Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006
for
GeNUGate Firewall 6.0
from
GeNUA
Gesellschaft für Netzwerk- und
UNIX-Administration mbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.1 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006
GeNUGate Firewall 6.0
from
GeNUA
Gesellschaft für Netzwerk- und
UNIX-Administration mbH
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
AVA_VLA.4 and ALC_FLR.2
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 12. September 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the component AVA_VLA.4 that is not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4-component of these assurance families are relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product GeNUGate Firewall 6.0 has undergone the certification procedure
at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-ITSEC-0226-2004. For this
evaluation specific results from the evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-
ITSEC-0155 and BSI-DSZ-ITSEC-0226-2004 (the first re-evaluation) were re-
used.
The evaluation of the product GeNUGate Firewall 6.0 was conducted by Tele-
Consulting GmbH. The Tele-Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
GeNUA
Gesellschaft für Netzwerk- und
UNIX-Administration mbH
Domagkstrasse 7
85551 Kirchheim
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 12. September 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
GeNUA
Gesellschaft für Netzwerk- und
UNIX-Administration mbH
Domagkstrasse 7
85551 Heimstetten
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 8
3 Security Policy 9
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
5 Architectural Information 9
6 Documentation 10
7 IT Product Testing 10
8 Evaluated Configuration 11
9 Results of the Evaluation 11
10 Comments/Recommendations 14
11 Annexes 14
12 Security Target 15
13 Definitions 15
14 Bibliography 16
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The TOE GeNUGate Firewall 6.0 is part of a larger product, the firewall
GeNUGate 6.0 Z (Patchlevel 11), which consists of hardware and software. The
TOE GeNUGate Firewall 6.0 itself is part of the shipped software. The operating
system is a modified OpenBSD.
GeNUGate 6.0 Z is a combination of an application level gateway (ALG) and a
packet filter (PFL), which are implemented on two different systems. It is thus a
two-tiered firewall. Both systems are shipped in one case. The network
connection between ALG and PFL is a cross cable.
Besides the network interface to the PFL, the ALG has (at least) three more
interfaces to connect to the external network, the administration network and
the secure server network. The PFL has a second interface which is connected
to the internal network.
The aim of the firewall is to control the IP-traffic between the different connected
networks. Therefore the ALG uses proxies that control all data transmitted
between the different networks, while the PFL uses packet filtering as an
additional means to control all data that is send to and from the internal
network.
The TOE, GeNUGate Firewall 6.0, consists of the software that implements the
IP traffic control and related functionality of the firewall. This includes the
proxies, the modified OpenBSD kernel modules IP-stack, packet filter, but also
other supportive functionality as logging of security events.
The TOE has a special maintenance mode. During normal operation IP packets
are handled as usual and the file system is secured by the BSD flags. In
maintenance mode, however, the BSD flags can be altered for maintenance
operation. In this mode all IP packets are dropped for security reasons.
The IT product GeNUGate Firewall 6.0 was evaluated by Tele-Consulting
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 24. August 2006. The Tele-
Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
GeNUA
Gesellschaft für Netzwerk- und
UNIX-Administration mbH
Domagkstrasse 7
85551 Heimstetten
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL 4 (methodically designed, tested, and reviewed) augmented by
AVA_VLA.4 and ALC_FLR.2. Table 6 in section 9 of this report shows the
assurance components and the evaluation results.The following table shows the
augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant
+: ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security audit
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_STG.2 Guarantees of audit data availability
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FDP User data protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT Security management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles
FMT_SMR.3 Assuming roles
FPT Protection of the TSF
FPT_RCV.2 Automated recovery
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security audit
FAU_GEN.1EX Audit data generation
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UAU.5EX External authentication mechanisms
FPT Protection of the TSF
FPT_SST.1 TOE testing
FPT_RTE.1 Restricted Runtime Environment
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FPT Protection of the TSF
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Table 4: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.4.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF_SA Security audit
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SF_DF Data flow control
SF_IA Identification and Authentication
SF_SM Security management
SF_PT Protection of the TSF
Table 5: Security Functions of the TOE
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed high (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6, chapter 8.4].
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The following users are described in the Security Target to give a better
understanding of the threats and organisational security policies:
user Any person or software agent sending IP packets to
or receiving from the TOE. The assumed attack
potential is high. The general term user is used when
it does not matter whether the user did authenticate
at the TOE or not.
unauthenticated user Any person or software agent sending IP packets to
or receiving from the TOE that did not authenticate at
the TOE. The assumed attack potential is high. This
term is used for users that did not (yet) authenticate
at the TOE.
authenticated user Any person or software agent sending IP packets to
or receiving from the TOE that authenticated at the
TOE. The assumed attack potential is high.
administrator These are authenticated users that have the role of
an administrator. This role authorises them to
change the TOE configuration. Their assumed attack
potential is undefined.
auditor These are authenticated users that have the role of
an auditor. This role authorises them to view the
TOE configuration. Their assumed attack potential is
undefined.
Assets for the TOE are defined as resources in the connected networks and
security sensitive data on the TOE.
The Security Target describes four threats for the TOE:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006 Certification Report
T.NOAUTH An unauthenticated user may attempt to bypass the security
functions of the TOE and gain unauthenticated access to
resources in other connected networks or read, modify or
destroy security sensitive data on the TOE. The attack method
is exploiting authentication protocol weaknesses.
T.SPOOF A user may attempt to send spoofed IP packets to the TOE in
order to gain unauthorised access to resources in other
connected networks. Without spoofing checks the TOE would
route a response to the spoofed IP packet into a connected
network that the user is not authorised to access.
T.MEDIAT A user may send non-permissible data through the TOE that
result in gaining access to resources in other connected
networks.
T.SELPRO A user may gain access to the TOE and read, modify or
destroy security sensitive data on the TOE, by sending IP
packets to the TOE and exploiting a weakness of the protocol
used.
Only one Organisational Security Policy is described:
P.AUDIT All users must be accountable for their actions.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE can be configured in such a way that the security needs for each
network are optimally met. A standard configuration consists of the following
networks connected to the TOE:
• internal network: This is the network that has to be secured against attacks
from the external network. Usually only a few services from the internal
network are accessible from the external network, secured by user
authentication. This is the network that is secured by both the ALG and the
PFL, using filtering mechanisms at two different levels of the IP stack. This
network is usually controlled by a defined security policy.
• external network: This is the most insecure network, e. g. the internet. In
general, no security policy exists, and all kind of attacks can occur in this
network.
• administration network: This network is used to allow a secure
administration of the TOE. This network is isolated from all other networks
and only administrators have access.
• secure server network: This network allows access to common services
from the external network, without the need to open the internal network.
Usually, Web- and FTP-servers are installed in this network. This network is
usually controlled by a defined security policy.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions for the environment are stated in the ST [6, chapter
3.2]:
A.PHYSEC The TOE is physically secure. Only authorised persons
have physical access to the TOE.
A.NOEVIL Administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator
guidance; however, they are capable of error. They use
passwords that are not easily guessable.
A.ADMIN All administration is done only in the administration network.
A.SINGEN Information can not flow among the internal, external, or
secure server network, unless it passes through the TOE.
A.POLICY The security policy of the internal network allows only the
administrators access to the network components and the
network configuration.
A.TIMESTMP The environment provides reliable timestamps.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The TOE, GeNUGate Firewall 6.0, consists of the software that implements the
IP traffic control and related functionality of the firewall. This includes the
proxies, the modified OpenBSD kernel modules IP-stack, packet filter, but also
other supportive functionality as logging of security events.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
GeNUGate Firewall 6.0
The TOE (software, guidance) is shipped as part of a larger product, the firewall
GeNUGate 6.0 Z (Patchlevel 11), together with the OpenBSD platform and the
required hardware. The following table outlines the deliverables of the
GeNUGate 6.0 Z:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW GeNUGate 400, 600, 800 or
200 with fourth network
interface
N/A
2 SW GeNUGate Firewall 6.0 CD-ROM
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3 SW GeNUGate Platform 6.0 Z
Patchlevel 11
CD-ROM
4 DOC Administrator and user
guidance manual
6.0 Z Manual and CD-ROM
5 HW PFL floppy/USB stick N/A
Table 5: Deliverables of the firewall GeNUGate 6.0 Z
To make sure the GeNUGate CD-ROM originates from GeNUA and has not
been manipulatet during delivery process, an identification of the
installationpackages can be done. Therefore SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160
checksums are provided in chapter 10 of this report and on the GeNUA-server
under the following URL:
http://www.genua.de/customer/gg_support/checksums/cs_600z.html
3 Security Policy
The TOE controls the connections and data transfer between different
networks, where each network has different security needs and different threat
levels for the other networks.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
For detailed description of the assumptions see chapter 1.5 of this report.
4.1 Usage assumptions
The assumptions A.PHYSEC, A.NOEVIL and A.ADMIN describe the assumed
usage of the TOE.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
A.SINGEN, A.POLICY and A.TIMESTMP describe the assumptions about the
TOE environment.
5 Architectural Information
Both ALG and PFL run on Intel compatible hardware that works with OpenBSD.
As the product GeNUGate 6.0 Z is a combination of hardware and software, the
hardware components are selected by GeNUA. The end user has no need to
check for compatibility. The TOE is located as software on the CD-ROM.
The physical connections are:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006
• the network interfaces to the external, internal, secure server and
administration networks
• connections for the keyboard, monitor, and serial interfaces at the ALG and
PFL
• power supply
Figure 1 gives a schematic overview on the TOE and its environment. It divides
the software on ALG and PFL into user and kernel space parts. On both
systems, the user and the kernel space contain part of the TOE, and part of the
environment. The following table lists the components in each part. The
components for the parts A, B, C and D are part of the TOE. The components
for E, F, G, and H are part of the environment.
Figure 1: Scope and boundary of the TOE
6 Documentation
Together with the TOE the following documentation is delivered:
“GeNUGate 6.0 Z Installations und Konfigurationshandbuch, August 2006” [8]
This document contains all necessary instructions for correct installation and
configuration of the TOE.
7 IT Product Testing
The test platform was set up by the developer according to the ST and all
relevant guidance, ensuring that the evaluated configuration as defined in the
ST was tested. The developer test scrips (approx. 640 single test scripts, partial
automatic, partial manual) were performed successfully on the evaluated
configuration of the TOE. Complete coverage was achieved for all the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006 Certification Report
security functions as described in the functional specification. The overall test
depth of the developer tests comprises the high-level design subsystems and
the internal interfaces of those subsystems as required for the assurance level
of the evaluation.
A selected subset from the test scripts provided by the developer have been
successfully repeated by the evaluation facility. The achieved test results
matched the expected results as documented by the developer in the developer
test documentation.
Furthermore, a set of independent penetration tests has been performed
successfully by the evaluation facility.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configurations were GeNUGate 400, 600, 800 and 200 with
fourth network interface as described in the ST.
The developer has tested the TOE software on all available hardware platforms,
the evaluator testing was performed on a GeNUGate 400 .
Detailed information about the differences of the single versions of GeNUGate
are provided on the GeNUA-server:
http://www.genua.de/dateien/genugate-hardware.pdf
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]).
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VLA.4 and ALC_FLR.2 and the class ASE for the Security
Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table:
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006
Assurance classes and components Verdict
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.2 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Highly resistant AVA_VLA.4 PASS
Table 6: Verdicts for the assurance components
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006 Certification Report
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by AVA_VLA.4 and ALC_FLR.2.
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
• SF_IA.3: For the TELNET- and FTP-relays a compulsory user
authentication at the TOE can be configured by the administrator. The
authentication method can be configured and either be password, radius,
LDAP, S/Key, or cryptocard. The password can be changed by the users
themselves, but a minimum quality is checked by the TOE. The
password must be of minimum length 6, must not only contain
uppercase- or lowercase letters, and must not contain the user name.
The TELNET- and FTP-relay capture the eventual option-negotiation
commands sent before the authentication proceeds, and replay them to
the destination, if the authentication completes successfully.
• SF_IA.4: The side channel authentication allows users to activate
configurable TCP-relays after a successful authentication at the side
channel web site. The authentication method can be configured by the
administrators and either be password, radius, LDAP, S/Key, or
cryptocard. The password can be changed by the users themselves, but
a minimum quality is checked by the TOE. The password must be of
minimum length 6, must not only contain uppercase- or lowercase letters,
and must not contain the user name.
• SF_IA.5: Administration is only possible after successful authentication at
the administration web server. Auditors (administrators with read-only
rights) can view the configuration after succesful authentication at the
administration web server. Connections to the administration webserver
are only accepted from the administration network. The authentication
method is password. The password can be changed by the respective
administrators themselves, but a minimum quality is checked by the
TOE. The password must be of minimum length 6, must not only contain
uppercase- or lowercase letters, and must not contain the user name.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE GeNUGate 6.0 in
the evaluated configuration as described in chapter 2 above.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [6] and [8] contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
Additional hints are given by the evaluator:
• Sidechannel-Authentication should only be used, provided that
• Sidechannel-Authentication is not activated on external interfaces.
• If using Sidechannel-Authentication, a security model has to be
established.
• External authentication servers are subject to the same organizational and
physical restrictions as the GeNUGate.
• Plausibility of the information about existing bootinstall scripts have to be
checked by an administrator each time before booting GeNUGate.
The following SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160 checksums are provided to check the
integrity of the delivered CD:
SHA1 (base37.tgz) = 04ca449dc3665f7aa81fda94db27a8b2517c4401
SHA1 (comp37.tgz) = bcdb46ee097146503f2a0e475b98be133a27b561
SHA1 (etc37.tgz) = 1929dce0a7afcafa5f41bbda939e41e85d037ebd
SHA1 (game37.tgz) = ddd7b90bfc7a3fdffc22990ded844d54af4f2e26
SHA1 (man37.tgz) = c1f5388126dcb5d1bcc8bd1643303c5278d72747
SHA1 (misc37.tgz) = 462612d06fb74ea64e0e132e1b6a4685ec87c55a
SHA1 (xbase37.tgz) = ae9efd1aed3dbad0ae2b60c42d30065fe6107882
SHA1 (xetc37.tgz) = f4a916d6e65124a47780efdc373ee51851481504
SHA1 (xshare37.tgz) = ec5716569fd1f6ba10f1b46ded4c932673d95cbc
RMD160 (base37.tgz) = 5d2c67d4d3dc317312e624d5544087e956461746
RMD160 (comp37.tgz) = 9d481ac1fa2bc6849465fd2f2803437b7d822703
RMD160 (etc37.tgz) = e92b0bba596a59c1f9254b2572181e7c68609661
RMD160 (game37.tgz) = e6391d75cd2aeb6bc84f162895e0700cd3a25217
RMD160 (man37.tgz) = f9a2b589fef02ab53047a97d84b08a748b8d6b97
RMD160 (misc37.tgz) = 9f3fee6f7016a898fc06bf073b7df3d5faeb6bed
RMD160 (xbase37.tgz) = 5c6ef8583e58f00c39055f66f37a37e54210d799
RMD160 (xetc37.tgz) = d02fbc7bda09fd85d11c66bcf446821466ef11f2
RMD160 (xshare37.tgz) = 1d3734ae383686e2e6da5cb45dfd3a467980d374
For the documentation the following checksums are provided:
SHA1 (manual-de.pdf) = 520120eff457a0f0d54ee36bda4b6e281ef9d7cf
RMD160 (manual-de.pdf) = ffce57ee8a6cefb107a0dcd37ea8fda0c27764eb
11 Annexes
none.
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12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
ALG Application Level Gateway
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PFL Packet Filter
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
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Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0300-2006, Version 242, 22.08.2006,
GeNUGate Firewall 6.0 Security Target, GeNUA mbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 23.08.2006
[8] GeNUGate 6.0 Z Installations- und Konfigurationshandbuch, August
2006, GeNUA mbH
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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