

ST33F1MD

Security Target -

Public Version

Common Criteria for IT security
evaluation

SMD_ST33F1M_ST_10_001 Rev 01.00

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ST33F1MD Security Target - Public Version

Common Criteria for IT security evaluation

1 Introduction

1.1 Security Target reference

- 1 Document identification: ST33F1MD SECURITY TARGET - PUBLIC VERSION.
- 2 Version number: Rev 01.00, issued June 2010.
- 3 Registration: registered at ST Microelectronics under number SMD_ST33F1M_ST_10_001_V01.00.

1.2 Purpose

- 4 This document presents **the Security Target - Public version (ST)** of the **ST33F1MD**, Security Integrated Circuits (IC), with Dedicated Software (DSW), designed on the **ST33 platform of STMicroelectronics**.
- 5 This document is a sanitized version of the Security Target used for the evaluation. It is classified as public information.
- 6 The precise reference of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and the security IC features are given in [Section 3: TOE description](#).
- 7 A glossary of terms and abbreviations used in this document is given in [Appendix A: Glossary](#)

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2 Context

- 8 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) referred to in [Section 3: TOE description](#), is evaluated under the French IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme and is developed by the Secure Microcontrollers Division of STMicroelectronics (ST).
- 9 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the ST33F1MD.
- 10 The assurance level of the performed Common Criteria (CC) IT Security Evaluation is EAL 5 augmented.
- 11 The intent of this Security Target is to specify the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) applicable to the ST33F1MD security ICs, and to summarise their chosen TSF services and assurance measures.
- 12 This ST claims to be an instantiation of the "[Security IC Platform Protection Profile](#)" (PP) registered and certified under the reference [BSI-PP-0035](#) in the German IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme, **with the following augmentations:**
- Addition #1: "Support of Cipher Schemes" from [AUG](#)
 - Addition #4: "Area based Memory Access Control" from [AUG](#)
 - Additions specific to this Security Target.
- The original text of this PP is typeset as [indicated here](#), its augmentations from [AUG](#) as [indicated here](#), when they are reproduced in this document.
- 13 Extensions introduced in this ST to the SFRs of the Protection Profile (PP) are **exclusively** drawn from the Common Criteria part 2 standard SFRs.
- 14 This ST makes various refinements to the above mentioned PP and [AUG](#). They are all properly identified in the text typeset as **indicated here**. The original text of the PP is repeated as scarcely as possible in this document for reading convenience. All PP identifiers have been however prefixed by their respective origin label: **BSI** for [BSI-PP-0035](#), **AUG1** for Addition #1 of [AUG](#) and **AUG4** for Addition #4 of [AUG](#).

3 TOE description

3.1 TOE overview

15 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the ST33F1MD.

Table 1. Product and versions of the TOE

Product name	Product version	Product identification number ⁽¹⁾	Product and System ROM version ⁽²⁾
ST33F1M	D	0000h	0007h

1. See the Datasheet referenced in [Section 9](#).

2. See the System ROM User Manual referenced in [Section 9](#).

16 The TOE is a serial access Smartcard IC designed for secure mobile applications, based on the most recent generation of ARM® processors for embedded secure systems. Its SecurCore® SC300™ 32-bit RISC core is built on the Cortex™ M3 core with additional security features to help to protect against advanced forms of attacks.

17 The ST33F1MD offer 1280 KBytes high-density User Flash memory, an internally generated clock, an MPU, an internal true random number generator (TRNG) and accelerators dedicated to cryptographic algorithms.

18 Operations can be synchronized with an external clock or with an internally generated clock issued by the Clock Generator module. The internal speed of the device is fully software programmable. High performance can be reached by using high speed internal clock frequency (up to 25 MHz). The CPU interfaces with the on-chip RAM, ROM and EEPROM memories via a 32-bit internal bus.

19 This device includes the ARM® SecurCore® SC300™ memory protection unit (MPU), which enables the user to define its own region organization with specific protection and access permissions. The MPU can be used to enforce various protection models, ranging from a basic code dump prevention model up to a full application confinement model.

20 The E-DES (Enhanced DES) module supports efficiently the Data Encryption Standard (DES [\[2\]](#)) with built-in countermeasures against side channel attacks. Additionally, an extra feature allows fast implementation of CBC and CBC-MAC modes [\[10\]](#) [\[9\]](#).


21 The NESCRYPT (NExt Step CRYPTo-processor) is the latest generation of ST cryptographic accelerator providing native modular arithmetic for both GF(p) and GF(2ⁿ) with a very high level of performance. NESCRYPT also includes dedicated instructions to accelerate SHA-1 and SHA-2 family hash functions. NESCRYPT allows efficient and secure implementation of almost all known public key cryptosystems with a high level of performance ([\[4\]](#), [\[8\]](#), [\[12\]](#), [\[18\]](#),[\[19\]](#), [\[20\]](#), [\[21\]](#)).

22 As randomness is a key stone in many applications, the ST33F1MD features a highly reliable True Random Number Generator (TRNG), compliant with P2 Class of AIS-31 [\[1\]](#) and directly accessible through dedicated registers.

23 The ST33F1MD offers 3 communication channels to the external world: a serial communication interface fully compatible with the ISO/IEC 7816-3 standard, a single-wire protocol (SWP) interface for communication with a near-field communication (NFC) router in

- SIM/NFC applications, and an optional and exclusive SPI Slave interface for communication in non-SIM applications.
- 24 In a few words, the ST33F1MD offers a unique combination of high performances and very powerful features for high level security:
- Die integrity,
 - Monitoring of environmental parameters,
 - Protection mechanisms against faults,
 - Hardware Security Enhanced DES accelerator,
 - AIS-31 class P2 compliant True Random Number Generator,
 - ISO 3309 CRC calculation block,
 - Memory Protection Unit,
 - NExt Step CRYPTography accelerator (NESCRYPT).
- 25 The TOE includes in the OST ROM a Dedicated Software which provides full test capabilities (operating system for test, called "OST"), not accessible by the Security IC Embedded Software (ES), after TOE delivery.
- 26 The System ROM and ST NVM of the TOE contain a Dedicated Software which provides a very reduced set of commands for final test (operating system for final test, called "FTOS"), not intended for the Security IC Embedded Software (ES) usage, and not available in User configuration.
- 27 The System ROM and ST NVM of the TOE contain a Dedicated Support Software called Secure Flash Loader, enabling to securely and efficiently download the Security IC Embedded Software (ES) into the NVM. It also allows the evaluator to load software into the TOE for test purpose. The Secure Flash Loader is not available in User configuration.
- 28 The System ROM and ST NVM of the TOE contain a Dedicated Support Software, which provides low-level functions (called Flash Drivers), enabling the Security IC Embedded Software (ES) to modify and manage the NVM contents. The Flash Drivers are available all through the product life-cycle.
- 29 [Figure 1](#) provides an overview of the ST33F1MD.

Figure 1. ST33F1MD block diagram



3.2 TOE life cycle


- 30 This Security Target is fully conform to the claimed PP. In the following, just a summary and some useful explanations are given. For complete details on the TOE life cycle, please refer to the [Security IC Platform Protection Profile \(BSI-PP-0035\)](#), section 1.2.3.
- 31 The composite product life cycle is decomposed into 7 phases. Each of these phases has the very same boundaries as those defined in the claimed protection profile.
- 32 The life cycle phases are summarized in [Table 2](#).
- 33 The limit of the evaluation corresponds to phases 2 and 3, including the delivery and verification procedures of phase 1, and the TOE delivery to the IC packaging manufacturer ; procedures corresponding to phases 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are outside the scope of this evaluation.
- 34 The TOE Manufacturer, as defined in [[BSI-PP-0035](#)], is STMicroelectronics.
- 35 In the following, the term "Composite product manufacturing" is uniquely used to indicate phases 1, 4, 5 and 6 all together.
This ST also uses the term "Composite product manufacturer" which includes all roles responsible of the TOE during phases 1, 4, 5 and 6.
- 36 In the following, the term "TOE delivery" is uniquely used to indicate after phase 3 (or before phase 4). The TOE is delivered after phase 3, in ISSUER or in USER configuration, depending on the customer's request.

Table 2. Composite product life cycle phases

Phase	Name	Description	Responsible party
1	IC embedded software development	security IC embedded software development specification of IC pre-personalization requirements	IC embedded software developer
2	IC development	IC design IC dedicated software development	IC developer: ST
3	IC manufacturing	integration and photomask fabrication IC production IC testing pre-personalisation	IC manufacturer: ST
4	IC packaging	security IC packaging (and testing) pre-personalisation if necessary	IC packaging manufacturer
5	Composite product integration	composite product finishing process composite product testing	Composite product integrator
6	Personalisation	composite product personalisation composite product testing	Personaliser
7	Operational usage	composite product usage by its issuers and consumers	End-consumer

37 The following figure shows the possible organization of the life cycle, adapted to the TOE which comprises programmable NVM. Thus, the Security IC Embedded Software may be loaded onto the TOE in phase 3, 4, 5 or 6, depending on customer's choice.

Figure 2. Security IC life cycle



3.3 TOE environment

38 Considering the TOE, three types of environments are defined:

- Development environment corresponding to phase 2,
- Production environment corresponding to phase 3,
- Operational environment, including phase 1 and from phase 4 to phase 7.

3.3.1 TOE Development Environment

39 To ensure security, the environment in which the development takes place is secured with controllable accesses having traceability. Furthermore, all authorised personnel involved fully understand the importance and the strict implementation of defined security procedures.

40 The development begins with the TOE's specification. All parties in contact with sensitive information are required to abide by Non-Disclosure Agreements.

41 Design and development of the IC then follows, together with the dedicated and engineering software and tools development. The engineers use secure computer systems (preventing unauthorised access) to make their developments, simulations, verifications and generation of the TOE's databases. Sensitive documents, files and tools, databases on tapes, and printed circuit layout information are stored in appropriate locked cupboards/safe. Of paramount importance also is the disposal of unwanted data (complete electronic erasures) and documents (e.g. shredding).

42 The development centres involved in the development of the TOE are the following: **ST ROUSSET** and **ST ANG MO KIO**, for the design activities, **ST ROUSSET**, for the engineering activities, **ST ROUSSET** for the software development activities.

43 Reticules and photomasks are generated from the verified IC databases; the former are used in the silicon Wafer-fab processing. As reticules and photomasks are generated off-site, they are transported and worked on in a secure environment with accountability and traceability of all (good and bad) products. During the transfer of sensitive data electronically, procedures are established to ensure that the data arrive only at the destination and are not accessible at intermediate stages (e.g. stored on a buffer server where system administrators make backup copies).

44 The authorized sub-contractors involved in the TOE mask manufacturing can be **DNP JAPAN** and **DPE ITALY**.

3.3.2 TOE production environment

45 As high volumes of product commonly go through such environments, adequate control procedures are necessary to account for all product at all stages of production.

46 Production starts within the Wafer-fab; here the silicon wafers undergo the diffusion processing. Computer tracking at wafer level throughout the process is commonplace. The wafers are then taken into the test area. Testing of each TOE occurs to assure conformance with the device specification. The wafers are then delivered for assembly onto the composite products.

47 The authorized front-end plant involved in the manufacturing of the TOE is **ST ROUSSET**.

48 The authorized EWS plant involved in the testing of the TOE is **ST ROUSSET**.

3.3.3 TOE operational environment

- 49 A TOE operational environment is the environment of phases 1, then 4 to 7.
- 50 At phases 1, 4, 5 and 6, the TOE operational environment is a controlled environment.
- 51 End-user environments (phase 7): composite products are used in a wide range of applications to assure authorised conditional access. Examples of such are pay-TV, banking cards, portable communication SIM cards, health cards, transportation cards, identity and passport cards. The end-user environment therefore covers a wide range of very different functions, thus making it difficult to avoid and monitor any abuse of the TOE.

4 Conformance claims

4.1 Common Criteria conformance claims

52 The ST33F1MD Security Target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria version 3.1.

53 Furthermore it claims to be CC Part 2 ([CCMB-2009-07-002](#)) extended and CC Part 3 ([CCMB-2009-07-003](#)) conformant. The extended Security Functional Requirements are those defined in the [Security IC Platform Protection Profile \(BSI-PP-0035\)](#).

54 The assurance level for the ST33F1MD Security Target is **EAL 5** augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.

4.2 PP Claims

4.2.1 PP Reference

55 The ST33F1MD Security Target claims strict conformance to the [Security IC Platform Protection Profile \(BSI-PP-0035\)](#), as required by this Protection Profile.

4.2.2 PP Refinements

56 The main refinements operated on the [BSI-PP-0035](#) are:

- Addition #1: “Support of Cipher Schemes” from [AUG](#),
- Addition #4: “Area based Memory Access Control” from [AUG](#),
- Specific additions for the Secure Flash Loader
- Refinement of assurance requirements.

57 All refinements are indicated with type setting text **as indicated here**, original text from the [BSI-PP-0035](#) being typeset [as indicated here](#). Text originating in [AUG](#) is typeset [as indicated here](#).

4.2.3 PP Additions

58 The security environment additions relative to the PP are summarized in [Table 3](#).

59 The additional security objectives relative to the PP are summarized in [Table 4](#).

60 A simplified presentation of the TOE Security Policy (TSP) is added.

61 The additional SFRs for the TOE relative to the PP are summarized in [Table 6](#).

62 The additional SARs relative to the PP are summarized in [Table 8](#).

4.2.4 PP Claims rationale

63 The differences between this Security Target security objectives and requirements and those of [BSI-PP-0035](#), to which conformance is claimed, have been identified and justified in [Section 6](#) and in [Section 7](#). They have been recalled in the previous section.

64 In the following, the statements of the security problem definition, the security objectives, and the security requirements are consistent with those of the [BSI-PP-0035](#).

- 65 The security problem definition presented in [Section 5](#), clearly shows the additions to the security problem statement of the PP.
- 66 The security objectives rationale presented in [Section 6.3](#) clearly identifies modifications and additions made to the rationale presented in the [BSI-PP-0035](#).
- 67 Similarly, the security requirements rationale presented in [Section 7.4](#) has been updated with respect to the protection profile.
- 68 All PP requirements have been shown to be satisfied in the extended set of requirements whose completeness, consistency and soundness have been argued in the rationale sections of the present document.

5 Security problem definition

69 This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is intended to be used and addresses the description of the assets to be protected, the threats, the organisational security policies and the assumptions.

70 Note that the origin of each security aspect is clearly identified in the prefix of its label. Most of these security aspects can therefore be easily found in the [Security IC Platform Protection Profile \(BSI-PP-0035\)](#), section 3. Only those originating in *AUG*, and the one introduced in this Security Target, are detailed in the following sections.

71 A summary of all these security aspects and their respective conditions is provided in [Table 3](#).

5.1 Description of assets

72 The assets (related to standard functionality) to be protected are:

- the User Data,
- the Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation,
- the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.

73 The user (consumer) of the TOE places value upon the assets related to high-level security concerns:

- SC1 integrity of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories),
- SC2 confidentiality of User Data and of the Security IC Embedded Software (while being processed and while being stored in the TOE's memories)
- SC3 correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.

Application note:

As the TOE provides a functionality for Security IC Embedded Software secure loading into NVM, the ES is considered as User Data being stored in the TOE's memories at this step, and the above security concerns are extended accordingly.

74 According to the Protection Profile there is the following high-level security concern related to security service:

- SC4 deficiency of random numbers.

75 To be able to protect these assets the TOE shall protect its security functionality. Therefore critical information about the TOE shall be protected. Critical information includes:

- logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, and configuration data,
- Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data, specific development aids, test and characterisation related data, material for software development support, and photomasks.

Such information and the ability to perform manipulations assist in threatening the above assets.

76 The information and material produced and/or processed by **ST** in the TOE development and production environment (Phases 2 to 3) can be grouped as follows:

- logical design data,
- physical design data,
- IC Dedicated Software, Security IC Embedded Software, Initialisation Data and pre-personalisation Data,
- specific development aids,
- test and characterisation related data,
- material for software development support, and
- photomasks and products in any form

as long as they are generated, stored, or processed by **ST**.

Table 3. Summary of security environment

	Label	Title
TOE threats	BSI.T.Leak-Inherent	Inherent Information Leakage
	BSI.T.Phys-Probing	Physical Probing
	BSI.T.Malfunction	Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
	BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation	Physical Manipulation
	BSI.T.Leak-Forced	Forced Information Leakage
	BSI.T.Abuse-Func	Abuse of Functionality
	BSI.T.RND	Deficiency of Random Numbers
	AUG4.T.Mem-Access	Memory Access Violation
OSPs	BSI.P.Process-TOE	Protection during TOE Development and Production
	AUG1.P.Add-Functions	Additional Specific Security Functionality (Cipher Scheme Support)
	P.Controlled-ES-Loading	Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software
Assumptions	BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
	BSI.A.Plat-Appl	Usage of Hardware Platform
	BSI.A.Resp-Appl	Treatment of User Data

5.2 Threats

77 The threats are described in the [BSI-PP-0035](#), section 3.2. Only those originating in [AUG](#) are detailed in the following section.

- BSI.T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
- BSI.T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
- BSI.T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
- BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
- BSI.T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage

BSI.T.Abuse-Func	Abuse of Functionality
BSI.T.RND	Deficiency of Random Numbers
AUG4.T.Mem-Access	<p>Memory Access Violation:</p> <p>Parts of the Security IC Embedded Software may cause security violations by accidentally or deliberately accessing restricted data (which may include code). Any restrictions are defined by the security policy of the specific application context and must be implemented by the Security IC Embedded Software.</p> <p>Clarification: This threat does not address the proper definition and management of the security rules implemented by the Security IC Embedded Software, this being a software design and correctness issue. This threat addresses the reliability of the abstract machine targeted by the software implementation. To avert the threat, the set of access rules provided by this TOE should be undefeated if operated according to the provided guidance. The threat is not realized if the Security IC Embedded Software is designed or implemented to grant access to restricted information. It is realized if an implemented access denial is granted under unexpected conditions or if the execution machinery does not effectively control a controlled access.</p> <p>Here the attacker is expected to (i) take advantage of flaws in the design and/or the implementation of the TOE memory access rules (refer to BSI.T.Abuse-Func but for functions available after TOE delivery), (ii) introduce flaws by forcing operational conditions (refer to BSI.T.Malfunction) and/or by physical manipulation (refer to BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation). This attacker is expected to have a high level potential of attack.</p>

5.3 Organisational security policies

- 78 The TOE provides specific security functionality that can be used by the **Security IC** Embedded Software. In the following specific security functionality is listed which is not derived from threats identified for the TOE's environment because it can only be decided in the context of the **Security IC** application, against which threats the **Security IC** Embedded Software will use the specific security functionality.
- 79 ST applies the Protection policy during TOE Development and Production (*BSI.P.Process-TOE*) as specified below.
- 80 **ST** applies the Additional Specific Security Functionality policy (*AUG1.P.Add-Functions*) as specified below.
- 81 A new Organisational Security Policy (OSP) is defined here below. This OSP is related to the capability provided by the TOE to load Security IC Embedded Software into the NVM after TOE delivery, in a controlled manner, during composite product manufacturing. The use of this capability is optional, and depends on the customer's production organization

BSI.P.Process-TOE	<p>Protection during TOE Development and Production:</p> <p>An accurate identification is established for the TOE. This requires that each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification.</p>
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- AUG1.P.Add-Functions Additional Specific Security Functionality:
The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the Security IC Embedded Software:
- Data Encryption Standard (DES),
 - Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES).
- Note that DES is no longer recommended as an encryption function in the context of smart card applications. Hence, Security IC Embedded Software may need to use triple DES to achieve a suitable strength.
- P.Controlled-ES-Loading Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software:
- The TOE shall provide the capability to import the Security IC Embedded Software into the NVM, in a controlled manner, either before TOE delivery, under ST authority, either after TOE delivery, under the composite product manufacturer authority.
This capability is not available in User configuration.

5.4 Assumptions

82 The assumptions are described in the [BSI-PP-0035](#), section 3.4.

- BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
- BSI.A.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
- BSI.A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data

6 Security objectives

- 83 The security objectives of the TOE cover principally the following aspects:
- integrity and confidentiality of assets,
 - protection of the TOE and associated documentation during development and production phases,
 - provide random numbers,
 - provide cryptographic support and access control functionality.

84 A summary of all security objectives is provided in [Table 4](#).

85 Note that the origin of each objective is clearly identified in the prefix of its label. Most of these security aspects can therefore be easily found in the protection profile. Only those originating in [AUG](#), and the one introduced in this Security Target, are detailed in the following sections.

Table 4. Summary of security objectives

	Label	Title
TOE	BSI.O.Leak-Inherent	Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
	BSI.O.Phys-Probing	Protection against Physical Probing
	BSI.O.Malfunction	Protection against Malfunctions
	BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation	Protection against Physical Manipulation
	BSI.O.Leak-Forced	Protection against Forced Information Leakage
	BSI.O.Abuse-Func	Protection against Abuse of Functionality
	BSI.O.Identification	TOE Identification
	BSI.O.RND	Random Numbers
	AUG1.O.Add-Functions	Additional Specific Security Functionality
	AUG4.O.Mem-Access	Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control
O.Controlled-ES-Loading	Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software	
Environments	BSI.OE.Plat-Appl	Usage of Hardware Platform
	BSI.OE.Resp-Appl	Treatment of User Data
	BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during composite product manufacturing

6.1 Security objectives for the TOE

- BSI.O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
- BSI.O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
- BSI.O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
- BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation

BSI.O.Leak-Forced	Protection against Forced Information Leakage
BSI.O.Abuse-Func	Protection against Abuse of Functionality
BSI.O.Identification	TOE Identification
BSI.O.RND	Random Numbers
AUG1.O.Add-Functions	Additional Specific Security Functionality: The TOE must provide the following specific security functionality to the Security IC Embedded Software: – Data Encryption Standard (DES), – Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES).
AUG4.O.Mem-Access	Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control: The TOE must provide the Security IC Embedded Software with the capability to define dynamic memory segmentation and protection . The TOE must then enforce the defined access rules so that access of software to memory areas is controlled as required, for example, in a multi-application environment.
O.Controlled-ES-Loading	Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software: The TOE must provide the capability to load the Security IC Embedded Software into the NVM, either before TOE delivery, under ST authority, either after TOE delivery, under the composite product manufacturer authority. The TOE must restrict the access to these features. The TOE must provide control means to check the integrity of the loaded user data. This capability is not available in User configuration.

6.2 Security objectives for the environment

86 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development environment (phase 1):

BSI.OE.Plat-Appl	Usage of Hardware Platform
BSI.OE.Resp-Appl	Treatment of User Data

87 Security Objectives for the operational Environment (phase 4 up to 6):

BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during composite product manufacturing
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6.3 Security objectives rationale

88 The main line of this rationale is that the inclusion of all the security objectives of the [BSI-PP-0035](#) protection profile, together with those in [AUG](#), guarantees that all the security environment aspects identified in [Section 5](#) are addressed by the security objectives stated in this chapter.

- 89 Thus, it is necessary to show that:
- security environment aspects from *AUG*, and from this ST, are addressed by security objectives stated in this chapter,
 - security objectives from *AUG*, and from this ST, are suitable (i.e. they address security environment aspects),
 - security objectives from *AUG*, and from this ST, are consistent with the other security objectives stated in this chapter (i.e. no contradictions).
- 90 The selected augmentations from *AUG* introduce the following security environment aspects:
- TOE threat "*Memory Access Violation, (AUG4.T.Mem-Access)*",
 - organisational security policy "*Additional Specific Security Functionality, (AUG1.P.Add-Functions)*".
- 91 The augmentation made in this ST introduces the following security environment aspects:
- organisational security policy "*Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software, (P.Controlled-ES-Loading)*".
- 92 As required by CC Part 1 (*CCMB-2009-07-001*), no assumption nor objective for the environment has been added to those of the *BSI-PP-0035* Protection Profile to which strict conformance is claimed.
- 93 The justification of the additional policies and the additional threat provided in the next subsections shows that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the protection profile *BSI-PP-0035* for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.

Table 5. Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies

Assumption, Threat or Organisational Security Policy	Security Objective	Notes
<i>BSI.A.Plat-Appl</i>	<i>BSI.OE.Plat-Appl</i>	Phase 1
<i>BSI.A.Resp-Appl</i>	<i>BSI.OE.Resp-Appl</i>	Phase 1
<i>BSI.P.Process-TOE</i>	<i>BSI.O.Identification</i>	Phase 2-3
<i>BSI.A.Process-Sec-IC</i>	<i>BSI.OE.Process-Sec-IC</i>	Phase 4-6
<i>P.Controlled-ES-Loading</i>	<i>O.Controlled-ES-Loading</i>	Phase 4-6
<i>BSI.T.Leak-Inherent</i>	<i>BSI.O.Leak-Inherent</i>	
<i>BSI.T.Phys-Probing</i>	<i>BSI.O.Phys-Probing</i>	
<i>BSI.T.Malfunction</i>	<i>BSI.O.Malfunction</i>	
<i>BSI.T.Phys-Manipulation</i>	<i>BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation</i>	
<i>BSI.T.Leak-Forced</i>	<i>BSI.O.Leak-Forced</i>	
<i>BSI.T.Abuse-Func</i>	<i>BSI.O.Abuse-Func</i>	
<i>BSI.T.RND</i>	<i>BSI.O.RND</i>	
<i>AUG1.P.Add-Functions</i>	<i>AUG1.O.Add-Functions</i>	
<i>AUG4.T.Mem-Access</i>	<i>AUG4.O.Mem-Access</i>	

6.3.1 TOE threat "Memory Access Violation"

94 The justification related to the threat "Memory Access Violation, ([AUG4.T.Mem-Access](#))" is as follows:

95 According to [AUG4.O.Mem-Access](#) the TOE must enforce the **dynamic memory segmentation and protection** so that access of software to memory areas is controlled. Any restrictions are to be defined by the **Security IC** Embedded Software. Thereby security violations caused by accidental or deliberate access to restricted data (which may include code) can be prevented (refer to [AUG4.T.Mem-Access](#)). The threat [AUG4.T.Mem-Access](#) is therefore removed if the objective is met.

96 The added objective for the TOE [AUG4.O.Mem-Access](#) does not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives for the TOE.

6.3.2 Organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security Functionality"

97 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Additional Specific Security Functionality, ([AUG1.P.Add-Functions](#))" is as follows:

98 Since [AUG1.O.Add-Functions](#) requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by [AUG1.P.Add-Functions](#), **and in the very same conditions**, the organisational security policy is covered by the objective.

99 Nevertheless the security objectives [BSI.O.Leak-Inherent](#), [BSI.O.Phys-Probing](#), , [BSI.O.Malfunction](#), [BSI.O.Phys-Manipulation](#) and [BSI.O.Leak-Forced](#) define how to implement the specific security functionality required by [AUG1.P.Add-Functions](#). (Note that these objectives support that the specific security functionality is provided in a secure way as expected from [AUG1.P.Add-Functions](#).) Especially [BSI.O.Leak-Inherent](#) and [BSI.O.Leak-Forced](#) refer to the protection of confidential data (User Data or TSF data) in general. User Data are also processed by the specific security functionality required by [AUG1.P.Add-Functions](#).

100 The added objective for the TOE [AUG1.O.Add-Functions](#) does not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives for the TOE.

6.3.3 Organisational security policy "Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software"

101 The justification related to the organisational security policy "Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software, ([P.Controlled-ES-Loading](#))" is as follows:

102 Since [O.Controlled-ES-Loading](#) requires the TOE to implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by [P.Controlled-ES-Loading](#), and in the very same conditions, the organisational security policy is covered by the objective.

103 The added objective for the TOE [O.Controlled-ES-Loading](#) does not introduce any contradiction in the security objectives.

7 Security requirements

104 This chapter on security requirements contains a section on security functional requirements (SFRs) for the TOE ([Section 7.1](#)), a section on security assurance requirements (SARs) for the TOE ([Section 7.2](#)), a section on the refinements of these SARs ([Section 7.3](#)) as required by the "[BSI-PP-0035](#)" Protection Profile. This chapter includes a section with the security requirements rationale ([Section 7.4](#)).

7.1 Security functional requirements for the TOE

105 Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) from the "[BSI-PP-0035](#)" Protection Profile (PP) are drawn from [CCMB-2009-07-002](#), except the following SFRs, that are **extensions** to [CCMB-2009-07-002](#):

- **FCS_RNG** Generation of random numbers,
- **FMT_LIM** Limited capabilities and availability,
- **FAU_SAS** Audit data storage.

The reader can find their certified definitions in the text of the "[BSI-PP-0035](#)" Protection Profile.

106 All extensions to the SFRs of the "[BSI-PP-0035](#)" Protection Profiles (PPs) are **exclusively** drawn from [CCMB-2009-07-002](#).

107 All iterations, assignments, selections, or refinements on SFRs have been performed according to section C.4 of [CCMB-2009-07-001](#). They are easily identified in the following text as they appear **as indicated here**. Note that in order to improve readability, iterations are sometimes expressed within tables.

108 In order to ease the definition and the understanding of these security functional requirements, a simplified presentation of the TOE Security Policy (TSP) is given in the following section.

109 The selected security functional requirements for the TOE, their respective origin and type are summarized in [Table 6](#).

Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE

Label	Title	Addressing	Origin	Type
FRU_FLT.2	Limited fault tolerance	Malfunction	BSI-PP-0035	CCMB-2009-07-002
FPT_FLS.1	Failure with preservation of secure state			

Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE (continued)

Label	Title	Addressing	Origin	Type
FMT_LIM.1 [Test]	Limited capabilities	Abuse of TEST functionality	<i>BSI-PP-0035</i>	Extended
FMT_LIM.2 [Test]	Limited availability			
FMT_LIM.1 [Issuer]	Limited capabilities	Abuse of ISSUER functionality	Security Target Operated	
FMT_LIM.2 [Issuer]	Limited availability			
FAU_SAS.1	Audit storage	Lack of TOE identification	<i>BSI-PP-0035</i> Operated	
FPT_PHP.3	Resistance to physical attack	Physical manipulation & probing	<i>BSI-PP-0035</i>	<i>CCMB-2009-07-002</i>
FDP_ITT.1	Basic internal transfer protection	Leakage		
FPT_ITT.1	Basic internal TSF data transfer protection			
FDP_IFC.1	Subset information flow control			
FCS_RNG.1	Random number generation	Weak cryptographic quality of random numbers	<i>BSI-PP-0035</i> Operated	Extended
FCS_COP.1	Cryptographic operation	Cipher scheme support	<i>AUG #1</i> Operated	<i>CCMB-2009-07-002</i>
FDP_ACC.2 [Memories]	Complete access control	Memory access violation	Security Target Operated	
FDP_ACF.1 [Memories]	Security attribute based access control			
FMT_MSA.3 [Memories]	Static attribute initialisation	Correct operation	<i>AUG #4</i> Operated	
FMT_MSA.1 [Memories]	Management of security attribute			
FMT_SMF.1 [Memories]	Specification of management functions		Security Target Operated	

Table 6. Summary of functional security requirements for the TOE (continued)

Label	Title	Addressing	Origin	Type
FDP_ITC.1 [Loader]	Import of user data without security attributes	User data loading access violation	Security Target Operated	CCMB-2009-07-002
FDP_ACC.1 [Loader]	Subset access control			
FDP_ACF.1 [Loader]	Security attribute based access control			
FMT_MSA.3 [Loader]	Static attribute initialisation	Correct operation		
FMT_MSA.1 [Loader]	Management of security attribute			
FMT_SMF.1 [Loader]	Specification of management functions	Abuse of ISSUER functionality		

7.1.1 Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)

110 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE’s capabilities when the following failures occur: **exposure to operating conditions which are not detected according to the requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1).**

7.1.2 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)

111 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: **exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur.**

112 Refinement:
 The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures for the “circumstances” defined above.
 Regarding application note 15 of [BSI-PP-0035](#), the TOE provides information on the operating conditions monitored during Security IC Embedded Software execution and after a warm reset. No audit requirement is however selected in this Security Target.

7.1.3 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Test]

113 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: Limited capability and availability Policy [Test].

7.1.4 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Test]

114 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced: Limited capability and availability Policy [Test].

115 *SFP_1: Limited capability and availability Policy [Test]*
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no

substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.

7.1.5 Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)

116 The TSF shall provide ***the test process before TOE Delivery*** with the capability to store the ***Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data and/or supplements of the Security IC Embedded Software*** in the ***NVM***.

7.1.6 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)

117 The TSF shall resist ***physical manipulation and physical probing***, to the ***TSF*** by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

118 Refinement:

The TSF will implement appropriate mechanisms to continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TSF can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that security functional requirements are enforced. Hence, "automatic response" means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.

7.1.7 Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1)

119 The TSF shall enforce the ***Data Processing Policy*** to prevent the ***disclosure*** of user data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.

7.1.8 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1)

120 The TSF shall protect TSF data from ***disclosure*** when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

121 Refinement:

The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as separated parts of the TOE.

This requirement is equivalent to FDP_ITT.1 above but refers to TSF data instead of User Data. Therefore, it should be understood as to refer to the same ***Data Processing Policy*** defined under FDP_IFC.1 below.

7.1.9 Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)

122 The TSF shall enforce the ***Data Processing Policy*** on ***all confidential data when they are processed or transferred by the TSF or by the Security IC Embedded Software***.

123 *SFP_2: Data Processing Policy*

User Data and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except when the Security IC Embedded Software decides to communicate the User Data via an external interface. The protection shall be applied to confidential data only but without the distinction of attributes controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software.

7.1.10 Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1)

- 124 The TSF shall provide a *physical* random number generator that implements a **total failure test of the random source**.
- 125 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet **P2 class of BSI-AIS31**.

7.1.11 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)

- 126 The TSF shall perform **the operations in Table 7** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **in Table 7** and cryptographic key sizes **of Table 7** that meet the **standards in Table 7**.

Table 7. FCS_COP.1 iterations (cryptographic operations)

Iteration label	[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]	[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]	[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]	[assignment: list of standards]
EDES	encryption decryption - in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode - in Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode MAC computation in CBC-MAC	Data Encryption Standard (DES)	56 bits	FIPS PUB 46-3 ISO/IEC 9797-1 ISO/IEC 10116
		Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES)	168 bits	

7.1.12 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Memories]

- 127 The TSF shall enforce the **Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy** to provide **minimally protective^(a)** default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
- 128 The TSF shall allow **none** to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
Application note:
The security attributes are the set of access rights currently defined. They are dynamically attached to the subjects and objects locations, i.e. each logical address.

7.1.13 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Memories]

- 129 The TSF shall enforce the **Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy** to restrict the ability to **modify** the security attributes **current set of access rights** to **software running in privileged mode**.

7.1.14 Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2) [Memories]

- 130 The TSF shall enforce the **Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy** on **all subjects (software), all objects (data including code stored in memories)** and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
- 131 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.

a. See the Datasheet referenced in [Section 9](#) for actual values.

7.1.15 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Memories]

- 132 The TSF shall enforce the **Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy** to objects based on the following: **software mode, the object location, the operation to be performed, and the current set of access rights.**
- 133 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **the operation is allowed if and only if the software mode, the object location and the operation matches an entry in the current set of access rights.**
- 134 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none.**
- 135 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **in Issuer or User configuration, any access (read, write, execute) to the OST ROM is denied, and in User configuration, any write access to the ST NVM is denied.**

Note: It should be noted that this level of policy detail is not needed at the application level. The composite Security Target writer should describe the ES access control and information flow control policies instead. Within the ES High Level Design description, the chosen setting of IC security attributes would be shown to implement the described policies relying on the IC SFP presented here.

- 136 The following SFP **Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy** is defined for the requirement "Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)":
- 137 *SFP_3: Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy*
- 138 *The TSF must control read, write, execute accesses of software to data, based on the software mode and on the current set of access rights.*

7.1.16 Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Memories]

- 139 The TSF will be able to perform the following management functions: **modification of the current set of access rights security attributes by software running in privileged mode, supporting the Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy.**

7.1.17 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Issuer]

- 140 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: **Limited capability and availability Policy [Issuer].**

7.1.18 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Issuer]

- 141 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: **Limited capability and availability Policy [Issuer].**
- 142 *SFP_4: Limited capability and availability Policy [Issuer]*
- 143 *Deploying Loading or Final Test Artifacts after TOE Delivery to final user (phase 7 / USER configuration) does not allow User Data to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, stored software to be reconstructed or altered, and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.*

7.1.19 Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1) [Loader]

144 The TSF shall enforce the **Loading Access Control Policy** when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.

145 The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the User data when imported from outside of the TOE.

146 The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside of the TOE:

- **the integrity of the loaded user data is checked at the end of each loading session,**
- **the loaded user data is received encrypted, internally decrypted, then stored into the NVM.**

7.1.20 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader]

147 The TSF shall enforce the **Loading Access Control Policy** to provide **restrictive** default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

148 The TSF shall allow **none** to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

7.1.21 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader]

149 The TSF shall enforce the **Loading Access Control Policy** to restrict the ability to **modify** the security attributes **password** to **the Standard Loader**.

7.1.22 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [Loader]

150 The TSF shall enforce the **Loading Access Control Policy** on **the execution of the Standard Loader instructions and/or the Advanced Loader instructions**.

7.1.23 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Loader]

151 The TSF shall enforce the **Loading Access Control Policy** to objects based on the following: **an external process may execute the Standard Loader instructions and/or the Advanced Loader instructions, depending on the presentation of valid passwords.**

152 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **the Standard Loader instructions and/or Advanced Loader instructions can be executed only if valid passwords have been presented.**

153 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none.**

154 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none.**

155 The following SFP **Loading Access Control Policy** is defined for the requirement "Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)":

156 **SFP_5: Loading Access Control Policy**

157 According to the value of the presented password, the TSF grants execution of the instructions of the Standard Loader, Advanced Loader or none.

7.1.24 Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Loader]

158 The TSF will be able to perform the following management functions: **modification of the Standard Loader behaviour, by the Advanced Loader, under the Loading Access Control Policy.**

7.2 TOE security assurance requirements

159 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE for the evaluation of the TOE are those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) and augmented by taking the following components:

- [ALC_DVS.2](#) and [AVA_VAN.5](#).

160 Regarding application note 21 of [BSI-PP-0035](#), the continuously increasing maturity level of evaluations of Security ICs justifies the selection of a higher-level assurance package.

161 The set of security assurance requirements (SARs) is presented in [Table 8](#), indicating the origin of the requirement.

Table 8. TOE security assurance requirements

Label	Title	Origin
ADV_ARC.1	Security architecture description	EAL5/ BSI-PP-0035
ADV_FSP.5	Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information	EAL5
ADV_IMP.1	Implementation representation of the TSF	EAL5/ BSI-PP-0035
ADV_INT.2	Well-structured internals	EAL5
ADV_TDS.4	Semiformal modular design	EAL5
AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance	EAL5/ BSI-PP-0035
AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures	EAL5/ BSI-PP-0035
ALC_CMC.4	Production support, acceptance procedures and automation	EAL5/ BSI-PP-0035
ALC_CMS.5	Development tools CM coverage	EAL5
ALC_DEL.1	Delivery procedures	EAL5/ BSI-PP-0035
ALC_DVS.2	Sufficiency of security measures	BSI-PP-0035
ALC_LCD.1	Developer defined life-cycle model	EAL5/ BSI-PP-0035
ALC_TAT.2	Compliance with implementation standards	EAL5
ATE_COV.2	Analysis of coverage	EAL5/ BSI-PP-0035
ATE_DPT.3	Testing: modular design	EAL5
ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing	EAL5/ BSI-PP-0035
ATE_IND.2	Independent testing - sample	EAL5/ BSI-PP-0035
AVA_VAN.5	Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis	BSI-PP-0035

7.3 Refinement of the security assurance requirements

- 162 As [BSI-PP-0035](#) defines refinements for selected SARs, these refinements are also claimed in this Security Target.
- 163 The main customizing is that the IC Dedicated Software is an operational part of the TOE after delivery, although it is not available to the user.
- 164 Regarding application note 22 of [BSI-PP-0035](#), the refinements for all the assurance families have been reviewed for the hierarchically higher-level assurance components selected in this Security Target.
- 165 The text of the impacted refinements of [BSI-PP-0035](#) is reproduced in the next sections.
- 166 For reader's ease, an impact summary is provided in [Table 9](#).

Table 9. Impact of EAL5 selection on [BSI-PP-0035](#) refinements

Assurance Family	BSI-PP-0035 Level	ST Level	Impact on refinement
ADO_DEL	1	1	None
ALC_DVS	2	2	None
ALC_CMS	4	5	None, refinement is still valid
ALC_CMC	4	4	None
ADV_ARC	1	1	None
ADV_FSP	4	5	Presentation style changes, IC Dedicated Software is included
ADV_IMP	1	1	None
ATE_COV	2	2	IC Dedicated Software is included
AGD_OPE	1	1	None
AGD_PRE	1	1	None
AVA_VAN	5	5	None

7.3.1 Refinement regarding functional specification (ADV_FSP)

- 167 ~~Although the IC Dedicated Test Software is a part of the TOE, the test functions of the IC Dedicated Test Software are not described in the Functional Specification because the IC Dedicated Test Software is considered as a test tool delivered with the TOE but not providing security functions for the operational phase of the TOE. The IC Dedicated Software provides security functionalities as soon as the TOE becomes operational (boot software). These are properly identified in the delivered documentation.~~
- 168 The Functional Specification **refers to datasheet to** trace security features that do not provide any external interface but that contribute to fulfil the SFRs e.g. like physical protection. Thereby they are part of the complete instantiation of the SFRs.
- 169 The Functional Specification **refers to design specifications to detail the** mechanisms against physical attacks **described** in a more general way only, but detailed enough to be able to support Test Coverage Analysis also for those mechanisms where inspection of the layout is of relevance or tests beside the TSFI may be needed.

- 170 The Functional Specification *refers to data sheet to* specify operating conditions of the TOE. These conditions include but are not limited to the frequency of the clock, the power supply, and the temperature.
- 171 All functions and mechanisms which control access to the functions provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software (refer to the security functional requirement (FMT_LIM.2)) **are part of the** Functional Specification. Details will be given in the document for ADV_ARC, ~~refer to Section 6.2.1.5.~~ In addition, all these functions and mechanisms **are** subsequently be refined according to all relevant requirements of the Common Criteria assurance class ADV because these functions and mechanisms are active after TOE Delivery and need to be part of the assurance aspects Tests (class ATE) and Vulnerability Assessment (class AVA). Therefore, all necessary information **is** provided to allow tests and vulnerability assessment.
- 172 Since the selected higher-level assurance component requires a security functional specification presented in a “semi-formal style” (ADV_FSP.5.2C) the changes affect the style of description, the *BSI-PP-0035* refinements can be applied with changes covering the IC Dedicated Test Software and are valid for ADV_FSP.5.

7.3.2 Refinement regarding test coverage (ATE_COV)

- 173 The TOE **is** tested under different operating conditions within the specified ranges. These conditions include but are not limited to the frequency of the clock, the power supply, and the temperature. This means that “Fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)” **is** proven for the complete TSF. The tests ~~must~~ also cover functions which may be affected by “ageing” (such as EEPROM writing).
- 174 The existence and effectiveness of measures against physical attacks (as specified by the functional requirement FPT_PHP.3) cannot be tested in a straightforward way. Instead **STMicroelectronics provides** evidence that the TOE actually has the particular physical characteristics (especially layout design principles). This **is** done by checking the layout (implementation or actual) in an appropriate way. The required evidence pertains to the existence of mechanisms against physical attacks (unless being obvious).
- 175 ~~The IC Dedicated Test Software is seen as a “test tool” being delivered as part of the TOE. However, the Test Features do not provide security functionality. Therefore, Test Features need not to be covered by the Test Coverage Analysis but all functions and mechanisms which limit the capability of the functions (cf. FMT_LIM.1) and control access to the functions (cf. FMT_LIM.2) provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software must be part of the Test Coverage Analysis. The IC Dedicated Software provides security functionalities as soon as the TOE becomes operational (boot software). These are part of the Test Coverage Analysis.~~

7.4 Security Requirements rationale

7.4.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements

- 176 Just as for the security objectives rationale of *Section 6.3*, the main line of this rationale is that the inclusion of all the security requirements of the *BSI-PP-0035* protection profile, together with those in *AUG*, and with those introduced in this Security Target, guarantees that all the security objectives identified in *Section 6* are suitably addressed by the security requirements stated in this chapter, and that the latter together form an internally consistent whole.

- 177 As origins of security objectives have been carefully kept in their labelling, and origins of security requirements have been carefully identified in [Table 6](#) and [Table 8](#), it can be verified that the justifications provided by the [BSI-PP-0035](#) protection profile and [AUG](#) can just be carried forward to their union.
- 178 From [Table 4](#), it is straightforward to identify two additional security objectives for the TOE ([AUG1.O.Add-Functions](#) and [AUG4.O.Mem-Access](#)) tracing back to [AUG](#), and one additional objective ([O.Controlled-ES-Loading](#)) introduced in this Security Target. This rationale must show that security requirements suitably address these three.
- 179 Furthermore, a more careful observation of the requirements listed in [Table 6](#) and [Table 8](#) shows that:
- there are additional security requirements introduced by this Security Target ([FMT_LIM.1 \[Issuer\]](#), [FMT_LIM.2 \[Issuer\]](#), [FDP_ITC.1 \[Loader\]](#), [FDP_ACC.1 \[Loader\]](#), [FDP_ACF.1 \[Loader\]](#), [FMT_MSA.3 \[Loader\]](#), [FMT_MSA.1 \[Loader\]](#), [FMT_SMF.1 \[Loader\]](#), and [FMT_SMF.1 \[Memories\]](#), and various assurance requirements of EAL5),
 - there are security requirements introduced from [AUG](#) ([FCS_COP.1](#), [FDP_ACC.2 \[Memories\]](#), [FDP_ACF.1 \[Memories\]](#), [FMT_MSA.3 \[Memories\]](#) and [FMT_MSA.1 \[Memories\]](#)).
- 180 Though it remains to show that:
- security objectives from this Security Target and from [AUG](#) are addressed by security requirements stated in this chapter,
 - additional security requirements from this Security Target and from [AUG](#) are mutually supportive with the security requirements from the [BSI-PP-0035](#) protection profile, and they do not introduce internal contradictions,
 - all dependencies are still satisfied.
- 181 The justification that the additional security objectives are suitably addressed, that the additional security requirements are mutually supportive and that, together with those already in [BSI-PP-0035](#), they form an internally consistent whole, is provided in the next subsections.

7.4.2 Additional security objectives are suitably addressed

Security objective “Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control ([AUG4.O.Mem-Access](#))”

- 182 The justification related to the security objective “**Dynamic** Area based Memory Access Control ([AUG4.O.Mem-Access](#))” is as follows:
- 183 The security functional requirements “**Complete access control** ([FDP_ACC.2 \[Memories\]](#))” **and** “**Security attribute based access control** ([FDP_ACF.1 \[Memories\]](#))”, with the related Security Function Policy (SFP) “**Dynamic Memory Access Control Policy**” exactly require to implement a **Dynamic** area based memory access control as demanded by [AUG4.O.Mem-Access](#). Therefore, [FDP_ACC.2 \[Memories\]](#) **and** [FDP_ACF.1 \[Memories\]](#) with **their** SFP **are** suitable to meet the security objective.
- 184 The security functional requirement “**Static attribute initialisation** ([FMT_MSA.3 \[Memories\]](#))” requires that the TOE provides default values for security attributes. The ability to update the security attributes is restricted to privileged subject(s) **as further detailed in the security functional requirement** “**Management of security attributes** ([FMT_MSA.1 \[Memories\]](#))”. These management functions ensure that the required access control can be realised using the functions provided by the TOE.

Security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality (*AUG1.O.Add-Functions*)”

185 The justification related to the security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality (*AUG1.O.Add-Functions*)” is as follows:

186 The security functional requirements “*Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)*” exactly require those functions to be implemented that are demanded by *AUG1.O.Add-Functions*. Therefore, *FCS_COP.1* is suitable to meet the security objective.

Security objective “Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software (*O.Controlled-ES-Loading*)”

187 The justification related to the security objective “Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software (*O.Controlled-ES-Loading*)” is as follows:

188 The security functional requirements “*Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1) [Loader]*”, “*Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [Loader]*” and “*Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Loader]*”, with the related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Loading Access Control Policy” exactly require to implement a controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software as demanded by *O.Controlled-ES-Loading*. Therefore, *FDP_ITC.1 [Loader]*, *FDP_ACC.1 [Loader]* and *FDP_ACF.1 [Loader]* with their SFP are suitable to meet the security objective.

189 The security functional requirement “*Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader]*” requires that the TOE provides default values for security attributes. The ability to update the security attributes is restricted to privileged subject(s) as further detailed in the security functional requirement “*Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader]*”. The security functional requirement “*Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Loader]*” provides additional controlled facility for adapting the loader behaviour to the user’s needs. These management functions ensure that the required access control, associated to the loading feature, can be realised using the functions provided by the TOE.

7.4.3 Additional security requirements are consistent

“Cryptographic operation (*FCS_COP.1*)”

190 This security requirement has already been argued in *Section : Security objective “Additional Specific Security Functionality (*AUG1.O.Add-Functions*)”* above.

“Static attribute initialisation (*FMT_MSA.3 [Memories]*), Management of security attributes (*FMT_MSA.1 [Memories]*), Complete access control (*FDP_ACC.2 [Memories]*), Security attribute based access control (*FDP_ACF.1 [Memories]*)”

191 These security requirements have already been argued in *Section : Security objective “Dynamic Area based Memory Access Control (*AUG4.O.Mem-Access*)”* above.

**"Import of user data without security attribute ([FDP_ITC.1 \[Loader\]](#)),
 Static attribute initialisation ([FMT_MSA.3 \[Loader\]](#)),
 Management of security attributes ([FMT_MSA.1 \[Loader\]](#)),
 Subset access control ([FDP_ACC.1 \[Loader\]](#)),
 Security attribute based access control ([FDP_ACF.1 \[Loader\]](#)),
 Specification of management function ([FMT_SMF.1 \[Loader\]](#))"**

192 These security requirements have already been argued in [Section : Security objective "Controlled loading of the Security IC Embedded Software \(O.Controlled-ES-Loading\)"](#) above.

7.4.4 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements

193 All dependencies of Security Functional Requirements have been fulfilled in this Security Target except :

- those justified in the [BSI-PP-0035](#) protection profile security requirements rationale,
- those justified in [AUG](#) security requirements rationale (except on [FMT_MSA.2](#), see discussion below),
- the dependency of [FCS_COP.1](#) on [FCS_CKM.4](#) (see discussion below).
- the dependency of [FMT_MSA.1 \[Loader\]](#) and [FMT_MSA.3 \[Loader\]](#) on [FMT_SMR.1](#) (see discussion below).

194 Details are provided in [Table 10](#) below.

Table 10. Dependencies of security functional requirements

Label	Dependencies	Fulfilled by security requirements in this Security Target	Dependency already in BSI-PP-0035 or in AUG
FRU_FLT.2	FPT_FLS.1	Yes	Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FPT_FLS.1	None	No dependency	Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.1 [Test]	FMT_LIM.2 [Test]	Yes	Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.2 [Test]	FMT_LIM.1 [Test]	Yes	Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.1 [Issuer]	FMT_LIM.2 [Issuer]	Yes	Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FMT_LIM.2 [Issuer]	FMT_LIM.1 [Issuer]	Yes	Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FAU_SAS.1	None	No dependency	Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FPT_PHP.3	None	No dependency	Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FDP_ITT.1	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	Yes	Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FPT_ITT.1	None	No dependency	Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFF.1	No, see BSI-PP-0035	Yes, BSI-PP-0035
FCS_RNG.1	None	No dependency	Yes, BSI-PP-0035

Table 10. Dependencies of security functional requirements (continued)

Label	Dependencies	Fulfilled by security requirements in this Security Target	Dependency already in <i>BSI-PP-0035</i> or in <i>AUG</i>
FCS_COP.1	[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1]	Yes, by FDP_ITC.1, see discussion below	Yes, <i>AUG #1</i>
	FCS_CKM.4	No, see discussion below	
FDP_ACC.2 [Memories]	FDP_ACF.1 [Memories]	Yes	No , <i>CCMB-2009-07-002</i>
FDP_ACF.1 [Memories]	FDP_ACC.1 [Memories]	Yes, by FDP_ACC.2 [Memories]	Yes, <i>AUG #4</i>
	FMT_MSA.3 [Memories]	Yes	
FMT_MSA.3 [Memories]	FMT_MSA.1 [Memories]	Yes	Yes, <i>AUG #4</i>
	FMT_SMR.1 [Memories]	No, see <i>AUG #4</i>	
FMT_MSA.1 [Memories]	[FDP_ACC.1 [Memories] or FDP_IFC.1]	Yes, by FDP_ACC.2 [Memories] and FDP_IFC.1	Yes, <i>AUG #4</i>
	FMT_SMF.1 [Memories]	Yes	No , <i>CCMB-2009-07-002</i>
	FMT_SMR.1 [Memories]	No, see <i>AUG #4</i>	Yes, <i>AUG #4</i>
FMT_SMF.1 [Memories]	None	No dependency	No , <i>CCMB-2009-07-002</i>
FMT_ITC.1 [Loader]	[FDP_ACC.1 [Loader] or FDP_IFC.1]	Yes	No , <i>CCMB-2009-07-002</i>
	FMT_MSA.3 [Loader]	Yes	
FDP_ACC.1 [Loader]	FDP_ACF.1 [Loader]	Yes	No , <i>CCMB-2009-07-002</i>
FDP_ACF.1 [Loader]	FDP_ACC.1 [Loader]	Yes	No , <i>CCMB-2009-07-002</i>
	FMT_MSA.3 [Loader]	Yes	
FMT_MSA.3 [Loader]	FMT_MSA.1 [Loader]	Yes	No , <i>CCMB-2009-07-002</i>
	FMT_SMR.1 [Loader]	No, see discussion below	
FMT_MSA.1 [Loader]	[FDP_ACC.1 [Loader] or FDP_IFC.1]	Yes	No , <i>CCMB-2009-07-002</i>
	FDP_SMF.1 [Loader]	Yes	
	FDP_SMR.1 [Loader]	No, see discussion below	
FDP_SMF.1 [Loader]	None	No dependency	No , <i>CCMB-2009-07-002</i>

- 195 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of "[Cryptographic operation \(FCS_COP.1\)](#)" on "Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1)" or "Import of user data with security attributes (FDP_ITC.2)" or "Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)". In this particular TOE, "[Import of user data without security attributes \(FDP_ITC.1\) \[Loader\]](#)" may be used for the purpose of creating cryptographic keys, but also, the ES has all possibilities to implement its own creation function, in conformance with its security policy.
- 196 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of "[Cryptographic operation \(FCS_COP.1\)](#)" on "Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)". In this particular TOE, there is no specific function for the destruction of the keys. The ES has all possibilities to implement its own destruction function, in conformance with its security policy. Therefore, FCS_CKM.4 is not defined in this ST.
- 197 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of "[Management of security attributes \(FMT_MSA.1\) \[Loader\]](#)" and "[Static attribute initialisation \(FMT_MSA.3\) \[Loader\]](#)" on "Security roles (FMT_SMR.1) [Loader]". This dependency is considered to be satisfied, because the access control defined for the loader is not role-based but enforced for each subject. Therefore, there is no need to identify roles in form of a Security Functional Requirement "FMT_SMR.1".

7.4.5 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements

Security assurance requirements added to reach EAL5 ([Table 8](#))

- 198 Regarding application note 21 of [BSI-PP-0035](#), this Security Target chooses EAL5 because developers and users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.
- 199 EAL5 represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL4 by requiring semiformal design descriptions, a more structured (and hence analyzable) architecture, and improved mechanisms and/or procedures that provide confidence that the TOE will not be tampered during development.
- 200 The assurance components in an evaluation assurance level (EAL) are chosen in a way that they build a mutually supportive and complete set of components. The requirements chosen for augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the corresponding requirements contained in EAL5. Therefore, these components add additional assurance to EAL5, but the mutual support of the requirements and the internal consistency is still guaranteed.
- 201 Note that detailed and updated refinements for assurance requirements are given in [Section 7.3](#).

Dependencies of assurance requirements

- 202 Dependencies of security assurance requirements are fulfilled by the EAL5 package selection.
- 203 Augmentation to this package are identified in paragraph [159](#) and do not introduce dependencies not already satisfied by the EAL5 package.

8 TOE summary specification

204 This section demonstrates how the TOE meets each Security Functional Requirement, which will be further detailed in the ADV_FSP documents.

205 The complete TOE summary specification has been presented and evaluated in the ST/SA/SB33F1M Security Target.

206 For confidentiality reasons, the TOE summary specification is not fully reproduced here.

8.1 Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2)

207 The TSF provides limited fault tolerance, by managing a certain number of faults or errors that may happen, related to memory contents, CPU, random number generation and cryptographic operations, thus preventing risk of malfunction.

8.2 Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)

208 The TSF provides preservation of secure state by detecting and managing the following events, resulting in an immediate reset:

- Die integrity violation detection,
- Errors on memories,
- Glitches,
- High voltage supply,
- CPU errors,
- MPU errors,
- External clock incorrect frequency,
- etc..

209 The ES can generate a software reset.

8.3 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Test]

210 The TSF ensures that only very limited test capabilities are available in USER configuration, in accordance with SFP_1: Limited capability and availability Policy [Test].

8.4 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1) [Issuer]

211 The TSF ensures that the Secure Flash Loader and the final test capabilities are unavailable in USER configuration, in accordance with SFP_4: Limited capability and availability Policy [Issuer].

8.5 Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2) [Test] & [Issuer]

212 The TOE is either in TEST, ISSUER or USER configuration.

- 213 The only authorised TOE configuration modifications are:
- TEST to ISSUER configuration,
 - TEST to USER configuration,
 - ISSUER to USER configuration.
- 214 The TSF ensures the switching and the control of TOE configuration.
- 215 The TSF reduces the available features depending on the TOE configuration.

8.6 Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)

- 216 In Issuer configuration, the TOE provides commands to store data and/or pre-personalisation data and/or supplements of the ES in the NVM. These commands are only available to authorized processes, and only until phase 6.

8.7 Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)

- 217 The TSF ensures resistance to physical tampering, thanks to the following features:
- The TOE implements counter-measures that reduce the exploitability of physical probing.
 - The TOE is physically protected by an active shield that commands an automatic reaction on die integrity violation detection.

8.8 Basic internal transfer protection (FDP_ITT.1), Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT_ITT.1) & Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)

- 218 The TSF prevents the disclosure of internal and user data thanks to:
- Memories scrambling and encryption,
 - Bus encryption,
 - Mechanisms for operation execution concealment,
 - etc..

8.9 Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1)

- 219 The TSF provides 8-bit true random numbers that can be qualified with the test metrics required by the BSI-AIS31 standard for a P2 class device.

8.10 Cryptographic operation: DES / 3DES operation (FCS_COP.1 [EDES])

- 220 The TOE provides an EDES accelerator that has the capability to perform DES and Triple DES encryption and decryption conformant to [FIPS PUB 46-3](#).

221 The EDES accelerator offers a Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode conformant to [ISO/IEC 10116](#), and a Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) mode conformant to [ISO/IEC 9797-1](#).

8.11 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Memories]

222 The TOE enforces a default memory protection policy when none other is programmed by the ES.

8.12 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Memories] & Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Memories]

223 The TOE provides a dynamic Memory Protection Unit (MPU), that can be configured by the ES.

8.13 Complete access control (FDP_ACC.2) [Memories] & Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Memories]

224 The TOE enforces the dynamic memory protection policy for data access and code access thanks to a dynamic Memory Protection Unit (MPU), programmed by the ES. Overriding the MPU set of access rights, the TOE enforces additional protections on specific parts of the memories.

8.14 Import of user data without security attributes (FDP_ITC.1) [Loader]

225 In Issuer configuration, the System Firmware provides the capability of securely loading user data into the NVM (Secure Flash Loader). The ciphered data is automatically decrypted, before installation in the NVM. The integrity of the loaded data is systematically checked, and the integrity of the NVM can also be checked by the ES.

8.15 Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3) [Loader]

226 In Issuer configuration, the System Firmware provides restrictive default values for the Flash Loader security attributes.

8.16 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) [Loader] & Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1) [Loader]

227 In Issuer configuration, the System Firmware provides the capability to change part of the Flash Loader security attributes, only once in the product lifecycle.

8.17 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) [Loader] & Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) [Loader]

228 In Issuer configuration, the System Firmware grants access to the Flash Loader functions, only after presentation of the required valid passwords.

9 References

229 Protection Profile references

Component description	Reference	Revision
Security IC Platform Protection Profile	BSI-PP-0035	1.0

230 Sx33F1M Security Target reference

Component description	Reference
ST/SA/SB33F1M Security Target	SMD_SB33F1M_ST_09_001

231 Target of Evaluation referenced documents

232 For security reasons, all these documents are classified and their applicable revisions are referenced in the ST/SA/SB33F1M Documentation Report.

Component description	Reference
ST/SA/SB33F1M Documentation Report	SMD_ST33F1M_DR_09_001

233 Standards references

Ref	Identifier	Description
[1]	BSI-AIS31	A proposal for Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for true (physical) random number generators, W. Killmann & W. Schindler BSI, Version 3.1, 25-09-2001
[2]	FIPS PUB 46-3	FIPS PUB 46-3, Data encryption standard (DES), National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999
[3]	FIPS PUB 140-2	FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999
[4]	FIPS PUB 180-1	FIPS PUB 180-1 Secure Hash Standard, National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1995
[5]	FIPS PUB 180-2	FIPS PUB 180-2 Secure Hash Standard with Change Notice 1 dated February 25, 2004, National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.A., 2004
[6]	FIPS PUB 186	FIPS PUB 186 Digital Signature Standard (DSS), National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.A., 1994
[7]	FIPS PUB 197	FIPS PUB 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, November 2001
[8]	ISO/IEC 9796-2	ISO/IEC 9796, Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature scheme giving message recovery - Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms, ISO, 2002

Ref	Identifier	Description
[9]	ISO/IEC 9797-1	ISO/IEC 9797, Information technology - Security techniques - Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, ISO, 1999
[10]	ISO/IEC 10116	ISO/IEC 10116, Information technology - Security techniques - Modes of operation of an n-bit block cipher algorithm, ISO, 1997
[11]	ISO/IEC 10118-3:1998	ISO/IEC 10118-3:1998, Information technology - Security techniques - Hash functions - Part 3: Dedicated hash functions
[12]	ISO/IEC 14888	ISO/IEC 14888, Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signatures with appendix - Part 1: General (1998), Part 2: Identity-based mechanisms (1999), Part 3: Certificate based mechanisms (2006), ISO
[13]	CCMB-2009-07-001	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction and general model, July 2009, version 3.1 Revision 3
[14]	CCMB-2009-07-002	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security functional components, July 2009, version 3.1 Revision 3
[15]	CCMB-2009-07-003	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security assurance components, July 2009, version 3.1 Revision 3
[16]	AUG	Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, Atmel, Hitachi Europe, Infineon Technologies, Philips Semiconductors, Version 1.0, March 2002.
[17]	MIT/LCS/TR-212	On digital signatures and public key cryptosystems, Rivest, Shamir & Adleman Technical report MIT/LCS/TR-212, MIT Laboratory for computer sciences, January 1979
[18]	IEEE 1363-2000	IEEE 1363-2000, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography, IEEE, 2000
[19]	IEEE 1363a-2004	IEEE 1363a-2004, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography - Amendment 1:Additional techniques, IEEE, 2004
[20]	PKCS #1 V2.1	PKCS #1 V2.1 RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June 2002
[21]	MOV 97	Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, CRC Press, 1997

Appendix A Glossary

A.1 Terms

Authorised user

A user who may, in accordance with the TSP, perform an operation.

Composite product

Security IC product which includes the Security Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and the Embedded Software and is evaluated as composite target of evaluation.

End-consumer

User of the Composite Product in Phase 7.

Integrated Circuit (IC)

Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.

IC Dedicated Software

IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC (also known as IC firmware) and developed by **ST**. Such software is required for testing purpose (IC Dedicated Test Software) but may provide additional services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support Software).

IC Dedicated Test Software

That part of the IC Dedicated Software which is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.

IC developer

Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC development.

IC manufacturer

Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC manufacturing, testing, and pre-personalization.

IC packaging manufacturer

Institution (or its agent) responsible for the IC packaging and testing.

Initialisation data

Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to identify the TOE and to keep track of the Security IC's production and further life-cycle phases are considered as belonging to the TSF data. These data are for instance used for traceability and for TOE identification (identification data)

Object

An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.

Packaged IC

Security IC embedded in a physical package such as micromodules, DIPs, SOICs or TQFPs.

Pre-personalization data

Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). These data are for instance used for traceability and/or to secure shipment between phases.

Secret

Information that must be known only to authorised users and/or the TSF in order to enforce a specific SFP.

Security IC

Composition of the TOE, the Security IC Embedded Software, User Data, and the package.

Security IC Embedded Software (ES)

Software embedded in the Security IC and not developed by the IC designer. The Security IC Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the Security IC in Phase 3.

Security IC embedded software (ES) developer

Institution (or its agent) responsible for the security IC embedded software development and the specification of IC pre-personalization requirements, if any.

Security attribute

Information associated with subjects, users and/or objects that is used for the enforcement of the TSP.

Sensitive information

Any information identified as a security relevant element of the TOE such as:

- the application data of the TOE (such as IC pre-personalization requirements, IC and system specific data),
- the security IC embedded software,
- the IC dedicated software,
- the IC specification, design, development tools and technology.

Smartcard

A card according to ISO 7816 requirements which has a non volatile memory and a processing unit embedded within it.

Subject

An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.

Test features

All features and functions (implemented by the IC Dedicated Software and/or hardware) which are designed to be used before TOE Delivery only and delivered as part of the TOE.

TOE Delivery

The period when the TOE is delivered which is after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) *in this Security target*.

TSF data

Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE.

User

Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.

User data

All data managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software in the application context. User data comprise all data in the final Smartcard IC except the TSF data.

A.2 Abbreviations

Table 11. List of abbreviations

Term	Meaning
AIS	Application notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (BSI)
ALU	Arithmetical and Logical Unit.
BSI	Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining.
CBC-MAC	Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code.
CC	Common Criteria Version 3.1.
CPU	Central Processing Unit.
CRC	Cyclic Redundancy Check.
DCSSI	Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information
DES	Data Encryption Standard.
DIP	Dual-In-Line Package.
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level.
ECB	Electronic Code Book.
EDES	Enhanced DES.
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory.
ES	Security IC Embedded SoftWare.
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard.
I/O	Input / Output.
IC	Integrated Circuit.
ISO	International Standards Organisation.
IT	Information Technology.
MPU	Memory Protection Unit.
NESCRYPT	Next Step Cryptography Accelerator.
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology.
NVM	Non Volatile Memory.
OSP	Organisational Security Policy.
OST	Operating System for Test.
PP	Protection Profile.
PUB	Publication Series.
RAM	Random Access Memory.
RF	Radio Frequency.
RF UART	Radio Frequency Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter.
ROM	Read Only Memory.

Table 11. List of abbreviations (continued)

Term	Meaning
RSA	Rivest, Shamir & Adleman.
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement.
SFP	Security Function Policy.
SFR	Security Functional Requirement.
SOIC	Small Outline IC.
ST	Context dependent : STMicroelectronics or Security Target .
TOE	Target of Evaluation .
TQFP	Thin Quad Flat Package.
TRNG	True Random Number Generator.
TSC	TSF Scope of Control .
TSF	TOE Security Functionality .
TSFI	TSF Interface.
TSP	TOE Security Policy.
TSS	TOE Summary Specification.

10 Revision history

Table 12. Document revision history

Date	Revision	Changes
04-May-2010	01.00	Initial release.

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