TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
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nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-03
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Certification Report
ePass Applet on JCOP 4 C1
Sponsor: Veridos GmbH, Identity Solutions by
Giesecke+Devrient and Bundesdruckerei
Prinzregentenstraße 161
81677 Munich
Germany
Developer: Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH
Prinzregentenstraße 161
81677 Munich
Germany
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300097-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300097-01
Author(s): Wim Ton
Date: 20 December 2023
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Evaluation Results 8
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the ePass
Applet on JCOP 4 C1. The developer of the ePass Applet on JCOP 4 C1 is Giesecke+Devrient Mobile
Security GmbH located in München, Germany and Veridos GmbH, Identity Solutions by
Giesecke+Devrient and Bundesdruckerei was the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A
Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT
security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is an electronic passport representing a smart card implementing
[ICAO_9303_10], [ICAO_9303_11], [TR-03110_1] and [TR-03110_3].
This smart card / passport application provides a travel document containing the related user data as
well as data needed for authentication with BAC, PACE, EAC or AA protocols (incl. PACE/BAC
passwords).
The application is intended to be used by governmental organisations as a machine-readable travel
document (MRTD).
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 20-12-2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in
the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the ePass Applet on JCOP 4 C1, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the ePass Applet on JCOP 4 C1 are
advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due
consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the following assurance requirements:
• The assurance level for the TOE is EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) with the components
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 in case PACE is used and EAC is not used and conformance to
[PP_SAC] is claimed.
• The assurance level for the TOE is EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) with the components
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 in case PACE and EAC are used and conformance to
[PP_EAC] is claimed.
• The assurance level for the TOE is EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) with the components
ALC_DVS.2 and ATE_DPT.2 in case BAC is chosen as authentication method and
conformance to [PP_BAC] is claimed.
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ePass Applet on JCOP 4 C1 from
Giesecke+Devrient Mobile Security GmbH located in München, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware NXP N7121 B1, R4
configuration
Platform
On-chip software 9.2.3.0
Flashloader OS 1.2.5
System Mode OS 13.2.3.0
JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4
Software ePass Applet C1, v1.0 (build 11)
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the ePass Applet on
JCOP 4 C1. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 2.3.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is an eMRTD and encompasses the following features:
• During the Personalisation phase:
o authentication protocol;
o 3DES, AES128, AES192 and AES256 Global Platform secure messaging;
o access control;
o initialisation of the LDS;
o data loading;
o Secure import and/or on-chip generation of Chip Authentication key pairs for CAv1;
o Secure import and/or on-chip generation the AA key pair;
o life-cycle phase switching to operational phase.
• During the Operational phase:
o Basic Access Control (BAC)
o Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)
o Active Authentication (AA)
o Chip Authentication v1 (CAv1)
o After CAv1: Read access to the holder’s data stored in the TOE using secure messaging with
3DES, AES128, AES192, or AES256.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 3.4.7 of the [ST].
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2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Note that the ICAO MRTD infrastructure critically depends on the objectives for the environment to be
met. These are not weaknesses of this particular TOE, but aspects of the ICAO MRTD infrastructure
as a whole.
The environment in which the TOE is personalised must perform proper and safe personalisation
according to the guidance and referred ICAO guidelines.
The environment in which the TOE is used must ensure that the inspection system protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the data send and read from the TOE.
2.4 Architectural Information
Figure 1 TOE boundary
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
Guidance Documentation ePass Applet on JCOP 4 C1, Giesecke & Devrient 0.3
Guidance Documentation for the Usage Phase ePass Applet on JCOP 4 C1 0.2
EPASS Applet EPASS10-200 Personalization Concept, Giesecke & Devrient 1.3
EPASS Applet EPASS10-200 Usage Phase Commands, Giesecke & Devrient 1.3
Guidance Documentation for the Initialization and Personalization Phase ePass
Applet on JCOP 4 C1, Giesecke & Devrient,
0.5
JCOP 4 P71, User manual for JCOP 4 P71, NXP DocNo 469543 4.3
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
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2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
Tests that are testing different parts of the functionality of the TOE were selected for witnessing. The
tests were running at the network of the developer and videos of the tests were shared and they were
analysed by the evaluator.
A sample of tests was witnessed with the following approach:
• Identify test samples (TOE and underlying platform)
• Check test environment
• Check tools and scripts used
• Witness of actual testing
The tests for the most important functionality of the ePass applet: BAC, PACE, Chip Authentication
and Terminal Authentication and the different types of test (smoke, system, performance) were
witnessed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
Potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes and
from information in the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these potential
vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed by penetration testing, a
guidance update, or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 2.75 weeks. During that test campaign, 36% of
the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, and 64% on logical tests.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST] chapter 3.4.1.
The evaluator testing and penetration testing was performed on the TOE in the operational life-cycle
state with applet instance configurations specified in the Security Target [ST].
The TOE was tested in the following configuration:
• TOE instantiated on the JCOP platform
• Using T=0, T=1 (ISO/IEC 7816) and T=CL (ISO/IEC 14443)
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by the use of 4 Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number ePass Applet on JCOP 4 C1.The
version of the EPASS Applet is available in FCI information from the Select Command in tag DF76
and is “EPASS10-200-100-V100-0011”.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
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The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the ePass Applet on JCOP 4 C1,
to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of:
EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and ATE_DPT.2 in case BAC is chosen as authentication
method whereby conformance to [PP_BAC] is claimed and
EAL 5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 in case PACE is chosen as authentication
method whereby conformance to [PP_SAC] is claimed and
EAL 5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 in case PACE and EAC are chosen as
authentication methods whereby conformance to [PP_EAC] is claimed.
This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
This ST claims strict conformance
- to [PP_BAC], if a BIS chooses BAC as authentication method
- to [PP_SAC], if a BIS chooses PACE as authentication method
- to [PP_EAC], if an EIS choses PACE as authentication method and additionally uses Extended
Access Control, which consists of two parts:
(i) the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1) and
(ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1) as defined in TR-03110_1.
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>, which are out of scope as there are no security claims relating to these.
Page: 10/12 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300097-01-CR, dated 20 December 2023
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3 Security Target
The Security Target ePass Applet on JCOP 4 C1, Version 1.3, 19 December 2023 [ST] is included
here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BAC Basic Access Control
BIS Basic Inspection System
CA Chip Authentication
CAM Chip Authentication Mapping
CGA Certificate Generation Application
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DCAP Dutch Conformity Assessment Program
DES Data Encryption Standard
CVCA Country Verifying Certification Authority
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
EAC Extended Access Control
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block-cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EIS Extended Inspection System
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
eMRTD electronic MRTD
FCI File Control Information
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
LAN Local Area Network
MAC Message Authentication Code
MITM Man-in-the-Middle
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
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RNG Random Number Generator
RMI Remote Method Invocation
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SCP Secure Channel Protocol
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SM Secure Messaging
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TA Terminal Authentication
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TRNG True Random Number Generator
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “Veridos ePass applet on JCOP4 C1” – EAL4/5,
23-RPT-1060, v4.0, 20 December 2023
[JC-CERT] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report JCOP 4 P71, NSCIB-CC-180212-
5MA1, 23.01.2023
[JC-ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition NXP “JCOP 4 P71” – EAL6+,
19-RPT-177 v14.0, 14 September 2022
[JC-ST] JCOP 4 P71 Security Target Lite, Security Target for JCOP 4 P71/SE050,
Rev. 4.11, 03.01.2023, NXP Semiconductors
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP_BAC] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control (MRTD-PP), Version 1.10, 25 March
2009, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
[PP_EAC] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2,
05 December 2012, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-
2012
[PP_SAC] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE, Version 1.0.1, 22 July 2014, registered
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011-MA-01
[ST] Security Target ePass Applet on JCOP 4 C1, Version 1.3, 19 December
2023
(This is the end of this report.)