JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
Certification Report
SAITO Yutaka, Commissioner
Innovation Platform Agency, Japan
2-28-8 Honkomagome, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
IT Product (TOE)
Reception Date of Application
(Reception Number)
2025-12-15 (ITC-5939)
Certification Identification JISEC-C0870
Product Name
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block
23/24/26/28 with Drive Box
Version and Release Numbers HA-DKC-04A-03X
Product Manufacturer Hitachi Vantara, Ltd.
Collaborative Protection Profile
Conformance
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices
Version 3.0e
(Certification Identification: CCEVS-VR-PP-0099)
Name of IT Security Evaluation
Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE has been certified as follows.
2026-06-19
YANO Tatsuro, Technical Manager
IT Security Technology Evaluation Department
IT Security Center
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following standards
prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification
Scheme Document."
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5
- Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP Version 3.0e
Evaluation Result: Pass
"Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23/24/26/28 with Drive Box, Version HA-DKC-
04A-03X" has been evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance with the
provisions of the "Requirements for IT Security Certification" by Innovation Platform Agency,
Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published
by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Product Overview............................................................................................................. 1
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package................................................................. 1
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality.............................................................................. 1
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives....................................................................... 1
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions ....................................................................... 2
1.1.3 Disclaimers................................................................................................................ 2
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation...................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Certification...................................................................................................................... 2
2. Identification............................................................................................................................ 3
3. Security Policy ......................................................................................................................... 4
3.1 User Roles......................................................................................................................... 4
3.2 Threats.............................................................................................................................. 4
3.3 Organizational Security Policy........................................................................................ 6
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ................................................................................ 7
4.1 Usage Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 7
4.2 Environmental Assumptions........................................................................................... 8
4.3 Clarification of Scope ..................................................................................................... 10
5. Architectural Information..................................................................................................... 12
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components .................................................................................. 12
5.2 IT Environment.............................................................................................................. 14
6. Documentation....................................................................................................................... 15
7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results ................................................ 18
7.1 Evaluation Facility......................................................................................................... 18
7.2 Evaluation Method......................................................................................................... 18
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity.................................................................................... 18
7.4 IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................... 18
7.4.1 Developer Testing.................................................................................................... 18
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing ............................................................................. 19
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing............................................................................... 21
7.5 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................... 22
7.6 Evaluation Results......................................................................................................... 22
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations ..................................................................... 23
8. Certification ........................................................................................................................... 24
8.1 Certification Result........................................................................................................ 24
8.2 Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 24
9. Annexes .................................................................................................................................. 24
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
10. Security Target................................................................................................................... 25
11. Glossary .............................................................................................................................. 26
12. Bibliography....................................................................................................................... 27
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
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1. Executive Summary
This Certification Report describes the certification result in relation to IT Security
Evaluation of "Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23/24/26/28 with Drive Box,
Version HA-DKC-04A-03X" (hereinafter referred to as the "TOE") developed by Hitachi
Vantara, Ltd., and the evaluation of the TOE was completed on 2026-06-11 by ECSEC
Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility"). It
is intended to report to the sponsor, Hitachi Vantara, Ltd., and provide security information
to procurement entities who are interested in the TOE.
This Certification Report assumes procurement entities who purchase the TOE to be
readers. Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target
(hereinafter referred to as the "ST") described in Chapter 10. Especially, security functional
requirements to be satisfied by the TOE and summary specifications of the security
functionality to implement the requirements are detailed in the ST.
Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance
requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does not guarantee an individual IT product
itself.
1.1 Product Overview
An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described as follows. Refer
to Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package
The TOE conforms to the following collaborative Protection Profile [10] (hereinafter
referred to as the "Conformance cPP").
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 3.0e
(Certification Identification: CCEVS-VR-PP-0099)
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality
The TOE is a disk storage device with remote management. The TOE provides disk storage
functions to host computers via a dedicated storage network. Additionally, the TOE
provides remote management functions via a network for operational management.
The TOE provides the security functions required by the Conformance cPP to protect the
data handled by the TOE against attacks targeting its remote management functions and
to prevent unauthorized access to the TOE.
For these security functions, the validity of the design policy and the accuracy of the
implementation were evaluated within the scope of the assurance requirements of the
Conformance cPP.
Threats and assumptions assumed for the TOE are described in the following sections.
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives
The TOE provides remote management functions, and there are threats that the data
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handled by the TOE could be exposed or altered, or that the TOE security functions could
be compromised, due to unauthorized access to the communication data for remote
management or unauthorized access to the TOE itself.
To counter these threats, the TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance
cPP, such as identification and authentication, encryption, and digital signatures.
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions
The TOE is assumed to be operated under the following configuration and assumptions.
The TOE is assumed to be operated in an environment where unauthorized physical access
is restricted.
The operational management of the TOE assumes that a trusted administrator will adhere
to the guidance documents and act in the best.
1.1.3 Disclaimers
Disk storage functions and their security measures of the TOE are outside the scope of this
evaluation.
Furthermore, the following operations are not guaranteed in this evaluation.
- An operational environment or configuration different from the description in "4.2
Environmental Assumptions"
- A TOE with settings different from the description in "7.5 Evaluated Configuration"
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation
Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body
operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed in 2026-
06, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE according to
the publicized documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document"[1],
"Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for Approval of IT
Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.
1.3 Certification
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [9] and the Observation
Reports prepared by the Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation documentation, and
confirmed that the TOE evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. The certification oversight reviews were also prepared for those concerns found
in the certification process. The Certification Body confirmed that all the concerns were
fully resolved, and that the TOE evaluation had been appropriately conducted in
accordance with the CC [4][5][6], the CEM [7] and the support document for the
Conformance cPP [11]. The Certification Body prepared this Certification Report based on
the Evaluation Technical Report and fully concluded certification activities.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
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2. Identification
The TOE is identified as follows:
TOE Name: Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23/24/26/28
with Drive Box
TOE Version: HA-DKC-04A-03X
Users can verify that a product is the TOE, which has been evaluated and certified, by the
following means.
Confirm the following information displayed on the TOE management screen in accordance
with the guidance documents of the product:
- Brand Name: "HITACHI"
- Model name: One of the following:
(For Japan)
VSP One B 23, VSP One B 26, VSP One B 28
(For other countries)
VSP One B 24, VSP One B 26, VSP One B 28
- Version: "HA-DKC-04A-03X"
- Drive box type: "DBN2"
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3. Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functions required by the Conformance cPP to protect the
data handled by the TOE from attacks targeting its remote management functions and to
prevent unauthorized access to the TOE.
As the background of the security functions provided by the TOE, user roles, threats, and
organizational security policy specified by the Conformance cPP are described in Sections
3.1 through 3.3 below. Details of the security functions of the TOE are described in Chapter
5.
3.1 User Roles
The user roles of the TOE are described in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1 User Roles
Name Description
Security Administrator
(or simply referred to as
“Administrator”)
A user with the authority to manage the
configuration of the TOE security functions. In the
TOE, the following four roles fall under this
category: Security Administrator (View & Modify),
Storage Administrator (Initial Configuration),
Audit Log Administrator (View & Modify), and User
Maintenance.
- Security Administrator (View & Modify)
manages administrator accounts, X.509v3
certificates and cryptographic keys.
- Storage Administrator (Initial Configuration)
configures initial settings such as the time and
banner messages.
- Audit Log Administrator (View & Modify)
configure audit log settings and view audit logs.
- User Maintenance performs maintenance tasks
such as software updates.
3.2 Threats
The threats to be countered by the TOE are described in Table 3-2.
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Table 3-2 Threats
Name Description
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMIN
ISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator
access to the Network Device by nefarious means
such as masquerading as an Administrator to the
device, masquerading as the device to an
Administrator, replaying an administrative session
(in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing
man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide
access to the administrative session, or sessions
between Network Devices. Successfully gaining
Administrator access allows malicious actions that
compromise the security functionality of the device
and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic
algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust
against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption
algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers
to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust
the key space and give them unauthorized access
allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the
traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNI
CATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may attempt to target Network
Devices that do not use standardized secure
tunnelling protocols to protect the critical network
traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly
designed protocols or poor key management to
successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks,
replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in
loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical
network traffic, and potentially could lead to a
compromise of the Network Device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATIO
N_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols
that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints,
e.g. a shared password that is guessable or
transported as plaintext. The consequences are the
same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could
masquerade as the Administrator or another device,
and the attacker could insert themselves into the
network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle
attack. The result is the critical network traffic is
exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality
and integrity, and potentially the Network Device
itself could be compromised.
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T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised
update of the software or firmware which undermines
the security functionality of the device. Non-validated
updates or updates validated using non-secure or
weak cryptography leave the update firmware
vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or
modify the security functionality of the Network
Device without Administrator awareness. This could
result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g.,
misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise
the device and the Administrator would have no
knowledge that the device has been compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONAL
ITY_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and
device data enabling continued access to the Network
Device and its critical data. The compromise of
credentials includes replacing existing credentials
with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing
credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device
credentials for use by the attacker. Threat agents may
also be able to take advantage of weak administrative
passwords to gain privileged access to the device.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONAL
ITY_FAILURE
An external, unauthorized entity could make use of
failed or compromised security functionality and
might therefore subsequently use or abuse security
functions without prior authentication to access,
change or modify device data, critical network traffic
or security functionality of the device.
3.3 Organizational Security Policy
The organizational security policy required for the TOE is described in Table 3-3.
Table 3-3 Organizational Security Policy
Name Description
P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing
restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other
appropriate information to which Administrators
consent by accessing the TOE.
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment for operating the
TOE.
4.1 Usage Assumptions
Assumptions for operating the TOE are described in Table 4-1. The effective performances
of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these assumptions are satisfied.
Note that the Conformance cPP includes the conditional assumption
A.COMPONENTS_RUNNING for "distributed TOEs"; however, the assumption is not
listed in Table 4-1 because the TOE is not a distributed TOE.
Table 4-1 Assumptions
Name Description
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The Network Device is assumed to be physically
protected in its operational environment and not
subject to physical attacks that compromise the
security or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This
protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the
device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP
does not include any requirements on physical
tamper protection or other physical attack
mitigations. The cPP does not expect the product to
defend against physical access to the device that
allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass
other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.
Note: The Conformance cPP includes the conditional
assumption statement for "virtual Network Device
(vND)"; however, the statement is removed because
the TOE is not a vND.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALI
TY
The device is assumed to provide networking
functionality as its core function and not provide
functionality/services that could be deemed as
general purpose computing. For example, the device
should not provide a computing platform for general
purpose applications (unrelated to networking
functionality).
Note: The Conformance cPP includes the conditional
assumption statement for "virtual Network Device
(vND)"; however, the statement is removed because
the TOE is not a vND.
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A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PRO
TECTION
A standard/generic Network Device does not provide
any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that
traverses it. The intent is for the Network Device to
protect data that originates on or is destined to the
device itself, to include administrative data and audit
data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device,
destined for another network entity, is not covered by
the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types
of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRAT
OR
The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device
are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best
interest of security for the organization. This includes
appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering
to guidance documentation. Administrators are
trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have
sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious
intent when administering the device. The Network
Device is not expected to be capable of defending
against a malicious Administrator that actively
works to bypass or compromise the security of the
device.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based
authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are
expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any
CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA
certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root
store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust
anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The Network Device firmware and software is
assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a
regular basis in response to the release of product
updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_S
ECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to
access the Network Device are protected by the platform
on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATIO
N
The Administrator must ensure that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material,
PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when
the equipment is discarded or removed from its
operational environment.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
Figure 4-1 shows the operational environment assumed for the TOE. The TOE connects to
hosts via a dedicated storage network (Storage Area Network or IP Network) and provides
disk storage functionality to the hosts. Additionally, the TOE is connected to servers and
management PCs via a Local Area Network (hereinafter referred to as "LAN") for
operational management. Administrators manage the TOE using a management PC
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
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connected via a LAN. Some management functions are performed using a management PC
connected locally to the TOE.
Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE
The operational environment of the TOE consists of the following components.
1) Host (Not evaluated)
A host computer that accesses the disk storage device, which is the TOE. It is outside the
scope of this evaluation based on the Conformance cPP.
2) Management PC (LAN connection)
A general-purpose PC used to manage the TOE. A web browser supporting the HTTPS
protocol (TLS 1.2, 1.3) and a REST API client are required. The following software was
used in this evaluation:
- OS: Windows 11 Pro
- Web browser: Google Chrome 141.0.7390.108, Mozilla Firefox 144.0
- REST API client: script using Python 3.13.5
3) Management PC (local connection)
A general-purpose PC directly connected to the TOE via Ethernet. In accordance with the
requirements of the Conformance cPP, it is used by administrators to perform
administration when they are locked out and unable to login due to consecutive
unsuccessful login attempts from the management PC connected via LAN. A web browser
supporting the HTTPS protocol (TLS 1.2, 1.3) is required. The following software was
used in this evaluation:
- OS: Windows 11 Pro
- Web browser: Google Chrome 141.0.7390.108
4) Audit Log Server
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A server that stores audit logs generated by the TOE. Software supporting the Syslog
over TLS (TLS 1.2, 1.3) is required. The following software was used in this evaluation:
- OS: Ubuntu 21.10
- Server software: rsyslogd 8.2302.0
5) Private CA
A server that issues the X.509v3 certificates used by the TOE. The following software
was used in this evaluation:
- OS: Kali Linux 2023.4
- Server software: OpenSSL 3.0.8
6) OCSP Responder and CRL DP Server
A server that the TOE uses to verify the revocation status of X.509v3 certificates. Either
an OCSP responder or a CRL DP server is required. An OCSP responder returns the
revocation status of a certificate queried via the OCSP protocol. A CRL DP server
distributes a list of revoked certificates via the HTTP protocol. The following software
was used in this evaluation:
[OCSP Responder]
- OS: Kali Linux 2023.4
- Server software: OpenSSL 3.0.8
[CRL DP Server]
- OS: Kali Linux 2023.4
- Server Software: Python 3.13.5
It should be noted that the reliability of the hardware and the software other than the TOE
shown in this configuration is outside the scope in the evaluation. They are assumed to be
trustworthy.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
The functions provided by the TOE or those guaranteed by this evaluation have the
following limitations.
1) Servers and Management PC
Administrators are responsible for secure operation of servers and management PCs
working with the TOE.
2) Non-evaluated functions
The following functions are disabled in the evaluated configuration and are outside the
scope of the assurance provided by this evaluation.
- SSH (Secure Shell) functionality for remote operation
- Time synchronization from an external NTP (Network Time Protocol) server to the TOE
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3) Protection of network communications
The "Trusted Path/Channels" function provided by the TOE protects network
communications between the management PC (LAN connection) and the TOE, and
between the TOE and the audit server. It does not apply to communications between the
TOE and other IT devices.
4) Web Browser and REST API client on the management PC
Most of the administration of the TOE can be performed on the management PC using
either a web browser or a REST API client. However, some procedures during the
installation of the TOE are not supported via a web browser and require the use of a
REST API client.
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5. Architectural Information
This chapter describes the scope and the main components of the TOE.
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components
The TOE is the entire product described in the TOE identification in Chapter 2.
The security functions of the TOE are described below.
1) Security Audit
This function generates audit logs of audit events relevant to security functions, stores
them within the TOE, and transmits them to the audit log server.
If the storage capacity is exceeded when storing audit logs within the TOE, the oldest
audit logs are overwritten by new ones. Audit logs stored in the TOE can be downloaded
to a management PC only by authorized administrators. Audit logs stored in the TOE
cannot be modified or deleted.
2) Cryptographic Support
This function consists of the cryptographic functions used in "Trusted Path/Channels"
and "Protection of the TSF." It provides the following cryptographic functions:
- Encrypted communication protocols (HTTPS, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3)
- Cryptographic key generation, key establishment, and key destruction
- Data encryption and decryption
- Generation and verification of digital signatures
- Hash
- Keyed-hash message authentication
- Deterministic random bit generation
The cryptographic communication protocols, cryptographic algorithms, and key lengths
used in the functions listed above are those specified by the Conformance cPP.
The seed input for deterministic random bit generation has sufficient unpredictable
entropy using random numbers output by a third-party CPU implemented in the TOE.
3) Identification and Authentication
This function consists of the function that identifies and authenticates administrators
using a user ID and password, and the function that verifies X.509v3 certificates to
authenticate communication peer in encrypted communication protocols.
The function that identifies and authenticates administrators using a user ID and
password includes the following functionality to strengthen identification and
authentication:
- Minimum password length requirement.
- Lock out the account for a set period after consecutive unsuccessful login attempts.
However, account lockout applies only when logging in from a management PC with LAN
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
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connection, i.e. it does not apply when logging in from a management PC with local
connection.
Verification of X.509v3 certificates includes revocation verification using an OCSP
responder or a CRL DP server. If communication with both the OCSP responder and the
CRL DP server is not possible when establishing a connection using the encrypted
communication protocol, the connection with the communication peer will not be
permitted.
4) TOE Access
This function allows administrators to control sessions that access TOE. It includes the
following functionality:
- Session termination due to a set period of inactivity after administrator login
- Session termination by administrator logout
- Display of a warning banner regarding unauthorized use before login
(However, it is not displayed when logging in via a REST API client on the management
PC)
5) Security Management
This function restricts settings of security functions to administrators. Administrative
privileges are subdivided into four roles based on scope of operations, and only
administrators with the appropriate role are permitted to perform the operation.
6) Protection of the TSF
This function protects the security functions of the TOE. It includes the following
functionality:
- Verification of digital signatures of the firmware during TOE start-up
- Known answer tests of cryptographic algorithms during TOE start-up
- Verification of digital signatures of the update firmware during firmware updates
- Hashing of administrator passwords when storing (plaintext passwords are not
stored)
- Providing reliable date and time information (the TOE maintains the date and time
set by the administrator)
The cryptographic algorithms for verifying digital signatures and hashing use the
"Cryptographic Support" function.
7) Trusted Path/Channels
This function protects communications from a remote management PC (LAN connection)
to the TOE using the encrypted communication protocol HTTPS, and communications
from the TOE to the audit server using the encrypted communication protocol TLS.
HTTPS, TLS, and related cryptographic functions use the "Cryptographic Support"
function.
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5.2 IT Environment
The TOE security function "Trusted Path/Channels" works with IT devices external to the
TOE and uses the following protocols. The TLS version is 1.2 or 1.3.
- Management PC (LAN connection): HTTPS (HTTP over TLS)
- Audit server: Syslog over TLS
The verification of X.509v3 certificates in the TOE security function "Identification and
Authentication" uses an OCSP responder and a CRL DP server external to the TOE.
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6. Documentation
The guidance documents of the TOE are identified in Table 6-1 and Table 6-2. TOE users
are required to fully understand and comply with the following documents to satisfy the
assumptions.
Table 6-1 Guidance (Japanese)
Name1 Version
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23 Hitachi
Virtual Storage Platform One Block 26 Hitachi Virtual
Storage Platform One Block 28
System Administrator Guide
4050-1J-U50-41
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23 Hitachi
Virtual Storage Platform One Block 26 Hitachi Virtual
Storage Platform One Block 28
ESM Message Guide
4050-1J-U07-41
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23 Hitachi
Virtual Storage Platform One Block 26 Hitachi Virtual
Storage Platform One Block 28
Audit Log Reference Guide
4050-1J-U00-41
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23 Hitachi
Virtual Storage Platform One Block 26 Hitachi Virtual
Storage Platform One Block 28
System Provisioning Guide
4050-1J-U09-41
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23 Hitachi
Virtual Storage Platform One Block 26 Hitachi Virtual
Storage Platform One Block 28
VSP One Block Administrator REST API Reference Guide
4050-1J-U41-40
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23 Hitachi
Virtual Storage Platform One Block 26 Hitachi Virtual
Storage Platform One Block 28
VSP One Block Administrator Users Guide
4050-1J-U40-40
1 The guidance name listed in Table 6-1 is the translation of Japanese name.
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Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23, Block 26,
Block 28 Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform 5100, 5200, 5500,
5600, 5100H, 5200H, 5500H, 5600H Hitachi Virtual Storage
Platform E390, E590, E790, E990, E1090, E390H, E590H,
E790H, E1090H Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform F350,
F370, F700, F900 Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform G130,
G150, G350, G370, G700, G900
REST API Reference Guide
4060-1J-U71-60
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23 Hitachi
Virtual Storage Platform One Block 26 Hitachi Virtual
Storage Platform One Block 28
SIM Reference
4050-1J-U21-41
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23/26/28 with
Drive Box HA-DKC-04A-03X
Users guidance
1.14
Table 6-2 Guidance (English)
Name Version
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block A3-04-0x
System Administrator Guide
MK-23VSP1B009-03
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 202 A3-03-2x
Installation Guide
MK-23VSP1B008-03
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block SVOS 10.4
Maintenance Utility Messages
MK-23VSP1B005-03
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block SVOS 10.4
Provisioning Guide
MK-23VSP1B012-03
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block SVOS 10.4
VSP One Block Administrator REST API Reference Guide
MK-23VSP1B002-02
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block SVOS 10.4
VSP One Block Administrator Users Guide
MK-23VSP1B001-02
2 The term "Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 20" in this guidance is a collective
term for the following three models for countries other than Japan.
- Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 24
- Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 26
- Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 28
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Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block Hitachi Virtual
Storage Platform 5000 Series Hitachi Virtual Storage
Platform E Series Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform G130,
G/ F350, G/F370, G/F700, G/F900 SVOS 10, SVOS RF 9
REST API Reference Guide
MK-23VSP1B003-05
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 24/26/28 with
Drive Box HA-DKC-04A-03X
Users guidance
1.13
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
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7. Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results
7.1 Evaluation Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center that conducted the evaluation as the
Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE (National Institute
of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, in accordance with the
requirements of ISO/IEC 17025. It is periodically confirmed that the Evaluation Facility
meets the requirements on the appropriateness of the management and evaluators for
maintaining the quality of evaluation.
7.2 Evaluation Method
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the assurance requirements in the CC
Part 3 required by the Conformance cPP using the evaluation methods prescribed in the
CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance cPP.
Details of the evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. The
Evaluation Technical Report describes the content of the evaluation and the verdict for each
work unit in the CEM and assurance activity of the Conformance cPP.
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity
The evaluation started in 2025-12 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation
Technical Report dated 2026-06. This evaluation is a continuation of the previous
evaluation conducted from 2024-12 to 2025-12.
The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation deliverables necessary for
evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the evidence in relation to a series of
evaluation conducted. Furthermore, the evaluator conducted the evaluator testing at the
developer site in 2025-10, 2025-11, 2026-03 and 2026-04.
Concerns found by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation were issued as the
Observation Reports and reported to the developer. The concerns were reviewed by the
developer, and all of them were resolved eventually.
Concerns found by the Certification Body during the evaluation certification were issued
as the certification oversight reviews and reported to the Evaluation Facility. The concerns
were examined by the Evaluation Facility and the developer, and reflected in the
Evaluation Technical Report.
7.4 IT Product Testing
Based on the evaluation documentation, the evaluator conducted evaluator independent
testing to ensure that the security functions of the product are accurately implemented,
and evaluator penetration testing based on vulnerability analysis.
7.4.1 Developer Testing
Developer testing is not included in the assurance requirements for this evaluation.
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7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing
The evaluator conducted evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as the
"independent testing") based on the evaluation documentation to ensure that the security
functions of the product are accurately implemented. The independent testing performed
by the evaluator is described below.
1) Independent Testing Environment
The environment for the independent testing is based on the operational environment of
the TOE shown in Figure 4-1. The components used in the independent testing
environment are listed in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1 Components of the Independent Testing Environment
Components Description
TOE (For Japan)
- Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 28 with Drive Box,
HA-DKC-04A-03X
(For other countries)
- Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 26 with Drive Box,
HA-DKC-04A-03X
Management
PC
(LAN
connection)
- OS: Microsoft Windows 11 Pro
- Web browser:
Google Chrome 141.0.7390.108, Mozilla Firefox 144.0
- REST API client: Python 3.13.5
Management
PC
(local
connection)
- OS: Microsoft Windows 11 Pro
- Web browser: Google Chrome 141.0.7390.108
Audit Log
Server
- OS: Ubuntu 21.10
- Server software: rsyslogd 8.2302.0
Private CA - OS: Kali Linux 2023.4
- Server software: OpenSSL 3.0.8
OCSP
Responder
- OS: Kali Linux 2023.4
- Server software: OpenSSL 3.0.8
CRL DP
Server
- OS: Kali Linux 2023.4
- Server software: Python 3.13.5
The following differences exist between the configuration of the independent testing and
the TOE configuration identified in the ST. The evaluator determined that there are no
problems with those differences and that the security functions of the TOE configuration
identified in the ST can be considered properly tested.
(1) Tested models
In the models of the TOE described in Chapter 2 "TOE identification," there are
multiple models due to the following differences:
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- Differences in languages for Japan and for other countries
- Differences in storage capacity
The evaluator determined that the security functions of all the models of the TOE can
be considered to have been tested by testing two representative models considering the
above differences, because the software for each model is identical.
(2) Use of the developer interface (SSH)
In the independent test, the developer interface (SSH) was used to modify and verify
data within the TOE. The evaluator determined that the testing using the developer
interface was valid, because SSH, which is disabled in the TOE evaluated configuration,
was only temporarily enabled.
(3) Use of additional test tools
In the independent testing, some test tools were used to verify and modify
communication data. The validity of those test tools was confirmed by the evaluator.
2) Summary of the Independent Testing
The independent testing conducted by the evaluator is as follows.
a. Independent Testing Viewpoints
Viewpoints of the independent testing devised by the evaluator based on the
requirements of the Conformance cPP and the evaluation documentation are as follows.
<Viewpoints of the Independent Testing>
(1) Verify security functions for each Security Functional Requirement (SFR).
(2) Verify that the implementation of the cryptographic algorithms is correct.
b. Independent Testing Outline
An outline of the independent testing conducted by the evaluator is as follows.
<Independent Testing Approach>
Inputs are provided to the TOE using a management PC, test tools, and a developer
interface, and its behavior is verified using input responses, communication data,
audit logs, and log information within the TOE.
< Independent Testing Contents>
Table 7-2 shows the independent testing content for each perspective.
Table 7-1 Performed Independent Tests
Viewpoint Test Overview
(1) <Verification of security functions>
Verify that all security functions work as the specification with the test items
devised based on the assurance activities of the Conformance cPP for each
SFR or the requirements of the SFR.
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(2) <Verification of implementation of cryptographic algorithms>
Verify that the following cryptographic algorithms are implemented as the
specification.
- RSA-2048, RSA-3072, RSA-4096
- ECDSA P-256, ECDSA P-384, ECDSA P-521
- KAS-ECC, KAS-FFC
- AES-CTR-256, AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256
- SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
- HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384
- CTR_DRBG (AES-256)
c. Results
All independent tests performed by the evaluator were correctly completed, and the
evaluator verified the behavior of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed that all test results
were consistent with the expected behavior.
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator devised and conducted evaluator penetration testing (hereinafter referred to
as the "penetration testing") on potentially exploitable vulnerabilities of concern under the
assumed operational environment and attack level. The penetration testing conducted by
the evaluator is described below.
1) Summary of the Penetration Testing
A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.
a. Vulnerability of Concern
The evaluator searched for potential vulnerabilities based on the evaluation
documentation and publicly available information, and identified the following
vulnerabilities that require penetration testing.
(1) There is a concern that unintended network ports may be open on the TOE.
(2) There is a concern that known vulnerabilities may exist in the web interface of the
TOE.
(3) There is a concern that buffer overflow vulnerability may exist in the input
processing of the TOE.
Note that the evaluation documentation includes a list of hardware and software
components used within the TOE, as required by the Conformance cPP. The evaluator
confirmed that these components did not contain any known vulnerabilities.
b. Penetration Testing Outline
The evaluator performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially
exploitable vulnerabilities.
<Penetration Testing Environment>
The penetration testing environment was identical to the independent testing
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
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environment, except for the addition of penetration testing tools. The tools used in the
penetration testing are listed in Table 7-3.
Table 7-3 Penetration Testing Tools
Name Overview and Purpose of Use
Nmap
Version 7.97
A tool for detecting available network ports.
OWASP ZAP
Version 2.16.1
A tool for assessing vulnerabilities in web applications.
Burp Suite Professional
Version 2025.5.4
A tool used to view and modify communication data
between the web browser and the web server (TOE).
<Penetration Testing Contents>
Table 7-4 shows the penetration testing content for each vulnerability of concern.
Table 7-4 Performed Penetration Tests
Vulnerability Test Overview
(1) - Verify that no unexpected network ports are open on the TOE
using Nmap.
(2) - Verify that there are no known vulnerabilities in the web interface
of the TOE using OWASP ZAP.
- Verify that there are no known vulnerabilities in the web interface
of the TOE by modifying data sent from a web browser to the TOE
using Burp Suite Professional.
(3) - Verify that countermeasures to prevent buffer overflow attacks are
enabled for the process that handles external inputs within the
TOE.
c. Results
In the penetration testing performed by the evaluator, no vulnerabilities were identified
that could be exploited by an attacker with the assumed attack potential.
7.5 Evaluated Configuration
The conditions of the TOE configuration that are prerequisites for this evaluation are as
described in the guidance documents listed in Chapter 6. In order to use the TOE securely,
as ensured by the evaluation, the TOE must be configured as described in the guidance
documents. Configurations that differ from the guidance documents are outside the scope
of the assurance provided by this evaluation.
7.6 Evaluation Results
The evaluator had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM
and all assurance activities in the Conformance cPP as per the Evaluation Technical Report.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
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In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.
- PP Conformance:
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 3.0e
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following assurance
components required by the Conformance cPP.
ASE_INT.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_OBJ.1, ASE_ECD.1,
ASE_REQ.1, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1, ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1
The evaluation results apply only to the configurations described in "4.2 Environmental
Assumptions" and "7.5 Evaluated Configuration" for the TOE identified in Chapter 2.
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
There is no evaluator recommendation to be addressed to procurement entities.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
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8. Certification
The Certification Body certified the evaluation from the following viewpoints based on the
materials submitted by the Evaluation Facility.
1. Contents pointed out in the Observation Reports shall be adequate.
2. Contents pointed out in the Observation Reports shall properly be resolved.
3. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the related
work units in the CEM and assurance activities of the Conformance cPP shall be
evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
4. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
5. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report
shall conform to the CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance cPP.
Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight
reviews, and they were sent to the Evaluation Facility. The Certification Body confirmed
the concerns pointed out in the certification oversight reviews were resolved in the ST and
the Evaluation Technical Report and issued this Certification Report.
8.1 Certification Result
As a result of verification of the Evaluation Technical Report, Observation Reports and
related evaluation documentation submitted by the Evaluation Facility, the Certification
Body determined that the TOE evaluation satisfies the assurance requirements required
by the Conformance cPP.
8.2 Recommendations
Procurement entities who are interested in the TOE are advised to refer "4.2
Environmental Assumptions" and "7.5 Evaluated Configuration" to make sure the scope of
the evaluation and the operational requirements of the TOE meet the operational
conditions assumed by each user.
9. Annexes
There is no annex.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
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10. Security Target
The Security Target [8] of the TOE is provided as a separate document from this
Certification Report and identified as follows:
Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23/24/26/28 with Drive Box Security Target,
Version 1.15, June 10, 2026, Hitachi Vantara, Ltd.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
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11. Glossary
The abbreviations related to the CC used in this report are listed below.
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP collaborative Protection Profile
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
The abbreviations related to the TOE used in this report are listed below.
CRL DP Certificate Revocation List Distribution Point
OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
REST API Representational State Transfer Application Programming Interface
SSH Secure Shell
TLS Transport Layer Security
The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.
Evaluation
Activities
Evaluation work to be performed by an evaluator for PP conformance.
It is a supplement of the CEM. In the case of the Conformance cPP
[10], it is described in the supporting document [11] for the cPP.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0870-01-2026
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12. Bibliography
[1] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document, August 2025,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCS-01
[2] Requirements for IT Security Certification, December 2023,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-02
[3] Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility, October 2021,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-03
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part1:
Introduction and general model Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-001
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part2:
Security functional components Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-002
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part3:
Security assurance components Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-003
[7] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation :
Evaluation methodology Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-004
[8] Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23/24/26/28 with Drive Box Security
Target, Version 1.15, June 10, 2026, Hitachi Vantara, Ltd.
[9] Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform One Block 23/24/26/28 with Drive Box HA-DKC-
04A-03X Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.7, June 11, 2026, ECSEC
Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center
[10] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 3.0e, December 6,
2023 (Certification Identification: CCEVS-VR-PP-0099)
[11] Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 3.0e, December 6, 2023