ Deny modification of all saved images.
・ Deny deletion of all saved images.
Unauthorized User ・ Deny submission of Fax transmission documents.
・ Deny browse of all scanned images.
・ Deny modification of all saved images.
・ Deny deletion of all saved images.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Fax transmission, Job display and Log display
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Table 28 Fax Reception Access Control for D.USER.DOC
User Access Control Rules
Job Owner ・ Assign U.ADMIN(a) and U.FAXOPERATOR as the Job
owners of Fax-received documents.
・ Allow browse and print of all Fax-received documents.
・ Deny modification of all Fax-received documents.
・ Allow deletion of all Fax-received documents.
U.ADMIN(a)
U.FAXOPERATOR
・ Allow all Fax receptions regardless of the user’s
operation.
・ Allow browse and print of all Fax-received documents.
・ Deny modification of all Fax-received documents.
・ Allow deletion of all Fax-received documents.
U.NORMAL(a)
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
・ Allow all Fax receptions regardless of the user’s
operation.
・ Deny browse and print of all Fax-received images.
・ Deny modification of all Fax-received images.
・ Deny deletion of all Fax-received images.
Unauthorized User ・ Allow all Fax receptions regardless of the user’s
operation.
・ Deny browse and print of all Fax-received images.
・ Deny modification of all Fax-received images.
・ Deny deletion of all Fax-received images.
None ・ All Fax-received images are received from the outside of
the TOE regardless of the user’s operation.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Print
・ Others: PSTN Fax Interface
Table 29 Print Access Control for D.USER.JOB
User Access Control Rules
Job Owner ・ Assign U.ADMIN(a) and U.NORMAL(a) as the Job owners
of the jobs printed by themselves.
U.ADMIN(a) ・ Allow creation of the print jobs.
・ Allow browse of all print jobs.
・ Deny modification of all print jobs.
・ Allow cancel of all print jobs.
U.NORMAL(a) ・ Allow creation of the print jobs.
・ Allow browse of all print jobs.
・ Deny modification of all print jobs.
・ Allow cancel of own print jobs, but deny cancel of other
users’ print jobs.
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
U.FAXOPERATOR
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
・ Deny creation of the print jobs.
・ Allow browse of all print jobs.
・ Deny modification of all print jobs.
・ Deny cancel of all print jobs.
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User Access Control Rules
Unauthorized User ・ Allow creation of print jobs by the identified U.ADMIN(a)
and U.NORMAL(a).
・ Allow creation of the print jobs.
・ Deny browse of all print jobs.
・ Deny modification of all print jobs.
・ Deny cancel of all print jobs.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Print, Job display and Log display
・ TopAccess: Job status
・ Printer Driver: Interface to a Print request
Table 30 Scan Access Control for D.USER.JOB
User Access Control Rules
Job Owner ・ Assign U.ADMIN(a) and U.NORMAL(a) as the Job owners
of the jobs scanned by themselves.
U.ADMIN(a) ・ Allow creation of the scanned jobs.
・ Allow browse of all scanned jobs.
・ Deny modification of all scanned jobs.
・ Allow cancel of all scanned jobs.
U.NORMAL(a) ・ Allow creation of the scanned jobs.
・ Allow browse of all scanned jobs.
・ Deny modification of all scanned jobs.
・ Allow cancel of own scanned jobs, but deny cancel of
other users’ scanned job.
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
U.FAXOPERATOR
・ Deny creation of the scanned jobs.
・ Allow browse of all scanned jobs.
・ Deny modification of all scanned jobs.
・ Deny cancel of all scanned jobs.
Unauthorized User ・ Deny creation of the scanned jobs.
・ Deny browse of all scanned jobs.
・ Deny modification of all scanned jobs.
・ Deny cancel of all scanned jobs.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Scan, Simple Scan, Job display and Log display
・ TopAccess: Job status
Table 31 Copy Access Control for D.USER.JOB
User Access Control Rules
Job Owner ・ Assign U.ADMIN(a) and U.NORMAL(a) as the Job owners
of the copy jobs executed by themselves.
U.ADMIN(a) ・ Allow creation of the copy jobs.
・ Allow browse of all copy jobs.
・ Deny modification of all copy jobs.
・ Allow cancel of all copy jobs.
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User Access Control Rules
U.NORMAL(a) ・ Allow creation of the copy jobs.
・ Allow browse of all copy jobs.
・ Deny modification of all copy jobs.
・ Allow cancel of own copy jobs, but deny cancel of other
users’ copy jobs.
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
U.FAXOPERATOR
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
・ Deny creation of the copy jobs.
・ Allow browse of all copy jobs.
・ Deny modification of all copy jobs.
・ Deny cancel of all copy jobs.
Unauthorized User ・ Deny creation of the copy jobs.
・ Deny browse of all copy jobs.
・ Deny modification of all copy jobs.
・ Deny cancel of all copy jobs.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Copy, Simple Copy, Job display and Log display
・ TopAccess: Job status
Table 32 Fax Transmission Access Control for D.USER.JOB
User Access Control Rules
Job Owner ・ Assign U.ADMIN(a), U.NORMAL(a), and U.FAXOPERATOR
as the Job owners of the fax transmission jobs executed
by themselves.
U.ADMIN(a) ・ Allow creation of Fax transmission jobs.
・ Allow browse of all Fax transmission jobs.
・ Deny modification of all Fax transmission jobs.
・ Allow cancel of all Fax transmission jobs.
U.NORMAL(a) ・ Allow creation of Fax transmission jobs.
・ Allow browse of all Fax transmission jobs.
・ Deny modification of all Fax transmission jobs.
・ Allow cancel of own Fax transmission jobs, but deny
cancel of other users’ Fax transmission jobs.
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
・ Deny creation of Fax transmission jobs.
・ Allow browse of all Fax transmission jobs.
・ Deny modification of all Fax transmission jobs.
・ Deny cancel of all Fax transmission jobs.
U.FAXOPERATOR ・ Allow creation of Fax transmission jobs.
・ Allow browse of all Fax transmission jobs.
・ Deny modification of all Fax transmission jobs.
・ Allow cancel of own Fax transmission jobs, but deny
cancel of other users’ Fax transmission jobs.
Unauthorized User ・ Deny creation of Fax transmission jobs.
・ Deny browse of all Fax transmission jobs.
・ Deny modification of all Fax transmission jobs.
・ Deny cancel of all Fax transmission jobs.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Fax transmission, Job display and Log display
・ TopAccess: Job status
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Table 33 Fax Reception Access Control for D.USER.JOB
User Access Control Rules
Job Owner ・ Assign U.ADMIN(a) and U.FAXOPERATOR as the Job
owners of the fax reception jobs executed by themselves.
U.ADMIN(a)
U.FAXOPERATOR
・ Allow creation of all Fax-received Jobs regardless of the
user’s operation.
・ Allow browse of all Fax-received Jobs.
・ Deny modification of all Fax-received Jobs.
・ Deny cancellation of all incoming fax jobs.
U.NORMAL(a)
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR
・ Allow creation of all Fax-received Jobs regardless of the
user’s operation.
・ Deny browse of all Fax-received Jobs.
・ Deny modification of all Fax-received Jobs.
・ Deny cancel of all Fax-received Jobs.
Unauthorized User ・ Allow creation of all incoming fax jobs regardless of user
operation.
・ Deny browse of all Fax-received Jobs.
・ Deny modification of all Fax-received Jobs.
・ Deny cancel of all Fax-received Jobs.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Job display and Log display
・ TopAccess: Job status
・ Others: PSTN Fax Interface
7.8. PSTN Fax-Network Separation
The following describes the summary specifications for the conditional requirements B.2.
FDP_FXS_EXT.1
Fax transmission and reception are only the functions of the Fax modem.
The Fax interface of the TOE is used only for transmission and reception of the Fax document data
with the external Fax machines, and is not used for other purposes.
The Fax interface of the TOE supports only ITU-T-compliant G3 as the transmission/reception
protocol. Thus, only transmission and reception using the Fax protocol are accepted in
communication between the TOE and PSTN. However, communication in which the negotiation
with Phase B is not established does not move to the subsequent phase and fails in the
communication error, so the TOE disconnects the communication line.
From the above, bridge connection between the PSTN and LAN is prohibited.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Fax transmission
・ Others: PSTN Fax Interface
7.9. Identification and Authentication
The following describes the summary specifications for the requirements for Class FIA.
FIA_AFL.1
・ When the user logs in from the control panel and TopAccess, the TOE locks out the user ID for a
predetermined time when the number of authentication failures counted from the last successful
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authentication or login after account unlocking reaches the number of times (1 to 30) set by
U.ADMIN (a).
・ The function which releases the locked-out state of a user is provided for the U.ADMIN(a) and
U.ACCOUNTMANAGER.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login
・ TopAccess: Login, Admin settings
FIA_ATD.1
・ The TOE associates the user ID and role with a user as the security attributes and registers and
maintains them.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ TopAccess: User management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
The TOE provides the function to investigate the user password at registration and change of the
password. Any combination of the following characters is allowed as a password: Upper and
lower case letters, numbers, punctuation marks (+ , - . / : ; = ? \ _ ` { | } ~ space), special characters
(! @#$^ *()), and European special characters (characters with the German umlauts and French
cedilla: See Table 16 for details.). It is also possible to set the minimum number of digits for a
password to more than 15 letters by the U.ADMIN(a).
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Home screen, Login, Admin settings
・ TopAccess: Login, Account
FIA_UAU.7
If a user enters a password on the control panel, the TOE displays “●” as dummy characters on the
control panel instead of the entered characters. Similarly, in the case that a user enters a password
from the web browser, alternative characters are displayed instead of the entered characters. The
alternative characters depend on the browser used by the user.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login
・ TopAccess: Login
FIA_UAU.1/FIA_UID.1
The TOE requires identification and authentication of a user. Identification and authentication of
a user are executed to the user account database. If the user ID and password do not match the
credential data which is internally saved, login is denied and an input prompt is displayed again for
the user. The user ID of a job owner is associated with a print job performed from the client PC
through the printer driver. The TOE identifies the user ID upon reception of a print job, and stores
the print job in the print hold queue.
Also, the TOE saves a fax-received job internally without performing identification and
authentication of the job.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login
・ TopAccess: Login
・ Printer driver: Interface to a Print request
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・ Others: PSTN Fax Interface
FIA_USB.1
The TOE associates a user with the user ID and role if identification and authentication are
successfully finished.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login
・ TopAccess: Login
7.10. Security Management
The following describes the summary specifications for the requirements for Class FMT.
FMT_MOF.1
The TOE provides the U.ADMIN(a) only with the function which switches the Enable/Disable settings
for secure channel function.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Admin settings
・ TopAccess: Admin settings
FMT_MSA.1
The TOE provides the U.ADMIN(a) with the following functions.
・ Creation, change, inquiry, deletion, and export of all user IDs
・ Creation, change, inquiry, deletion, and export of all roles
The TOE provides the U.ACCOUNTMANAGER with the following functions.
・ Inquiry and export of all user IDs
・ Creation, change, and deletion of the user IDs except for the U.ADMIN(a)
・ Creation, change and deletion of the roles except for the U.ADMIN(a)
The TOE provides the U.NORMAL and U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR with the following functions.
・ Inquiry of own user ID
・ Inquiry of own role
[Relevant TSFI]
・ TopAccess: User management
FMT_MSA.3
When a new D.USER.DOC and D.USER.JOB are created, the TOE assigns the user ID of the user who
created them as the initial value of the security attribute.
The TOE does not provide the function which overwrites the initial value of the user ID which is the
security attribute when the D.USER.DOC and D.USER.JOB are created.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Copy, Simple Copy, Scan, Simple Scan, Fax transmission
・ TopAccess: User management
・ Printer Driver:Interface to a Print request
FMT_MTD.1
The TOE provides the U.ADMIN(a) with the following operation functions.
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・ Change and export of the user password for the U.ADMIN(a).
・ Change and export of the user password for the U.ACCOUNTMANAGER.
・ Change and export of the user password for the U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR.
・ Change and export of the user password for the U.NORMAL.
・ Change of the Allowable Number of entry for Login Password.
・ Change of the lockout time.
・ Status clear for all locked-out accounts.
・ Change of the auto logout time.
・ Change of the date and time information.
・ Change of the minimum password length.
・ Creation, change, and deletion of the address book.
・ Change of the SYSLOG server settings.
・ Change of the FTP server settings.
・ Software version check and update
The TOE provides the U.ACCOUNTMANAGER with the following operation functions.
・ Change and export of the user password for the U.ACCOUNTMANAGER.
・ Change and export of the user password for the U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR.
・ Change and export of the user password for the U.NORMAL.
・ Status clear for the locked-out accounts other than the U.ADMIN(a).
The TOE provides the U.NORMAL with the following operation functions.
Change of the own user password.
The TOE provides the U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR with the following operation functions.
・ Change of the own user password.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login, Home screen, Job display and Log display, Admin settings
・ TopAccess: Login, Account, User management, Admin settings
FMT_SMF.1
The TOE provides the following security management functions to realize FMT_SMF.1.
Time Stamp Settings Management:
・ Change operation of the date and time information by the U.ADMIN(a).
User ID Management:
・ Change operation of the user ID by the U.ADMIN(a) or U.ACCOUNTMANAGER.
User Password Management:
・ Change and export operation of the user password for U.ACCOUNTMANAGER, U.NORMAL,
U.ADMIN(a) and U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR by the U.ADMIN(a).
・ Change and export operation of the user password for the U.ACCOUNTMANAGER, U.NORMAL,
and U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR by the U.ACCOUNTMANAGER.
・ Change operation of the own user password by the U.NORMAL.
・ Change operation of the user password by the U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR.
Unsuccessful User Authentication Processing Management:
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・ Change operation of the number of entries of the login password by the U.ADMIN(a).
・ Change operation of the lockout time by the U.ADMIN(a).
・ Locked-out account status clear operation by the U.ADMIN(a) or U.ACCOUNTMANAGER.
Minimum Password Length Management:
・ Change operation of the minimum password length by the U.ADMIN(a).
Specification of the inactive predetermined time for the user after the session is finished:
・ Change operation of the auto logout time by the U.ADMIN(a).
Secure Channel Settings:
・ Change operation of the Enable/Disable settings for TLS communication by the U.ADMIN(a).
Address Book Management:
・ Change operation of the Address Book by the U.ADMIN(a).
SYSLOG Server:
・ Change operation of the SYSLOG server settings by the U.ADMIN(a).
FTP Server:
・ Change operation of the FTP server settings by the U.ADMIN(a).
Software:
・ Software version confirmation and update by U.ADMIN(a).
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login, Home screen, Job display and Log display, Admin settings
・ TopAccess: Login, Account, User management, Admin settings
FMT_SMR.1
The TOE retains a role related to the U.ADMIN(a), U.ACCOUNTMANAGER, U.NORMAL, and
U.ADDRESSBOOKOPERATOR, and associates the role with the applicable user when a user is
registered.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login
・ TopAccess: Login, User management
7.11. Protection of the TSF
The following describes the summary specifications for the requirements for Class FPT.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1
• The TSF stores the server secret keys described in the TSS of FCS_CKM.1(a) in volatile memory
in plaintext, but does not provide access to all users. Additionally, these server secret keys are
cleared when the power is turn off.
• When the TSF stores the server secret keys described in the TSS of FCS_CKM.1(a) in Field-
Replaceable Nonvolatile storage (SSD), it encrypts them in ciphertext using AES-CBC with a 128-
bit DEK, in accordance with FCS_COP.1(d) and FDP_DSK_EXT.1. The TSF does not provide
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access to all users for the DEK necessary for decryption. These DEKs are also cleared when the
power is turned off.
• The TSF stores the keys and key materials (KEK derivation key, key material encryption key,
context for KEK derivation, KEK, DEK, submask, LUKS key) described in the TSS of
FCS_KYC_EXT.1 in volatile memory in plaintext, but does not provide access to all users. These
CSPs are cleared when the power is turned off.
• The TSF stores the DEK for the swapping partition in volatile memory in plaintext, but does not
provide access to all users. These CSPs are cleared when the power is turned off.
• The TSF stores the KEK derivation key and key material encryption key described in the TSS of
FCS_CKM.1(b) in plaintext within the FROM, but does not provide access to all users.
• The TSF stores the session keys for TLS communication and HMAC keys described in the TSS of
FCS_CKM.1(b) in volatile memory in plaintext, but does not provide access to all users. These
symmetric keys are cleared when the power is turned off.
From the above, FPT_SKP_EXT.1 is realized.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ none
FPT_STM.1
The TOE uses “Year”, “Month”, “Day”, “Hour”, “Minute”, and “Second”, which are provided by
the real clock IC embedded in the TOE for registration of the audit log, as a stamp to realize
FPT_STM.1.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Conform to relevant TSFI of FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.２
FPT_TST_EXT.1
The TOE conducts the following self-tests at power on.
• Verification of TSF Images
The TSF is implemented by software that controls the MFP (SYSTEM FIRMWARE, SYSTEM
SOFTWARE). To ensure the integrity of the TSF, the system performs verification on the image
files of both the system firmware and system software using an electronic signature method,
employing RSA for public key cryptography and SHA-256 for hashing. Additionally, the firmware
for the printer unit (ENGINE FIRMWARE), scanner unit (SCANNER FIRMWARE), and fax unit (FAX1
FIRMWARE) calculates a 16-bit checksum for self-verification of the firmware images to detect
implementation failures. If any anomalies are detected during the verification of the image files,
the affected image files will not be executed, a service call message will be displayed in the TOE's
panel message area, and the TOE will halt its start-up process, rendering it unusable to the user.
• Health test of the entropy source
Software that controls the MFP (SYSTEM SOFTWARE) starts the rngd process at power on and
gets 4096 bytes from /dev/random of Linux PRNG to perform self verification according to NIST
SP 800-90B. rngd calls the RDRAND instruction several times by retrying tight loop because
entropy is supplied to Linux PRNG at this time. The SYSTEM SOFTWARE outputs a log of the
abnormal detection and terminates the rngd process upon detection of the continuous error
(CF=0) 10 times during the call. If the constant monitoring of the process monitoring task
detects the termination of the rngd process, Service Call is displayed on the panel, and the TOE
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stops operation. The purpose of this health test is to detect unexpected software failures related
to the entropy source of the random number generator.
In addition, when the CPU's RDRAND instruction is called, a Built-In Self Test (BIST) is
automatically performed to verify that the SoC's built-in Online Health Test (OHT) is conducting
continuous health tests correctly, ensuring that the noise source in the entropy source is not
faulty. If an anomaly is detected during the BIST, the RDRAND instruction will always return an
error with CF=0, and software controlling the MFP will detect a failure in the noise source. If an
anomaly is detected in the above health test, an error code will be displayed on the control panel,
the TOE will stop operating, and the user will no longer be able to use the TOE.
• Health test of the DRBG
The DRBG’s FCS_RBG_EXT.1(a) and FCS_RBG_EXT.1(b) are both in compliance with NIST SP
800-90A, and when each TSF is first called after the TOE start-up, the health test in Section 11.3
of NIST SP 800-90A rev.1 is automatically executed. If an anomaly is detected in the above
health test, an error code will be displayed on the control panel, the TOE will stop operating, and
the user will no longer be able to use the TOE.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Power key
・ Others： Main switch
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
The TSF provides the U.ADMIN(a) with the Admin settings screen on the Home screen of the control
panel as an interface to confirm the current software version information of the TOE, and the Admin
settings screen on the control panel and the admin settings screen in TopAccess as the interfaces
to update software.
Also, the TSF provides the digital signature verification function which verifies the authenticity of
software to be updated before starting update. The verification method is as follows: Compare the
hash value which is decrypted from the digital signature provided in the files of each firmware to be
updated (SYSTEM SOFTWARE, SYSTEM FIRMWARE, ENGINE FIRMWARE, SCANNER FIRMARE, and
FAX1 FIRMWARE) by RSASSA-PSS according to FCS_COP.1(b) and the hash value which is derived
from each firmware to be updated by SHA-256 according to FCS_COP.1(c). If the values match, it
can be verified that the firmware is correct.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Home screen, Admin settings
・ TopAccess: Admin settings
7.12. TOE Access
The following describes the summary specifications for the requirements for Class FTA.
FTA_SSL.3
The TOE forcibly logs the user out if the user does not operate the control panel for a certain period
of time. The time can be set from 15 through 150 seconds. Also, a session is forcibly terminated
and a user is logged out when the user does not operate for a certain period of time after accessing
the TOE though the web browser. The time can be set from 5 through 999 minutes. The TOE
does not create an interactive session when submitting a print job from the printer driver, but ends
the session immediately after processing a print request.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Login
・ TopAccess: Login
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7.13. Trusted Path/Channel
The following describes the summary specifications for the requirements for Class FTP.
FTP_ITC.1
The TOE starts communication using TLS1.2 to protect data during communication between each
server. In the case that the TOE accesses the mail server, SYSLOG server, and FTP server through
the trusted channel, start of the TLS communication is requested to each server.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ Control Panel: Power key, Login, Home screen, Copy, Simple Copy, Scan, Simple Scan, Print,
Fax transmission, Job display and Log display, Admin settings
・ TopAccess: Login, Job status, Account, User management, Admin settings
・ Printer Driver: Interface to a Print request
・ Others: Main switch, PSTN Fax interface
FTP_TRP.1(a)、FTP_TRP.1(b)
The TSF provides the following functions in order to prevent the communication data from leakage
and provide the trusted path which detects alteration of the communication data in the
communication path among the TOE, remote administrators, and remote users.
Communication with the WEB page:
• Connection is made by the HTTPS network protocol so as to establish the trusted path
from the client PC to the web page of the TOE.
• Communication starts only in the case that the connection is made by the HTTPS protocol
when a remote administrator and remote user connect to the web page of the TOE from
the client PC using the web browser.
• The first administrator authentication, user authentication, and all remote user actions
from the client PC are executed only for connection using the HTTPS protocol.
Print from the client PC:
• For printing from the client PC using the printer driver, connection should be made by the
TLS communication protocol for establishing the trusted path during connection to the
TOE.
[Relevant TSFI]
・ TopAccess: Login, Job status, Account, User management, Admin settings
・ Printer Driver: Interface to a Print request
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Table 34 defines the TSFI related to this Chapter.
Table 34 Definition of TSFI
TSFI Name Details
Control Panel
Power key An interface which starts up and shuts down the MFP by turning off and on
the main switch.
Login An interface which identifies and authenticates a user who accesses the MFP
from the control panel.
Home Screen An interface which changes the user password and confirms the TOE
version.
Copy An interface which copies a document.
Simple Copy An interface which copies a document.
Scan An interface which scans an original as the image data, and previews,
deletes, replaces, and inserts the scanned image data, saves the data to the
folder in the FTP server, and sends the data to the specified email address.
Simple Scan An interface which scans an original as the image data, and previews and
deletes the scanned image data, and sends the data to the specified email
address as an attached file.
Print An interface which prints an original which was sent from the client PC and
stored in the hold queue of the MFP and fax-received data.
Fax Transmission An interface which scans an original as the image data, and previews,
deletes, replaces, and inserts the scanned image data, and performs Fax
transmission.
Job Display and
Log Display
An interface which operates the execution status of Print and Scan and the
Address Book data.
Admin Settings An interface by which the Admin performs Security operations, such as
change of the Admin password and Address Book data operation.
TopAccess
Login An interface which identifies and authenticates a user who accesses the MFP
from the client PC.
Job Status An interface which operates the active print job and scan job.
Account An interface which changes the own password and displays the set role
information.
User Management An interface which executes management related to a user, such as
registration of the user information.
Admin Settings An interface which performs the MFP settings, such as the Auto Clear setting,
and MFP management, such as the password policy setting and import of the
Address Book.
Printer Driver
Interface to a
Print Request
An interface which holds (saves) the print data from the client PC to the
MFP.
Others
PSTN Fax
Interface
An interface which receives the Fax data from the external Fax machines.
Main Switch An interface which turns on the MFP and starts log collection to use the TOE.
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Apendix
This Appendix describes the definition of acronyms and reference documents.
Table 35 Definition of Acronyms
Abbreviation Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BEV Border Encryption Value
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CPU Central Processing Unit
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EE Encryption Engine
FDE Full Drive Encryption
FIPS PUB Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
FRAM Ferroelectric Random Access Memory
FROM Flash ROM
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HCD Hardcopy Device
SSD Solid State Drive
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol over SSL
IPP Internet Printing Protocol
IPPS IPP over SSL
IT Information Technology
ISO/IEC
International Organization for Standardization / International
Electrotechnical Commission
LAN Local Area Network
LCD Liquid crystal display
LED light emitting diode
MFP Multifunction Product
NCU Network control unit
NIC Network Interface Controller
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PC Personal Computer
PP Protection Profile
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
RFC Request for Comments
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
Soc System-on-a-chip
TLS Transport Layer Security
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Abbreviation Definition
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
⚫ Reference Documents
➢ [Rambus 2012]
 Analysis of Intel's Ivy Bridge Digital Random Number Generator, Cryptography Research
a division of Rambus, 2012.
 Available: https://www.rambus.com/intel-ivy-bridge-random-number-generator/.